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COMMISSIONER’S INTRODUCTION
 While I was regional director of the Lower Colorado Region in Boulder 
City, it was a great pleasure to be the executive sponsor of Reclamation’s Centennial 
activities.  This is one of the last of these activities to reach fruition.  Commissioner 
John W. Keys III and I opened the history symposium the day after the Water for the 
West Foundation sponsored a spectacular birthday party for Reclamation at Hoover 
Dam.
 The Bureau of Reclamation has a grand tradition of which I have been part 
since 1975 when I started work in the regional offi ce in Sacramento.  Reclamation’s 
history closely parallels that of the development of the twentieth century American 
West.  Reclamation was established in 1902 by President Theodore Roosevelt to 
“make the desert bloom.”  Reclamation projects have been the seed for many of 
the modern American West’s large agricultural and metropolitan centers.  I have 
watched completion of the Central Arizona Project and seen its effect on growth in 
Valley of the Sun communities.
Today, Reclamation provides one out of fi ve Western farmers with water for 10 mil-
lion irrigated acres.  These farmlands produce sixty percent of the nation’s vegeta-
bles and twenty-fi ve percent of its fruits and nuts.  We are the largest electric utility 
in the seventeen western states (operating 58 hydropower plants) and the nation’s 
largest wholesale water supplier, administering 348 reservoirs with a total storage 
capacity of 245 million acre-feet.  Nearly 30 million people all over the West depend 
on Reclamation projects for their municipal, industrial, and domestic water supplies. 
Throughout its history, Reclamation has been an innovator in the engineering and 
science of dam design and construction, hydroelectric power production and deliv-
ery, water delivery, conservation, and multipurpose uses of water.  Reclamation’s 
masonry dams represent a distinguished lineage and include many landmarks of the 
West: East Park, Pathfi nder, Buffalo Bill, Arrowrock, Owyhee, Hoover, Grand Cou-
lee, Shasta, Friant, and Morrow Point are only the highlights of the list.  Reclama-
tion’s embankment dams follow an equally distinguished lineage and include Belle 
Fourche, Anderson Ranch, and San Luis.
Reclamation’s history is a rich tapestry fi lled 
with the politics, colorful personalities, and the 
unique character of the West.  It is marked by en-
gineering accomplishments and economic growth 
woven into the tapestry of western water devel-
opment and delivery.  These essays prepared for 
Reclamation’s history symposium in 2002 add 
new dimensions to the story of Reclamation.
    Robert W. Johnson
    Commissioner
    Bureau of Reclamation
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SENIOR HISTORIAN’S INTRODUCTION
On June18-19, 2002, the Bureau of Reclamation and Department of 
History at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, hosted a symposium on the 
history of Reclamation.  The symposium was held in conjunction with the 
Bureau’s centennial anniversary birthday party at Hoover Dam the afternoon and 
evening of June 17, and Dr. Andrew Kirk and Ms. Mary Wammack made the local 
arrangements at UNLV.
Reclamation’s commissioner and executive staff from about 1992 
forward supported centennial activities planned by the committee I chaired 
for Reclamation, including publication of these papers.  Various issues have 
prevented preparation of this publication until several years after the symposium 
was held.  In particular, commissioners Dennis Underwood, Daniel Beard, 
Eluid Martinez, John W. Keys III, and Bob Johnson and other executive staff 
such as Margaret Sibley, Elizabeth Harrison, and Roseann Gonzales have been 
very supportive of the history program and this publication.  The support of 
my supervisors, Richard Rizzi and Ronald (Rusty) W. Schuster, was also very 
important to the success of these activities.
The proposed papers for the history symposium were vetted through a peer 
review group consisting of James Corbridge of the University of Colorado School 
of Law, Patricia N. Limerick of the University of Colorado, Toni Rae Linenberger 
of Reclamation, Donald J. Pisani of the University of Oklahoma, William D. 
Rowley of the University of Nevada-Reno, Wm. Joe Simonds of Reclamation, 
and me.  In addition, Larry Walkoviak reviewed proposals for papers from an 
internal Reclamation perspective and provided comments on the proposals.
It was always the intent of the planning to embrace a broad range of 
ideologies, attitudes, and interpretations of Reclamation’s history, and neither I 
nor the Bureau of Reclamation nor the members of the peer review committee 
necessarily agree with, or in any way endorse, the authors’ selection of data or 
their interpretation of that data.
I consulted two noted, veteran, western history editors, Dr. Maxine 
Benson and Dr. Judith Austin, about how to approach this collection of papers.  
As a result, it has been my choice as editor to avoid trying to homogenize each 
symposium paper to uniform format, writing, and endnote styles.  Instead, each 
author’s work is permitted to show differences of professional training, endnote 
style, and writing style.  Generally we have tried to use dictionary guidance for 
spelling and for a few stylistic issues have gratefully used the guidance of The
Chicago Manual of Style’s fi fteenth edition.  Among a few other items of which 
the reader might wish to be aware are the following standards we have tried to 
follow:
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quotations, notwithstanding our few efforts at $
standardization, were not altered, except that quotations of 
three or more lines were separated from text and double-
indented with quotation marks removed;
quotations were not checked for accuracy by the editor;$
no U.S. Postal Service or other abbreviations for states were $
used outside quotations; no abbreviations for months were 
used outside quotations; 
we used abbreviations for footnote and bibliography entries $
only when they are standard to the publication cited;
we used the convention of  “U.S.” with no space between $
the letters while placing a space between letters for the 
initials of names, e.g., R. F. Walter;
and, except in the more technically-oriented papers, where $
we have adhered to the conventions of the authors, we 
normally spelled out numbers under 100 and used numerals 
for 100 and over.
Because of the lapse of time between the symposium and this publication, 
some of the authors have placed their papers in other locations.  When those 
other publications vary signifi cantly from the original manuscript, we have 
also published the symposium original.  All author-reported publications 
incorporating signifi cant portions of the original symposium paper are listed 
in the “Bibliography of Papers Published in Other Locations.”  The remaining 
papers are presented in this publication, and we appreciate the authors’ continuing 
assistance to us.  These papers represent a tremendous amount of labor in terms 
of research and writing, and we are pleased that the history program is now 
able, through the support of Commissioner Robert W. Johnson, to provide this 
information to those interested in Reclamation’s history.
To bring some order to the presentation of these essays, I felt it necessary 
to group them according to topic, but that proved more diffi cult than I had 
originally thought.  In the end, the groupings became an engineering/technical 
section, a general Reclamation history section, and a section devoted to essays 
limited largely to a single Reclamation project.
Two technical notes are in order.  In neither of these instances have we 
tried to correct authors’ text to conform to these technical notes.  
? First, there is a widespread belief among historians and the water 
  community that the Colorado River Basin is divided at “Lee’s 
  Ferry” into the Upper Colorado River Basin and the Lower 
  Colorado River Basin.  This is an assumption that has gained 
  currency over the years both because the Lee’s Ferry site, at the 
  mouth  of the Paria River, is of historical signifi cance as an early 
  settlement on the Colorado River at the upriver edge of the Grand 
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  Canyon and because there is a confusing similarity of terminology. 
  The Colorado River Compact states that the division between the 
  basins is at “Lee Ferry” and specifi es in its defi nitions section that 
  “The term ‘Lee Ferry’ means a point in the main stream of the 
  Colorado River one mile below the mouth of the Paria River.”  
  Therefore, “Lee Ferry” and “Lee’s Ferry” are slightly different 
  locations—the Compact defi nition assures that the Paria River is a 
  tributary wholly within the Upper Colorado River Basin.
? Second, some authors have referred to Reclamation as an 
  “agency.”  This is a common misconception held both within 
  and outside the federal government.  The term “agency” refers 
  to cabinet level agencies, e.g., the Department of the Interior or the 
  Department of Agriculture, and some independent agencies.  The 
  term “bureau” refers to subdivisions within agencies—such as 
  the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the 
  National Park Service, all bureaus within an agency—the 
  Department of the Interior.
Finally, layout and design of our publication was carried out in 
Reclamation’s Technical Services Center, by Charles Brown with assistance 
from Bonnie Gehringer.  The assistance provided from that offi ce is particularly 
important to the successful and timely completion of this publication.
Brit Allan Storey, Ph.D.
Senior Historian
Bureau of Reclamation
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1Concrete Dam Evolution:  The Bureau of 
Reclamation’s Contributions to 2002
By:
Gregg A. Scott
Larry K. Nuss
and John LaBoon
I.  Introduction
Over the last 100 years the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) has 
made signifi cant engineering contributions to the advancement and  evolution of 
concrete dam analysis, design, and construction.  The beginning of Reclamation’s 
long history of world renowned concrete dam construction began shortly after 
the turn of the century with landmark masonry dams.  Arch, gravity, and buttress 
 dam design evolved through the 1920s.  In the 1930s with the design and 
construction of  Hoover Dam, signifi cant strides were made in design, analysis, 
and construction.  Advances were also made in concrete materials, temperature 
control, and construction techniques.  Concrete technology improved to solve 
the problems of alkali-aggregate reaction and freeze-thaw damage following 
 Hoover Dam.  In addition to  Hoover Dam, some of the largest concrete dams 
in the world were constructed by Reclamation during the 1930s, 1940s, and 
1950s.  Following the failure of  Malpasset Dam (France) in the late 1950s, it 
became fully recognized that foundation conditions were critical to the stability 
of concrete dams.  Reclamation made signifi cant contributions in the areas of 
rock mechanics and dam foundation design in the 1960s and later.  In the 1970s 
attention was paid to the earthquake response of concrete dams, and Reclamation 
was among the fi rst to apply the fi nite element method to these types of analyses.  
A new method of concrete dam construction, termed  roller-compacted concrete 
(RCC), was developed in the 1980s using earthmoving and paving technology 
to transport and place concrete materials, resulting in shorter construction times 
and decreased cost.  Reclamation advanced RCC materials design and placement 
methods.  Continued evaluations for dam safety, operations, and maintenance 
have been in the forefront of recent Reclamation activities.  As the behavior and 
risks posed by these dams are better understood, modifi cations have been made 
for several concrete dams to improve their safety and service life.  Part of the 
evolution of concrete dam analysis, design and construction, has been associated 
with waterways; specifi cally  spillways and outlet works.  These features are key 
components to safely pass water through concrete dams.  Although these features 
are also critical for embankment dams, advances often came during concrete dam 
design due to the high heads associated with many of these structures.
2Table 1.1.   Large Masonry and Concrete Storage Dams Designed and Built by the 
Bureau of Reclamation or Currently in the Bureau of Reclamation Inventory.
Dam Year Completed* Type
Structural
Height
(feet)**
State
Pathfi nder 1909 Thick Arch 214 Wyoming
Buffalo Bill 1910, 1990 Thick Arch 325 Wyoming
East Park 1910 Gravity Arch 139 California
Jackson Lake 1911 Composite Gravity/Embankment 66 Wyoming
Theodore Roosevelt 1911,1996 Thick Arch
280
raised to 356 Arizona
Arrowrock 1916 Gravity Arch 350 Idaho
Elephant Butte 1916 Gravity 301 New Mexico
Clear Creek 1918, 1993 Thick Arch 84 Washington
Warm Springs 1919 Thin Arch 106 Oregon
Black Canyon Diversion 1924 Gravity 183 Idaho
Gerber 1925 Thin Arch 88 Oregon
Mormon Flat 1926 Thin Arch 224 Arizona
Horse Mesa 1927 Thin Arch 305 Arizona
Stony Gorge 1928 Slab and Buttress 139 California
Gibson 1929 Medium-thick Arch 199 Montana
Stewart Mountain 1930 Thin Arch 207 Arizona
Deadwood 1931 Medium-thick Arch 165 Idaho
Owyhee 1932 Thick Arch 417 Oregon
Thief Valley 1932 Slab and Buttress 73 Oregon
Hoover 1936 Thick Arch 726 Nevada/Arizona
Parker 1938 Medium-thick Arch 320 Arizona
3Dam Year Completed* Type
Structural
Height
(feet)**
State
Bartlett 1939 Multiple Arch 309 Arizona
Seminoe 1939 Medium-thick Arch 295 Wyoming
Friant 1942 Gravity 319 California
Grand Coulee 1942, 1974 Gravity 550 Washington
Marshall Ford 1942 Gravity 278 Texas
Altus 1945 Curved Gravity 110 Oklahoma
Shasta 1945 Curved Gravity 602 California
Angostura 1949 Composite: Gravity/Embankment 193 South Dakota
Olympus 1949 Composite: Gravity/Embankment 70 Colorado
Keswick 1950 Gravity 157 California
Kortes 1951 Gravity 244 Wyoming
Hungry Horse 1953 Thick Arch 564 Montana
Canyon Ferry 1954 Gravity 225 Montana
Folsom 1956 Composite: Gravity/Embankment 340 California
Monticello 1957 Medium-thick Arch 304 California
Anchor 1960 Thin Arch 208 Wyoming
Flaming Gorge 1964 Medium-thick Arch 502 Utah
Glen Canyon 1964 Thick Arch 710 Arizona
East Canyon 1966 Double-curvature Arch 260 Utah
Yellowtail 1966 Medium-thick Arch 525 Montana
Swift 1967 Double-curvature Arch 205 Montana
Morrow Point 1968 Double-curvature Arch 468 Colorado
Wild Horse 1969 Double-curvature Arch 110 Nevada
4Dam Year Completed* Type
Structural
Height
(feet)**
State
Mountain Park 1975 Double- curvature Arch 133 Oklahoma
Pueblo 1975 Composite: Massive-head Buttress/ Embankment 250 Colorado
Crystal 1976 Double-curvature Arch 323 Colorado
Nambé Falls 1976
Composite: Double-
curvature Arch/ 
Embankment
150 New Mexico
American Falls 1978 Composite: Gravity/Embankment 104 Idaho
Upper Stillwater 1987 RCC Gravity 292 Utah
Brantley 1989 Composite: Gravity/Embankment 144 New Mexico
* For cases where the height or shape was signifi cantly altered, the modifi cation date is also given
** Structural height is generally the difference between the dam crest and lowest point of the 
excavation
II.  Masonry Dams and the Early Years
 Shortly after the beginning of the twentieth century, just after the 
establishment of the U.S. Reclamation Service, explorations were underway for 
large storage dams.  In September  1903  George Y. Wisner, consulting engineer 
for the Reclamation Service, addressed a conference of Reclamation Service 
Engineers in Ogden, Utah.  He indicated 
Reclamation would be required to build 
masonry dams of great height in order to 
store the water required to reclaim arid 
lands.  This could be accomplished in 
narrow canyons where the arch action 
of the dam could be taken into account, 
provided the plans were based upon 
accurate data and correct determination 
of the stresses to which the dams 
would be subjected.  In 1904, Wisner 
began what was to be a leading role in 
the design of  Pathfi nder Dam on the 
North Platte River in central Wyoming, 
collaborating with  Edgar T. Wheeler, 
consulting engineer, on the analysis.  It 
was recognized that masonry dams are 
far from rigid, and that temperature 
was an important load.  The modulus 1.1.  Pathfi nder Dam, Wyoming.
5and coeffi cient of thermal expansion were estimated for a composite of rock 
and concrete.  The dam was designed as a combination of an arch and a vertical 
cantilever fi xed at the base.  The load, both temperature and reservoir, was 
distributed between the arch and cantilever so as to produce equal defl ections.  
The stresses resulting from the defl ections were then calculated.  This was the 
early beginnings of what was to later become the  Trial Load Method of analysis.  
The designed cross-section, constructed on a radius of 150 feet, was determined 
to give suffi cient thickness to safely resist the forces that would act upon it.  
Above elevation 5830, reinforcement was considered necessary to reduce thermal 
cracking.
 The dam was constructed in a narrow granite canyon.  A large tunnel was 
constructed to divert the fl ow of the river, and later was used for the outlet works.  
Foundation excavation and dam construction were facilitated by an overhead 
cableway and guy derricks with steam driven hoist engines.  The overhead 
cableway was key to constructing in the deep narrow canyon.  Cableways are 
still an important component of modern construction for such conditions.  Steam 
engines powered the concrete and mortar batch plant as well as the aggregate 
crushing and sorting plant.  The side walls of the canyon were excavated to 
produce surfaces normal to the face of the dam.  The fi rst masonry was laid in 
August 1906, and the dam was completed in 1909.  It was recognized that an 
impervious dam could be built at 
the same cost as a leaky dam, the 
main difference being more rigid 
inspection and an understanding at 
the start that fi rst-class work only 
would be allowed.  Any rock to be 
built against and any material to be 
placed in the dam was thoroughly 
washed and cleaned.  A course of 
masonry was built on the upstream 
and downstream faces, and granite 
stone from the spillway excavation, 
varying in size from one to fi ve 
cubic yards, was set in a heavy 
bed of mortar between the faces.
The stones were lifted, reset, and 
vibrated with bars as necessary 
to get them completely in contact 
with the mortar.  The vertical 
joints were fi lled with concrete 
consisting of cement, sand, and 
coarse aggregate.  The concrete 
was fairly wet and would fl ow 
into most of the joints, where 
it would be worked by shovels 
1.2.  Original Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Arizona.
1.3.  Masonry Construction at Theodore 
Roosevelt Dam, Arizona
6and leveled.  Spalls or small stones were placed in the wider joints.  The stone 
was placed from abutment to abutment.  Stone of differing heights resulted in 
beds of mortar at varying elevations throughout the structure.  Due to the high 
cost of cement, which was furnished by the Government, attempts were made to 
optimize the use of concrete and mortar.  This required skilled masonry workers.  
Flat deformed steel bars were placed in the mortar joints near the face of the dam 
above elevation 5830.  The fi nished dam has a structural height of 214 feet, and 
impounds about 1 million acre feet of water.  The dam has performed extremely 
well for nearly a century, and for all practical purposes should have an indefi nite 
life.
 Similar masonry construction was in progress about the same time for 
 Theodore Roosevelt Dam on the Salt River, in south-central Arizona.  The design 
of the dam was somewhat more conservative than Pathfi nder Dam, having a 
more conventional gravity dam section.  This probably refl ects the fact that it was 
designed under the direction of different engineers,  F. Teighman and  Louis C. 
Hill, and that the design for Theodore Roosevelt Dam probably predates that for 
Pathfi nder Dam, even though Pathfi nder Dam was completed fi rst.  Construction 
at Theodore Roosevelt Dam began in 1903.  It appears that a simpler design 
methodology was employed.  The dam was designed two-dimensionally such that 
the resultant force from maximum anticipated static loading fell within the middle 
third of the structure, and then the dam was arched to provide an extra margin of 
stability.  It was recognized that temperature could affect the upper portions of 
the dam, and records indicate that some reinforcing steel was used in this area.
Despite this, the thinner upper portion of the dam cracked vertically at regular 
intervals, in effect forming contraction joints.  Leakage through these cracks 
was minimal.  The dam was built in a narrow canyon formed by Precambrian 
siltstone, sandstone, and dolomite.  Dolomite blocks formed the masonry for 
the dam.  The construction practices were nearly identical to those at Pathfi nder 
Dam, and a sound and water-tight dam, with a structural height of 280 feet 
and a storage volume of about 1.4 million acre feet, resulted.  One of the main 
differences from Pathfi nder Dam involved the early use of hydroelectric power 
at Theodore Roosevelt Dam.  A 19-mile long power canal was constructed from 
a diversion dam upstream of the site.  The canal fed a 7-foot diameter penstock 
tunnel leading to a temporary hydroelectric unit installed in a cave behind the 
permanent powerhouse.  This provided construction power.  Six 25-cycle units 
were installed in the original powerhouse with a combined capacity of 11,000 
horsepower.  President Theodore Roosevelt, in whose honor the dam was named, 
attended the dedication ceremonies held on March 18, 1911.  Completed in 1996, 
modifi cations to the dam included raising the crest 76 feet to mitigate dam safety 
concerns, provide additional conservation storage (i.e., raise the top of active 
conservation from 2136 to 2151 feet), and enlarge fl ood storage.  The original 
masonry dam was found to be in excellent condition, and was incorporated nearly 
entirely into the modifi ed structure (discussed later in this paper).
7 At approximately 
the same time, in northwest 
Wyoming, plans were underway 
to construct the then highest dam 
in the world across the Shoshone 
River.  Initially called  Shoshone 
Dam, it was originally designed 
as a straight gravity masonry 
dam in 1904, but in 1905, 
because of the narrow granite 
canyon across which it was to 
be constructed, the arch design 
proposed by George Y. Wisner 
was also adopted for what was to 
later be called  Buffalo Bill Dam.  
The cross-section of the dam is 
nearly identical to Pathfi nder 
Dam.  It is of interest to note 
that independent arch theory 
design, where the thickness of 
the dam at any given elevation 
is a function of water depth and 
radius of curvature, was also 
being developed during this time 
period.  In fact, a discussion by 
John S. Eastwood, describing 
how the thickness of  Shoshone 
Dam could be substantially reduced by using this theory, appears in an early 
edition of Engineering News.  The construction of the dam differed from that 
used at Pathfi nder and Roosevelt Dams, beginning the transition from masonry 
construction to concrete construction.  Wooden forms were built at the upstream 
and downstream faces for concrete placement.  Concrete was mixed and deposited 
in 8-inch layers.  Granite plum rocks, forming approximately 25 percent of the 
concrete volume, were placed in the concrete, and were shaken or rammed into 
fi nal position.  This solidifi ed the mass to a remarkable degree, and additional 
tamping was scarcely required.  However, spading and tamping was performed to 
work the concrete into all the cavities of the rock and ensure consolidation against 
the forms.  The plum stones usually projected about half of their thickness above 
the surface of the new concrete.  This presented a rough surface for bonding 
with the next layer.  When a layer of concrete had set for more than 24 hours, 
the surface was thoroughly cleaned and a thin coat of mortar was placed prior to 
the next layer of concrete.  The concrete was placed from abutment to abutment 
without contraction joints.  Due to the contractor’s desire to complete the work, 
winter placements occurred under a steam-heated tent.  Upon completion in 1910, 
the dam was 325 feet high, and capable of storing over 400,000 acre feet of water.  
The dam was raised 25 feet in 1989.
1.4.  Buffalo Bill Dam (includes 1990 raised dam 
and replacement spillway), Wyoming
1.5.  Construction at Buffalo Bill Dam, Wyoming.  
Note wooden forms at downstream face and plum 
stones protruding from previous lift.
8 The fi rst use of vertical 
radial contraction joints for 
a Reclamation concrete dam 
occurred at  East Park Dam in 
north-central California.  The 
radial joints were spaced at 
20 feet, and a key, six inches 
deep by three feet long, was 
constructed in the contraction 
joints about six feet from the 
upstream face.  Although there 
is no indication that waterstops 
were installed in the joints, a 
system of four-inch diameter 
tile drains was constructed downstream of 
the keys to convey water from the joints 
to the outlet tunnel.  This dam also was 
constructed entirely of concrete.  The 
original design called for sandstone blocks 
to be imbedded in the concrete to make up 
20 to 30 percent of the mass.  However, 
the sandstone was of poorer quality than 
fi rst believed, and the sandstone blocks 
were omitted from the construction.  The 
aggregate was processed and screened 
into three sizes (1/4, 1, and 3 inch).  A 
little over one barrel (4 sacks) of cement 
was used for each cubic yard of cement.
The concrete was placed quite wet, and 
water cured for 10 days.  The dam was 
designed as a curved gravity structure, 
similar to Theodore Roosevelt Dam.  It 
was constructed in a narrow gorge of 
massive conglomerate.  Although the 
dam was completed in 1910, construction began in 1908, after construction of 
Theodore Roosevelt, Pathfi nder, and Buffalo Bill Dams had begun.  Despite the 
work of Wisner, a more conservative approach was taken.  The 140-foot high dam 
impounds a reservoir of about 50,000 acre feet.
 The reign of Shoshone Dam as the world’s highest dam was short 
lived.  In 1916,  Arrowrock Dam was completed to a height of 350 feet.  Once 
again, the cross section of this dam was similar to a gravity dam, but the dam 
was constructed as an arch.  The construction of Arrowrock Dam also made 
use of vertical radial contraction joints.  Radial joints were formed in the upper 
portion of the dam by building alternate sections at different times.  The joints 
were spaced at various intervals dependent on the elevation and thickness of the 
1.6.  East Park Dam, California.
1.7.  Construction at East Park Dam, 
California.  Note the vertical formed con-
traction joint and concrete forms.
9dam.  Three vertical wells 
were formed in each joint 
which were later fi lled with 
concrete during cold weather, 
after the dam had undergone 
contraction.  A Z-strip 
annealed-copper water stop 
was installed in each joint 5 
feet from the upstream face 
of the dam, and immediately 
downstream from this strip a 
triangular drain was formed 
in the joint.  These drains 
collect water which gets past 
the waterstop and transports 
it to inspection or operating 
galleries.  A unique material called 
“ sand cement” was used for the 
construction of this dam, and for 
Elephant Butte Dam, a 300-foot-
high straight gravity dam near Truth 
or Consequences, New Mexico, 
completed the same year.  This 
consisted of standard Portland cement 
to which was added a little less than 
an equal amount of pulverized sand, 
reground to such fi neness that 90 
percent would pass a No. 200 sieve.
Although this saved on the quantity 
of cement used, the concrete did not 
attain as much strength, and as a 
result, the durability suffered.  This 
was not signifi cant for the relatively 
mild climate at Elephant Butte Dam, 
but at Arrowrock Dam, spray from downstream releases resulted in severe freeze-
thaw damage to the concrete.  This necessitated construction of a new overlay 
on the face of the dam in 1936.  The use of sand-cement in the construction of 
concrete dams was discontinued after these projects.  The concepts of  foundation 
grouting and  drainage appear at Arrowrock and Elephant Butte Dams, and 
galleries were constructed in both of these dams.  Shallow grout and drainage 
curtains (25 to 30 feet deep) were constructed by drill holes in the granitic near 
the upstream face of Arrowrock dam.  The foundation drainage holes, spaced at 
about 10-foot centers, exit in an inspection gallery 27.5 feet from the upstream 
face.  Vertical formed drains were also constructed within the concrete, spaced at 
15 feet and located 12 feet from the upstream face of the dam.  These drains also 
exit in the inspection gallery.  Similar construction occurred at Elephant Butte 
1.9.  Elephant Butte Dam, New Mexico.
1.8.  Arrowrock Dam, Idaho.
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Dam.
 In 1918  Duff A. Abrams fi rst published results of research that investigated 
the effect of water-cement ratio and grading of aggregates on concrete quality.  
This was a major breakthrough in developing the science of concrete technology.  
Obviously, Reclamation concrete dams constructed up to that point did not have 
the benefi t of his research, and the concrete quality and durability was largely a 
function of fortuitous circumstances and the experience of the on-site staff.  With 
the exception of Arrowrock Dam, which required fairly minor modifi cations for 
freeze-thaw damage due to nondurable concrete, the early concrete dams of the 
Bureau of Reclamation have held up remarkably well.
III.  The Amazing Arch and Developments of the 1920s
 During the 1920s, materials were relatively expensive, and there was a 
desire to optimize dam design to reduce the required concrete.  Independent arch 
theory became the order of the day, as thinner dams resulted from this method 
of design.  Hence, many thin concrete arch dams were designed and constructed 
during this era.  In addition, buttress dams became popular for wider canyons, 
since they minimize the required materials in favor of a more labor-intensive 
construction.  The Bureau of Reclamation inventory contains only one gravity 
dam ( Black Canyon Diversion) from this era.  Most of the arch dams from this 
era in the Reclamation inventory were designed and constructed by water user 
groups.  Titles were later transferred to Reclamation for various reasons.  One 
of the exceptions is  Gerber Dam.  Gerber Dam was completed in 1925 on Miller 
Creek, a tributary of the Lost River in southern Oregon.  The dam is a variable 
radius arch with a structural height of 85 feet and a reservoir volume of 94,000 
acre feet.  The Design Engineer was  J. L. Savage and the General Construction 
Superintendent was  F. T. Crowe, two individuals who would play prominently 
into later Reclamation projects.  The foundation for the dam is basalt with weak 
clayey interfl ow zones.  As was the practice up until this time, the main concern 
for foundation conditions related to the strength and hardness of the rock, and the 
water-tightness of the foundation.  To assess the water-tightness of the foundation, 
tests were conducted in drill holes.  Pipes were grouted and sealed into eight drill 
holes.  Water was applied to all eight holes simultaneously under pressure from 
an elevated water tank.  The leakage was determined to be small.  Still, after 
excavating a keyway trench for the foundation to a depth greater than anticipated, 
a grout curtain was installed to a depth of 15 feet in holes spaced about 5 feet 
apart throughout the length of the foundation.  The holes were grouted after the 
concrete above the grout hole reached a thickness of 6 feet by applying a steam 
pressure of 100 lb/in2.  No foundation drainage was included in the design or 
construction.
 Concrete was placed in the dam by use of a trestle with rail buggies, a stiff 
leg derrick, and a high line.  Most of the concrete was placed by cars with a 
¾ yd3 capacity, run on the trestle from the mixer and dumped into chutes and 
pipes leading to the forms.  Five to six sacks of cement were used for each 
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cubic yard of concrete.  Plum rocks, not exceeding 20 percent of the volume, 
were placed in the concrete at locations away from the forms, to reduce the 
needed concrete volume and provide small keys between lifts.  Cold weather 
placements required heating the sand and mixing water, as well as heating the 
concrete placements under canvas enclosures.  The rock foundation and concrete 
surfaces were thoroughly cleaned with wire brushes and water jets prior to 
concrete placement.  All surfaces were sprinkled with water and dry cement 
just prior to placements.  The concrete was placed in 4-foot lifts between keyed 
contraction joints at 50-foot centers, with no plum rocks in the bottom of the 
1.10.   Comparison of Maximum Sections of Early Reclamation Arch Dams.
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lift.  The concrete was spaded against 
the forms to reduce “bug holes.”  Two 
closure slots, four feet wide were left 
near the ends of the center overfl ow 
section.  Concrete was placed in these 
slots at low temperature conditions, once 
the dam had cooled.  Extensive fi eld 
testing was performed on samples taken 
during construction.  This included sieve 
tests of the sand and aggregate used for 
the concrete, tensile tests on briquettes 
composed of the sand and cement used 
in the concrete, compression tests on 6- 
by 12-inch cylinders of concrete taken 
from the forms confi rming the 1600 lb/
in2 required 28-day strength, colorimetric 
tests to determine the cleanness of the 
sand, and slump tests for concrete 
wetness.  The slump was limited 
to 3 inches for most of the work 
to allow the concrete to fl ow 
through the chutes, but a slump 
of 6 to 8 inches was allowed in 
thinner reinforced walls.  This 
represents early use of extensive 
standardized testing to control the 
work quality.  Gerber Dam also 
represents the fi rst installation of 
instrumentation in a Reclamation 
concrete dam.  Seventeen electric 
resistance thermometers were 
placed in horizontal layers at 
three elevations in the crown 
cantilever (vertical plane of 
the line of arc centers).  Berry 
Strain Gages, consisting of 
eight posts set in a circle 
about a center post, were 
installed in nine locations on 
the downstream face of the 
dam.  Two post stations were 
installed on the crest of the 
dam across contraction joints 
on each side of the dam.  A dial 
gage instrument was used to 
take the readings, which were adjusted by also reading a reference invar bar.  Four 
1.13.  Construction of Gerber Dam.  Note 
closure slot near left side of photo.
1.11.  Gerber Dam, Oregon.
1.12.  Stony Gorge Dam, California.
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survey targets were set in the downstream face of the dam at the line of centers 
for measurements relative to reference targets on the abutments.  Later tests for 
concrete modulus, coeffi cient of thermal expansion, and other properties were 
planned.  The intent of the instrumentation was to verify the arch dam design 
and analysis techniques.  Documentation describing this evaluation could not be 
located.
 The fi rst buttress dam 
constructed by the Bureau of 
Reclamation was completed in 
1928.  Stony Gorge Dam is an 
Ambursen type slab and  buttress 
dam built downstream of East 
Park Dam.  It has a structural 
height of about  140 feet, and 
a reservoir capacity of 50,000 
acre feet.  The dam is made of 
individual simply supported 
elements; buttresses, upstream 
face slabs, and struts bracing 
between buttresses in the 
downstream areas.  The sloping 
upstream slabs span 
between and transfer 
the reservoir loading 
to the buttresses; the 
buttresses carry the 
upstream-downstream
loading and transfer 
it to the foundation; 
and the struts provide 
lateral stiffness to the 
buttresses and keep 
them from deforming 
excessively in the cross-
canyon direction.  The 
reinforced concrete 
members were designed 
using codes available 
at the time.  Additional 
horizontal reinforcing 
was added to the 
buttresses following 
the early appearance 
of vertical cracks in 
some of the taller 
1.14.  Photo taken during construction of Stony 
Gorge Dam, California from downstream side.
Note struts between buttresses and sloping slabs 
on left side of photo.
1.15.  Gerber Dam Plan and Sections
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buttresses.  A recent check indicates the design is generally acceptable for normal 
static loading conditions, even considering modern American Concrete Institute 
(ACI) code.  The concrete mixing plant discharged into bottom-dump buckets of 
1½ cubic yard capacity which were successively transported by hoist, highline 
cableway, and small cars on light tracks supported by the buttress forms to chutes 
conveying the concrete from the buckets to its fi nal position.
 The method of using chutes to convey the concrete was common practice 
during this era.  This required a wet concrete mix for enough workability to 
allow the concrete to fl ow along the chutes.  Unfortunately, this also resulted in 
somewhat weaker and less durable concrete than could be attained with a drier 
mix.  In addition, it often resulted in latence rising to the lift surfaces.  If this 
was not removed and thoroughly cleaned, bonding between successive lifts was 
compromised.  However, many dams from this time period have performed well 
and are still in service.  Although concrete technology had advanced, the effects of 
alkali-aggregate reaction and freeze-thaw deterioration were not well understood.  
Most of the arch dams constructed during this era in cold climates suffer from 
freeze-thaw deterioration, such as Gerber Dam.  If built with reactive aggregate, 
the resulting cracking typically accentuates the freeze-thaw damage.  Dams 
subject to alkali-aggregate reaction in mild climates, such as Stewart Mountain 
Dam, tend to exhibit cracking but continue to perform well.
IV.  Prelude to  Hoover Dam
 Owyhee and Gibson Dams 
were built before  Hoover Dam and 
included experimental sections 
for collecting temperature data 
and grouting in preparation for 
the construction at Hoover.  These 
were also the fi rst Bureau of 
Reclamation concrete dams to use 
tunnel spillways.  Some of the fi nal 
developments for the Trial Load 
Method were also performed during 
the design of these structures.
 Owyhee Dam is located on the  Owyhee River in eastern Oregon.  It is a 
concrete, thick arch structure with structural and hydraulic heights of 417 and 325 
feet, respectively.  The crest is 833 feet long and 30 feet wide at elevation 2675.  
The maximum base width is 265 feet.  The dam was completed in 1932.  The dam 
forms a reservoir (Lake Owyhee) with storage of 1,183,300 acre feet at elevation 
2675.  Owyhee Dam was the world’s highest dam at the time of completion.   John 
L. Savage, Chief Designing Engineer, wrote:
1.16.  Owyhee Dam, Oregon.
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From an engineering standpoint the Owyhee Dam, to be constructed 
on the Owyhee Project in eastern Oregon, is the most outstanding dam 
undertaken to date by the Bureau of Reclamation.… this dam is likely 
to stand as the highest dam in the world until the great Boulder Canyon 
Dam [ Hoover Dam] is constructed.
 The Owyhee River valley was visited early in the nineteenth century by 
Hawaiian trappers who are credited with having named the river “Hawaii.”  Later, 
this name was handed down phonetically by scouts, Indians, and early settlers as 
“Ow-Y-Hee”, and ultimately the name was given this spelling.  The dam site is 
also referred to as the “Hole-in-the-Ground” site.  Intermittent site explorations 
began in 1903, a feasibility report was issued in 1925, and the project was 
recommended by the Secretary of the Interior on October 9, 1926.  The General 
Construction Company of Seattle, Washington, was the low bidder at $3,198,779 
and was awarded the contract on July 7, 1928.  The government fi eld organization 
reached its peak in 1931 with 107 employees under the charge of  F. A. Banks 
(later to become Construction Engineer for  Grand Coulee Dam).  In June 1931 the 
contractor was placing from 40,000 to 50,000 cubic yards of concrete per month.
The contractor’s workforce reached 274 people.  Construction was completed fi ve 
months ahead of schedule in 1932.  The fi rst water was delivered to the irrigation 
lands in 1935.
 The materials and construction were similar to structures that had come 
before.  The complete details will not be 
repeated here, but a few items of note are 
provided.  Cobble rock was added to the mix.
The cobble rock was sound, clean gravel or 
broken rock of such size as passed through a 
screen having 8-inch square or 9-inch round 
openings and was retained on a screen having 
2¾-inch square or 3-inch round openings.
 Porous concrete tile drains were placed 
in the dam near its upstream face.  The joints 
in the tile were not cemented.  The concrete 
tile had an internal diameter of not less than 
5 inches, and wall thickness of not less than 
1 3/16 inches.  The tile was made of 1 part 
Portland cement and 4 parts total aggregate, 
the aggregates being so proportioned as to 
give a degree of porosity such that an 18-inch 
length of tile when set on end on a water-tight 
base shall discharge water poured into it at 
the rate of not less than 3 gallons per minute. 
Construction today would form these drains 
using a removable fi ve- to six-inch- diameter 
tapered steel pipe.
1.17.  Owyhee Dam, Oregon.  Tile 
formed drains, strain meter for 
Hoover test, and gallery reinforce-
ment.
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 The main advancements 
made during the design and 
construction of  Owyhee 
Dam involved temperature 
control.  Owyhee Dam was 
the largest dam at the time in 
which radial contraction joints 
were to be pressure grouted.
Radial vertical contraction 
joints were placed at 50-foot 
intervals with 9-inch deep 
by 3-feet wide shear keys at 
3-foot centers along each joint.  
The vertical contraction joints 
were grouted from March 30 
to May 8, 1934, which is two 
years after construction of the 
dam.  Internal temperature 
measurements, concrete 
cracking, grout operations, 
grout takes, grout pressures, 
and contraction joint opening 
measurements were reported 
in 1934.  The grouting system installed in Owyhee was similar to that previously 
used in Gibson and Deadwood 
Dams except for a few minor 
improvements.  A system of 
pipes were installed along the 
vertical contraction joints to 
cool the mass concrete to 50°F 
and grout the joints.  Grout 
zones were 100-feet high and 
isolated with 20-gage soft 
copper sheets.  The radial 
contraction joints in the dam 
were pressure grouted with 
cement grout forced through 
the pipe grouting systems.  The 
grout was forced in to ensure 
a pressure of at least 100 
pounds per square inch at the 
highest point in the system being grouted.  Vertical keys were built in the joints.  
The entire face of each vertical joint in the dam, except the grouting units and 
copper expansion strips, were painted with one thin coat of water-gas tar paint and 
allowed to dry before the adjacent concrete was placed against it.  The tar paint 
served as a bond breaker between the blocks of concrete. Copper grout stops were 
1.19.  Owyhee Dam, Oregon.  Grout pipes and 
shear keys on vertical contraction joint.
1.18.  Owyhee Dam Plan and Sections.
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laid horizontally at vertical intervals of about 100 feet.  The top of the grout zone 
was at elevation 2400, 2500, 2600, and top of dam.  Construction today would 
limit the grout zone to approximate 60 vertical feet.  The headers on the upstream 
face below elevation 2500 were not available for grouting because the reservoir 
elevation at the time of grouting varied between 2520 to 2527.  Owing to the fact 
that there were quite a few cracks in the concrete in the dam, all cement used was 
screened through a 200 mesh sieve with the intention that this fi ne cement would 
seal most of the cracks.  However, considerable cracking in the concrete on the 
downstream face of the dam occurred, primarily due to alkali-aggregate reaction.
 Placing the mass concrete of the dam was begun in the fall of 1930 and 
completed in the summer of 1932.  In the cooler months of the year, concrete was 
placed at around 52° to 70°F and heated up to around 98° to 116°F.  In the warmer 
months of the year, concrete was placed at around 65° to 82°F and heated up to 
around 112° to 119°F.  At the time of grouting, the internal concrete temperatures 
varied from 42° to 62°F.  Grouting pressures inside the joint were around 100 
lb/in2.  The allowable placing temperatures were much higher than allowed 
by modern standards and probably contributed to surface cracking.  Electric 
resistance thermometers were placed in the concrete immediately on pouring.
Dissipation of setting heat was accelerated by circulating water through the grout 
system except in the middle of winter.  An experimental cooling system was 
located in panel 8 at elevation 2486.  Tests in Panel 8 measured the effectiveness 
of cooling coils to dissipate heat in a thick concrete section.  Additionally, the 
upper 82 feet of panels 3 and 4 (blocks 3 and 4, between contraction joints at 
stations 2+00 and 3+00) at Owyhee Dam were used as a test section to test 
cooling coils placed on the top of lift lines and their ability to open contraction 
joints for grouting.  In this location of the dam, a system of cooling coils 1-inch 
diameter were placed 4-feet 7.5-inches apart near the bottom of each 4-foot 
lift.  The section was highly instrumented to obtain temperature and strain 
measurements.  The test section was placed from March 3, 1932, to May 28, 
1932, at a fairly uniform rate with about three and one-half days between pours.
Reservoir water was circulated 
in the test section cooling coils 
for only one month between May 
13, 1932, and June 20, 1932.
This period of time permitted 
cooling until the rising river 
water temperatures and lowering 
concrete temperatures permitted 
no further heat extraction from 
the concrete.  Measurement of 
concrete temperature before 
cooling shows interior concrete 
around 117°F and the surface 
temperatures around 75°F, 
producing a thermal gradient 
1.20.  Owyhee Dam, Oregon.  Spillway “Burp” 
(unstable fl ow condition, sometimes referred to as 
“blow-back”).
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of 42°F.  This amount of gradient is very high and probably contributed to the 
surface cracking.  The contours after the cooling coils were turned off show 
interior concrete and surface concrete about the same temperature at 70°F.  The 
thermal gradient is very small which would minimize if not eliminate any surface 
cracking.
 A series of model tests of the Owyhee morning-glory spillway were made 
from 1930 to 1931.  No formal reports were prepared at the time of these studies.
In 1944, the hydraulic studies for the spillway tunnels at Owyhee Dam and 
Gibson Dam were documented.  In 1928, when designs for Owyhee Dam were 
underway, there were few installations of vertical shaft or  glory-hole spillways 
and there was little information available that would assist in the design.  The 
 ring gate had no precedent whatsoever.  A 1:48 scale model, which included the 
topography surrounding the spillway, the spillway and ring-gate control, and the 
discharge tunnel below the spillway was built to aid in the design.  The design 
included forty-eight 1/16-inch holes equally spaced around the circumference of 
the lower crest which served as air vents to aerate the crest when the gate was 
raised.  Prototype behavior indicates for heads of from 1 foot to 2 feet over the 
gate, the water falls in a solid sheet toward the center of the shaft, apparently 
entraining air faster than it can be released at the outlet end of the tunnel.  This 
entrainment causes the pressure to increase until it is suffi cient to regurgitate 
or “break back” through the sheet of overfl owing water; then air emerges with 
suffi cient force to carry spray 50 feet or 60 feet above the level of the gate.  
This phenomenon occurs sometimes as often as once every fi fteen seconds and 
sometimes only once in fi ve minutes, depending on the tailwater elevation.  For 
heads less than 1 foot over the crest, entrained air can apparently move back up 
the spillway shaft unhampered.  For heads greater that 2 feet, the air pressure 
is not suffi cient to break back and the air is forced through the outlet end of the 
tunnel, causing spray to be thrown high into the canyon.  This action is directly 
related to the tailwater as a rather large tailwater depth causes a jump to form 
in the tunnel for most discharges.  With a 1000 second-foot discharge, the fl ow 
into the stilling basin was undisturbed, but as the fl ow increased an unexpected 
disturbance occurred that was not detected in the model.  The stream of water 
from the spillway tunnel created waves on the surface of the stilling pool.  These 
waves traveled across the canyon, refl ected, and returned.  As they struck the 
oncoming high-velocity stream from the tunnel an incident occurred which 
for lack of a better term, is called an explosion.  With this particular fl ow 
(3000 second-feet) the spray from the explosion was thrown two-thirds the 
distance up the adjacent cliff.  Larger discharges threw spray to the top of the 
cliff.  Evidently the air drawn into the spillway entrance was ejected as a strong 
wind.  When the refl ected waves reach the tunnel portal, they are great enough to 
seal the exit for a short time and the air is quickly compressed to the extent that an 
explosion results from the release of the air.
 During construction, a circular concrete-lined 22.6-foot diameter tunnel 
1005 feet long was used for diversion.  The tunnel was plugged with concrete 
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upstream from the vertical  morning glory shaft.  Downstream of the vertical shaft 
it is used as the permanent spillway outlet.  The diversion tunnel was constructed 
in rhyolite tuff requiring no timbering.  First a 9- by 9-foot  pioneer tunnel was 
driven followed by the full size tunnel.  The rock in the tunnel was hard, self-
supporting, full of incipient cracks, with an occasional mud seam.  Immediately 
before placing concrete, the foundation surface was cleaned of mud and debris 
using a combination of air and water under pressure.  The invert was placed by 
hand and screeded to shape.  The crown and side walls were placed in 20-foot 
sections using wooden forms built in place.  A 1-yard Ransome concrete gun shot 
the concrete through a 6-inch pipe and rubber hose into a V notched in the crown 
of the previous placement.  The concrete then fl owed along training 
boards into place.  The concrete was worked into place by hammering on the 
forms with air hammers and by workers equipped with hip boots working and 
spading the concrete behind the forms.  Grout pipes were placed into crevices 
and holes drilled into the foundation rock at frequent intervals.  A 5-sack-per-
yard mix was used in the tunnel lining between the inlet and the spillway shaft.
A 6-sack-per-yard mix was used from the shaft to the outlet portal.  The tunnel 
was equipped with a grouting system, and the lining-rock interface was grouted 
in 1934 using a 1.0 water to cement ratio in the invert and side walls.  Sand was 
added to the mix in the roof grouting.
 The spillway was featured in the 1956 Transactions of the American 
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE).  Excerpts from this article are as follows:
The Owyhee Dam spillway in Oregon, completed in 1932 by the USBR, 
was a daring design at the time.  The capacity is 30,000 cu ft per sec, 
the maximum head on the crest for this discharge is 12 ft, and the water 
is dropped 320 ft through a vertical shaft.  A fl ood occurred in 1936 in 
which 300,000 acre-ft of water were passed in 3 months.  The maximum 
discharge recorded was 15,000 cu ft per sec, or one-half capacity.  
Subsequent to this fl ow, smaller discharges have passed through the 
spillway frequently.  A fl ow of 6,600 cu ft per sec was recorded in 1951.  
The greatest fl ood occurred in 1952, when the spillway operated for more 
than a month.  The maximum discharge through the spillway was 20,000 
cu ft per sec, or 67 % of capacity.  Inspections of the spillway have been 
conducted frequently since the spillway fi rst operated in 1936; the latest 
inspection was made after the 1952 fl ood.  The spillway shaft appeared to 
be in excellent condition.
The form board marks still appeared on the concrete surface.  The visible part 
of the invert of the vertical bend showed only slight surface wear, the maximum 
probably not exceeding 1/4 inch in depth.
V.   Hoover Dam—Quantum Leaps Forward
  Hoover Dam is a 726-foot-high, concrete, thick-arch dam located on 
the border between Arizona and Nevada about thirty-six miles from Las Vegas, 
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Nevada.  The dam was completed 
in 1935, has a crest length of 1244 
feet, a crest thickness of 45 feet, 
and a maximum base width of 660 
feet.  It is the highest concrete dam 
in the United States, the eighteenth 
highest dam in the world, and forms 
the largest manmade reservoir in 
the United States.  The designs for 
Hoover Dam evolved over several 
years of careful study, representing the 
combined efforts of many engineers 
of Reclamation and various consulting 
boards.  Preliminary designs were 
prepared from time to time over a 
period of ten years, so the successive 
designs refl ected some of the developments in design techniques during the 1920 
to 1930 decade.  In 1920, the fi rst design for a high dam in Boulder Canyon was 
prepared.  At that time the highest dam in existence was Arrowrock Dam in Idaho. 
Hoover Dam was to be more than double the height of Arrowrock Dam.  As such, 
it was evident from the start that many new problems in design and construction 
would require solution before the dam could be built.
 As a result of intensive research, improvements were made in practically 
every feature in the dam, spillway, and appurtenances.  To bring the materials to 
the site, railroad lines of forty-eight miles 
length and thirty-fi ve miles length were 
constructed, and paved roads from Las 
Vegas were built.  A 150-ton cableway 
across the canyon was built.  Electrical 
power had to be supplied to the dam site, 
Government operations, and the newly 
founded  Boulder City.  The town of 
Boulder City had to be planned and built 
for all the workers at the site.  Aggregate, 
sand, cement, and mixing plants had to be 
built for the massive amounts of concrete.  
The  concrete was artifi cially cooled by 
circulating water through cooling pipes 
placed at the top of each 5-foot high 
concrete lift.  This required a massive 
cooling tower 143 feet long, 16 feet wide, 
and 43 feet high.  A steel fabrication 
manufacturing plant was built to construct 
the massive penstocks and steel works.
Drill crews on elaborate truck-mounted 
1.22.   Hoover Dam, Arizona-Nevada.  
50- by 50-foot concrete block place-
ments
1.21.  American Flag displayed during the 
1996 Summer Olympics,  Hoover Dam, 
Arizona-Nevada.
21
carriages excavated the 56-foot-
diameter diversion and spillway 
tunnels.  These tunnels were lined 
with 3 feet of concrete.  The site had 
to be excavated to sound rock for the 
foundation of the dam.  In the river 
channel, silt, gravel, and boulders 
had to be removed to a depth of 
120 feet.  The foundation was then 
grouted for the purpose of providing 
an impervious zone under the dam.
The initial grouting involved drilling 
6,700 feet of holes and injecting 
7,500 sacks of cement.  The main 
cut-off grouting was not started 
until the dam was at 100 feet high.
This operation took 54,000 feet of 
holes and more than 60,000 sacks of 
cement (1 sack = 1 cubic foot).  The 
dam was built in a series of 50-foot 
by 50-foot by 5-foot high blocks.  An 
8-foot slot was left open down the 
middle of the dam for the extensive 
system of cooling pipes.  The vertical 
and horizontal surfaces have formed 
shear keys.  A combination of water 
stops and grout stops were embedded 
in the concrete.  After each 50-foot 
vertical section of dam had been 
cooled, grout was injected into the 
radial and circumferential joints.  The 
3.25 million cubic yards of concrete 
were placed from June 1933 to May 
1935 in approximately 23.5 months.
Systems of drains were installed in 
the dam and in the foundation.  The 
foundation drains were 3.5 inches 
in diameter and extended 100 feet 
into the foundation at the base 
and graduated to 30 feet depth at 
elevation 1200.  The internal drains 
in the concrete were 8-inch porous 
concrete pipes placed vertically at 
10-foot intervals in a line parallel to 
the dam axis.
1.23.  Upstream face of  Hoover Dam, Arizona-
Nevada.
1.24.   Hoover Dam, Arizona-Nevada:  
Horizontal lift line and vertical contraction 
joint.
1.25.   Hoover Dam, Arizona-Nevada.  Rela-
tive size of penstocks
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 Hydraulic and structural models played 
an important part in the design of  Hoover Dam 
to verify existing theories as well as advance the 
current state-of-the-art for applications of greater 
magnitude than those previously developed.  The 
hydraulic models provided direct empirical data 
while the structural models furnished checks 
on analytical methods using the Trial Load 
Method.  There were two complete models of 
Hoover.  The fi rst model, 1:240 scale, was made 
of a mixture of plaster and diatomaceous earth.
The second model, 1:180 scale, was made of a 
rubber-litharge compound.  In addition, detailed 
models were made of the crown cantilever and a 
thick arch at elevation 900 using model tests and 
slab analogy tests.  Therefore, three independent 
solutions of the same problems were obtained.
 Determining stress distributions in an arch dam requires a 3-dimensional 
analysis which was very diffi cult in the 1930s.  The Trial Load Method of 
analysis was developed to represent the 3-dimensional arch structure with a grid 
of 2-dimensional arch and cantilever elements.  The analysis would adjust the 
load into the elements and bring the elements into geometric agreement.  As such, 
accurate solutions of the arch and cantilever elements had to be known.
V.A.  Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part V—Technical 
 Investigations: Bulletin 2—Slab Analogy Experiments, Denver 1938.
 Professor Harald M. Westergaard, at the University of Illinois in 1931, 
proposed the use of slab analogy in experimental investigations of stresses 
in  Hoover Dam by means of measurements on rubber slabs.  Slab analogy 
experiments were made to defl ect slab models of the crown cantilever and an 
arch at elevation 900 to obtain stress functions usable in the Trial Load analyses.  
Stresses in the slab are proportional to twists and curvature in the slab.  In other 
words, any system of curvatures and twists possible in a slab due to deformation 
of the boundaries is analogous to a distribution of stress in a plane solid of 
the same shape distorted by loads applied at the edges.  Therefore, to solve a 
plane stress problem by slab analogy methods, it is suffi cient to apply along the 
boundary of a slab, similar in shape to the original, curvatures proportional at 
every point of the boundary to the loading on the original.  The two structures, 
being analogous at the boundaries, are thereby analogous throughout; and 
the direct stress or shear at any point in the solid may be determined from 
curvatures and twists at the corresponding point in the slab.  So proper curvature 
measurements were made at the desired location and translated into stresses.
1.26.  Scale model of  Hoover 
Dam, Arizona-Nevada.
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V.B.  Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part V—Technical 
Investigations: Bulletin 3—Model Tests of Boulder Dam, Denver 1939.
 Before the Hoover model tests, there were model tests on Gibson Dam in 
cooperation with the University of Colorado, the Engineering Foundation Arch 
Dam Committee, and Reclamation.  Concrete was mixed with the same aggregate 
as in the dam, and mercury was used for the water load.  Results showed the 
Trial Load Method gives accurate results for an arch dam, and measurements 
on the model checked closely with measurements on the downstream face of 
the dam.  It was evident however that a different material would need to be used 
in the Hoover model to permit measurable defl ections.  As a result, a mixture 
of plaster and diatomaceous earth (Celite) was developed and used for the fi rst 
model.  During testing of the plaster/diatomaceous earth model, the Aluminum 
Corporation of America developed a rubber-litharge compound which was used 
in the second model of  Hoover Dam.  It had a lower modulus and same unit 
weight as concrete.  Water could be used for reservoir load instead of mercury 
permitting measurements on the upstream face.  The model tests showed stress 
concentrations at the top of  Hoover Dam where there was a rapid change in 
lengths of the arches.  As a result, fi llets were added to increase the thickness of 
the dam near the abutments.
V.C.  Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part V—Technical 
Investigations: Bulletin 4—Stress Studies for Boulder Dam, Denver 
1939.
 Stress studies for  Hoover Dam included several special analyses that 
had not been previously made including: analysis of tangential shear, twist, 
Poisson’s ratio effects, radial shear in the arch elements, horizontal shear in the 
cantilever elements, foundation deformation, thermal induced stresses from 
artifi cial cooling and exposed surfaces, nonlinear stress distributions in arch 
and cantilever elements, spreading of canyon walls and settling of the reservoir 
bottom from reservoir load, grouting and stage construction sequencing, and 
earthquake loading.  Maximum stresses and nonlinear stress variations in typical 
arch and cantilever elements were checked by slab analogy experiments and by 
tests on slab models.  The method of analyzing nonlinear stress effects was based 
on the analogy between partial differential equations for an Airy’s surface and 
for a homogeneous slab loaded at the edges.  Solutions were obtained both by 
mathematical analyses and by experiments on rubber slabs defl ected by twists and 
moments applied at the edges.  Adjustments were made for cantilever elements 
varying radially in thickness from downstream to upstream.  Supervisors during 
the stress studies were R. S. Lieurance for the Trial Load studies, F. D. Kirn for 
the nonlinear cantilever studies, and R. E. Glover for the nonlinear arch studies 
and special studies.
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V.D.  Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part V—Technical 
Investigations: Bulletin 6—Model Test of Arch and Cantilever 
Elements, Denver 1940.
 It was desirable to obtain comparisons between cross-sectional models and 
the three-dimensional model of the entire dam.  The cross-sectional models were 
performed at the University of Colorado in Boulder.
 Cantilever model—the cantilever model was 3-inches thick and at 1:240 
scale was the same scale as the three dimensional model of the dam.  The depth, 
upstream, and downstream dimensions of the foundation were equal to the height 
of the cantilever.
 Arch model—the purpose of the arch model was to obtain experimental 
measurements of strains and defl ections in a thick arch element.  Thin arches 
had been investigated in detail, but thick arches had not been thoroughly studied.
A horizontal section at elevation 900 was selected for the study.  Prior to these 
experiments, this thick arch had been investigated analytically and experimentally 
by slab analogy.  The arch model was built at 1:120 scale.
V.E.  Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part VII—Cement and 
Concrete Investigations: Bulletin 1—Thermal Properties of Concrete, 
Denver, 1940.
 One of the major problems at Hoover was the prevention and removal 
of heat in the concrete due to the heat of hydration.  The problem was 
compounded by the rapid construction and 
extraordinary size of the dam—locking 
in temperatures that would take more 
than 100 years to dissipate.  A series of 
radial and circumferential contraction 
joints were installed to control shrinkage 
of the concrete.  For the dam to act as a 
monolithic structure, the joints must not 
open.  However, the joints would open as 
the dam contracted from cooling of the 
concrete.  Under this scenario, grouting 
the joints would have to be done over 
generations.  Various methods were 
considered to remove the excess heat.  This 
included low-heat cement and artifi cial 
cooling.  Low-heat Portland cement was 
developed to reduce the heat of hydration 
by one-third and the temperature rise 
by about one-fourth.  Investigations 
were performed to determine the effects 
1.27.  Concrete cylinder test for  Hoover 
Dam, Arizona-Nevada
25
of physical and chemical composition of the Portland cement on strength, 
temperature rise, and other properties.  The design of the artifi cial cooling 
plan was based on the measured properties and mathematical theory of heat 
conduction.  Knowledge base at the time did not provide accurate and applicable 
values for these properties, so investigations had to be performed.  Considerable 
preliminary testing was necessary to develop apparatus and procedures for 
accurate thermal tests.  Thermal property tests on concrete were also made for 
Gibson and Owyhee Dams.  A method was developed for predicting thermal 
properties of concrete from these tests.  Computed internal temperatures showed 
close agreement with measured test sections at Hoover and Owyhee Dams, 
where concrete was cooled by circulating water through metal pipes in the dam.
Laboratory tests showed the effect on concrete temperatures of various rock types, 
water content, cement types, mix proportions, and age.  The investigations were 
made at the  Welton Street laboratory of Reclamation under the direction of H. S. 
Meissner, Arthur Ruetgers, and Robert F. Blanks.
V.F.  Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part VII—Cement and 
Concrete Investigations: Bulletin 4—Mass Concrete Investigations, 
Denver, 1940.
 The selection of the most suitable mass-concrete mix for  Hoover Dam 
and the exact determination of its properties and qualities was one of the most 
important design problems affecting the economies of the design.  The effects of 
aggregate size, test cylinder size, curing, and relative humidity on the strength, 
elasticity, permeability of the concrete; and on the bond strength of the horizontal 
lift surfaces were studied.  Rocks as large as two people could lift, plums, were 
used in the past in some dams.  Reclamation felt more satisfactory results could 
be obtained with a maximum size aggregate able to fi t in a mixer.  A 9-inch 
maximum size was arbitrarily chosen to match available sources in the area.
Little information existed on material properties using aggregate of this size; 
therefore, a comprehensive investigation program was initiated.  Procedures 
for this type of concrete mix at the time would screen off any aggregate larger 
than 1.5-inch and test 6-inch diameter by 12-inch high concrete cylinders.  No 
complete investigation had been performed to study the effect of the screening 
process.
 Information existed concerning the effect of various curing conditions on 
concrete properties, but no direct comparison could be made between strengths 
of concrete cured in the interior of a large dam and the conditions in a laboratory.  
Only permeability tests on concrete under low water pressures had been 
performed.  Because of the height of  Hoover Dam, concrete permeability tests 
for high water pressures were performed.  Most of these tests were performed in 
the old Custom House laboratory under the supervision of E. N. Vidal.  Concrete 
dams are built in lifts.  Subsequent concrete placements must be suffi ciently 
bonded.  Bond tests were conducted at the University of California Material 
Laboratory, Berkeley, California.
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V.G.  Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports: Part VII—Cement and 
Concrete Investigations: Bulletin 2—Investigations of Portland 
Cement, Denver, 1940.
 Although Portland cement had been used as a building material for more 
than a century, the unsuitability of the standard product for a structure as massive 
as  Hoover Dam had become generally recognized at the time design work was 
begun.  The main concerns were the heat generated during the hydration process 
and the shrinkage.  The ideal cement for all purposes would be one which would 
permit the concrete to have no volume change subsequent to setting.  Other 
desirable properties of mass concrete, which are dependent on the cement, 
are slower and better sustained hardening and adjustment to early stresses.  In 
constructing the dam, contraction joints were provided at regular intervals in both 
the radial and circumferential directions.  The structure was built in columnar 
blocks, approximately 50 feet square.  The joints in between the blocks would 
allow for contraction of the concrete when it cooled.
 At the time Hoover was designed, little work had been done on the 
investigation of cements for mass concrete.  C. P. Williams during construction 
of the Rodriguez Dam in Mexico fi rst recognized the value of low-heat cement 
in reducing temperatures and reducing cracking.  Late in 1930 Burton Lowther, 
a Denver consulting engineer, recognized the desirability of a low-heat cement 
and performed investigations for Reclamation at the Pierce Testing Laboratories 
in Denver.  At the laboratories of the Bureau of Standards, Washington, D. C., 
preliminary tests were made of forty-nine commercial cements, selected from 
various parts of the United States.  The work begun in Washington was continued 
and greatly expanded in the Engineering Materials Laboratory of the University 
of California at Berkeley.  Some specimens cast and tested were concrete, but the 
majority were mortar or neat cement.  Concurrent with and supplementing the 
investigations at Berkeley were the investigations made in the laboratories of the 
Bureau of Reclamation in Denver.  Unlike the Berkeley test, most of the tests in 
Denver were made on concrete specimens rather than mortar specimens.
 In summary, it is safe to say that the sheer size of the  Hoover Dam 
project, and the associated need to overcome many shortcomings in the design, 
analysis, and construction of concrete dams up until that time, led to  signifi cant 
advancements in the  state-of-the-art, ultimately to become the  state-of-practice.  
This project, perhaps more than any other, came to represent the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s world renowned expertise.
VI.  Hydraulics for High Concrete Dams
 Without question, a major breakthrough in the understanding of high-
head, high-velocity spillway designs resulted from the Boulder Canyon Project 
and construction of  Hoover Dam.  Between 1928 (authorization of the Project) 
and 1948 (completion of Project documentation), extensive research formed the 
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“benchmark” for present-
day spillway designs and 
analyses.  The unprecedented 
size of the spillways (each 
with design capacity of 
200,000 ft3/s and a maximum 
average velocity approaching 
175 ft/s) for  Hoover Dam 
was the motivation to initiate 
a comprehensive research 
program.  Of particular 
note, was the research and 
development of methods to 
design the “ogee” spillway 
crest, which is still used for spillway designs around the world.  Prior to this 
research, methods of estimating the “under-nappe” of a jet of water moving over 
a sharp crested-weir were based on approximate observations made by M. Bazin 
in the late 1800s and typically used a vertical upstream face on the spillway 
crest.  The shape of the under-nappe defi nes a minimum shape or profi le for 
the spillway fl ow surface.  Unless the fl ow surface matches or is fl atter than the 
under-nappe, sub-atmospheric pressure can occur, possibly leading to reduced 
stabilizing tailwater backpressure, increased cavitation potential, or vibrations.
The Boulder Canyon Project hydraulic research expanded on Bazin’s methods and 
developed design tools, which can still be found in Reclamation’s Engineering
Monograph (EM) No. 9 by J. N. Bradley and in Design of Small Dams.  The 
design tools provide considerable fl exibility and methods to: (a) determine the 
spillway ogee shape required to best fi t the under-nappe of the overfalling stream 
for any practical condition of design; (b) derive the nappe shape due to varying 
approach velocities; (c) determine the coeffi cient of discharge for overfall dams 
(or spillways) with vertical, 
sloping, overhanging and 
offset upstream faces; (d) 
determine effects on coeffi cient 
of discharge due to different 
crest shapes with and without 
control gates, including the 
effects of adjacent terrain, 
piers, and position of gates; 
and (e) determine the effects on 
the coeffi cient of discharge due 
to downstream submergence.
 A second major 
breakthrough in hydraulic 
design for high dams occurred 
in 1958 with the fi rst printing of Reclamation’s Engineering Monograph (EM) 
1.29.  Basin X (tunnel fl ip bucket), spillway discharg-
ing approximately 27,000 ft3/s - Glen Canyon Dam, 
Arizona.
1.28.  Modern Ogee Spillway crest confi guration.
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No. 25, Hydraulic Design of  Stilling Basins and Energy Dissipators by  Alvin J. 
Peterka.  This publication summarized twenty-three years of research and design 
experience, and provided a practical design tool for sizing  stilling basins.  Since 
that initial printing this EM has been updated and was last reprinted in 1984.
Until the development of this EM, attempts to generalize data from hydraulic 
model studies and resulting designs led to inconsistent results.  To resolve this, 
a research program was undertaken, starting with observing all phases of the 
“hydraulic jump.”  With an understanding of this phenomenon, it was possible 
to develop practical and common aspects of energy dissipation designs.  This 
EM documents that effort, and provides general design rules and procedures for 
ten stilling basin or  energy dissipator types, which in some cases eliminates the 
need for hydraulic model studies.  It should be noted that hydraulic model studies 
still play an important role in the design process.  They are used to optimize the 
structure’s size, account for non-symmetrical approach and exit conditions, and 
to evaluate unusual fl ow conditions in or through the structure.  Three types of 
stilling basins and energy dissipators have been primarily used for spillways 
associated with high concrete dams.  These include:
1. Basin V (sloping aprons)—This basin relies on a hydraulic jump to 
dissipate energy.  The downstream basin slopes gently downstream.  
Designs that used Basin V stilling basins included Shasta, Canyon Ferry, 
Olympus, Friant, and Keswick Dams.
2. Basin VII (slotted and solid buckets)—As with Basin V, this basin also 
relies on a hydraulic jump to dissipate energy.  However, the downstream 
basin is curved up with a lip at the downstream end.  Designs relying on 
Basin VII stilling basins included  Grand Coulee Dam, (solid bucket); and 
Angostura Dam (slotted bucket).
3. Basin X (tunnel fl ip buckets)—Unlike the basin V and VII, a hydraulic 
jump is not initiated.  This is an energy dissipater that projects the exiting 
jet into the air, spreading and aerating the jet before it impinges into the 
tailwater.  Basin X energy dissipators were used for Glen Canyon, Hungry 
Horse, Yellowtail, and Flaming Gorge Dams.
 A third major advancement in evaluating hydraulics for high concrete 
dams involved the understanding of  cavitation.  Although Reclamation had 
investigated cavitation damage and implemented repairs since 1941, the 
understanding and methodology to adequately mitigate cavitation damage was 
not developed until after signifi cant cavitation damage occurred at Glen Canyon 
and  Hoover Dam tunnel spillways as a result of  fl ooding in 1983.  Prior to 
this, standard practice was to specify very stringent concrete fi nishes for fl ow 
surfaces associated with discharge velocities greater than 75ft/s.  The concrete 
fi nishes for these fl ow surfaces were very diffi cult to achieve in the fi eld.  A 
more effective method had actually been employed in 1961 and 1969 with the 
installation of aerators to address the cavitation damage which occurred at  Grand 
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Coulee Dam outlet works tubes, and the  Yellowtail Dam spillway, respectively.  
The installation of the aerator for Yellowtail Dam spillway is thought to be the 
fi rst of its kind, and after which, it was noted that aerators were being installed 
worldwide.  It is interesting to note that research had already illustrated the 
effectiveness of extremely small quantities of air entrained in fl owing water in 
signifi cantly reducing the tendency for cavitation damage.  However, it was not 
until the mid- to late-1980s that suffi cient research, design, and experience had 
been gained to change Reclamation’s approach to mitigating cavitation potential.  
Cavitation was found to be the result of formation and collapse of vapor cavities 
at abrupt changes in geometry of the fl ow surface.  Resulting from an eight year 
effort,  Henry T. Falvey’s  Engineering Monograph (EM) No. 42,  Cavitation in 
Chutes and Spillways was published in 1990, providing common-sense guidance 
on how to identify and mitigate cavitation potential.  Two important developments 
include: (1) generalized guidelines and tools were developed to assess the 
potential degree of cavitation, and to develop preliminary aeration designs, and 
(2) concrete fi nishes (surface textures) were decoupled from concrete tolerances 
(surface offsets and irregularities), recommended surface tolerances were revised 
to be more achievable in the fi eld, and these tolerances were linked to cavitation 
indices.  These indices are a function of the fl uid velocity and pressure, and 
empirically give an indication of the potential for cavitation.
 Today, as standard practice 
in the technical evaluations of 
existing and new spillways, the 
cavitation potential is evaluated by 
fi rst evaluating the cavitation index 
(?) profi les at different discharges.  
Based on cavitation index profi les, 
the required surface tolerances are 
determined as a function of the 
minimum value of cavitation index.
If the cavitation index is less than 
0.2, cavitation would be expected, 
and the effects of changing the 
spillway geometry on the cavitation 
index should be evaluated.  If low 
values of the cavitation indices 
cannot be raised by changing the 
geometry, a concept change or an 
aeration device should be considered. 
Using these procedures, aerators 
have been installed in the spillway 
tunnels for Glen Canyon, Flaming 
Gorge, Hoover, and Yellowtail Dams.
1.30.  1983 cavitation damage in the Left Spill-
way Tunnel.  The “big hole” extends 
approximately 27 feet below the tunnel invert, 
Glen Canyon Dam, Arizona.
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VII.  World War II Era—Large Gravity Dams
 In the 1930s the United States was hungry for electric power, and this 
became even more important to power war production factories following entry 
into World War II in 1941.  The technology developed during the design and 
construction of  Hoover Dam was available to construct large concrete dams and 
associated hydroelectric power plants.  In order to tap the energy reserves of 
large and wide rivers, it became necessary to construct gravity dams.  Two of the 
largest of these,  Grand Coulee and  Shasta Dams, were constructed by the Bureau 
of Reclamation in the late 1930s and 1940s.  These dams became engineering 
landmarks, and have been studied and emulated by other countries around the 
world.  During this time, John “Jack” L. Savage served as Chief Design Engineer.  
His offi ce in Denver then was 
the foremost engineering offi ce 
in the world for water resource 
heavy construction projects.
Savage gained world-wide 
renown for his work with 
the Bureau of Reclamation, 
and received may honors and 
awards.  He was reputed to be 
modest to an extreme, and was 
of such character as to readily 
receive the loyalty of his 
capable organization.
 The original design of  Grand Coulee Dam called for a low dam to be built 
to elevation 1116 with the left power plant included.  It would accommodate a 
future dam raise and expansion of the power plants, but originally would not 
provide irrigation water.  The specifi cations were issued, the contract awarded, 
and the Notice to Proceed issued on September 25, 1934, for the low dam 
concept.  Shortly after the construction activities began, renewed pressure came 
from the local agricultural constituents for the high dam.  They caught the ear of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt during his August 4, 1934, visit to the site.  A 
reevaluation of the economics and technical issues associated with raising the dam 
indicated substantial benefi ts in going directly to a high dam.  By June 5, 1935, a 
major change order was issued, increasing the excavation and changing the shape 
and details of the dam to allow immediate construction of a high dam to elevation 
1311 through a second contract.  The dam would be a gravity structure nearly 
a mile long and 550 feet high, with a downstream slope of 0.8:1, and a central 
spillway section controlled by drum gates capable of releasing 1,000,000 ft3/s.
Water would be pumped from the Columbia River to a reservoir in the Grand 
Coulee, a basin eroded by the river during the Ice Age when ice blocked the main 
course of the river.  In January 1942, about a month after the Japanese attacked 
Pearl Harbor, a contingent of the U.S. Army took up quarters in Mason City and 
performed guard duty at the dam due to concerns about a possible enemy thrust 
1.31.   Grand Coulee Dam, Forebay Dam, and Third 
Powerplant, Washington.
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into the area.  All efforts were concentrated 
on getting the power online to supply energy 
to aluminum plants and shipyards.
 Diversion of such a large river posed 
many problems, but a series of cofferdams, 
and diverting fl ows over the low blocks in 
the dam allowed the construction to proceed. 
Landslides in the fi ne-grained deposits from 
the Ice Age mantling the river banks were 
also problematic.  Stabilization included 
fl attening slopes, installing drainage, and 
temporarily freezing the soil.  The dam was 
founded on hard granite scoured by the 
pre-ice age river.  As had become standard 
practice, foundation grouting and drainage 
were constructed.  Three-dimensional Trial 
Load twist analyses, fully developed during 
the design of  Hoover Dam, were performed 
for the high gravity dam design.  Due to 
stress concentrations in the portion of the 
dam adjacent to the sharply rising abutments 
and concerns for potential cracking, vertical “twist slots” were designed for the 
abutment sections to give the structure some fl exibility to adjust to loads.  Five 
twist slots were constructed, two on the left side and three on the right side.  The 
slots were initially fi lled with sand.  After the reservoir had fi lled to elevation 
1150, the sand was removed and the slots fi lled with concrete.
 Low heat cement was used for the project.  It had a slower set time 
delaying stripping of the forms, but lower heat of hydration than conventional 
cement was a great bonus in cooling the concrete and keeping cracking to 
a minimum.  The concrete was made of aggregate, cement, and water.  No 
admixtures, other than limited quantities of calcium chloride to accelerate the set, 
had become acceptable at that time.  Two mixing plants were constructed, one 
on each side of the canyon, and at the peak of production 20,684 yd3 of concrete 
were placed in 24 hours on May 29, 1939.  The rock and concrete surfaces were 
thoroughly cleaned for placement of concrete using wire brushes, sand blasting, 
and water jets.  The concrete was placed in 5-foot lifts and about 50-foot square 
maximum size blocks.  At least 72 hours were required between successive 
lift placements.  Cooling coils were placed on the lift surface, and drain forms 
installed.  Then a ½-inch-thick layer of mortar was placed on the surface to 
provide a good bond.  Concrete with a 2-inch slump or less was delivered in four-
yard buckets using small trains running on a trestle and cranes.  The concrete was 
placed in one foot layers and thoroughly consolidated with electric and pneumatic 
vibrators.  The exposed surfaces were kept wet for fourteen days.  River water 
was pumped through the cooling coils to cool the concrete.  An evaporative 
1.32.  Construction of Grand Cou lee 
Forebay Dam, Washington.  
(Note unkeyed contraction joint.)
32
cooling tower was eventually installed to enhance the concrete cooling.  The 
concrete was cooled to about 45 degrees Fahrenheit, and then the transverse keyed 
contraction joints, spaced at 50 feet, were grouted.  Reclamation’s 4,000,000 lb. 
testing machine was installed in the Denver laboratory at the U.S. Customs House 
during the period of dam construction to permit testing the strength of large 
aggregate concrete, using cylinders up to 36 inches in diameter.
 The Forebay Dam and  Third 
Power Plant were completed in 1974, 
and they greatly increased the power 
generating capacity of the project.  Two 
concrete mixes were used for construction 
of the Forebay Dam; a richer mix for 
exterior surfaces and a somewhat leaner 
mix for the interior mass concrete.  Fly 
ash and air entrainment were used in all 
concrete.  The fully automatic batching 
plant had provisions for handling 
fi ve aggregate sizes ranging to 6-inch 
maximum, and a refrigeration plant for 
chilling water and making ice to cool the 
mix to the required 40 to 50°F placement 
temperature.  All concrete was membrane 
cured.  Vertical contraction joints normal 
to the axis were spaced at alternating 
distances of 50 and 70 feet, the large 
spacing required to accommodate the 40-
foot-diameter penstocks.  Artifi cial cooling was performed in the lower portions 
of the blocks.  The contraction joints contain water stops, but only the lower 
portions were grouted, presumably to stabilize the sections of the dam that contain 
the penstocks.  However, the more important consideration is that the contraction 
joints keyed.  This allows each block to adjust to movements individually, but also 
reduces load transfer between adjacent monoliths in the case of local instability.
 Construction of  Shasta 
Dam in northern California 
overlapped with construction 
of the original  Grand Coulee 
Dam.  At the time,  Shasta Dam 
was second only to Grand 
Coulee in volume, and second 
only to Hoover in height.  The 
dam is on the Sacramento 
River in northern California, 
and is the cornerstone of 
the Central Valley Project.  
1.33.  Construction of  Grand Coulee 
Dam, Washington.  (Note Keyed con-
traction joint.)
1.34.   Shasta Dam, California.
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Although curved in plan to match the site conditions, the dam was designed as a 
gravity dam, with a downstream slope of 0.8:1.  By this time effi cient placement 
and cooling of large volumes of concrete could be readily achieved, due largely 
to the development that occurred during the 
design and construction of  Hoover Dam.  
Construction methods were nearly identical to 
those at  Grand Coulee Dam.  As an interesting 
note, two generators lay idle at  Shasta Dam 
in the early days of World War II, with no 
prospect for immediate use.  They were 
shipped and installed at  Grand Coulee Dam, 
providing power during the critical war years, 
and then returned to Shasta following the war.
 It should be noted that during this 
period of time the effects of alkali-aggregate 
reaction (AAR) came to the forefront.  A 
chemical reaction between the alkali in 
the cement and certain types of aggregates 
causes expansion of the concrete usually 
leading to cracking, and in cold climates 
the damage can be exacerbated by freeze-
thaw mechanisms as water enters the cracks.
Extensive cracking and deterioration at  Parker 
Dam in Arizona, and  American Falls Dam 
in Idaho led the Bureau of Reclamation to 
conduct studies into the phenomena beginning 
about 1941.  Petrographic examination of 
aggregates became the primary means of 
identifying potentially reactive aggregates in 
about 1941.  The limitation of alkalis in the 
cement to less than 0.6 percent as a means 
to control AAR was fi rst published in the 
Fourth Edition of the Concrete Manual by 
the Bureau of Reclamation in October 1942.
Investigations into the effects of pozzolans to 
reduce alkali- aggregate reaction were begun 
in the early 1940s.  Using 20 percent Class F 
or N pozzolans as a replacement for cement 
became standard practice for the Bureau of 
Reclamation in about 1970.  This not only 
reduces the cost of the cementitious material, 
but also provides additional protection.
 By this time, deterioration of some 
concretes in cold climates had been noted, 
1.35.  Cracking at Friant Dam due 
to Alkali-Aggregate Reaction, Friant 
Dam, California.
1.36.  Freeze-thaw damage on 
downstream face of Deadwood 
Dam, Idaho.  (Note that damage is 
near contraction joint due to leak-
age.)
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and was described in general terms as durability.  The problem was  freeze-thaw 
damage, whereby water present in the saturated cement expands upon freezing, 
exerting pressures that far exceed the tensile capacity of the paste, causing 
cracking and ultimately failure of the concrete after repeated cycles.  It was found 
that high strength concrete made with good quality aggregates and low water to 
cement ratios generally had better durability.  However, experience accumulated 
during the 1920s and 1930s suggested that other factors also contributed to 
whether a concrete was susceptible to freeze-thaw damage.  The Bureau of 
Reclamation began testing concrete for freeze-thaw durability in about 1937 with 
the development of accelerated freezing-thawing test apparatus.  The fi rst studies 
of standard concrete mixes of the time indicated that failure usually occurred 
after about 150 to 200 cycles.  Formal studies of the effects of an  air-entraining 
admixture performed in 1942 reported an increase in the number of cycles to 400 
to 450.  However, the Fourth Edition of Reclamation’s Concrete Manual provided 
no reference to air entrained concrete.  Due to World War II, this information 
was not published until 1949 in the Fifth Edition of the Concrete Manual.  Air-
entrained concrete as a means to increase concrete durability has been standard 
practice since.
VIII.  The Post-War Boom—Developments Continue
 Following World War II, 
the country entered into a boom 
period.  The demand for power was 
high, and the developments that 
occurred with the building of large 
concrete dams and associated power 
plants such as Hoover and Grand 
Coulee were put to use in quickly 
building several more monumental 
concrete dams and power plants, 
such as  Glen Canyon (a 710-foot 
high thick arch dam on the Colorado 
River),  Yellowtail (a 525-foot high 
arch dam on the Bighorn River in 
Montana), and  Flaming Gorge Dam (a 502-foot high arch dam on the Green River 
in Utah).  The fi rst of these large post-war concrete dams was Hungry Horse.
Hungry Horse Dam, constructed in 1948-1953, is a concrete arch structure 
that has a structural height of 564 feet and a crest length of 2,115 feet at crest 
elevation 3565.0.  The dam is located on the South Fork of the Flathead River 
in northwestern Montana, south of the southern border of Glacier National 
Park.  The dam impounds a reservoir containing 3,467,000 acre feet of storage at 
elevation 3560.0.  The reservoir provides the benefi ts of power generation, fl ood 
control, irrigation, river regulation for fi sheries, and recreation.
1.37.  Hungry Horse Dam, Montana.
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 Hungry Horse Dam was designed and analyzed by Trial Load Methods.  
(Though not used for Hungry Horse, physical model studies were still in use, and 
were performed later for Glen Canyon and Morrow Point Dams.)  The analyses 
include the stage construction of varying reservoir elevations and grout zones.
Concrete was cooled by embedded cooling pipes to 38°F.  Original designs 
called for the vertical radial contraction joints to be 50 feet apart, but based on 
temperature studies, an 80-foot spacing was used.  One cross canyon contraction 
joint was used across blocks 10 to 23 at alternating distances of 134 feet and 
186 feet from the axis.  The vertical contraction joints have shear keys.  Formed 
drains were constructed at each contraction joint and at 10 feet on centers across 
the dam.  Collected drainage fl ows by gravity into a sump consisting of two 
pumps each discharging 500 gallons per minute.
 The dam consists of 27 blocks numbered from 2 on the left abutment to 
28 on the right abutment.  Lifts were 5 feet in height.  There were different 
concrete mixes for the interior and exterior (5 foot minimum to 9 foot average 
exterior concrete thickness on the faces and crest roadway) of the dam consisting 
of cement, fl y ash, and 6-inch maximum sized aggregate.  Flyash used as 
pozzolan helped reduce the heat of hydration while providing long term strength 
gain.
 Another major development of the post-war era was the use of  air-
entraining admixtures to increase the durability of concrete to freeze-thaw 
damage.  Problems with air entrainment persisted throughout construction of 
Hungry Horse Dam, but were perfected at later structures.  Early stripping of 
forms was a major cause of surface damage.
 Extensive instrumentation systems had become standard by this time.  The 
dam has seven lines of uplift measurements at the dam to foundation contact, 
three plumb lines, and fl ow measurements from drain holes in the right abutment.  
Defl ections are measured with three plumb lines located in blocks 8, 17 (crown), 
and 24.  The dam has permanently shifted upstream about 0.3 inches since 1962.  
The dam moves a total less than 0.4 inches season to season.
 The dam was constructed close to current day standards with vertical 
contraction joints, formed drains at 10-foot centers in the concrete, foundation 
drains at 10-foot centers in the foundation, foundation grouting, artifi cial cooling 
of the mass to 38°F and contraction joint grouting, cleaning of the lift lines 
and dam to foundation contact for bond, and concrete strengths (tested during 
construction) averaging over 4000 lb/in2.  There is radial cracking on the crest 
in blocks 4 and 24 progressing 30 feet down on the downstream face and into 
the roadway gallery.  Radial cracking on the crest is probably thermal induced 
cracking because the contraction joints are 80 feet apart and not the typical 
50 feet.
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 The spillway at Hungry Horse Dam is a concrete-lined tunnel with a 
morning-glory intake on the right abutment designed for a maximum discharge 
capacity of 53,000 ft3/s for a reservoir elevation at the crest of the dam (elevation 
3565.0).  The normal high water surface is 5 feet lower than this maximum 
with the ring gate in the raised position.  The spillway was designed using two 
laboratory models and approximately 200 tests.  Subatmospheric pressures were 
reduced to very low levels by shaping the crest profi le, developing an effi cient 
venting system, increasing the lower bend radius from 55 to 120 feet, and 
providing a guide vane for the upper bend together with a pier on the spillway 
crest.  The only difference in the actual spillway was the elimination of the vane 
and pier because of diffi culty in construction.  The venting system vents the 
1.38.  Plans and Sections of Hungry Horse Dam and spillway, Montana.
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undernappe from the crest structure with nine 8-inch pipes at 30 degree centers 
around the crest and vents the crown of the spillway tunnel in the upper bend 
at elevation 3514.0 with an additional inlet.  Air is supplied by a 6-foot square 
air inlet tunnel in the right abutment.  With 53,000 ft3/sec discharge, velocities 
of the water at the outlet portal are computed to be between 132 and 146 ft/sec.
The spillway crest is controlled by a 64-foot diameter buoyant ring gate having a 
maximum lift of 12 feet from elevation 3548.0 to 3560.0.  A  deicing system using 
compressed air bubblers prevents ice forming on the gate.  Spillway discharge 
varies from free-fl ow discharge at low heads to orifi ce-fl ow discharge at higher 
heads.
 Several precautions were taken during construction of the spillway to 
assure accurate alignment and smooth concrete surfaces.  Even construction joints 
were eliminated in the vertical curve and defl ector sections to avoid offsets at the 
joints.  A 50 degree inclined shaft was chosen over a vertical shaft for economic 
reasons and ease of excavation, to cross bedding planes at right angles and confi ne 
overbreaks to the upper right-hand quadrant of the shaft because of one of the 
joint systems.  After placement of the tunnel lining, the surrounding rock was 
thoroughly grouted using pressures varying between 125 lb/in2 and 150 lb/in2.
Irregularities in the lining were eliminated by grinding, sandblasting, hand-stoning 
with a fi ne-grit Carborundum™ stone, and then fi nal grinding after 7 days of cure. 
The vertical bend and defl ector sections were placed without construction joints 
and cooled with river water pumped through cooling coils.  Rather extensive 
repairs of the concrete surfaces in the spillway tunnel were required because of 
retractions and bulges in the wood forms.  Concrete was placed in above-freezing 
temperatures and curing was by hand sprinkling.
 The foundation at Hungry Horse Dam is the Siyeh limestone formation 
with beds ranging in thickness from a few inches to several feet.  The average 
strike of these beds is  N38W and an average dip of 30NE which is upstream 
and into the right abutment.  Several faults were present in the foundation which 
required excavation and backfi ll concrete treatment.  Foundation grouting and 
drainage were typical for the time.  However, an unusual foundation treatment 
was used for the fi rst time.  A clay seam along bedding was discovered in blocks 
11, 12, and 13.  It was decided to wash out the clay with water and air at less 
than 30 lb/in2 pressure and backfi ll with grout rather than to remove the 7,100 cy 
of rock above the seam.  At some point, pressures of 250 lb/in2 were used.  The 
seam was excavated above fault 3.  The treatment was verifi ed to be effective by 
extracting core and inspections down calyx sized holes.
IX.  The Failure of Malpasset Dam—Rock Mechanics and Foundation 
Design Develops
 Although several concrete dams failed due to foundation defi ciencies 
during the early years of concrete dam construction in the United States, it wasn’t 
until the failure of  Malpasset Dam in 1954 that the profession recognized a need 
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for more rigorous foundation 
investigations and analytical 
design methods.  Malpasset 
dam was a 216-foot high thin 
arch dam completed on the 
Reyran River upstream of 
Frejus in the Cannes District 
of France.  The reservoir had 
a capacity of 41,700 acre 
feet.  Although the foundation 
contact was blanket grouted 
with 16-foot deep holes, a 
grout curtain was considered 
unnecessary due to the low permeability of the rock.  No drainage had been 
provided in the dam or foundation, and no instrumentation, other than surface 
measurement points, was installed.  The foundation consisted of metamorphic 
schists.  Heavy rainfall occurred during the fall of 1954 shortly after completion 
of the dam, and by mid-November the reservoir was within 17 feet of the normal 
maximum level.  At that time operators discovered a trickle of clear water about 
60 feet downstream of the dam on the right abutment.  Cracks had been seen 
in the concrete apron at the toe of the dam, but no one knew when they fi rst 
appeared.  Another intense rainstorm began on November 28, and by December 
2, the reservoir was full and the outlet was opened.  At 8:45 p.m., the caretaker 
left the dam without observing anything unusual.  At 9:10 p.m. the dam failed 
suddenly, causing total destruction along a 7-mile course to the Mediterranean 
Sea.
 Analysis of the 
displacements of the dam 
remains showed that the left 
side of the dam and underlying 
foundation lifted and rotated 
as a monolithic unit about a 
vertical axis located where the 
crest met the right abutment.
Conventional structural 
analyses using a wide range 
of material properties showed 
concrete stresses were well 
within strength parameters, 
and did not explain the failure.  
Arch buckling analyses also indicated an ample margin of safety.  The failure 
left an upstream dipping fault zone and downstream dipping foliation plane 
exposed on the left abutment, intersecting below where the dam once stood.  The 
measured movements and post-failure evidence pointed to abutment sliding on 
the fault as the cause of failure.  Dr. Pierre Londe developed three-dimensional 
1.40.  Malpasset Dam failure, Cannes District, 
France.
1.39.  Malpasset Dam, Cannes District, France.
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limit equilibrium analysis techniques to evaluate the stability of a dihedral wedge 
formed by the fault, the shear, and a third joint release plane.  The stability of the 
wedge was evaluated under loads consisting of dead weight, water uplift forces on 
each plane, and the thrust from the dam.  Instability was explained by this analysis 
when large uplift forces were assumed to develop on the foliation shear.
 Thus, the science of rock mechanics was applied to concrete dam 
foundations.  Shortly after this, in the late 1950s and early 1960s during the design 
of Yellowtail, Glen Canyon, and Morrow Point Dams, the Bureau of Reclamation 
began further developing rock mechanics methods in application to concrete 
dam  foundation design and analysis.  Large scale in-situ tests were developed 
for determining rock mass deformability properties.  Exploratory drilling and 
geophysical testing were performed to evaluate foundation conditions, and careful 
attention was paid to major discontinuities within the rock.  However, it was 
not until the designs for Auburn Dam were underway in the late 1960s that the 
foundation exploration, analysis, and design were coherently integrated.  Under 
the direction of Louis R. Frei, James S. Legas, and J. Lawrence Von Thun, world 
class foundation investigations, testing, evaluation, design, and treatment occured 
at the Auburn Damsite.  Although Auburn Dam was never completed, this work 
was an enormous contribution to the profession, and formed the basis for future 
evaluations within the Bureau of Reclamation.
 The Auburn Damsite 
consists of complex 
metamorphic geology.  The 
basic rock type is a dense 
amphibolite, but numerous 
faults and talc zones cut the 
rock, and metasediments 
occurred within the 
foundation.  Careful 
diamond core drilling 
using split inner tube core 
barrels, trenching, and 
excavation of exploratory 
tunnels and drifts was 
performed to defi ne the 
geologic conditions.  The 
results of this exploration were portrayed on geologic plan, section, and structural 
contour maps to provide a complete three-dimensional picture of the foundation.
Weathering profi les and fracture density characterization were used to defi ne 
the foundation excavation to suitable rock.  It was recognized that the rock 
deformation properties were key in determining how load was distributed to the 
foundation from the dam, and that jointing and discontinuities within the rock had 
a pronounced effect on these deformation properties.  In-situ deformation testing 
was performed in the exploratory tunnels and drifts.  Despite the large size of the 
1.41.  Photo of Uniaxial Jacking Test performed at the 
Auburn Damsite, California, to measure deformation 
properties of foundation rock mass.
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tests, it was recognized that 
they still represented a small 
point in the foundation rock.  
Methods were therefore 
developed to extrapolate 
these results to the rest of the 
foundation.  From this, the 
deformation properties of 
the foundation were defi ned 
for input to fi nite element 
and Trial Load structural 
analyses of the concrete arch 
dam.
 Seepage analyses were performed to evaluate potential foundation uplift 
pressures.  Exit gradients at fault and talc zones near the toe of the dam were 
analyzed, and testing was developed to determine critical exit gradients where 
piping of these zones would initiate.  Potential modes of instability were identifi ed 
by evaluating discontinuities (faults, shears, joints, foliation planes, talc zones) 
within the foundation.  “Failure mode assessment” as it is sometimes called, was 
developed fully in the rock mechanics arena, and has been a valuable contribution 
to other areas of engineering.  Foundation blocks formed by discontinuities that 
intersected beneath the dam, with the intersection or one of the planes daylighting 
downstream, were analyzed using limit equilibrium techniques.  The shear 
strength of the critical potential sliding planes was evaluated by laboratory and 
in situ testing of samples from the appropriate faults, talc zones, and joints.  Arch 
thrust from gravity, reservoir, and temperature loads; dead load of the foundation 
blocks; uplift on the planes that formed the blocks; and earthquake loading were 
all considered in the evaluations.  Finally, foundation treatment, in the form of 
excavation of the weak zones and replacement with mass concrete, was designed 
based on the results of all the studies.  In some cases the treatment was controlled 
by the need to develop a smooth deformation pattern or transfer of load across 
discontinuities.  In others, the treatment was controlled by the extra shear strength 
needed for stability, or by the need to reduce exit gradients.
 Although improvements to the analysis methods have been made over 
the years including better methods for evaluating seismic stability, the basic 
evaluation process remains essentially the same as that developed at the Auburn 
Damsite.  Many concrete dam foundations have been evaluated using these 
procedures.  Detailed foundation rock mechanics analyses are now an important 
aspect of the standard practice for evaluating concrete dams.
X.  The  Double-Curvature Arch—A New Standard for Effi ciency
 Beginning in about the early 1960s a new concept for shaping arch 
dams found its way to the Bureau of Reclamation.  This shape, termed “double-
1.42.  Schematic of Uniaxial Jacking Test performed at 
the Auburn Damsite, California, to measure deformation 
properties of foundation rock mass.
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curvature” provided for more effi cient distribution of loads within the structure 
and to the abutments.  A double-curvature arch is curved in plan view and section 
view.  This results in more of a “bowl” shape to the structure.  The undercutting at 
the heel of the dam that results from this shape, and the inward curvature on the 
downstream face, eliminate areas where tensions typically develop in arch dams.
 The fi rst double-curvature dam 
constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation 
is Morrow Point Dam.  The dam has a 
structural height of 468 feet and a crest 
length of 724 feet.  The dam is a variable-
center arch structure with an axis radius of 
375 feet.  The crest of the dam at elevation 
7165 carries a 12-foot-wide roadway.  
Storage in the Morrow Point Reservoir 
is 117,190 acre feet at the top of active 
conservation.
 In addition to being Reclamation’s 
fi rst double-curvature arch dam, the 
project also boasts Reclamation’s fi rst 
(and only)  underground power plant.  The 
power plant chamber is tunneled into the canyon wall in the left abutment about 
400 feet below the ground surface.  Two 13.5-foot-diameter steel penstocks carry 
fl ow to the power plant, which contains two 86,667-kilowatt generators driven by 
two 83,000-horsepower turbines.
 Because Morrow Point Dam was the fi rst double-curvature thin arch dam 
built by Reclamation, the geologic exploration program was one of the most 
extensive programs ever carried out.  The geologic data was developed through a 
comprehensive investigation which included detailed geologic mapping, diamond 
core drilling, excavation of fi ve exploratory tunnels, examination of drill holes 
by television, and seismic surveys.  Geologic studies were also coordinated with 
horizontal and vertical in-situ jacking tests and with Whittemore and borehole 
strain gage measurements.  However, failure mode assessment and foundation 
stability analyses were not part of the original foundation studies.
 Morrow Point Dam is located in a narrow section of the Black Canyon of 
the Gunnison River with very steep canyon walls and many overhangs.  The rock 
encountered at the damsite consists of alternating lenticular and irregular beds of 
biotite schist, mica schist, micaceous quartzite, and quartzite, all of which were 
intruded by granite pegmatite ranging from small veinlets to massive intrusions.
The quality of rock type varies considerably, the hardest being the granite 
pegmatite and the quartzite with variations of hardness down to the weaker biotite 
schist.
1.43.  Morrow Point Dam, Gunnison 
River, Colorado.
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 The damsite is located on 
the axis of a synclinal fold which 
plunges gently to the south (or into 
the left canyon wall) at about 5 
degrees.  The fold is expressed by 
the attitude of foliation or bedding 
which dips toward the axis from 
both upstream and downstream.
The rock contains stress relief 
jointing which generally parallels 
the canyon walls and dips steeply 
toward the river, probably resulting 
from unloading through the 
removal of overlying rock by 
river erosion.  Another indication 
of stress relief is an apparent halo of fractured rock which extends to a depth of 
about 80 feet beneath the valley fl oor.
 The analyses were very thorough since the design and layout requirements 
went beyond the state-of-the-art of that time.  The dam was mathematically 
modeled and analyzed using the Trial Load Method of Analysis when subjected 
to static load and was further analyzed using the computerized adaptation of the 
Trial Load Method (ADSAS—Arch Dam Stress Analysis System) to refi ne the 
design and layout for nine different loading conditions, including seismic loads, 
construction loads, various temperature and grouting conditions, and the as-
excavated foundation layout.  In addition, the dam was analyzed by the use of 
physical models as a check to the mathematical modeling process.  One model 
of the dam and foundation was prepared by Reclamation and the other was made 
by the Laboratorio Nacional de Enenharia Civil of Portugal.  All the analyses 
indicated the dam could safely withstand any of the loading conditions applied.
 The contract for construction of Morrow Point Dam and Powerplant 
was awarded to a joint venture of the Al Johnson Construction Company and 
Morrison-Knudsen Company on May 14, 1963, with construction completed 
on May 24, 1968.  In general, the dam and power plant were constructed in 
accordance with the designs and specifi cations with only a few complications 
arising requiring changes in the planned construction.
 Open stress relief jointing, especially in the left abutment, caused several 
small rockslides in the excavation for the access road and the upper left keyway.  
To keep the excavated surfaces stable and at grade, the contractor had to use 
controlled blasting techniques and the installation of many rockbolts.  Asphaltic 
grouting was later performed to control seepage along relief joints.  This adverse 
jointing and the presence of shears within the excavation for the underground 
power plant caused movement of large blocks of rock within the power plant 
walls.  This prompted the contractor to install additional access/drainage tunnels 
1.44.  Section thru outlet works and stilling basin, 
Morrow Point Dam, Colorado.
43
and extensive systems of rockbolts, post-tensioned cables, and fl at-jacks to 
support the rock mass and prevent further movement.
 At the beginning of concrete placements in 1966, two longitudinal cracks 
were found in the top of blocks 9 and 11 at elevation 6777.5.  Both cracks were 
in the center of the block, extended completely across the block, and had a 
maximum width of 0.03 inches.  A mat of No. 11 reinforcement bars was placed 
over these cracks and concrete placements continued with no additional problems 
identifi ed in this area.
 In May of 1966 the center formed drain in block 10 was found to be 
plugged at elevation 6815 and had fi lled with sand and debris to about elevation 
6897.  The contractor requested permission to use high pressure water to loosen 
and remove the plug.  Reclamation granted permission as long as the pressure 
in the formed drain did not exceed 100 lb/in2.  On May 5, 1967, the contractor 
applied the water pressure to the hole, but used pressures of almost 300 lb/in2 and
cracked the concrete in block 10 shortly after placements in this block reached 
elevation 7100.  The crack formed in block 10 extended completely across the 
block and extended a short distance into block 9.  The repair work included the 
following: all concrete was removed upstream of the crack, 24 rockbolts were 
installed within the dam below the crack to prevent downward propagation, 
56 No. 11 dowel bars were installed to anchor the replacement concrete to the 
undamaged concrete, concrete was replaced using an epoxy bonding agent, 
and a mat of No. 11 bars was placed over the repair area to prevent any upward 
propagation of the crack.  No problems have been identifi ed at this area since the 
repairs were completed.
 Several other  double-
curvature arch dams were 
successfully designed and 
constructed by the Bureau of 
Reclamation in the late 1960’s 
and 1970’s.  One that bears 
mention is  Nambé Falls Dam, 
a 150 foot high dam on Rio 
Nambé in New Mexico.  The 
arch is part of a composite 
structure with a massive 
concrete thrust block on the 
left abutment that ties into an 
embankment dam.  The dam 
is quite thin, and temperature 
loadings were diffi cult to design for.  Therefore, a series of fl at jacks were 
installed in the crown cantilever, and the fl at jacks were pressurized to prestress 
the dam into a state of compression that could handle all loading conditions 
adequately.  Another item of interest is the development of elliptical arches by 
1.45.  Nambé Falls Dam, New Mexico.
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the use of “three-centered” geometry.  The elliptical arches are approximated by 
a central section with a smaller radius, fl anked by abutment sections with larger 
radii.  This allows double-curvature arch dams to be designed for wider canyons.  
Although none of these were built by Reclamation, the method was developed 
and several designs were completed.
XI.  Structural Analysis Developments
A.  Development and Computerization of the  Trial Load Method
 The Trial Load Method of stress analysis assumes that the load applied to 
an arch dam would be divided between horizontal (arch) and vertical (cantilever) 
elements in such a way as to produce equal movements in all directions at points 
of intersection of these horizontal and vertical elements.  Each arch and cantilever 
element is assumed to move independently of all others, but at the conclusion 
of the analysis, geometrical continuity exists at the intersections.  Only a few 
representative arch and cantilever elements (5 to 10 each) need be analyzed.  The 
basic concept is that the internal loads equal the external loads at any intersection 
point.  The internal loads are divided between the arch and cantilever elements 
until the defl ections match.  Thus the name, Trial Load Method of analysis.  Then 
tangential and twist loads are applied in equal and opposite directions, one on 
the arch and one on the cantilever.  This way the arch and cantilever defl ections 
are brought into tangential and rotational agreement without changing the 
external load on the structure.  These internal loads set up the three-dimensional 
interaction between two-dimensional arch and cantilever elements.  To facilitate 
the process of dividing the internal loads between arches and cantilevers, certain 
patterns of loads called unit loads were developed.  In applying the unit loads, 
it was advantageous to compute the movements of arches and cantilevers from 
unit loads before attempting to divide the external load between the arches and 
cantilevers.  The total load resisted by the arches and cantilevers are determined 
by the Trial Load adjustments.  With these loads, stresses are then computed.
 There are basically  three levels of Trial Load analysis depending 
on the desired accuracy and time duration for computations.  1) The crown 
cantilever analysis consisted of adjusting defl ections of arch elements and the 
crown cantilever (the maximum vertical section in the center of the dam).  The 
results were crude and neglected the effects of tangential shear and twist, but 
the computation time was relatively short and with judgement was an effective 
tool for preliminary designs.  2) The radial defl ection analysis added two more 
cantilevers so radial defl ection agreement was obtained at the crown and quarter 
points of the dam.  The distribution of load along the arch was more accurate 
but the tangential shear and twist were still neglected, so the accuracy was only 
slightly better.  The time for a radial defl ection analysis was only slightly longer 
than the crown adjustment.  3) The complete Trial Load analysis produced 
agreement of all three linear and all three angular displacements by properly 
dividing the radial, tangential, and twist loads between the arches and cantilevers.  
45
The accuracy was only limited by the number of arches and cantilevers used, 
the exactness of the basic assumptions (stress distribution), and the magnitude 
of error permitted in the slope (angular) and defl ection adjustments.  The results 
from a complete analysis were confi rmed by the  Hoover Dam model studies.  The 
major limitation was the time required to perform an analysis.
 In the 1960’s 
before the application of 
computers to structural 
analysis, computations for 
the  Trial Load analysis were 
done by a group of six to 
eight engineers operating 
mechanical “adding” 
machines and fi lling in values 
on large tables.  One analysis 
would take a pair of engineers 
from six to eight weeks 
depending on the skill of the 
designer.  As such, not many load combinations were analyzed.  New rotation 
engineers performed these tedious computations.  They would work in pairs so 
one could check the other’s computations as they were performed.  The seating 
arrangement in the Section was like a Viking ship with the row master behind 
the rowers.  They worked with an experienced design engineer.  It would take 
about 5 years to transition from a human calculator to a beginning designer.  Arch 
dam designers would layout a preliminary shape for an arch dam.  The loading 
conditions to analyze were decided upon and younger engineers would start the 
Trial Load computations.  When the computations were complete, the results 
were returned to the designer and displacements were plotted.  Adjustments to 
the loads between the cantilever and arches were determined, and the process 
repeated.  Some designers, such as Howard Boggs, Milt Kramer, and Carl Jones, 
had a tremendous feel for how an arch dam reacted to loads and were very skillful 
in making adjustments.  This took many years to develop.  Howard Boggs wrote 
Engineering Monograph No. 36 explaining the beginning steps to lay out an arch 
dam.  However, this produced only a beginning shape.  The real skill then came 
in trying to adjust the shape and produce the most optimum design.  Layouts were 
done on a topography map with a large beam compass, french curve, and graph 
paper.  Mechanical calculators ran eight hours a day, fi ve days a week, for weeks.  
There were replacement calculators on hand and Eddie Carlson was a full-time 
repair person from the Marchant company.  The mechanical machines had 100 
keys (10 rows of 10 keys) and the decimal point was set with a key.
 With the application of  computers to civil engineering problems in the 
1960s, some engineers saw the potential of having the computer do the tedious 
manual calculations while other engineers viewed the computer as a threat to their 
jobs.  Merlin Copen wrote:
1.46.  Seating arrangement in the Analysis Section.
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The major limitation to the use of the complete trial-load analysis is the 
time required to perform such studies, and the high degree of technical 
training necessary to effi ciently conduct such an analysis.  The time 
element has been effectively reduced by use of the electronic computer, 
and will be further diminished as the analysis is completely programmed.
The number of highly-trained engineers required will also be greatly 
reduced.
 In 1957,  Loyd Scrivner was the fi rst engineer to write a computer program 
to compute geometric values.  Reclamation initially rented time on an IBM 
650 located in downtown Denver and eventually obtained one for themselves.
Scrivner’s initial programs were not written to be reused for other dams but 
had hard coded values inserted so a new program had to be written for each 
dam.   Bob Main started with Reclamation in the summer of 1958 in the newly 
created Data Processing Section.   Darrell Webber, who later became the Assistant 
Commissioner of the Engineering and Research Center, was a rotation engineer in 
that unit at the time.  Because Bob could program on the IBM 650, he was hired 
into the analysis section.  Bob wrote the general purpose geometry program for 
the lines of centers, introduced the idea of inputting values so the same program 
could be used for other dams, and introduced the concept of subroutines. 
 Loyd Scrivner wrote:
In 1957, the Analysis Unit of the Concrete Dams Section (USBR) began 
the development of a series of electronic computer programs to reduce 
the time and cost required to complete a trial-load study.  Programs have 
been developed utilizing the IBM 650 digital electronic data processing 
machine (system)…
Most of the programming was done using a modifi ed form of an 
interpretive routine (Bell Interpretive Language) which was developed 
to handle fl oating decimal arithmetic including the computation of the 
elementary transcendental functions.  The electronic computer, to date, 
has been used primarily for the computation of forces and defl ections in 
arch elements due to unit arch loads.  This approach has been followed 
because of the following:
 1.  About 70 percent of the man-hours, and therefore the
 cost of performing a trial-load study, is expended making   
 these computations.
 2.  These computations are repetitive in nature, which is a   
 factor favoring advantageous use of electronic computers.
Although we are not committed to any particular solution for the 
defl ection adjustments, serious consideration will be given to an iteration 
process as opposed to a procedure based on the solution of a large group 
of simultaneous equations.
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  Merlin Copen wrote:
The initial layout for an arch dam is based largely on the experience 
and judgement of the designer.… As soon as a layout for a particular 
site has been completed, it is checked by means of a crown cantilever 
analysis to obtain an estimate of the stresses in the proposed dam.
Currently the defl ections of the arches and cantilevers produced by unit 
loads are computed by electronic digital computer.  The time required, 
in a normal situation, to determine stresses with a crown adjustment, is 
approximately three days for two men.  Several layouts may be necessary 
before a satisfactory stress condition is obtained.  Then a radial defl ection 
adjustment is made.  This provides a more complete stress picture and 
might indicate the possibility of necessary or desirable changes.  The 
radial defl ection analysis requires approximately two days more than the 
crown cantilever analysis, or a total of approximately fi ve days for two 
men.
In practice, after a design has been analyzed and found to be acceptable 
with a radial defl ection analysis, the effects of tangential shear and twist 
are estimated, based on the experience of the designer.… Now the fi nal 
test of the effi ciency of the dam is made.  While the detailed design 
work proceeds, a complete trial-load analysis is made of the structure.
This will require approximately 100 to 150 man-days, depending on 
the size and complexity of the dam and the accuracy required from the 
analysis.  It is anticipated that in the near future, further application of 
electronic computer processes will result in considerable reduction in the 
layout, such changes are made and incorporated in the detailed design 
procedures.
 There was plenty of arch dam work in the 1960s.  Merlin Copen, George 
Wallace, and George Rouse went on a  10-week tour to Europe to see how they 
designed arch dams.  As stated in their report:
In recent years European engineers have made many important 
contributions to the design and construction of concrete dams.  Through 
experimentation and studies European engineers have devised new 
techniques and have extended or improved existing practices.… The 
team traveled in six countries and visited 15 organizations.… Forty-
three dams in various stages of completion were inspected together 
with 25 power stations.  Thirteen laboratories were visited as well as six 
manufacturing plants and more than 100 engineers were interviewed.
 It was this trip that led to the development of  double-curvature design 
methods at Reclamation.  Yellowtail and Flaming Gorge were being designed and 
Morrow Point was on the horizon.  Additional design staff probably would have 
been hired for this work.  Additional design groups would probably have been 
created and promotion to heads of these groups would have been made.  However, 
as Merlin Copen predicted, the large staffs were not required for this workload 
because of the advent of the effi cient computer methods.  Interviews for this paper 
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revealed there may have been bitter feelings about lost advancements and lost 
promotion potential because of the computer.  However, the computer did reduce 
the tedious part of structural analysis for arch dams.  Some engineers that left the 
analysis section because of the tedious, boring, and repetitive computation work 
actually came back to the unit because of the joy and prestige of designing and 
working with arch dams.
 There were disagreements on the best way to determine the response and 
design of arch dams.  In 1960, Merlin Copen wrote:
Since the end of World War II, interest in the design and construction 
of dams has received considerable impetus.  This interest has resulted 
in novel approaches to problems of design.  Currently the methods 
used appear to fall in one or more categories: (1) analysis of small 
scale models; (2) thin cylinder theory; (3) relaxation methods; (4) shell 
theory; and (5) trial-load analysis.  Each of these has advantages and 
disadvantages.  The choice of methods generally resolves into accuracy 
and reliability desired as opposed to time, fi nances, and experience 
available for design procedures.
After exhaustive study of the various possibilities, the United States 
Bureau of Reclamation, Dept. of Interior (USBR) adopted the Trial Load 
Method of analysis for designing and analyzing arch dams.  Whereas 
there have been notable advances in the use of other methods, the USBR 
has still found the use of trial-load to be completely satisfactory and 
unexcelled in this fi eld.  Recent developments in the use of electronic 
digital computers, and the effective application of simplifi ed analyses 
have made this method even more effective.
 The steps to develop a computerized Trial Load Method were to fi rst 
program the geometry, then the arch computations, next the cantilevers, and then 
combine this into a crown adjustment (several arches and one cantilever).  The 
computer being used could only handle forty-two equations.  The fi nal step was 
a complete analysis.  This was a very challenging task with limited computer 
capabilities.  After the IBM 650, Reclamation obtained time on a Honeywell 
machine in Minneapolis.  Cards would be sent in on Friday and results would 
be back on Wednesday.  Reclamation obtained their own Honeywell 800.  The 
programming language was Automath, Honeywell’s version of Fortran.   Harry 
Beck, Assistant Division Chief of the Data Processing Group, taught the new 
rotation engineers this version of Fortran.  The dams section hired Dale Morsette 
as a GS-12 because he had a Masters Degree.  This caused some bad feelings 
in the Section because most individuals were GS-11’s and the requirement to 
be a GS-12 was the ability to do a complete analysis unassisted.  Dale worked 
on the initial phases of computerizing a complete analysis from 1963 to 1967.
This was a very frustrating task for Dale.  In 1967 H. Walter Anderson realized 
the Honeywell did not have the capability needed for arch dam analyses, so he 
arranged time on a Control Data Corporation (CDC) 1601 at the Environmental 
Science Services Administration (ESSA), currently the National Bureau of 
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Standards, in Boulder, Colorado.  Reclamation had a daily shuttle that would 
take cards up to Boulder at 3:00 and return the next day at 10:00.  Reclamation 
started moving into Building 67 on April 13.  Dale left in early 1967, so Glenn 
Tarbox was assigned the programming task since he knew how to do a complete 
analysis.  Bob Main, a computer programmer, started assisting in June of 1967, 
and a working version was accomplished in September 1967.  The programming 
was divided into 4 phases: 1) data reorganization, 2) equations, 3) solution, and 4) 
stresses.
 These computer programming efforts and advancements for the  Trial Load 
Method evolved into what is called today the  Arch Dam Stress Analysis System 
(ADSAS).  ADSAS was a computerized version of a fl exibility method of analysis 
referred to as “trial load.”  However, equations were developed and written 
to compute defl ections at any location along the cantilevers and arches.  The 
equations for defl ections could be solved directly without using trial-loads.  This 
essentially is a precursor to the fi nite element method.  The computers still did not 
have enough storage space to hold all the matrices at one time.  So ADSAS used 
an iteration method to solve the simultaneous equations.  The solution technique 
used in ADSAS is unique and innovative and based on approaches developed for 
the hand calculations.
 ADSAS really advanced the state-of-the-art in arch dam analysis, sped 
up the design process, and helped justify the engineering mainframe computers.
ADSAS changed the way the concrete dam group operated because more load 
combination and geometrical shapes could be investigated in minutes rather 
than weeks.  Output from ADSAS was still in paper form and was about one 
inch thick.  Designers would quickly thumb through the large volume of paper 
output, propose changes to the dam geometry, and have the younger engineers run 
ADSAS and bring back the paper output.
 Despite the advances that came with ADSAS, it was still not appropriate 
for dynamic analysis.  In addition, the ADSAS program and users manual 
were developed for internal use, there was machine-dependent computer code 
specifi cally for a Cyber 70-74/28, and the program was in excess of 39,000 cards 
long with over 240 subroutines.  This caused problems for others to convert the 
program to their computers and use the program.
B.  Linear Structural Analysis
 In 1974 the  Structural Analysis Program (SAPIV) was written by Klaus 
Bathe and Ed Wilson at the University of California at Berkeley.  Glenn Tarbox 
and Karl Dreher were instrumental in getting SAPIV operational on the CDC 
mainframe computer at Reclamation, debugging the program, and developing 
the fi nite element capability for arch dams.  Many sensitivity runs were made 
comparing the Trial Load Method (ADSAS) with the fi nite element method 
(SAPIV) during the design of  Auburn Dam.  Full dynamic time-history, linear 
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elastic, three dimensional, modal superposition analyses were performed.
Auburn Dam was the fi rst “test” case.  Since that time, almost every arch dam 
in Reclamation’s inventory has been analyzed using  SAPIV for earthquake 
loading.  SAPIV also has the ability to handle static loading including reservoir, 
temperature, and stage construction, making it a powerful tool for dam analysis.
Many engineers in the analysis group wrote pre- and post-processing programs to 
work with SAPIV, which sped-up and advanced the fi nite element analysis of arch 
dams.
 Evaluating the results of dynamic fi nite element analyses required 
advances in estimating concrete strengths for comparison to the calculated 
stresses.  It was postulated that concrete would be stronger in both tension and 
compression under the rapid loading associated with earthquake events.  Rapid 
loading laboratory tests were developed which confi rmed this is the case.  An 
increase in tensile strength of approximately 50 percent can be expected under 
dynamic loading.
 Reclamation funded the University of California at Berkeley to develop 
a computer fi nite element program specifi cally for arch dams: the  Arch Dam 
Analysis Program (ADAP).  The development was supposed to occur over three 
years, but funding got tight after the fi rst year.  As such, only a partial program 
was developed.  Dr. John R. Mays, from the University of Colorado at Denver 
was hired part-time to debug the program and get it operational.  Over the years, 
the University of California at Berkeley, continued to develop ADAP.  The 
Enhanced Arch Dam Analysis Program (EADAP) contained hydrodynamic 
interaction and ADAP-88 was a nonlinear version that implemented contraction 
joints in the form of contact surfaces.  This program has not been used much at 
Reclamation, but has found some use on the outside.
 The University of California at Berkeley also developed a series of 
computer programs specifi cally for arch dams:  Earthquake Analysis of Concrete 
Dams (EACD).  The current version implements hydrodynamic interaction with 
incompressible or compressible fl uid elements and dam to foundation interaction 
incorporating the damping effects of the foundation.  Engineers in Reclamation 
have developed pre- and post-processing programs to aid in the use of this 
program.  It has been used for the earthquake analysis of several Reclamation 
concrete dams.
 In 1978 Reclamation obtained the fi rst general purpose nonlinear 
fi nite element program from Klaus Bathe from the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT):  Automatic Dynamic Incremental Nonlinear Analysis 
(ADINA).  The program mainly implemented the material nonlinearity of 
concrete.  Dr. John R. Mays developed a nonlinear joint element within ADINA.  
Howard Boggs and Dr. Mays were some of the fi rst engineers to analyze an arch 
dam with nonlinear contraction joints.  ADINA was used sparingly for specialty 
problems at Reclamation until 1996 when Reclamation made the transition to 
51
ABAQUS.  In 1984, the structural analysis group purchased a Hewlett-Packard 
UNIX workstation for pre- and post-processing fi nite element data using 
PATRAN.  The fi nite element analyses were still run on the Cyber mainframe 
computer.
 In August 1993 the mainframe Cyber computer was being 
decommissioned and the structural analysis group made the transition to a larger 
Hewlett-Packard UNIX workstation (HP-755).  In 1997 a HP J2240 was obtained 
that had 2 CPUs, 2 Gigabytes of internal memory and 90 Gigabytes of hard disk 
storage.  This was more powerful than the early computers at Reclamation just 
35 years previous.  Structures modeled with 38,000 nodes, 100,000 degrees-
of-freedom, contraction joint contact surfaces, and nonlinear concrete material 
properties are now being analyzed for earthquake loads.
C.   Nonlinear Structural Analysis
 Linear fi nite element analysis has long been accepted as a way to analyze 
structures.  There are limitations, however, when performing a linear analysis.  
Stresses calculated in a linear analysis can exceed the allowable strengths of 
materials.  In these cases the actual behavior of the structure after the material 
strengths were exceeded could be signifi cantly different than that predicted by the 
linear analysis.  Also, response of geometric nonlinearities (contraction joints or 
compression only members) cannot be modeled using linear analysis.  In the past, 
attempts have been made to model these conditions by modifying the modulus 
of elasticity in a particular direction and by using a combination of members to 
simulate the expected behavior of a connection with limited success.  Analysis 
tools have now progressed to the point where good nonlinear capabilities are 
available.  Nonlinear analysis is the next step in addressing these limitations. 
 Engineers at Reclamation are very familiar with linear fi nite element 
analysis.  In the past several years, work has been done using non-linear 
capabilities as well.  Two nonlinear analysis methods have been used using 
ABAQUS fi nite element code.  The fi rst method employs the standard stiffness 
formulation (F=Kx).  The second method solves an explicit formulation with 
Newton’s Second Law, F=Ma.  Each method has advantages and disadvantages.  
The following examples illustrate the use of nonlinear analysis for dynamic and 
static loading conditions. 
C.1.  Nonlinear Structural Analysis of Monticello Dam
  Monticello Dam is a 304-foot-high constant-center concrete arch dam, 
with fi llets at the abutments, located on the Putah Creek, thirty miles west of 
Sacramento, California.  The dam was constructed from 1953 to 1957, has a crest 
length of 1,023 feet, a crest thickness of 12 feet, and a maximum base thickness 
of 100 feet.  The earthquake response of the structure, incorporating the vertical 
contraction joints and weak horizontal lift lines, was analyzed non-linearly using 
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the ABAQUS/Explicit computer 
code.
 In this analysis, eight 
elements through the thickness 
were chosen to better model the 
contact surface interactions.  The 
8-noded linear brick element 
and the 6-noded linear wedge 
element were chosen for the 3-D 
model.  The 8-noded element is a 
reduced integration element.  The 
foundation rock was modeled to a 
distance of two times the dam height to properly model earthquake energy around 
the dam itself.  It was modeled with the same type of elements that were used to 
model the dam.  For this analysis Rayleigh damping values of ? = 3.0 and ? = 0.0 
were used.  This is comparable to the 5 percent of critical viscous damping used 
traditionally in dam analysis.
 As expected, the tensile arch stresses are less with the model that 
incorporates the contraction joints in comparison to a linear elastic analysis.
Cantilever compression stresses increase in the center portion of the dam on the 
downstream face, and tensile cantilever stresses decrease slightly in the bottom 
center of the dam on the upstream side.  The existence of tensile cantilever 
stresses on the upstream face with the contraction joint model indicates that the 
cantilevers are taking load.  This is because when the winter temperature load is 
1.48.  Finite element model of Monticello Dam, California. (Foundation mesh not shown.)
1.47.  Monticello Dam, California.
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applied, the cantilevers contract and create openings in the joints.  The hydrostatic 
loads tend to close these openings, but can not fully because of resistance offered 
from the cantilevers in bending (initially no cracking of concrete or horizontal 
weak lift lines was incorporated in this model to relieve the stress).  Thus, a large 
tensile cantilever stress continues to exist on the upstream side toward the bottom 
center of the dam.  Gravity load was applied fi rst.  Although gravity was applied 
to the entire structure at once, the contact surfaces used to model the vertical 
contraction joints prevented the structure “hanging” from the abutments as would 
be the case if gravity was applied without contact surfaces.  The gravity load 
caused the cantilevers to displace upstream, thereby, allowing the weight of each 
cantilever to act independently.  Next the reservoir load was applied.  This caused 
the cantilevers to move downstream and the contraction joints to close.  The 
temperature load was applied as temperature differentials at all the nodes in the 
dam. Hydrodynamic interaction was incorporated by adding mass to the upstream 
nodes of the fi nite element model based on an incompressible fl uid element 
formulation.
 Three earthquake records were applied to the contraction joint model.  
Crest displacements, crest velocities, contraction joint opening and closing, 
and arch and cantilever stress histories were obtained for each record.  Crest 
displacements at the centerline of the dam reach peak values of about 7 inches.
Permanent offsets at joints were less than 1 inch.  Maximum crest velocities 
at the centerline of the dam are on the order of 40 in/sec in the cross canyon 
direction, 14 in/sec in the vertical direction and 100 in/sec in the upstream/
downstream direction.  Contraction joints at the centerline of the dam open to a 
maximum value of about 0.4 inches.  Tensile arch stresses reduced signifi cantly in 
comparison to linear elastic analyses
 Large tensile cantilever stresses continue to exist in the dam during static 
and dynamic loadings with the contraction joint model.  These stresses will be 
relieved by horizontal crack formation in the dam.  Since the lift lines of the 
cantilevers are weak in comparison to the parent concrete (based on laboratory 
test of drill core), these cracks will occur at the lift line locations.  There are two 
ways to model these lift lines.  The fi rst method is to set the cracking stress to 
a low value in the nonlinear concrete material property statement.  This would 
allow the concrete to crack and  relieve any cantilever stress that would exceed 
the cracking stress value specifi ed.  However, it isn’t possible to specify that the 
lift lines are weaker than the parent material within the concrete cracking model.
The second method, which was ultimately used, is to insert a series of horizontal 
contact surfaces, spaced so as to model the effect of  the weak lift lines.  This 
approach further lends itself to a kinematic study; i.e., a series of blocks stacked 
on top of each other held in place by the arch action of the dam.  The analyses 
indicated the dam would be stable even with cracked lift lines.  Although 6-inch-
deep shear keys exist at each contraction joint of the dam, these keys were not 
included in the fi nite element model because of the need to keep the contact 
surfaces simple in order to obtain a stable solution.  The effects of neglecting 
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the keys, and better methods for modeling contraction joints, are the subject of 
ongoing research.
C.2.   Nonlinear Structural Analysis of  Pueblo Dam
 Pueblo Dam is located 
near Pueblo, Colorado.
Pueblo Dam is a composite 
concrete and earthfi ll structure 
approximately 10,230 feet in 
length.  The concrete portion 
consists of a massive head 
buttress dam including a 
550-foot overfl ow spillway 
section located near the central 
part of the concrete dam.
The dam was designed and 
constructed by Reclamation, 
and completed in 1975. 
 The purpose of this nonlinear study was to reevaluate the sliding stability 
at potentially disbonded lift lines and the vertical stress level at the dam heel 
using a three dimensional fi nite element model incorporating horizontal contact 
surfaces.  Previous linear-elastic fi nite element analyses completed at Reclamation 
resulted in acceptable factors of safety against sliding (with some cohesion) 
but they also indicated that tensions would develop at the dam heel under some 
static load cases.  Since the linear elastic analyses completed previously used 
a continuous mesh, the potential nonlinear characteristics existing along the 
dam-foundation contact surface were not captured; therefore, it was necessary to 
complete a nonlinear fi nite element analysis incorporating a horizontal contact 
surface in order to capture the 
effects of stress redistribution 
upon opening of the contact 
at the dam heel, representing 
crack propagation along the 
contact if weak lift lines are 
actually present.
 A single overfl ow 
buttress of Pueblo Dam was 
modeled using ABAQUS / 
STANDARD.  The model used 
three-dimensional 8-noded 
fully integrated brick elements 
throughout the dam and 
foundation.  The foundation 
1.49.  Pueblo Dam, Colorado.
1.50.  Finite element model of an overfl ow 
buttress at Pueblo Dam, Colorado.
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was modeled as a large rectangular block of solid sandstone, approximately 
350 feet long, 250 feet wide and 150 feet in depth.  The upper surface of the 
foundation block, at elevation 4755 feet, was used to defi ne the lower half of 
the non-linear contact surface in these analyses.  The dam model was positioned 
in the center of the foundation block with the bottom surface of the dam 
model forming the upper half of the non-linear contact surface.  The edges of 
the foundation were fi xed, but there were no translation or rotation boundary 
conditions applied at nodes in the dam model.  Although a tension limit could 
be input, once cracked the only force preventing rigid body motion of the dam 
was the frictional force developed on the contact surface; therefore, additional 
iterations were required to obtain convergence of the fi rst increment of the gravity 
loading to establish normal forces on the contact surface.
 The ABAQUS / STANDARD fi nite element program uses time varying 
load application for all of the static loads.  The gravity load was applied gradually 
from zero to one second of analysis time, followed by application of the 
reservoir and uplift pressure loads.  The uplift pressures were also automatically 
recalculated at each analysis time increment as both a function of the current 
reservoir depth and the crack (open contact surface) length.  The non-linear 
analyses indicated that the dam was stable for these static loading conditions.  The 
tensile stresses which developed at the dam heel in the previous linear analysis 
were relieved upon opening of the contact surface when zero tensile strength was 
assumed on the contact surface, but a signifi cant portion of the dam remained in 
compression, and was capable of carrying the load.
XII.   Roller-Compacted Concrete—Rapid Construction for Gravity 
Dams
 Despite advances in automated mixing, handling, and placement of mass 
concrete, the procedures were still somewhat labor intensive and time consuming 
in comparison to earthfi ll production rates.  In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s 
some relatively small projects were completed using the concept of  roller-
compacted concrete (RCC).  The concept involved placement of a lean and dry 
concrete mix by spreading it in thin layers with a bulldozer, and compacting 
it with vibratory drum rollers.  The lean mix reduced the heat generated, and 
rapid production rates could be achieved, as the placement was mechanized and 
there was no need to wait for curing before placing the next lift.  The Bureau 
of Reclamation began testing a high paste (cement plus fl yash) RCC concept 
in 1980.  This resulted in a strong and stiff material with similar properties to 
conventional concrete.  Thus, the design of gravity dams using this type of 
material could be based on conventional gravity dam design methods.
 In 1985 RCC placements began at  Upper Stillwater Dam, the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s fi rst RCC dam and at that time the world’s largest.  The straight 
gravity dam is about 280 feet high, and nearly 2700 feet long, and contains 
more than 1,600,000 yd3 of concrete (most of which is RCC).  Although the 
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downstream slope is 0.6:1, 
the point of intersection of 
the downstream and upstream 
slopes is above the dam 
crest, which results in an 
equivalent downstream slope 
of about 0.7:1 for the height of 
Upper Stillwater Dam when 
compared to other typical 
gravity dams.  The upper part 
of the downstream slope was 
steepened to allow suffi cient 
crest width for the construction 
equipment.  This increases the 
mass and stiffness of the dam 
when compared to traditional 
gravity sections.
 Typical excavation 
and treatment of the quartzitic 
sandstone and argillite 
foundation rock were 
performed.  Crushed aggregate 
and sand were manufactured 
for the RCC.  A richer RCC 
mix was used near the upstream face.  The RCC contained between 135 and 160 
pounds of cement per cubic yard, and between 290 and 350 pounds of fl yash per 
cubic yard.  Temperature control was achieved by placing the RCC below 50°F 
and by replacing cement with fl yash to limit the heat rise.  The RCC was tied 
to the abutments and to the foundation by use of conventional concrete.  At the 
base of the dam, conventional concrete was fi rst placed to form a level surface 
to start RCC placements.  At the abutments, conventional concrete was placed 
between the RCC and the rock.  Laser-guided slip-form machines were used to 
place concrete elements forming the upstream and downstream faces of the dam.
This proved to be a fairly rapid means of forming the dam, and eliminated the 
relatively time consuming and labor intensive process of erecting and stripping 
conventional forms.  RCC was delivered to the dam from the batch plant using a 
conveyor belt.  There it was loaded into trucks, transported to the placement, and 
spread with a small bulldozer using a laser controlled blade.  A vibratory drum 
roller then compacted the material into a dense mass.  In 1986, over 715,000 yd3
of RCC was placed in less than fi ve months.  The peak shift placed over 5400 
yd3.  Joint cleanup was required, depending on the age of the concrete, and joints 
greater than 72 hours old were required to be sandblasted or waterblasted.  Very 
good bond was achieved.  In fact, it was diffi cult to fi nd the lift lines in the core 
taken from the dam.
1.52.  Compacting RCC at Stillwater Dam, Utah.
1.51.  Upper Stillwater Dam, Utah.
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 The major drawback to the design and construction of Upper Stillwater 
Dam was the exclusion of  contraction joints or other means to control the 
cracking and subsequent leakage through the dam.  Thermal and structural 
analyses had indicated that cracking would be limited to the face of the dam, 
and would not extend through the dam thickness.  However, this proved to be 
incorrect, and regularly spaced vertical cracks propagated through the dam normal 
to the axis.  Leakage from some of these cracks became signifi cant, and the 
grouting and drainage gallery constructed about 20 feet from the upstream face of 
the dam received large infl ows.  The leakage at two of the cracks was exacerbated 
by small sliding movements on an argillite layer within the foundation that 
stopped when the passive rock mass downstream of the dam was mobilized.  This 
tended to open the cracks on either end of where the movement occurred.  All 
open cracks were grouted twice.  The upper portions of the cracks were grouted 
with hydrophillic polyurethane grout, and the lower portions were grouted with 
cement grout.  This proved to be effective for several years.  However, seasonal 
movements of the cracks due to variations in reservoir level and temperature 
eventually reopened the cracks, resulting in renewed leakage.  Plans are being 
developed to seal the cracks with an upstream membrane or a secant wall drilled 
across the cracks upstream of the gallery.
 The contraction joint 
issue in RCC dams is critical.
For gravity dams it is adequate 
to control the cracking by 
forming joints or placing crack 
inducers to control the crack 
locations.  Water stop features 
can then be designed to reduce 
fl ow through the cracks.  If 
RCC is to be used for arch 
dams, it will be necessary to 
develop a way to grout the 
joints to lock in arch action 
at the desired temperature.
The Bureau of Reclamation 
developed such a system for 
the foundation modifi cations at  Pueblo Dam in the late 1990s.
 By way of background on this project, nearly horizontal shale layers 
beneath the massive head buttresses of the dam daylighted in the spillway stilling 
basin excavated at the toe of the dam, downstream of some of the buttresses.  Due 
to the large population downstream of this dam, potential sliding of the structure 
on these shale layers posed a high risk, and was a dam safety concern.  A RCC 
plug and toeblock, anchored with double-corrosion-protected high strength 
rock bolts, were constructed in the stilling basin to block the daylighting planes 
and buttress the foundation.  State-of-the-art distinct element analyses, and 
1.53.  Section through Buttress 8 or 9 at 
Pueblo Dam, Colorado.  Showing RCC stabilization 
measures.
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probabilistic stability analyses 
were performed to ensure 
the RCC geometry would be 
effective in stabilizing the 
dam.  The RCC material was 
somewhat different than that 
used at Upper Stillwater Dam.
Rounded river aggregates up 
to 1½ inch maximum size 
were used.  Approximately 
120 pounds of cement and 180 
pounds of fl yash were used per 
cubic yard of RCC.  Surface 
cleanup and bonding mortar 
were used on all lift surfaces of the toe block and on lift surfaces more than twelve 
hours old in the plug (below elevation 4728).  Although the design strengths 
were met, a somewhat porous zone developed a few inches below the lift surface, 
particularly for lifts that were a day old when the next layer of RCC was placed.
It was thought that the rounded aggregate made the RCC more susceptible to 
damage from construction traffi c on lifts that were in a fragile condition just after 
setting of the RCC.  Windy conditions at the site may have also prematurely dried 
the surface of the RCC lifts during and shortly following placement.
 Contraction joints were 
formed in the RCC by vibrating steel 
plates into the freshly compacted 
lifts.  The joints trending in the 
cross-canyon direction needed to 
be grouted to ensure that load could 
be transferred across the joints with 
minimal displacement.  The plate 
locations were carefully surveyed 
prior to installation so that the 
joints could be intercepted by 
vertical grout holes.  Six-inch-
diameter holes were drilled 
at 10-foot spacing in the 
upstream-downstream direction 
and 5-foot spacing in the cross-
canyon direction.  Steel plates 
were not placed in the drill 
1.55.  Installing joint inducing 
plates in RCC at Pueblo Dam, 
Colorado.
1.56.  Opening of transverse contraction joint in RCC 
at Pueblo Dam, Colorado.  Grouting of joints 
occurred in February 2000.
1.54.  RCC placement, spreading, and 
compaction operations in the spillway pool, 
Pueblo Dam, Colorado.
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hole locations.  Some holes were fi lled with polyurethane grout to isolate grout 
zones.  Tubing was designed and installed in the holes to provide grout supply 
and return lines, and venting to remove air and water from the system.  Grouting 
was performed the second winter following RCC placement when joint meters 
indicated suffi cient joint opening for grouting.  The grouting was successful, and 
the joints did not close the following summer, indicating good fi lling of the joints.
XIII.  Transition to Dam Safety—Applying Technology to Reduce Risk
 The Bureau of Reclamation has been actively involved with a formal 
safety of dams program since April 1977 when an Executive Order was issued 
initiating the Federal guidelines for  dam safety.  The aim of Reclamation’s dam 
safety program is to ensure that the agency’s dams do not pose an unacceptable 
risk to the downstream public.  To that end, Reclamation has pioneered the use 
of  risk analysis in assessing dam safety.  Once it is determined that structural 
modifi cations are needed to reduce risk, Reclamation has used the design and 
construction technology developed over the past century to fi x existing dams.  For 
concrete dams, this means application of detailed analyses, design procedures, and 
modern concrete technology.  Two cases,  Theodore Roosevelt and Pueblo Dam 
modifi cations, illustrate this point.  The case of Pueblo Dam was discussed in the 
previous section on roller-compacted concrete (RCC).  Additional details of the 
Theodore Roosevelt Dam modifi cations are provided here.
 Potential defi ciencies with regard to the potential to pass large fl oods, 
potential instability during large earthquakes, inadequate release capacity, and 
the need for more water storage resulted in major modifi cations to Theodore 
Roosevelt Dam between 1988 and 1995.  Part of those modifi cations resulted in 
raising the arch dam 77 feet.  It was necessary to determine whether the dam and 
foundation could withstand this increase in head.  Combinations of joints and 
bedding planes (dipping upstream at about 20 to 25 degrees) in the Precambrian 
sedimentary foundation rock formed potentially unstable blocks.  Initial stability 
analyses indicated that the foundation would not meet the desired factors of safety 
under the increased loading.  Therefore, foundation drainage was installed from 
adits excavated in the rock and a gallery excavated through the existing masonry.  
Piezometers were installed to measure foundation water pressures before and 
after construction of the drainage, and pressure contour maps were developed 
for determining uplift forces in the foundation analysis.  The drainage was 
very effective, reducing pressure heads by about 43 to 68 feet.  In situ uniaxial 
jacking tests were performed in the drainage adits, and correlated with seismic 
tomography testing to estimate the deformation properties of the foundation rock 
mass and concrete masonry of the existing dam.  These properties were included 
in fi nite element structural analyses to study the behavior of the dam and more 
closely determine loads acting on the foundation.  Final foundation analyses 
indicated that the raised dam with the drainage in place met the desired safety 
factors, and was more stable than the existing dam without drainage.
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 Constructing an overlay of conventional concrete on the existing dolomite 
masonry dam posed some additional challenges.  A concrete test panel was 
constructed on the downstream face of the dam to determine the likely bond 
strength between the new concrete overlay and the masonry.  Core samples 
were extracted and the interface was tested in tension and direct shear.  This 
information was used in extensive computer modeling to verify the design and 
shape of the overlay.  The dam was analyzed for static and dynamic loading using 
fi nite element methods.  The existing masonry was modeled in three horizontal 
stages to simulate the layered construction.  The mass concrete overlay was 
1.57.  Schematic of raising Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Arizona.
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modeled as it was constructed, in blocks separated by (keyed) contraction joints.
Recommended block dimensions, lift heights, concrete placement temperatures, 
and cooling requirements were based on temperature control studies.  These 
studies took into account the thermal properties of the concrete mix design, and 
the expected temperature rise within the mass concrete during construction.  The 
concrete was cooled using cooling coils embedded in the 10-foot lifts, and the 
contraction joints in the overlay were grouted to provide arch action and improve 
the stress distribution within the structure.  The numerical modeling simulated 
this construction sequence.  Final analysis of the composite structure indicated 
improved stress conditions within the existing masonry portion of the dam, and 
results meeting Bureau of Reclamation stability and stress criteria.  Seismic 
response analyses indicated the structure should perform well under large seismic 
loadings.  Construction 
of the overlay followed 
typical mass concrete 
placement techniques, 
developed and refi ned 
since the construction 
of  Hoover Dam.  A high 
line was used to transport 
concrete to the placement 
in buckets.  The concrete 
was placed in layers 
and vibrated into place.
Something not done before 
included placement of 
geo-composite strip drains 
between the existing masonry and the new concrete to provide drainage at the 
interface.
 Other modifi cations to the dam included construction of a lake tap 
and tunnel system to provide a new outlet works and power penstock.  New 
mass concrete thrust blocks were constructed on each abutment to fi ll the gap 
formed by the original spillway cuts.  New spillways were constructed through 
each thrust block.  Hydraulic model studies were used in the hydraulic design 
of the spillways.  Spillway fl ows enter a diverging chute and fl ip structure 
before plunging to an excavated basin in the river channel below.  The spillway 
alignments cause the discharge jets to impinge at or above tailwater level, while 
both spillways are operating under higher reservoir heads.
 The following illustrations show concrete placement during modifi cations 
to Theodore Roosevelt Dam.  Note placement and vibration of concrete in layers , 
placement in blocks against the masonary, and new thrust block and spillway.
1.58.  Results of seismic tomography testing at Theodore 
Roosevelt Dam, Arizona.
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1.59.  Concrete placement dur-
ing modifi cations to Theodore 
Roosevelt Dam, 
Arizona.
1.60.  Placement and vibration 
of concrete in layers during 
modifi cations to Theodore 
Roosevelt Dam, Arizona.
1.61.  Showing the new 
thrust block and spillway at 
Theodore Roosevelt Dam, 
Arizona.
1.62.  Modifi ed Theodore Roosevelt Dam, Arizona, completed and rededi-
cated in 1996.
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XIV.  Conclusions
 We hope you have enjoyed this tour of the evolution of concrete dam 
design, analysis, and construction within the Bureau of Reclamation over the past 
century.  There is no question that the early pioneers in this effort were extremely 
talented and set the stage for some of the great feats of human engineering that 
were to follow.  Monumental projects like Hoover and Grand Coulee Dams are 
still “wonders” today.  During the heyday of dam construction in the United 
States, the Bureau of Reclamation developed a reputation as a world leader 
in concrete dam technology.  The construction of dams in the United States is 
winding down now after a century of extensive development.  The last new 
concrete dam constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation was completed over a 
decade ago (1989).  The legacy and expertise in concrete technology and dam 
construction at the Bureau of Reclamation remains a valuable national resource, 
and has been recently used to effi ciently fi x dams where safety concerns exist.  
So what do the next 100 years hold?  As long as dam safety projects remain to 
be done, the expertise will be maintained and developments will slowly occur.  
However, without large projects, it is likely that the leadership in this area will 
gradually shift to developing countries in the future.  The Bureau of Reclamation 
can be proud of the giant springboard they have provided from which these efforts 
can be launched.
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100 Years of Embankment Dam Design and 
Construction in the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
by:
Richard Lyman Wiltshire
Introduction
The design and construction of earthfi ll and rockfi ll  embankment dams in 
the western United States and throughout the world have evolved dramatically 
during the past 100 years.  The U.S.  Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) played 
a signifi cant role in that evolution of embankment dam engineering, construction, 
and dam safety.  There are now more than 240 water-storage embankment dams 
in the western United States that were designed and constructed by Reclamation 
during the twentieth century, which was the most intensive period of dam building 
the world has ever seen.  The list of embankment dams built by Reclamation 
includes many of the most innovative, largest, and highest dams of their eras.  The 
list of civil engineers and other professionals who have helped to design and build 
Reclamation’s embankment dams is lengthy and highly regarded.
 Reclamation is currently organized into fi ve Regions, across the seventeen 
western states, and the Washington and Denver Offi ces.  The fi ve Regions, 
which have performed almost all of the dam construction work, are: 1) Pacifi c 
Northwest, 2) Mid-Pacifi c, 3) Lower Colorado, 4) Upper Colorado, and 5) Great 
Plains.  The Denver Offi ce includes the Technical Service Center, the current 
name of the engineering organization that has performed most of the embankment 
dam engineering and design work.
 This paper summarizes Reclamation’s embankment dam design and 
construction history.  The last 100 years have seen the design and construction of 
embankment dams develop from the relatively simple homogeneous or two-zone 
earthfi ll embankments designed in 1904 or 1905 into the extremely complex, 
highly analyzed, well-instrumented zoned earthfi ll and/or rockfi ll structures 
that are the embankment dams of the new millennium.  This embankment dam 
engineering evolution has also involved the growth of several related disciplines, 
including  engineering geology,  seismology,  hydrology,  hydraulic engineering, 
 instrumentation engineering,  mechanical engineering, and  electrical engineering.  
A central component of the evolution of the engineering of  embankment dams has 
been the birth and maturation of  geotechnical engineering as a civil engineering 
specialty.  The use of computers and computer programs for the analysis and 
design of embankment dams became standard practice within a fairly short time 
after they were developed by geotechnical engineers.  Another component of 
this evolution has been the development of larger, faster, more powerful, and 
more effi cient earthwork construction equipment.  The paper also discusses the 
design and construction organizations within Reclamation and how they have 
changed during the last 100 years.  Reclamation’s publication of its well-known 
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engineering books, such as the Earth Manual1 and the Design of Small Dams,2 is 
noted.  Lastly, the successes and failures that occurred during the last 100 years 
of Reclamation’s embankment dam design and construction history are discussed, 
and the lessons learned from those experiences are summarized.
 In telling the story of the evolution of Reclamation’s embankment dam 
engineering, the paper separates the 100-year history into fi ve periods, which are 
partly based on noteworthy events such as World Wars I and II and the failure 
of Teton Dam in 1976.  Period I runs from 1902 to 1918; Period II extends from 
1919 to 1933; Period III covers 1934 to 1944; Period IV includes 1945 through 
1975; and Period V runs from 1976 to the Present (2002).  This paper examines 
the embankment dam design and construction changes that occurred during each 
period.  Representative and remarkable/notable embankment dams from each of 
the fi ve periods are discussed.  A few problems, some signifi cant, occurred during 
the construction and/or subsequent operation of Reclamation’s embankment dams 
and they are also discussed.  And the effects of certain developments, such as the 
Proctor compaction (moisture density) test procedure and the failure of Teton 
Dam, are discussed in the paper.
Reclamation’s Design and Construction Organizations
 In 1902, the new U.S.  Reclamation Service (Service) was organized 
within and was drawn from the U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS) Division of 
Hydrography, Hydrographic Branch, that had studied western water resources 
for the previous 20+ years.   Frederick H. Newell, Chief of USGS’s Division 
of Hydrography, was selected to head the new Service under USGS Director 
 Charles D. Walcott and was titled Chief Engineer, and  Arthur Powell Davis 
was Newell’s chief assistant.3  Based on the studies previously conducted by 
USGS, which had included studies of streams, watersheds, irrigable lands, and 
potential dam and reservoir sites throughout the West, six projects were approved 
for design and construction by the Secretary of the Interior in 1903.  Out of 79 
projects investigated, a total of 25 projects had been examined and authorized for 
construction by the Secretary within the fi rst fi ve years, and 15 of those had been 
started by private companies or by a group of cooperating farmers who requested 
the Service’s help.  
Period I (1902-1918)— Reclamation’s Design and Construction 
Organizations
 At the beginning of Period I, each of the 16 western states (17 states 
after Texas was added in 1906) had at least one district under the direction of a 
“District Engineer,” who was responsible for all Reclamation activities, including 
surveys, investigations, designs, and construction.  For each authorized project, 
a qualifi ed (civil) engineer was selected as the “Resident Engineer” and he was 
responsible for conducting site investigations and developing preliminary design 
plans on the embankment dam judged appropriate for the site.  On a larger 
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project, the Resident Engineer might have the help of an Assistant Engineer.  
Supervisory Service engineers, who functioned as liaison representatives of 
the Chief Engineer on certain projects, and consulting engineers with special 
skills, reviewed the preliminary plans and made project recommendations to 
the Secretary of the Interior.  Upon the Secretary’s approval, the Service was 
authorized to develop fi nal plans and specifi cations.  The early embankment dams 
were constructed either by contract with private contractors or by “force account” 
using Government forces.  Both types of construction were managed/supervised 
by Service engineers and inspectors.  Most of the dam sites were fairly remote, so 
construction included transportation of all necessary equipment and materials to 
the dam site, as well as construction of the camps and facilities required to house 
the construction workers.
 In 1903, a permanent western headquarters offi ce was established in 
Denver, Colorado, to house the engineers and assistants of the Hydrographic 
Branch who would facilitate the location and construction of dams, in order 
to avoid overcrowding in the Washington, D. C., offi ce.  The  Reclamation 
Service became independent from the USGS in 1907, with Chief Engineer 
Newell becoming the Service’s fi rst Director and Davis becoming Chief 
Engineer.  Newell reorganized the 17 states into six divisions to enhance the 
Service’s administration of its large workload: the Central, Idaho, Northern, 
Pacifi c, Southern, and Washington Divisions.  The Division boundary lines were 
determined by the ease of railroad travel and communication, with drainage 
boundaries also being considered.  Each of the six Divisions was headed by a 
Division Engineer.  Reclamation’s early Project, District, and Division Engineers 
included such notables as: Ira W. McConnell, Raymond F. Walter, Frank E. 
Weymouth, Joseph B. Lippincott, Hiram N. Savage, David C. Henny, Ernest G. 
Hopson, Louis C. Hill, and Charles H. Swigart.  Note that engineers Weymouth, 
Lippincott, and Hill were all elevated to Honorary Member status in the American 
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE).
 In 1913 the Service’s hierarchy was reorganized, creating a fi ve-member 
 Reclamation Commission, which included: the Director of the Service, Chief 
Engineer, Chief Counsel, Comptroller, and  Supervisor of Irrigation.  In December 
1914 the Chief of Construction was added as a member of the Reclamation 
Commission.  Davis became Director of the Service in December1914 after 
Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane removed Newell as Director and named 
him “Consulting Engineer.”  Newell fi nally resigned from the Service in May 
1915 and became Chairman of the Civil Engineering Department at the University 
of Illinois.   Also in May 1915, the Commission’s membership was reduced to 
three, consolidating the Director and Chief Engineer positions with Davis as 
Director and Chief Engineer and retaining the Comptroller and Chief Counsel 
positions (which also appears to have removed the Supervisor of Irrigation and 
the  Chief of Construction as members of the Commission).  That same year, the 
direction of fi eld operations was centralized at the Denver Offi ce under the Chief 
of Construction.  With the establishment of the Chief Engineer’s Offi ce in Denver, 
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Reclamation’s engineering design and construction management functions were 
centralized in the Denver Offi ce.  In 1918 the Secretary of the Interior followed 
 Arthur P. Davis’ recommendations and the top level structure of the Service was 
again reorganized, making the Comptroller and the Chief Counsel subordinate to 
the Director and Chief Engineer.
Period II (1919-1933)—Reclamation’s Design and Construction 
Organizations
 In May 1920 Director and Chief Engineer Davis changed his title to 
Director and appointed the Chief of Construction in Denver,  Frank E. Weymouth, 
to the Chief Engineer position.  Arthur Powell Davis served as President of ASCE 
in 1920.  On June 18, 1923, the  Service became the  Bureau of Reclamation 
headed by the Commissioner of Reclamation; Davis resigned from Reclamation 
the following day.   David W. Davis was named Reclamation’s Commissioner on 
July 1, 1923, quickly followed by  Elwood Mead after Davis left offi ce on April 2, 
1924.  Dr. Mead served as Commissioner from 1924 until his death on January 26, 
1936.  Reclamation’s design and construction organizations remained much the 
same for the next 20 years.  During the 1920s and 1930s, the status of the Chief 
Engineer grew as Reclamation’s authority was consolidated in the offi ce of the 
Chief Engineer headquartered in Denver.  Reclamation’s various laboratories fi rst 
got started in 1930 with the hydraulic model testing performed in the laboratory 
of the  Colorado Agricultural Experiment Station in Fort Collins, Colorado.  The 
 Concrete Laboratory and the  Earth Materials Laboratory were also begun in the 
early 1930s in the U.S. Customs House in Denver.
Period III (1934-1944)—Reclamation’s Design and Construction 
Organizations
 In 1942 and 1943, Secretary of the Interior  Harold Ickes reorganized 
Reclamation in accordance with a plan designed to: 1) decentralize the authority 
for work execution along regional lines, 2) limit the authority of the Chief 
Engineer and his staff to project design and construction, and 3) establish a 
“functional type” of organization with the Commissioner’s authority going 
straight to the Regional Directors.  The reorganization provided for:
Four major branches in the Denver Offi ce: Design and Construction 
under the Chief Engineer, Project Investigations, Operation and 
Maintenance, and Fiscal and Administrative Management.  The Chief 
Engineer remained Reclamation’s ultimate authority in the technical 
execution of construction projects, even though responsibility over 
construction in the fi eld was now divided between the Regional Directors 
and the Chief Engineer.
 Six Regional Offi ces, later expanded to seven, concentrated on planning 
and development activities, and supervised the operation and maintenance of 
completed project facilities.  The seven Regional Offi ces were located at Boise, 
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Idaho; Sacramento, California; Boulder City, Nevada; Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Amarillo, Texas; Denver, Colorado; and Billings, Montana.  The Regional 
Directors reported directly to the Commissioner’s Offi ce.
Period IV (1945-1975)—Reclamation’s Design and Construction 
Organizations
 In 1945 the Commissioner won support for his position that “the 
responsibility for the technical aspects of design and construction work should 
remain in the Chief Engineer, and therefore, authority for this work should also 
be vested in the Chief Engineer.”  This created problems for the Construction 
Engineers because they had two bosses: the Regional Director and the Chief 
Engineer.  Reclamation’s Denver Offi ce included some 2,000 employees by 
1948 that were scattered around the Denver metropolitan area.  Reclamation’s 
new Denver headquarters was established in 1950 as the Engineering and 
Research Center at the Denver Federal Center in Lakewood, located 10 miles 
west of downtown Denver.  In 1953, during the Eisenhower Administration, the 
 Chief Engineer’s authority was upgraded and the title was changed to Assistant 
Commissioner and Chief Engineer.  This title continued to be changed, becoming 
Director, Offi ce of Design and Construction in 1963, Director, Offi ce of Design 
and Construction/Chief Engineer in 1970, and Director, Offi ce of Design and 
Construction in 1972.
Period V (1976-2002)—Reclamation’s Design and Construction 
Organizations
 Reclamation’s  Teton Dam failed on June 5, 1976, killing 11 people and 
causing about $400 million in property damage.  This failure had a profound 
effect on the  Bureau of Reclamation.  Two offi cial panels of technical experts 
reviewed the probable causes of the dam’s failure and released reports in 
December 1976, April 1977, and January 1980.  Signifi cant recommendations 
by these two panels involved several areas of concern.  These included: the need 
to establish independent dam design and construction review boards, greater 
documentation of design decisions, closer project supervision and oversight 
by design personnel, and more intensive construction and post-construction 
monitoring of the structures.  A team was named by then Commissioner R. 
 Keith Higginson in 1977 to review Reclamation’s dam design and construction 
procedures, which resulted in a November 1977 reorganization that reaffi rmed 
many of the 1943 reorganization’s objectives to more clearly defi ne the respective 
functions of the Denver and Washington Offi ces and to streamline the lines of 
authority and accountability.  Reclamation’s staff for technical review and support 
was established and added to the Denver Offi ce.  Since the failure of Teton 
Dam, and with the decrease in the authorization of new projects, the majority 
of the  embankment dam design and construction work has involved dam safety 
evaluations and modifi cations of existing dams and appurtenant structures.
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 The title Director, Offi ce of Design and Construction was changed to 
Assistant Commissioner for Engineering and Research in 1978.  In 1979, the 
Bureau of Reclamation’s name was briefl y changed to the  Water and Power 
Resources Service, which lasted until 1981 when the name was changed back 
to the Bureau of Reclamation.  The  Lower Missouri Region was absorbed into 
the Upper Missouri/Great Plains Region in 1985.  The  Southwest Region was 
abolished in 1988, splitting its area between the Upper Colorado Region and 
the Great Plains Region.  Reclamation now has fi ve regions: Pacifi c Northwest 
in Boise, Mid-Pacifi c in Sacramento, Lower Colorado in Boulder City, Upper 
Colorado in Salt Lake City, and Great Plains in Billings.  In 1994, the Denver 
Offi ce was reorganized, and the title Assistant Commissioner for Engineering 
and Research was changed to Director, Technical Service Center (TSC) under 
the Director of the Reclamation Service Center, with the latter position recently 
abolished.  The 1994 reorganization increased the relative authority and power of 
the Regions and their local project and area offi ces, and reduced that of the TSC 
engineering organization.
 The majority of the embankment dam design work, now mostly dam 
safety modifi cations determined necessary on existing dams, is still performed 
by the civil/geotechnical engineers in the TSC.  The majority of the embankment 
dam modifi cation construction work is done by civil engineers in the Regions 
and their Project and Area Offi ces.  There are still Construction Engineers in the 
TSC who perform the construction management work and/or function as liaisons 
and provide oversight on the construction work managed by the Regions and the 
Project and Area Offi ces.
Modern Embankment Dam Design and Construction
 As different cradles of civilization evolved all over the world, irrigation 
works and dams were basic components of their development.  The earliest 
known design and construction of an  embankment dam occurred around 
2900 B.C. with the construction of Sadd el-Kafara Dam in Egypt.  The early 
history of dams in the world includes many other countries as well, such as 
India, China, and Iraq.  In North America, the Hohokam Indians built diversion 
works and canals along the Salt and Gila Rivers in southern Arizona as early 
as about 300 B.C.  And in the Four-Corners area (Colorado, Utah, Arizona, and 
New Mexico), the Anasazi and Pueblo Indians constructed mud-wattle dams 
across streams that diverted infrequent runoff into ditches and storage reservoirs 
throughout the area in order to support their agricultural civilization, according to 
a recent study by Wright Water Engineers, Inc. of Denver, Colorado.  According 
to Dams and Public Safety4 by Robert B. Jansen (Reclamation’s Director, 
Offi ce of Design and Construction and Assistant Commissioner for Engineering 
and Research, 1977-1979), the fi rst dam built in North America by European-
Americans was built in 1623 on the Piscataqua River to operate a sawmill at 
South Windham, Maine.  The fi rst embankment dam was called Mill Pond Dam 
and was built in 1677 at Newington, Connecticut.  In the far West, in early 
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California, Old Mission Dam was built on the San Diego River about 1813 by 
the Jesuits to provide water for the mission.  It was composed of mortared rubble 
masonry and was about 5 feet high.
 Starting about 1850, gold miners in California built rock-fi lled log-crib 
dams faced with wood planking that ranged up to about 125 feet in height to store 
water for hydraulic mining, but there were numerous failures.  It should be noted 
that many of the early dams constructed in California during the latter half of 
the nineteenth century supplied water for mining purposes.  One of the earliest 
notable non-mining dams in the West was  San Andreas Dam, constructed on San 
Mateo Creek near San Francisco, California, in 1870 to supply water for the city.  
This dam is notable because it was unknowingly built across the San Andreas 
fault zone.  This earthfi ll dam was about 105 feet in height and was built using the 
nineteenth century puddled-core technique, where the upstream and downstream 
shells consisted of rolled clay and the narrow core was made by manually tamping 
wet clay.  The dam’s upstream slope was 3.5:1 (horizontal:vertical, H:V) and the 
downstream slope was 3:1.  The embankment included a cutoff trench excavated 
down through the alluvium and colluvium (30 to 40 feet thick) that was backfi lled 
with a clay puddle core about 20 feet wide that was extended upward to form 
the central portion of the dam.  The dam was subsequently raised about 12 feet 
in 1875 and another 6 feet in 1928.  The great San Francisco earthquake of 1906 
caused a horizontal strike-slip offset of about 6 to 8 feet in the left abutment, but 
the dam embankment was not damaged.
 Across San Francisco Bay, the highest embankment dam built in the 
United States during the nineteenth century was  Chabot (Lower San Leandro) 
Dam, which was constructed in 1875 above San Leandro (near Oakland) on 
San Leandro Creek with a height of 115 feet above the streambed.  Its reservoir 
stored residential water for the East Bay communities.  It was constructed as a 
central-core earthfi ll dam, with the earthfi ll dumped from wagons, sprinkled, 
and compacted by the wagon wheels and by a herd of horses moved back and 
forth across the fi ll.  The dam’s cross-section included a central foundation 
(cutoff) trench excavated down through foundation soils to 30 feet below the 
streambed.  In the bottom of the cutoff trench, three parallel concrete cutoff walls 
were constructed 3 feet thick and 5 feet high, with about half the height (2½ 
feet) anchored into the foundation and half protruding up into the fi ll.  The core 
zone was about 90 feet wide/thick at its bottom in the foundation trench.  The 
embankment’s upstream slope was 3:1 and the downstream slope was 2.5:1.  A 
buttressing zone of earth and rock material was sluiced onto the downstream 
slope, giving the embankment a total volume of about 543,000 yd3.  In 1890, the 
dam was enlarged by sluicing earthfi ll onto the downstream slope.  Subsequent 
raising and buttressing of the dam embankment has increased the height to 
154 feet.  A good source of information on the evolution of dam design and 
construction, including embankment dams, is Development of Dam Engineering 
in the United States,5 which includes information on six of Reclamation’s 
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embankment dams.  Such was the state-of-the-art in embankment dam design and 
construction at Reclamation’s birth. 
 The design of modern earthfi ll and rockfi ll  embankment dams is far more 
complex today than was the case just 100 years ago.  There are now many college 
courses, books, collections of professional papers, professional groups, computer 
programs, etc., related to the design of modern embankment dams.  Most of the 
major unknowns and uncertainties involved with the design of embankment dams 
100 years ago have been removed by the evolution of engineering experience, 
research, knowledge, and education.  Reclamation has played a central role in 
that engineering evolution through its pioneering embankment designs, analyses, 
and soil behavior work on developing new laboratory tests and procedures 
for soils; development and publication of geotechnical and embankment dam 
engineering manuals and books; and contributions to the articles, transactions, 
and proceedings of engineering periodicals and professional civil engineering 
organizations.  Some of Reclamation’s learning and knowledge has come at a high 
price, as was the case with the 1976 failure of Teton Dam in Idaho.
 In addition to the books and professional papers that now exist on modern 
embankment dam design and construction, several professional organizations 
regularly deal with and publish state-of-the-art papers on the design and 
construction of embankment dams and related topics.  These organizations 
include: ASCE, the recently renamed United States Society on Dams (USSD, 
formerly the United States Committee on Large Dams, USCOLD), its worldwide 
parent organization, the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), the 
International Society on Soil Mechanics and Geotechnical Engineering, and The 
Institution of Civil Engineers (in Great Britain). 
 To the lay-person,  embankment dams may look like huge “piles of 
dirt” thrown across a valley or canyon, and it can be hard to imagine how truly 
complex and amazing they actually are.  Most people can perceive how complex 
a large concrete dam, like Hoover Dam, must be with a height of 726 feet.  The 
highest embankment dam in the world is currently Rogun Dam on the Vakhsh 
River in Tajikistan at a height of about 1,066 feet, and California’s Oroville 
Dam the highest in the United States at about 770 feet.  The largest embankment 
dam volume in the world is Tarbella Dam on the Indus River in Pakistan with a 
volume of about 159,000,000 yd3, and Montana’s Fort Peck Dam is the largest in 
the United States with a volume of about 126,000,000 yd3.  Many of these huge 
embankment dams are almost as amazing in their own way as Hoover Dam.
 There are many more embankment dams (currently about 72 percent) 
than there are concrete dams (currently about 28 percent) in the United States, out 
of the total of about 77,000 dams, meeting minimum dam height and reservoir 
volume criteria.  Among several reasons, one key aspect of why embankment 
dams are so popular is that in general, a properly designed embankment dam 
can be constructed at almost any damsite, as opposed to the more stringent 
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site limitations associated with concrete dams.  A limited “picture” of the 
various elements that are included in the design (and construction) of a modern 
embankment dam is presented below.  A more complete understanding can be 
obtained by reading publications such as Reclamation’s  Design Standards No. 
13—Embankment Dams6 and the previously mentioned Design of Small Dams.
 Once the need for a new dam and reservoir and a variety of other factors 
such as funding availability and environmental impacts have been resolved, 
several potential damsites are studied and investigated in suffi cient detail that 
a conceptual design report can be developed, which includes recommendations 
as to the preferred damsite and the appropriate type of  embankment dam and 
related features.  Once the damsite, the type of embankment dam, and related 
features have been selected, more detailed studies, investigations, and analyses 
are conducted in order to have the information necessary to start the fi nal design 
work, which concludes with the preparation of written specifi cations and drawings 
that are used as the basis for constructing the new embankment dam.  The various 
studies, investigations, and analyses included in these design phases, which often 
overlap, generally include:
1) a hydrologic study of the upstream drainage basin; 
2) a geologic study of the damsite and the reservoir basin, including
   a seismotectonic study of the area; 
3) a fi eld investigation of the foundation at the damsite and of the locally   
   available earthfi ll and rockfi ll materials and concrete aggregates; 
4) a laboratory program including testing and analysis of the soil, rockfi ll,  
   and bedrock materials obtained from the damsite and the borrow   
   area(s); 
5) a conceptual design study, intended to develop and present various   
   alternatives and their costs, and to recommend the preferred   
   alternatives for the embankment dam, spillway, and outlet works   
   features;
6) a fi nal design based on the selected-alternative features, including the   
   necessary construction specifi cations and drawings;
7) during construction, embankment design details often change to
   accommodate the changed conditions encountered; and
8) during “First Filling” of the reservoir and for the fi rst few years
   thereafter, the performance/behavior of the foundation and/or 
   the dam embankment may indicate the need for changes or 
   modifi cations to the original design.
 It should be noted that even a brief a description of how to design an 
embankment dam is beyond the scope of this paper.  The hydrologic study of 
the drainage basin above the damsite develops information on the probable 
fl ood hydrology that is used to design the dam embankment and the appurtenant 
spillway and outlet works features.  If the dam and its appurtenant features can’t 
accommodate the fl ood fl ows resulting from the various potential storm events, 
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the reservoir can overtop the dam embankment and cause it to fail.  The geologic 
study develops the necessary information on the geology of the damsite and 
the surrounding area, which often affects the type of dam selected for design 
and construction.  Unless the damsite’s geology is properly understood, the 
response of the foundation to the loads imposed by a dam and reservoir may 
cause malfunction, leading to serious maintenance or in some cases failure of the 
dam.  This is especially true in the event of an unexpected earthquake shaking 
a dam that is not designed to withstand the severity of the loading imposed on 
the structure.  The dam, spillway, and/or outlet works can all fail because of a 
moderate to severe earthquake event.  The fi eld investigation and laboratory 
testing of the dam foundation and the embankment borrow materials accumulate 
and develop engineering design data on the foundation soils, bedrock, and borrow 
soil and rockfi ll materials.  These fi eld and laboratory design data are critical and 
must be properly collected and evaluated if dam failure is to be avoided.  These 
design data form the basic information used in the various analyses conducted 
during the design of an embankment dam, including standard concerns about 
seepage, internal erosion/piping, settlement, static stability, seismic stability, etc.  
Design information on sources of sand and aggregate materials for concrete is 
also developed.
 After the design data have been properly developed, and the various 
design analyses have been completed, the dam embankment’s alignment, cross-
section, freeboard, foundation treatment(s), material zoning, fi lters, drainage, 
camber, upstream and downstream slope protection, and instrumentation (for 
monitoring performance) are then determined.  Computers have greatly enhanced 
the designer’s ability to perform extremely complex analyses, as well as to 
create 3-dimensional models portraying the dam’s confi guration to ensure that 
all of the dam embankment’s components join together properly.  The written 
specifi cations and drawings that describe the details for construction of the dam 
are then developed.  The spillway and the outlet works are similarly designed, and 
must be compatible with the embankment dam’s design.  Because of the potential 
public danger created by any dam and reservoir, dam design work (including 
that performed by Reclamation) undergoes a very high level of review, including 
review by boards of outside consultant experts, where appropriate, to ensure that 
our designs achieve the high quality required.
 A well-known saying related to embankment dam design is that the 
design work is not complete until the dam’s construction has been fi nished.  And, 
this “construction period” should also include the fi rst few years of a dam’s 
performance under full reservoir loading.  If the “First Filling” of a large reservoir 
takes 10 to 20 years to complete, then the “construction period” during which 
design changes and modifi cation of the dam may be necessary could last well over 
15 to 25 years.  The design uncertainty during the dam’s construction involves 
the fact that the geologic studies, the fi eld investigation data, and the laboratory 
testing data actually involve a relatively limited exposure and assessment of the 
dam’s entire foundation and all of the earthfi ll materials used to construct the 
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embankment.  When the fi nal foundation surface is completely exposed, there can 
easily be overburden soils and bedrock that were not encountered by any of the 
subsurface investigations conducted, depending on the damsite geology.  And, 
when the borrow materials are brought to the damsite for construction of the dam 
embankment, some of the material may not be quite what was sampled and tested 
in the laboratory.  The dam construction process may also be affected by the 
construction contractor’s plans for constructing the embankment.  The contractor 
might propose a different approach than was anticipated by the designer, such 
as the use of different construction equipment and the use of soil amendments 
to improve one of the earthfi ll material’s characteristics (such as decreasing its 
permeability).  Design changes during construction are most often subject to the 
same review process as the initial design.
 The dam engineering work required in the development of the design 
data, the performance of analyses, the preparation of the fi nal design, and 
the construction of a modern embankment dam and its appurtenant features 
generally involves a large number of related disciplines, including engineering 
geology, seismology, hydrology, civil engineering, geotechnical engineering, 
instrumentation engineering, structural engineering, hydraulic engineering, 
mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, and construction engineering.
Several of the above disciplines are included as sub-disciplines or specialties 
within the civil engineering profession: geotechnical, structural, hydraulic, 
instrumentation, and construction engineering.  As you can see from the “brief” 
description provided above, the planning, design, and construction of a modern 
embankment dam is a complicated process that requires the civil engineers and 
other professionals performing the work to have high levels of expertise and years 
of experience.  The entire dam design and construction process can take years 
(sometimes tens of years) to complete.
 Improvements in the size, speed, and effi ciency of construction equipment 
during the last 100 years have played a major role in the evolution of embankment 
dam construction.  The construction of a modern embankment dam and its 
appurtenant structures involves a large variety of construction equipment.  A 
brief list of the common types of larger construction equipment typically used in 
constructing an embankment dam includes: backhoe, dragline, crane, articulated 
concrete pumper, pneumatic drill, front-end-loader, belly-dump truck, tandem 
end-dump truck, all-terrain haul truck, belt conveyors, water truck, bulldozer, 
motor grader, self-elevating scraper, excavators of all types, tamping-foot 
compactor (static and vibratory), sheepsfoot roller, and smooth-drum roller 
(static and vibratory).  Construction on a large dam or at a diffi cult damsite may 
effectively utilize more effi cient or unusual equipment, such as a belt conveyor 
system or a short railroad for hauling the borrow material to the damsite.
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Reclamation’s History of Embankment Dam Design and Construction
 The history of Reclamation’s century of embankment dam design 
and construction is separated into the fi ve periods already used in describing 
Reclamation’s design and construction organizations.  More than 240 reservoir-
storage embankment dam structures have been designed and constructed by 
Reclamation during the past century.  Some of the information presented in 
the following period sections on Reclamation’s embankment dam design and 
construction history through 1958 is taken from Development of Earth Dam 
Design in the Bureau of Reclamation7 by F. C. Walker, then Head of the Earth 
Dams Section, Dams Branch, Division of Design.  The location map and map 
index of Reclamation’s  embankment (earth-fi ll) dams are shown in 2.1 and 2.2.
2.1.  Location map of Reclamation’s earthfi ll dams.
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Period I (1902-1918)—Reclamation’s History of Embankment Dam 
Design and Construction
 As already mentioned, at Reclamation’s emergence in 1902, the 
USGS’s Division of Hydrography, Hydrographic Branch had been studying 
water resources in the West for about 20 years, developing data on potential 
reservoir and dam sites.  The USGS had published reports such as Reservoirs for 
Irrigation,8 authored by James D. Schuyler in 1897.  When the U.S. Reclamation 
Service was established and given its mission of developing western water 
resources, Frederick H. Newell and his nucleus of engineers were transferred from 
the USGS’s Hydrographic Branch to the Service and they quickly started work on 
the design of the six projects that had been approved for design and construction 
by the Secretary of the Interior in 1903.  Work on the additional dams and projects 
2.2.  Location index of Reclamation’s earthfi ll dams.
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approved for design and construction during the next few years commenced as 
quickly as was possible.
 What was the state-of-the-art in embankment dam design and construction 
in 1903?  Only a few books had been published in the United States that covered 
the design and construction of dams, including embankment dams.  The fi rst such 
book was The Design and Construction of Masonry Dams9 written by Edward 
Wegmann (Member, ASCE) in 1888, followed in 1899 by his The Design and 
Construction of Dams, Including Masonry, Earth, Rockfi ll, Timber and Steel 
Structures10.  The third important book on dams, Reservoirs for Irrigation, 
Water-Power, and Domestic Water Supply,11 was written by James Dix Schuyler 
(Member, ASCE) in 1901, with a second edition in 1909,12 which included 
information on the Service’s Minidoka, Belle Fourche, and Cold Springs Dams.  
The 1909 book included chapters on: rock-fi ll dams, hydraulic-fi ll dams, masonry 
dams, earthen dams, steel dams, reinforced concrete dams, natural reservoirs, and 
miscellaneous dams, and included a total of 381 photos, fi gures, and illustrations.
 The publications of several engineering, mining, and construction 
organizations were the primary source of information on which embankment dam 
designs worked or failed, and why.  These publications included: Engineering
News and Engineering Record (both subsequently merged to form Engineering
News-Record), Mining and Scientifi c Press, Engineering and Mining Journal, 
Transactions of the American Institute of Mining Engineers, and ASCE.  Service 
engineers such as Hiram N. Savage had already written articles on dams,13
published before the Service was created.  Within a relatively short period, 
more books were written about dams, an increasingly important subject in 
the arid West.  Articles about the new Service and its dams fi rst appeared in 
Engineering News in 1903 and then in other publications like Engineering
Record, Engineering and Construction, Irrigation Age, and Pacifi c Builder and 
Engineer shortly thereafter.  Papers on the Service’s dams began to appear in the 
Proceedings of ASCE in 1907 and of the American Society for Testing Materials 
in 1908 (dealing with cement and concrete work).
 The Service’s Chief Engineer and his initial staff of 15 (civil) engineers 
and related disciplines reportedly had lots of previous practical experience.
Although the Denver Offi ce was established in 1903 for the engineers and 
assistants from USGS, a Resident Engineer at each irrigation project was 
assigned to supervise the development of all phases of the project, which included 
investigations, design, and construction.  The project plans were reviewed by a 
“project board” consisting of the Resident, District, and Supervising Engineers.  If 
warranted, one of Reclamation’s technical experts or a consultant would assist on 
a complex or diffi cult project.  The actual records from this early period are fairly 
limited.  Once the reservoir storage site was examined and appeared acceptable, 
it was used only if the observable geological conditions were “unquestionably 
adequate in light of past experience.”  Where explorations were made, they were 
directed at locating a competent foundation, with little consideration given to the 
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material overlying the good foundation.  Streamfl ow records were either short or 
nonexistent.  Except for critical items such as gates, cement, and reinforcing steel 
for concrete, materials for constructing the dam, including sand and gravel for 
concrete, had to be locally available due to transportation diffi culties.
 Reclamation’s fi rst approved project was the Truckee-Carson Project, 
later called the Newlands Project that was located in California and Nevada.
Reclamation’s fi rst constructed dam was part of that project.  Truckee River 
Diversion Dam located on the Truckee River in Nevada, now called  Derby 
Diversion Dam, was constructed as a combination gated concrete structure and 
earthfi ll wing embankment dam.  Construction of the diversion dam and canal 
works began under Specifi cations No. 1 in 1903 and was completed in 
June 1905.  The dam was 1,331 feet long, had a structural height of 31 feet and a 
hydraulic height of 15 feet, contained about 37,000 yd3 of earthfi ll, and had a 
3:1 upstream slope and a 1.5:1 downstream slope.  The Project Engineer 
responsible for design and construction was Leon H. Taylor.  Reclamation’s fi rst 
completed embankment dam, whose primary purpose was to impound a water-
storage reservoir, was  Minidoka Dam located on the Snake River in Idaho 
(see 2.3).  Its construction began in 1904 and was completed in 1906 (see 2.4).  It 
was a zoned earthfi ll and rockfi ll embankment 80 feet high that contained 257,000 
yd3 of earth and gravel fi ll and rockfi ll materials, had a crest length of 664 feet, 
and impounded 210,000 acre-feet of water.  Minidoka Dam was designed by 
John H. Quinton (Member, ASCE) and was constructed under the supervision of 
Construction Engineer F. C. Horn.
 Rolled (compacted) earthfi ll was generally preferred by Reclamation 
for embankment dam construction because of the diffi culty in handling rockfi ll 
material, but hydraulic or semi- hydraulic fi ll construction was used in several 
instances.  Foundation treatment varied substantially.  Some of the dam 
foundations were excavated to bedrock, some had cutoff trenches excavated to
bedrock, and some had multiple trenches.  Some cutoff trenches included a 
concrete cutoff wall constructed into the foundation bedrock that extended up into 
the cutoff trench backfi ll.  Some trenches were for drainage and some provided 
additional cutoffs.  Two dams had pile cutoffs: one made of wood and one made 
of steel sheet piling; neither of them was considered very effective.  Almost all of 
these embankment dams had one to three feet of riprap on the upstream slope.
 Most of the embankment dams constructed by Reclamation during Period 
I were relatively small structures (by today’s standards) that still took quite 
some time to build with the methods available at the time (Belle Fourche Dam 
took over 5 years).  The designs for these dams, which depended on the nature 
of the locally available earthfi ll materials (and still do today), were based on a 
relatively limited knowledge of geotechnical engineering and the other disciplines 
mentioned earlier.  The design standards of that time were limited: 1) an adequate 
foundation to support the dam, 2) an impervious core or upstream facing, and 3) a 
spillway capable of passing fl ood fl ows without damage to the embankment.  Data 
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on the hydrology of the drainage basins were very limited.  The geology of the 
damsites may have been studied and documented, but its effect on the dams to be 
designed and constructed was probably poorly understood.  The fi eld investigation 
performed at the damsite and on the earthfi ll borrow areas was generally limited 
to test pits and borings of shallow depth.
2.3.  Minidoka Dam plan and section.
2.4.  Minidoka Dam construction.
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 Any laboratory testing of the anticipated earthfi ll materials was extremely 
limited by today’s standards since most of the tests now performed on earthfi ll and 
rockfi ll materials were developed during and after the 1920s.  Grain size analysis 
was probably performed on the soils, but only of the sand, gravel, and cobble 
size materials, and information on the amount of clay and silt materials was not 
possible until later.  Darcy’s Law about the rate of water-fl ow through a soil (its 
permeability) was promulgated in 1856, and it dictates how and where different 
types of earth materials (clay, silt, sand, gravel, cobbles, and rockfi ll) can be 
used in an embankment dam, which is still very relevant today.  Early scientists, 
physicists, and engineers like Charles A. Coulomb (1773), Alexandre Collin 
(1846), and W. J. M. Rankine (1857) developed theories about earth pressure on 
retaining walls and tests of the shear strength of soil materials, but there were no 
standardized shear-strength tests performed on soil materials or analysis of slope 
stability as are an integral part of embankment dam design today.  The Atterberg 
limits tests, still used today to help characterize clayey materials, were developed 
by A. Atterberg of Germany in 1911.  In 1916 K. E. Pettersson and S. Hultin 
developed a slope stability analysis method to analyze the failure of a quay wall in 
Goteborg, Sweden, but it does not appear to have been introduced to engineers in 
the United States until several years later.  And settlement/ consolidation behavior 
of soil materials was not tested, although settlement benchmarks were fi rst 
installed along the edges of the embankment crest at Belle Fourche Dam in 1911.  
Thus, the ability to develop the necessary data and to analyze an earthfi ll structure 
like an embankment dam during Period I was very limited by today’s standards.
 The various types of construction equipment that existed during Period 
I played a large role in defi ning the size and height limitations placed on these 
early  embankment dams.  Excavation of foundation overburden soils (alluvium 
and colluvium) or borrow materials was performed by pick and shovel, horse-
drawn (Fresno) scraper, dragline, and/or steam shovel.  The borrow soil 
materials were excavated by hydraulic monitor or dredge for use in hydraulic-
fi ll embankment dams, and by dragline and/or steam shovel for the other types 
of embankment dams.  For relatively short distances, transportation of borrow 
materials to the damsite was accomplished by hydraulic pipelines or fl umes in the 
case of hydraulic-fi ll dams and by horse-drawn wagons and/or scrapers for the 
other types of embankment dams.  For longer distances, borrow materials were 
transported by railroads using trains of side-dump cars pulled by small “dinkey” 
steam locomotives.  After the earthfi ll material was brought to the embankment 
and dumped, it was spread out in relatively thin (i.e., 6-inch-thick) layers using 
horse-drawn drags and/or graders.  Water may or may not have been added to 
the layers of uncompacted earthfi ll before compaction.  Each layer of earthfi ll 
was then compacted by team and wagon travel, steel-drum rollers, concrete 
(cylinder) rollers, and/or steam-powered engines (“traction engines” were used 
at Belle Fourche Dam).  The use of the  sheepsfoot roller for earthfi ll compaction 
was reportedly developed around 1905, but they were not used on Reclamation’s 
dams for a while yet.  Rockfi ll material was either placed without compaction 
or was sluiced with hydraulic monitors.  Period I construction by Reclamation 
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was accomplished either by government forces or by contract with a construction 
company.
 During this early period of embankment dam design and construction, 
the height of dam and the foundation geology had little effect on the design of 
the embankment dam section.  However, the type of earthfi ll materials available 
for embankment construction had a noticeable infl uence.  Hence, depending 
on the nature of the earthfi ll materials available in the borrow area(s), the dam 
embankment section was either: 1) an upstream impervious zone supported by 
a downstream rockfi ll zone, 2) an upstream impervious zone supported by a 
downstream gravel zone, or 3) a modifi ed homogeneous section, which included 
design features that modifi ed the homogeneous performance.
Upstream Impervious Zone Supported by Downstream Rockfi ll Zone
 Period I  embankment dams utilizing this type of cross-section included: 
Avalon, Clear Lake, Minidoka, and McMillan Dams, and Elephant Butte Dike.  
Avalon and McMillan Dams, both on the Pecos River near Carlsbad, New 
Mexico, were actually the second or third reconstructions of earlier private dams 
that had failed by overtopping that breached both dams during fl oods.  Neither 
dam included a transition/fi lter zone between the earthfi ll and rockfi ll zones, 
which was added to later dams of this type.  Avalon Dam also had a part sheet-
pile, part concrete core/cutoff wall the full height of the dam.  The upstream slope 
of these dams was typically 3:1 that was often steepened to 2:1 above the full 
reservoir level, and the downstream slope was typically 1.5:1.  The relatively high 
cost of using rockfi ll material with the equipment then available was the reason 
that few of this type of embankment dam were constructed by Reclamation.  The 
failure of several non-Reclamation dams of this type during this period probably 
contributed to the decision to stop building this type of dam.
Upstream Impervious Zone Supported by Downstream Gravel Zone
 Period I  embankment dams utilizing this type of cross-section included: 
Cold Springs, Lahontan, Keechelus, and Minitare Dams, and Pathfi nder Dike.  
The upstream slope of these dams was typically 3:1 and the downstream 
slope was typically 2:1, except for Minitare Dam.  Minitare Dam had a 2.5:1 
upstream slope to the full reservoir level, a 2:1 slope above that level, and a 2.5:1 
downstream slope.  Pathfi nder Dike also had a concrete cutoff wall that extended 
above the reservoir level.  The earthfi ll zone became thicker during the period, 
probably because gravel material was more diffi cult to use with the construction 
equipment then available, and because of the greater relative abundance of 
earthfi ll material.  Although the mechanics of internal erosion (piping) of earthfi ll 
materials was not yet understood, dam designers did understand the nature of the 
problems potentially caused by seepage from the reservoir, as indicated by their 
efforts to control that seepage with defensive measures like cutoff trenches and 
walls.  The designers also made the embankment’s upstream impervious earthfi ll 
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zones thicker than twice the hydraulic water-pressure head from the reservoir.  
Cold Springs Dam, constructed between 1907 and 1908, had a total of four zones 
in which the gravel content increased from 50 percent in the upstream zone to 
67 percent, then 80 percent, and fi nally 100 percent in the downstream zone.
Modifi ed Homogeneous Section
 The remaining Period I  embankment dams were of the “modifi ed” 
homogeneous cross-section type, and they included: Belle Fourche, Deer Flat, 
Strawberry, and Sherburne Lake Dams.  Except for Belle Fourche Dam, the other 
dams had 3:1 upstream slopes and 2:1 downstream slopes.  Sherburne Lake Dam 
includes a vertical screened-gravel drain near the center of the embankment 
section, with this type of design detail being many years ahead of its time.  Belle 
Fourche Dam had a “bold” (less conservative) embankment cross-section, 
probably due to its large size.  The lower upstream slope is 5:1 to a berm, 2:1 
above the berm to the full reservoir pool level, and 1.5:1 above that; and the upper 
downstream slope is 1.655:1 to a berm and drain gutter, and 2:1 below that level.  
At the time it was built, Belle Fourche Dam was reportedly the largest rolled 
earthfi ll dam constructed in the world; it is discussed in greater detail below.  
Strawberry Dam also had a reinforced concrete core wall that extended above the 
reservoir level.
Belle Fourche Dam
  Belle Fourche Dam (locally called Orman Dam) is located on Owl Creek 
about 10 miles northeast of Belle Fourche, South Dakota, and was the most 
notable embankment dam constructed by Reclamation during Period I.  The dam 
was constructed 115 feet high above its streambed with a crest length of 
6,262 feet, an earthfi ll volume of 1,783,000 yd3, impounded a 192,000 acre-foot 
off-stream reservoir and a water-surface area of about 8,000 acres, and was fed by 
a 6-mile-long canal that conveyed a maximum of 1,600 ft3/s of water diverted by 
a diversion dam on the Belle Fourche River.  Information on the embankment’s 
as-built slopes is given above.  The original upper slopes shown on the 1905 Belle 
Fourche Dam design drawings were 1:1 instead of 1.5:1 upstream and 1.75:1 
instead of 1.655:1 downstream.  The decision was made during construction to 
fl atten the upper upstream slope and fl atten the upper downstream slope, moving 
the crest downstream (see 2.5).
 The greater steepness of the upstream slope, compared to the other 
embankments designed and built by the Service during Period I was an important 
difference.  Construction under contract No. 73 awarded to Orman & Crook of 
Pueblo, Colorado, began in November 1905, but work was suspended in early 
1908 when Orman & Crook went into bankruptcy.  Construction resumed in 
April 1908 under a new contract with the National Surety Company of New York, 
which was the “bondsman” for Orman & Crook.  The National Surety Company 
subcontracted with several private companies to perform the construction and 
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the dam was completed on June 30, 1911.  The total cost, including engineering, 
construction, cement, and general expenses, was about $1,299,000.  An article 
on Belle Fourche Dam by Project Engineer  Raymond F. Walter was published in 
Engineering Record in March 1906.14  A second article on the dam by Resident 
Engineer O. T. (Oliver) Reedy (Associate Member, ASCE) was published in 
Engineering Record in April 1910,15 describing the early plans for the project 
and the construction to date (early 1910) on the dam and appurtenant structures.
Some of the more unique or informative details related to Belle Fourche Dam’s 
design and construction are discussed below.
 In April 1904 a board consisting of Arthur P. Davis, John H. Quinton 
(consulting engineer from Los Angeles), and Charles H. Fitch (Supervising 
Engineer) examined the Belle Fourche Project and ordered detailed surveys of the 
irrigable areas, potential damsites, and canal alignments.  Three dam sites were 
located and the fi nal damsite was selected in May 1905.  The dam foundation 
had been “thoroughly prospected” by both open test wells and by earth auger 
borings located every 200 feet along the dam’s alignment.  The embankment was 
founded on a “heavy compact clay,” locally known as “gumbo,” which overlies a 
soft slatey shale located 20 to 40 feet below the surface.  There were occasional 
pockets of gravel encountered in the overburden layer.  The dam embankment 
was constructed using the locally available clay obtained from borrow pits located 
upstream and at both ends of the dam.  An expert “Engineer of Soils,” Thomas H. 
Means came and tested the proposed earthfi ll material.  Small scale experiments 
determined that this material needed an additional 7 percent water, by weight, 
for compaction to achieve the maximum density of the earthfi ll.  Belle Fourche 
Dam was designed under the direction of Project Engineer Raymond F. Walter, 
with the resulting plans approved by a board of engineers consisting of John H. 
Quinton, C. E. Wells, Charles H. Fitch, and Raymond F. Walter, resulting in a 
July 5, 1905, letter in which they approved the plans and specifi cations, 
recommending “that the drawings be reduced to standard size and the 
specifi cations printed in Washington and that the work be advertised as soon as 
possible.”  The 1905-era Specifi cations No. 56 contained a total of 37 pages and 
12 drawings used to show the dam embankment, appurtenant structures, and 
canals.  The specifi cations sections included topics such as: Engineer, Changes, 
Sanitation, Use of liquor, Embankment construction, and Measurements.  During 
2.5.  Belle Fourche Dam section.
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construction, several design details related to the dam’s upper slopes and the 
appurtenant structures had to be revised.  Resident Engineers Patch and Reedy 
were in daily to weekly contact with Project Engineer Walter during the entire 
period of dam construction.  Visitors (mostly engineers) from as far away as South 
Africa and Sweden visited the dam during construction.16
 In August 1910 engineers from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) 
visited the dam for a few hours and subsequently informed Reclamation that they 
considered the dam’s slopes, particularly the downstream slope to be excessively 
steep.  Reclamation’s engineers, including Project Engineer Walter and Chief 
Engineer A. P. Davis, developed the response to the Corps and provided a list of 
some 20 recently constructed embankment dams built with slopes steeper than at 
Belle Fourche Dam.  They knew that the location (height) of the phreatic surface 
in the dam embankment would affect the slope stability of the embankment, 
so they decided to install some 2-inch-diameter vertical pipes to function as 
observation wells for monitoring the “plane of saturation.”  More details on these 
pipe observation wells are provided below.
 The cutoff trench was excavated by horse-drawn “wheel scrapers” and 
a locomotive crane, using a ½-yd3 clamshell bucket, after which the trench was 
backfi lled with compacted “select material” (see 2.6).  The earthfi ll material in the 
borrow area(s) was excavated by 70-ton and 75-ton steam shovels with a 2½-yd3
bucket/dipper and was dumped into the 4-yd3 Western side-dump cars (see 2.7).  
The trains of 10 to 13 side-dump cars (a total of about 60 side-dump cars were 
used) were pulled by 18-ton Dinkey locomotives that hauled the trains about 
¾-mile to the embankment, up a maximum grade of about 4 percent onto the 
embankment surface.  The 36-inch gage train tracks and wooden ties were moved 
every third layer as the embankment rose in height.  Three-horse-team 1¼-yd3
dump wagons, fi lled by Western graders pulled by traction engines, were also 
used to haul earthfi ll from some of the upstream borrow pits.
2.6.  Belle Fourche Dam: Cutoff trench construction.
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 Four-horse-team Fresno scrapers were used to move the dumped earthfi ll a 
maximum distance of 50 feet away from the tracks, and ordinary four-horse-team 
road graders ran over the material deposited by the scrapers to spread and level 
the layer (see 2.8).  The layer of earthfi ll was thoroughly wetted, if necessary, 
using a 2-inch hose to apply water pumped up from wells or small reservoirs.
If the earthfi ll was compacted immediately after being placed on the fi ll, little 
if any water needed to be applied.  The specifi cations required that the earthfi ll 
material be placed and rolled in 6-inch layers using steam rollers weighing not 
less than “200 pounds per linear inch of roller rim.”  According to O. T. Reedy’s 
article, one of the rollers used was a 12-ton roller with a 4-foot rolling base.
According to the Belle Fourche Project History,17 an “8-ton asphalt dirt roller with 
smooth wheels” was also used, but it often became stuck on the slick surface of 
the embankment.  However, most of the compaction was accomplished by four 
32-horsepower 18-ton and 21-ton traction (steam) engines, with the rear wheels 
having been widened to create a 6-foot-wide “rolling base.”  The traction engines 
accomplished the compaction more quickly due to their greater power (see 2. 9).
2.7.  Belle Fourche Dam: Steam shovel, dinkey locomotive, and side-dump cars in 
borrow pit.
2.8.  Belle Fourche Dam:  Embankment fi ll construction.
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 A somewhat unique feature of the construction of Belle Fourche Dam 
was a gap through the embankment in the vicinity of station 42+00 (note that 
the distance between stations 0+00 and 1+00 equals 100 feet) that was left open 
to pass Owl Creek fl ows through the damsite from the start of construction until 
it was quickly closed in 1909.  The “Owl Creek Gap” (Gap) had side slopes a 
little steeper than 1.5:1.  Flooding on Owl Creek occurred several times during 
construction, with a maximum fl ow of about 5,500 ft3/s moving through the Gap.
Earthfi ll cofferdams were constructed at the upstream and downstream ends of the 
Gap.  Three cutoff trenches were excavated across the Gap that were backfi lled 
with select earthfi ll material.  A drainage system consisting of 4-inch tile pipes 
enclosed in screened gravel was constructed in the Gap’s bottom downstream of 
the lower cutoff trench to collect and convey any foundation seepage to discharge 
into Owl Creek downstream of the dam.  The Gap was closed using earthfi ll 
hauled to the dam by wagon and by train, which involved dumping the earthfi ll 
off a Howe truss bridge, and spreading and compacting the earthfi ll layers as 
rapidly as possible.  The Howe truss bridge consisted of one 100-foot center span 
and two 60-foot side spans built across the Gap.  The Gap fi ll was joined to the 
two existing embankments by excavating the slopes of the Gap until fi rm material 
was reached.  Due to the confi ned area, the bottom layers of earthfi ll were 
compacted by hand tampers that could exert a pressure of 1 lb/in2, by a wooden 
tamper weighing about 200 pounds operated by the locomotive crane, by the 
small 12-ton roller, and then by the wheels of a traction engine.
 Another unique feature of the dam’s design was the upstream slope 
protection.  The nearest rock quarry was located 32 miles away and the 
sandstone’s quality was considered poor, together causing its use to be rejected.  
The selected upstream slope protection consisted of 8-inch-thick concrete blocks/
2.9.  Belle Fourche Dam:  Traction engine hauling “dinkey” locomotive to damsite.
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slabs that measured 5 feet by 6½ feet, and weighed about 3,000 pounds each.
A concrete footing wall was constructed at the bottom of the 2:1 slope and the 
bottom course of blocks rested against this wall.  Along the center portion of 
the embankment, the concrete footing wall was buttressed by 10-inch-diameter 
16-foot-long timber piles driven into the earthfi ll on 3-foot centers.  The concrete 
blocks were placed on a 24-inch-thick bed of gravel using stiff-leg 3-ton-
capacity traveling derricks with 25-foot masts and 50-foot booms operated by 
20-horsepower hoisting engines.  The blocks were moved into place with the 
derrick and were then levered and hammered into place. 2.10 shows the nearly-
completed dam embankment from the right abutment. 
 The upstream slope protection at Belle Fourche Dam suffered some degree 
of damage by wave action almost every year due to the common, sustained high 
winds in the area and the 8-mile fetch (length) along the Owl Creek arm of the 
reservoir.  A 4-foot-thick layer of grouted riprap was suggested in 1943 by Chief 
Design Engineer John L. (Jack) Savage (Honorary Member, ASCE), but World 
War II caused the work to be deferred.  A 4-foot-thick layer of dumped rock 
riprap was constructed in 1976-1977, but the wave-erosion/beaching problem still 
persists in some areas on the upstream slope.
 The downstream slope was fi nished by placing a 12-inch-thick layer 
of rich loam-soil dressing, which was then “seeded with a mixture of grasses 
recommended by the Department of Agriculture.”  Concrete gutters were also 
placed on berms located 30 feet apart vertically, with down-slope gutters every 
1,000 feet, to collect and remove runoff during heavy rainstorms.
 The dam included two canal outlet works, each one well above the old 
Owl Creek channel, and a waste weir (spillway) at the left (north) end of the 
embankment.  Downstream of the weir structure, the spillway channel was earth 
lined below which it was concrete lined.  Ensign-type balanced valves were 
installed on the canal outlet works in 1910 and 1911.  Two 58-inch valves were 
installed at the upstream end of the North Canal outlet works conduit and one 
58-inch valve was installed at the upstream end of the South Canal outlet works 
conduit.
2.10.  Belle Fourche Dam:  Embankment from right abutment.
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 During the summer of 1910, after the reservoir had reached a maximum 
elevation of about 2930 feet, seepage began to surface downstream of the dam 
where the ground is at about elevation 2910.  Borings were driven to investigate 
the cause and source of the seepage, which indicated a strata of disintegrated 
shale and gravel about 10 feet below the surface.  The engineers had known about 
this layer of gravel, but thought it was 30 to 40 feet below the ground surface.
Supervising Engineer David C. Henny of Portland, Oregon, had been brought in 
as a “consulting engineer” during much of the work on the dam, and he was again 
consulted on the seepage problem.  A drainage system was advised, designed, 
and constructed along the downstream toe of the embankment in November and 
December 1910.  This drainage system consisted of a trench excavated about 3 
feet wide and up to 17 feet deep between stations 26+00 and 41+00 (1,500 feet), 
with 14-inch-diameter “telephone pole auger” wells drilled in the bottom of the 
trench that were backfi lled with coarse screened gravel, covered by fi ne screened 
gravel and then pit-run gravel.  A 12-inch-diameter vitrifi ed clay tile pipe was 
placed with open joints and surrounded by coarse screened gravel (1-inch to 
2-inch) and by fi ne screened gravel (¼-inch to 1-inch) surrounding the coarse 
gravel in the bottom of the trench, which was then covered with unscreened gravel 
and regular backfi ll.  Manholes were constructed at several locations along the toe 
drain—using 2-foot-diameter vitrifi ed clay pipe.  The outfl ow from the drainage 
system reached a maximum of 45 to 50+ gal/min, which varied with the reservoir 
water surface elevation.  The fl ow from this drainage system has been monitored 
ever since, and constitutes the longest continuous monitoring performed on one of 
Reclamation’s embankment dams.
 In late 1911, a series of 2-inch-diameter open-end pipe (observation) 
“wells” were installed in the embankment in the vicinity of stations 37+00 and 
38+00 to determine the “plane of saturation” (phreatic surface) and to obtain data 
on its movements with reservoir fl uctuations.  A wash-boring apparatus was used 
to drill the holes into which the pipes were installed; 34 wells were constructed, 
ranging in depth from 10 to 90 feet.  These were the fi rst “instruments” installed 
in a Reclamation embankment dam for the purpose of monitoring the porewater 
pressures in the dam and/or foundation.  A few of these observation wells are still 
monitored, making them the longest continuously monitored instruments of that 
type.  Their rate of response to reservoir fl uctuation is very slow (about a 2-year 
lag time) due to the relatively large diameter of the 2-inch pipes and the very 
low fl ow rate (permeability) of the seepage percolating through the gumbo-clay 
embankment.  Also in 1911, a set of iron benchmarks was installed every 
300 feet along the embankment crest to monitor its settlement, also the fi rst of that 
type of instrumentation installed on a Reclamation dam.   Belle Fourche Dam was 
quickly turned into the most instrumented embankment dam built by Reclamation 
between 1902 and 1911.
 The 90-year-long performance of Belle Fourche Dam has been quite 
an interesting story.  The concrete paving blocks protecting the upstream slope 
have suffered storm damage fairly frequently, which is why that type of slope 
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protection was not used after the construction of Minitare Dam in 1915.  In 1928, 
after 17 years of acceptable embankment performance, parallel cracks several 
hundred feet long occurred on the embankment crest between stations 27+00 and 
31+00, and they occurred close to the upstream slope.  This led to an investigation 
and exploration shafts; the cracks were up to 3 inches wide and up to 12 feet deep. 
The resulting judgement was that drying out of the embankment was the cause.
Other cracks had also been reported in the vicinity of station 39+00 to 46+00.
Then on August 2, 1931, after a fairly rapid drought-caused reservoir drawdown 
of 27 feet in 60 days, part of the upstream slope failed, resulting in a slump about 
610 feet long between stations 40+50 and 46+60.  The slide mass averaged a 
thickness of 9 to 10 feet and extended from about elevation 2962 down to the base 
of the 2:1 slope at elevation 2920.  Several factors contributed to this slide, but 
the steepness of the upstream slope, the (low) shear strength of the as-constructed 
“gumbo” clay embankment material, the low permeability of the “gumbo” clay 
material, and the rapid reservoir drawdown were the primary factors that caused 
the failure.
 The slope failure was quickly examined by Reclamation’s engineers, 
including Chief Design Engineer Savage on August 12th.  Plans for reconstruction 
of the upstream slope were agreed upon.  On August 24th, a ¾-yd3 dragline began 
building an access ramp into the slide and began to remove the concrete blocks.
A total of 20,320 yd3 of the slumped embankment material and gravel bedding 
was excavated by a larger dragline with a 50-foot boom and a 1¾-yd3 bucket, 
making sure to dig at least 1 to 2 feet below the “lowest slip plane,” and placing 
the material in stockpiles to one side for reuse.  The embankment was then rebuilt 
by several pieces of equipment.  The larger dragline picked up a half-bucket of 
gravel, then fi lled the bucket with stockpiled embankment material, and dumped 
the material into the excavation where it was hauled and spread in 6-inch layers 
by Caterpillar tractors pulling Fresno scrapers.  These layers were then compacted 
by rollers pulled by the Caterpillar tractors.  The initial attempts to use concrete 
rollers for compaction encountered diffi culty when the roughness of the roller 
prevented it from being properly cleaned.  An “iron mule” loaded with one yard 
of gravel was tried, but it was too slow.  They then tried an old printing press 
roller, for which they had to make a pulling device, and fi lled the roller with 
concrete.  This smooth roller allowed the use of cleaning scrapers and it worked 
well pulled by a “Fifteen” (horsepower) Caterpillar tractor.  A total of eight 
Caterpillar tractors were used, ranging in size from fi fteen to forty horsepower.  
The most effective “dirt mover” was a “Thirty” Caterpillar tractor pulling a 
1½-yd3 Fresno scraper.  Up to three working shifts were used due to the approach 
of winter.  Once the embankment was rebuilt, the gravel bedding was rebuilt and 
the concrete paving blocks were placed back on the upstream slope.
 After the completion of this reconstruction, Reclamation proceeded during 
the remainder of the 1930s to drill, sample, install piezometers (for monitoring 
water pressure) in the dam embankment and foundation, and then conduct a 
laboratory investigation of the Belle Fourche Dam embankment material in one 
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of the most comprehensive laboratory investigations conducted up to that time.
That work was followed by a (then) state-of-the-art analysis of the upstream 
slope stability.  Finally, in 1939, a 25-foot-wide earthfi ll berm was constructed 
to improve the stability by buttressing the upstream slope.  The berm sloped at 
3:1 and included a 3-foot-thick layer of well-graded ¼-inch to 3-inch gravel that 
was placed against the existing dam embankment to provide drainage.  The berm 
included earthfi ll material similar to the original embankment material, but it was 
enclosed in gravel for drainage.  The earthfi ll material was placed in 6-inch lifts 
and was compacted by 12 passes of a tamping roller.  The tamping rollers were 
to be confi gured such that they had one ball foot or knob for each square foot, a 
knob end area between 5 and 7 in2, produced a knob pressure of not less than 300 
lb/in2, and were equipped with roller cleaners.  The berm was surfaced with 24 
inches of riprap placed on 12-inches of gravel bedding.  Weep holes were also 
drilled on 5-foot centers through the concrete paving slabs for drainage purposes.
The embankment section shown in 2.5 includes this upstream berm.  The concrete 
paving slabs on the upstream slope continued to be damaged by wave action, and 
in 1976-1977, the upper portion of the upstream slope was rebuilt to provide 4 
feet of riprap slope protection on a 2.33:1 slope from the top of the 1939 berm 
(elevation 2950) to the embankment crest (elevation 2990).  Longitudinal cracks 
have continued to appear on the dam crest into the 1990s, and the rate of reservoir 
drawdown continues to be carefully controlled in order to prevent further 
drawdown-induced slope instability.
 Belle Fourche Dam is a truly amazing and unique early embankment 
dam in Reclamation’s history.  ASCE designated Belle Fourche Dam a National 
Historic Civil Engineering Landmark in 1988, and (somewhat surprisingly) it is 
Reclamation’s only embankment dam so honored.  Many of the design details and 
construction procedures developed and utilized at Belle Fourche Dam starting 97 
years ago are still used by Reclamation engineers today, especially some of the 
innovative design and construction concepts.
Period II (1919-1933)—Reclamation’s History of Embankment Dam 
Design and Construction
 Reclamation engineers had helped advance the state-of-the-art in 
embankment dam design and construction during Period I.  Reclamation’s 
reputation grew as the numbers of its successful projects increased throughout the 
West.  Reclamation received more and more publicity in the articles and papers 
published in western newspapers, magazines, and professional journals to which 
Reclamation’s engineers contributed their experience, innovations, and new 
design ideas.
 Reclamation’s engineering design groups had been centralized and were 
better organized in the Denver Offi ce, and they produced designs for new projects 
and dams at a high rate.  Respected civil engineers like  J. L. Savage, who had 
started his career with Reclamation on the Minidoka Project in 1903, had joined 
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the new Denver Offi ce staff as a Design Engineer in 1916 and was subsequently 
promoted to Chief Design Engineer in February 1928.  The Chief Engineers 
during Period II were Arthur P. Davis (also serving as Director of the Service until 
1923), Frank E. Weymouth, and Raymond F. Walter.
  The embankment dams designed and constructed during Period II were 
larger and the designs were more varied.  Consultants were used extensively 
during Period II, although the list of dams constructed during this period is fairly 
small.  Most of them were built with homogeneous sections, had little foundation 
treatment of note, and generally had 3:1 upstream and 2:1 downstream slopes.
Early in this period, the 40-foot-high  Salmon Lake Dam was constructed between 
1919 and 1923 on Salmon Creek as part of the Okanogan Project in Washington 
state.  It was Reclamation’s fi rst embankment dam that utilized a central 
impervious (sandy loam) core and a fl attened downstream toe or “tail” with 5:1 
and 10:1 slopes.  It was also the fi rst dam to be constructed on a “questionable” 
foundation (sand and clay of unknown depth).  The base of the impervious core 
was widened, and in the bottom of the 8-foot-wide cutoff trench located 25 feet 
upstream of the dam crest, Wakefi eld sheet piling 38 feet long was driven into the 
foundation with part of the sheet piles extending up into the core.  Note that these 
embankment design changes were included on a relatively small dam.
 Several other notable  embankment dams were designed and constructed 
during Period II.  These included: Sherburne Lake, Tieton, McKay, Guernsey, 
American Falls, Echo, and Cle Elum Dams.  Most of the embankment dams 
constructed during Period II were compacted earthfi ll structures, with some semi-
hydraulic fi ll dams built too, such as Tieton Dam.  Most of them were built on 
rock foundations that required the excavation of the overburden soils.  Some of 
these dams included reinforced concrete core walls the full height of the reservoir, 
such as at Tieton and American Falls Dams.  Sherburne Lake Dam, completed in 
1921, included a vertical zone of screened gravel located beneath the downstream 
edge of the crest intended to prevent saturation of the downstream embankment 
material.  This was one of the earliest uses of a “chimney drain” inside an 
embankment dam to control the phreatic surface and porewater pressures.
  Tieton Dam, completed in 1925 with a maximum height of 185 feet above 
the streambed, was the highest embankment dam built by Reclamation during 
Period II.  It was the fi rst Reclamation dam designed on the basis of a stability 
analysis, and the soil’s shear strength characteristics were assumed on the basis of 
the material’s angle of repose.  A concrete core wall 10 feet thick was excavated 
down a maximum of 134 feet through river-channel deposits and 10 feet into 
bedrock.  This foundation wall was constructed by mining out vertical shafts 
driven to bedrock and horizontal side drifts, forming a wall within the foundation.  
The core wall foundation was also pressure grouted using fi ve holes each 22 feet 
deep in one of the fi rst such applications (the maximum grout take was only one 
sack per foot).  Grout is generally a mixture of cement and water, and possibly 
sand, bentonite, and other materials.  According to Design of Small Dams 
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(p. 195), “Foundation grouting is a process of injecting under pressure a fl uid 
sealing material into the underlying formations through specially drilled holes 
to seal off or fi ll joints, fractures, fi ssures, bedding planes, cavities, or other 
openings.”  The  Tieton Dam embankment included a puddled-clay core one-
third the thickness of the hydraulic head constructed against the upstream side 
of the concrete core wall.  The remainder of the dam was constructed using the 
semi-hydraulic fi ll method in which the earthfi ll is dumped at the upstream or 
downstream embankment shoulder and is sluiced with jets of water, washing the 
fi nes into the center pool.
  McKay Dam, completed in 1926 with a maximum height of 160 feet 
above the streambed, rested almost entirely on bedrock and was constructed 
of compacted sand and gravel.  The upstream slope at 1.75:1 is the steepest 
ever constructed on one of Reclamation’s embankment dams and was covered 
with a monolithic concrete slab tied to bedrock with a concrete cutoff.  Three 
cutoff walls were constructed across McKay Dam’s foundation contact, and 
the foundation beneath each of the walls was grouted.  Steps were cast into the 
upper part of the upstream concrete facing to break up the wave runup (unlike the 
smooth concrete-panel facing at Belle Fourche Dam).  The concrete facing was 
very hard to construct and the construction engineer advised against using that 
design again.
  Guernsey Dam, completed in 1927 with a maximum height of 105 feet 
above the streambed, rested on a pervious foundation of unknown depth.  Because 
of the foundation, the embankment section included an upstream “blanket” and 
a large downstream rockfi ll.  The central portion of the embankment included 
an inclined impervious core zone confi ned by zones of sluiced sand and gravel 
located upstream and downstream of the core.  This was the last hydraulic fi ll 
embankment constructed by Reclamation.  A new concept used at Guernsey Dam 
was the incorporation of the upstream cofferdam into the embankment section.  A 
partial cutoff trench was excavated and backfi lled with the impervious earthfi ll.
  American Falls Dam, also completed in 1927 with a maximum height of 
75 feet above the streambed, was a combination concrete gravity and earthfi ll 
structure.  The bedrock foundation beneath its reinforced concrete core wall was 
grouted.
  Echo Dam, completed in 1931 with a maximum height of 130 feet above 
streambed, was another zoned embankment.  The central core consisted of 
compacted clay, silt, sand, and gravel; the zones upstream and downstream of 
the core consisted of sand and gravel; and the downstream toe zone consisted of 
conglomerate rockfi ll rolled in 12-inch layers.  The excavated cutoff trench was 
about 25 feet deep to bedrock and included a concrete cutoff wall.  The cutoff 
trench was located well upstream of the central core and was connected to it 
by a thick blanket of the compacted core material.  The earthfi ll materials were 
hauled to the damsite using gasoline-powered trucks, the fi rst such use on one 
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of Reclamation’s  embankment dams.  Compaction of the embankment materials 
was accomplished using a sheepsfoot-type tamping roller for the fi rst time on a 
Reclamation dam.  The  sheepsfoot tamping roller was an important development 
in the evolution of earthfi ll compaction because of the kneading action produced 
by the steel knobs or “feet” fabricated around the roller drum.  Water and/or sand 
were usually placed inside the steel drum to increase its weight and thereby the 
amount of stress applied by the ends of the feet during compaction.
  Cle Elum Dam, completed in 1933 with a maximum height of 135 feet 
above the streambed, was the fi rst instance in which a sheepsfoot tamping roller 
was specifi ed to be used for embankment compaction (it was used, but was not 
specifi ed, on Echo Dam).  Cle Elum Dam was the last dam designed using just 
empirical rules and the last one constructed without earthfi ll testing to verify the 
quality of the as-built earthfi ll materials, to evaluate construction practices, and to 
confi rm design assumptions.
 Dams generally put more people at risk than any other type of civil works 
structure.  Dam failures tend to be catastrophic, which causes them to be studied 
very thoroughly to try to explain why the failure occurred and to avoid repeating 
any mistakes.  The dramatic failures of dams like  St. Francis Dam at about 
midnight on March 12, 1928, near Los Angeles, California, tended to produce 
important changes in the practice of dam engineering.  By the end of 1929 several 
states had enacted laws placing the construction and maintenance of non-Federal 
 dams that imperil the lives and property of others under the supervision and 
control of the state engineer or other authorized offi cial.  With embankment dams, 
the need to explain why a dam failed when the same basic design had worked 
elsewhere was a major concern to all civil engineers, as well as the general 
public.  As civil engineering evolved, the increasing knowledge of the engineering 
design of certain materials (such as wood, steel, and concrete) that are used in 
constructing civil structures (such as buildings, bridges, and dams) generally 
improved the overall record with respect to reducing the incidence of structural 
failure.  However, the failure rate with respect to embankment dams did not seem 
to keep pace with the evolution of those other civil engineering structures, and 
remained of great concern into the 1920s and 1930s.  In general, Reclamation 
had a very good record with respect to its embankment dams.  However, 
Reclamation’s record was not perfect, as evidenced by the rapid drawdown failure 
of the upstream slope of  Belle Fourche Dam in August 1931.  While this slumping 
of the upstream slope material did not breach the dam or release the reservoir, the 
steep slope did become unstable, and it did fail.
 In the years just after World War I, several European engineers began to 
specialize in the mechanics of soil and rock materials, and thereby began the fi eld 
that has become  geotechnical engineering.   Dr. Karl Terzaghi (Honorary Member, 
ASCE) is generally considered the father of soil mechanics (geotechnical 
engineering).  According to Karl Terzaghi—The Engineer as Artist by Professor 
Richard E. Goodman,18 Karl Terzaghi graduated from the Technical University 
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of Graz in 1900 with a degree in mechanical engineering, having resisted his 
grandfather’s civil engineering profession.  However, after a short stint working 
as a mechanical engineer, Karl Terzaghi switched and began his lifelong career 
in civil engineering.  After receiving his Doctor of Technical Sciences degree 
from the Technical University of Graz in 1912, Dr. Terzaghi visited the United 
States for the next two years.  He quickly found his way to a meeting with Service 
Director F. H. Newell and immediately began an extensive tour of Reclamation 
projects and dams then under construction.  Back in Europe, Dr. Terzaghi began 
to study the mechanics of soils toward the end of World War I in 1917, working 
on the problem of earth pressure against retaining walls that had been worked 
on earlier by Coulomb and Rankine.  Dr. Terzaghi’s work (in German) was fi rst 
summarized (in English) in Engineering News-Record in 1920, which wrote an 
editorial preface declaring that characterizing earth as an engineering material is 
“the outstanding research problem in civil engineering” and that Terzaghi’s article 
“heralds the opening of an avenue of progress.”  He completed the manuscript 
for Erdbaumechanik (Principles of Soil Mechanics) in April 1924 and, after it 
was translated from German to English, it was circulated widely in the United 
States by John R. Freeman (Honorary Member, ASCE).  The Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology quickly offered Dr. Terzaghi the opportunity to develop 
a graduate course in foundations and soil mechanics.  Because of Professor 
Terzaghi’s background and expertise in geology, the “marriage” of geotechnical 
engineering and geology has been one of his more important achievements.
Professor Terzaghi continued to lead in the development of the new fi eld of soil 
mechanics and foundation engineering in the United States, with a continued 
special interest in dams until his death in 1963.  (In his memory, Mission Dam 
in British Columbia, Canada was renamed Terzaghi Dam in 1965.)  Briefl y 
described, thus began what is now geotechnical engineering.  The birth of 
geotechnical engineering as it relates to embankment dams “arrived” at ICOLD’s 
First Congress on Large Dams meeting in 1933 at Stockholm, Sweden, which 
was quickly followed by ICOLD’s Second Congress on Large Dams meeting in 
1936 at Washington, D.C.  Reclamation engineers participated in both of these 
meetings, including Commissioner Mead and Chief Design Engineer Savage.
 Reclamation’s fi rst engineering publication, entitled  High-Pressure 
Reservoir Outlets—A Report on Bureau of Reclamation Installations by
J. M. Gaylord, Electrical Engineer, and J. L. Savage, Designing Engineer, 
was published in 1923.19  This book of 179 pages included information and 
reproductions of drawings on the outlet works designed for and constructed 
at many Reclamation dams, including Minidoka, Belle Fourche, Strawberry, 
Lahontan, Minitare, Jackson Lake, Sherburne Lake, and McDonald Dams 
(McDonald Dam was designed and constructed by the Service under an agreement 
with Interior’s Indian Affairs Offi ce).  A second engineering publication, entitled 
Dams and Control Works, was published by Reclamation in 1929.20  This book 
of 164 pages included information written by Reclamation engineers on various 
diversion and storage dams, including Tieton, McKay, Guernsey, American 
Falls, and Echo Dams.  A section of miscellaneous articles presented information 
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on topics such as: “Corewalls for Earth and Rockfi ll Dams,” and “Design and 
Construction of Small Earth Dams.”  And the Appendix included a reprint of 
the recent specifi cations on Echo Dam.  Included in the article on “Design and 
Construction of Small Earth Dams” was a material placement recommendation 
for two-zone  embankment dams.  This recommendation called for placement 
of the selected water-tight material in the upstream portion of the dam, and of 
the heavy, stable, free draining material such as sand, gravel, and stone in the 
downstream portion, distributed such that the coarser material was placed on the 
downstream slope, changing gradually to the fi ner and more claylike material 
as the impervious material in the upstream portion of the dam was reached.
The importance of the proper placement of soils with fi ne-grained vs. coarse-
grained gradations within a dam embankment became much better understood 
subsequently in the 1940s and 1950s.
 Field and laboratory testing of soil and rock materials also began to 
emerge during the 1920s and early 1930s.  In addition to the pioneering soil 
mechanics work by Dr. Terzaghi on topics such as soil permeability, others 
contributed greatly to the evolution of soil and rock testing in the attempt to 
characterize these materials.  Reclamation’s  Earth Materials Laboratory was 
established in Denver at the U.S. Customs House in the fall of 1933.  The 
primary duties of the new Earth Materials Laboratory “were to determine the 
characteristics of proposed embankment and foundation soils, to work with the 
design section in planning fi eld control tests on the foundation and compacted 
embankment, and to train construction inspectors in the test procedure.”21  While 
the subject of soil compaction and optimum moisture content had been written 
about as early as 1907,  Ralph R. Proctor developed a soil test procedure in 1933 
that established the principles of soil compaction and moisture content and their 
application.  A four-article series was published by Engineering News-Record 
beginning on August 31, 1933.  Proctor’s compaction control test standard was 
quickly adopted by every engineer and organization involved with embankment 
dams, which was a major milestone in the history of embankment dam design 
and construction.  In addition to performing  Proctor’s density test, Reclamation’s 
Earth Materials Laboratory used or developed a variety of soil testing equipment 
and procedures, which included mechanical (grain size) analysis, penetration 
resistance (on compaction specimens), percolation and settlement, consolidation, 
shear strength, specifi c gravity, and soluble solids.  The laboratory also began 
to conduct studies and experimentation on different methods of compaction, on 
the percolation rates in different soils, on porewater pressure movement through 
different soils, and on consolidation rates of different soils.  The rapid drawdown 
failure of the upstream slope at Belle Fourche Dam in 1931 indicated that there 
was still a lot for Reclamation’s engineers to learn about soil mechanics and 
earthfi ll embankments.
 As Period II began, World War I advances in mechanized equipment 
such as tanks and trucks led to the post-war development of new  construction 
equipment.  Gasoline engines were now used to power 5-ton trucks for hauling 
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earthfi ll materials more quickly and with greater economy.  The new 15-
horsepower Caterpillar tractor was introduced and could be used to pull a roller 
for earthfi ll compaction, a Fresno scraper for moving earthfi ll, or a bulldozer 
for excavating and moving earth materials.  Further development of larger-
sized engines lead to more powerful Caterpillar tractors and other construction 
equipment during Period II.  As discussed on Echo and Cle Elum Dams, the use 
of sheepsfoot tamping rollers for compacting earthfi ll materials on Reclamation’s 
embankment dams began in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Period III (1934-1944)—Reclamation’s History of Embankment Dam 
Design and Construction
 Reclamation’s state-of-the-practice in embankment dam design and 
construction at the beginning of Period III had developed to a fairly high 
degree of sophistication.  Reclamation’s projects and dams were often written 
about in publications like Engineering News-Record and its engineers’ papers 
were often published in ASCE’s Transactions.  Reclamation’s reputation and 
those of its engineers were well established in the West and the United States.  
Reclamation’s evolution in concrete dams peaked during Period III with the 
design and construction of Hoover Dam.  While the concrete dams received more 
notice nationally and worldwide, Reclamation designed and constructed several 
milestone embankment dams during Period III.
 Reclamation’s centralized engineering design and construction 
organization and the Chief Engineer in the Denver Offi ce were well established 
and empowered.  Reclamation’s Chief Engineers during Period III were Raymond 
F. Walter (mentioned earlier under Period II) and Sinclair O. Harper, and J. L. 
Savage remained the Chief Design Engineer during the entire period. 
 The embankment dams designed and constructed during Period III 
involved some revolutionary changes and they were larger and more numerous 
than ever before.  At about the same time, testing of earth materials, construction 
testing for compaction and moisture control, and engineering design specialization 
all became part of Reclamation’s embankment dam design and construction 
process.  The installation of performance monitoring instruments in Reclamation’s 
embankment dams became standard procedure during this period.
 Data from laboratory testing, construction control testing, and performance 
measurements obtained on Reclamation’s embankment dams were collected and 
analyzed by the specialized embankment dam design group, which determined 
that soil as a construction material was extremely variable and very sensitive.  The 
data also indicated that the performance characteristics of many types of ordinary 
soil could not be adequately defi ned by the existing tests and procedures.  Hence, 
the earthfi ll construction practices then in use would not necessarily produce the 
desired consistent performance.  While attempting to solve these concerns and 
problems, the successful empirical design and construction practices historically 
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used with success by Reclamation continued to be followed.  Government 
regulations covering concerns such as working hours, transportation of 
equipment, safety, and wage rates became part of the process.
 Many notable embankment dams were designed and constructed by 
Reclamation during Period III.  These included: Hyrum, Pineview, Agency Valley, 
Rye Patch, Taylor Park, Moon Lake, Alcova, Caballo, Bull Lake, Midview, 
Fresno, Green Mountain, Deer Creek, Vallecito, and Anderson Ranch Dams (the 
latter dam wasn’t actually completed until 1947).  All of these embankment dams 
were constructed as compacted earthfi ll structures.  The dams had upstream slopes 
ranging from 3:1 to 3.5:1 with fl atter slopes at the (upstream) toe where material 
needed to be wasted, and had downstream slopes ranging from 2:1 to 2.5:1, 
similarly with fl atter slopes at the (downstream) toe.  These dams were built on 
a variety of foundations; almost all of them included a cutoff trench excavated 
down through the overburden soils to bedrock and quite a few of them included 
concrete cutoff walls in the bottom of the cutoff trench.  The cutoff trenches 
moved toward the center of the dam.  The rock(fi ll) material produced from 
required excavations, that was unsuitable for use as upstream riprap, was often 
placed on the downstream slope of the embankment.
  Pineview Dam, completed in 1936 with an initial maximum height of 
about 55 feet above streambed, included a steel sheet pile cutoff in the foundation, 
which was later determined to be ineffective, causing little if any porewater 
pressure drop in the seepage percolating downstream.  The dam’s crest was raised 
about 29 feet in 1955.
  Taylor Park Dam, completed in 1937 with a maximum height of 167 feet 
above the streambed, was constructed as an embankment dam at a good concrete 
damsite because of its remoteness.  Comparative cost estimates were developed 
for both types of dam, and they indicated little difference in cost.  Contractors 
were allowed to submit alternative bids, and an embankment dam was the 
low bid.  This reportedly indicated that earthfi ll construction had developed to 
the point where it could be cost competitive with concrete dam construction 
at a damsite suited to either type of dam.  A large rockfi ll zone mantles the 
downstream slope.
  Alcova Dam, completed in 1938 with a maximum height of 185 feet above 
the streambed, was a fairly complex embankment dam.  The foundation consisted 
of sedimentary rock dipping downstream that had quite different permeabilities, 
artesian pressure in one bedrock layer, and hot sulfurous groundwater.  An 
extensive “U”-shaped grout curtain was constructed in the foundation and up 
the abutments to control seepage and uplift.  A concrete gallery was constructed 
on top of the excavated bedrock to provide access for drilling drain holes and 
to perform additional foundation grouting if the need arose.  Alcova Dam was 
thoroughly instrumented with the new hydrostatic pressure indicators at three 
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sections of the embankment to monitor porewater pressures.  A large rockfi ll zone 
mantled the downstream slope.
  Fresno Dam, completed in 1939 with a maximum height of 75 feet above 
the streambed, was built on a very soft foundation of questionable strength.
Consolidation of the foundation and settlement of the embankment became major 
problems as construction progressed.  A theoretical approach and the results of 
plate bearing tests of the foundation were used to estimate the total settlement, 
which was estimated to be relatively minor.  However, the actual settlement has 
been in excess of 8 feet, about half of which occurred during construction.  The 
base of the dam embankment was widened, primarily to avoid abrupt changes 
in the stress in the foundation and to distribute the load from the embankment.
Piezometers were installed in the embankment for the fi rst time to monitor the 
development of construction porewater pressures in the earthfi ll.  The control of 
embankment compaction and earthfi ll moisture content proved to be effective in 
controlling the earthfi ll porewater pressures. 
  Green Mountain Dam, completed in 1943 with a maximum height 
of 274 feet above the streambed, was the highest embankment dam yet built 
by Reclamation.  Collectively, Green Mountain, Deer Creek, and Vallecito 
Dams marked Reclamation’s initial use of geological data in formulating the 
embankment dam’s design.  The alignment of Green Mountain Dam was shifted 
downstream to avoid an old landslide in the left abutment.  The upstream 
foundation was excavated to bedrock to remove potentially unstable foundation 
material.  Shale bedrock unexpectedly deteriorated rapidly on exposure to the air, 
which was addressed by spraying an asphalt coating on the shale immediately 
after it was cleaned off.  This procedure became standard practice on Reclamation 
dams whenever shale is encountered.  The borrow material was processed to 
remove the cobble-size (plus 3-inch) particles from the earthfi ll used to construct 
the embankment.  The compacted earthfi ll at Green Mountain Dam achieved 
the highest dry density yet at 132 lb/ft3.  Even at this high density, construction-
induced porewater pressures in the embankment caused by the weight of the fi ll 
were excessive.  Studies were begun to discover what could be done to avoid this 
effect, with the fi nding that slight reductions in moisture content in the earthfi ll 
caused a marked reduction in the  earthfi ll porewater pressures.  Construction 
practices on Reclamation’s embankment dams were changed accordingly.
  Anderson Ranch Dam, started in 1941 and completed in 1947 with 
a maximum height of 344 feet above the streambed and with a cutoff trench 
excavated a maximum of 112 feet to bedrock, set a new record as the World’s 
highest embankment dam.  The scheme developed on Green Mountain Dam 
to carefully control the earthfi ll moisture content to avoid excessively high 
porewater pressures was followed on Anderson Ranch Dam, but it wasn’t until 
near the end of construction that the moisture content control effort effectively 
controlled the porewater pressures.  The designed upstream and downstream 
slopes gradually fl atten from crest to toe, going from 3:1 to 3.5:1 on the upstream 
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slope and from 2:1 to 2.5:1 to 8:1 on the downstream slope.  This was done in 
an attempt to balance the cost savings from minimizing the embankment volume 
(steeper slopes) vs. the need to maintain adequate slope stability (fl atter slopes).  
In 1941, the design of the embankment slopes on Anderson Ranch Dam was 
based with some confi dence on the results of the slope stability analyses and the 
earthfi ll strength data developed by Reclamation’s  Earth Materials Laboratory.  
The contractor on Anderson Ranch Dam introduced a number of innovations 
during construction, including the use of a belt conveyor system for transporting 
the borrow material to the embankment, with facilities for adding moisture to the 
material moving along the belt conveyor.
 After Dr. Terzaghi and others began to develop geotechnical engineering 
during Period II, and after the First and Second Congress on Large Dams 
meetings in 1933 and 1936, Reclamation’s engineers joined the national and 
worldwide efforts in advancing the new fi eld as it related to embankment 
dams.  Reclamation continued to develop and make available information on its 
engineering work.  A second edition of  Dams and Control Works was published 
in February 1938.22  This soft-cover 261-page book, again written by Reclamation 
engineers, contained three parts: One: Storage Dams; Two: Diversion Dams; and 
Three: Special Articles.  Part 3 still included an article by engineer F. F. Smith 
on “Design and Construction of Small Earth Dams.”  Paragraph 5 of that article 
contains the statement: 
Among Engineers charged with the responsibility for the safety of large 
earth dams, it is appreciated that the outworn empirical methods have 
given way to thorough preconstruction investigations, careful theoretical 
design, and construction on known and defi nite principles of soil 
mechanics.23
A fi gure in the article on page 254 portrays “Methods of  Zoning Earth Dams,” 
and notes that zones 2 and 3 (zone 2 fl anks the zone 1 impervious core and zone 
3 is located between zone 2 and the rockfi ll zone on the downstream slope) 
“are roughly graded from fi ne material at the inner slopes to coarse at the outer 
slopes.”  This grading from fi ner grained material at the zone 1 core to coarser 
grained material toward the outer slopes was generally used on Reclamation’s 
embankment dams, and provides the fi ltering action necessary to prevent soil 
“internal erosion” (piping).  Dr. Terzaghi seems to have started the work to 
develop  rational fi lter criteria.  The results of his work and the research work 
by George E. Bertram with the assistance of Dr. Terzaghi and Professor Arthur 
Casagrande (Honorary Member, ASCE) resulted in a paper by Bertram24 that 
is generally given the credit as the fi rst document on fi lter criteria.  The Corps 
conducted its own research into fi lters in the early 1940s.
 Field and laboratory testing of soil and rock materials continued to be 
refi ned in response to the need of designers to better characterize those materials 
for potential use in embankment dams.  As noted above in the discussion of 
Anderson Ranch Dam, the Earth Materials Laboratory was able to provide the 
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engineering data necessary to optimize the design of the embankment slopes to be 
constructed.
 Reclamation’s  instrumentation for and monitoring of embankment dams 
continued to be improved, with the development and installation in 1935 of 
13 water level indicators (WLI) at Hyrum Dam and 12 more WLIs at Agency 
Valley Dam.  The water level indicators were a combination manometer and 
piezometer, but it was not suffi ciently accurate.  This led to the development of 
the  hydrostatic pressure indicator (HPI), a modifi cation of the Goldbeck cell, 
which were installed at Caballo Dam, Alcova Dam, and several other dams in 
1938 and 1939.  The hydrostatic pressure indicator used a thin gold-plated monel-
metal diaphragm, which used air pressure on one side to balance and measure the 
porewater pressure on the other side of the diaphragm.  The HPIs were installed 
in the embankment as it was constructed, and copper tubing was run in trenches 
from the instrument to the embankment surface where a recording apparatus 
could be attached and operated to measure the porewater pressure.  Reclamation 
developed the more-rugged  hydraulic piezometer that could be installed in 
either the foundation or the embankment; the fi rst 72 hydraulic  piezometers 
were installed at Fresno Dam in 1939.  Reclamation also developed the  internal 
vertical movement device, which was fi rst installed at Caballo Dam in 1936.  
The device was installed as the embankment was constructed and allowed the 
vertical consolidation behavior of the embankment to be measured at 5- or 10-foot 
intervals and also measured the settlement of the foundation at the bottom.
 During Period III the equipment available for the construction of 
embankment dams continued to improve in size, power, speed, and effi ciency.  
The rockfi ll zones included in these dam embankments could now be constructed 
because the construction equipment now permitted the handling of larger and 
larger sizes of rock particles, which were usually obtained from the required 
excavations for the outlet works and/or spillway.  The improved  construction 
equipment and improved techniques for dewatering below the groundwater table 
allowed the excavation of cutoff trenches through overburden soils to become 
larger and deeper where necessary.
Period IV (1945-1975)—Reclamation’s History of Embankment Dam 
Design and Construction
 Reclamation’s state-of-the-practice in embankment dam design and 
construction at the beginning of Period IV had developed to quite a high degree 
of sophistication.  Reclamation’s projects and dams were generally written about 
in engineering and construction publications as indicative of the state of the 
practice.  The reputations of Reclamation and its engineers continued to grow as 
more milestone embankment dams were designed and constructed during Period 
IV.  Reclamation’s Chief Engineers during Period IV were Walker R. Young, 
Leslie N. McClellan, Grant Bloodgood, (both McClellan and Bloodgood were 
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also Assistant Commissioners), Bernard P. Bellport, and Harold G. Arthur (both 
Bellport and Arthur were also titled Director, Offi ce of Design and Construction).
 The  embankment dams designed and constructed during Period IV 
generally involved more diffi cult and complex damsites than had been built on 
before, and the resulting designs were more complex.  After World War II, a new 
rush of dam construction occurred because of the delays caused by the war.  The 
multi-purpose dam and project came into being at Reclamation, expanding its 
previous focus on irrigation projects and storage dams.  Signifi cant improvements 
were made to the construction equipment available at the start of Period IV.
 Laboratory testing of earthfi ll materials saw new improvements in the 
quality and size of the apparatuses and instrumentation available for conducting 
soil and rock testing, aided especially by the introduction of computers for 
automated data acquisition during testing.  Starting around 1957, Reclamation 
started to use  computers in laboratory testing and in the analysis of slope 
stability.  Larger sizes of testing equipment allowed research and development 
of data on the effects of larger-size particles on the shear strength of the true 
matrix of earthfi ll materials being used in  embankment dams.  The improved 
instrumentation used in monitoring the testing allowed them to be run more 
slowly and allowed for the measurement of porewater pressures generated during 
shearing of the saturated specimens.  Reclamation’s research into fi lters was 
conducted by K. P. Karpoff, which led to  The Use of Laboratory Tests to Develop 
Design Criteria for Protective Filters published in 1955.25
 In October 1961 Waco Dam in Texas, a Corps dam, suffered a slope failure 
during construction that dropped the crest 18 feet vertically and caused horizontal 
movements of up to 26 feet downstream.  The slope failure was caused by a 
combination of high porewater pressures in the foundation clay shale generated 
by the weight of the overlying embankment that were transmitted through a sand 
layer and the failure of the low shear strength clay-shale foundation.  Research on 
testing the Waco Dam foundation clay-shale material and improvements in slope 
stability analyses resulted from that event (this became important to Reclamation 
at the end of Period IV and the beginning of Period V).
 Sheffi eld Dam near Santa Barbara, California, had failed in 1925 due 
to earthquake-induced soil  liquefaction in the dam’s foundation.  Reclamation 
became more concerned about the seismic stability of its embankment dams in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, and a technical memorandum entitled Seismic
Stability of Earth Dams26 by Civil Engineer Elbert E. Esmiol (Life Member, 
ASCE and USCOLD/USSD) was published in April 1951.  Several large 
earthquakes occurred during Period IV, which led to the development of new soil 
tests and methods of analysis, trying to model the loading of and the response 
by the various soils that occurred during those earthquakes.  The powerful 
earthquakes that occurred at Nigata, Japan, and in Alaska in 1964 caused 
geotechnical engineers to begin research on how to model the soil behavior called 
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“liquefaction” that was exhibited by sandy soils during those events.  The near-
failure and breaching of Lower Van Norman (San Fernando) Dam during the 1971 
earthquake that hit the Los Angeles area caused a renewed burst of research into 
soil liquefaction, fi eld and laboratory testing, and modeling of the deformations 
that occurred in the upstream portion of the Lower Van Norman Dam, a 
hydraulic-fi ll embankment.  Reclamation’s Soils Engineering Branch participated 
in the post-earthquake evolution of fi eld and laboratory testing of liquefaction-
susceptible sandy soils.   Starting around 1962, computers had begun to be used 
to analyze soil stresses with the newly-developed fi nite-element method of 
analysis.  This analysis method was subsequently upgraded to allow the Lower 
Van Norman Dam embankment and foundation to be modeled, and to estimate the 
deformations produced by the earthquake shaking for comparison with the actual 
deformations.
 Many embankment dams were designed and constructed by Reclamation 
during Period IV.  These included: Davis, Granby, Martinez, Box Butte, 
Scofi eld, Shadow Mountain, Cascade, Dixon Canyon, Spring Canyon, Soldier 
Canyon, Long Lake, Dry Falls, O’Sullivan, Jackson Gulch, Enders, Medicine 
Creek, Heart Butte, Bonny, Cedar Bluff, Shadehill, Dickinson, Trenton, 
Kirwin, Webster, Cachuma, Carter Lake, Glen Anne, Lauro, Rattlesnake, Tiber, 
Jamestown, Palisades, Sly Park, Wanship, Lovewell, Casitas, Vega, Trinity, 
Navajo, Fontenelle, Merritt, San Luis, Soldier Creek, Pueblo, and Teton Dams.  
These Period IV embankment dams generally had upstream slopes that ranged 
from 2.5:1 to 3.5:1, with fl atter slopes ranging from 4:1 to 20:1 at the toe where 
excess material could be wasted.  The steep 2.5:1 upstream slopes were used only 
where an upstream rockfi ll zone created the necessary strength and stability.  The 
downstream slopes ranged from 2:1 to 2.5:1, similarly with fl atter slopes ranging 
from 3.5:1 to 20:1 at the toe.  These dams were built on a variety of foundations; 
all of them were either founded on bedrock or they included a cutoff trench 
excavated down through the overburden soils to bedrock, and quite a few of them 
included concrete cutoff walls in the bottom of the cutoff trench.  The cutoff 
trenches remained near the upstream center of the dam.  The rockfi ll material 
from required excavations was generally placed and compacted in the outer slopes 
of the embankment.
  Granby Dam, completed in 1948 with a maximum height of 235 feet 
above the streambed, encountered several construction problems that were 
successfully dealt with.  A signifi cant change in the borrow source for the 
embankment was accomplished with little adverse effect on the schedule.  An 
attempt was made to use the surface mapping of the damsite’s geology instead of 
the usual amount of investigative drilling; however, the use of this approach (used 
elsewhere) proved to be inappropriate due to the complex geology of the damsite.  
The construction experience on Granby Dam was discussed in F. C. Walker’s 
publication:
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It was necessary to perform additional grouting after the structure was 
placed in operation.  However, this grouting was accomplished so 
economically that portions of other dams have since been left ungrouted 
until actual performance indicates a need for such treatment.27
This insight into Reclamation’s foundation  grouting design philosophy by the then 
Head of the Earth Dams Section becomes more meaningful when  Fontenelle and 
 Teton Dams are discussed.
  Davis Dam, which spans the Colorado River, was completed in 1950 
with a maximum height of 138 feet above streambed.  This dam represented 
an important advancement because of the diversion scheme for bypassing the 
large fl ow of the river around the damsite.  That diversion was accomplished 
by excavating an open channel through the left abutment that was later closed 
by the construction of a concrete dam, which contained the spillway and the 
hydroelectric powerplant penstocks.28
 Construction of Enders, Medicine Creek, and Heart Butte Dams and 
several other  embankment dams were all begun around 1946 and 1947 in the 
Great Plains area where the foundations generally consisted of relatively weak 
Cretaceous and Tertiary formations of sand, silt, and/or clay.  These formations 
tend to be fairly permeable if sandy or structurally weak if clayey.  The valley 
fl oors are generally broad and are covered with moderately deep alluvium.  The 
available borrow materials usually ranged from sandy silts to silty clays, with both 
gravel and rock (suitable for use as riprap) scarce to nonexistent.  These damsites 
also had stream fl ows that were highly variable, with large fl oods possible.  It 
proved to be cheaper to increase the size of the reservoir to increase fl ood-storage 
capacity rather than build a larger spillway.
  Cachuma (Bradbury) Dam, completed in 1953 with a maximum height 
of 206 feet above the streambed, was constructed in a highly seismic area close 
to where Sheffi eld Dam had failed during an earthquake in 1925.  The design 
of the embankment dam was therefore more conservative than otherwise would 
have been necessary.  A large amount of siltstone and shale rockfi ll was produced 
by the spillway excavation, and this otherwise unsuitable material was used by 
enclosing it entirely within the downstream sand and gravel zone.  In one of 
the fi rst applications of this type, a concrete “grout cap” was constructed at the 
bedrock surface in the center-bottom of the cutoff trench at Cachuma Dam to 
provide fi rm support for the curtain grouting of the foundation beneath the dam.
  Tiber Dam, completed in 1956 with a maximum height of 196 feet above 
the streambed, was built on a shale foundation that contained numerous seams 
of low shear strength bentonite clay.  Hence, the foundation shear strength was 
uncertain.  The earthfi ll materials available for use as the embankment’s central 
core varied widely in characteristics and shear strength, which was expected to 
be low.  The embankment cross section therefore refl ected these concerns with a 
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waste material disposal zone between the upstream cofferdam and the upstream 
slope, and with downstream slopes ranging from 2.25:1 near the crest to 5.5:1 
toward the toe.  The embankment also included zones fl anking both sides of the 
core that transition between the fi ner-grained clay, silt, sand, and gravel core 
founded on bedrock and the coarser outer shells that consisted of sand, gravel, and 
cobbles.
  Palisades Dam, completed in 1957 with a maximum height of 260 feet 
above the streambed, was one of the largest embankment dams yet built by 
Reclamation.  The embankment volume of over 13,500,000 yd3 caused the design 
to use nearby borrow materials that might otherwise have been rejected.  The 
borrow soils available were pervious sand and gravel alluvium on the valley fl oor 
and impervious soils along the abutments, which had moisture contents either too 
high or too low with respect to optimum moisture for compaction.  There was also 
some concern about potentially high  construction porewater pressures created 
by the weight of the fi ll.  The design was adjusted to place the better but wetter 
borrow soils in the lower and central parts of the embankment and the drier but 
poorer borrow soils in the upper and outer parts of the embankment, while still 
maintaining adequate slope stability.
  Sly Park Dam, completed in 1954 with a maximum height of 175 feet 
above the streambed, was one of the fi rst and few rockfi ll embankment dam 
designs built by Reclamation.  The upstream rockfi ll slope was 2.5:1 and the 
downstream rockfi ll slope was 2:1.  Because of the size of the rockfi ll particles, 
the rockfi ll material could not be tested in the laboratory.  The design therefore 
had to assume that the shear strength should refl ect the natural slopes of the loose 
rock in the vicinity (the angle of repose).  Again, the central core of compacted 
silt, sand, and gravel was fl anked by transition zones, consisting of quarry fi nes 
in this case.  Because of the difference between the properties of the compacted 
central core and the rockfi ll shells, differential consolidation between these zones 
later caused longitudinal cracks along the crest.
 Although vibratory rollers had been developed for compacting 
cohesionless soils for roads in Europe in the 1930s, they were fi rst used to 
compact rockfi ll dam materials at Quoich Dam in Scotland around 1958.  In the 
United States, the use of vibratory rollers for compaction of rockfi ll materials was 
fi rst attempted by the Corps at the 445-foot-high Cougar Dam in Oregon, built 
between 1959 and 1964.  Reclamation fi rst used smooth steel-drum vibratory 
rollers to compact a sand and gravel zone at  Navajo Dam in 1959.29
  Trinity Dam, completed in 1962 with a maximum height of 465 feet above 
the streambed, is the highest embankment dam ever designed and constructed 
by Reclamation, and its volume of 29,400,000 yd3 made it the largest yet built.  
Almost all of the overburden material was excavated  such that the embankment 
rested almost entirely on bedrock.  The embankment contained four zones, 
grading from the central core to outer toe zones of rockfi ll.  The upstream slope 
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ranged from 2.5:1 in the upper slope to 4:1 in the lower rockfi ll toe zone.  The 
downstream slope ranged from 2:1 near the crest to 3:1 in the lower rockfi ll toe 
zone.  The upstream and downstream rockfi ll toe zones were added to improve 
stability; the rockfi ll was placed in 3-foot-thick layers (without compaction).  A 
belt  conveyor system over 10,000 feet long, that dropped 1,000 feet in elevation 
and handled 1,850 yd3/hr, moved a total of about 10,000,000 yd3 of earthfi ll 
material from the borrow area to the damsite.
  Navajo Dam, completed in 1963 with a maximum height of 388 feet above 
streambed, had a miscellaneous earthfi ll zone downstream of the central core 
that was completely enclosed within a zone of “selected sand, gravel, cobbles, 
and boulders.”  That selected sand, gravel, cobbles, and boulders zone formed an 
inclined transition/drain zone between the core and the miscellaneous earthfi ll and 
formed a blanket/drain zone against the downstream bedrock foundation.
  Fontenelle Dam, completed in 1964 with a maximum height of 128 feet 
above streambed,  included: irrigation canal outlet works in both abutments, a 
river outlet works near the middle of the dam capable of passing 18,700 ft3/s, a 
hydroelectric powerplant, and a right abutment overfl ow spillway of 20,000 ft3/s
capacity at full pool.  The river outlet works was large because it was less costly 
than increasing the size of the spillway.  The embankment cross-section is shown 
in 2.11.  The embankment zoning included: the zone 1 core, the zone 2
chimney and blanket drain of selected (pit run alluvium) sand, gravel, and 
cobbles, and a zone 3 miscellaneous fi ll that was completely enclosed within the 
Zone 2.  The surface of the bedrock foundation was far more broken than had 
been anticipated, so the cutoff trench was deepened by 6 feet.  The foundation and 
abutments were grouted by a single-row grout curtain installed through a grout 
cap.  Grout “takes” in the upper 65 feet of the foundation were very large and 
a second line of grout holes was placed in the vicinity of the river outlet works 
and in the right abutment to perform additional grouting.  The grouting program 
included a total of 45,900 linear feet of drill hole and 143,000 ft3 of cement 
grout pumped into the foundation, for an average grout take of 3.1 ft3 per foot of 
hole.  Reservoir fi lling was to be very slow so that if any seepage leaks occurred, 
they could be plugged before permanent operations commenced—remember the 
previous reservoir fi lling and additional grouting experience on Granby Dam.  
2.11.  Fontenelle Dam section.
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There was no surface treatment of the foundation rock beneath the zone 1 core, 
such as slush (lean cement) grouting of surface cracks, and smoothing of the 
foundation with dental concrete.
 First fi lling of the 345,000 acre-foot reservoir commenced in April 1964.  
During the summer of 1964, after the reservoir had risen to a depth of about 
49 feet, seepage appeared in the fl oor of an exhausted borrow area 2,000 feet 
downstream of the dam and stabilized at a fl ow of 6 ft3/s.  The reservoir continued 
to fi ll through the spring runoff from the heavy snowpack winter of 1964-1965 
(which produced a peak reservoir infl ow of 17,560 ft3/s) until it reached a depth 
of about 85 feet in early June 1965.  Seepage then began to discharge from a 
rock cut in the spillway discharge channel and  from a cliff face about 0.6-mile 
downstream on the left abutment.  The seepage fl owing from the downstream 
borrow area also appeared to have increased.  The reservoir began to spill on 
June 15th and the rate of total seepage increased to about 70 ft3/s.  A small slough 
occurred at the edge of the embankment on the left side of the spillway chute at 
about the mid-height of the dam on June 29th, with about 1 ft3/s issuing from a 
crack in the rock beneath the chute.  On the morning of September 3rd, a wet spot 
was observed on the downstream slope of the dam at about mid-height near the 
right abutment about 100 feet to the right of the slough that occurred in June.  By 
mid-afternoon, seepage water started fl owing from the wet spot area, causing 
erosion and sloughing of the dam embankment material.  The fl ow that evening 
was estimated at about 5 ft3/s.  Local offi cials were then alerted to stand by, ready 
to evacuate downstream residents.  The next morning (September 4th), the seepage 
fl ows had increased to about 21 ft3/s and an estimated 10,500 yd3 of material had 
2.12.  Fontenelle Dam:  Large sinkhole on downstream slope.
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been eroded from the downstream slope (see 2.12).  Rockfi ll was dumped into 
the hole on the downstream slope, trying to stop the erosion, and the seepage 
fl ows appeared to stabilize.  On the morning of September 5th, it was decided to 
fully open the outlet works, and by the morning of the 6th the reservoir level had 
dropped 8 feet from the initial level.  That afternoon, an area on the dam crest 
about 20 feet in diameter near the upstream edge collapsed (see 2.13) and dropped 
about 30 feet, exposing bedrock on the abutment side of the cavity.  The reservoir 
continued to drop about 4 feet per day until the pool was low enough to halt the 
seepage.
 There were several causes for the near-breaching (and near-failure) of 
Fontenelle Dam, which was barely avoided because of the large outlet works 
capacity.  According to Chief Engineer Bellport’s “appraisal of the accident” 
included in his paper Bureau of Reclamation Experience in Stabilizing 
Embankment of Fontenelle Earth Dam30 presented at the 1967 ICOLD Conference 
in Istanbul, Turkey, “It is apparent that the weak spot was in the abutment and not 
the embankment.  Many dams have been placed on similar foundations.… With 
steep abutments, it is diffi cult to obtain adequate shallow grouting because of the 
low pressures that must be used to prevent movement in the foundation.”31 The 
single row grout curtain was judged to have been inadequate, given the nature 
of the sedimentary shale and sandstone bedrock jointing in the abutments.  The 
problem was (supposedly) fi xed by a grouting program consisting of eight lines of 
grout holes in the steep right abutment; a total of 80,000 feet of hole was drilled 
and an additional 200,000 ft3 of grout were pumped into the abutments during 
August-December 1966.  Bellport commented in the paper that
In the 20-year span from 1940 to 1960, increasing boldness in reducing 
the number of lines and amount of grout seemed to be proving a 
philosophy that grouting was mostly superfl uous.  At the Bureau of 
Reclamation too, in situations where defi ciencies could be readily 
2.13.  Fontenelle Dam:  Crest sinkhole.
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remedied, the process of “try and see” was being used with increasing 
success until the situation at Fontenelle Dam was encountered.32
Further, 
This diffi culty occurred on fi rst fi lling of the reservoir which was 
unusually rapid due to extremely large infl ows and the fact that the outlet 
work was not being used so that some repair work could be performed.
This experience illustrates the need for slow, controlled fi lling of 
reservoirs where unfavorable foundation conditions are known to exist.33
Within Reclamation, it appears that information on the near failure of Fontenelle 
Dam may not have been widely distributed, but other organizations, such as 
the Corps, reportedly changed some of their embankment dam design and 
construction practices after reviewing this incident.  Fontenelle Dam will be 
discussed further under Period V.
  Merritt Dam, completed in 1964 with a maximum height of 120 feet 
above the original ground surface, was the fi rst embankment dam that used 
“soil cement” instead of rock riprap to protect the upstream slope.  Merritt Dam 
is located on the Snake River in north-central Nebraska where the usual rock 
riprap material was not economically available.  Reclamation had developed 
and successfully used soil cement on a test section constructed in 1951 at Bonny 
Reservoir in eastern Colorado.  Since its fi rst success at Merritt Dam, soil cement 
slope protection has been used on twelve more embankment dams by Reclamation 
and on countless other structures.
  San Luis Dam, completed in 1967 with a maximum height of 244 
feet above the original ground surface and a volume of over 77,000,000 yd3,
is the largest embankment dam by volume ever designed and constructed by 
Reclamation.  The embankment included a central impervious core with a volume 
of about 42,000,000 yd3.  The borrow material was excavated using a Bucyrus-
Erie wheel excavator with a 30-foot-diameter digging wheel equipped with ten 
2½ yd3 buckets.  This machine had a capacity of about 4,000 yd3/hr and loaded a 
100-ton Euclid bottom-dump truck every 45 seconds.  In September 1981 a 
rapid-drawdown of the reservoir led to a slide in the upstream slope that was 
caused by a weak clay layer in the foundation.  The slide was about 1,300 feet 
long and involved the reconstruction of the upstream slope and construction of a 
berm along the toe, with a total volume of about 1.4 million yd3.
  Soldier Creek Dam, completed in 1973 with a maximum height of 251 feet 
above streambed, was built to enlarge the reservoir originally impounded by the 
1913-era Strawberry Dam, which was then breached when the water on both sides 
equalized.  The design and construction of Soldier Creek Dam were similar to 
Fontenelle Dam.  Soldier Creek Dam was one of seven dams (both embankment 
and concrete dams) selected by the Department of the Interior for a post-
Teton 1977 study by W. A. Wahler & Associates to review recently completed 
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Reclamation dams.  Soldier Creek Dam will be discussed further in the Period V 
section.
  Pueblo Dam, completed in 1975 with a height of 165 feet above original 
ground, is a composite dam consisting of a concrete massive-head buttress 
structure containing the 550-foot- long spillway, fl anked by two earthfi ll 
embankments. The concrete structure is 1,750 feet long and consists of 23 
buttresses with a maximum height of 176 feet.  The two wing embankments 
wrapped around the ends of the concrete structure and consist of the 3,570-foot-
long left embankment and the 4,910-foot-long right embankment.  Bedrock at 
the damsite consists of fl at-lying Cretaceous sediments in alternating units of 
sandstone, limestone, and shale.  The concrete dam section was founded on 
Dakota sandstone and the embankments rest partly on alluvium in the valley 
bottom and on Graneros shale on the gently rising abutments.  The Dakota 
sandstone contained a few discontinuous lenses and seams of shale.  The Graneros 
shale contained a number of seams of bentonite clay up to 6 inches thick.  When 
the left embankment had risen to within about 20 feet of the fi nal crest elevation 
in November 1973, the inclinometer casing located at the downstream toe at 
station 90+00 indicated a downstream shear deformation through the casing that 
prevented the lowering of the inclinometer instrument.  Additional inclinometer 
casings were installed along the downstream toe of the left embankment, which 
fi nally indicated the deformation had stopped, after reaching a total of about 
6 inches of downstream deformation.  There were no piezometers installed in 
the shale or the bentonite clay seams prior to embankment construction that 
might have indicated the amount of construction-induced porewater pressure 
in the foundation.  Sampling and laboratory testing of the Graneros shale were 
performed, and fi nite element analyses were conducted to help judge whether 
a long-term stability problem was indicated by this foundation deformation.
This left embankment deformation in the foundation, which occurred during 
construction, appears to have been similar to what occurred during construction 
at Waco Dam in 1961, although not to the same degree.  The left and right 
embankments were both completed and the dam and reservoir were put into 
service.  Pueblo Dam will be discussed further in the Period V section.
  Teton Dam was constructed between February 1972 and November 1975 
with a maximum height of 305 feet above the streambed.  The embankment cross-
section was remarkably similar to that of Fontenelle Dam (see 2.14).  The wide 
zone 1 core consisted of silt, fl anked upstream and downstream by zone 2, which 
consisted of (pit-run alluvium) selected sand, gravel, and cobbles.  There was also 
a zone 3 miscellaneous earthfi ll zone downstream, with zone 2 constructed as a 
chimney fi lter/drain and as a 20-foot-thick drainage blanket beneath the zone 3 
and up the abutments.  The outlet works at Teton Dam consisted of the river outlet 
works with a capacity of 3,400 ft3/s and an auxiliary outlet works with a capacity 
of 850 ft3/s.  The construction schedule required that the river outlet works be 
operational by May 1, 1976, but the contractor was behind schedule and only the 
auxiliary outlet works were operational to control reservoir fi lling.
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2.14.  Teton D
am
 sections.
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  Foundation grouting at Teton Dam consisted of 3 lines of grout 
holes up to 310 feet deep.  A test-grouting program was conducted in 1969 and 
was to inject about 260,000 ft3 of grout into the foundation.  The actual test 
grouting program pumped twice that amount of grout during the pilot grouting 
program, and just two of the test holes took 16,000 sacks of cement and 18,000 
sacks of sand, for an equivalent total of about 34,000 ft3 of grout.  During actual 
construction, the grout was injected into 118,179 lineal feet of drilled holes and 
totaled: 496,515 ft3 of cement, 82,364 ft3 of sand, 132,000 pounds of bentonite, 
and 418,000 pounds of calcium chloride.  Looking at just the cement and sand 
grout materials, the above fi gures equate to about 4.9 ft3 per foot of drill hole, or 
an increase of over 50 percent compared to the initial grouting done at Fontenelle 
Dam.  Beneath the zone 1 core, the rock foundation surface was cleaned using air 
and water jets and some open joints and cracks in the bottom of the key trenches 
and the cutoff trench were treated by installing pipes and grouting with a grout 
slurry, or by fi lling with specially compacted zone 1 material.  Surface grouting 
stopped at elevation 5205.34  The instrumentation installed at Teton Dam consisted 
of surface settlement points and strong motion accelerographs; there were no 
piezometers installed in the dam embankment or foundation.  Reclamation’s 
embankment dam design engineers made only two visits to the damsite during 
construction; the construction liaison engineer made six visits during construction.
 Data on the dam obtained during subsequent investigations were 
summarized in the paper “Teton Dam: Summary of Technical Investigations” 
by D. J. Duck, R. W. Kramer, and L. W. Davidson that was presented at the 13th
ICOLD Congress in New Delhi, India, in 1979.35  The zone 2 chimney fi lter 
and drainage blanket located downstream from the core was intended to: fi lter 
the zone 1, prevent water from attacking the zone 3, reduce seepage pressures, 
and transmit seepage fl ows to the downstream toe.  The permeability of the 
zone 2 material was not tested prior to construction.  The zone 2 contained 2 to 
12 percent silt fi nes, average 4.5 percent; had been placed at a relative density 
ranging from 80 to 120 percent, average 94 percent; and had a permeability that 
ranged from 0.7 to 39.3 x 10-6 cm/s, average 9.4 x 10-6 cm/s.  The zone 1 silt 
had a mean horizontal permeability of 5 x 10-6 cm/s, which was just a bit lower 
than the average for the zone 2 material.36  These permeability numbers indicate 
that the zone 2 fi lter/drain material was nearly as impervious as the zone 1 core 
material.  According to Peter Aberle, Field Engineer on Teton Dam construction, 
when it rained during construction, the water would pond on the zone 2 surface.37
It appears that the as-constructed zone 2 did not have suffi cient permeability to 
function as the intended blanket drain.
 First fi lling of the 288,000 acre-foot reservoir commenced in October 1975 
with the reservoir at elevation 5060.  The design considerations required that the 
reservoir not be fi lled faster than 1-foot per day above elevation 5200.  In early 
March 1976, with the reservoir 135 feet deep at elevation 5170, the fi lling rate 
limit in the design considerations was “relaxed” and fi lling rate of 2 feet per day 
was “allowed” to accommodate the high reservoir infl ows from a large snowmelt 
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runoff.  However, they had no other option but to relax the reservoir fi lling rate 
limit and accept the 2-foot-per-day rate of rise—the river outlet works weren’t yet 
operational!  By early May 1976 the reservoir was 185 feet deep.  The decision 
was “made” (note once again the inoperable river outlet works) around May 13th
to fi ll the reservoir to the spillway crest, which led to an average fi lling rate of 
about 3 feet per day, and a maximum rate of 4.3 feet per day.  Teton Dam failed 
catastrophically on June 5, 1976, when the reservoir had reached the spillway 
approach channel at elevation 5301.7.  The failure of this embankment dam 
killed 11 people, left 25,000 people homeless, inundated partially or completely 
an area of about 300 mi2 that extended 80 miles downstream, and did property 
damage estimated at about $400 million.  This dam failure changed the Bureau 
of Reclamation in many, very signifi cant ways.  The construction of Teton Dam 
therefore completes Period IV.  The failure of Teton Dam will be discussed further 
in the Period V section.  
 During Period IV, Reclamation’s engineers continued to enjoy national 
and worldwide acclaim as they helped to advance the new fi eld of geotechnical 
engineering and its sub-specialty of embankment dams by conducting research 
and publishing reports and professional society papers.  Reclamation continued to 
develop and make available information on its engineering work.  A total of 6,000 
copies of the “tentative edition” of Reclamation’s  Earth Manual were printed and 
distributed in 1951, followed quickly by another 28,000 copies of the “fi rst formal 
edition.”  The Earth Manual was a huge success worldwide and was in great 
demand.  A First Edition—Revised, Second Printing was printed and distributed 
in 1968 with 783 pages.  The Earth Manual combined and revised three earlier 
manuals: the Earth Materials Laboratory Test Procedures; the Field Manual for 
Rolled Earth Dams; and the Earth Materials Investigation Manual.  The Earth
Manual was prepared by Reclamation’s engineers in the Earth Dams Section, 
Dams Branch, Division of Design, and in the Soils Engineering Branch, Division 
of Research, with editing and coordination performed by John (Jack) W. Hilf of 
the Earth Dams Section.  Reclamation’s Design of Small Dams was published and 
distributed in 1960, with a Second Edition released in 1973. 
 Reclamation’s instrumentation for and monitoring of embankment 
dams continued to be improved during Period IV.  During the 1950s, several 
modifi cations were made to the  piezometers used on Reclamation’s embankment 
dams.  The tubing used between the hydraulic piezometer tip and the embankment 
surface was updated to polyethylene tubing.  In the 1960s, the tubing was updated 
again to polypropylene.  Reclamation researched and developed the use of 
carborundum disks in the hydraulic piezometer tips in the 1950s for improved 
measurement of porewater pressures.  In 1959 the use of ceramic fi lter disks in 
the piezometer tips was fi rst attempted by Reclamation at Steinaker, Sherman, 
and Merritt Dams.  The fi rst strong-motion earthquake instrument was installed at 
Hoover Dam in 1937, and Cachuma (Bradbury) Dam was the fi rst embankment 
dam to have one installed in 1954.  There are now over 20 embankment dams 
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instrumented with such devices.  As noted earlier, Reclamation seems to have cut 
back on the amount of instrumentation installed in its dams during Period IV.
 During Period IV, the variety of equipment available for the construction 
of embankment dams continued to improve in size, power, speed, and effi ciency.  
As already mentioned, the wheel excavator used at San Luis Dam produced 
4,000 yd3 per hour, and the earthfi ll haul trucks used there were 100-ton capacity 
bottom-dump wagons.  The versatile front-end wheel loader with a bucket of up 
to 12 yd3 capacity was added to the  construction equipment available.  Earthfi ll 
compaction rollers and scrapers became self-propelled instead of having to be 
towed behind a Caterpillar bulldozer or tractor.  After its initial use at Cougar 
Dam, the vibratory roller, both the smooth drum and later the tamping pad-foot 
varieties, became available for improved compaction of earthfi ll and  rockfi ll 
materials.
Period V (1976-2002)—Reclamation’s History of Embankment Dam 
Design and Construction
 At the start of Period V, the failure of  Teton Dam on June 5, 1976, began a 
chain of events during which Reclamation’s design and construction organizations 
changed dramatically.  As already mentioned, the fi rst fi lling of the reservoir was 
very rapid, due to the earlier-than-usual high infl ows from a heavy snowpack in 
the mountains upstream.  The reservoir infl ow peaked at around 4,000 ft3/s in mid-
May.  It should be noted again that Teton Dam’s main river outlet works in the left 
abutment, with a full-pool capacity of 3,400 ft3/s, was not yet operational because 
the regulating gate had not yet been received from the manufacturer.  Only the 
auxiliary outlet works in the right abutment, with a capacity of only 850 ft3/s,
could be used to control the rate of reservoir fi lling, or to lower the reservoir water 
surface in the event of a Fontenelle Dam type of emergency drawdown situation.  
Hence, even if the main river outlet works had been operational, the releases from 
the combined outlet works would have been about equal to the infl ows and would 
not have been able to drop the reservoir pool as had been the case at Fontenelle 
Dam.
 On June 3rd, with the reservoir at about elevation 5300, two small seeps 
fl owing about 60 and 40 gal/min were found 1,300 and 1,500 feet, respectively, 
downstream of the dam at the base of the right abutment.  On June 4th, a small 
seep was found fl owing about 20 gal/min at the base of the right abutment about 
150 to 200 feet downstream from the toe of the embankment.  At about 7:00 
A.M. on June 5th, a survey party observed a leak coming from the right abutment 
at the top of a berm at elevation 5045.  It was immediately reported to one 
of the fi eld engineers who drove to the dam, and at 8:15 A.M. he estimated the 
leak to be fl owing 20 to 30 ft3/s.  At about 9:10 A.M., a slightly muddy leak was 
observed exiting from the right abutment at elevation 5200, fl owing about 2 
ft3/s.  The lower leak at elevation 5045 was estimated to be fl owing 40 to 50 ft3/s
at about 9:30 A.M.  Between 10:00 and 10:30 A.M., a wet spot was observed on 
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the downstream slope of the dam at elevation 5200 and about 15 to 20 feet from 
the right abutment.  The wet spot quickly increased to a fl ow of 10 to 15 ft3/s
and was eroding the material on the downstream slope.  At about 10:30 A.M., a 
loud sound (roar) was heard, followed by the sound of rapidly running water.  At 
about 11:00 A.M., a whirlpool formed in the reservoir about 150 feet from the right 
abutment and its diameter rapidly began to expand.  By about 11:20 A.M., attempts 
to bulldoze rockfi ll into the opening (as had been done at Fontenelle Dam) proved 
futile (see 2.15).
 A sinkhole developed on the downstream slope shortly before the 
embankment crest collapsed at 11:55 A.M. (see 2.16), and the dam was breached 
two minutes later at 11:57 A.M. (see 2.17).  This sequence of observed new 
seepage, wet spots, erosion, sinkhole, whirlpool, crest collapse, and embankment 
breaching took only fi ve hours from start to fi nish and the complete release of 
the reservoir followed.  By 5:00 to 6:00 P.M. that same day, the reservoir had 
completely emptied.
 On June 8, 1976, just three days after the failure of Teton Dam, the 
Under Secretary of the Interior, D. Kent Frizzell, established the Department 
of the Interior  Teton Dam Failure Review Group (IRG) that was formed to 
examine the causes of the dam’s failure and to make recommendations as 
appropriate to prevent the recurrence of such failures.  The IRG was directed 
to “review the following aspects of the failure: geologic, engineering, design, 
construction, hydrologic factors, and all other pertinent background information 
and testimony.”  The IRG was composed of representatives from several Federal 
Government agencies, such as the Soil Conservation Service, the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  The Secretary of 
the Interior, Thomas S. Kleppe, and the Governor of Idaho, Cecil D. Andrus, 
2.15.  Teton Dam:  Downstream sinkhole at about 11:20 A.M.
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empowered another review group of experts not associated with the Federal 
Government, who were referred to as the “ Independent Panel to Review Cause 
of Teton Dam Failure” (Independent Panel).  The IRG and the Independent Panel 
operated simultaneously from June to December 1976, with fi eld investigations 
coordinated and the results shared by the two groups.  The Independent Panel’s 
report Failure of  Teton Dam was published in December 1976.38  The IRG’s 
Failure of Teton Dam—A Report of Findings was published in April 1977,34
2.16.  Teton Dam:  Crest collapsed at 11:55 A.M.
2.17.  Teton Dam.  Dam completely breached.
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and its Failure of Teton Dam, Final Report was published in January 1980.39
The reports/conclusions of the IRG and the Independent Panel were in general 
agreement, concluding that the failure of Teton Dam had been caused by:
1. Internal erosion (piping) of the core of the dam deep in the right 
foundation key trench, with the eroded soil particles fi nding exits through 
channels in and along the interface of the dam with the highly pervious 
abutment rock and talus, to points at the right groin of the dam;
2. Seepage moving through openings that existed in inadequately sealed 
rock joints, and that may have developed through cracks in the core zone 
in the key trench;
3. Once started, piping progressed rapidly through the main body of the 
dam and quickly led to complete failure; and
4. The design of the dam did not adequately take into account the 
foundation conditions and the characteristics of the soil used for fi lling the 
key trench.
 Regarding Cause No. 1 above, it should be noted that the apparently 
impervious zone 2 blanket drain material probably confi ned the seepage fl ows 
and eroded zone 1 core material within the abutment channels, joints, fractures, 
and cracks all the way to the right groin downstream, and prevented the safe, 
proper interception and collection of the seepage fl ows.  The nature of the damsite 
geology, the design of the dam embankment, the treatment(s) of the foundation 
bedrock surface and open joints (or lack thereof), the characteristics of the 
embankment materials, the defensive measures taken to control seepage and 
piping erosion, and the construction practices at  Teton Dam were all too similar 
to those involved on Fontenelle Dam.  The IRG and the Independent Panel both 
recommended that Reclamation should take certain specifi c measures to prevent 
the recurrence of another dam failure:
1. An independent board of review should be convened for each major 
dam project to review both design and construction at frequent intervals;
2. Design decisions should be formally documented;
3. Design personnel should remain involved with a project during 
construction, including frequent scheduled site visits; and
4. Major dams and their foundations should include an instrumentation 
program to monitor construction and post-construction behavior.  
Instrumentation data should be promptly interpreted and evaluated.
120
 In a July 20, 1976, letter, the Comptroller General of the United States 
was asked by U.S. House of Representatives’ Environment, Energy, and Natural 
Resources Subcommittee to examine the dambuilding procedures and practices 
used by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers.  The resulting 
report Actions Needed to Increase the Safety of Dams Built by the Bureau of 
Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers was published on June 3, 1977.40  The 
Comptroller’s report discussed several concerns involving the dam designers, 
recommending that
We recommend that the Secretary of Interior direct the Bureau of 
Reclamation to establish written procedures to better ensure that design 
intent is achieved.  In so doing the Bureau should: (1) evaluate and 
implement ways to improve the clarity of instructions, specifi cations, and 
drawings; (2) evaluate and implement ways to better ensure that onsite 
personnel fully understand the intent of the designers, and (3) develop 
and implement policies and procedures calling for more frequent onsite 
inspections by designers during construction.41
The Comptroller’s report also noted the comments made in the paper by Chief 
Engineer Bellport about the lessons learned after the near failure of Fontenelle 
Dam, and recommended that 
Thus, by averting a disaster at Fontenelle, the Bureau had seemingly 
learned a valuable lesson regarding reservoir fi lling.  Yet, at Teton Dam, 
over 10 years later, the lesson was not applied.
and
We believe that the failure of Teton Dam and the near failure at 
Fontenelle Dam should clearly illustrate to dambuilders the importance 
of (1) a slow, controlled fi lling rate during fi rst fi lling to closely monitor 
the behavior of the dam and (2) an operable outlet of suffi cient size to 
release enough water to lower the reservoir level when emergencies arise 
affecting dam safety.42
 Reclamation’s organization and its state-of-the-practice in embankment 
dam design and construction at the beginning of Period V, which were thought 
to have been developed to as high a degree of capability and sophistication 
as any dam-building organization in the World, were immediately put under 
the proverbial microscope.  In April 1977 President Jimmy Carter ordered all 
Federal agencies that build, maintain, or operate dams to review their dam safety 
practices.  Reclamation Commissioner R. Keith Higginson named a team to 
review Reclamation’s dam design and construction procedures, and charged 
the team “to review expeditiously all factors relevant to safety of dams in the 
Bureau’s plan-design-construct-operate process and to develop recommendations 
which would assure that Bureau procedures follow acceptable standards…”  On 
March 31, 1977, the Department of the Interior contracted with W. A. Wahler 
& Associates to conduct a program entitled “An Emergency Study of Seven 
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Completed Bureau of Reclamation Dams.”  All seven dams were  recently 
completed structures, both earthfi ll and concrete dams.  The seven dams studied 
by W. A. Wahler & Associates were: Crystal, Mountain Park, Mt. Elbert Forebay, 
Nambé Falls, Pueblo, Ririe, and Soldier Creek Dams.43  On November 29, 
1977, Commissioner Higginson announced a reorganization plan in which 
the decentralized fi eld structure was retained, and the Denver Offi ce became 
Reclamation’s center for technical review and support.  On November 6, 1979, 
under Commissioner Higginson, Reclamation changed its name to the “ Water and 
Power Resources Service,” but changed it back to the Bureau of Reclamation on 
May 20, 1981, under Commissioner Robert N. Broadbent.
 Reclamation’s Chief Engineers (now with different titles, which began 
as Director, Offi ce of Design and Construction) during Period V were Harold 
G. Arthur, Robert B. Jansen (title was changed to Assistant Commissioner for 
Engineering and Research on February 1, 1978), Rodney J. Vissia, James Cook 
(acting for 3 or 4 months in 1982), Darrel W. Webber, Felix W. Cook, Sr. (the title 
was changed once again in October 1994 to Director, Technical Service Center), 
and by Michael J. Roluti.
 While Reclamation still had many dams and projects in its “pipeline” 
awaiting funding and construction at the start of Period V, environmental “clouds” 
had been gathering on the horizon in both numbers and power and they wanted 
to put a halt to the continued construction of new dams.  The embankment dams 
that Reclamation designed and constructed during Period V generally involved 
even more diffi cult and complex damsites than had been built on before, and the 
resulting designs were more complex.  Part of this increased design complexity 
was a direct result of the fi ndings and recommendations by the IRG, the 
Independent Panel, and the Comptroller on the failure of Teton Dam.
 The Wahler Reports on seven of Reclamation’s recently constructed 
dams presented some fairly alarming conclusions and recommendations.  For 
example, on Soldier Creek Dam, the Wahler Report concluded that “there may 
be signifi cant risk of serious distress and/or failure associated with fi lling the 
reservoir behind Soldier Creek Dam.”  And on Pueblo Dam, the Wahler Report 
concluded that “the reservoir behind Pueblo Dam should not be permitted to rise 
signifi cantly above its present level until certain supplementary investigations 
and/or actions have been completed.”  After the fi ndings of the Wahler Reports 
were presented to the Department of the Interior (and Reclamation), Reclamation 
responded by beginning its own reevaluation of these seven dams, which 
included fi eld and laboratory investigations, new evaluations of the design and 
construction, etc.  With the conclusions and recommendations resulting from the 
two Teton Dam failure reviews needing to be implemented, Reclamation made 
dramatic changes in its design and construction organizations.
 In 1978 Reclamation instituted its new  Safety Evaluation of Existing 
Dams (SEED) Program under the Division of Dam Safety and reporting directly 
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to the Assistant Commissioner —Engineering and Research (ACER).  The 
SEED Program began a comprehensive review of dam design, construction, and 
operation records; analysis of material data; fi eld inspections; and study of any 
apparent defi ciencies.  The Denver Offi ce’s engineering staff was increased to 
handle the enlarged program.  A Technical Review Staff, also reporting directly 
to ACER, was added to the Denver Offi ce and was tasked with independently 
reviewing all new dam and major structure designs, modifi cations to existing 
dams and major structures, and the SEED Program.  Reclamation also hired 
independent consulting engineers and other professionals to review and approve 
Reclamation’s dam design and construction work.
 The work by the Denver Offi ce to respond to the embankment dam 
concerns raised in the Wahler Reports included fi eld investigations that produced 
embankment and foundation samples, which needed laboratory testing to develop 
information on their engineering properties.  This additional engineering workload 
and the laboratory testing workload for projects already planned led to an increase 
in the size and capability of the Denver Offi ce Laboratory.  Improved electronics 
and computers were involved with the upgrading of the Laboratory’s capability.  
New testing equipment was needed in a few cases because of the nature of some 
of the dam foundation problems encountered and for testing new materials such 
as synthetic geomembranes and geotextiles.  For example, the weak clay seams 
in the foundation shale at Pueblo Dam required testing for residual shear strength, 
which Reclamation had never done before.
 During Period V, Reclamation continued to design and build some notable 
embankment dams in the West.  These Period V embankment dams included: Mt. 
Elbert Forebay, Twin Lakes, Palmetto Bend, Funks, Wintering, Red Fleet (Tyzak), 
Stateline, Choke Canyon, Sugar Pine, Ridgway, Calamus, McPhee, McGee Creek, 
San Justo, Brantley, Davis Creek, Jordanelle, New Waddell, and Buckhorn Dams.  
The Period V embankment dams generally had upstream slopes that ranged 
from 2:1 to 3.5:1 and downstream slopes that ranged from 2:1 to 1.5:1, with the 
steepest slopes at Jordanelle Dam.
 These dams were built on a variety of foundations, but after the foundation 
problems that in part caused the failure of Teton Dam, the foundation treatments 
constructed during Period V were more aggressive and more “complete” than 
those previously constructed.  This included design details and features such as: 
more aggressive cleanup and mapping of foundations, foundation shaping to 
fl atten steep slopes and remove bedrock overhangs, more dental concrete backfi ll 
to shape abutments, lean cement (slush) grouting of surface joints, thorough 
blanket grouting in the upper 20 to 30 feet of the foundation-core contact zone, 
more lines of curtain grouting, and removal of more poor-quality bedrock in the 
foundation.  The concrete grout cap used at Fontenelle and Teton Dams was also 
eliminated, grouting from the rock surface, removing any damaged surface rock, 
or using a reinforced concrete slab so that grout pressure can be applied to near-
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surface rock.  Blanket grouting is then done after the curtain grouting has been 
completed.
 The embankment dam designs changed in several important ways during 
Period V.  The chimney fi lter/drains placed between the core and the downstream 
shell material were revised to use processed materials instead to ensure the 
prevention of internal erosion/piping.  A processed transition/fi lter zone was used 
between the core backfi lling the cutoff trench and the downstream alluvium.  
Blanket drains were used against the downstream foundation.  Processing of 
borrow soils or the use of imported soil materials to supply the fi lter gradation(s) 
necessary was used more aggressively in the chimney fi lter/drains and the blanket 
drains.  These fi lters included 1, 2, or even 3 zones of different soil sizes and 
gradations where necessary to prevent potential internal erosion/piping.  These 
fi lter/drain systems were interconnected and drained by a perforated toe drain pipe 
with emphasis on monitoring seepage fl ows.  There was also more emphasis on 
inspection manholes and monitoring devices in the toe drain system, and more 
emphasis on the use of relief wells for deeper seepage collection.  The design 
of the embankment constructed adjacent and around concrete structures such 
as outlet works and spillways changed, eliminating the seepage collars around 
conduits to facilitate compaction by the tires of heavy equipment rolling next to 
the conduit instead of regular compaction equipment such as tamping rollers.
Processed fi lters and drains were also placed around the downstream section of 
the conduits.  New synthetic materials such as geomembranes and geotextiles 
were used in modifi cations constructed at several embankment dams.  Several of 
the embankment dams noted above, including San Justo and Jordanelle Dams, 
were constructed close to major “active” earthquake faults in California and 
Utah, respectively.  Starting with the early work by Esmiol, 26 Reclamation has 
continued to investigate and develop appropriate design requirements for its 
 embankment dams in the earthquake-prone western U.S. that have been used by 
many others worldwide.
 Like other dam-safety programs nationwide, the results of  Reclamation’s 
Safety Evalualtion of Existing Dams (SEED) Program and the reevaluation of 
the existing dams determined that quite a few existing embankment dams needed 
to be modifi ed to improve their condition and to ensure their continued safe 
operation.  A partial list of Reclamation’s modifi ed embankment dams includes: 
Jackson Lake, Helena Valley, Soldiers Meadow (not built by Reclamation), 
Fontenelle, Navajo, Casitas, Soldier Creek, Pueblo, Lost Creek, Twin Buttes, 
Twin Lakes, San Justo, Horsetooth (modifi cation under construction), and 
Pineview (modifi cation being designed) Dams.  Reclamation has also been 
involved with the analysis, design, and construction of modifi cations to several 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) embankment dams, including Black Lake, Pablo, 
and McDonald Dams on the Flathead Indian Reservation in Montana, and dams 
belonging to the National Park Service.
  Red Fleet ( Tyzak) Dam, completed in 1978 with a maximum height of 
145 feet above streambed, was one of the fi rst embankment dam designs started 
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by Reclamation after the failure of Teton Dam.  Its design cross-section included 
the new defensive features: a two-stage transition zone and chimney fi lter/drain, 
a transition/fi lter zone between the core backfi lling the cutoff trench and the 
downstream alluvium, and a processed sand and gravel drainage blanket beneath 
the downstream shell.
  Mt. Elbert Forebay Dam, completed in 1980 with a maximum height of 
92 feet above the stripped foundation, was built above Twin Lakes as part of a 
pumped-storage hydroelectric project.  The original forebay reservoir was lined 
with compacted earthfi ll, but excessive leakage was detected and it could have 
triggered an ancient landslide, endangering the powerplant at the edge of Twin 
Lakes Reservoir below.  The design was changed to add about 290 acres of 45-
mil-thick reinforced chlorinated polyethylene geomembrane liner covered by 18 
inches of earthfi ll.
  Pueblo Dam was identifi ed in the Wahler Report as needing certain 
supplementary investigations and/or actions while restricting its reservoir level.
Field investigations were performed and samples of the Graneros shale and 
bentonite clay seams were obtained for laboratory testing, along with work to 
resolve several other concerns.  Soil testing was performed to determine the 
residual shear strength of the bentonite clay and the test data were used to re-
analyze the stability of the left embankment.  The analysis results indicated the 
downstream slope stability was inadequate and the left embankment had to be 
modifi ed to increase its stability.  An earthfi ll berm 2,500 feet long and 
35 feet high was constructed along the downstream toe of the left embankment 
in 1980-1981.  Subsequent analysis of the concrete buttress dam section and a 
concern about the low strength shale seams in part of its sandstone foundation 
resulted in some recent (1999-2000) modifi cations to improve its resistance to 
sliding along the shale seams.
  Soldier Creek Dam was identifi ed in the Wahler Report as having certain 
defi ciencies that individually or in combination could jeopardize the safety of the 
dam.  Field and laboratory investigations were conducted and Soldier Creek Dam 
was re-analyzed by Reclamation.  The results confi rmed that several concerns 
raised by the Wahler Report were suffi ciently serious that modifi cation of the dam 
embankment was justifi ed.  A lack of instrumentation made it diffi cult to evaluate 
the performance of the dam embankment, which led to the installation of over 
25 piezometers in the embankment and foundation.  The foundation bedrock 
surface preparation and the lack of proper treatment with lean cement (slush) 
grout placed in surface cracks, shaping, and dental concrete were of concern.
The single-row grout curtain also caused concern.  The nature of the zone 1 core 
material and the fact that it was placed directly against the untreated foundation 
bedrock caused concern.  The permeability of the unprocessed zone 3 chimney 
fi lter/drain and blanket drain material caused concern, as did the fact that the 
chimney fi lter/drain and the toe drains did not extend all the way up to the full-
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reservoir water surface.  Embankment and foundation drainage modifi cations 
were constructed in 1983-1984 to address these problems.44
  Fontenelle Dam continued to have seepage and internal erosion/piping 
problems after it was supposedly fi xed by the additional abutment grouting 
performed in 1966.  Instrumentation monitoring data in 1983 indicated that a 
potential dam safety problem was developing, and the decision was made to 
modify the dam by installing a continuous concrete diaphragm wall through 
2.19.  Fontenelle Dam:  Diaphragm wall construction.
2.18.  Fontenelle Dam:  Section of embankment with diaphragm wall.
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the dam and into the foundation.  There were several aspects of the existing 
Fontenelle Dam embankment’s design that were judged to have been partly 
responsible for the failure of Teton Dam, such as vertical to overhanging abutment 
cliffs, extensive joints and cracks in the abutments, no processed material placed 
as a chimney to fi lter the erodible silty zone 1 core as protection against internal 
erosion/piping, and silty core material placed directly against open, unsealed 
bedrock joints, cracks, and crevices.  Only one solution was judged to be capable 
of alleviating all of these potential problems, and construction of a concrete 
diaphragm wall from the crest of the dam down through the embankment and the 
upper highly-fractured bedrock was selected as the appropriate modifi cation (see 
2.18).  The concrete diaphragm wall had to avoid damaging the river outlet works 
near the middle of the embankment and the spillway on the right abutment.  The 
concrete diaphragm wall modifi cation was constructed between 1987 and 1989.  
2.19 and 2.20 show the rockmilling equipment used to excavate embankment and 
rock for the diaphragm wall at Fontenelle Dam.
 Black Lake, 
Pablo, and McDonald 
Dams are BIA dams 
on the Flathead 
Indian Reservation in 
Montana; Reclamation 
had designed and 
constructed Pablo 
and McDonald Dams 
between 1905 and 
1920.  At BIA’s 
request, Reclamation 
investigated and 
prepared Safety 
Evaluation of Existing 
Dams (SEED) reports 
on these three dams, 
along with the other 
14 dams on the 
Reservation.  Under 
a contract with the 
BIA, the Confederated 
Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes entered into an 
agreement with the 
TSC for Reclamation 
to perform fi eld 
investigations,
laboratory testing, 
and engineering 2.20.  Fontenelle Dam:  Hydromill rock excavator for dia-
phragm wall.
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evaluations to determine the adequacy and safety of the dams on the Reservation.  
Starting with the dam of greatest initial concern, the investigation and analysis of 
Black Lake Dam indicated it needed to be modifi ed to prevent a piping/erosion 
failure.  The original Black Lake Dam had failed by internal erosion/piping in 
1967, and the replacement embankment dam was judged to have several serious 
defi ciencies that could result in another piping/erosion failure.  Black Lake Dam 
was modifi ed in 1992 by the construction of a geomembrane liner installed along 
the upstream right abutment, across the upstream slope of the embankment, 
and as a liner beneath part of the reservoir upstream of the dam.  A downstream 
drainage berm is scheduled to be constructed in the near future and will hopefully 
remediate the current situation.
 Pablo Dam was investigated and analyzed next, and it was determined that 
the upper portion of the embankment was susceptible to seepage, internal erosion/
piping, and potential failure.  The upper portion of the dam was more pervious 
because two embankment raises had been constructed and had used more pervious 
earthfi ll material than the original embankment.  A geomembrane liner was 
constructed in 1993-1994, covering the upper embankment to control/prevent the 
seepage that had been percolating through it.
 McDonald Dam was the third embankment dam investigated and 
analyzed.  It was located about ½-mile upstream of the Mission fault, which 
had experienced a major earthquake about 7,700 years ago, and which was 
judged capable of producing a magnitude 7½ earthquake at any time.  The dam 
embankment had been constructed by Project Manager/Engineer Frank Crowe 
(Honorary Member, ASCE) using dumped and sluiced earthfi ll, with a puddled 
core created by sluicing the dumped earthfi ll (see 2.21).  The embankment 
and an outwash foundation beneath part of the dam were judged susceptible to 
liquefaction and excessive deformation.  Various alternatives were developed 
and evaluated, with the fi nal decision reached to completely replace the existing 
dam embankment, spillway, and outlet works.  These modifi cations were 
designed by Reclamation which also provided the construction management 
services.  It should be noted that the Construction Engineer for McDonald Dam 
2.21.  McDonald Dam:  Original dam in 1920.
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Modifi cation was on the Design Team.  The new McDonald Dam embankment 
was a completely different embankment design.  The new embankment cross-
section included: a textured geomembrane covered by earthfi ll and riprap on the 
upstream slope, an impervious earthfi ll zone behind the geomembrane, followed 
by an inclined processed chimney fi lter/drain, all of which rest against a large 
miscellaneous earthfi ll zone that sits on top of a blanket drain consisting of 
processed drainage material sandwiched between two layers of the processed 
fi lter material.  The instrumentation consisted of piezometers in the embankment 
and foundation, embankment measurement points, and weirs to monitor seepage 
fl ows.  These McDonald Dam modifi cations were constructed in 1994-1995 
and 1999-2000 (see 2.22), after which its behavior during resumed fi lling of the 
reservoir in 2000 and beyond went very well.45
 At the beginning of Period V, the failure of Teton Dam and the results 
of the IRG, Independent Panel, and Comptroller reviews resulted in many 
organizational changes as already discussed.  Several of Reclamation’s 
embankment dam design engineers retired, leaving a small cadre of experienced 
engineers to work with the new staff of engineers then being hired to work on 
Reclamation’s new dam safety program and on the embankment dam design work 
already in the “pipeline.”  That work has been going on for over 20 years now and 
is expected to continue for some time.  Reclamation’s current dam safety program 
includes conducting in-depth reviews, referred to as Comprehensive Facility 
Reviews (CFR), which are performed mostly by in-house senior engineers every 
six years.  The CFRs include an examination of the dam and evaluations of: 
the dam’s design, analysis, and construction; its structural behavior; its seismic 
and hydrologic hazards; its potential failure modes; its failure consequences; a 
2.22.  McDonald Dam:  New dam in 2000.
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risk analysis; and its performance parameters.  Reclamation has continued to 
develop, revise, and make available information on its engineering work.  The 
Earth Manual is now in its third edition, with Part 2 published in 1990 and 
Part 1 published in 1998.1 Part 1 of the Earth Manual (now containing 1,270 
pages) includes updated information on properties of soils, fi eld and laboratory  
investigations and test procedures, construction quality control testing of 
earthfi ll materials used as foundations and for dams, canals, and other types of 
structures built by Reclamation. Part 2 (now containing 329 pages) includes 
updated information on properties of soils, fi eld investigations, and control 
of earth construction.  Reclamation’s  Design of Small Dams was revised and 
published as a “revised reprint” in 1977 and was revised again and published 
as the Third Edition in 1987.2  In the 1980s, Reclamation developed its Design
Standards, with Design Standards No. 13—Embankment Dams6 covering all of 
the embankment dam design issues and concerns; they are all continually updated. 
Reclamation has continued to make its technical publications available to the 
public.  Reclamation has recently embarked on a new program, generally referred 
to as risk-based analysis of existing structures, to help with its decision-making 
process.
 Reclamation’s instrumentation for and monitoring of  embankment dams 
continued to be improved during Period V.  Since their fi rst installation at Fresno 
Dam in 1939, almost 2,800 hydraulic twin-tube piezometers have been installed 
at Reclamation’s embankment dams.  Pneumatic piezometers have more recently 
been used to measure porewater pressures and vibrating-wire piezometers are 
now the piezometer of choice installed at Reclamation’s embankment dams.  In 
addition to piezometers, other instrumentation often installed at Reclamation’s 
new and modifi ed embankment dams includes: observation wells, seepage weirs, 
embankment measurement points, strong-motion accelerographs (in earthquake-
prone areas), and inclinometer casings with inclinometers to monitor known slide 
areas.  One important aspect of current instrumentation is the use of automated 
monitoring systems at Reclamation’s dams, allowing timely monitoring of 
embankment dams in remote locations where winter access can be a problem.
Such automated monitoring systems also allow the data to be used by early 
warning systems.  The monitoring data are collected by the TSC’s Structural 
Behavior and Instrumentation Group which automatically interprets and evaluates 
the data in a timely manner and alerts the appropriate design groups if any of the 
instrumentation data cause concern.  Reclamation published its Embankment Dam 
Instrumentation Manual in 1987.46
 As usual, during Period V, the variety of equipment available for the 
construction of  embankment dams continued to improve in size, power, speed, 
and effi ciency.  For example, 2.23 and 2.24 show the construction of New 
Waddell Dam (1986-1992) and the size of the equipment currently used to 
construct embankment dams.  Compare the end-dump truck in 2.24 and its 35 
yd3 capacity to the train of 4 yd3 side-dump cars used to construct Belle Fourche 
Dam in 1909 shown in 2.7.  Also compare the large excavator in 2.24 and its 
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2.23.  New Waddell Dam construction.
2.24.  New Waddell Dam:  Construction equipment.
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12 yd3 bucket with the steam shovel at Belle Fourche Dam with its 2½-yd3
bucket shown in 2.7.  During Period V, synthetic materials such as high-density 
polyethylene (HDPE) and polypropylene were developed into new products, such 
as corrugated pipe, geomembranes, and geotextiles, that were promptly put to 
use on embankment dams where judged appropriate.  New types of equipment 
related to these new materials and products were developed, and quality control 
tests, testing equipment, and detailed test procedures were developed, with 
Reclamation’s signifi cant participation in these developments.
Conclusion
 The information presented in this paper has summarized the U.S. Bureau 
of Reclamation’s embankment dam design and construction history.  During the 
past century, Reclamation has designed and built some of the most signifi cant 
embankment dams in the West.  Reclamation and its dam engineers produced 
many successes and a few failures during that period.  Reclamation and its 
civil engineers, through the study of both success and failure and the sharing 
of the knowledge gained with all professionals worldwide, have indeed played 
a signifi cant role in the evolution of embankment dam design and construction 
during the past century.  Starting before World War II, Reclamation has provided 
technical assistance to more than 80 countries and has trained more than 
10,000 international colleagues.  It is hoped that the lay reader of this paper has 
gained some appreciation of Reclamation’s history and just how remarkable 
the evolution of embankment dam design and construction has been.  It is also 
hoped that the design and construction engineers reading this paper have gained 
some understanding of Reclamation’s embankment dam design and construction 
history, and of the reasons for doing all embankment dam work with the utmost 
knowledge, care, and caution.  One of the most important lessons learned from 
the failure of Teton Dam involved the need for embankment dam designers and 
construction engineers to work as a team, with their primary concern being the 
need to design and build the very best and safest dam possible.
Richard Lyman Wiltshire, P.E., recently retired as a Civil Engineer 
and Principal Designer in the Geotechnical Services Division, at the 
Technical Services Center of the Bureau of Reclamation in Denver, 
Colorado.  He is a fellow of the American Society of Civil Engineers 
(F.ASCE) and serves on its History and Heritage Committee.  He is also 
a member of the U.S. Society on Dams (USSD).
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Historical Development of Durable Concrete for the 
Bureau of Reclamation
By:
Timothy P. Dolen
Introduction
 Bureau of Reclamation infrastructure stretches across many different 
climates and environments in the seventeen western states.  Many of the dams, 
spillways, pumping plants, power plants, canals, and tunnels are constructed 
with concrete.  These structures were built from Arizona to Montana, across 
the plains and in the mountains and deserts.  Concrete structures had to remain 
durable to resist both the design loads and the natural environments of the western 
climate zones.  Many natural environments can be quite destructive to concrete 
and the earliest Reclamation projects were faced with a variety of durability 
problems.  The state-of-the-art of concrete construction advanced from hand 
mixing and horse and wagon transporting operations to automated mixing plants, 
underwater canal construction, and pumping and conveyor placing.  This paper 
fi rst overviews the challenges facing concrete construction in the beginning of 
the twentieth century.  It then traces the Bureau of Reclamation=s role in the 
development of durable concrete to resist the environments of the west.
What is Concrete?
 Before we begin, we must fi rst understand what is concrete, the most 
versatile building material.  The American Concrete Institute defi nes  concrete as
 a composite material that consists essentially of a binding medium 
within which are embedded particles or fragments of aggregate, usually a 
combination of fi ne aggregate and coarse aggregate; in Portland-cement 
concrete, the binder is a mixture of Portland cement and water.1
The earliest concretes date at least as far back as early Roman times including 
the aqueducts and the historic Pantheon in Rome.  These concretes did not 
use Portland  cement as a binder.  Rather, they used combinations of lime and 
 pozzolanic sands mixed with broken rocks and shards of pottery.  
 Most twentieth century concretes are composed of about seventy-fi ve 
percent aggregates by volume and about 2 percent Aportland cement paste.@
The paste is the binder and contains cementitious materials and water.  The 
cementitious materials include primarily Portland cement and sometimes an 
additional cementing material such as a  pozzolan.  Pozzolans are fi nely ground, 
calcined (heated to a high temperature) materials that react with lime to form 
compounds similar to Portland cement.  Natural pozzolans are heated by events 
like volcanoes.  Artifi cial pozzolans are calcined in a kiln or furnace, such as fl y 
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ash.  The ratio of water to cementitious materials is about 1.5:1 by solid volume 
or 1:2 by weight.  The individual components are mixed wet for about 5 to 10 
minutes, then placed in forms to harden into their fi nal shape.
 The chemical process that turns the wet concrete into a hardened mass 
is called Ahydration,@ a reaction between the cement and water that forms 
strong chemical bonds.  Concrete does not get hard by drying like some clay 
bricks and lime mortars.  It must retain the moisture to allow the cement to 
chemically hydrate; usually for about one month.  The best concrete is one that 
stays continuously moist at a temperature of about 40 to 70 degrees Fahrenheit, 
such as the center of a mass concrete dam.  The  strongest concrete contains just 
suffi cient water to chemically react with the available cement, about 25 to 40 
percent water to cement by weight.  The  weakest concretes are those that contain 
excess water or prematurely dry out, stopping the reaction from continuing.
Pozzolanic materials do not naturally harden through hydration with water; they 
must have added calcium hydroxide, or lime, to allow the reactions to take place.
Fortunately, one of the chemical by-products of  cement hydration is calcium 
hydroxide.  Thus, added pozzolan when combined with cement and water makes 
for even stronger and often more  durable concrete.  Cement hydration also 
generates heat and can lead to temperature cracking when the interior mass wants 
to expand while the exterior contracts as it cools.  Thus, any means of reducing 
the cement content reduces the potential for cracking.
 The  durability of concrete depends on the durability of its constituents: 
cement paste and aggregates.  A concrete with strong paste may not be durable 
if combined with poor aggregate, and vice versa.  One of the most important 
parameters is the Aporosity@ of the paste, which is a function of the amount of 
water relative to the cementitious materials.  Excess water can dilute the cement 
paste leaving a more porous medium.  This can be attacked more easily by 
deleterious substances and physical processes.  The climate is a signifi cant factor 
infl uencing the long-term durability of concrete structures.  One of the reasons 
the ancient structures have survived is because they were constructed in relatively 
dry, temperate climates.
Early Obstacles to Durable Concrete
 The turn of the twentieth century presented numerous obstacles to 
constructing durable concrete structures, one of which was population expanding 
across America into harsh climate zones.  The  quality of concrete was impaired 
by limitations of the quality of the materials and the methods of construction.  In 
some instances, limitations on the quality of the basic concrete materials: cement, 
sand, and gravel, and the proportioning of ingredients impaired quality concrete 
construction under the severe exposures and harsh climates of the West.  In other 
instances, the methods of batching, mixing, placing, and protecting the concrete 
limited the rate of construction and the overall quality of the structures.  Lastly, 
the methodology behind concrete design and construction was just developing 
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and was not well documented or distributed throughout the industry.  A number 
of signifi cant events and innovations during the twentieth century contributed to 
the development of concrete as a  durable engineering material resulting in what 
is now considered Amodern concrete.@  First, let=s look at durability environments 
and then the state-of-the-art developments related to constructing durable 
concrete.
Mechanisms of Deterioration in the Western United States
 There are about a half dozen  environments that aggressively attack 
Portland cement concrete.  These include the following:
 • Sulfate environment
 • Alkali-silica or alkali-carbonate environment—Aalkali-aggregate    
  reactions@
 • Freezing and thawing environment
 • Acid environment
 • Chloride (corrosion) environment
 • Wetting and drying environment
Concretes that remain durable under these conditions were proportioned in some 
way to withstand the elements, either accidentally or purposely.  Some advances 
in the development of durable concrete resulted from observations of concretes 
that essentially used chemically resistant cements or Aaccidentally@ introduced 
benefi cial admixtures, and comparing them with those that rapidly fell to pieces.
 The three most critical natural deterioration mechanisms affecting 
Reclamation structures are sulfate attack, alkali-silica reaction, and freezing-
thawing attack.  These three mechanisms are described in the paragraphs that 
follow.  In many cases, concrete deterioration is caused by a combination of 
aggressive environments, such as wetting and drying in concert with sulfate attack 
in some California desert climates or freeze-thaw attack and alkali-silica reaction 
in the northwest.   Here, micro-fractures caused by one destructive element 
allow moisture to more easily penetrate the paste and contribute to a secondary 
reaction.  One environment common to United States highways and bridges is 
chloride/corrosion of reinforcing steel and the resulting deterioration.  It was not 
a major deterioration mechanism for Reclamation concretes due to the absence 
of chlorides, that is, until some rather dramatic failures of precast, prestressed 
concrete pipe in the 1990s.
Sulfate Attack
  Sulfate attack is a chemical degradation of cement paste caused by high 
concentrations of sulfates in soils and groundwater.  Sulfate attack is caused by 
chemical interactions between sulfate ions and constituents of the cement paste.
The disintegration appears to be caused by chemical reactions with cement 
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hydration products and the formation of a secondary compound, ettringite, 
accompanied by a large volumetric expansion and cracking of the concrete.  
Sulfate attack was also known as Acement corrosion@ in the early 1900s and is 
very common in the white Aalkali fl ats@ of the arid western states and in seawater, 
particularly tidal zones.  Sulfate attack was noted in Reclamation structures on 
the Sun River Project in Montana 
in 1908, shortly after the formation 
of the U.S. Reclamation Service.2
3.1 shows the disintegration of a 
concrete canal lining in the Central 
Valley Project only fi ve years after 
construction.3  Early observations 
in these failures identifi ed certain 
cement brands as being more 
resistant to deterioration in these 
environments than others. ABad@
cements were less resistant and 
avoided if possible in favor of more 
resistant Agood@ cements.
Alkali-aggregate Reactions
  Alkali aggregate reactions (AAR) are the chemical reactions between 
certain specifi c mineralogical types of aggregates (either sand or gravel) and the 
alkali compounds (generally less than 2 percent of the cement composition) of 
cement in the presence of moisture. 
Typical manifestations of  concrete deterioration through alkali-silica 
reaction are expansion; cracking, which frequently is of such nature the 
designation Apattern@ or Amap@ cracking; exudations of jelly-like or hard 
beads on surfaces; reaction rims on affected aggregate particles within 
the concrete; and sometimes popouts.4
The reaction products have a swelling nature, leading to tensile stresses that cause 
cracking within the concrete.  The 
cracking may allow moisture to 
more readily be absorbed by the 
silica gel or accelerate freezing 
and thawing damage.
 Alkalies in cement can 
react with certain Aglassy,@
siliceous aggregates such as opals, 
chalcedony, cherts, andesites, 
basalts, and some quartz; termed 
alkali-silica reaction or ASR, 
and certain specifi c carbonate 
3.1.  Concrete canal lining on the Central Valley 
Project.
3.2.  Alkali-silica reaction within concrete.
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aggregates called alkali-carbonate reaction.5  Alkali-silica reaction, shown in 3.2, 
was probably fi rst experienced by Reclamation at American Falls Dam in Idaho, 
completed in 1927.  However, extensive freezing and thawing deterioration 
and poor quality construction practices masked ASR as a primary cause of 
deterioration at American Falls Dam.  Some structures, such as Parker Dam and 
Stewart Mountain Dam, suffered early rapid expansion and distress, and then 
became relatively stable after a few years as the available alkalies and reactive 
aggregates were consumed early in the process.  Other structures, such as 
Seminoe Dam, are showing continued expansion and resulting distress even 50 
years after construction.6
Freezing and Thawing Deterioration
  Freezing and thawing (FT) deterioration is the deleterious expansion of 
water within the cement paste resulting in destruction of the concrete.  Water 
present in the cement paste expands about 9 percent upon freezing.  When 
confi ned within a rigid, crystalline micro-structure, the expanding ice crystals can 
exert pressures far exceeding the tensile capacity of the paste, causing cracking 
and ultimately failure of the concrete.  The concrete must be nearly saturated 
when it undergoes the freezing for this form of deterioration to take place.  
Repeated cycles of freezing and thawing are common in Reclamation water 
conveyance structures.  Areas subject to cyclic freezing, such as the spillway 
shown in 3.3, and particularly those in fl uctuating water surface levels, or in 
splash or spray zones are the most susceptible to deterioration.7  Freeze-thaw 
deterioration is most pronounced in more porous concrete having a high water 
to cement ratio and those concretes without purposely entrained, air bubbles; 
the very same concretes commonly used in early twentieth century construction.
Freeze-thaw deterioration was fi rst identifi ed early in Reclamation history under 
the general term of durability 
of concrete without specifi c 
causes or solutions.  This form 
of damage is present in the 
colder and mountainous regions 
and non-existent in the desert 
southwest.  A mixture placed on 
the All-American Canal would 
have no problems, but, the very 
same concrete placed on the 
Yakima Project would be severely 
affected.
 Developing the State-of-the-Art of Concrete Technology
 Even with quality materials, durable concrete could not effectively be 
mixed and placed in the larger Reclamation structures without new construction 
practices and equipment.  The historical development of durable Reclamation 
3.3.  A spillway showing results of cyclic 
freezing and thawing.
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concrete can roughly be divided into four generations with regard to both 
materials and methods of construction.  Each generation contributed to the 
knowledge base of the developing state-of-the-art.  The fi rst generation of 
Reclamation concrete technology covers from its inception in 1902 until about 
World War I.  These practitioners were the fi rst Apioneers@ of Reclamation 
concrete construction.  The next generation, from 1918 until the late 1920s, began 
developing concrete as an engineering material.  The Boulder/Hoover generation 
began in the late 1920s and continued up to World War II.  This generation solved 
many of the fundamental problems encountered in massive concrete construction 
and developed many of the standardized quality concrete construction practices.
They uncovered the mysteries of sulfate attack, alkali-aggregate reaction, and 
freezing and thawing durability, leading to the fi rst truly engineered, modern, 
durable concretes.  The postwar generation incorporated the basic concepts of 
modern concrete to a multitude of applications for dams, pumping and power 
plants, canals, and tunnels under a variety of differing site conditions.  This is the 
fi rst long-lasting, concrete infrastructure.
The Early Years —The Concrete Pioneers (1902-1918)
 The fi rst generation of concrete practitioners developed the technology 
largely through trial and error and continued observation.  The earliest concrete 
was composed of poorly manufactured cements, unprocessed aggregates, 
and was mixed by hand or small mixers.  The materials themselves; cement, 
sand, and gravel were subject to great variability.  The concrete mixture was 
proportioned by Arecipe@ based on previous experience, not necessarily as an 
engineered material.  Many early Reclamation projects were somewhat isolated 
geographically and there was less communication beyond regional boundaries.
A change in location or structural design was not necessarily followed with an 
appropriate change in concrete mixture design, resulting in spotty performance.
Labor was cheap, equipment and cement were expensive.  The resulting 
mixtures contained the least amount of cement necessary to meet low strength 
requirements, at least by today=s standards.  Concrete was largely transported by 
wheelbarrows and compacted in place by manual tamping, spading, and rodding.
The production rates were very slow, resulting in frequent Acold joints@ or 
unplanned fl aws that allowed seepage and subsequent deterioration.
 A major change in building technology, the introduction of steel-
reinforced, concrete structures, at fi rst did not improve concrete quality.  Pre-1900 
structures were more massive and used a stiffer concrete that was tamped into 
place.  The resulting concrete was less permeable and somewhat more resistant 
to the elements due to its low porosity; water simply had diffi culty entering the 
matrix to cause damage.  Reinforced concrete structures took advantage of the 
tensile strength capacity of the steel and the sizes of structural members were 
reduced.  In addition to thinner structures, the reinforcing steel interfered with 
the placing and tamping practices.  As a result, water was added to the concrete 
mixture to make it more fl uid and thus easier to place.  However, more cement 
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was not necessarily added, and the weaker more porous concretes started 
falling apart in the fi eld in only a few years.8  The favorite phrase of concrete 
construction workers Aadd more water@ likely came about during this era and a 
century later concrete technologists still shudder at the request!
 The earliest Reclamation construction projects did not have the benefi t 
of a developed methodology and specifi c equipment for concrete construction.  
Construction practices gradually improved during the fi rst Reclamation 
construction era.  Many structures fortunately utilized techniques that have 
helped them resist degradation.   Theodore Roosevelt Dam in Arizona utilized a 
masonry facing and  cyclopean concrete methods: large Aplum stones@ were placed 
followed by smaller cobbles and boulders and then the concrete was added to 
fi ll the remaining voids.  This construction technique left large stones across the 
construction joint surface that reduced shear planes.  The mixtures had a low 
cement content on a per cubic yard basis that reduced thermal cracking and the 
cost.9
 One construction advance called Achuting,@ shown in 3.4, resulted in poor 
quality concrete.  An Aimprovement@ over the back-breaking manual hauling by 
buckets, long chutes were used to transport concrete to the forms.  This permitted 
a centralized concrete batching and mixing location and larger batches could be 
fed to sometimes intricate, gravity-fed, chute systems.  Water was added to make 
the concrete fl ow down relatively fl at sloping chutes.  The extra water diluted 
the cement paste in the concrete.  These mixes were much weaker and had poor 
durability.  To discourage this practice, engineers fi nally specifi ed that the slope of 
the chutes could not be fl atter than about 35 degrees from horizontal.10
 The developing state-
of-the-art had a few Ahiccups@
along the way.   ASand-cement@
was introduced to reduce the 
cost of cement by inter-grinding 
crushed rock fl our during the 
manufacturing process.11  The 
fi nely ground rock fl our was 
introduced as a Apozzolan@
to react with the cement for 
increased strength, and indeed, the 
sand-cement mixtures had higher 
7- and 28- day compressive 
strengths compared to the control 
mixtures.  However, the compressive strength development did not continue 
much after 28 days as is more typical of Portland cement plus real pozzolans.
Thus, the problem was the fi ner ground sand-cement reacted faster, but did not 
act as a pozzolan because the rock fl our was not calcined.  Arrowrock Dam, in 
Idaho, constructed using sand-cement in 1915, was rehabilitated with a higher 
3.4.  “Chuting” of concrete resulted in poor quality 
concrete.
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strength concrete facing in the mid-1930s to stop continued freezing and thawing 
damage.12
First generation Reclamation concretes were vulnerable to sulfate attack, ASR, 
and FT deterioration.  In spite of these problems, some concretes seemed 
remarkably durable.  Engineers and scientists began examining concrete materials 
to try to improve the quality.  Studies conducted at the Lewis Institute in Chicago 
beginning in 1914 shed new light on the engineering properties of concrete.
The Abrams Generation (1918-1928)
The fi rst major advance in concrete technology during the twentieth 
century occurred about 1918 with the publication of  Duff Abrams’s “Design of 
Concrete Mixtures.”13  Abrams improved on the recipe proportioning methods 
through deliberate design practices with proportioning methods and mix design 
tables.  Abrams’s classic research and his Awater to cement ratio law@ provided
the foundation of concrete mix design still followed today.  He found concrete 
strength and thus quality could be controlled by the relative proportions of water 
and cement.  He also found it was possible to design mixes for the same strength 
using different materials.  Concrete mixes could be designed and proportioned 
to meet a variety of conditions and structural requirements.  Stronger concretes 
were developed to resist deterioration by the environment.  Researchers began 
investigating the fundamental physical-chemical reactions that were needed 
to advance the state-of-the-art.  One of the fi rst inroads to developing durable 
concrete took place with the identifi cation of the chemical reaction products 
of cement hydration, and development of a method to compute the relative 
proportions of each constituent in cement by Bogue in 1927.14  This important 
step was necessary to formulate different compositions of cement.  Without the 
knowledge of its composition, it was not possible to purposely change materials 
and manufacturing processes to enhance the performance of Portland cement.
 Concrete manufacturing methods also improved during the 1920s, 
including centrally batched and mixed concrete plants and systems to haul and 
transport concrete to the site, as 
shown in 3.5.  The daily output 
of concrete plants increased, 
resulting in fewer cold joints.
The horse and wagon was being 
replaced by the locomotive 
and trucks.  Larger projects 
were constructed, and more-
mechanized processes were 
developed.  Still, the process 
of consolidating concrete was 
left to the common laborer 
through rodding and spading.
3.5.  Delivery of concrete by truck from a 
centrally located concrete plant.
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The fi rst methods to consolidate concrete with mechanical equipment were 
just being developed.  Better treatment of cold joints was developed during 
this time, improving the continuity between adjacent placements.  For the fi rst 
time, control tests were used to design and monitor concrete mixtures within 
specifi c parameters.  Abrams’s generation of concrete technologists provided the 
foundation of knowledge for the next generation, beginning with the decision 
in December 1928 to construct Boulder (Hoover) Dam on the mighty Colorado 
River.
Boulder Dam / The “Hoover Generation” (1928-1945)
In 1928, the Boulder Canyon Act ratifi ed the Colorado River Compact 
and authorized construction of  Hoover Dam.15  The size of Hoover Dam required 
a completely new technology for large-scale concrete design and construction.  
The Hoover generation raised concrete materials technology, design methods, 
and concrete construction technology to unprecedented heights.  This generation 
of concrete technologists formulated large-scale research and development 
programs of special cements to meet the specifi c engineering properties for 
massive concrete structures.  They answered some fundamental questions about 
cement chemistry and the effects on mass concrete.  Solving these questions 
required close cooperation and communication between government agencies, 
manufacturers, contractors, and private and academic research institutions.  The 
application of scientifi c methods to solve complex durability problems led to what 
we now know as Amodern concrete.@
 One of the fi rst steps required for concrete for Hoover Dam was to 
investigate the composition of cement to reduce the amount of heat generated as 
it hydrated.  Extensive research on cement composition resulted in developing 
a  low-heat cement for mass concrete, now known by the American Society of 
Testing and Materials (ASTM) as Type IV cement.  The hydration product Atri-
calcium aluminate,@ abbreviated in a simplifi ed form as AC3A,@ was found to be 
one of the principal compounds that generates heat during the hydration process.
Reclamation specifi ed the chemical composition of cement supplied to Hoover 
Dam in 1933 to assure a low heat of hydration.  The low-heat cement also had 
improved durability because the low C3A cements had better resistance to sulfate 
attack.  This improved resistance to sulfate attack was the basis for specifying 
less than 5 percent C3A for cement used on the  Kendrick Project in 1938; another 
forerunner of the ASTM Type V (sulfate-resisting) cement.16
 Construction of such large projects as Hoover and Grand Coulee Dams 
could not have been accomplished without advances in concrete aggregate 
processing, concrete manufacturing, transporting, and placing.  The use of 
 block construction techniques, shown in 3.6, and artifi cial post-cooling reduced 
the potential for thermal cracking.  Specialized concrete batch plants with rail 
transporting and Ahigh-lines@ or cableways, were used to transport and place large 
quantities in round-the-clock operations.  One of the underappreciated advances 
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in concrete quality developed 
by eliminating the back-
breaking Atamping@ techniques 
of consolidation with the  high-
frequency, mechanical concrete 
vibrator shown in 3.7.17  Vibrators 
allowed a lowered unit water 
content of the mixture and thus 
lowered the cement content.  The 
concrete generated less heat and 
became less porous, while costing 
less.
 The size of Hoover Dam 
required not only signifi cant 
advances in construction equipment 
and materials processing but 
also in  construction project 
management and  process quality 
control techniques.  The designers 
and constructors of Hoover and 
Grand Coulee Dams were diligent, 
meticulous, and to some degree 
lucky.  Fortunately, one of the 
chemical processes that could 
cause expansion, cracking, and 
deterioration of concrete; alkali-
aggregate reaction, was avoided 
at Hoover Dam.  The cements 
furnished to the dam had a high 
alkali content and fortunately, the concrete was mostly free from potentially 
reactive aggregates; though not by design, because the alkali-aggregate 
phenomena had not yet been identifi ed and studied.18
 Two of the indirect products of the Hoover generation were the founding 
of the  Concrete Laboratory in Denver, Colorado, in 1931 and the fi rst printing of 
the Concrete Manual in 1936.  The Concrete Laboratory and Concrete Manual
grew out of the need for a better understanding of the behavior of concrete and the 
control of concrete construction.  Over 100,000 copies of the Concrete Manual
have been printed in nine editions and at least four languages. AConcrete schools@
were developed for training engineering and fi eld personnel, and have continued 
to this day.  Reclamation concrete technologists were active participants in ASTM 
and ACI, serving as both committee chairmen and as president.  This commitment 
to voluntary standards organizations continues today.
3.7.  The use of vibrators allowed a 
lowered unit water content of the concrete 
mixture.
3.6.  Block construction techniques reduced the 
potential for thermal cracking.
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 As the United States entered World War II, the last two pieces of the 
durability puzzle were identifi ed and fi nally corrected.   Alkali-aggregate reaction 
was encountered by Reclamation at American Falls Dam, and about 150 miles 
downstream of Hoover Dam at Parker Dam.  While American Falls Dam was 
undergoing rehabilitation from a variety of causes, Parker Dam was just being 
completed in 1937.  Within two years, cracks appeared in the dam.19  The cracking 
at Parker Dam was severe enough to warrant a large scale research investigation 
and a blue ribbon panel of consultants.  In the end, the chemical reactions between 
certain altered andesites and rhyolites in less than 2 percent of the aggregates 
and the alkalies in the cement fostered a deleterious, expansive reaction called 
alkali-silica reaction, known as ASR20.  First observed in Pennsylvania in the 
early 1920s at the Buck Hydroelectric Plant, ASR became a noticeable problem 
throughout the country in the 1930s and early 1940s.21  The solution to ASR was 
to use petrographic techniques to identify those aggregates with the potential 
for expansion and to specify a 0.6 percent limit of alkalies in the cement.22
Reclamation quickly instituted the low-alkali limit for  concrete with potentially 
reactive aggregates by April of 1941.23
 The last major advance in developing durable concrete was the result 
of both accident and observation in 1938.  In New York State certain highway 
pavements were observed to have superior performance when a particular brand 
of cement was used in the concrete.  The highway departments began specifying 
this particular brand of cement for all their highway construction without fully 
understanding the reason for superior performance.  Microscopic examination 
of the  concrete revealed a paste structure containing tiny, entrained, air bubbles 
brought about by using beef tallow in the cement kilns during manufacturing.24
This produced the fi rst Aair-entrained@ cement, accompanied by signifi cantly 
improved freezing and thawing resistance compared to other cements.  The 
microscopic air bubbles absorbed the expansive forces of freezing ice crystals 
within the paste, preventing micro-cracking.  Though not a direct player in the 
initial identifi cation of entrained air, Reclamation began testing concrete for 
freeze-thaw durability in the mid-1930s.  This included evaluating concrete, 
aggregate quality, and other additives, some of which may have accidentally 
entrained air.  The perceived superior durability of Grand Coulee Dam concrete 
in the 1930s may have resulted from specifi cations allowing grinding aids during 
cement manufacturing that may have entrained some air.25  Anecdotal evidence 
points to other accidental introductions of air in concrete in the United States as 
early as the 1920s.  These concretes were quickly rejected due to lower density 
and compressive strength! Higginson even refers to the possibility of forms of 
entrained air in stucco specifi ed by Marcus Vitrivius Pollio in the fi rst century 
A.D.26  Reclamation quickly changed their specifi cations and changed to air-
entrained concrete by 1942.27  By the end of World War II, Reclamation had 
fi nally overcome the three primary causes of concrete durability problems in the 
West, resulting in what is considered Amodern concrete;@ an engineered concrete 
capable of resisting the physical and chemical forces of nature. 
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The Post-War Generation: “The Constructors” (1945-1990)
The post-war generation of concrete technologists applied the 
fundamentals of modern concrete to Acustomize@ it for a variety of new 
applications and over a wide range of different environments.  This generation 
began as post-war citizen soldiers returned to the United States and continued 
through the cold war.  These people were the constructors.  During the fi fties 
and sixties Reclamation was completing Aa dam a year.@  Large, thick arch 
dams became high-strength, double curvature, thin arch dams.  Projects were 
constructed across the desert and through 14,000 foot high mountain ranges.
Some of the largest water development and distribution systems were completed 
during this era, the Central Arizona and Central Utah Projects.  The concretes 
used new additives to achieve greater durability, economy, and performance.  
These concretes should remain durable through the next century.
 One of the most signifi cant contributions of this generation improved 
durability and also made concrete less expensive.  The purposeful addition of 
natural  pozzolans in the early twentieth century was done somewhat as a cost-
saving measure and later to reduce the temperature rise of mass concrete.  The 
Bureau of Reclamation began investigating a power plant by-product, fl y ash, 
in the 1930s and 1940s as a substitute for natural pozzolans in mass concrete.
The fi rst large-scale specifi ed use of fl y ash was at  Hungry Horse Dam in 
1950.28  Reclamation continued research on fl y ash, yielding other benefi ts such 
as improving the sulfate resistance of concrete.  In the 1970s cement shortages 
prompted Reclamation to begin using fl y ash in normal structural concrete and 
canal linings to save cement.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency=s
implementation of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, beginning in 
1980, strongly encouraged the reuse of recycled materials, including fl y ash in 
concrete.29  The long-term benefi ts of using fl y ash will continue for generations 
as these concretes are less porous and more resistant to sulfate attack and alkali-
silica reaction, even more than with sulfate-resisting, low-alkali cements.30
 The advances in construction equipment design dramatically increased 
concrete production during this time.  Large-size canal linings are now placed 
at ten times the rate as in the early days.  Instead of adding water to increase 
fl uidity, superplasticizers are now added to make concrete fl ow like water, yet 
be twice the strength of its predecessors.  Concrete linings were even placed 
under water to reduce leakage in unlined canals.31  Concrete vibrators capable of 
consolidating 25 to 50 yd3 of concrete per hour were replaced by 10-ton, vibratory 
rollers capable of placing 500 yd3 per hour in  roller-compacted concrete (RCC) 
dams.32  It is interesting to note that the earliest Reclamation concretes were of 
such a consistency that they had to be manually Arammed@ into place.  The era of 
Reclamation concrete dam construction concluded at Upper Stillwater Dam using 
RCC of such consistency that was mechanically Arammed@ into place!
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The Present Generation and Beyond (1990-    )
By about 1990, the last large dams were being completed and a new era 
was underway.  Most of Reclamation=s construction program is now devoted 
to rehabilitation of existing structures.  The Reclamation Safety of Dams Act 
of 1978 provided the Secretary of the Interior with the authority to construct, 
restore, operate, and maintain new or modifi ed features at existing Federal 
Reclamation dams for safety of dams purposes.33  As the inventory of dams was 
closely examined, it became apparent that many dams were in need of attention.
The  safety of dams program recognized dams constructed prior to changes in 
the state-of-the-art in dam design and construction were candidates for funding 
under this act.  In addition to dam safety needs, many aging Reclamation 
structures were in need of some type of repair due to the ravages of time.  An 
example is Tieton Dam, 3.8, 
constructed in Washington in 
1925.  The concrete lined spillway 
suffered from serious freezing 
and thawing deterioration.  It was 
fi rst rehabilitated in the 1970s and 
again in 1999 with operations and 
maintenance funding.  Concrete 
canals, power and pumping plants, 
and appurtenant structures are also 
being rehabilitated throughout the 
West.  The present generation of 
concrete technologists benefi ted 
from four generations of research 
and development.  They must 
continue to apply the hard won 
practical knowledge of their 
predecessors to maintain the 
existing infrastructure well into the 
twenty-fi rst century.
Conclusions
 This paper reviewed the most signifi cant causes of concrete deterioration 
and Reclamation=s role in improving the technology to the current state-of-the-art.  
Without durable concretes, Reclamation could not have developed the western 
water resources infrastructure we enjoy today.  The development and rapid 
implementation of these advances kept Reclamation at the forefront of the state-
of-the-art through the twentieth century.  This has extended the long-term service 
life of our infrastructure well into the twenty-fi rst century.  3.9 summarizes many 
of the steps encountered in developing durable, modern concrete.  Although the 
list of accomplishments is long, the author nominates the following as the Atop
3.8.  Tieton Dam spillway rehabilitated in 1999.
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fi ve@ contributions to durable concrete in the twentieth century (in chronological 
order):
 1. Abrams= design of concrete mixtures and Awater-cement ratio
  law@—Abrams applied engineering practices to concrete mixtures
  and he was the fi rst to institutionalize control of the water content 
  to improve concrete quality.
 2. Development of special cements to improve concrete quality, such   
  as low-heat and sulfate resisting cements.
 3. Development of the internal vibrator to consolidate concrete—this   
  equipment signifi cantly reduced the water content of concrete,   
  making it less permeable.
 4. Determining the causes of and solutions to alkali-aggregate   
  reaction and freezing and thawing attack—using scientifi c methods  
  such as petrographic mineralogical examination and long-term   
  testing to identify the parameters which affected the durability of   
  concrete under these conditions.
 5. Incorporating fl y ash in Reclamation concrete construction—fl y 
  ash improved concrete workability, decreased the porosity of the
3.9.  Timeline for major improvements in concrete quality and the development of 
Reclamation durable concrete.
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  cement paste, and improved its resistance to sulfate attack and 
  akali-silica reaction. 
 The  modern concrete of today incorporates all of the advances of the 
past century.  An example of 1 cubic yard of modern concrete will include the 
following ingredients and their proportions:
Table 1. Bureau of Reclamation “modern concrete” - one cubic yard of concrete.
Ingredient Mass(lb/yd3)
Vol-
ume
(ft3/
yd3)
ASTM
Specifi cation Comments
Air 5 percent 1.3 C 260
Air-entraining admixture for freezing and thaw-
ing durability
Water * 220 3.5 C 94 Suffi cient for 3 inch slump
Cement * 390 2.0 C 150
Type II, moderate sulfate resisting with less 
than 0.6 percent alkalies to resist alkali-silica 
reaction
Pozzolan * 100 0.7 C 618
Class F, AR Factor@ less than 2.5 for improved 
sulfate resistance, and decreased potential for 
ASR
Sand 1080 6.6 C 33 Fineness Modulus of 2.75
Coarse Ag-
gregate 2120 12.9 C 33 1-1/2 inch maximum size aggregate
Total 3910 27
* Water to cement plus pozzolan ratio = 0.45 for superior durability in sulfate
and freezing and thawing environments.  Water reducing admixture included.
The Author’s Closure:
The Challenge for the Twenty-fi rst Century—Identify, Protect, 
Preserve
 Reclamation must now face the critical task of maintaining the existing 
infrastructure to meet the needs of the twenty-fi rst century.  The aging of concrete 
structures will require a major investment for continued operation.  The most 
immediate needs are to protect concretes constructed before the Abig three@
durability issues were solved.  Unfortunately, this only narrows the fi eld down to 
about the 50 percent of our inventory constructed before World War II.  Of these 
structures, those constructed before about 1930 are in need of the most urgent 
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attention.  A decision support system for aging concrete is under development to 
evaluate the earliest structures and present information on their long-term, service 
life potential.34  With this information, Reclamation intends to present the status 
of our concrete infrastructure on a time-line to prioritize funding for protection 
before deterioration processes damage these facilities beyond repair.
 I was fortunate to have as a mentor one of the great Reclamation concrete 
technologists of his time, Mr. Edward Harboe.  Whenever I had a question, I 
would stop and talk to Ed because I knew he either had the answer or knew where 
to fi nd it.  Within a couple of hours, Ed would stop by after digging through his 
fi les to come up with the results of a long-ago study.  In my opinion, many of our 
questions have already been answered by our predecessors.  We must continue 
to preserve and to pass on the knowledge base that is our history.  I would like 
to dedicate this paper to Ed and the many pioneers of Reclamation concrete 
construction, with special recognition the late Mr. G. W. ABill@ DePuy, my old 
boss, who passed away on January 3, 2002.
Timothy Dolen is a Research Civil Engineer and Senior Technical 
Specialist for the Bureau of Reclamation, Materials Engineering and 
Research Laboratory.  He has been employed for 30 years as a civil 
engineer with the Reclamation Concrete Laboratory.
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History of Drainage in the  Bureau of Reclamation:
A History of Subsurface Drainage in the Bureau of 
Reclamation
By:
Rodney G. TeKrony, Glen D. Sanders,
and Billy Cummins
Abstract
In the early days of the Reclamation Service, the criteria for irrigability 
of lands generally consisted of two elements: 1. Is water available?, and, 2. 
Can we get it to the land?  Within a few years, many of the early projects were 
experiencing reduced agricultural productivity and reduced ability to repay 
construction loans because their soils were becoming waterlogged and saline.
By 1915 construction of subsurface  drainage facilities had been initiated on 
several projects.  However, at the time, subsurface drainage was more of an 
art than a science.  Much of the world’s experience with agricultural drainage 
had been gained in humid areas which are quite different than arid areas.  With 
no standards and limited knowledge of ground water movement, these early 
drainage efforts met with varying degrees of success.
 Faced with large areas of nonproductive land, several irrigation districts 
requested and were granted deferments in their repayment contracts.  Congress 
responded over a period of some 30 to 40 years by passing a series of laws that 
progressively attempted to correct the defi ciencies in Reclamation’s project 
formulation procedures.  The Fact Finders’ Act of 1924 initiated the economic 
land classifi cation in which lands were charged according to their potential 
productivity.  The Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1925 reduced the repayment 
obligations for several districts due to nonproductive lands.  The Reclamation 
Act of 1939 provided for periodic reclassifi cations to adjust classifi cations 
based on current productivity.  The Interior Department Appropriation Act of 
1954 required the Secretary of the Interior to certify sustainable productivity 
of the lands by means of irrigation.  This law provides that the Secretary of the 
Interior must certify to the Congress that lands to be developed for irrigation are 
suitable for sustained productivity under irrigation.  This means that the lands 
must be drainable at a cost that is economically feasible within the limits of the 
repayment capacity of the lands.
 To meet this challenge, Reclamation drainage engineers developed 
scientifi c methods for conducting soil and water investigations and mathematical 
procedures for the design of subsurface drainage facilities.  Reclamation fi rst 
adopted existing steady-state methods for drain design and later developed the 
more accurate transient state procedures that are in use today.  The methods and 
procedures developed by Reclamation have proven to be successful not only in 
correcting problems that develop on irrigated lands but also in predicting the 
drainage requirement before water is applied to the land.
 Reclamation drainage engineers were also involved in the development 
of modern construction practices and in the development of modern materials 
such as corrugated perforated plastic pipe which is used in drain construction 
today.
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 Even armed with the legal authority and the technical knowledge to 
develop sustainable irrigation projects, good drainage practices were not always 
followed.  Political decisions that run counter to the best available technical 
knowledge have contributed to such actions as the Riverton Third-Division 
buy-back and subsequent resale, and the utilization of Kesterson Reservoir as 
a terminal storage facility for return fl ows.  Agriculture in California=s fertile 
Central Valley remains in jeopardy because the planned outlet drain has never 
been constructed.  The curtailments on the Oahe and Garrison Diversion Projects 
were in part due to misconceptions regarding drainage.  While these decisions 
did not make use of the best technical expertise, they are nonetheless an integral 
part of Reclamation=s drainage history.
 By the 1950s, Reclamation had gained recognition as a world leader 
in the fi eld of subsurface drainage.  Reclamation drainage engineers have been 
responsible for the construction of several thousand miles of subsurface drains 
that maintain the productivity of over a million acres of irrigated land in the 
western United States.  They have also been actively engaged in successful 
drainage projects in many countries around the world.
 This paper includes brief discussions of how the need for drainage 
helped to shape Reclamation law as we know it.  It also summarizes the 
development of scientifi c methods to ensure success.  Some of the early projects 
that suffered drainage problems, and the challenges and successes in providing 
drainage, are also discussed.   Reclamation has introduced these methods to 
solve irrigated drainage problems at the international level.  We will address the 
international experience, and how the same methods and procedures are now 
being used to design corrective drainage facilities for dams and other major 
structures and to support environmental enhancement programs.
Introduction
 Drainage of irrigated lands by the Bureau of Reclamation began shortly 
after the passage of the Reclamation Act in 1902.  However, not until the 
late 1940s and early 1950s did engineers in the Bureau of Reclamation begin 
pioneering efforts to develop the technology of  drainage of irrigated lands into a 
modern engineering science.  (USBR 1993)
 In the early days of Reclamation, the criteria for bringing land under 
irrigation were quite simple.  If water was available and if it was economically 
feasible to get it to the land, the land was irrigable.  Within a few years of 
development, waterlogging and salinity became serious problems for some of the 
irrigation districts.  Beginning in 1911 the  Huntley Project on the Yellowstone 
River in Montana constructed subsurface drainage systems that were very 
successful in returning the lands to full productivity.  However, subsurface 
drainage was more of an art than a science at the time.  Much of the world’s 
experience with agricultural drainage had been gained in humid areas which are 
quite different than arid areas.  A lack of standards and limited knowledge of 
ground water movement led to early  drainage efforts which met with varying 
degrees of success.  Huntley is located on coarse alluvial deposits that drained 
easily and were very forgiving if the drain was not placed in exactly the right 
location, orientation, and depth.  For other projects, such as  Belle Fourche in 
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western South Dakota, the solutions were more diffi cult.  Attempts at drainage 
met with limited success at best and in many cases they were completely 
unsuccessful.
 Faced with large areas of nonproductive land, several Irrigation Districts 
requested and were granted deferments in their repayment contracts.  Over the 
years, Congress passed various acts aimed at developing a sustainable irrigated 
agriculture in the western United States.
 In order to ensure development of lands that could be kept in production 
within economic limits, Reclamation drainage engineers realized that they needed 
better methods of measuring soil permeability, a better understanding of soil 
salinity factors, and better drain spacing procedures.  Working in cooperation 
with the U.S. Salinity Laboratory and other researchers who were struggling with 
the same issues, they adopted state-of-the-art standards for soil salinity, sodicity, 
and toxicity to various trace elements.  Various in-situ permeability tests were 
developed and perfected.  They adopted the steady-state drain spacing formula or 
ellipse equation as it is often called.  Although several authors have published the 
same formula in different forms, Reclamation typically uses William Donnan’s 
version which was published in 1935.  While the Donnan formula is generally 
considered acceptable in the industry, it does not account for variations in 
irrigation practices nor does it account for specifi c yield, the natural water storage 
capacity of soils.  To address these defi ciencies, Reclamation engineers developed 
transient state procedures that more accurately defi ned the required spacing and 
provided for risk analyses of drain systems.  The fi rst version of the transient state 
procedure, published in 1953, underwent various modifi cations for about the next 
15 years.
 When the Chief Engineer’s Offi ce was established at the Denver 
Federal Center in 1948, it included the  Drainage Engineering Section.  This 
marked the fi rst centralized effort to address drainage issues in Reclamation.  
Design standards were developed in order to achieve consistency of methods 
throughout Reclamation.  The location, depth and orientation of pipe drains were 
designed to achieve the greatest system effi ciency.  Materials used and gradation 
and placement of envelope materials were controlled by standards, as were 
construction deviation tolerances.  The standards were generally monitored and 
enforced by the Denver Offi ce drainage staff.
 Within the organizational framework of Reclamation, the drainage 
discipline has been unique in that it has been intimately involved in every phase of 
irrigation projects, from the preliminary planning through design and construction 
and, fi nally, operation and maintenance (O&M).  The offi ce originally designated 
Drainage Engineering Section later became the  Drainage and Ground Water 
Division, and later still the  Drainage and Ground Water Branch of the Engineering 
and Research Center.  From 1953 to 1994, the Reclamation Instructions required 
each Regional Director to have a Regional Drainage Engineer on staff.  This 
156
person was to ensure that the Drainage and Ground Water organization in the 
Region was properly staffed and that Reclamation  drainage policy was followed.  
On the organizational charts of that period, the Drainage and Ground Water 
Branch was located in the Planning Division in two of the seven Regions, in the 
Construction Division in one Region, and in the O&M Division in four Regions.
The functional statements were nearly identical in all of the offi ces.  There has 
never been a Drainage Offi ce in Washington, D.C., but for many years there was a 
Drainage Liaison position in the Planning Division.
 Construction techniques have evolved over the years, sometimes in 
response to Reclamation design standards.  Contractors developed new and better 
ways to handle envelope materials and to maintain grade within the limits of 
specifi cations.  
 In the late 1960s, the plastic pipe industry developed corrugated 
polyethylene and polyvinyl chloride tubing for use in agricultural drains.
Reclamation’s Open and Closed Conduit Systems (OCCS) research program was 
deeply involved in writing corrugated fl exible plastic pipe standards.
 From the 1950s, through the 1980s, Reclamation=s drainage program was 
heavily involved in irrigation and drainage projects all around the world.  The 
methods and procedures developed for use in the western United States proved 
to be useful wherever we went, and the experience gained in other countries was 
used to modify and bolster the domestic program.
 In 1978 the  Drainage Manual containing “the engineering tools and 
concepts that have proven useful 
for planning, construction, and 
maintaining drainage systems for 
successful long term irrigation 
projects” was published as a 
Department of the Interior water 
resources technical publication.
 In recent years, the 
methods and procedures that were 
developed for agricultural drains 
are gradually being accepted for use 
in control of seepage from dams, 
slope stabilization, and other non-
agricultural applications.
4.1.  In October 1913 a Pioneer traction en-
gine pulled an Austin elevating grader 
digging drainage ditches on the Milk River 
Project near Malta, Montana.
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Legislation
Fact Finder’s Act (December 5, 1924), (ch. 4, 43 Stat. 672)
 The status of some Federal Reclamation projects of the western United 
States in the early 1920s was dire.  Waterlogging and salinity problems were 
widespread and such conditions had not been anticipated.  Lands were failing, 
farmers were failing, and costs for corrective measures were far greater than the 
costs originally anticipated.  The U.S. Government decided to take action in the  Fact 
Finder’s Act of 1924, which charged the Secretary of the Interior, the cabinet offi cial 
responsible for federal irrigation development, that irrigable lands shall be classifi ed 
with respect to their capacity to support a farm family and pay water charges.  The 
Secretary was also empowered in that act to apportion equitably the total costs 
assessed against the irrigable lands so that they all would pay in accordance with 
their productivities.  Thus, a federal irrigation development would be composed of 
lands having varying productivities and payment capacities, but all would have to be 
able to support a farm family and pay operation and maintenance costs.
Omnibus Adjustment Act (May 25, 1926)
 This act adjusted water right charges on specifi ed projects (Belle Fourche, 
South Dakota; Boise, Idaho; Carlsbad, New Mexico; Grand Valley, Colorado; 
Huntley, Montana; King Hill, Idaho; Klamath, Oregon; Lower Yellowstone, 
Montana-North Dakota; Milk River, Montana; Minidoka, Idaho; Newlands, 
Nevada; North Platte, Nebraska-Wyoming; Okanogan, Washington; Rio Grande, 
New Mexico-Texas; Shoshone, Wyoming-Montana; Sun River, Montana; Umatilla, 
Oregon; Uncompahgre, Colorado; and Yakima, Washington.)  The adjustments 
were deductions from the total repayment of projects’ costs because of unproductive 
lands determined by land classifi cation.  Lands that were found to be permanently 
unproductive, generally due to waterlogging and salinity, were excluded from the 
projects.
Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (August 4, 1939) (ch. 418, 53 Stat. 
1187)
 This act provides that the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to require 
provisions in Reclamation water contracts for proper accounting, to protect the 
condition of project works, and to protect project lands against deterioration “due 
to improper use of water.”  The contracts will also require advance payment of 
adequate operation and maintenance charges.  This act requires the classifi cation or 
reclassifi cation of project lands from time to time but not more often than at 5-year 
intervals “as to irrigability and productivity those lands which have been, are, or 
may be included within any project.”  The reclassifi cation is to be done only at the 
request of the water users association or other authorized representatives of the water 
users.
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Interior Department Appropriation Act, 1953 (July 9, 1952) (ch. 597, 66 
Stat. 445)
 This was the fi rst law that requires the Secretary of the Interior to certify to 
the Congress that an “adequate soil survey and land classifi cation has been made 
and that the lands to be irrigated are susceptible to the production of agricultural 
crops . . .” before any appropriation for any of the construction items for a project is 
available.  This requirement was repeated in the  Interior Department Appropriation 
Act of 1954 and is generally cited under that law.
Interior Department Appropriation Act, 1954 (July 31, 1953) (ch. 298, 67 
Stat. 261)
 This act provides that no appropriation for any of the construction items for a 
project is available until the Secretary certifi es to the Congress that an adequate soil 
survey and land classifi cation has been made and that the lands can be successfully 
irrigated.
Drainage and Minor Construction Act (D&MC) (June 13, 1956) (ch. 382, 
70 Stat. 274)
 The so-called D&MC Act provides for funding up to $200,000 per year for 
irrigation districts to correct minor defi ciencies that developed after the transfer of 
facilities to the district for operation and maintenance.  The district enters into a 
contract with the United States to construct or repair minor facilities not to exceed 
$200,000 per year.  One of the more common defi ciencies is inadequate subsurface 
drainage.  The law allows districts to construct drainage facilities as the need 
develops over time.  In some instances, it has been used in conjunction with a much 
larger rehabilitation and betterment (R&B) contract in order to get the most benefi t 
from the dollars spent.  The D&MC loan is repayable at the rate established by the 
district=s primary repayment contract and usually is tacked on to the end to extend 
the time of repayment rather than increasing the amount of the payments.
Food Security Act of 1985 (99 Stat. 1354; 16 U.S.C. 3801-3862)
 The  Food Security Act of 1985, otherwise known as the Swampbuster Act, 
makes producers ineligible for certain U.S. Department of Agriculture farm program 
benefi ts if they convert wetland and use it to produce agricultural commodities after 
December 23, 1985.  The problem then becomes determining what constitutes a 
“jurisdictional” wetland.  The USDA Soil Conservation Service (renamed National 
Resources Conservation Service) was charged with making that determination 
on a case-by-case basis.  Rules for making the determination were published in 
the Federal Register on September 17, 1987, and by October 1, 1987, wetland 
determinations had been made on about 750,000 acres on 34,000 farms.  (Schnepf)
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 The Swampbuster Act did not have a profound impact on Reclamation’s 
drainage program because our mission is to maintain agriculturally productive lands 
in a productive state, rather than draining jurisdictional wetlands.  Nevertheless, 
it changed the process in that every proposed drainage project is now subject to 
Swampbuster rules and we must be vigilant in avoiding incidental drainage of 
wetlands.
Garrison Diversion Unit Reformulation Act of 1986 (May 12, 1986) (100 
Stat. 418)
 This Act requires that Reclamation conduct investigations and provide an 
estimate of any trace elements or toxic substances which may be present in return 
fl ows from irrigation.  In order to make this estimate, it is necessary to explore the 
entire soil profi le through which the drainage water from the project will fl ow.
Federal Reports Elimination Act of 1998 (November 10, 1998) (112 Stat. 
3280)
 This act eliminated the certifi cation of land classifi cation requirements by 
striking pertinent language of the 1953 and 1954 Appropriations Acts and Section 
10 of the Garrison Diversion Unit Reformulation Act.  Reclamation may seek to 
reestablish the certifi cation through legislation.
Development of  Transient State Drain Spacing Procedures
 The Bureau of Reclamation used a steady-state equation known as the ellipse 
equation to determine spacing between drains until the early 1950s.  An adjustment 
to the equation is made to account for dissimilar fl ow conditions where drains are 
placed directly on an impermeable soil layer (“on barrier”) rather than at some 
distance (“above-barrier”).  The validity of the drain spacing obtained by use of the 
ellipse equation is dependent upon the assumed steady recharge of water to the water 
table.  The steady-state assumptions seldom represent the conditions produced by 
intermittent irrigation applications nor do they account for water storage capacity of 
the soil profi le.
 Reclamation  drainage engineers believed that more precise drain spacings 
could be computed using an equation that refl ected the typical pattern of irrigation 
applications with alternate drain-out periods and would also account for storage 
capacity.  Reclamation drainage staff embarked on an initiative to develop a drain 
spacing procedure which would be applicable to widely varying soil and ground 
water conditions.
 During the 1940s and 1950s drainage fi eld personnel were making many 
drainage investigations of soils across the western United States.  The information 
collected during these investigations included the capacity of the soils to transmit 
water; the amount, source, movement, and chemical characteristics of the water 
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to be transmitted; and the available hydraulic gradients.  The data they were 
accumulating were sent to the Chief Engineer=s Offi ce and were used by Drainage 
Division staff to develop the transient state spacing procedure.
  Ray Winger initially conceived the transient state spacing theory and 
recruited  Robert E. Glover to develop the mathematics.  (Winger 2001)  Glover had 
previously worked on the heat fl ow formulas that were used to cool the concrete at 
Hoover Dam.  (Cunningham)  Because the physics of heat fl ow is very similar to 
the physics of ground water movement, Glover was able to adapt the heat transfer 
formulas for cooling a fl at slab with initial uniform temperature distribution to the 
problem of ground water movement to a drain. 
 In 1953 the transient state procedure used an initial fl at water table for drains 
above the barrier and second degree curve for drains on the barrier.  (Dumm 1953)  
Winger and Glover worked together to adjust the shape of the curve based on fi eld 
data from the Redfi eld Research Farm on the Oahe Unit in South Dakota.  William 
Ryan installed and monitored wells on the drainage research plots at the Redfi eld 
farm to determine the water table response to various recharge and drawdown 
events.  (Winger 2001)
 In 1959 the Offi ce of Drainage and Ground Water Engineering sent a 
memorandum to all Regional Directors presenting new formulas which redefi ned 
the initial shape of the water table between drains to more closely match conditions 
found on functioning drains in the fi eld.  (Maierhofer)  This description of the initial 
water table condition for the drain spacing solution is important because it more 
accurately predicts the height of the water table than the formula with a fl at initial 
water table and relates the behavior of the water table to time, physical subsurface 
characteristics, and drain spacing.  The validity of this new concept of water table 
shape over a subsurface drain was checked extensively using data from Australia, 
Canada, and the western United States.  Good correlation was found between the 
computed and measured values.  (Dumm 1962)
 In 1966  W. T. Moody wrote a computer program that used a stable fi nite-
difference formulation to solve the nonlinear differential equations for various 
depths to barrier from zero to infi nity and a fourth degree parabola initial water table 
condition.  This is the fi rst time the fourth degree parabola initial water table shape 
was applied to the drain on barrier case.  This is the basis for the drain-out curves 
that were published in the Drainage Manual.  (Cunningham)  The curves serve as 
a tool for designers, eliminating the need to slog through the rigorous mathematics 
for each new drain spacing effort.  The intermediate curves have largely been 
underutilized by the drainage community although recent authors are discovering 
this important work.
 The success of the development of the transient state formula in design of 
drains is due to the fl exibility of the drainage engineers at that time.  They were 
willing to apply the theoretical to the practical and use the results to refi ne and 
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redefi ne the theoretical.  Glover, Maierhofer, Dumm, Winger, and Moody were 
also willing to look at fi eld results and revamp the formulas for transient state drain 
spacing.
Development of Design Standards
 It has been said that drainage is as much an art as a science.  As quaint as this 
sounds, as long as it was true failure to achieve satisfactory results would always 
be a probable outcome of building complex drainage systems.  On the  Shoshone 
Project, for instance, many drains were placed at 12 to 14 feet below ground, 
depending on how deep the contractor could bury them.  This was done in the early 
1950s in the belief that deeper was better without regard to scientifi c examination of 
the soil profi le.  The problem was that the shale barrier was at 8 to 10 feet—above 
the drain—in most locations.  As a result, the drains are painfully ineffi cient.  
Although the drains do seem to work as well as they would at the barrier depth, the 
spacing is too wide, because it was based on the deeper depth.
 Reclamation adopted the attitude that failure was unacceptable.  The cost 
was just too great.  With this motivation, Reclamation set out to establish design 
standards that would be as close to fail-safe as good science and responsible 
economics would permit.
 The Function Statement of the Drainage Section, Chief Engineer’s Offi ce, in 
1948 charged the Section with the task of developing Reclamation-wide standards 
for drainage.  Design standards were needed to establish consistency and to protect 
the taxpayers and the water users from spending large sums of money for facilities 
that offered a low rate of success.  Over the years, Reclamation=s policy toward 
ground water control has evolved to a stated policy that “. . . drainage construction 
is an integral part of all irrigation projects.”  Typically, projects must demonstrate 
favorable cost-benefi t ratio before they are funded for construction.  The cost/benefi t 
factor includes costs for providing subsurface drainage.
 The collector drains have always been considered a project cost, but 
the relief drains are not always so.  In 1951, a general Reclamation Policy was 
established that “. . . construction of project drains on farm should be precluded or 
defi nitely restricted and that the land owner should assume responsibility for such 
construction the same as for other on farm development.”  (USBR 1954)  This 
policy was reviewed and modifi ed in 1963 to allow the cost of drains to “. . . be 
considered, depending upon the circumstances, as a project, or a farm cost.”  (USBR 
1963)  Since that time, on farm  drainage costs are decided during the planning stage 
of all projects.  Since subsurface drainage problems tend to indiscriminately cross 
property lines and are usually contributed to by the distribution system, drainage is 
nearly always considered to be a project cost.
 Among the original set of design standards was the placement of a graded 
sand-gravel envelope around all pipe drains.  While gravel envelopes were used as 
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early as 1911, their use was inconsistent and there was no specifi c gradation.  Design 
criteria for envelope design, based on hydraulic fl ow properties as well as fi lter 
properties, were published in 1970.  (Winger and Ryan)  The resulting envelope 
enhances the fl ow of ground water into the drain while excluding soil particles 
which would clog the drain pipe.  Along with the advent of plastic pipe came a 
plethora of synthetic envelopes that were cheaper and easier to install.  Beginning in 
the 1970s, Reclamation tested many of these envelope materials.  Every attempt to 
replace the sand-gravel envelope with synthetic geotextiles, fabrics, beads, or mats 
has resulted in inferior performance or complete failure of the drains.  Each research 
effort concluded that the sand-gravel envelope, even with the greater cost compared 
to synthetics, is very inexpensive insurance.
 The emergence of  corrugated plastic pipe for use in subsurface drains 
represents the most signifi cant change in design standards since the standards 
were developed.  In 1968 the fi rst test sections of 6-inch-diameter plastic pipe 
were installed in the Kansas River Projects and in the Columbia Basin Project in 
Washington.  Within 4 years, plastic had become the most popular material for small 
diameter drains and, within 20 years, sizes up to 42-inch-diameter were available.
Concrete pipe is still used in some instances, but clay tile has all but vanished, 
and asbestos cement was eliminated when asbestos was classifi ed as a hazardous 
substance.
 The advent of plastic pipe allowed for curvilineal design of drains to better 
fi t topographic features and eliminated the need for certain manholes.  It also 
speeded the construction process as pipe is laid as a continuous unit rather than in 
3-to-5 foot segments.  It also opened the door to high-speed trenchers, which at the 
time were not large enough to handle rigid pipe sections.
 The Reclamation  drainage community is concerned with protecting the 
resources that Reclamation develops.  If we develop fl ourishing irrigation enterprises 
only to see them deteriorate into salt beds and low value marshes, we have failed in 
our mission.    Reclamation’s design standards and procedures, as described in 1977, 
(Frogge and Sanders) have remained nearly unchanged since that time.
Evolution of Construction Practices
 The construction of drains over the last century has taken as many forms as 
contractors and engineers could conceive.  The following discussion is by no means 
a complete history of the evolution of construction techniques for drainage, but 
includes what the authors are familiar with or could fi nd in the literature.
 When the fi rst  drainage problems developed on Reclamation projects, 
the solution was to excavate open ditch drains using a horse-drawn earth-moving 
implement sometimes called a “tumblebug.”  The tumblebug was pulled by 4 or 6 
horses or mules.  As it was pulled along, it would scrape up about 1/3 of a cubic yard 
of earth.  When it was full, the operator moved a lever to raise the blade for transport 
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to the waste area, usually the drain bank.  To unload, the operator pulled another 
lever and the implement tumbled to an upside down position, spreading its load over 
a short distance.
 Some early subsurface tile drains were laid in an open trench and backfi lled 
to make a subsurface  drain.  One such undertaking on the Huntley Project on the 
Yellowstone River just east of Billings, Montana, in 1912 lasted 4 months, from 
June 1 through September 30.  The Contractor was paid $2,618.40 while his costs 
were $2,602.64 leaving a profi t of $15.76.  (USBR 1912)  However, even in that 
time better methods were available.  The ancestor of modern  trenching machines 
was introduced on the Huntley Project in 1912.  It was an Austin trenching machine 
that excavated a trench up to 8 feet in depth.  It was joined a year later by a Parsons 
trenching machine with similar capability.  Construction of 2500 feet of tile drain in 
one month=s time was considered good progress.  Neither machine carried a shield 
for laying the pipe, so where trench walls would not stand, shoring was constructed 
behind the machine.  Where the grade line was deeper than 8 feet, laborers dug the 
last increment by hand, 2 to 4 feet in places.  (USBR 1913)
 In the summer of 1913 laborers were hard to fi nd, so the wage rate was 
raised from $2.50 a day to $2.75 and rubber boots were furnished.  The construction 
crew consisted of 30 to 40 men and from 2 to 8 teams of horses or mules.  (USBR 
1913)
 Another early mode of excavation was the steam shovel, the precursor of 
modern backhoes.  By the 1950s most open  drains were excavated by modern drag 
lines which are particularly well suited to ditch excavation.
 Subsurface pipe  drains were fi rst installed by digging an open ditch, laying 
a bedding for the pipe, placing the pipe by hand, covering it with a gravel envelope, 
and fi nally backfi lling the ditch.  Often the bedding consisted of wooden cribbing 
placed in the trench to support the pipe.  The wooden cribbing was later replaced 
by coarse gravel material which will stabilize a trench that displays quicksand 
conditions.  Surprisingly, open ditch methods of construction are still used in many 
cases, although the excavation equipment has generally changed to large backhoes.
 In 1951 a trenching machine appeared on the Delta-Mendota Canal in the 
Central Valley Project.  This machine towed a sled-mounted shield for laying pipe 
and gravel envelope.  The forward movement of the trencher was assisted by a 
cable winch with a block and tackle arrangement hooked to a deadman dozer.  This 
avoided slippage of the tracks which would quickly dig into the boggy ground 
and the trencher would become stuck.  Similar arrangements were used to assist 
trenchers to move over boggy ground as late as the mid-1970s.  In 1955 trenching 
machines were working in the Gila Project in Arizona and the Heart Mountain 
Division in Wyoming.  Both machines were ladder-type excavators and had shields 
for placing the gravel envelope and pipe.  The Cook and Butler machine on the Gila 
Project was mounted on a halftrack with large steel wheels on the front.  The wheels 
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made traversing boggy ground nearly impossible.  Another design problem was that 
the shield was rigidly attached to the machine, which prevented separate control of 
the shield and the trencher.  The machine was still in use as late as 1969.  The Heart 
Mountain machine was a Parsons model 310.  It was track-mounted and the shield 
was completely separate from the trencher, having its own set of tracks and being 
towed rather than carried.
 The Jetco wheel trencher was developed specifi cally for conditions on the 
Columbia Basin Project where rock-like caliche layers must be excavated.  The 
wheel was 16 feet in diameter and could excavate a trench to a depth of 12 feet.  In 
the Republican Valley of Nebraska and in California=s Imperial Valley, quicksand 
conditions presented the most diffi cult conditions.  There, Buckeye trenchers with 
ladder excavators and wide fl oatation tracks were developed.  The Buckeye machine 
with its trench shield attached was 50 feet long and weighed 50 tons.  It could place 
drains in fairly boggy conditions at a depth of 10 feet.  It carried two large diesel 
engines, one to move the machine forward and run the digging mechanism and one 
to run the hydraulic pumps to adjust the depth of the digger and the shield.
 Both the Jetco and the Buckeye carried a trench shield in which the concrete 
or clay tile sections were placed by hand.  A hydraulic lift was used to lower 2.5-foot 
lengths or Ajoints@ of pipe into the shield where a man placed it in position on a 
set of steel rails.  A hydraulic ram pushed the pipe tight against the preceding joint 
and held it there as the machine moved forward.  When the machine had traveled 
the length of the pipe joint, the man in the shield sounded a horn and the operator 
stopped the machine to allow another joint of pipe to be lowered into place.  The 
machine moved a pace of about 50 feet per hour, including the stops.  Later a dual 
ram apparatus was introduced which allowed continuous forward movement as the 
joints were handled.  The pace accelerated to a dizzying 300 feet per hour.
 Besides the rails, the hydraulic ram and cramped quarters for a man to work 
in, the shield contained a chute for placing the gravel bed for pipe to lie on and 
another chute to place gravel around and over the pipe before it left the shield and 
was subject to trench wall caving.   Often there was a spool mounted on the back 
of the shield to dispense a continuous sheet of plastic or asphalt saturated felt along 
the top of the pipe.  This so-called blinding was thought to prevent soil from being 
washed into the pipe along with the drain water.  That practice was discontinued 
when the hydraulics of the system became better understood.  Most shields also 
carried a hopper for gravel material so that a continuous feed of gravel was made 
as the pipe was laid.  With the advent of plastic drain pipe, there was no longer 
a need for a laborer to ride inside the shield.  The man and machinery inside the 
shield were replaced by a chute through which the continuous pipe is fed so that the 
pipe and gravel envelope emerge from the rear of the shield as a single unit.  The 
machines were not manufactured for placement of a gravel envelope around the 
pipe as Reclamation standards require.  Contractors typically found it necessary to 
modify their new machines by attaching shields, strengthening bearings and shafts, 
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and adding special controls before the new machine ever went to the fi eld.  This 
procedure is still common in the industry.
 In 1970 a German-made Hoess Machine was introduced in the Republican 
Valley.  The Hoess was a smaller, lighter weight machine with a high-speed chain 
digger.  Although the machine could not lay solid pipe joints, it could lay continuous 
4-, 6- and 8-inch plastic tubing at 7 feet deep at a pace of 1200 feet per hour.  
Several more years would pass before larger-diameter plastic pipe was approved for 
use.  Many contractors preferred to stay with their old machines rather than have 
two large machines on the job.  By the end of the 1970s plastic pipe was approved 
in diameters up to 18 inches.  The need for greater depth and larger shields to 
accommodate the larger pipe meant that many contractors simply converted their old 
machines rather than investing in the new smaller ones.  During this time, several 
European companies introduced the larger high-speed trenchers that are now in use.  
Forward speeds of 2,000 feet per hour are now common.
 In addition to the accelerated rate of construction, fi eld drainage engineers 
found that trenching machines provided a superior product when working in unstable 
soil conditions.  (Frogge and Sanders)  In 1974 the fi rst drains for which a trenching 
machine was required by the construction specifi cations were constructed down the 
center of a primary street in Loup City, Nebraska.  The purpose of this requirement 
was to ensure that the gravel envelope was placed in direct contact with undisturbed 
soil to form a strong hydraulic connection between the soil profi le and the drain.  
Construction specifi cations requiring the use of trenching machines that excavate the 
trench, lay the pipe and the gravel envelope are becoming a common practice where 
construction costs are high and the consequences of failure unacceptable.
 A longstanding problem for contractors building subsurface drains is 
operating heavy equipment on wet ground.  In many cases, the drains are designed 
to remove excess water from land that has become perpetually marshy.  A  drain 
contractor in the Kansas River Projects solved this problem by constructing 
through such areas in midwinter when there was a foot or more of frost.  Using a 
concrete saw, two cuts were made through the frost layer, one foot on each side of 
centerline.  The blocks of frozen soil were removed with a backhoe making a slot 
for the trenching machine to work through.  This operation required great caution to 
avoid placing frozen chunks in the backfi ll, which is forbidden by the specifi cations.  
Another solution was the use of fl otation tracks.  In the early 1980s, a Hollanddrain 
trencher having tracks that were 4 feet wide was used on the Riverton Project.  It 
could easily trench through ground so soft that walking was diffi cult.
 With the early trenching machines, grade control was done one pipe joint 
at a time and the digger was adjusted as needed.  As speed increased, contractors 
began using a string line which the operator tried to follow (with varying degrees of 
success) to maintain grade.  Another approach to grade control was a line of targets.  
This line of targets was set up in the fi eld at an exact elevation above the grade 
line.  The operator sighted on these targets and lined up two targets attached to the 
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digging apparatus with the line of targets in the fi eld.  The targets were more reliable 
than the string lines, but still required a skilled operator to maintain an acceptable 
grade on the drainpipe.  Along with the high-speed trenchers came laser-controlled 
grade where the operator adjusted the machine according to a red laser dot that was 
aimed at the control panel.  Often the laser beam would be warped by the heat of 
the trenching machine=s engine, making the dot much larger than the permissible 
deviation from grade.  Sometimes the dot would disappear entirely.  That system 
was quickly replaced by laser planes that project a plane of laser light on the correct 
slope over the entire fi eld by a revolving laser sending unit.  The plane is intercepted 
by sensors on the trenching machine; the sensors signal the hydraulic controls 
several times per minute to adjust the digger and the shield up or down as needed.
Interference from engine heat has been overcome by placing the sensors on masts, 
several feet above the machine.
 The September 1955 issue of Intermountain Industry Magazine featured a 
machine developed by Sumner G. Margetts & Company of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
claiming it was “The only machine of its type in the world (government approved).”  
The manufacturer was not identifi ed and photos appear to be different from any of 
the machines discussed earlier in this writing, indicating that at that time there were 
at least 4 such machines in existence.  However, as revolutionary as these giant 
machines were they never became common construction industry equipment.  A 
total of 12 machines were reported to be in operation in 1977, (Frogge and Sanders) 
and in the United States, there are currently less than 10 operable machines with a 
depth capability greater than 8 feet.
Operation and Maintenance
 As noted earlier, the Drainage and Ground Water function organizationally 
resided in the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Division in four of the seven 
Regions for nearly 50 years.  This was due in part to the reality that  drainage 
problems usually arose after the projects had been transferred to the O&M Division.  
However, regardless of their position on the organizational chart, the maintenance of 
drains after construction was the responsibility of the Regional Drainage Engineer 
with the support of the Projects Offi ce Drainage Branches.
 The same observation well network that is used for planning and design is 
used to monitor the effectiveness of drain systems after they are built.  Usually, the 
records of ground water fl uctuation are maintained by the same drainage personnel 
who installed the wells.  Most drainage offi ces in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s 
maintained handwritten or typed records of all the well readings within their project 
area.  The wells were measured 2 to 12 times a year, depending on the relative need 
for detail.  Hand-drawn hydrographs of the measurements were updated annually 
and kept in three-ring binders for ready access.  In more recent times, the records are 
usually kept electronically, and, thanks to modern software, hydrographs are printed 
as needed.  The hydrographs are used to forecast emerging drainage needs in time 
to plan and execute corrective measures before they became a serious economic 
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burden on the landowners or the irrigation district.  The hydrographs are also useful 
in diagnosing defi ciencies in existing drainage works.
 In projects where drainage was a major factor, drainage personnel typically 
participated in scheduled reviews of maintenance along with the distribution system 
O&M experts.  When problems developed in drainage systems, the drainage staff 
advised O&M forces on methods of repair and, in many cases, actively participated 
in the repair, as they still do.  Through the years, these kinds of activities have aided 
in verifi cation of design criteria and methods.
Early Experience
 Many of the fi rst wave of Reclamation projects experienced severe 
drainage problems within a few years.  Efforts to correct drainage defi ciencies met 
with varying degrees of success.  The experiences of some of these early projects 
are recounted here.
Belle Fourche Project
 The  Belle Fourche Project was among the fi rst Reclamation projects to 
be developed.  The project was initiated with studies in 1903 and authorized 
in 1904.  By 1910 many of the facilities were in place and water was being 
delivered.  However, by 1912, seeped areas totaling 1,420 acres were scattered 
over most of the project.  By 1914 the seeped areas had grown to 2,500 acres and, 
by 1917 they were estimated to be 35,000 acres.  Small  drainage districts were 
formed and managed to get several thousand acres relieved of water charges.  
Notes from a landowners meeting in 1920 state, “It begins to look like the only 
way to accomplish drainage of the project would be to have an order from the 
Secretary of the Interior with provision that the costs be charged to Operation 
and Maintenance of the Project.”  (USBR 1920)  The district requested and was 
granted a delay in the repayment contract.  The 1926 Omnibus bill provided an 
adjustment to water charges due to drainage defi ciencies.
 From 1917 to 1930 a drainage construction program was carried out 
to correct the problems.  Some 230 miles of drains, mostly open ditch, were 
constructed.  Over the years, the Soil Conservation Service constructed buried 
pipe drains on many of the fi elds.  Even that effort was not fully successful in 
relieving the drainage problems.  Improved irrigation practices have helped.  In 
1984 the District entered into a Rehabilitation and Betterment (R&B) contract 
with Reclamation.  Work done under the R&B put most smaller irrigation 
laterals in pipe and lined many of the larger ditches, thus eliminating many 
sources of seepage.  In the1990s a land reclassifi cation placed some of the more 
unproductive lands into class 6 (nonirrigable).  All of these actions have improved 
the overall situation, but parts of the district suffer from unresolved drainage 
problems to this day.
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Huntley Project
  Huntley Project was authorized in 1905 and many of the facilities were 
completed by 1908.  As was the case on the Belle Fourche Project, within a 
few years serious waterlogging problems developed—but with a much happier 
outcome.  In 1911 there were 
160 acres of waterlogged land 
and “another 40 farms where 
seepage has shown up.”  (USBR 
1911)  Even as drains were being 
constructed and successfully 
relieved seepage problems, the 
problems continued to grow.  In 
1914 there were 1,426 acres 
“waterlogged” and 8,000 acres 
“threatened” (USBR 1914), but 
by 1920 construction had caught 
up with demand and the problem 
was well under control.
 From 1911 to 1920 some 65 miles of drains were constructed, most of 
which were clay tile.  Eventually, the total drainage on the project reached 186 
miles.  (USBR 1981)  The manholes or “trap boxes” as they were called, were 3 
feet square, made of creosote-treated wood, with 6-inch by 6-inch vertical timber 
corners and sides consisting of 2-inch planks.  Some of these manholes have been 
replaced by corrugated metal pipe, but many of them are still in use.  As to the 
effectiveness of the drains, they were nearly 100 percent successful and continue 
to function with minimal maintenance.
Newlands Project
 The USBR Dataweb provides the early project history:
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) began 
investigations into possible irrigation projects in the Truckee and Carson 
River Basins in the late 1880s.  In 1902, the newly organized United 
States Reclamation Service took over investigations.  On March 14, 
1903, the Secretary of the Interior authorized the Truckee-Carson Project, 
making it one of the fi rst projects authorized for construction by the 
Reclamation Service.
 Work on the Truckee-Carson Project began in mid-1903.  The 
original plan proposed reclamation of over 300,000 acres of land in 
western Nevada. (Eventually the service area included about 73,000 
acres.  (USBR 1981))… The fi rst water deliveries to project settlers 
began in February 1906. …
4.2.  An Austin trencher digging a drain on the 
North Platte Project in 1917.
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 As early as 1908 it had been recognized that there were serious 
problems throughout the project.  In spite [of] the Reclamation Service’s 
belief that soils would support a wide variety of crops, that suffi cient 
water would be available to farms, and that markets existed for produce, 
many entrymen soon discovered that a forty-acre farm was too small to 
produce an adequate income, that irrigation water did not drain properly, 
and that little water was available during the later part of the irrigation 
season.  By 1912, large areas on the project were saturated and unusable, 
and farm prices were much lower than expected.  Drainage ditches 
excavated in 1906 did not suffi ciently drain irrigated fi elds, and the water 
table was very near the surface, saturating the root zone.
 Lack of adequate drainage was a signifi cant impediment to 
successful farming in the region.  Area water users formed an informal 
organization and began to demand that the Reclamation Service 
provide a solution to the drainage problem.  Confl icts over who was 
responsible delayed resolution of the situation.  The water users claimed 
that the Reclamation Service had promised adequate drainage, while 
the Reclamation Service contended that the problem was due to over-
irrigation and that the farmers should assume the cost of constructing 
a drainage system.  Offers by the Reclamation Service to correct 
the drainage problems with the costs paid by the water users were 
overwhelmingly rejected.
 In 1916, after several years of resisting the formation of a 
formal water users organization, the Reclamation Service proposed to 
begin work on a drainage system as soon as an irrigation district could 
be formed that could contract for payment of the costs of the drainage 
system.  In March 1917, the Nevada Legislature passed a bill approving 
formation of the irrigation district, and on November 16, the Truckee-
Carson Irrigation District (TCID) was created by a vote of nine-to-one in 
favor of organization.
 A contract for construction of a drainage system was not 
approved until 1921, and a second contract had to be approved in 1924.
By 1928, when work under the contracts was complete, more than 230 
miles of drains had been excavated. …
 Following World War I, conditions on many Reclamation 
projects had become so bad with many farmers unable to fulfi ll their 
payment obligations that the Secretary of the Interior appointed 
a fact fi nding commission to investigate the situation and make 
recommendations. The commission determined that by 1926, $7,899,479 
had been spent on the Newlands Project.  Of that amount, the 
commission determined that $4,437,820 had been spent without proper 
cause and that the water users should not be responsible for repayment 
of that amount.  The Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 relieved the water 
users of that amount and gave them forty years to repay the remaining 
$3,281,999. (USBR Dataweb)
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 Although the drainage system was considered complete upon completion 
of the contracts in 1928, drainage work continued at a slower pace.  In a trip 
report dated October 28, 1964, Ray J. Winger, Jr., reported “. . . a total of about 
335 miles of open drains.”  Winger also noted that they observed several small 
areas of 100 acres or so that needed additional drainage for good production.  He 
was told that the farmers do not want drainage because they believed they were 
benefi ting from subirrigation.  He noted that, “Under these circumstances, the 
lands are becoming salinized.  Without drainage they will eventually become 
suffi ciently saline to limit or preclude crop production.”  (Winger 1964)  His 
conclusion was apparently acted on because a 1985 land classifi cation report 
by Reclamation says, “A maze of nearly 400 miles [additional 65 miles] of 
open drains and 4 miles of closed drains presently serve the Newlands Project.”
(USBR 1985)
 A unique feature of the Newlands Project is the concept of so-called 
“bench and bottom lands” based primarily on subsurface drainage characteristics 
which were not clearly defi ned until some 60 years after the concept was initiated. 
In 1925, following a series of legal actions and hearings that began in 1913, a 
temporary restraining order was issued.  Under the restraining order farmers on 
the project were to receive, after transportation losses, 3.5 acre feet of water per 
acre for bottom lands and 4.5 acre feet of water per acre for bench lands.  The 
restraining order neither defi ned nor identifi ed project bench and bottom lands.  In 
1944 a fi nal decree simply restated the restraining order.  Legal actions continued 
through the years and a 1986 Court Order directed the Secretary of the Interior to 
prepare and submit a “revised initial designation of Bench and Bottom lands in 
the Newlands Project.”  The new map was to be based on two criteria, including 
waterholding capacity of the soils and the “seasonal high water table.”  In 1990, 
Reclamation drainage personnel produced a “fi nal draft” report which included 
detailed maps and legal descriptions of the designations.
Challenges Met
 Examples of early Reclamation drainage history are too numerous 
and varied to include them all in this paper.  A few of the more outstanding 
experiences are presented here.
Riverton
 The  Riverton Project consists of three divisions.  Construction began 
on the fi rst and second divisions in 1921, and fi rst water was delivered in 1925.  
 Drainage problems developed on some of the lands almost immediately.  In the 
1930s and 1940s, a few open drains were constructed along farm boundaries but 
were largely ineffective in controlling the seepage because the spacing was too 
wide.  In the 1950s additional open drains were constructed midway between 
the original drains, but still the spacing was too wide because the open drains 
were constructed to keep crop producing areas at an optimum.  All of this was 
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done prior to the development of the transient state drain spacing procedures.
Meanwhile, construction began on Third Division in 1947, and public notice 
number 26 opened 55 farm units for homestead.  An additional 50 farm units 
were opened in 1950, and 54 units were opened in 1951.  Since certifi cation 
of irrigability was not yet law, no drainage studies were conducted prior to 
settlement.
 As newcomers, mostly returning veterans from World War II, colonized 
the First and Second Divisions in greater numbers, Reclamation heard some bad 
news about the Third Division.  The Third Division, a foundation of promise for 
post-war homesteaders, had a false bottom.  A 1951 soil survey reclassifi ed large 
areas of shallow soil in the Third Division as Class 6-nonirrigable.  This acreage 
drained poorly and was susceptible to waterlogging and salinity severe enough 
to prevent cultivation.  Congress passed Public Law 258 in 1953 permitting 
homesteaders on inadequate farms to amend their existing properties with vacant 
lands on the same project.  Public Law 258 also allowed farmers to exchange their 
units for land on other Reclamation projects.  Every landowner on a Reclamation 
project in the West could fi le a claim under Public Law 258, but the law 
specifi cally helped farmers working unproductive acreage on the  Riverton Project. 
(USBR Dataweb)  Within a few years, all or parts of every farm unit in Third 
Division were suffering from waterlogging and salinity problems.  The problem 
was attributed to poor irrigation practices as well as natural drainage defi ciencies 
of the land.  Many of the farms were located downslope from other farm units, so 
they had to deal with return fl ows from neighbors as well as their own irrigation 
applications.
 Another problem faced by Riverton farmers and by  drainage engineers 
trying to correct problems was sodium in the soils.  Some of the lands contained 
high levels of sodium, which can cause the soil structure to break down leaving 
the land impossible to drain adequately.  Although the problem may develop on 
any project in semiarid climates, the Riverton Project seemed to be particularly 
susceptible.
 Enactment of Public Law 258 resulted in many farmers leaving Wyoming.  
Those who relocated under the provisions of Public Law 258 settled on the 
Columbia Basin Project in Washington, the Minidoka Project in Idaho, and the 
Gila Project in Arizona.  Those staying in Riverton added vacated land to their 
existing acreage.  Public Law 258 stabilized the Riverton Project as remaining 
homesteaders increased the size of their units and subsequently improved 
themselves fi nancially.  Those determined to farm the Third Division formed an 
irrigation district in August 1957.  By the dawn of the 1960s, a Bureau “Project 
History” lamented their decision: “The ratio of operating expenses to prices 
received for crops and livestock continued unfavorable.”  (USBR Dataweb) 
 By the early 1960s, the situation on the Third Division required the 
Government to make a hard decision.  Reclamation proposed to buy out the 
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homesteaders and write off most of the $20.5 million on the Federal books.  
A congressional delegation came to Riverton in October 1961 to hear local 
grievances.  The testimonials the delegation heard “were adverse and favored 
abolishing the project.”  Reclamation responded by threatening to shut off water 
to the Third Division if growers refused to sign a repayment contract.  One 
farmer, Marvin H. West, stated to a Denver newspaper in 1962, “10 to 12 years 
should prove the feasibility of these places.  We have not made a living or showed 
any repayment ability in that time.”  (USBR Dataweb)
 The growers’ anger was enough to persuade the government in 1964 to 
pass Public Law 88-278 authorizing Federal purchase of Third Division lands.  
The Bureau bought back 78 units totaling about 22,000 acres.  Farmers from 
the Midvale Irrigation District leased certain sections of the land over the next 6 
years.  In September 1970 Public Law 91-409 consolidated the three divisions of 
the  Riverton Project.  Besides employing power sales to pay rehabilitation costs 
on project works, the bill restored 8,900 irrigable acres of the Third Division to 
private ownership, with provision that no further Federal funds would be provided 
for drainage works.  In January 1971 the Third Division Irrigation District ceased 
operations.  The following month, the Government auctioned 43 units to farmers 
of the Midvale Irrigation District.  By spring, the farmers petitioned the 43 
units into Midvale.  In December the Government executed a new amendatory 
repayment contract with Midvale.  (USBR Dataweb) 
 In 1976, the Midvale Irrigation District entered into a Rehabilitation and 
Betterment (R&B) contract with Reclamation to upgrade certain facilities and to 
provide adequate subsurface drainage for the First and Second Division lands.
Over the next 10 years, some 200 miles of subsurface drains were constructed.
Many of the original open drain ditches, which had eroded to several times their 
design width, were replaced with more effective subsurface drains and backfi lled, 
reducing maintenance costs and increasing the tillable acreage.  In an odd twist, a 
provision of the law authorizing the R&B contract precluded expenditures of any 
of the funds for drainage works on Third Division lands.
 A reclassifi cation of 
the Midvale Irrigation District 
in 1999 confi rmed that for the 
most part, the entire project was 
experiencing good productivity.  
Although small scattered parcels 
of land were placed in a non-
irrigable class due to the sodium 
content of the soil being too high 
to permit economical drainage, 
waterlogging and salinization are 
under control within the project 
lands.
4.3.  A CCC enrollee painting a pipe siphon 
across an open drain on the Gem Irrigation 
District, Owyhee Project, during February 1939.
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Kansas River Projects
 A series of irrigation projects in the Republican River Valley from Trenton 
in southwest Nebraska to south of Courtland, Kansas, were completed around 
1960.  By 1965 waterlogging was becoming prevalent in many areas along this 
200 mile reach of the river.  Drain construction began in 1966 and more than 200 
miles of drains had been constructed in the Republican River Valley by 1975.
 The  Bostwick Division, Kansas, is a 40,000 acre project located mostly 
on uplands around the town of Courtland.  On July 3, 1967, a fi eld review of 
 drainage needs was conducted by representatives of the Chief Engineer=s Offi ce, 
the Region 7 Offi ce, and the  Kansas River Projects Offi ce.  During that review, 
Mr. Lee Dumm of the Chief Engineer=s Offi ce noted that the water table was in a 
delicate state of dynamic equilibrium and that sooner or later a spell of unusually 
wet weather would probably upset the balance, creating serious problems.  His 
prediction came true sooner rather than later.  The fall of 1968 brought heavy 
precipitation that continued through the winter and into the summer of 1969.  By 
August 1969 fully 90 percent of the 27,500 acres under irrigation were seriously 
affected by high water tables, and about 2,000 acres were not farmed.  In 1970, a 
12-person offi ce consisting of an investigations crew, a survey crew, an engineer, 
and a construction inspection crew, was opened in Superior, Nebraska, with the 
specifi c purpose of constructing drains on the Kansas-Bostwick Unit and the 
lower half of the Nebraska-Bostwick Unit.  By 1981 when the Superior Field 
Engineering Offi ce closed, more than 250 miles of pipe drains and 50 miles of 
open ditch drains had been constructed on the Kansas-Bostwick Unit.
 In order for this small group to accomplish this effort in a span of 10 
years required some innovative measures.  Ground water depth probes were 
made from ¼-inch iron pipe lined with ?-inch plastic tubing.  Water level was 
read by hooking an ohmmeter to the pipe and inserting a wire connected to the 
other terminal into the plastic tubing.  When the wire reached the water surface, it 
completed the circuit.  The probes were easily inserted to a depth of about 5 feet 
wherever the water table was less than 2 or 3 feet below land surface, which was 
almost everywhere.  The probes allowed a 2-man crew to create ground water 
surface maps in about one-third the time needed to do it with augers.
 Soil profi les were logged using a variation of split tube sampler that was 
developed by the Superior Offi ce.  It was driven directly into the ground without 
benefi t of the hollow stem augers that are usually used.  While the tube increased 
production of the soil logging operation by four to fi ve times, it was specifi c to the 
Kansas upland soils and was never successful in other areas of the country or even 
other areas of the Kansas River Projects. 
 Another fi rst for the Superior Field Engineering Branch Offi ce was the 
hiring of Reclamation’s fi rst women as fi eld technicians, whose duties included 
operating small drill rigs.  In 1973,  Naomi Fritson, a Nebraska farm girl, and 
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 Mary Torpin, daughter of a Hollywood fi lm director, were Engineering Tech 
students at Curtis Community College in Curtis, Nebraska.  They were hired as 
summer employees.  Their 4-month employment with Reclamation constituted 
one semester of their required curriculum.  At the time, it was a signifi cant enough 
event to rate a spot on the evening news of the Nebraska Television Network.
Columbia Basin Project
 The  Columbia Basin Project in eastern Washington is the most extensive 
 drainage construction that Reclamation has undertaken in our fi rst century 
of existence.  About 540,000 acres has been developed of what was initially 
envisioned as a 1-million acre project.  The fi rst water was delivered in 1948, and 
water tables began to rise almost immediately.  By the early 1950s the need for 
artifi cial drainage was becoming evident.  Water table levels rose steadily until 
they reached a point where drainage was needed on large areas of land to maintain 
productivity.  By 1968 the water table had risen an average of 150 feet over the 
entire project. (Monteith and Myers)
 The extensive need for drainage had not been recognized in the original 
project formulation, and it was not until 1960 that a large-scale construction 
program was initiated. (Christopher and Campbell)  The Columbia Basin 
Drainage staff was established in 1954 and, during the peak drain construction 
period of 1971 to 1976, the staff numbered around 60 full-time drainage 
personnel.  Innovative approaches to fi eld investigations were initiated in an 
attempt to increase productivity without increasing staff.  In the geologic setting 
of the Columbia Basin, 20 feet was the depth of most drainage borings.  The 
need to increase productivity and lower engineering costs led to the modifi cation 
of the drill rigs used in fi eld investigations.  The small rigs were fi tted with a 
mast and a 20 foot long continuous auger so that 20 foot holes could be drilled 
without stopping to insert and remove the standard 5-foot auger sections.  Seismic 
equipment was used to locate caliche layers so that borings could be farther apart.
 The fi rst drains to be constructed were open ditches to be used as outlets 
for the pipe drains.  In 1961 construction of pipe drains began with a 3-mile 
segment.  This would increase fairly steadily until the peak in 1974 when 195 
miles of drains were constructed.  By 1979 more than 2,200 miles of drain had 
been constructed and, by 1995, the total was 2,845 miles.  (Hubbs)
 Drainage of the lands was complicated by the existence of caliche layers 
underlying most of the project lands.  Caliche is a form of solidifi ed calcium 
deposit which occurs at depths shallower than the design depth of the drains.
Construction equipment was often unable to excavate the caliche until it was 
blasted with dynamite.  The large wheel trenching machines were designed for 
this type of construction and were quite successful in reducing or eliminating the 
need to blast.
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 Drain depths on the Columbia Basin Project are typically 8 to 9 feet, 
which is 1 to 2 feet deeper than on most Reclamation projects.  This decision was 
based largely on the capability of the local contractors’ equipment, although the 
depth of the outlet drain and the depth to a favorable drain zone in the soil profi le 
may control the depth locally.  (Brohl)
Central Valley Project
The  Central Valley Project was authorized by Congress in 1937.  First water 
was delivered from the  Contra Costa Canal on August 16, 1940.  Water deliveries 
began on the Delta-Mendota service area in 1950 and the fi rst tile drains were 
constructed on the Grasslands area in the early 1950s.  The drains discharged into 
wetlands.  (Most of the following was paraphrased from written communications 
provided by Michael Delamore, South-Central California Area Offi ce, USBR, and 
Joel Zander of the Mid-Pacifi c Regional Offi ce, USBR)
 In 1956 the California State Department of Water Resources recommended 
the state study a “comprehensive master drainage works system” indicating 
that  drainage problems were beginning to develop on a signifi cant scale.  Also, 
Reclamation submitted a feasibility report on the San Luis Unit to Congress.  The 
report included a 300 cubic feet per second earth-lined interceptor drain as part of 
the “distribution system and drains.”  On-farm drainage on the San Luis Unit was 
the responsibility of the landowner, but Reclamation was to provide an outlet drain 
that could be accessed by irrigators through irrigation district facilities.  Construction 
of the  San Luis Drain began in 1968, and Reclamation acquired 5,900 acres of land 
for  Kesterson Reregulating Reservoir.  The reservoir was to be operated according 
to a cooperative agreement with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for the conservation 
and management of wildlife, subject to the primary use of the lands for regulation of 
drain fl ows.  Water was to be held in the reservoir until fi nal discharge permits were 
acquired for the drainage water.
 On July 1, 1969, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) began managing the 
lands acquired for Kesterson Reservoir under terms of the agreement.  Construction 
of the reservoir began a year later.  In 1972 construction of the fi rst phase of the 
reservoir and the adjacent drain were completed.  However, by February 1975, 
funds had run out, and construction was stopped with about 40 percent (85 miles) 
of the drain and the fi rst stage of Kesterson Reservoir complete.  Four months later, 
the fi rst contract for collector drains on Westlands Water District was awarded and 
construction began on a collector system, encompassing about 42,000 acres of 
irrigated lands.
 In 1977 Public Law 95-46, the 1978 appropriation, increased the ceiling 
for distribution and drainage systems on the San Luis Unit.  Construction was 
not reinitiated at least in part because discharge criteria had not been established.  
Attempts to address this critical issue were unsuccessful as the  State Water 
Resources Control Board (SWRCB) had the authority to set discharge requirements 
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but was “not in a position to do so at this time.”  A March 20, 1978, letter from 
Reclamation=s Regional Director to SWRCB explained Reclamation=s position and 
hinted at the urgency of having discharge criteria established.
 In 1978 use of Kesterson Reservoir as interim evaporation ponds for 
subsurface agricultural  drainage fl ows from Westlands Water District began.  The 
proportion of subsurface drainage fl ows to surface fl ows increased yearly until 
infl ows to Kesterson were principally subsurface drainage water in 1981.
 In May 1979 FWS began expressing reservations about the quality of the 
drainage water from San Luis Drain and the possible effects of toxic constituents 
on receiving waters.  A year later, they would notify Reclamation that such effects 
would need to be evaluated in a Fish and Wildlife Coordination Report and there 
were concerns over completion of the San Luis Drain.
 In 1981 Reclamation began studies to identify any potential toxic 
constituents in the drain water.  The studies found high concentrations of selenium 
in San Luis Drain and Kesterson Reservoir.  Reclamation imposed a moratorium on 
additional farm drainage connections to San Luis Drain because Kesterson Reservoir 
was reaching capacity and the outlet had not yet been constructed.  Existing farm 
drains continued discharging through local wetlands to the San Joaquin River.  
Meanwhile, Reclamation was developing detailed plans for completion of San Luis 
Drain and, at the same time, reevaluating possible alternatives such as in-valley 
evaporation, desalinization, discharge to San Francisco Bay rather than Suisun Bay, 
and no action.  Through the early 1980s, Reclamation and several cooperating state 
and federal agencies and universities spent about $4 million gathering information 
needed to obtain the discharge permit.
 In 1982 FWS found high  selenium concentrations in fi sh at Kesterson 
Reservoir and discovered higher-than-normal waterfowl mortalities and deformities 
a year later.  Reclamation took action to minimize waterfowl attraction at Kesterson 
Reservoir by reducing the number of ponds and providing additional water to 
neighboring wetland areas.  In September 1984 a hazing program was started to keep 
the birds off Kesterson Reservoir.  A number of techniques were tried, including 
periodic shotgun blasts and chasing birds with ATVs.  At the same time, 15,000 acre 
feet of clean water was provided to alternate habitat sites.
 In February 1983, because of high rainfall, Reclamation fi led an application 
with the  Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board (CVRWQCB) 
for a discharge permit from Kesterson to the San Joaquin River.  CVRWQCB 
responded by acknowledging the need to discharge excess water from San Luis 
Drain and Kesterson Reservoir and requiring Reclamation to immediately begin 
a sampling program and submit reports.  On January 13, 1984, Reclamation 
notifi ed CVRWQCB that high rainfall amounts combined with drainage water were 
threatening the dikes and warning that failure would mean uncontrolled fl ooding.  
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On February 2, the application was approved for limited discharge to prevent failure 
of the dikes, but large discharges were not allowed.
 On April 8, 1983, Reclamation requested SWRCB approve a schedule for 
preparation of a technical report to accompany the application for the discharge 
permit to Suisun Bay and for the board to act on the application by November 
1984.  The Board responded on May 4 saying the schedule could not be met but that 
December 1984 was workable only if the report met acceptance by the scientifi c 
community, the SWQCB, and National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permit conditions.
 In March 1985 the Department of the Interior announced plans to close 
Kesterson Reservoir and San Luis Drain and to terminate deliveries to 42,000 acres 
in Westlands Water District because of concern of violation of the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act.  A month later the Department reached an agreement with Westlands to 
continue delivering water to all of the lands in the district, but the drain remained 
closed.  This was followed quickly by landowners fi ling lawsuits against the United 
States for taking of their property by seepage of drainage water from Kesterson 
Reservoir.  In November Westlands Water District fi led a draft EIR on plans for 
on-farm management, water recycling and plugging of the farm drains if necessary.  
By May 1986 Westlands completed plugging of the drains to prevent drainage water 
from entering San Luis Drain.
 On December 30, 1986, the United States and Westlands Water District 
reached a compromise settlement known as the “ Barcellos Judgment” fi led in United 
States District Court as a court judgment.  The judgment, among other things, 
required the Federal Government to develop a plan for drainage service facilities by 
December 31, 1991.  The Judgment stipulates that the drainage facilities shall have 
suffi cient capacity and capability to transport, treat as necessary, and 
dispose of the annual quantity of subsurface agricultural drainage water 
from the District (not less than 60,000 acre feet and not more than 100,000 
acre feet) required to be disposed of by December 31, 2007 …
To help fi nance construction of the drainage service facilities, the District was 
required to make annual contributions to a trust fund established under the judgment. 
These funds were released to the District in June 1992 when the court ruled that the 
Government had failed to meet the terms of the Barcellos Judgment.
 In January 1988, after considerable controversy, Reclamation began 
dewatering Kesterson Reservoir in preparation for cleanup.  The dewatering was 
completed on April 12 and by November low-lying areas of Kesterson Reservoir had 
been fi lled with dirt.  However, this did not end the life of the San Luis Drain. 
 In 1996 the San Luis Drain was reactivated as part of the Grassland Bypass 
Project.  Drainage water from 97,000 acres of agricultural land in the Grasslands 
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Basin that historically drained to the San Joaquin River is transported through the 
lower 28 mile segment of the drain.  The drain water contains lower concentrations 
of selenium than did the original drain water that fl owed to Kesterson reservoir.  
The drain carries the water around the Grassland Conservation District to the 
terminal structure of San Luis Drain and returns to the San Joaquin River through 
Mud Slough.  The selenium load is monitored for compliance with agreed-upon 
monthly and annual load limits.  Fees of $25,000 to $250,000 are levied against the 
participating irrigation districts when the limits are not met.  (Quinn, et al.)
 One of the many entities involved in the drainage problems surrounding the 
fertile Central Valley lands was the  San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program (SJVDP).  
Public Law 96-375 passed in 1980 authorized the San Joaquin Valley Drainage 
Investigation feasibility study.  In August 1984 Governor Deukmejian and Secretary 
of the Interior William Clark established the SJVDP as a cooperative effort of 
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Geological 
Survey, California Department of Fish and Game, and California Department of 
Water Resources.  The purpose of SJVDP was to conduct comprehensive studies 
to identify the magnitude and sources of the drainage problem, the toxic effect of 
selenium on wildlife, and what actions needed to be taken to resolve these issues.
By the end of 1990 funds totaling $50 million had been appropriated to support the 
Program.
 In April 1987 SJVDP issued a draft report which discussed ocean disposal 
possibilities.  Public reaction was so strongly adverse that the SJVDP Management 
Committee narrowed the focus of the program to exclude any disposal of 
agricultural drainage water or brine outside the San Joaquin Valley.  In September 
1990 SJVDP issued its fi nal report titled “A Management Plan for Agricultural 
Subsurface Drainage and Related Problems on the West Side San Joaquin Valley.”  
In December 1991 four federal agencies, including Reclamation, and four state 
agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Implementation of the San 
Joaquin Valley Drainage Program=s Recommended Plan.  The major components of 
the plan are to (1) reduce the amount of irrigation water applied to the fi eld, (2) reuse 
drainage water, (3) store drainage water in evaporation ponds, (4) cease irrigating 
lands that have high selenium levels in the subsurface, (5) pump ground water to 
lower the water table, (6) discharge to the San Joaquin River, and (7) protection, 
restoration, and provision of substitute water supplies for fi sh and wildlife habitat.
 The controversy over the trace element selenium and how to handle drainage 
waters containing elevated concentrations has sparked numerous research efforts 
and other spin-off activities.  In September 1986 the Westlands Water District Board 
approved a $6.6 million drainage treatment plant and a prototype deep well injection 
unit.  After 18 months, the research project was indefi nitely postponed because it 
did not appear to be economically feasible on a large scale.  However, in October 
1989 the District entered into an agreement with state and federal agencies and 
universities to begin work on a treatment research center to be located in the district.  
At about the same time, Panoche Drainage District began construction of a prototype 
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facility to remove selenium from water using an iron absorption process.  In June 
1989 Westlands began drilling on an 8,100-foot-deep prototype injection well to be 
used for disposal of drainage water. 
 Several treatment methods were employed in an effort to reduce selenium 
in the soil, including fi eld testing of a biological cleanup plan using selenium eating 
fungi.
 The problems associated with high concentrations of selenium in the 
drainage water at Kesterson Reservoir were the primary reason why the Department 
of the Interior launched the  Irrigation Drainage Program in 1985 with an inventory 
of more than 600 irrigation projects in the western United States to discover the 
extent of toxic trace elements in drainage water from the projects.  (Department of 
the Interior, NIWQP website)
 In 1992 Reclamation announced that it would award Challenge Grants for 
demonstration projects of innovative approaches to advance water conservation 
and address agricultural drainage problems in the Mid-Pacifi c Region.  Challenge 
Grants addressing drainage problems would be accepted only for the SJVDP 
study area.  Six Challenge Grants investigating various methods of treatment or 
management of selenium rich drainage water were executed in 1994.
Central Utah Project
 In the middle to late 1960s the  Central Utah Project (CUP) was one center 
of activity for Reclamation=s  drainage forces.  Detailed drainage investigations 
covering nearly 250,000 acres were completed in anticipation of development of 
the project, which would provide a full water supply to about 33,000 acres and 
supplemental water to the remainder.  The bulk of these lands lay in the Uintah 
Basin, which is tributary to the Green River, in Emery County in east central 
Utah, and in the Sevier Basin, a closed dry lake bed in southwestern Utah.  The 
CUP was one of the primary proving grounds for the auger hole permeability test, 
which has become a standard test for permeability of saturated soils.  Several 
thousand auger hole tests were conducted, some as deep as 25 feet, and a number 
of minor modifi cations to the test procedure were initiated.  Observation well 
networks were installed on about a 1-mile grid and monitored weekly.  The 
wells generally consisted of a galvanized downspout with holes punched by a 
geologist=s pick and an endcap for a lid.
 For the most part, drainage fi eld crews across Reclamation at the time 
were mobile.  The CUP crews would make a brief visit to the Provo Offi ce 
each Monday morning to get their assignment for the week, turn in time sheets 
and conduct any necessary personnel business.  They would make the 2- to 
4-hour drive back to Provo on Friday evening, on their own time.  A CUP 
fi eld crew generally consisted of 10 to 20 people, including a lead engineer, 
several subordinate engineers and technicians, and a group of 90-day temporary 
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laborers.  The lead engineer’s offi ce was a pickup truck containing all the tools 
and equipment needed for the investigations and briefcases containing reference 
materials, test forms, and personnel fi les for the engineer and his crew.
 The summer and fall of 1965 found enough Reclamation drainage 
personnel in the small town of Delta, Utah, to fi ll all 7 rooms in the only motel 
and a good part of the only apartment building for a period of about 6 months.
In October a football game was played between the Feds and the town in which 
the Feds scored a narrow victory.  On the last day in Delta—before Christmas 
break—the local restaurant closed to the public and the owner prepared a special 
Japanese meal for the Reclamation employees in appreciation of their patronage.
By 1990 about 50 miles of subsurface drains had been constructed in the Uintah 
Basin and in Emery County.  As of this writing, the Sevier Unit has not been 
developed.
Oahe Unit
 The Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Plan envisioned two irrigation 
developments in the Dakotas to compensate the states for the loss of prime 
agricultural land to the Main Stem Reservoirs, which now form a nearly 
continuous lake from Yankton, South Dakota, to Williston, North Dakota.  The 5 
dams, built for fl ood control and power generation, fl ooded thousands of acres of 
rich river bottom lands in the Dakotas.  Originally the Garrison Diversion Project 
and the Oahe Project were each to be more than a half million acres.  Construction 
was begun on both projects in the mid-1970s, but, to date, neither of them has 
been completed. 
 Although the  Oahe Unit was never completed, it was an important 
milepost in the history of  drainage in the Bureau of Reclamation.  Investigations 
began on the Oahe Unit in 1950 with the exploration of glacial till soils in eastern 
South Dakota.  Water for the project would be pumped from Oahe Reservoir on 
the Missouri River.
 Extensive investigations were carried out in an effort to determine the 
ability of glacial till soils to support sustained irrigation.  The techniques for 
some of the in-place permeability tests that are standard Reclamation procedure 
were developed and proven on the Oahe Unit.  At the same time Reclamation 
was developing the transient state drain spacing procedures, and data from the 
Oahe Unit was being used to help establish the relationships that are used in the 
calculations.
 An exhaustive study of prairie potholes was conducted to understand the 
connection between the surface water in the potholes and the ground water under 
and around them.  At one point, in an attempt to understand the movement of 
water in till soils, men were placed in a cage and lowered into large-diameter drill 
holes in order to log the sidewalls of the hole.
181
 The studies of glacial till soils were in concert with similar studies on the 
Garrison Diversion Unit in North Dakota and in Alberta, Canada.  Each study 
that was done concluded that the permeability of glacial till soils was inadequate 
to provide economical subsurface drainage for irrigation.  In 1957, based on all 
available knowledge, the decision was made to bypass the till soils and develop 
the Oahe Unit on the lake plain soils in the James River Valley some 100 miles 
east of the Missouri River.
 A detailed drainage investigation was carried out on the lake plain soils 
in an effort to forecast drainage needs for the authorized 190,000 acre project.  
Soil sampling tubes adapted specifi cally to the Oahe soils investigations and 
other specialized tools were handmade by Oahe drainage engineers because no 
commercial supplier existed.  (Burnett and TeKrony)
 Because soils at drain depth in the Dakota Lake Plain are very unstable 
when saturated and construction would be very costly, the plan was to construct 
drainage facilities along with the water distribution facilities “in the dry.”  
(Burnett and TeKrony)  This procedure would also avoid the lag time between the 
need for drainage and the construction of facilities.  Historically, the lag time on 
most projects was long enough to cause economic hardship for the farmers and 
the irrigation districts.
 Construction of the drainage system before the delivery of water would 
have been a fi rst for Reclamation.  Since drainage construction was to take 
place prior to the development of high water tables from irrigation, the drainage 
investigations during the planning stage of the project were completed to 
design data standards, a much greater level of detail than normal for projects 
in the planning stage.  As it turned out, project opponents gained control of the 
Conservancy District Board in 1977 and requested that Congress deauthorize 
the project.  The takeover of the Board was bolstered by the fact that thousands 
of acres of glacial till lands were being impacted by the 100-mile-long canal, 
but were not allowed to share in the benefi ts because of their inherent drainage 
defi ciency.  Deauthorization never was formalized, but the action nevertheless 
sounded the death knell for the Oahe Unit.  Even though the pumping plant and 
parts of the Oahe canal were constructed, no further construction funding was 
provided.
Eastern South Dakota Basins Study
 The  Eastern South Dakota Basins Study (ESDB) was the most far-
reaching  drainage study ever conducted by Reclamation.  This study was unique 
in that drainability was the fi rst controlling element in the assessment of potential 
for irrigation development.  The entire area east of the Missouri River in South 
Dakota was covered by a subreconnaissance-level investigation aimed at locating 
lands that would sustain irrigation.  Soils were logged on a 3-mile grid covering 
the entire area and about 6,000 in-place permeability tests were conducted.  Based 
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on these data and visual observations, the land was divided into four categories 
according to estimated drainage costs if the land were irrigated.  Category I was 
the least expensive and category IV included lakes, rock outcrops and other areas 
considered to be nondrainable.  The soils logs, permeability results, and category 
delineations were recorded on aerial photos at a 1,000-foot-per-inch scale, and a 
narrative report explained the process.  The results were published in 1972.  The 
original report and the photos are on fi le in the Great Plains Regional Offi ce in 
Billings, Montana.
Oakes 5,000 Acre Test Area
 One of the obstacles faced by North Dakota=s Garrison Diversion Project 
was that the project overlapped the continental divide into Hudson Bay  drainage 
rivers.  The Canadian Government raised concerns over the possibility of biota 
transfer from Missouri River waters to the Hudson Bay drainage, where it was 
feared that the fi shing industry might be adversely affected.  Among the solutions 
that were proposed was a closed system concept in which no surface return 
fl ows from irrigation would be allowed.  In order to test this concept, the Oakes 
5,000 Acre Test Area was constructed on the James River south of the city of 
Oakes, North Dakota.  Missouri River water was to be carried through canals to 
the James River where it would be pumped to irrigate the test area.  In the early 
1980s, the Oakes Offi ce drainage staff installed monitoring wells on a ¼-mile 
grid so that the water table could be closely monitored.  In 1985 42 miles of pipe 
drains were constructed to provide adequate subsurface drainage and a terminal 
seepage pit was constructed to handle all surface return fl ows.  This was followed 
by construction of the pumping plant and distribution facilities.  No water would 
be allowed to leave the project until it had passed through the aquifer.
 As of this writing, the canal system has not been completed and there 
has never been a full water supply for the test area.  However, the drains have 
provided the opportunity to study various irrigation management schemes and 
iron ocher problems.  The drains have also been effectively used to distribute 
artifi cial recharge waters through the aquifer.  Spring fl ood fl ows on the James 
River are pumped to the main canal where it is discharged to closed depressions 
around the project.  The pipe drains help to convey water from the depressions to 
other parts of the aquifer.  During the irrigation season, the water is pumped by 
individual farmers for irrigation.
Wellton-Mohawk
 Early history of agricultural development in the Wellton-Mohawk area, in 
southwestern Arizona, dates back to 1538 when the Pima Indians irrigated some 
of the bottom land adjacent to the Gila River.  In the late 1800s settlers developed 
irrigation in the area by diverting water from the Gila River, but alternating fl oods 
and drought encouraged them to turn to pumping the abundant supply of ground 
water.  This worked well for a time, but, by 1934, Wellton-Mohawk farms were 
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facing another hazard.  Excessive salt appeared in many wells and the water table 
had declined alarmingly.  One after another, farms were abandoned as water and 
soil became too saline for successful farming.
 In 1937 the Wellton-Mohawk Division was authorized as a Reclamation 
project.  Construction of the irrigation features was started in August 1949.  On 
May 1, 1952, water from the Colorado River was turned onto the Wellton-
Mohawk fi elds for the fi rst time.  However, importation of water from the 
Colorado River caused the water table to rise and threatened crops.  (USBR 
Dataweb)
 Conventional drainage was contemplated, but investigations revealed 
that conventional drains would not be effective due to artesian pressures in 
the aquifer.  (Tapp)  The solution was to lower the water table by pumping the 
aquifer.  Drainage wells were constructed to remove the excess ground water, and 
the drainage water was discharged into the Gila River.  The drainage water was 
highly saline, initially averaging about 6,000 parts per million.  Late in 1961, the 
Wellton-Mohawk Main Conveyance Channel was constructed for the entire length 
of the Wellton-Mohawk Division 
to carry drainage water from 
about 67 wells.  Additional wells 
were installed in 1963 to allow 
for selective pumping to reduce 
the salinity of the effl uent during 
the winter months and to provide 
drainage to other areas with high 
ground water.  (USBR Dataweb)
 The Wellton-Mohawk 
Division is unique in Reclamation 
as it is the only major  drainage 
project that relies on pumping 
wells rather than horizontal drains 
to control ground water levels.
The concept works well with the 
single drawback that operation, 
maintenance, and replacement 
costs are very high compared to 
conventional drain systems.
National Irrigation Water Quality Program
 Subsurface drainage from Reclamation irrigation projects was generally 
considered to be a benefi cial side effect of irrigation as long as salinity levels in 
the water were not excessive.  Even the high salinity waters were often welcomed 
by the managers of wildlife refuges.  When unusually high numbers of waterfowl 
4.4.  About 1959 Reclamation experimented 
with using dynamite to clean drains on the 
Lower Yellowstone Project.
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deaths and deformities were found at California’s Kesterson Reservoir National 
Wildlife Refuge in 1982, FWS began an investigation which continued through 
1985.  The problem was attributed to high levels of the element selenium in the 
water and sediments of the reservoir.  At very low concentrations selenium is 
benign or even benefi cial, but at high concentrations it can be toxic to biological 
communities.  The source of selenium in Kesterson reservoir was determined to 
be drainage water from irrigation, which was the primary water supply for the 
reservoir.  This revelation was to have far reaching impacts to Reclamation=s
drainage program.  A more detailed discussion of Kesterson Reservoir and reasons 
for the buildup of selenium is included in the Central Valley Project section of this 
paper.
 Congressional interest and widespread media attention, including several 
television programs and more than 100 newspaper and magazine articles, 
prompted the Secretary of the Interior to open an investigation of the possible 
toxic effects of irrigation drainage water in the western United States.  The 
investigation resulted in the  National Irrigation Water Quality Program (NIWQP).  
NIWQP focused on areas important to migratory birds and endangered species 
and public water supplies receiving water from DOI irrigation projects.  NIWQP, 
which is ongoing, is a 5-phase program.  The studies are conducted by a core team 
of DOI agencies including FWS, Geological Survey, and either Reclamation or 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), depending on which agency sponsored the 
project involved. 
 Phase 1, Site Identifi cation, was essentially complete by 1989 (more 
sites could possibly be identifi ed in the future).  Based on existing information, 
sites likely to have irrigation-induced toxicity problems advanced to Phase 2, 
Reconnaissance Investigations.  If selenium levels found posed a possible threat 
to fi sh and wildlife resources, the site moved on to Phase 3.  Phase 3, Detailed 
Studies, consists of fi eld studies to measure the extent of any adverse biological 
impacts.  Where adverse impacts are found, the site advances to Phase 4, 
Remediation Planning, and then to Phase 5, Remediation Implementation.  FWS 
was the lead agency in phases 1, 2, and 3 with Reclamation or BIA having the 
lead role in phases 4 and 5.
 A survey of about 600 irrigation projects and wildlife areas was completed 
in phase 1.  Thirty-one sites moved to Phase 2, eight sites to Phase 3, fi ve sites to 
Phase 4 and two sites are currently in Phase 5.  All of the sites involved in Phases 
4 and 5 are Reclamation projects.  The two Phase 5 sites are Middle Green and 
Kendrick.  The Middle Green centers around Stewart Lake State Wildlife Area, 
which receives a large part of its infl ow from subsurface drains on the Jensen Unit 
of the Central Utah Project.  Drainage water containing high concentrations of 
selenium are believed to be the source of selenium found in the lake sediments.
In 1999 facilities were constructed to route the pipe drains around the lake so 
they discharge directly to the Green River, where the water is quickly diluted to 
naturally occurring concentrations.  A number of “cleanup” techniques are being 
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tested to remove selenium from the lake sediments.  The Kendrick site is being 
addressed by eliminating return fl ows to two small closed basins and providing 
fl ow-through water to fl ush two others.  In addition, Reclamation will construct 
replacement wetlands at locations away from selenium sources.
Research
 Since the Chief Engineer=s Offi ce was established, Reclamation Drainage 
and Ground Water personnel have been involved in applied research into every 
aspect of subsurface  drainage.  Some of the subjects are:
water movement through soils•
fi eld permeability testing•
salt balance in the root zone•
quality of return fl ows•
drain spacing, location, and depth•
orientation of drains with respect to natural hydraulic gradient•
infl uence of irrigation practices on drainage•
how water enters drain pipes•
envelope design•
biological and mineral clogging of drains•
construction methods•
construction costs•
materials used in pipe drains•
drain cleaning techniques•
well construction and rehabilitation•
 The purpose of the research was to check scientifi c theories, improve 
constructability and maintenance techniques, and validate current practices.  Analog, 
physical, and digital models were used extensively in the various research studies.
 The complicated processes by which water moves through soils have been a 
focal point of research efforts since Reclamation fi rst viewed subsurface drainage as 
a science.  In many cases cooperating with other agencies or universities, researchers 
studied fl ow through saturated and unsaturated soils, between different soil textures, 
and through preferential fl ow paths.  Sand tanks were constructed where water 
movement could be observed and 16-mm movie fi lms were made of the processes 
for training purposes.
 In 1978 a 16-mm movie titled “Subsurface Drainage” was produced in 
cooperation with Washington State University.  The fi lm used sand tanks with 
manometers to show how water moves through soil profi les to buried drains, and 
how a shallow saline water table can harm or even kill growing plants.  This fi lm has 
since been copied to video tape for use in standard VCR units.
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 The Oahe Project in the early 1950s was the impetus for some of the most 
important research in the drainage discipline.  The drainage requirements for Oahe 
were known to be extensive and the plan was to construct drainage facilities in 
conjunction with the distribution facilities.  In that way, the fi nancial burden on the 
farmers and the irrigation districts resulting from the normal lag time between the 
need for and the provision of  drainage could be avoided.  Mathematical theories for 
the transient state drain spacing equations were developed in response to this need.
Analog models were used fi rst to verify the theories and later fi eld measurements 
would validate the procedures.
 Field tests for hydraulic conductivity, or permeability, that had been 
developed in the 1940s were adopted, tested, and, in some cases, modifi ed to meet 
specifi c needs of Reclamation projects.  These tests were also subjected to analog 
model verifi cation as well as fi eld testing.
 Many analog models and digital models have been constructed in an attempt 
to predict return fl ow quantity and quality from various projects.  Reclamation has 
worked closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture Salinity Laboratory to 
establish safe root zone salinity levels and leaching requirements needed to maintain 
acceptable salinity levels.
 Drainage on sloping land was investigated in the early 1970s by constructing 
a sand tank in the Hydraulics Laboratory.  The tank was 60 feet long, 2.5 feet deep 
and 2 feet wide and was mounted on a platform that could be tilted at slopes between 
zero and twelve percent.  The wood frame tank was fi tted with Plexiglas panels so 
that observers could see what was occurring outside the drains.  The tank was later 
used to study sediment accumulation in drains with sags built into the grade.
 Analog models were used during the 1960s and 1970s to predict the effects 
of placing interceptor drains on an angle to the natural hydraulic gradient on 
sloping land.  Field verifi cation was done in the Columbia Basin and on the Kansas-
Bostwick Unit in Kansas.
 Drainage staff participated in the Irrigation Management Service (IMS) 
studies that were done beginning in the 1960s.  IMS studies were conducted on 
several projects and in every region to determine the fate of irrigation water that 
was applied to fi elds.  All water entering the fi eld through irrigation or precipitation 
was measured, consumptive use was estimated using state-of-the-art consumptive 
use formulae, root zone moisture levels were measured, and tail waters leaving 
the fi eld were measured.  Cooperating irrigators were assisted in management of 
their irrigation water to the benefi t of production and reduction in water usage.  
Reclamation phased out the program in the late 1970s, but the practice is carried on 
by private industry for the benefi t of private irrigators as well as those on federal 
projects.
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 Analog and sand tank models were used to study the way water enters 
clay tile and concrete drain pipe that had open joints for water to enter and how 
it enters perforated plastic pipe.  Standards were set for the length of the clay tile 
and concrete pipe between open joints for various diameters of pipe.  The larger 
the diameter of a pipe, the longer the pipe section can be.  This research included 
establishing gradations and thicknesses for gravel envelopes around drain pipes.
Sand tank models to study envelope and pipe perforation design are still in progress.
 In the 1970s clogging by iron ocher caused by bacteria growth was noted at 
several locations.  Reclamation initiated a cooperative program with Dr. Harry Ford, 
a renowned expert on  ocher-forming bacteria, of Florida State University.  The result 
was early identifi cation of problem soils and various means of treating the problems 
that develop.
 In the 1970s the “Open and Closed Conduit Systems” research program 
was used extensively to study various methods of construction, including the 
introduction of high-speed trenchers and trenchless drain construction or “plow 
drains.”  The program was also used in the development of standards for plastic 
pipe drain materials.  Video inspections of installed drains were used to determine 
defl ection and other problems associated with pipe strength. Working closely 
with the corrugated plastic pipe industry and the Soil Conservation Service, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, who were also developing a progressive  drainage 
program, standards were developed for pipe strength and other properties.  Mr.  Ray 
J. Winger Jr. Chief of the Drainage and Ground Water Branch in the Engineering and 
Research Center from 1972 to 1981, was inducted into the Drainage Hall of Fame 
for his contribution to the advancement of plastic pipe for use in agricultural drains.
 In the 1980s a 12-inch-diameter hemispheric demonstration well was 
constructed in the Hydraulics Laboratory.  The well was completed as an actual well 
except that it was fi tted with a Plexiglas plate across the fl at side so that observers 
could see what occurred in the aquifer and gravel pack outside the well during 
various rehabilitation treatments.
 Not every research venture ended in new methods or products being 
adopted.  Through the 1970s Reclamation tested Ano envelope@ and thin synthetic 
envelopes under various conditions in California, Kansas, Wyoming, Washington, 
and Montana.  In every case, the drains either failed completely or performed poorly 
compared to a sand/gravel envelope.  In 1976 and 1978 ABS plastic pipe was 
installed at two locations in the Republican River Valley.  ABS was a lightweight, 
thick-walled pipe formed in 5-foot long sections with bell and spigot joints.  In both 
cases, the pipe failed to retain its shape after being in place for less than 1 year.  In 
1974 a “trenchless” plow was used to install drains near Courtland, Kansas.  The 
drains failed to control the water table and had to be replaced by conventional 
drains.  In 1989, a thick or “voluminous” synthetic envelope consisting of styrofoam 
beads held in place by a nylon net was installed on a drain in central Nebraska.
Hydrostatic pressure forced the beads into the pipe perforations and thoroughly 
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plugged them, preventing any water from entering the pipe.  These learning 
experiences have not deterred the Reclamation drainage staff from being receptive to 
new products and ideas.
International Infl uence
 Since the Chief Engineer’s Offi ce was established in 1948, Reclamation 
Drainage and Ground Water staff have been involved in assisting other countries 
in developing responsible  drainage programs.  The fi rst foreign assignments for 
drainage staff were in Pakistan, India, Thailand, Peru, Egypt, Taiwan, Sri Lanka 
(formerly known as Ceylon), Afghanistan and the Philippines.  Much of the 
data used to develop root zone moisture and salinity concepts was collected on 
assignments to Spain, Turkey, Australia, and other countries.  Assignments to the 
African continent began when African nations gained independence from colonial 
rule: Senegal, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania.  Our largest foreign involvement 
occurred during the 1970s, when we were involved in drainage and ground water 
activities throughout the developing world—South America, Africa, and Asia.  
 The foreign assistance focus has been to educate foreign nationals on the 
importance of understanding agricultural irrigation and the need to minimize land 
salinization or waterlogging of the soils.  An economic land classifi cation which 
considers drainage costs is central to protecting the land resources from permanent 
degradation and ensuring that the lands being developed are productive enough to 
provide the farmer with a living wage.  Another area of emphasis is the importance 
of operation and maintenance of all facilities, including drains.
 The individual assignments of a few weeks up to several years in length 
were typically fi nanced by World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or the U.S. 
Department of State under the Aid to Developing Countries Program.
 In the 1970s  Ray J. Winger Jr. of the Engineering and Research Center 
participated in technical meetings of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Specialists Working 
group on Cooperation in the Field of Water Resources.  The topic “Plastics in 
Hydrotechnical Construction” and subtopic “Investigating the Effectiveness 
of Utilizing Plastic Pipe in Irrigation and Drainage” were part of the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Agreement on Science and Technology of May 24, 1972.  Materials and 
specifi cations were exchanged, fi eld experiments were conducted in each country, 
and meetings and fi eld reviews were held in each country.  The results of these 
experiments are incorporated into Reclamation=s technical drainage policy.
 Reclamation drainage staff served as consultants to the Prairie Farm 
Rehabilitation Administration, Department of Agriculture, Canada in the 1950s.  A 
fi eld review and comment on the drainage and related salinity and waterlogging 
problems in Alberta and Saskatchewan Provinces were requested by the Canadian 
government.
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 Through the 1980s and early 1990s Reclamation drainage engineers 
participated in an informal discussion group known as the Northern Plains Water 
Management Workshop.  The workshop was made up of engineers and soil scientists 
from various universities and government agencies from the Dakotas, Montana, 
Alberta, and Saskatchewan.  The workshop had no formal structure, no offi cers, and 
no budget, but they would gather once a year at some facility and spend 2 to 3 days 
discussing the problems, research needs, and breakthroughs in irrigation of glacial 
till soils.  The place and time of the gathering depended on someone volunteering to 
be the host.
Publications
Drainage Manual
 Drainage engineering was in its infancy during the 1940s through 1960s, 
and standard procedures for investigation and design had not been adopted.  The 
purpose of the Drainage Manual was to present engineering tools and concepts 
that had proven useful in planning, constructing, and maintaining drainage 
systems for successful long-term irrigation projects.  The fi rst drafts of the manual 
were in limited circulation within Reclamation in the early 1960s, but new 
procedures were being developed so rapidly that it was very diffi cult to arrive at 
a fi nal draft.  It was not until the deluge of new concepts began to subside that 
the manual was published as a hardcover book.  The fi rst edition was published 
in 1978.  The manual was then quickly accepted as an authoritative publication 
by many in the world drainage community, and it is used now as a textbook by 
several universities.  A revised reprint in 1993 contains only a few substantive 
changes.
 The Drainage Manual is used throughout Reclamation as a guide to 
performing drainage investigations, and the design, construction, and operation 
and maintenance of drainage systems for irrigated lands.  The manual is gradually 
gaining acceptance as a guide to other drainage applications such as dam toe 
drains and slope stability.
Ground Water Manual
 The  Ground Water Manual was developed as a guide to fi eld personnel in 
the more practical aspects and commonly encountered problems of ground water 
investigations, development, and management.  It standardized Reclamation=s
procedures for ground water.  The manual was developed over a period of years.  
Its contributors included personnel from the Bureau of Reclamation, other 
agencies, foreign governments, and many individual scientists and engineers.
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Comprehensive Construction Training Program
 In 1987, Reclamation=s drainage and ground water personnel from several 
projects and regional offi ces contributed to the Comprehensive Construction 
Training Program by producing two modules titled Buried Pipe Drains and Well 
Construction.
Plastic Pipe Specifi cation
 With the introduction of  plastic pipe for subsurface drains in the late 
1960s came a need to ensure reliability of the new product.  Research and testing 
conducted by Reclamation led to the need to develop standards for the strength 
and performance of the pipe.  As larger diameters of pipe became available, new 
specifi cations were written to accommodate these sizes.  By the early 1990s, 
American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) and American Association 
of State Highway and Transportation Offi cials (AASHTO) had developed 
parallel standards for the same product.  On February 1, 1995, Reclamation 
produced a new document titled “M-20: Standard Specifi cations for Corrugated 
Polyethylene and Polyvinyl-Chloride Drainage Pipe” which combines all of the 
former specifi cation documents and relies heavily on ASTM and AASHTO while 
retaining certain standards that are more stringent than ASTM or AASHTO.
Spin-off Applications
 Not all of the drainage and ground water work is in the agricultural arena.  
Often dams, pumping plants, large canals, and other structures require subsurface 
drainage facilities to stabilize foundations and prevent damage from sloughing 
earthen slopes or seepage water.
Safety of Dams
 It has long been recognized that most earth dams and some concrete dams 
need adequate toe drains to maintain a stable foundation.  It was not until the 
1980s that agricultural  drainage experts began to have involvement in the design 
and construction of drains where the cost of failure could be measured in human 
lives.  Replacement of the toe drains at Sherman Dam in Nebraska was the fi rst 
such venture for the agricultural drainage staff.  Then slowly came Canyon Ferry 
Dam in Montana, Diamond Creek Dike at Buffalo Bill Dam in Wyoming, Bonny 
Dam in Colorado, and Glendo Dikes in Wyoming.  Success in these projects 
has demonstrated that the science of ground water engineering is not limited to 
agricultural applications.  While adaptations need to be made to deal with the 
greater hydraulic gradients and the greater risk in the case of failure, the same 
basic concepts, materials and construction techniques are applicable. 
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Canal and  Structure Stabilization
 Toe drains are constructed along major  canals for a variety of reasons.  
Slope stability, waterlogging of agricultural lands, and salinity control have all 
been accomplished by use of subsurface drains.  McClusky Canal on the Garrison 
Diversion Unit in North Dakota experienced slope stability problems through cut 
sections 100 feet or more in depth.  The canal was constructed in the 1970s and 
suffered chronic sloughing of the banks into the canal prism.  Attempts to solve 
the problems using horizontal wells placed with an AAardvark@ horizontal drilling 
machine proved futile.  After 10 to 15 years of severe maintenance problems, 
drainage personnel in the Garrison Diversion Offi ce provided solutions to these 
problems by applying their knowledge of agricultural drainage in till lands.
 The New Rockford Canal in North Dakota was constructed in the mid-
1980s and marked the fi rst example of canal toe drains being constructed as part 
of the canal contract specifi cally to protect agricultural lands from seepage from 
the canal.
 The Courtland Canal along the Nebraska-Kansas border is perched atop 
the steep river bluffs and causes serious waterlogging problems in the irrigated 
fi elds below.  Most of these problems have been relieved by use of interceptor 
drains at the base of the bluffs.  However, the volume of water coming from the 
canal overwhelmed the fi rst attempts at interception in the mid-1960s.  Additional 
drainage works were constructed periodically for the next 20 years.  A fi eld 
review in the summer of 2000 concluded that the problems have fi nally been 
essentially solved.
 Agricultural drainage techniques were used in 1980 to prevent the 
Yellowstone River from washing out the  Terry Pumping Plant.  As the slope 
progressively sloughed, the river threatened to cut a new channel behind the 
60-cubic-foot-per-second pumping plant.  Field investigations and transient 
state computations revealed the source of the problem, and it was solved by 
constructing a simple agricultural drain.
 Again in 1990 concepts that were developed for agricultural drainage 
came to the rescue of a 50-foot-wide, 22-foot-high drop structure that carries 
2,300 cubic feet per second at full capacity.  The East Drain Terminal Drop 
structure below Palmetto Bend Dam on the gulf coast of Texas is subjected to 
extreme variations in hydrostatic pressure as tides move in and out.  Perforated 
plastic pipe drains at the sides of the structure and a graded gravel bed at the 
bottom successfully relieved the stresses on the structure.
Wetlands Applications
 As the focus of Reclamation activities has shifted from construction 
to water management, drainage and ground water personnel have used the 
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knowledge gained over the past 50 years to incorporate wetland construction and 
management into their realm of expertise.  In the Bay Delta, programs associated 
with the Central Valley Project in California, the Platte River Recovery Program 
in central Nebraska, and the National Irrigation Water Quality Program, the same 
concepts that were developed for drainage are being used by drainage personnel 
to create and enhance wetlands.
Conclusions
 In our fi rst century, Reclamation has constructed over 13,000 miles of 
surface and subsurface drains to protect an estimated 1 million acres of irrigated 
land from damage due to waterlogging and salinity.  This does not include 
the miles of drains or acres protected on projects that treat  drainage as a farm 
development cost.
 The fi rst 50 years were typifi ed by struggles to cope with technical 
unknowns as scientists, engineers, farmers, irrigation managers, and politicians 
attempted to develop water projects to attract settlers to the American West.  
During the last 50 years, we have seen the uncertain art of drainage evolve into 
a science which removes most of the technical unknowns from the drainage of 
irrigated lands and allows development of sustainable agriculture to occur in a 
controlled manner.
 Changing social values in the last quarter century have preempted some 
very promising irrigation developments.  We have seen our focus change from 
developing new agricultural lands to maintaining existing water resources 
and environmental assets for the good of all society.  We want to take note 
of a common thread that repeatedly appeared in the references used for this 
paper.  It was the concern that Reclamation employees have always had for the 
environment.  Well before the time of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
and most environmental groups, Reclamation drainage engineers were concerned 
about the quality of water that fl owed from the drains and the effect that it would 
have on wildlife and other downstream users.  Drainage engineering also has 
provided the agricultural community with the comprehension and capability to 
keep irrigated farm land in productivity and avoid exploitation.  The twentieth 
century has been the fi rst time in history that large-scale irrigation has not 
been marked by a majority of lands that became waterlogged, salinized, and 
abandoned.
 The lessons learned and the science that was developed around 
Reclamation=s experience in drainage and ground water will be useful to future 
developments in the United States and around the world as developing countries 
endeavor to feed and clothe their people.
193
References:
Brohl, R. E., “Design Considerations for Agricultural Drains on the Columbia Basin Project,”  
 (Denver: Bureau of Reclamation, 1971).
Burnett, Roger, and Rodney TeKrony, “Drainage Investigations on the Oahe Unit, South Dakota,” 
 (Denver: Bureau of Reclamation, 1977).
Christopher, J. N., and K. Campbell, “Drain Construction on the Columbia Basin Project,” 
 (Denver: Bureau of Reclamation, 1980).
Cunnigham, A. Jack, Jr., written communication, unpublished chronology of Reclamation=s
 Transient Spacing Formulae, June 2001.
Delamore, M., South-Central California Area Offi ce, USBR, written communication, unpublished 
 chronology of West Side Drainage History, 2001.
Department of the Interior, National Irrigation Water Quality Project website, http://www.usbr.
 gov/niwqp/prgmdscr.html
Dumm, Lee D., “New Formula for Determining Depth and Spacing of Subsurface Drains in 
 Irrigated Lands,” (Denver: Bureau of Reclamation, 1953).
Dumm Lee D., “Drain-spacing Method Used by the Bureau of Reclamation,” (Denver: Bureau of 
 Reclamation, 1962).
Frogge, R. R., and G. D. Sanders, “USBR Subsurface Drain Design Procedures,” (Denver: Bureau 
 of Reclamation, 1977).
Hubbs, Danny, Columbia Basin Area Offi ce, written communication, unpublished Summary of 
 Subsurface Drainage Program—Columbia Basin Project, 1960 to 1995, March 21, 2001.
Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, January-February, 1988.
Mairhofer, C. R., memorandum from Chief, Offi ce of Drainage and Groundwater Engineering, to 
 Regional Directors, subject Drain-Spacing Formulas and Charts, April 20, 1959.
Monteith, John, III, and Phillip M. Myers, “Construction of Pipe Drains on the Columbia Basin 
 Project,” (Denver: Bureau of Reclamation, 1968).
Quinn, Nigel W. T., M. Chris Eacock, and M. Gardener, “A Watershed Approach to Load 
 Management of Agricultural Selenium Drainage,” (in preparation).
Schnepf, Max, “The Food Security Act: A Redefi nition of Conservation,” Journal of Soil and 
 Water Conservation, vol 43, no 1, p. 8, 1988.
Tapp, W. N., Trip Report, “Subject: South Gila Valley Drainage Wells, Yuma, Arizona,” dated
 February 20, 1961.
USBR, Drainage Manual, A Water Resources Publication, U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau 
 of Reclamation, 1993.
USBR, http://dataweb.usbr.gov/html/gila.html#development
USBR, http://dataweb.usbr.gov/html/rvrton2.html
USBR, letter from Commissioner to Regional Director, Billings Montana, Subject Oahe Irrigation 
 Project, March 1, 1954.
USBR, letter from Assistant Commissioner to Chief Engineer (et al.), Subject Drainage Policy, 
 April 15, 1963.
Water and Power Resources Service (USBR), Project Data, (Denver: Government Printing Offi ce, 
 1981).
USBR, “Project History,” Belle Fourche Project, 1920.
USBR, “Project History,” Huntley Project, 1911.
USBR, “Project History,” Huntley Project, 1912.
USBR, “Project History,” Huntley Project, 1913.
USBR, “Supplementary Irrigation Suitability Land Classifi cation Report, Phases I and II, 
 Newlands Project-Nevada, Truckee and Carson Divisions,” February 1985.
USBR, http://dataweb.rsgis.do.usbr.gov/html/newlandsh.htm#Post-Construction_History
Winger, Ray J., Jr, “Trip Report, Review of Maintenance Program - Drainage - Newlands and 
 Humboldt Projects,” 1964.
Winger, Ray J., Jr., and W. F. Ryan, “Gravel Envelope for Pipe Drains-Design,” American Society 
 of Agricultural Engineers Paper 70-708.  Presented at the 1970 Winter Meeting, 
194
 American Society of Agricultural Engineers, Sherman House, Chicago, Illinois, 
 December 8-11, 1970.
Winger, Ray J., Jr, personal telephone communication, June 27, 2001.
Zander, J., Mid-Pacifi c Regional Offi ce, USBR, written communication, unpublished chronology 
 of Challenge Grants, 2001.
195
Evolution of the Hoover Dam Infl ow Design Flood:
A Study in Changing Methodologies
By:
Robert E. Swain
Abstract
Over the years many changes have taken place in estimating the 
maximum fl ood potential at Bureau of Reclamation dams.  This paper traces the 
technological changes by using the  Hoover Dam fl ood studies as an example.
 The largest recorded fl ood in the Black Canyon of the Colorado River, 
which is the site of Hoover Dam, occurred in July 1884.  It was estimated to 
have a peak discharge of about 300,000 ft3/s.  The Bureau of Reclamation and 
the Geological Survey determined the magnitude of the 1884 fl ood based on 
high water marks in the Black Canyon; fl ood observations at Lees Ferry; and 
gage height observations at Grand Junction, Colorado, and Yuma, Arizona.  The 
fi ve-month volume of the fl ood was estimated to be about 30,000,000 acre-feet.   
The 1884 fl ood was considered a Anear maximum fl ood@ and became the basis 
for the design of the spillways and fl ood control space in Hoover Dam.
 In 1990 the Bureau of Reclamation revised the probable maximum 
fl ood studies for the  Colorado River Basin and for Hoover and Glen Canyon 
Dams.  The Dam Safety Offi ce identifi ed the need for the study when fl ood 
operations during the 1983 fl ood required operating the spillways and resulted 
in considerable damage to the concrete lining of the spillways.  The fl ood 
hydrology data used for the original dam design were not found to conform to 
current technical methodology for estimating the probable maximum fl ood.
 New  hydrologic studies were conducted using a hydrologic model to 
convert precipitation to runoff.  The design storm was developed from historical 
storm data that indicated the possibility of two large rain events occurring within 
a few days of each other.  For Hoover Dam the most critical situation could 
occur in August, when a Pine and Cedar Mountains-centered storm follows 
a San Juan Mountains centered storm by seven days.  This storm sequence 
would produce a probable maximum fl ood at the dam with a peak discharge of 
1,130,000 ft3/s and a 60-day volume of 9.3 million acre-feet.
 Oftentimes, technological change has resulted in the need to modify 
dams to ensure public safety.  In this case, routing the probable maximum fl ood 
through Lake Mead does not overtop the dam and results in a maximum water 
surface that is still three feet below the top of the parapet wall.  However, about 
100 of Reclamation=s dams are unable to safely accommodate the probable 
maximum fl ood.
Introduction
 A large fl ood resulting from late season snowmelt in the spring and 
summer of 1983 required operation of the  Hoover Dam spillways.  During this 
operation, damage to the concrete lining of the spillways occurred, leading to the 
assessment of potential modifi cations to alleviate the problem.  As a part of this 
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analysis, the Flood Section of the Bureau of Reclamation evaluated the adequacy of 
the hydrologic engineering aspects of the dam.  Additional high runoff occurrences 
in 1984 and 1986 kept the fl ood issues at  Hoover Dam in the forefront.
 Upon reevaluation, the hydrologic data used as a basis for sizing the dam, 
the outlet works capacity, and the allocated fl ood storage/surcharge space were not 
found to conform to the current state-of-the-art with respect to operational criteria 
and technical methodologies.  These data also do not refl ect recent hydrologic and 
meteorological data acquired since the original design was completed.  Previous 
design fl ood investigations were crudely developed from high water marks left from 
large historical fl ood events.  More recent investigations account for the effects of 
upstream basin development and reservoir regulation, as well as the knowledge 
gained from the many large storms that have occurred over the basin since the dam 
was built.
Basin Description
 The Colorado River above Hoover Dam drains an area of 167,000 mi2.  The 
drainage basin includes parts of Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, 
and Nevada.  Approximately 108,000 mi2 of the drainage basin are above Glen 
Canyon Dam.
 Many dams and reservoirs have been constructed in the basin over the years.  
The larger reservoirs are formed from water impounded by Fontenelle, Flaming 
Gorge, Blue Mesa, Morrow Point, Crystal, Dillon, Navajo, Glen Canyon, and 
Hoover Dams.
 The basin is arid to semi-arid with an average annual rainfall of about 
10 inches.  The annual precipitation varies from over 40 inches in the higher 
mountainous areas to less than 3 inches near Hoover Dam.  Long cold winters and 
cool short summers characterize the climate of the mountains in the basin.  In the 
lower areas the winters are mild and short, and the summers are long and warm.  The 
temperature extremes in the basin range from B45?C to 46?C.  The average annual 
runoff is less than 1.5 inches for the entire basin.  Most of this runoff is produced in 
the upper basin areas.  Snow accumulation normally begins in October in the high 
mountains and in some years continues through May.
Basis for Original Spillway Design
  Hoover Dam (also known as Boulder Dam) was sized using streamfl ow 
records in existence prior to 1929.  Reliable recorded streamfl ow records for the 
Colorado River at Yuma, Arizona, began in 1902.  Less reliable gage heights were 
also available at the Yuma site for the earlier period from 1878 through 1901.  The 
largest recorded fl ow was 210,000 ft3/s on June 26, 1920.  The maximum historic 
discharge, since the river was fi rst occupied by civilized man in 1856, was believed 
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to have occurred in the summer of 1884 and was estimated to range from 250,000 to 
350,000 ft3/s.1
 On the basis of the fl ood data and other safety considerations, a spillway 
capacity of 400,000 ft3/s with the reservoir water surface at the crest of the dam 
(elevation 1232.0 feet) was provided to prevent any possibility of the dam being 
overtopped by an unprecedented future fl ood.  The total discharge capacity of the 
dam was 520,000 ft3/s, which included the spillway capacity along with the outlet 
works release capacity of 100,000 ft3/s and the power plant release capacity of 
20,000 ft3/s.2
 The total reservoir capacity is 30.5 million acre feet, which includes 
9.5 million acre feet of fl ood control storage.  The design and construction reports 
for the Diversion, Outlet, and Spillway Structures indicate that the intent of the 
design was to accommodate not only the largest possible fl ood but also a fl ood 
resulting from a dam failure upstream.  The report states, AThe ponding effect of the 
fl ood storage, combined with the 520 thousand second-feet of discharge capacity, 
provides for an estimated infl ow into the reservoir of nearly 1 million second-feet 
for several days without overtopping the dam.  The provision for so large an infl ow 
into the reservoir was based on the criterion that the dam must be entirely safe for 
any fl ood condition, even though the fl ood might be caused by the failure of a dam at 
some upstream location.@3
Original Flood Study
 E. B. Debler, Hydraulic Engineer with the Bureau of Reclamation, conducted 
the original fl ood studies that were used to size the spillways and fl ood control space 
for the dam.  In 1930 he wrote Hydrology of the Boulder Canyon Reservoir.  Data 
that were used in the analysis consisted of stream gage records, high water marks, 
and newspaper accounts.4
 Prior to construction of the many major dams now located in the  Colorado 
River basin, high fl ows in the lower portion of the basin occurred frequently.  
Between 1878 and 1929, peak fl ows were estimated to exceed 100,000 ft3/s twenty-
three times and 200,000 ft3/s three times in the vicinity of Hoover Dam.  The 
Geological Survey and Bureau of Reclamation estimated the peak discharge for the 
1884 fl ood as 250,000 and 300,000 ft3/s, respectively.  These estimates were based 
on high water marks in the Black Canyon, gage heights at Grand Junction and Yuma, 
newspaper accounts, and a fl ood observation at Lees Ferry.5
 The Geological Survey estimated that the 1884 fl ood had a peak of 250,000 
ft3/s at Lees Ferry.  A high water mark given by a local resident was compared with 
gage heights for the Lees Ferry gage.  The rating curve that was used is unknown.  
Since the largest gaged fl ow at this site was 114,000 ft3/s, the rating curve that was 
provided by the Geological Survey for this station was extended to estimate the 1884 
peak.  Several extension techniques were explored to try to reproduce the Geological 
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Survey fl ood estimate.  Reclamation engineers could get close to their estimate but 
could not reproduce it.  Therefore, Reclamation decided to develop its own estimate 
of the 1884 fl ood.6
 Newspapers of 1884 contain numerous references to heavy snows 
throughout the basin.  The Gunnison Daily Review Press reported in mid-May snow 
from two to fi ve feet deep at several locations between elevations of 9,000 and 
10,000 feet.  The normal snow depth for the Gunnison watershed was about 
18 inches for the end of April.  Other newspaper accounts indicated that this 
condition was widespread over the upper basin.7
 Only one precipitation station was available for the upper basin in 1884.  It 
was located at Fort Lewis, La Plata County, in the San Juan basin.  At this station 
precipitation was about 40 percent above normal from October through May, and 
temperatures were below normal during the spring months.8
 Flows in upstream tributaries were at all-time highs.  The Gunnison River, 
 Colorado River at Fruita, and Green River at Green River were at their highest 
known stages in 1884 and were reported in 1929 as the highest of all time.  High 
fl ows were also reported in Utah by the Salt Lake City newspapers.  Inhabitants 
reported that high fl ows continued for weeks.9
 Based on these accounts and various fl ow records, Reclamation concluded 
that the peaks at Green River, Utah, and on the Colorado River at Fruita occurred 
simultaneously.  Mr. Robert Follansbee, District Engineer with the Geological 
Survey, estimated the fl ow at Fruita to be 125,000 ft3/s and at Green River to be 
95,000 ft3/s.  After making an allowance for the lower streams, the discharge at 
Black Canyon was estimated as 300,000 ft3/s.10
 To check the 1884 fl ood peak Reclamation used the gage height at Yuma 
and channel cross section to compute the associated discharge.  Based on 1920 
and 1921 fl ow velocity data, a mean velocity of 7.2 ft/s was used for the hydraulic 
calculations.  The discharge was estimated as 250,000 ft3/s at Yuma.  Since fl ows 
at Black Canyon were greater than at Yuma due to channel storage in the lower 
reaches, the Yuma discharge was increased by 19 percent to arrive at the Black 
Canyon discharge of 300,000 ft3/s.11
 Flows, which formed the basis of a fl ood frequency analysis, were estimated 
at Black Canyon using data from the gages at Yuma, Topock, Hardyville, Boulder 
Canyon, Bright Angel, Lees Ferry, and some unidentifi ed main tributaries.  
Empirical relationships were used to transfer peak fl ows to Black Canyon.  Flows for 
1878 through 1901 were solely based on the fl ow at Yuma.  Later years, 1902-1929, 
relied on comparisons between gages and considerable engineering judgment 
to develop the annual peaks at Black Canyon.  The fl ow data were plotted on 
probability paper using methods developed by H. Alden Foster and R. D. Goodrich.  
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The results are shown on Table 1.  The 1884 fl ood was determined to be about a 
500-year fl ood.12
Table 5.1.  1930 Flood Frequency Analysis for  Hoover Dam
Source:  U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin Probable 
Maximum Floods - Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams, (Denver, 1990), 9.
.
Peak Flow
(ft3/s)
Return Period
(Years)
Annual Exceedance Probability
(Percent)
130,000 5 20.00
160,000 10 10.00
190,000 20 5.00
230,000 50 2.00
260,000 100 1.00
320,000 500 0.20
360,000 1,000 0.10
450,000 10,000 0.01
 The volume of the 1884 fl ood was estimated as 30,450,000 acre feet for the 
period May 3 through August 22.  Flow records were reconstructed for the Yuma 
gage to develop the volume estimate.  When the infl ow design fl ood was developed, 
the duration of the fl ood was extended to include April through the end of August 
by using comparisons with other high runoff years.  Table 2 displays the monthly 
volumes of the infl ow design fl ood.  As indicated on the table, the infl ow design 
fl ood volume increased to 33,200,000 acre feet after adding additional spring fl ows 
and extending the period from April through August.13
Table 5.2.  1930 Infl ow Design Flood Volumes for  Hoover Dam
Source:  U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin Probable 
Maximum Floods - Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams, (Denver, 1990),10
Month Volume
(Acre-feet)
Mean Monthly Flow
(ft3/s)
April 2,000,000 33,610
May 5,000,000 81,320
June 11,850,000 199,160
July 11,350,000 184,590
August 3,000,000 48,790
Total 33,200,000
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1990 Probable Maximum Flood Study
 Reclamation revised the infl ow design fl ood for  Hoover Dam in 1990.  
Meteorological studies were conducted by Morrison-Knudsen Engineers and 
are documented in the report entitled, Determination of an Upper Limit Design 
Rainstorm for the Colorado River Basin Above Hoover Dam.  Reclamation 
performed the hydrologic analysis, and the results of this study are documented in 
the report, Colorado River Basin Probable Maximum Floods - Hoover and Glen 
Canyon Dams.  The following sections of this paper describe these studies 
in more detail.14
Meteorological Analysis
 Modern procedures for developing a probable maximum fl ood involve 
development of the probable maximum precipitation (PMP) and rainfall-runoff 
modeling.  Probable maximum precipitation is generally defi ned as Atheoretically, 
the greatest depth of precipitation for a given duration that is physically possible 
over a given size storm area at a particular geographical location at a certain 
time of the year.@  Traditionally the PMP storm is developed by transposing 
moisture maximized storms to various locations in the basin.  Then differences in 
orographic effects between the storm location and the selected storm centerings 
are accounted for either by a transposition index or by storm separation 
techniques.  For Hoover Dam, a slightly different approach was taken due to the 
very large drainage area, extreme variation in orographic effects, and defi ciency 
of large-area storms.15
 Upper limit design rainstorms (ULDRS) were developed for three 
locations in the Colorado River drainage above Hoover Dam.  The term, ULDRS, 
was used to emphasize that there are differences in the procedures used to develop 
these storms from those used to develop the traditional PMP for smaller area 
sizes.  Specifi c storm analyses involved determination of the ULDRS magnitude, 
spatial and temporal distributions, storm sequencing, and seasonal variation.16
 As with any study of this nature, it was fi rst necessary to assemble an 
exhaustive listing of all known major storms that have occurred in or near the 
region surrounding the Colorado River Basin above Hoover Dam.  Due to the 
large drainage area and the availability of extreme precipitation estimates from 
Hydrometeorological Report No. 49 for areas less than 5,000 mi2, the search for 
critical storm data concentrated on fi nding severe rainfall events covering larger 
areas.  Of the 20 storms for which detailed meteorological investigations were 
performed, 13 storms were analyzed to provide the necessary depth-area-duration 
data.17
 Since the study basin is located in a region of complex topography, 
which produces a signifi cant effect on total storm rainfall, it was necessary to 
estimate likely storm centerings and associated Ageneric@ isohyetal patterns prior 
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to development of the ULDRS.  An important consideration in the development 
of likely storm centerings was the location of Glen Canyon Dam in relation to 
Hoover Dam.  The objective was to provide the necessary design storms that 
would affect not only Hoover, but also the two dams operating in combination.  
Examination of the isohyetal patterns of rainfall associated with major storms 
occurring in the drainage was particularly useful in identifying three storm 
centerings and their related isohyetal patterns.  The three storms were located in 
the San Juan Mountains (Colorado), Boulder Mountains (Utah), and Pine and 
Cedar Mountains (Utah).
 The ULDRS magnitude for each of the three storm centerings was 
evaluated by two separate methods.  The fi rst approach is commonly referred 
to as the storm separation method, where observed areal storm precipitation is 
separated into components (convergence and orographic).  Each precipitation 
component is treated and evaluated separately, and later recombined, to provide 
total design storm precipitation.  The second approach used the traditional 
method of storm moisture maximization and transposition.  After evaluation of 
the assumptions and uncertainties involved in application of each approach, the 
results were averaged to produce the fi nal ULDRS magnitude.
 Due to the large basin and storm areas involved, it was necessary 
to describe the spatial distribution of average areal ULDRS precipitation.
Hydrologic trials were conducted using preliminary average areal precipitation.  A 
storm area of 40,000 mi2 was critical for development of the maximum infl ow to 
Hoover Dam.  The ULDRS magnitude was estimated as averaging from 6.93 to 
7.29 inches in depth for 72-hour storms for the three locations.
 Critical infl ow to the dams could result from a series of storms occurring 
in sequence.  Investigations were conducted to defi ne the relationship between 
storm magnitude and dry-period interval separating the sequenced storms.  A 
relationship between the days separation between storms, and the magnitude of 
areal rainfall both prior and subsequent to the main storm was developed.
 To adequately assess the fl ood potential, it was necessary to defi ne the 
magnitude of the ULDRS event for the period from May through October.  It 
is during this period that the greatest fl ood threat on the Colorado River above 
Hoover Dam would likely result from the combination of the ULDRS event with 
the snowmelt hydrograph.  The ULDRS event for all three centerings could occur 
with the same magnitude during the period from August 1 through October 31.  
Prior to August, the seasonal variation of the ULDRS would indicate a decrease in 
rainfall potential.
Hydrologic Analysis
 Selection on an infl ow design fl ood (IDF) is generally based on an 
incremental hazard evaluation downstream for the dam. AThe IDF is the fl ood 
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fl ow above which the incremental increase in water surface elevation downstream 
due to failure of a  dam or other water retaining structure is no longer considered 
to present an unacceptable additional downstream threat.@  In this case, the 
probable maximum fl ood (PMF) was selected as the infl ow design fl ood because 
if the dam failed, it would result in catastrophic consequences, including loss 
of life.  The PMF is defi ned as Athe maximum runoff condition resulting from 
the most severe combination of hydrologic and meteorologic conditions that are 
considered reasonably possible for the drainage basin under study.@18
 Reclamation used the  Flood Hydrograph and Routing (FHAR) computer 
program to convert excess precipitation to runoff and generate the fl ood 
hydrograph for the ULDRS.  FHAR, which was developed by  Reclamation, uses 
unit hydrograph theory.  The program derives the fl ood hydrograph by applying 
increments of excess precipitation to the unit hydrograph.  The unit hydrograph is 
computed from the dimensionless graph, given the basin area, lag time, and unit 
time.
 The lower and upper basins were divided into 99 subbasins for the 
analysis.  In general, subbasin delineation was made by following major tributary 
boundaries.  Subbasins that had similar characteristics of elevation, slope, 
land use, and drainage pattern were combined where possible.  The size of the 
subbasins was limited to areas of less than 5,000 mi2.
 Field trips were made to become familiar with the subbasins.  Soil and 
geologic conditions, land use, vegetation type and cover, and basin roughness and 
steepness were examined to better estimate loss rates and lag coeffi cients.  These 
observations were used for all subbasins visited.
 Loss rates are a measure of the precipitation lost to infi ltration, 
evaporation, transpiration, absorption, and minor depression storage in the 
basin.  In general, the lower basin near Lake Mead and the north-side tributaries 
to the lake are areas of low infi ltration and are subject to fl ash fl ooding.  The 
other areas and tributaries, especially Kanab Creek, Kaibab Creek, and most 
of the Little Colorado River basin had somewhat higher loss rates.  In these 
areas, the vegetative cover was heavier, and the loss rates appeared to increase 
with elevation rise.  Most of the Little Colorado River basin showed very little 
evidence of fl ash fl ooding or stream channel development.
 In the upper basin, those areas tributary to Lake Powell were very desert-
like and exhibited signs of fl ash fl ooding.  The loss rates appeared quite low, 
and the vegetative cover was very sparse.  Some portions of the lower Green 
River subbasin had extensive outcrops of Mancos Shale.  The upper basin areas 
exhibited a similar increase in vegetation and loss rates with elevation rise.
 In applications of the unit hydrograph approach, the Reclamation lag 
equation is used in determining the lag time of the fl ood hydrograph.  Lag time 
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is defi ned as the time from the center of mass of unit rainfall excess to the time 
that one-half the volume of unit runoff from the drainage basin has passed the 
concentration point.  The lag coeffi cient is a measure of the hydraulic effi ciency 
of a basin to transmit water, which refl ects overall basin roughness, steepness, and 
vegetative cover.  Lag coeffi cients for the basins above Hoover ranged from 
1.3 to 5.5.19
 The dimensionless unit hydrograph was used to calculate the fl ood 
hydrograph for each subbasin.  The basin above Hoover Dam includes three basic 
types of terrain—deserts, foothills, and mountains.  Data gathered from the fi eld 
reconnaissance and from analysis of basin features shown on topographic maps 
were compared with similar data for basins where unit hydrographs had been 
developed from observed fl ood hydrographs.  Separate dimensionless graphs were 
used for each type of topography.  The following three dimensionless graphs were 
used in the study: (1) Salt River for the desert areas, (2) Buckhorn for the foothill 
areas, (3) Uinta for the mountainous areas.20
 The Tatum method was used to route fl ood hydrographs from one 
subbasin to the next downstream subbasin, and to combine them with additional 
fl ood hydrographs as the fl oods move downstream.  The Tatum method is a 
successive average lag procedure.  It is commonly used to route hydrographs 
through channels, which have no appreciable storage or large tributary infl ows, 
or where costs of obtaining channel cross-section and other data needed for more 
sophisticated methods are prohibitive.  FHAR uses the modifi ed Puls method to 
route fl oods through reservoirs or through short stream reaches in which the time 
of travel and wedge storage is negligible.
Antecedent Flood
 The antecedent fl ood is that fl ood, and associated climatic conditions, 
affecting the basin prior to the onset of the upper limit design rainstorm.  For this 
study, the antecedent fl ood is a 100-year snowmelt event.  This fl ood is not nearly 
as large as what might be expected as the probable maximum snowmelt fl ood, 
but the volume is still very large when compared to the volume of the ULDRS 
fl ood event.  In order to model operations of the reservoirs of the Colorado River 
above Hoover Dam, daily fl ows were required for a complete calendar year.  The 
100-year base snowmelt fl ood, which was developed statistically, had an annual 
volume of 25,375,000 acre feet into Lake Powell and 1,281,000 acre feet as 
intervening fl ow into Lake Mead from the contributing drainage area downstream 
of Lake Powell.
Reservoir Operations
 The reservoirs in the  Colorado River Basin are operated as an 
integrated system.  The system has a total fl ood control space requirement of 
5,350,000 acre feet, which must be evacuated from storage by January 1.  At least 
204
1,500,000 acre feet of that space must be in Lake Mead, which is the only facility 
in the system with exclusive fl ood control space.  One of the primary goals of the 
fl ood control operations for the  Colorado River system is to keep the exclusive 
fl ood control storage at Hoover vacant year-round to regulate potential rain 
fl oods.21
 The 1982 fi eld working agreement between Reclamation and the Corps of 
Engineers for fl ood control operations of Hoover Dam and Lake Mead establishes 
the reservoir operating criteria.  Two sets of operating rules are used to operate 
the system.  During the space-building or drawdown season, which extends from 
August through December, the objective is to gradually drawdown the reservoir 
system to create space for next spring=s snowmelt runoff.  During the runoff 
forecast season, from January through July, the forecasted maximum infl ow 
hydrograph is routed through the reservoir using predetermined release rates, so 
that the reservoir system is full by July 1.22
 Using the 100-year snowmelt fl ood values, routing studies were performed 
to simulate reservoir operations during the antecedent fl ood event.  The Colorado 
River system operation was modeled bimonthly beginning January 1 to refl ect 
proper operations during a forecasted 100-year snowmelt fl ood.  Runoff forecast 
errors were subtracted from the actual infl ows through July 31 in order to make 
operational decisions that refl ect a reasonable degree of conservatism.  The results 
of these investigations produce the starting elevations that were required to route 
the ULDRS fl ood event.
Probable Maximum Floods
 Determination of the probable maximum fl oods for  Hoover Dam 
involved generating seasonal fl ood hydrographs by applying the results of the 
meteorological investigation.  Numerous combinations of ULDRS centerings 
and storm separations were evaluated to determine the most critical hydrologic 
conditions for the dam.  The ULDRS fl ood hydrographs were combined with the 
snowmelt antecedent fl ood to determine the most critical hydrologic condition at 
the dam.  Results of these analyses produced PMFs for the critical May through 
August storm season.
 The most critical fl ood situation for Hoover Dam occurs when the 
San Juan storm is followed by the Pine and Cedar Mountain storm.  The 
fl ood hydrographs developed for the upper basin were routed through Glen 
Canyon Dam, and combined with concurrent runoff and intervening base fl ow 
hydrographs for the area between Glen Canyon and Hoover Dams.  The resulting 
PMF had a peak infl ow of 1,130,000 ft3/s and a 60-day volume of 
9.3 million acre feet.23
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Discussion
 Reclamation=s approach toward estimating the infl ow design fl ood for 
 Hoover Dam has changed dramatically over the years, moving from simple hand 
calculations to more complex computer simulations.  The original fl ood study 
for Hoover Dam relied on high water marks and gage heights to construct the 
largest possible fl ood for design.  The analysis assumed that the largest fl ood had 
already occurred in the basin and was refl ected in the historical record.  Even 
today, the 1884 fl ood is still the largest fl ood on record in this basin.  When put 
in a statistical context, it was estimated to have a return period of about once in 
500 years.  By modern standards, this is considered an unsafe design standard.
However, the engineers who designed the dam sized the spillways and outlet 
works to pass the peak of this fl ood without taking credit for the additional fl ood 
regulation provided by the storage space in the reservoir.  These very conservative 
design decisions produced a dam that is still safe when tested against today=s
design criteria.
 The magnitude of the differences between the two studies can be 
determined by comparing the peak discharge and the 60-day volumes.  The 1930 
fl ood study produced an infl ow design fl ood with a peak discharge of 300,000 ft3/s
and an approximate 60-day volume of 23,200,000 acre feet.  The 1990 PMF had a 
peak discharge of 1,130,000 ft3/s and a 60-day volume of 9,300,000 acre feet.  So 
even though the peak discharge of the 1990 PMF is nearly four times as large as 
the 1930 IDF, the volume is less than half the 1930 volume.
 An additional 60 years of data have been collected since the 1930 study 
was completed.  Because PMF procedures attempt to produce the maximum fl ood 
possible at a site, one would expect additional data to result in larger fl ood values 
in the 1990 study.  Since most of the volume comes from snowmelt, one could 
speculate that the 1884 fl ood was predominately a snowmelt fl ood with a return 
period much greater than the once in 100 years, which was used as the antecedent 
fl ood in the 1990 study.  This could account for the smaller peak and larger 
volume in the 1930 analysis.
 The dams and reservoirs that have been built upstream of Hoover could 
also be responsible for some of the volume differences.  Hoover Dam was one 
of the fi rst major structures on the Colorado River.  The other large dams, which 
were built after 1930, can store much of the fl ood volume.  Normal reservoir 
operations use fl ood forecasting to regulate snowmelt fl oods by vacating reservoir 
storage prior to the occurrence of the fl ood peak.  This helps maximize power 
generation and minimize fl ood damages in the basin, and reduces the volume of 
water into Lake Mead.
 Since Hoover Dam was built, engineers and hydrologists have collected 
a lot of data and gained additional understanding of meteorological, hydrologic, 
and statistical processes.  Climate and streamfl ow data available for analysis has 
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increased dramatically in both quantity and quality.  Computer technology now 
allows analysis of detailed storm patterns and construction of rainfall-runoff 
models in order to obtain a better understanding of the hydrology of the Colorado 
River.  This allows the engineer to run numerous computer simulations to 
determine the most critical hydrologic condition for the dam.
Robert E. Swain, P.E., is a longtime engineering employee of the Bureau of 
Reclamation and served as a Flood Hydrology Technical Specialist in the Flood 
Hydrology and Meteorology Group.  He was actively involved in safety of dams 
work for Reclamation and is now retired.
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A Struggle of Needs:  A History of Bureau of 
Reclamation Fish Passage Projects on the Truckee 
River, Nevada
By:
Rick Christensen and Brent Mefford
Abstract
 The Truckee River fl ows from the Sierra Nevada Mountains of 
California eastward to Pyramid Lake, Nevada.  The river basin experienced 
explosive growth in the mid-to-late 1800s when gold was found in California 
and Nevada.  The gold rush was followed by an infl ux of farmers and ranchers to 
the area.  In about 1905 Reclamation constructed the Truckee-Carson Irrigation 
Project, one of the agency’s fi rst water diversion and storage projects.  Pyramid 
Lake and the Truckee River are home to two important fi sh that are lake 
dwellers and stream spawners.  This paper follows the history of Reclamation’s 
fi sh passage projects designed to protect this important fi shery. 
Background
 The  Truckee River originates in  Lake Tahoe in the Sierra Nevada 
Mountains of California and runs east into Nevada.  The river forms  Pyramid 
Lake where it fl ows into a large natural sink that lies about 50 miles east of Reno, 
Nevada.  Being a terminal lake, the water quality of Pyramid Lake is slightly 
saline, however, the lake supports several fi sh species among which are two 
notable lake dwellers and stream spawners,  cui-ui lake suckers (Chasmistes cujus)
and Lahontan cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarki henshawi).  Both of these 
species migrate up the Truckee River to spawn during high spring fl ows.  Prior 
to the 1900s, cui-ui likely spawned as far as twenty-fi ve miles upstream, and 
Pyramid Lake  Lahontan cutthroat trout spawning reached into the Sierra Nevada 
Mountains.  Historical fl ows in the Truckee River vary between 1,000 and 2,000 
cubic feet per second (ft3/s) during the spawning runs in normal years, with fl ows 
in excess of 3,000 ft3/s in wet years.  For nearly one and a half centuries, demand 
for waters of the Truckee River by immigrants to the area has impacted the unique 
fi sheries native to this closed basin ecosystem.  And for nearly as long, attempts 
have been made to protect fi sh in the presence of a growing demand for water.  
However, during the 1900s, fi sh protection could not keep pace with the growth 
of urban and agricultural water demand.  The last spawning run of the Pyramid 
Lake Lahontan cutthroat trout occurred in about 1938, and the trout was thought 
extinct by 1940.  In 1967 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service1 listed the cui-ui 
sucker as endangered.  This paper follows the progression of Reclamation fi sh 
passage projects on the lower Truckee River that accompanied a century of water 
development.
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Early History
 The river and its fi sheries were impacted suddenly when gold was 
discovered near Virginia City, Nevada, in 1859.  For the next forty years the 
Truckee River experienced rapid changes along its path.  Joe Simonds2 depicts the 
rapid early growth and its impact on the river as follows: 
 The Comstock Lode, as it would come to be called, began an 
infl ux of settlers to northern Nevada that would place heavy demands 
on the region’s natural resources, including water and timber.  Water to 
supply the growing needs of the Comstock’s’ mines was diverted from 
the  Truckee River and Lake Tahoe Basins, marking the beginning of 
interbasin water diversions.  The demands for lumber to supply the mines 
and railroads led to the rapid growth of logging and milling operations 
throughout the Sierra Nevada.  Before long, the rivers and streams in the 
area became clogged with sawdust and logging debris, preventing fi sh 
migration and seriously degrading the quality of water in the Truckee 
River.
 In 1861, Congress granted Nevada territorial status.  Among 
the fi rst acts of the Territorial Assembly was to pass a requirement that 
all dams constructed in Nevada allow for the natural transit of fi sh.  
Unfortunately, this requirement was frequently overlooked. 
 In the early 1860s, the fi rst irrigation ditches began to appear.  
The Pioneer and Cochran Ditches diverted water from the Truckee River 
to irrigate lands in Truckee Meadows.  Numerous dams were constructed 
on the Truckee River to divert water for irrigation or to power mills.  In 
1870, the California Legislature authorized the Donner Lumber and 
Boom Company to improve the channel of the Truckee River from the 
outlet of Lake Tahoe to the California/Nevada state line.  The company 
constructed a rockfi lled timber crib dam at the outlet of the lake, 
controlling the outfl ow of the lake for the fi rst time.  Throughout the later 
part of the 1800s, growth along the Truckee River continued at a rapid 
pace.  More dams were constructed, increasing diversions from the river 
and further limiting migration of fi sh.
 By about 1900 the federal government through the United States 
Geological Survey and, later, the United States Reclamation Service was 
investigating a large scale irrigation project involving the lower Truckee and 
Carson Rivers.  In 1903 the Secretary of the Interior authorized the  Truckee-
Carson Irrigation Project (Newlands Project).  On the Truckee River, the project 
included storage reservoirs on the upper river and a diversion dam on the lower 
river, 6.1.  The diversion dam, initially called the Truckee River Dam, was 
renamed Derby Diversion Dam.  Derby Diversion Dam diverts water from the 
Truckee River basin through a canal to Lahontan Reservoir on the Carson River.  
The thirty-one foot high dam providing about fi fteen feet of hydraulic head was 
completed in 1905, 6.2.  The dam has an embankment that runs across the river 
valley to a 155-foot-wide concrete buttress gated spillway that spans across the 
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Truckee River channel.  The spillway originally consisted of 
16, 5-foot by 5-foot cast iron slide gates separated by 5 foot-wide-piers.  The 
impact of the dam on fi sh moving upstream to spawn was recognized early in 
the project.  It is believed a weir and pool fi shway was constructed on the right 
abutment shortly after the dam was completed.  This fi shway was replaced in 
1913 with another pool and weir fi shway constructed downstream of the fi rst 
spillway gate, 6.3.  The 1913 fi shway was a wood fl ume containing fl ashboards 
(weirs).  The fi shway provided a series of 16, 6-ft-long by 10-ft- wide pools, 
each pool dropping about one foot to the next.  The height of the fl ashboards 
was adjustable to accommodate large changes in river fl ows.  The 1913 fi shway 
was not unlike many of today’s pool and weir fi shways.  There are no records of 
fi shway effectiveness or how long the fi shway remained in service.
 Despite these early attempts to provide fi sh passage, there is little doubt 
 Derby Diversion Dam was one of several signifi cant factors that led to the 
extinction of the Pyramid Lake Lahontan cutthroat trout by the 1940s.  For 
the next half century following the extinction of the Pyramid Lake Lahontan 
cutthroat trout there was little pressure to provide effective fi sh passage at Derby 
Diversion Dam.  In the early 1970s another species of Lahontan cutthroat trout 
was reintroduced to Pyramid Lake.  This population has largely been sustained 
by hatchery spawning.  The goal of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and many 
public and private organizations is to restore spawning Lahontan cutthroat trout 
to the Truckee River.  To this end, in 2000 Reclamation announced a plan to 
design and construct a new fi shway on Derby Diversion Dam.  Working with the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Reclamation designed a rock channel fi shway 
that will allow passage of Lahontan cutthroat trout, cui-ui, and other resident fi sh 
species currently held below the dam.  The rock fi shway will consist of a 940 ft 
long channel sloping 1.8 feet every 100 feet, 6.4.  Flow down the channel will 
be controlled by a series of boulder weirs that create pools upstream and small 
drops downstream.  Each weir is formed by placing boulders about 1 ft apart in an 
upstream pointing chevron pattern.  The boulder weirs create a hydraulic control 
that produces a drop in water surface of about 0.4 ft, producing a maximum 
passage velocity of about 5.0 feet per second (ft/s).  The fi shway was scheduled 
for construction in 2002-2003.
The River’s End
 The problem of fi sh passage on the lower Truckee River is not limited to 
Derby Diversion Dam.  The confl uence of the Truckee River and  Pyramid Lake 
is a critical location where fi sh passage has often been blocked by the infl uences 
of man and nature.  An excerpt from the Nevada Governor’s address to the 
Legislature in 1875 cited the start of many efforts to deal with passage issues that 
have occurred at the river’s end.3
A subject of importance to many citizens of the state,… is the 
preservation of the fi sheries of the Truckee River...unless preventative 
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measures are soon adopted and rigidly enforced, their certain destruction 
is imminent....  To the Indians there residing (Pyramid Lake) the fi sheries 
are a valuable source of food, employment and profi t.
 The mouth of the Truckee, where the river empties into the lake, 
is closed by a bar of sawdust at least a mile in length, three hundred 
yards in breadth and three feet in depth… I saw hundreds of fi ne trout 
dead and rotten upon the shores.  The air was poisoned with the stench of 
their decay.
 With the construction of Derby Diversion Dam and other upstream 
diversions the passage problem at the river’s end changed from sawdust to a 
declining lake elevation.  The average annual infl ow to  Pyramid Lake for the 
period of 1918 to 1970 was approximately 250,000 acre feet, while the average 
annual evaporative loss is approximately 440,000 acre feet.4  In 1967 Pyramid 
6.1.  M
ap of the N
ew
lands P
roject.
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Lake’s water level reached its lowest recorded level—more than 87 feet lower 
than it was in 1906 when Derby Dam diversions began.  This lowering was due to 
the increased diversions of water out of the Truckee River, the natural evaporative 
loss at Pyramid Lake, and also due to some major droughts within this period.
6.2.  View of Derby Diversion and Truckee River.
6.3.  Pool and weir fi shway constructed at Derby Diversion Dam in 1913.
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 As the water 
level in Pyramid 
Lake began to fall in 
the early 1900s, the 
gradient of the Truckee 
River steepened in 
the lower river and 
exposed a large fl at 
delta area at the mouth 
of the river.  This made 
upstream migration of 
the Pyramid Lake fi sh 
diffi cult.
 The fi rst major 
structural effort to 
improve fi sh migration 
up the Truckee River 
was started by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1942 when it started construction 
of a diversion dam and fi shway channel near the site of the present Marble Bluff 
facilities.  However, World War II interrupted construction, and the dam was 
washed out during fl ood fl ows in 1950. 
 In 1975 Reclamation completed construction of  Marble Bluff Dam and 
 Pyramid Lake Fishway.  The dam was designed as a grade control structure to 
stabilize the lower Truckee River gradient.  The fi shway was designed to provide 
fi sh passage from the lake to the river upstream of the river delta.  The dam is 
6.4.  View of proposed rock channel fi shway overlaid on a 
photograph of Derby Diversion Dam.
6.5.  View of Marble Bluff Dam and the exit of Pyramid Lake Fishway.
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located approximately three miles upstream of Pyramid Lake, 6.5.  The 
35 foot high dam is a 1440-foot long, earth fi lled embankment with 150-foot long, 
centered, uncontrolled concrete ogee crest spillway with gated sluiceway.  The 
spillway and sluiceway pass fl ow down a baffl ed apron drop to the downstream 
river channel.  Storage at the dam is negligible, as the facility was not intended to 
store water.5
 In conjunction with the dam’s construction, a fi sh handling facility and 
two different paths for fi sh passage from the lake to the river above the dam 
were constructed.  The primary purpose of the fi sh handling facility was to trap, 
examine, and document fi sh that migrated from Pyramid Lake into the Truckee 
River.6  Two fi sh passage paths were needed as river access for fi sh is often 
blocked, for lake elevations below about 3800 feet, by a large sediment delta at 
the junction of the river and lake.  Historically, when exposed, the delta causes 
the river to fan out into a shallow braided channel that blocks fi sh passage up 
the river.  For these conditions, a direct route was constructed from the lake to 
upstream of Marble Bluff Dam, called the Pyramid Lake Fishway.  The Pyramid 
Lake Fishway combined fi ve fi sh ladders and about three miles of fi shway 
channel to provide a maximum elevation gain of about seventy-six feet between 
the lake and the river upstream of the dam.  Typical salmon style fi sh ladders 
with weir/orifi ce baffl es were designed for the fi shway, 6.6.  Each fi sh ladder was 
sloped at a grade of one foot vertical to ten feet horizontal (10% grade), while 
the fi shway channels linking the fi sh ladders were sloped at one foot vertical in 
10,000 feet horizontal.  The fi shway was designed to pass up to 50 ft3/s at a fl ow 
depth of 4 feet and fl ow velocity of 1 ft/s.  The weir/orifi ce baffl es in each fi sh 
ladder were spaced 10 feet apart, provided an approximate 1 foot drop across each 
baffl e, and a passage fl ow velocity of 8 ft/s.
 For years when Pyramid Lake elevation covers the sediment delta, 
fi sh can move up the Truckee River to the dam and must be passed over.  Fish 
passage over the dam was originally achieved by constructing a fi sh trap with a 
mechanical hoist lift system to raise the trapped fi sh over the dam. 
6.6.  Location map showing Marble Bluff Dam and Pyramid Lake Fishway.
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 The trap, 6.7, was lowered into a sump at the head of a fi sh attraction 
channel located on the right bank of the downstream river channel.  Fish moved 
up the attraction channel following attraction fl ows and passed into the fi sh trap.  
Operators judged when to raise the trap with the mechanical hoist.  The original 
system was designed such that all fi sh entering the trap/lift system must pass 
through the fi sh handling facility.  In 1987 the trap/lift system was modifi ed by the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to allow the lifted fi sh to be released directly to the 
upstream river, via the upper fi shway channel. 
 Neither of the original Marble Bluff Dam fi sh passage facilities functioned 
as intended.  During the fi rst years of fi shway operation, the ladder baffl e design 
and head drop were found to be a poor match for cui-ui behavior and swimming 
strength.  The cui-ui displayed a strong bottom oriented behavior in the fi shway 
that was contrary to passing over a weir and the 8 ft/s fl ow velocity was found to 
be too high for many cui-ui.  Cui-ui attempting to move up the fi shway at times 
crowded so densely that many fi sh were smothered.  To improve fi sh passage, 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service added a fi sh exclusion gate at the fi shway entrance 
to regulate the number of fi sh entering the fi shway and modifi ed the fi sh ladders.  
In each fi sh ladder, weirs were added halfway between the original ladder baffl es 
to reduce the drop over each baffl e to 0.5 foot and slow down the passage velocity 
to about 5 ft/s.  Passage of the cui-ui improved, however, fi sh passage effi ciency 
remained low. 
 The fi sh trap/lift system also had numerous operational problems and 
limitations.  The biggest limitation was that the system was too slow, resulting in 
6.7.  Schematic of the Marble Bluff Dam fi sh trap used to lift fi sh over the dam from 
1987 to 1997.
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fi sh over-crowding, delays, and mortality. 
 In 1993, two thousand cui-ui died in the river trap due to a mechanical 
failure.7  Both fi sh passage structures were progressively modifi ed by U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service in a continual effort to improve fi sh passage at the site.  
However, fi sh passage for the cui-ui and Lahontan cutthroat remained a signifi cant 
problem.
 The period from the mid 1980s through the 1990s brought fl oods 
accompanied by large cui-ui runs that the fi sh passage facilities couldn’t handle 
and periods of drought with few spawning fi sh.  High water years in the mid-
1980s raised Pyramid Lake to an elevation submerging the Pyramid Lake fi shway 
entrance and opening up river passage to the dam.  During these high water 
years, thousands of fi sh moved up the river to the dam overwhelming the ability 
of the fi sh trap to pass fi sh.  This period of high water was followed by a period 
of lower than normal winter precipitation from 1988 to 1992.  The lake declined 
to elevation 3797 feet prior to the spring runoff of 1993.  For these fi ve years of 
operation, the entire fl ow (30-50 ft3/s) of the lower Truckee River was diverted 
into the Pyramid Lake fi shway during the spawning run seasons.  Lahontan 
cutthroat trout ascended the fi shway in 1988-1990 with the runs ranging from just 
over 100 fi sh to a high around 450 fi sh in 1989.8  During this timeframe, only in 
1989 did cui-ui migrate up the fi shway to the fi sh handling building, and these 
seventy-one fi sh were transported to the Tribal Hatchery at Suttcliff, Nevada.  Due 
to the continued drought in 1991 and 1992, bar racks were installed at the terminal 
ladder to prevent fi sh from migrating into the fi shway.  Water releases from 
upstream storage during this fi ve year drought period were minor and intermittent. 
This dry period was followed by a record wet winter in 1992-1993.  Even 
though the lake was low, both the fi shway and the river trap were operated that 
year.  It was estimated that on April 3, 1993, tens of thousands of cui-ui entered 
the terminal ladder.  This mass movement of fi sh exceeded the rate that cui-ui 
could ascend up the ladder resulting in cui-ui being killed due to crowding and 
suffocation, and no fi sh passed on up the fi shway to the river.  A second and even 
larger run started on May 29th.  To keep the fi sh from again overcrowding, fi shery 
personnel netted cui-ui from the entrance ladder, to reduce their numbers.  These 
fi sh were then transported and released upstream of Marble Bluff Dam.  During 
the 1993 spawning run, over 18,000 cui-ui and 108 Lahontan cutthroat trout were 
passed upstream of Marble Bluff Dam from the fi shway, river trap by netting 
and transporting, while approximately 4000 cui-ui died due to overcrowding in 
the fi sh ladders and a mechanical failure in the river trap.  Prior to the spawning 
run of 1994, Fish and Wildlife Service again modifi ed the entrance ladder and 
river trap to reduce the mortality rate of the migrating cui-ui.  The 1994 fi sh 
runs resulted in 66,425 cui-ui and seventy-nine Lahontan cutthroat trout being 
passed upstream of Marble Bluff Dam with about 250 cui-ui killed at the entrance 
ladder.9
 In 1995, the Bureau of Reclamation assisted a team of federal, tribal, state, 
and local organizations in addressing the fi sh passage problems at Marble Bluff 
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Dam.10  The main objective was to improve passage over the dam.  An identifi ed 
objective was an estimated fi sh passage capacity of 300,000 fi sh during a three-
day period to prevent migration delays at the dam.  By 1998 this process had 
resulted in the Bureau of Reclamation replacing the fi sh trap/lift system with a 
hydraulic fi sh lock, and constructing a new fi shway channel exit ladder, 6.8.  This 
was the fi rst time that a hydraulic lock was built for fi sh passage by the Bureau of 
Reclamation.
Reclamation’s Fish Lock
 A hydraulic fi sh lock is simply a water elevator which operates similar to 
a boat lock.  The sequencing of events required during passage of fi sh through the 
lock is shown in 6.9.  Each lock cycle is divided into four phases: fi sh attraction, 
lock fi lling, fi sh release, and lock draining.  In the fi sh attraction phase, fl ow 
attracts the migrating fi sh into the fi sh lock chamber.  After a preset time, the 
fi sh entrance gate is closed and the lock is fi lled with water (lock fi lling phase).  
When the fi sh lock is approximately full, a fi sh crowder is raised by a hoist and 
the lock exit gate opened (fi sh release phase).  The fi sh crowder moves fi sh up 
near the surface and into the fi sh lock exit channel.  Once the fi sh are out of the 
lock, the exit gate is closed, the false fl oor lowered, and the fi sh lock chamber 
drained (draining phase).  The lock cycle then repeats.  The system is operated 
manually or automatically via a software based control system linked to water 
level and gate position sensors.  The new hydraulic fi sh lock required modifying 
the existing 15 foot by 15 foot fi sh trap/lift concrete well and building a new fi sh 
lock exit channel.  The existing fi sh attraction channel was lengthened and a fi sh 
barrier gate was added to provide a method of controlling fi sh access to the fi sh 
lock.
6.8.  Plan view of Marble Bluff fi sh lock and Pyramid Lake Fishway exit ladder.
219
 Soon after the fi sh lock design was fi nished, nature again changed fl ow 
conditions at the river’s end.  In January 1997 a large fl ood on the Truckee 
River (23,000 ft3/s) scoured the river channel downstream of Marble Bluff 
Dam lowering the river elevation by several feet leaving fi sh access to the fi sh 
lock facility in question.  It was decided that the pre-fl ood elevation of the river 
downstream of the dam had to be recovered if the existing trap/lift structure was 
to be modifi ed into a fi sh lock.  The problem was solved in 1998 when a nearly 
450-foot-long by 2-foot-high rock ramp was constructed in the river channel 
about 300 yards downstream of the dam.  The rock ramp was designed to imitate 
a natural riffl e so as not to block fi sh passage to the dam.
 In 1998 the Reno Gazette-Journal, ran a story that exclaimed “Cui-ui 
spawning the biggest in years.”11  The journal further reported that this was the 
largest spawning run since Marble Bluff Dam was built.  It was estimated that the 
new fi sh lock can move 3,500 fi sh at a time, compared to only 600 to 800 fi sh at a 
time by the old fi sh trap/lift system.  In its fi rst year the lock passed over 400,000 
spawning cui-ui upstream of Marble Bluff Dam.  A year later an estimated 
600,000 cui-ui passed through the fi sh lock with no apparent delay.
A Look to the Future—Rebuilding the Pyramid Lake Fishway
 Construction of the fi sh lock required removing the upstream-most fi sh 
ladder on the Pyramid Lake fi shway (exit ladder) and presented the opportunity 
to design and construct a replacement fi sh ladder tailored to cui-ui.  Fish ladder 
6.9.  Marble Bluff Dam fi sh lock operating phases.
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construction was preceded by hydraulic tests of several fi sh ladder designs at 
Reclamation’s Water Resources Research Laboratory in Denver, Colorado.  These 
tests resulted in a unique fi shway ladder design tailored to the behavior and 
swimming capabilities displayed by the cui-ui sucker.  A dual-slot-chevron shaped 
baffl e design was chosen, 6.10.  The new fi sh ladder’s slope is about one-third that 
of the ladder it replaced (3.1% grade) and holds fl ow velocity to about 
4 ft/s.12  The fi shway channel with the new bypass fi sh ladder is still not 
considered fully operational as the fi shway still contains four old weir/orifi ce style 
ladders along its route to the dam.  Rebuilding the Pyramid Lake fi shway channel 
to an effective fi shway for both cui-ui and Lahontan cutthroat trout remains a 
major task to fulfi lling the original goals of the Marble Bluff Dam and fi shway 
project.
Brent Mefford, P.E., and Rick Christensen work for the Bureau of Reclamation 
in Denver, Colorado.
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6.10.  Marble Bluff Dam Fishway exit Ladder.
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Explaining Hoover, Grand Coulee, and Shasta 
Dams:  Institutional Stability and Professional 
Identity in the USBR
By:
Karin Ellison 
Abstract
 Between 1923 and 1943 the U.S.  Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) 
changed dramatically.  In 1923, after two decades of operation, the USRS was 
small and embattled.  It had 27 irrigation projects, 3700 full-time employees, and 
a budget of $20.6 million.  In contrast, in 1943 the USBR could have celebrated 
20 years of growth and success and anticipated more.  In 1943, the USBR had 52
projects.  It had increased its staff to 6500, or more than doubled it.  Even more 
impressively, it had increased its budget to $91.7 million, or to almost 4½ times 
1922’s budget.  One of the big changes in the USBR was the construction of large 
multiple purpose dams—Hoover, Grand Coulee, Shasta, and, after World War II, 
many more.  Multiple purpose dam building, of course, did not arise out of the 
blue in the 1920s.  USBR engineers took utilitarian conservation ideas, espoused 
by Progressive Era scientists, engineers, and politicians, and implemented them by 
building large multiple purpose dams.
 I explain the advent of multiple purpose dam building, and the growth 
of the Bureau of Reclamation, in terms of a stable agency leadership and its 
professional culture.  Clearly, the Depression and the New Deal government 
provided the means that developed rivers, hired new staff, and, generally, fueled 
agency growth.  President Roosevelt, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, Washington 
Senator Dill, and others involved in directing relief funds to water development 
did not, however, determine the features of the techno-environmental systems that 
rivers would become.  USBR engineers drew on engineering paradigms, common 
solutions that could be fi tted to new problems, to refi ne both the production 
practices and design choices of river development and create these systems.  These 
men gazed at the world through engineers’ glasses and saw disorderly construction 
sites and disorderly rivers.  In response, they applied the tools of their trade and 
rationalized construction sites and rivers.  The result was multiple purpose dams, 
conservation ideas put into practice, and an expanding USBR.
 Biographical data establish the stability of the USBR’s leaders in the 
1920s and 1930s, their virtually exclusive orientation towards engineering, and 
links between this group and Progressive Era engineering reforms.  Two features 
of the careers of USBR leaders particularly indicate the stability of the group in 
the 1920s and 1930s: the long length of their employment with the USBR and 
the dates and reasons that men left.  Education and professional affi liation reveal 
the group as one of professional engineers.  With respect to Progressivism, the 
biographical data show possibilities.  These engineers were in the right places at 
the right times to be exposed to Progressive ideas about conservation of natural 
resources and scientifi c management.  They were educated in the Progressive 
Era.  More importantly, these men began their careers at the USBR in its fi rst 
decade.  They trained into their profession under Director Fredrick Newell and 
Chief Engineer Arthur Powell Davis, both notable fi gures in the conservation and 
engineering reform movements.
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 As with many groups of engineers in this period, this stable group 
of engineers with links to Progressivism embraced industrial practices and 
rationalization.  They applied these paradigms to both the processes of building 
dams and to the designing of river systems.  To illustrate the industrialized and 
rationalized elements of dam building and river development plans, I compare 
these activities with scientifi c management.  I chose Taylorism as a framework 
for comparison because F. W. Taylor laid out an explicit program for rationalizing 
workplaces that can serve as a way to distill the broad ranging changes of 
industrialization and rationalization.  Further, Taylorism was broadly discussed and 
debated in this period, so these concepts would have been part of the intellectual 
resources of the  USBR leaders as they engaged in river planning and directed dam 
construction.  Taylor sought to standardize and routinize everything in a factory—
production processes, spatial layout of factories, machines, and, especially, 
workers.  To do this, he created expanded roles for engineers.  Not only would 
mechanical engineers invent and refi ne factory machinery, but they would also 
oversee factory operations.
 By analyzing the construction methods used at Grand Coulee Dam, 
I show that the USBR and its contractors set up a process, like Taylorism, that 
placed engineers in the center, emphasized fl ow, and refi ned machinery.  During 
the construction of a dam, USBR employees provided important management 
oversight through drawings and inspectors.  Contractors set up fl owing processes 
construction systems, such as a set of trucks and conveyor belts to remove the 
“overburden” from the dam site.  The USBR employed experts to study and refi ne 
the machinery used in the construction of dams, for example concrete mixers.
 As with construction sites, Federal engineers developed the ideas about 
river development, advocated by Progressive Era conservationists, into a set of 
technical practices, structures, and new landscapes with analysis and management 
techniques similar to those used by F. W. Taylor and his followers.  Like Taylorism, 
conservation included places for professional engineers in large organizations.  
Planning and constructing large dams prompted growth of engineering 
organizations.  When engineers changed free-fl owing rivers into series of lakes, 
they used the same kind of spatial logic as Taylor’s rearrangement of machinery 
on factory fl oors.  The USBR’s Denver offi ce specialized in designing, analyzing, 
and refi ning the main technology of comprehensive river development—multiple 
purpose dams—just as Taylor worked on making faster and more precise 
machine tools.  While Taylor stretched rationalization to encompass workers, 
comprehensive planning stretched rationalization to encompass another new 
area—large natural systems.
 When Interior Secretary Hubert Work called for an investigation and 
reorganization of the U.S. Reclamation Service (USRS)1 in 1923 and Interior 
Secretary Harold Ickes repeated the exercise in 1943, the institution that they 
targeted could hardly have been more different.  In 1923 after two decades of 
operation, the USRS was small and embattled.  By 1922, it had constructed twenty-
seven irrigation projects, had 3,667 full-time employees, and $20,603,793 in funds 
to spend.  Its major constituency, the farmers who worked the USRS’s irrigated 
land, was in open revolt.  The cost of creating irrigation farms had far exceeded rosy 
government estimates, and, with the revival of European agriculture in the wake 
of World War I, markets for American farmers collapsed.  In contrast, in 1943 the 
USBR could have celebrated twenty years of growth and success and anticipated 
more.  In 1943 the USBR had fi fty-two projects.  It had increased its staff to 6,543,
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or more than doubled it.  Even more impressively, it had increased its budget to 
$91,665,613, or to almost 4½ times 1922’s budget.  Further, this growth included 
the construction of Hoover,2 Grand Coulee, and Shasta dams—the fi rst set of 
monumental multiple purpose structures and the entree to integrated development of 
rivers after World War II.3
 Given the weakness of the USRS as an organization in the early 1920s, the 
institutional success of the  USBR in the 1930s and 1940s begs explanation.  The 
Depression is surely part of the story.  The severe economic problems of the 1930s 
and the willingness of Franklin Roosevelt’s administration to spend money in an 
attempt to solve them provided great opportunities for men with plans.  However, 
dams were not the only way, or even a particularly important way, for the federal 
government to spend money.4
 One might argue that the  multiple purpose dams themselves adequately 
provided the rest of the story of the USBR’s success.  The concept of a multiple 
purpose dam is clearly well suited to the American political system.  Each dam 
offers a range of services—navigation improvement, irrigation water, fl ood control, 
and hydroelectricity, most commonly.  Each service can have a constituency and 
each constituency one or more votes to fund a dam in Congress.  However, in 
the early 1920s, multiple purpose dams were much more an idea than a reality.  
Engineers had reported favorably on a proposal to build Hoover Dam on the lower 
Colorado River.  However, neither the compact dividing the waters of the Colorado 
between the tributary states nor the political coalition, which would wrest approval 
and funding for Hoover Dam from Congress, yet existed.  The Army Corps of 
Engineers had built a hydroelectricity dam and two nitrate plants at Muscle Shoals 
on the Tennessee River during World War I.  Congress, however, would fi ght over 
how to dispose of these seeds of the Tennessee Valley Authority until Franklin 
Roosevelt took offi ce in 1933.5
 People, as much as money and a new technology, explain the successes 
of the USBR in the 1920s and 1930s.  In this period, a remarkably stable and 
homogeneous group of men6 led the USBR.  In the fi rst part of this paper, I will 
show that overwhelmingly the leaders of the USBR between 1923 and 1943 were 
engineers familiar with Progressive reform engineering.  In the second part, I 
will suggest that the training and professional identifi cation of USBR leaders as 
Progressive engineers made a signifi cant impact on its development.  USBR leaders 
used experience with and enthusiasm for industrialization, scientifi c management, 
and conservation to reshape the organization’s activities.  Conservation provided 
a broad conceptual framework for water development by pairing “comprehensive 
planning” with reservoir construction.  Industrialization and scientifi c management 
emphasized process-place engineers at the center and study and refi nement of all 
processes and components.7
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Engineering Leaders
 One of the most striking features of the USBR between 1923 and 1943 
was the stability and uniformity of its leadership.  USBR leaders devoted their 
careers to government service.  Overwhelmingly, they came to the USRS during the 
Progressive Era with strong ties to engineering through education and professional 
affi liations.
 The organization chart appearing in the USBR’s monthly magazine 
Reclamation Era identifi ed the small groups of key fi gures in the commissioner’s 
offi ce in Washington, D.C., and the chief engineer’s offi ce in Denver, Colorado, 
as well as a larger group of men heading the various irrigation projects and 
investigations across the West.  Standard biographical data, such as found in Who’s 
Who and other common biographical sources, was available for fi fty-three of the 
167 individuals so identifi ed.8  The fi eld engineers were by far the largest group.9
Some 125 men held high positions in fi eld offi ces as opposed to twenty-four men 
in Denver and seventeen men and one woman in Washington, D.C.  However, 
information was much more readily available on leaders from the commissioner’s 
offi ce and from the chief engineer’s offi ce than on fi eld men.  Data on thirteen 
individuals from the Washington group and twenty from the Denver group provided 
information on over 70 percent of these leaders.  The additional twenty fi eld men 
identifi ed only allow analysis of 16 percent of this group.10
 The career paths of USBR leaders established a remarkable stability in this 
group between 1923 and 1943.  The longevity of these men as USBR employees 
paired with when and why they left the USBR indicates the stability of this group.
Many of these men worked for the USBR for lengthy periods.  Field engineer 
 Frank Banks, who oversaw the construction of Owyhee and Grand Coulee dams, 
set the challenge with fi fty-one years of service.  While few rivaled Banks, twenty-
fi ve additional men spent twenty years or more as employees of the USBR.  This 
pattern of lengthy service is particularly striking when compared with other groups 
of federal experts.  In agricultural economics, for example, men used employment 
in the U.S.  Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Agricultural Economics in lieu 
of graduate school.  Many of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics’ early staff only 
worked there briefl y.11
 The small number of USBR leaders who departed between 1927 and 
1942—ten—and the reasons they left, further indicate stability.  Many of these 
leaders did not leave by choice.  Seven of the men died while employed by the 
USBR.  The men in the USBR pushed out the one woman in the group, Mae 
Schnurr.  Schnurr worked her way up through the federal bureaucracy to a position 
of responsibility under Commissioner Mead—assistant to the commissioner and, on 
occasion, acting commissioner.  After Mead died in 1936, Schnurr was repeatedly 
demoted until she arranged a transfer to the Offi ce of the Secretary of the Interior in 
1941.  Even the two leaders who willingly left did not make signifi cantly different 
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career choices.  One retired and the other transferred to a very similar position with 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).12
 A clearly defi ned group of ten engineers did leave the  USBR between 1924 
and 1926—fallout from reorganization.  The Interior Secretary pushed Director 
 Arthur Powell Davis out of the USRS in 1923.13  He replaced A. P. Davis with David 
W. Davis, a banker and politician from 
Idaho.  After a brief period of reorganization, 
D. W. Davis was one of the early 1920s 
departers.  A second, Morris Bien, retired 
in 1924 at age 65 to pursue a private law 
practice.  The rest followed Chief Engineer 
Weymouth.  Weymouth resigned in 1924 as 
Elwood Mead, an engineer, replaced David 
Davis.  After slightly over one year in private 
practice, Weymouth went on to work as 
chief engineer for J. G. White Engineering 
Corporation from 1926-1929, for the City of 
Los Angeles Water Works from 1929-1930, 
and for Southern California’s Metropolitan 
Water District (MWD) until he retired.  All 
seven of the other men who left the USBR 
between 1924 and 1926 worked with 
Weymouth at one or more of these three 
organizations.14
A stable group, these men also made a very homogeneous group.  Homogeneity 
started at home.  Geographically, Commissioners Mead and Page and Chief 
Engineer Walter all hailed from the Midwest or Plains states, and they exemplifi ed a 
trend.  In all, twenty-two of fi fty-three USBR leaders, or 42 percent, came from this 
region.  The Reclamation West15 and Northeast evenly split a second twenty.  Only 
three men came from each the South and Europe.  This geographic distribution, 
however, shifted over time.  When I divided the fi fty-three USBR leaders by both 
birth decades and hiring decades, the eleven born in the 1890s and 1900s and the 
thirteen hired in 1923 or later more strongly represented the Reclamation West.  In 
these divisions, 36 percent and 38 percent respectively came from federal irrigation 
states.
 In respect to marriage and children, USBR leaders were even more uniform 
and conservative.  The large majority married and had children.  Commissioner 
Mead, for example, married Florence Chase in 1882 and, after she passed away, 
married Mary Lewis in 1905.  In all, Mead had six children.  While most USBR 
leaders had fewer children: biographical sources identifi ed none as life-long 
bachelors and only three as childless.  Information on family, however, was reported 
less frequently than many of the data on these leaders.  No information on marriage 
or children appeared for roughly one-third of these individuals. 
7.1.   Frank E. Weymouth.
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 Similarities multiplied at work.  The typical USBR leader was born in 
the 1880s (42 percent), attended a land-grant university (70 percent), majored in 
civil engineering (42 percent), completed his education with a bachelor’s degree 
(62 percent), began working in the Progressive Era (74 percent), belonged to the 
American Society for Civil Engineers (62 percent), worked for the USBR for 20 
years or longer (68 percent), and ended his career at the USBR (51 percent).  A 
closer look at this data suggests not just similarities, but patterns linking USBR 
leaders to Progressivism and engineering reform more specifi cally. 
 USBR leaders were  Progressive engineers.  Dates of birth, education, fi rst 
employment, and hiring by the USRS place the beginning of these men’s careers 
fi rmly in the Progressive Era.  The fi rst leaders of the USRS pursued reform goals 
and taught the leaders of the 1930s and 1940s their jobs in an atmosphere of 
activism.  Further, the careers of the latter group demonstrated a commitment to 
public service indicative of engineering reformers.
 Dates place the  USBR leaders of 1923-1943 as young professionals during 
the Progressive Era.  USBR leaders were born between 1858 and 1905.  The largest 
portion was born in the 1870s (nine) and, especially, the 1880s (twenty-two).  Age 
meant that the men attended college and began their careers in the Progressive Era.
Thirty-one of fi fty-three graduated with a bachelor’s degree between 1900 and 1919. 
The addition of the few men who did not have a college degree and those for whom 
education information is not available meant that even more began working in these 
two decades—thirty-nine of fi fty-three.
 More specifi cally, the leaders of the 1920s and 1930s began working 
for the USRS in the reformist atmosphere of its fi rst decade.  The USRS hired 
thirty-four of the fi fty-three between 1902 and 1912—the fi rst decade of the 
organization’s existence.  In these early years, reform-minded men led the USRS 
and trained the future leaders into their profession.  Before 1923, the USRS had two 
heads— Frederick Haynes Newell and  Arthur Powell Davis.  Both these men began 
their careers in the U.S. Geological Survey under John Wesley Powell, a colorful 
explorer, administrator, and founder of the conservation movement.  Newell helped 
Nevada Senator Newlands and other western senators draft the Reclamation Act 
and became the fi rst director of the USRS.  He was a leader of the conservation 
movement and, as part of the major effort of Progressive engineers directed at their 
own profession, advocated unifying engineers in one professional society through 
his Committee on Cooperation and the American Association of Engineers.  In 
1914 a fi nancial house cleaning in the USRS led to Newell’s fi ring.  Newell’s chief 
engineer and Powell’s nephew, Arthur Powell Davis, moved into the top leadership 
position, Davis too pursued conservation.  He formulated an early reform tradition 
plan for the development of the lower Colorado River.16
 A commitment to government service evident in the careers of the USBR’s 
second generation of leaders suggests that these men did indeed adopt some of the 
values of their mentors.  Both career paths and number of years spent in the USBR 
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show a commitment to government engineering.  Of fi fty-three men, thirty-one—
over half—either spent their entire career with the USBR or ended it there.  Another 
13 gave long periods of service at the beginning or in the middle of careers.  Only 
fi ve worked for the USBR for less than 10 years.  
 Unlike one strain of Progressive engineering reformers,  USBR engineers 
demonstrated a commitment to government service without condemning 
corporations or corporate work.  Morris Cooke represented the anti-corporate 
strain in engineering reform.  A member of the inner circle of the founder of 
“‘scientifi c’management,” F. W. Taylor, Cooke began his career by applying 
scientifi c management ideas to the running of a government agency, as Director 
of Public Works in Philadelphia, and to the operation of a professional society, the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers.  These efforts convinced Cooke of the 
dishonesty of corporations, and especially electrical and other utility companies.
He campaigned against utility infl uence in the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers in the mid-1910s and, in the New Deal, headed the Rural Electrifi cation 
Administration, one of Roosevelt’s efforts to curb the excesses and go beyond the 
self-imposed limits of electrical utilities.17
 USBR leaders, in contrast, worked closely with corporations in relevant 
fi elds and did not see former corporate employment as a ban to a job in the USBR.  
Starting in 1925 the USBR organized most of its major construction work by 
contract and, as a result, worked closely with corporate executives and engineers.
For example, between 1934 and 1943 two successive groups of general contractors 
made Grand Coulee Dam a massive and concrete reality from a set of plans.18  A 
consortium of Silas Mason Company of New York; Walsh Construction Company 
of Davenport, Iowa; and Atkinson-Kier Company of San Francisco won the fi rst 
contract.  Kaiser Construction Company of Seattle, Morrison Knudsen Company of 
Boise, Utah Construction Company of Ogden, J. F. Shea Company of San Francisco, 
Pacifi c Bridge Company of San Francisco, McDonald and Kahn of San Francisco, 
and General Construction Company of Seattle joined the fi rst group to complete 
construction.  Below I describe how USBR engineers and their contractors interacted 
during routine construction and how they could collaborate to experiment on, and 
improve production processes.  In terms of careers, many USBR leaders—thirty-two 
or almost two-thirds—worked for private companies at some point in their careers.
A handful worked for the large electrical companies Cooke and other reformers 
found especially repugnant.  For example,  Leslie McClellan, the USBR’s chief
electrical engineer, worked briefl y for Southern California Edison.  Robert Monroe, 
another Denver offi ce man, worked for Pacifi c Gas & Electric before coming to the 
USBR.19
 Between 1923 and 1943 a remarkably stable and homogeneous group of 
men steeped in Progressive Era reform movements provided the leadership for the 
USBR.  Additionally, the ties between these men, the USBR, and engineering cannot 
be overstated.  The domination of the USBR by civil engineers, rather than experts 
on water resources or irrigated agriculture, was a contingent historical phenomenon.  
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Other groups with technical expertise critical to the planning, construction, and 
operation of irrigation projects were available as choices to staff the new USRS.  
Experts in the U.S. Geological Survey, with stronger ties to geology, hydrography, 
and geography than to civil engineering, dominated federal debates over irrigation in 
the nineteenth century.  Experts in the U.S. Department of Agriculture worked with 
Wyoming Senator Francis E. Warren to prepare an alternative to the bill prepared by 
Senator Newlands and engineer Newell, which created the USRS.  Still, engineers, 
rather than experts in other related areas, led the USBR.  The structure of the USBR, 
the fi elds of education of USBR leaders, and the professional affi liations of these 
men show their disciplinary ties to engineering generally, and civil engineering 
in particular.  Further, these leaders had much in common with other engineers in 
this period: regional affi liation, educational institutions, level of education, and 
international work.20
 An organization chart from the 1920s or 1930s immediately reveals the 
importance of engineering in the USBR.  The USBR was a very strict hierarchical 
organization with engineers in all leadership positions, except for a small legal 
branch parallel to the main engineering organization.  Physically, space separated the 
 USBR engineers.  A commissioner and a small staff led the USBR from Washington, 
D.C.  By far, however, most of the employees and leaders worked in the West.  The 
chief engineer’s offi ce in Denver served as the technical hub for the USBR.  In 
addition, each irrigation project had a fi eld offi ce. 
 A commissioner—typically with substantial engineering experience—led 
the USBR.  From Washington, D.C., commissioners and their small staff primarily 
interacted with others in the capital—members of 
Congress, Interior Secretaries, and other upper-
administration offi cials.  The USBR had three 
commissioners between 1923 and 1945.  David W. 
Davis broke virtually all USBR patterns.  Interior 
Secretary Hubert Work appointed this banker and 
former governor of Idaho commissioner in hopes 
that a businessman could place the USRS on a more 
sound fi nancial footing.  Davis only stayed with 
the USBR for a few years.  Engineering training 
and long careers in public service made the other 
two commissioners typical of leaders of the USBR.
 Elwood Mead took the commissioner’s offi ce in 1924.  
It was his fi nal position in a lengthy career in water 
resources.  After working on a survey team during his 
teenage years, Mead earned bachelor’s and master’s 
degrees at Purdue University and a bachelor’s in civil 
engineering at Iowa State College in the early 1880s.
A short tenure as professor of irrigation engineering 
at Colorado Agricultural College led to the position 
of State Engineer of Wyoming during the 1890s.  In 
7.2.  Secretary of the 
Interior Hubert Work and 
Commissioner Elwood Mead 
at the site of the Stony Gorge 
Dam on the Orland Project, 
California, in 1927.
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Wyoming Mead participated in writing water law that made the state the sole owner 
of all water.  This legislation became the basis for revising water rights doctrine in 
several western states.  Subsequently, Mead promoted irrigated agriculture through 
the following positions: director of irrigation investigations in the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture; chairman of the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission in Victoria, 
Australia; and director of the state planned irrigation communities at Durham and 
Delhi, California.  He also worked as a professor at University of California, Berkeley. 
When Mead died in 1936 Interior Secretary Harold Ickes appointed civil engineer 
John C. Page acting commissioner and then commissioner.  Page was a much less 
well-known engineer.  Other than a year as assistant city engineer of Grand Junction, 
Colorado, Page spent his entire career in USBR.  His training consisted of a bachelor 
of science from University of Nebraska and a year of graduate study at Cornell 
University.  Page’s work in the early 1930s as the second in charge of the fi eld offi ce 
for Hoover Dam moved him from USBR staff to USBR leadership.21
 Designation of a chief engineer as the  USBR’s second-in-command further 
focused the USBR around engineering.  The chief engineer held fi nal authority for 
all technical matters—construction, design, and research—but focused on overseeing 
construction.  Denver, Colorado, housed the chief engineer and his engineering staff, 
which grew dramatically between 1923 and 1943.  In the early 1920s, a few senior 
engineers coordinated USBR engineering from Denver.  By the 1930s, a leadership 
staff of nine—an assistant chief engineer, a chief designing engineer, an assistant 
chief designing engineer, a chief electrical engineer, a designing engineer of dams, 
a designing engineer of canals, a mechanical engineer, and an engineer on technical 
studies—oversaw a staff of over 750.22
 Three men held the job of chief engineer between 1923 and 1943.  Like the 
commissioners, in both education and public service, the chief engineers had strong 
links to engineering and engineering reform.  A civil engineer from the University of 
Maine (1896),  Frank Weymouth served his last of twenty-two years with the USBR 
in 1924.  When Weymouth left, Chicagoan  Raymond (Ray) Walter became chief 
engineer.  Walter joined the USRS as a freshly minted civil engineer from Colorado 
State College in 1903, one year after conservationists and western congressmen 
created the USRS.  He held the position of chief engineer from 1924 until his death 
in 1940.  Walter’s long-time assistant chief engineer and another career USBR man, 
 Sinclair Ollason Harper, held the top position in Denver from 1940 to 1944.  Harper 
received his bachelor’s in civil engineering from the University of California.
 After the chief engineer, the most important man in Denver was  John (Jack) 
Savage, the chief designing engineer.  While Chief Engineer Walter focused on 
construction, Savage oversaw all aspects of design, planning, and research in the 
USBR.  Savage too followed the typical education and career pattern.  Except for 
eight years with a small consulting engineer fi rm, Savage spent his entire career 
with the USBR.  His formal training consisted of a bachelor of science in civil 
engineering from the University of Wisconsin.  Savage’s achievements, however, 
exceeded most USBR engineers.’  He held three honorary doctorates.  The National 
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Academy of Sciences and the American 
Academy of Arts and Science elected 
him a member.  The four engineering 
founder societies—the American Society 
of Civil Engineers, American Institute of 
Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 
and the American Institute of Electrical 
Engineers—awarded Savage the John Fritz 
Medal for notable achievement in 1945.  In 
addition, the Concrete Institute awarded 
him its Turner gold medal for his work on 
hydraulic structures.
 Beyond the central staffs in 
Washington, D.C., and Denver, the USBR 
detailed engineers to oversee construction 
and operation of projects.  This group—
the largest by number—consisted of 
surveyors, construction inspectors, and 
“offi ce engineers.”  These last drafted, 
made cost estimates, and performed other 
engineering offi ce tasks.   Frank Banks, described by Chief Engineer Walter as 
“our best construction engineer,”23 followed the education and career path of other 
USBR leaders.  Banks studied for his degree in civil engineering at the University 
of Maine.  He joined the USRS immediately upon graduation in 1906 and retired 
in 1957, after 51 years of service.  He supervised the construction of several USBR 
major dams including  Owyhee Dam in Oregon in the 1920s and  Grand Coulee Dam 
in Washington State in the 1930s.24
 Finally, the  USBR hired consulting engineers to monitor major construction 
endeavors like Hoover and Grand Coulee dams.  These men met as a board a couple 
of times a year to review designs and specifi cations, to inspect the quality of the 
work and procedures, and to provide opinions on issues raised by the USBR regular 
staff.  For example, the USBR’s consulting board for Grand Coulee Dam consisted 
of Columbia University Professor of Geology Charles Berkey; retired Stanford 
Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Fluid Mechanics William Durand; Seattle 
consulting engineer and former USBR employee Joseph Jacobs; and Dayton, Ohio, 
consulting engineer Charles Paul, also a former USBR engineer.25
 The education and professional affi liations of USBR leaders cemented the 
connection between the engineering organization and the broader profession of 
civil engineering.  USBR men primarily chose civil engineering as their fi eld of 
education—twenty-two men or 42 percent.  Another thirteen men selected other 
engineering fi elds.  Electrical and mining at four each were the best represented.  
The single man with topographical engineering as a major suggests the weakness 
7.3.  Raymond F. Walter while he served 
as Chief Engineer of the Bureau of 
Reclamation.
231
of remaining ties to the disciplines of the U.S. Geological Survey.  Unfortunately, 
biographical sources did not reveal the fi eld of study for more than 20 percent of the 
USBR leaders.
 Participation in professional societies maintained the connection to 
engineering, and especially civil engineering.   USBR leaders belonged to honor 
societies, professional organizations, and social clubs for engineers.  Tau Beta Pi 
(an engineering honor society), Chi Epsilon (the civil engineering honor society), 
and Sigma Xi (a science and engineering research honor society) elected thirteen 
USBR leaders as members.  Thirty-seven men (70 percent) belonged to at least 
one professional organization.  By far, the American Society of Civil Engineers 
claimed the most USBR men—thirty-three.  Societies representing other areas 
of engineering, such as the American Institute of Electrical Engineers (5) and
the American Concrete Institute (5), only claimed a handful of men.  Roughly 
one-quarter of the men also belonged to regional organizations for engineers 
and scientists.  Among these were the Colorado Society of Engineers (7), the 
Commonwealth Engineers Club in San Francisco (3), and the Cosmos Club in 
Washington D.C. (3).  Membership in professional organizations associated with 
geology and agriculture again show only very weak ties between USBR leaders and 
these closely related areas of expertise.  Two of the leaders belonged to American 
Geophysical Union, and one of these men also belonged to American Meteorological 
Society.  One additional man belonged to the semi-popular National Geographic 
7.4.  June 23, 1929, the Board of Engineers for Hoover Dam posed on a viewpoint above 
the Black Canyon Damsite.  Probably left to right: A. J. Wiley and Louis C. Hill, consulting 
engineers; Chief Designing Engineer J. L. Savage, Bureau of Reclamation; Chief Electri-
cal Engineer L. H. McClellan, Bureau of Reclamation; Designing Engineer B. W. Steele, 
Bureau of Reclamation; and Project Construction Engineer Walker R. Young, Bureau of 
Reclamation.
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Society.  In terms of agriculture, only three men belonged to the American Society 
of Agricultural Engineers (ASAE). 
 The similarities between USBR leaders and other groups of engineers further 
show how engineering dominated the USBR.  The best quantitative information on 
another group of American engineers in the 1920s and 1930s comes from Deborah 
Fitzgerald’s Every Farm a Factory.  Fitzgerald describes agricultural engineers and 
these men shared many, but not all, characteristics with USBR leaders.  Fitzgerald 
reports on a group of founders, offi cers, or council members of the ASAE between 
1907 and 1930.  The founders were men of the same generation as the USBR 
leaders.  They were born in the 1880s and attended college in the fi rst decade of 
the twentieth century.  They also took degrees in engineering fi elds and, far from 
rejecting business ties, moved easily in and out of commercial employment.  Further, 
both groups overwhelmingly attended the same kinds of institutions of higher 
education, fi nished their education at the same level, and worked internationally for 
part of their careers.26
 The tie between  USBR leaders, engineers more generally, and engineering 
reform was to a type of education institution and the profession generally, rather 
than one specifi c university.  USBR leaders attended state schools—thirty-seven 
or 70 percent.  They chose universities all across the West and Midwest.  ASAE 
founders likewise chose land-grant schools, although all midwestern.  Neither group 
came out of a unique strong department at a single university.  Two groupings, 
however, did exist among USBR leaders.  Six men came from the University of 
Maine.  Frank Weymouth—later chief engineer and clearly more of an institution 
builder than many in the USRS—returned to his alma mater, Maine, to speak about 
his work with the USRS in 1904.  His visit recruited Francis Crowe to work for 
the USRS that summer (and Crowe would return after graduation).  The following 
school year Crowe spoke about the West and reclamation with enthusiasm.  The 
tales of Weymouth and Crowe led several other young men from Maine to join the 
USRS.27  Less surprising, given the location of the chief engineer’s offi ce, a group 
of men also came to the USBR from the universities in or near Denver.  Three took 
undergraduate degrees at Colorado State College, two at the Colorado School of 
Mines, and one at the University of Colorado. 
 In level of education, USBR leaders followed general patterns for 
engineering.  For many of the men, 72 percent, the bachelor’s degree completed 
their formal education.  Likewise, Fitzgerald found that a substantial portion of 
ASAF founders and leaders had college degrees.  USBR men in the commissioner’s 
offi ce, as a group, did have more education than their USBR peers or ASAE leaders.  
Two held a second bachelor’s degree and three held master’s or professional 
degrees.  One additional man had done one year of graduate work.  These men were 
six of the eleven total who had undertaken schooling beyond the bachelor’s and 46 
percent of the thirteen individuals from the Washington Offi ce. 
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 Many American technical professionals of the early decades of the twentieth 
century consulted or worked internationally.  Fitzgerald examines the experience 
of agricultural experts in the Soviet Union.  Twenty  USBR leaders—fi ve from the 
Washington offi ce, nine Denver offi ce men, and six of the men from fi eld offi ces—
worked internationally too.  They worked on a range of international projects.  
These included planning irrigation communities in Australia, building waterworks 
in Mexico, and working on the Panama Canal.  The Near East, Far East, British 
Empire, and Central and South America all provided opportunities for USBR men.28
 In all, a special group of men led the USBR during the 1920s and 
1930s.  All of the USBR’s main hierarchy—commissioners, chief engineers, 
Denver offi ce department heads, and the top staff of large projects—was a stable 
and uniform group of men affi liated with engineering and, more particularly, 
Progressive engineering reform.  Long tenure of USBR leaders created stability 
and few departures in the late 1920s and 1930s, in particular, reinforced this 
trend.  The USBR uniformly hired western or midwestern family men for its 
leaders.  Strong patterns in education and career paths further demonstrated the 
uniformity of the group and linked them to engineering and, especially, Progressive 
engineering reform.  Virtually all of these men fi nished their formal education 
with undergraduate degrees in engineering from land-grant universities during the 
Progressive Era.  They maintained ties to engineering through professional societies, 
most commonly the American Society of Civil Engineers.  Long careers in public 
service further suggest they adopted values of their engineering reform mentors.
USBR leaders did not, however, belong to the anti-corporate wing of Progressive 
reform engineering.  The USBR worked closely with corporate contractors, and 
many USBR leaders worked for private companies at some point in their career.  
Engineering Rivers
 This group of stable and uniform Progressive engineers drew on the 
important experiences of their disciplines as they remade the USBR in the 1920s and 
1930s.  The sibling Progressive reform movements of conservation and scientifi c 
management, as well as industrialization more generally, were the most important 
of these experiences.  USBR men used scientifi c management, and some of the 
more general principles of industrialization, to refi ne conservation and create both 
industrialized dam construction and industrialized rivers. 
 Over the nineteenth century, industrialization fundamentally changed the 
production of goods and ways of life in the United States.  Items made by artisans, 
such as guns and shoes, or in homes, such as cloth or butter, became goods produced 
in factories.  For example, skilled armorers making complete guns gave way to 
armories.  In the latter, semi-skilled men or boys used special purpose machine tools 
to produce standardized parts to assemble into guns.  Compared to earlier ways of 
making things, factories were specialized, mechanized, capital-intensive, market-
oriented, and big.29
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 At the turn of the century, engineers formulated rational management 
systems, as the fi nishing touch to this transformation.  Many engineers worked on 
such systems but “scientifi c management,” as propounded by  Frederick W. Taylor, 
was the best known and, in many ways, epitomized this movement.  A son of a 
Philadelphia aristocrat, Taylor became a mechanical engineer by apprenticing to the 
eminent businessman-engineer William Sellers and completing a correspondence 
course at the Steven’s Institute of Technology.  A zealot for “effi ciency,” Taylor 
sought to standardize and routinize everything in a factory—machines, production 
processes, and, especially, workers.30
 Taylor’s general approach included tuning-up all the work processes and 
machinery in a factory and implementing an exceedingly detailed management 
regimen.  To refi ne work processes, experts would observe and time the motions 
of workers.  The experts then broke down complex processes, refi ned movements, 
assigned optimal times, and provided workers with explicit instructions on how 
to perform tasks.  Taylor tried to sweeten these changes for workers by tying the 
reformulated work to incentive pay scales.  Refi ning machinery entailed replacing 
belting to make it uniform, installing high-speed tool steel, and arranging machinery 
on a factory fl oor so that work could fl ow from one to the next and so on through 
the factory.  The most visible parts of Taylor’s management reforms were planning 
offi ces.  In these spaces, engineers oversaw the operations of a factory and 
coordinated sets of cards, which tracked items around the shop fl oor.  Finally, Taylor 
called his system scientifi c because he believed that analysis would provide a unique 
“one-best-way” to reorganize a workplace and the process occurring within it.
 Drawing on experiences from industrialization and Taylorism, the USBR 
and its contractors built dams in a fully industrialized and Taylorized fashion by 
the 1930s.  The USBR and its contractors split the tasks of building large dams.  
The USBR managed and refi ned work processes, such as pouring concrete.  The 
contracting corporations handled the construction plant and workers. 
 Dam sites lacked a space labeled a planning offi ce, but, during the 
construction of a dam, USBR employees primarily provided the management 
oversight, which Taylor placed in planning offi ces.  The  USBR used drawings and 
inspectors to manage construction of dams in the 1930s.  For example, in building 
Grand Coulee Dam, the USBR created at least three distinct sets of drawings to 
guide the process.  First, preliminary studies, such as the one conducted by Major 
 John Butler of the Army Corps of Engineers between June 1928 and July 1931, 
contained a handful of general drawings to convey the concept behind a proposal.31
For the Grand Coulee site, the printed version of Butler’s report contained an eleven-
page description of a high dam and hydroelectric power plant and two drawings: 
one plate with a plan and an elevation for a dam cresting at elevation 1266.6 feet 
and one plate with sections of the same structure.32  Second, junior engineers in the 
USBR’ s Denver offi ce prepared a more detailed set of drawings and specifi cations 
for contractors to use in preparing bids.  There were two separate major contracts 
for Grand Coulee Dam and two sets of specifi cations.  The second document, 
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from 1937, covered the completion of the dam from roughly low water level to 
its full height, the base of a facility to pump irrigation water, and one power plant 
to generate hydroelectricity.  This document used 161 pages and 122 drawings to 
describe the undertaking in much greater detail than Butler.33  Third, during the 
process of construction, USBR engineers in Denver made numerous detail drawings 
that superseded those in the specifi cations.  Every particular of the dam would be 
laid out in a series of drawings.  For Grand Coulee Dam, the Denver Offi ce sent 
these drawings to USBR Construction Engineer Frank Banks at the site offi ce.  He, 
in turn, gave the drawings to the contractors.  Nothing happened on the dam without 
authorization from Denver.  For example, in January 1936 the contractors and Banks 
negotiated with the Denver Offi ce over the pouring schedule for a section of the 
downstream edge of the dam but could not go ahead without drawings from Denver.  
H. Leslie Myer, the contractors’ general manager, worried that any delay in pouring 
this section would delay the entire dam.  Correspondence only gradually brought 
agreement on a modifi ed plan.  Banks wrote several times requesting drawings to 
prevent delay before the Denver engineers approved a plan and sent the illustrated 
guidelines.34
 Inspectors provided the second key mechanism of engineering oversight 
in the Taylorist fashion by guaranteeing that contractors followed directions 
communicated through drawings.  A  USBR project offi ce employed many inspectors 
who worked shifts alongside construction men.  Inspectors primarily oversaw the 
pouring of concrete for the dam and the grouting of its foundation.  (Foundation 
grouting was a procedure in which technicians pumped very thin cement into deep 
holes drilled into the bedrock under a dam to seal any cracks in the rock.)  Inspectors 
verifi ed the quality of these operations.  For example, contractors poured Grand 
Coulee Dam in blocks and engineers reviewed the setup for each before pouring.
First, men placed wood and metal forms capable of holding 265 cubic yards to 
463 cubic yards of concrete.  The largest forms measured 50 feet by 50 feet by 
5 feet.  Second, workers installed hardware for the block, including pipes for grout, 
metal sheets to manage the fl ow of grout in the structure, pipes to carry water to cool 
the concrete as it set, and pipes for drainage.  Third, they cleaned the concrete and 
metal surfaces.  This step insured that the new block bonded to those surrounding it.  
USBR inspectors checked the performance of all these tasks and issued an OK valid 
for three hours.  If the contractor did not place the concrete in that time, USBR men 
had to reinspect.35
 The Taylorist style of management conducted by the USBR matched the 
extensively mechanized, fl ow-oriented, and capital intensive construction plant 
erected by the contractors.  The contractors employed partially or completely 
mechanized systems to remove the dirt, rock, and debris down to bedrock at the 
dam site; to prepare materials for and mix concrete; and to convey concrete to the 
dam.  Unwanted materials fl owed out of the site and needed ones fl owed into it.  To 
clear the dam site, contractors brought in a fl eet of shovels, bulldozers, and dump 
trucks.  The trucks moved debris to a conveyor system with four 60-foot feeder 
belts serving a mile long main belt, which transported materials to Rattlesnake 
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Canyon.  After clearing the dam site, producing and placing concrete dominated 
construction.  The basic components of concrete are gravel, sand, cement, and water. 
Contractors mined gravel and sand at a location 1.5 miles from the dam site.  From 
pits, a mechanized system washed, screened, and separated the raw materials into 
three grades of sand, four grades of gravel, and waste.  Two automated concrete 
mixing plants—one on each side of the river—combined sand, gravel, cement that 
had arrived by rail, and water in set ratios to make concrete.  Locomotives hauled 
buckets of concrete from the mixing plants onto a trestle over the dam.  Crane 
operators, high above the dam, picked up the buckets and swung them down to 
the next block to be fi lled.  At the block, men dumped the buckets and urged the 
concrete into place with electrical vibrators.36
 In addition to Taylorist oversight of production and a Taylorist mechanized, 
fl ow-oriented, capital-intensive workplace, the USBR employed experts to study 
and refi ne work processes, much as Taylor and his colleagues used time and motion 
studies to modify workers’ performance.  USBR men, however, could not analyze 
workers.  In 1911 molders struck the Watertown Arsenal when Carl Barth, one of 
F. W. Taylor’s inner circle, attempted to reorganize the foundry.  Ultimately, 
Congress banned the use of stopwatches to analyze workers and incentive pay 
systems in federal workplaces.  Instead of workers, USBR men took on machinery.  
Work with cement mixers exemplifi ed this impulse to refi ne.  The two plants for 
making concrete—Westmix and Eastmix—each had four mixers that could each 
hold four cubic yards (a total of thirty-two cubic yards).  During the winter of 
1936-1937,  USBR engineers and the contractors’ men collaborated on redesigning 
these mixers to increase mixing speed.  They built model mixers of one-thirteenth 
capacity and tested them at a laboratory at the Grand Coulee Dam site.  The USBR 
engineers tested between fi fty and sixty different arrangements of mixer blades 
seeking the shortest time to produce a uniform product.  The best design reduced 
nine blades to three and reoriented them.  These new arrangements shortened mix 
and discharge time by 16 percent.  Since the second contract alone required mixing 
5,800,000 cubic yards of concrete thirty-two cubic yards at a time, this timesaving 
was substantial.37
 While the comparison of a factory fl oor and a construction site is fairly 
direct, an analogy between a factory fl oor and a river is necessarily much 
more abstract.  At the damsite, USBR engineers provided expert oversight, the 
contractors built a mechanized and rationalized construction plant, and the two 
groups worked together to investigate ways to refi ne the equipment.  Similarly, 
Taylorism experts implemented planning offi ces, organized shop fl oors, and tuned 
up processes, machinery, and workers.  With multiple purpose dam building, federal 
engineers combined ideas about river development advocated by Progressive Era 
conservationists with analysis and management techniques similar to Taylorism.
 While engineers formulated around scientifi c management, a broader 
group of scientists, engineers, and politicians brought conservation to the fore as 
a set of “scientifi c” ideas to govern the management of natural resources during 
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the Progressive Era.  Championed by forester and politician Gifford Pinchot, 
conservation called for the maximum sustained use of natural resources, such 
as forests, grazing lands, rivers, and oil and mineral deposits.  As with scientifi c 
management, technical experts—engineers, foresters, geologists, etc.—implemented 
the programs to achieve the goals of conservation.  Conservationists called for two 
major changes in river development.  Comprehensive planning provided schemes 
that combined navigation, fl ood control, irrigation, hydroelectricity, and other 
improvements.  Construction of reservoirs captured seasonal fl oods and made 
“wastewater” into a critical supplement to water supply in arid regions.38
 In order to implement conservation ideas about river development, in 
a Taylorist style, federal engineers began by measuring rivers.  Rather than 
stopwatches, engineers, like  John Butler, used gaging stations, topographical maps, 
and geological assessments of potential dam sites to assess the river’s current 
practice and as a basis for constructing a new “rational” river.  Butler invested 
over half of his funds for studying the upper Columbia River (the river above its 
confl uence with the Snake River) in collection of data and preliminary analysis 
of water supply, topography, geology, and land classifi cation.  Gaging produced 
quantitative data on the monthly discharge at 21 locations and on the stages of fi ve 
lakes.  Topography provided an overall profi le of the river.  Finer topography and 
core drilling (removing columns of rock to assess the structures) provided more 
specifi c data on 12 potential dam sites.  Land classifi cation ranked land near the river 
by its quality for irrigation farming.39
 To redesign the river, as Taylor redesigned workers’ movements and 
machinery, Butler combined this information with broad conservationist goals.  
Butler began with the canonical conservation goal for river development: the 
intention to consider all of the possible uses of water and their interactions.  Butler 
stated:
The purpose of this report is to formulate plans for the most 
effective improvement of Columbia River for the purposes of navigation, 
and for combining such improvement with the most effi cient development 
of the potential water electricity, the control of fl oods, and the needs of 
irrigation.40
 Adapting this general mandate to the  Columbia River, Butler quickly 
concluded that production of hydroelectricity and irrigation of the Columbia Basin, a 
large arid area southwest of Spokane, Washington, would be the most valuable uses 
of the upper Columbia River.  Navigation was unlikely to be cost effective, and the 
upper river had few fl ooding problems.  With knowledge of the water supply and an 
assessment of water needs, Butler set aside water for the irrigation of the Columbia 
Basin.  He then used knowledge of topography and geology to identify a set of dams 
that would allow full use of the remaining water for producing hydroelectricity.  
Butler sketched a plan in which each dam backed water to the foot of the next, so 
that all the potential energy created by change in elevation could be converted into 
hydroelectricity.  This approach gave rivers planned in the early twentieth century 
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a characteristic stair-step, or chain-of-lakes, profi le—the conservationists’ “one-
best-way” to develop a river.  Geology narrowed the possible dam sites to those 
suited to hold large structures.  Ultimately, Butler proposed fi ve hydroelectric dams; 
an electricity and irrigation project at the head of the Grand Coulee; three storage 
reservoirs in the headwaters of tributaries to the Columbia River; and two sets of 
locks and lateral dams to improve navigation, if increased river use justifi ed these 
last structures at some point.41
 Butler, his staff, and his counterparts in the USBR provided the expertise, 
called for by both Taylor and conservationists.  Butler headed eighteen men 
from fi ve fi elds who conducted the upper Columbia River study.  Butler’s 
acknowledgements indicated a permanent staff of eight men: fi ve members of the 
American Society of Civil Engineers, two members of the American Institute of 
Electrical Engineers, and one man identifi ed simply as an irrigation engineer.  Butler 
also drew on the advice of ten consultants: four civil engineers, two electrical 
engineers, three geologists, and one economist.  Similarly, the USBR placed studies 
of potential new irrigation projects in the hands of a senior fi eld engineer and a small 
staff.  Men from the Denver offi ce often provided consulting services on dam design 
and in other areas.42
 While fi eld staff analyzed and refi ned the river, the Denver offi ce 
specialized in analyzing and refi ning the main technology of multiple purpose 
river development—dams.  During the 1920s and 1930s as the Denver offi ce grew, 
it substantially expanded investigation and analysis.  First, the USBR developed 
two methods for analyzing stresses and strains in dams.  Using mathematics, 
USBR engineers developed the trial-load method of analyzing arch dams as part of 
designing Hoover Dam.  When a dam curves from side to side, as Hoover Dam does, 
some or all of the weight of the water behind the dam is transmitted to the abutments 
(canyon sides) through arch action, rather than to the foundation under the dam by 
gravity effects.   Trial-load analysis provided a more accurate approach to calculating 
the extremely complicated stresses and strains in a potential structure due to this 
dual distribution of forces.  In parallel with trial-load analysis,  USBR engineers 
developed a program of photoelastic analysis using models to determine stresses and 
strains on potential structures.  Beginning in 1927 the USBR built models of dams 
at a facility at the University of Colorado in Boulder.  The engineers constructed 
the earliest models—those of  Stevenson Creek Test Dam and  Gibson Dam—out 
of concrete and used a rubber pouch fi lled with mercury to simulate the weight of 
a reservoir.  They used optical instruments and a system of gages to measure stress 
and strain in the models.  For Grand Coulee Dam, the combination of mathematical 
and photoelectric analyses led USBR men to add twist adjustment slots near each 
abutment to reduce twist forces in the structure.43
 The second major experimental program for refi ning dam technology 
developed in this period used hydraulic models.  Building on a European tradition, 
USBR men began making models of dams in metal and wooden beds and running 
water over them to observe the qualitative effects of elements of the structure on 
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water fl ow.  The  USBR men located their fi rst laboratories at Colorado State College 
(now University) in Fort Collins and in Montrose, Colorado.  For Grand Coulee 
Dam, the USBR men used hydraulic experiments to refi ne the “toe” of the dam.  
At the downstream edge of Grand Coulee Dam, the structure must dissipate the 
substantial energy of a large river pouring off a 430 ft prism of concrete.  The shape 
of the toe determines whether the water digs a hole under the dam, digs at the dam’s 
edge, geysers up in the air, boils and then joins the fl ow at the base of the dam, or 
any number of better and worse possibilities.  After observing models of several 
different options, engineers chose a curved toe with a 50-foot diameter bucket for 
the base of Grand Coulee Dam.  USBR men also used a hydraulic model to plan 
the order of pouring Grand Coulee Dam.  This work reduced the damage to the 
riverbanks above and below the dam site caused by the hydraulic characteristics of 
the partly complete structure.44
 Finally, the USBR used a materials laboratory to tune up dams.  The primary 
work of this facility was concrete analysis.  Originally located at the University of 
California, USBR men and their academic collaborators studied cement and concrete 
to reduce shrinkage during drying, which could cause uneven distribution of forces 
and cracks in a structure.  Out of such work, USBR men developed a system of 
embedding thin water pipes throughout very large structures to speed concrete 
cooling.  They also wrote new specifi cations for cement.45
 Gazing at the world with vision sharpened by engineering training, USBR 
leaders saw disorderly construction sites and disorderly rivers.  They drew on the 
experiences and enthusiasms of their profession—industrialism, Taylorism, and 
conservation—to fi x the problems they saw.  Construction sites looked a lot like a 
factory fl oor where engineers could be put in charge, work could be mechanized 
and made to fl ow, and components could be analyzed and tuned for speed.  USBR 
engineers placed themselves at the metaphorical center managing construction with 
drawings and inspections.  From removing dirt to delivering concrete, contractors, 
such as Morrison-Knudsen and H. J. Kaiser, used trucks, conveyor belts, and cranes 
to make materials fl ow out of and into dam sites.  USBR engineers and contractors 
collaborated to analyze not workers but machines, such as concrete mixers, to tune-
up and speed work. 
 Rivers looked less like factories.  Still, USBR leaders fused ideas from 
conservation and Taylorism in the planning and building of the fi rst generation of 
multiple purpose dams.  As with Taylor and his program, USBR engineers placed 
experts in control, analyzed and rationalized both processes and components, 
and believed single “best” solutions existed for the problems they tackled.  They 
used the conservation concepts of comprehensive planning and increasing water 
supplies through storage as the framework in which to seek Taylorist solutions.  
First, groups of engineers gaged water supply, mapped terrain, examined beds 
of rivers, and classifi ed lands.  They used this analytic deconstruction and the 
concept of comprehensive planning to create a new water system tuned to supply 
the water resources in a single best way.  For example, the whole Columbia River, 
240
reconceptualized as a signature chain-of-lakes, would use 92 percent of possible 
head for an installed capacity to produce 8.5 million kilowatts of electricity while 
providing water to irrigate 1.6 million acres and providing a 9-foot navigation 
channel 200 miles inland along the Washington-Oregon border.46  Second, engineers 
turned their rationalizing attention to dams, the technological backbone of new 
rivers.  For dam building, they conducted mathematical and experimental analyses to 
maximize desired performance—a safe structure with good hydrodynamics—while 
minimizing cost.
Conclusions
 In this paper, I have demonstrated that between 1923 and 1943 a very 
stable and uniform group of engineers with a Progressive pedigree led the  USBR.  
I have also suggested that the signifi cance of this fi nding lies in the ways that 
these men drew on the experiences and enthusiasms of engineering, especially 
industrialization, Taylorism, and conservation, as the USBR grew and instituted 
multiple purpose dam building.  In the Taylorist fashion, USBR men created central 
managerial spaces for themselves, analyzed and rationalized large processes and 
their components, and undertook this work with a faith that it would produce unique 
optimal solutions.  They did this to both dam construction sites and to the planning 
of water resources.  In the latter, USBR leaders fused Taylorism and conservation to 
take multiple purpose dam building from an idea to a reality.
 Philosophers of science traditionally end papers with a promissory note that 
acknowledges important areas for future research.  While I am no philosopher, I 
would like to note that the second part of this paper suggests an important area for 
additional research.  The USBR was certainly not the only dam builder in this period 
nor the only one to employ industrialized and Taylorized construction plants.  A 
broader consideration of the technologies and industrialization of dam construction 
would trace the shift from brick or stone and mortar dams built primarily using 
animal and human power to concrete dams whose construction relied on internal 
combustion engines and electricity.
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From Pathfi nder to Glen Canyon:  The Structural 
Analysis of Arched, Gravity Dams
By:
David P.  Billington,
Chelsea Honigmann,
Moira A.  Treacy
Abstract
 Shortly after its 1902 establishment the Reclamation Service embarked 
upon an ambitious program of designing and building large masonry dams in 
the West.  The design engineers focused attention on the problem of high dams 
curved in plan such that the behavior was partly as a horizontal arch and partly 
as a vertical cantilever.  This physical reality for dam sites in the fi rst decade of 
the twentieth century posed a challenge to the analytic talents of engineers and 
called forth an approach that eventually in the 1920s came to be called the trial-
load analysis.
 In March 1903 the Reclamation Service hired George Y. Wisner as 
their structural consultant, and in 1904, with E. T. Wheeler, he embarked on a 
mathematical study focused on the Pathfi nder Dam.  Their report, published 
in 1905, identifi ed the two types of behavior—horizontal arch and vertical 
cantilevers—and showed how a highly approximate approach could be used 
to estimate the overall performance of curved masonry or concrete dams.  The 
Service used the result for the design of Pathfi nder and used it to check the 
design for the Theodore Roosevelt Dam.
 In a 1921 landmark paper, Fred Noetzli, a Swiss-trained engineer, 
developed a more complete procedure for the arch-gravity dam analysis 
which he applied to Pathfi nder and found  results reassuringly similar to those 
published by Wisner and Wheeler.
 After much published discussion of Noetzli’s paper, C. H. Howell and 
A. C. Jaquith presented, in a 1929 paper, a more extensive procedure and for the 
fi rst time used the term trial-load as the method of defi ning the extent of the arch 
action and that of the cantilever action.  Hoover Dam, then under design, did not 
benefi t from this analysis but in the 1950s the trial-load method helped justify 
the design for Glen Canyon Dam, which unlike Hoover Dam, could not stand 
safely as a pure gravity structure.
 The paper will conclude with some general observations about the role 
of conceptual design, based on approximate methods of analysis, in the search 
for structural forms that are suffi ciently safe and relatively economical.  Also 
included will be a related discussion about the tension between the massive and 
structural traditions of concrete design.
The Beginning of Rational Design
 Structural engineering as a modern profession begins with the building of 
iron bridges in the late eighteenth century in Great Britain.  It began because of 
the desire for lighter bridges that could nevertheless be as strong or even much 
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stronger than those built of stone or wood.  Starting with the French schools, the 
Ponts et Chaussées established in 1748 and the Ecole Polytechnique established 
in 1794, structural engineering by the early nineteenth century began to have a 
foundation of a scientifi c basis where mathematical theory could help predict 
performance and be, therefore, a guide to designing new forms.
 Bridges were the primary focus of early structural theory because they 
were pure structure, they had the longest spans, and they also had the most 
dramatic failures.  During the last half of the nineteenth century structural theory 
became formalized, began to be used extensively for buildings, and was taught 
systemically in the Polytechnic Institutes of Western Europe.  By contrast with 
bridges and buildings, dams did not receive the same intensive attention in 
schools or in the technical literature.  This was so because most dams were low, 
were built of earth or rock, and thus remained part of a preindustrial technological 
culture.  Throughout the  nineteenth century dams received little attention either in 
the technical literature or in schools of engineering.  But at the end of the century 
three major changes in the United States brought dams into the forefront of 
 engineering: fi rst, cities were expanding at an unprecedented rate and they could 
not grow without new sources of water; second, the new electric power industry 
moved rapidly into hydroelectric stations; and, third, the closing of the frontier 
raised strong social pressure to develop the west in large part through irrigation.
 Those social pressures combined with the advanced state of structural 
theory produced the desire for a more scientifi c treatment of dams with the belief 
that they could therefore be more rationally, hence more economically and more 
safely, designed.  Just at this time the new and prototypical twentieth century 
material,  structural concrete, came into general practice to encourage designers 
to abandon stone masonry and sometimes embankment dams for ones built using 
the new material.  But even where earth or rock dams seemed still preferable, 
concrete became widely used in spillways, powerhouses, and diversion works.
 In addition to these social and technical forces there was the crisis of fl ood 
to prompt federal funds for control dams.  The political actions that such fl oods 
bring naturally result in population growth and urban expansion.  As the twentieth 
century unfolded, the major dam building in the United States and elsewhere 
began to take a  new direction, characterized by high dams, huge reservoirs, and 
the search for rational methods of analysis as a basis for design.  This search led 
to two competing visions of structural form, one characterized by the structural 
tradition and the other by the massive tradition which we can rephrase as the 
battle between  form and mass.1
Form and Mass in Structure
 In the preindustrial world, with the notable exception of the high gothic 
cathedrals, there was an implicit belief that great works were built as massive 
structures which were primarily of stone.  This aesthetic of mass connoted 
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permanence, opulence, and power; it stood in opposition to the ephemeral wooden 
structures of peasants and the urban poor.  To be monumental was to be safe 
and handsome.  When engineers began to construct skeletal metal bridges in the 
nineteenth century, they were initially banned from urban settings, and when 
concrete entered practice in the 1890s it had to be covered in, or formed to look 
like, stone to be accepted.
 It is therefore of no surprise that when large dams entered modern 
America of the twentieth century, they would refl ect that context, especially those 
dams designed by large municipalities and agencies of the Federal Government.  
And yet right from the start of federal dam building in concrete, with the founding 
of the Reclamation Service in 1902, the confl ict between form and mass was 
immediately present and it would remain as a continuing issue, never fully 
resolved, throughout the century.
 In its most elementary form, a dam in the massive tradition consists of a 
mass of material that, by its weight alone, holds back a volume of water.  Such 
structures are known as  gravity dams, an appropriate name because it is the force 
of gravity pulling vertically down on the dam that provides resistance against 
pressure exerted horizontally by water in the reservoir.  Designs adhering to the 
massive tradition can be based upon sophisticated engineering analysis, but the 
basic principle underlying the tradition is simple: accumulate as much material as 
economically or physically possible, thus insuring that the dam will not tip over, 
slide or rupture; in turn, the massive dimensions will increase the likelihood that 
the dam can achieve long-term stability in holding back a reservoir.
 A dam in the structural tradition, in contrast to gravity designs, depends 
upon its shape, and not simply its mass, to resist hydrostatic pressure.  For 
example, an arch dam in a narrow canyon with hard rock sides allows a signifi cant 
amount of the hydrostatic pressure to be carried by arch action horizontally into 
the canyon walls.  Because of this arch action, the thickness (and hence bulk) 
of the dam’s profi le can be much less than a gravity dam of the same height.  In 
essence, the amount of material in (or the mass of) a structural dam is a less 
important attribute than it is for a massive dam.  For a dam adhering to the 
structural tradition, it is more important to develop a design that takes advantage 
of shape and not just weight.
The  Profi le of Equal Resistance
 Masonry gravity dams can be built without any reliance upon 
mathematics, but in the nineteenth century European engineers realized that this 
type of structure was amenable to a quantifi able approach to design.  In the early 
1850s a paper published by the French engineer  J. Augustine DeSazilly set the 
course for all subsequent work in this area of gravity dam design.2  Knowing 
the hydrostatic force exerted by a given height of water (which weighs about 
62.5 pounds per cubic foot) and the approximate weight of masonry used in dam 
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construction (usually about 140-150 pounds per cubic foot), DeSazilly conceived 
what he termed the “profi le of equal resistance.”  Using basic formulas of statics, 
he developed a cross-section in which compressive stresses at the upstream 
face when the reservoir is empty equal compressive stresses at the downstream 
face when the reservoir is fi lled.  In taking these two extreme conditions, he 
hypothesized a design that, at least in cross-section, would minimize the material 
necessary to erect a stable masonry gravity dam.
 The profi le of equal resistance came from a consideration of two major 
conditions of dam loading (see 8.1):  reservoir empty or reservoir fi lled.  For the 
former case the dead load of the dam, assumed to be a pure triangle in cross 
section, caused a maximum vertical compressive stress f h1  at the heel of the dam 
(upstream edge) equal to the weight of concrete or stone above that point or
f Hwh c1 ? (Height H times the density of concrete wc ).  For the case of the full 
reservoir, to the vertical stress of case one must add the infl uence of the horizontal 
force F due to water pressure.  This force causes the dam to bend and thus creates 
maximum vertical compressive stresses at the toe f Hw H
Bw2
2
2
t ?
?
?
?
?
?
?  with equal vertical 
tensile stress at the heel (see Figure 8.1).  The criterion for equal resistance is that 
the maximum vertical compressive stress for case one be the same as for case two, 
hence Hw Hw
H
Bc w
?
?
?
?
?
?
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2
2  or 
H
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w
2
2 ? .  For example where the density of concrete wc
is taken to be 140 pounds per cubic foot and the density of water ww  to be 62.5 
pounds per cubic foot then H
B
2
2
140
62 5
2 25? ?
.
.  so that HB ? ?2 25 15. .  or 3/2.  For example, 
for a dam 60 feet high the base width would be 40 feet.
The  Middle Third
 In the early 1870s, the Scot  W. J. M. Rankine confi rmed the validity 
of DeSazilly’s work; he further observed that a stable gravity dam must have 
suffi cient cross-section so that the combined vector force (or “resultant force”) of 
the horizontal hydrostatic pressure and the vertical weight of masonry will pass 
through the center (or middle) third of the structure at any horizontal elevation.3
Should the resultant fall outside the center third, a gravity dam will become 
susceptible to dangerous cracking because tension (rather than compression) 
will develop along the upstream edge of the structure; the further outside the 
center third the resultant passes, the greater the tensile stress and the greater the 
likelihood that cracking will occur.  And if the resultant should fall completely 
beyond the downstream edge, then the structure will “overturn.”  Although 
the “middle third” precept was inherently adhered to by any design developed 
in accord with De Sazilly profi les, Rankine’s work established it as an overt 
principle of masonry gravity design.4
 When the stresses for case two are plotted over the dam base we fi nd that 
they form a triangle with the maximum value at the toe and the minimum (equals 
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zero) at the heel.  The centroid of that pressure lies at B/3 from the toe.  Likewise 
for the reservoir empty in case one the centroid lies at B/3 from the heel.  Thus, 
the centroids of all loading cases between one and two lie between those two 
positions or within the middle third of the dam width B (see 8.2).
The Danger of  Uplift and Sliding
 Interest in other issues relating to gravity design did not remain stagnant 
and this is best refl ected in concern over the infl uence of uplift on the safety of 
gravity structures.  Uplift is a phenomena resulting where water seeps under the 
foundation (or into the interior of the dam proper) and—because of pressure 
8.1.  Profi le of equal resistance.
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exerted by water in the reservoir—pushes upward and increases the likelihood 
that the structure will slide horizontally downstream.  Uplift attracted the attention 
of engineers in the early twentieth century and encouraged both the use of thicker 
profi les as well as the development of grouting and drainage techniques that 
would mitigate its occurrence and possible effect.
 The 1911 failure of a gravity dam in Austin, Pennsylvania, led the 
American engineering profession to look more closely at the infl uence of uplift 
on dam safety especially as it related to sliding.  Figure 8.3 illustrates the forces 
that infl uence the horizontal movement of a gravity dam over its foundation.  In 
addition to the force of the water F and weight of the dam W, the water pressure 
underneath the dam produces uplift U while the cohesion C between dam and 
rock resists sliding.  The friction between dam and foundation (usually rock) tan ?
will resist sliding in proportion to the vertical force W less the uplift.  Neglecting 
cohesion and assuming full uplift on a dam where B/H = 2/3, the safety factor 
against sliding is less than one.  This result helps explain the Austin Dam 
failure, where B/H = 0.6 and investigations after failure led to the conclusion of 
substantial uplift.  Part of the solution was to increase B/H and also to drain the 
base to relieve the pressure (see 8.3) and hence reduce the uplift force to 0.5 or 
less.5
 The most signifi cant drawback to  gravity designs involved their high cost.  
While the “profi le of equal resistance” offered a mathematically rational basis of 
design, this did not mean that gravity dams would necessarily be cheap to build.
For major municipalities, the economic benefi ts that accompanied an increased 
water supply might easily justify the huge expenditures required to build large 
masonry gravity designs.  But once cities such as Boston (with the Wachusetts 
Dam completed in 1904) and New York (with the New Croton Dam completed 
in 1907) erected masonry gravity structures as part of major civic improvement 
projects, the technology came to represent—at least in many people’s eyes—the 
most conservative, the most appropriate, and, if at all economically feasible, the 
most desirable type of dam.  In such dams, the free end (top) of a straight gravity 
dam will move horizontally as the cantilever bends downstream under water 
pressure.  In this way the water load is carried down to the foundations (on the 
valley fl oor) by bending.
Arch and Cantilever Behavior in Dams
 Unlike the Croton structure, many dams in narrow valleys have been 
designed as arches using an elementary mathematical theory based upon the 
 cylinder formula (see 8.4).  The dam, curved into an arch between the sides of 
the valley, will carry water load to the vertical canyon walls, by compression 
forces calculated from the cylinder formula.  As these horizontal arches carry 
compression they will become shorter and hence move in the horizontal 
direction downstream.  Thus a curved arch dam can carry loads both vertically 
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as a cantilever and horizontally as an arch.  The challenge to the engineer is to 
determine how much of the load goes to the canyon fl oor and how much to the 
canyon walls.
 This issue is crucial to design because much more material is required 
for safe cantilever behavior than for safe arch action.  For example, designers 
proportioned gravity dams (those assumed to act as cantilevers alone) with a 
base thickness B equal to about 2/3 of H, the dam height.  Where H = 60 ft.  and 
B = 40 ft. the amount of concrete required per foot of dam length would be 
V = 60 x 40 x ½ = 1200 cubic feet.  By contrast an arch dam with H = 60 ft. and 
Ru = 100 ft. would require a base thickness of about 7.5 feet from the cylinder 
formula ( for f = 350 psi) and hence a total volume of 60 x 7.5/2 = 225 cubic feet 
or less than 20% of the material required for the gravity or massive dam.
 As a result, some engineers, seeing this great advantage of  arch dams, had 
a strong incentive to fi nd a rational way to determine analytically how much load 
was carried by the arching action and thereby justify designing a safe dam with 
far less material than a gravity dam carrying load by cantilever action.  Engineers 
8.2.   Dam Design:  The middle third.
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consulting with the newly 
established Reclamation Service 
began this process of analysis as 
early as 1903.
The Wisner and Wheeler 
Report on  Pathfi nder Dam
 In September 1903, the 
Reclamation Service held a 
 conference of engineers at Ogden, 
Utah, where their newly appointed 
(March 1903) consulting engineer, 
 George Y.  Wisner (1841-1906), 
presented a paper which called 
for a thorough study of stresses in 
high masonry (stone or concrete) dams to ensure safety and achieve minimum 
construction cost.6   F. H. Newell, the chief engineer of the Service, asked a select 
committee of four, including  Arthur Powell Davis (1861-1933) later to become 
8.3.  Uplift and Sliding.
8.4.  The cylinder formula.
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director of the Service, to make him a recommendation which it did formally on 
October 5, 1904.  Its letter spoke of the two high dams proposed for Wyoming 
(Pathfi nder and Buffalo Bill later renamed Shoshone Dam) and of the fact that 
“no thorough analysis has ever been made of the relative economy and stability of 
reinforced concrete dams as compared with similar dams of gravity sections.…”
They suggested that such an analysis be commissioned by the Service, and 
they recommended Mr.  E. T. Wheeler of Los Angeles for the job.7  Under the 
supervision of Wisner, Wheeler began work in January of 1905.  Wheeler 
submitted his fi nal report on May 5, 1905, and Wisner sent that report, preceded 
by a lengthy discussion of his own, to Newell on May 16.  Its importance was 
considered to be so great that the  Wisner-Wheeler paper was published in the 
August 10, 1905, issue of Engineering News.  Since this report inaugurated the 
structural tradition of large-scale dam design within the federal government of the 
United States, it is essential to explain its substance and its impact.8
 Although Wisner proposed the study in the light of the Service’s new big 
dams—Roosevelt, Buffalo Bill, and Pathfi nder—he and Wheeler actually focused 
only on Pathfi nder (see 8.5), it being the fi rst one to be completed (1909).  Wisner 
described how an arch dam in a narrow valley (he called it “of short span”) 
carried water loads and also how it behaved under wide  swings of temperature 
both with reservoir full and with it drawn down.  He then gave Wheeler’s report 
which consisted of the sets of formulas for water loads: one which assumed that 
the dam carried the water pressure as a series of horizontal arches supported by 
the side walls of the Canyon.  He 
then computed the horizontal 
defl ection of these arches at 
their crowns—essentially only 
the vertical centerline of the 
dam (see 8.6).  Wheeler next 
took a vertical slice of the dam 
at this centerline and, assuming 
it carried all the water pressure 
as a cantilever, supported only 
on the fl oor of the Canyon, he 
computed its horizontal defl ection 
at various points from base to top 
of the dam.  The arch defl ections 
and the cantilever defl ections 
should have been the same at 
the same points on the dam, but 
this two-part calculation did not 
give such results.  Thus Wheeler 
had to make a second calculation 
by adjusting the amount of load 
taken by the arches and that taken 
by the cantilevers.  The fi rst 
8.5.  Upstream face of Pathfi nder Dam on the 
North Platte River near Casper, Wyoming, is a 
masonry arch and cantilever section.  Source:
Bureau of Reclamation.
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calculation shows that the free cantilever defl ects far more than the arches do in 
the top portion of the dam while the reverse is true at the bottom.  Thus the arches 
carry more load at the top and the cantilevers carry more load at the base.  This 
redistribution of load would eventually be called the trial-load method of analysis. 
Moreover, Wheeler found that the Pathfi nder Dam could carry all the water load 
as a series of arches with compressive stresses under 200 psi for a material (stone 
masonry) whose compressive strength is well over 2000 psi.
 Next Wheeler studied temperature stresses in the Pathfi nder dam.  Here 
he assumed that the temperature dropped 15°F at the top with the reservoir only 
fi lled up to 100 feet from the top and that the temperature drop decreased linearly 
to zero at 120 feet below the top.  This drop would cause the arches to bend 
and defl ect in the downstream direction that would cause vertical cracks in the 
upper arches; and the defl ection of the arches above relative to the undefl ected 
cantilevers below would cause vertical bending in the lower parts of the dam and 
hence horizontal cracks there.  This qualitative description helps explain where 
reinforcing steel needs to be placed (if it were a concrete dam), but it does not
give a good quantitative measure.  However, by iteration again Wheeler was able 
to make a more reasonable estimate of the temperature stresses which he then 
combined with the water load to give one design condition.
Noetzli and the Curved Dams
 Strictly speaking, the analysis of Wisner and Wheeler was a trial-load 
method because it assumed a distribution of loads between arches and cantilevers 
and then after various other trials it based design on a fi nal iteration.   Fred Noetzli 
(1887-1933), a Swiss trained engineer, summarized the situation in a landmark 
8.6.  Pathfi nder Dam section and elevation diagrams.  Wheeler took a vertical slice of the 
dam as a cantilever and analyzed the defl ections.  He then analyzed the defl ections in a 
horizontal arch section.  He repeated these analyses, distributing load to both the arches 
and cantilever, until the two sets of defl ections were nearly equal.
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1921 paper in which he reviewed the practice of  arched dams, gave relatively 
simple formulas for calculating the cantilever and the arch actions in horizontally 
curved dams, and then applied his formulations in detail to the Pathfi nder Dam.  
This last part is the heart of his paper in which he compares his semi-graphical 
approach to the purely analytical calculations presented by Wisner and Wheeler in 
1905.  He concludes that his “distribution of load between cantilever and arches 
compares very favorably with that obtained analytically by Mr. Wheeler.”9
 Noetzli then proceeded to discuss the central issues in  dam design that 
went beyond the statics of water-pressure loading: stresses due to temperature 
change, to shortening of the arches under water pressure, and to shrinkage of the 
concrete as well as the infl uence of cracks in the concrete.  He showed by simple 
calculations that these effects were at least as important as those due to the statics 
of water pressure loading.
 The benefi t of analyzing the dam as a set of independent arch and 
cantilever elements is that one can use simple calculations to determine the 
defl ection of any point along an arch or cantilever element.  Cantilever defl ections 
are approximated using the moment area method.  The height at which a 
defl ection will occur along the cantilever can be calculated for members with 
constant and linearly varying cross-sections using simple equations.
 The process of determining the load distribution between arches and 
cantilevers in a given dam is an iterative approach based on fi nding the height, H1,
above which cantilever action no longer exists and arch action takes all the load.
A fi rst approximation of H1 is made by applying the full water load individually 
to the arch and cantilever elements.  The arch and cantilever defl ections will 
coincide at a single point.  The results of an independent analysis of the Pathfi nder 
Dam based on the method outlined by Noetzli in his 1921 paper are shown in 
8.7 below.  8.7a shows the intersection of the arch and cantilever elements at a 
defl ection of approximately 0.25 inches.  This value is used to calculate the height 
at which this defl ection would occur in an idealized structure.  As the actual 
cross-section of the dam is something between prismatic and triangular, the fi rst 
approximation of H1 is taken as the average of the results from the two equations.
 The load distribution defi ned by this new value of H1, becomes the basis 
for the second iteration.  The defl ection of the arch and cantilever elements is 
calculated as before for the new loading and is shown in 8.7b.
 Although the cantilever carries no load above H1, the defl ection continues 
to increase up to the waterline.  In some cases, the calculated cantilever defl ection 
may exceed the arch defl ection at the top of the dam, as it does in 8.7b for the 
Pathfi nder Dam.  In actuality, however, the defl ection of the cantilever and arch 
must coincide, requiring that the arch must resist any additional defl ection of the 
cantilever.  Subsequent iterations involve adjusting the value of H1 and fi nding, by 
trial and error, the additional “reaction” load on the arches required to bring the 
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cantilever defl ection approximately into coincidence with the arch defl ection, as 
shown in 8.7c.
 Table 8.1 summarizes Noetzli’s results for the Pathfi nder Dam and the 
results of the independent check of Noetzli’s analysis.  Additionally, a fi nite 
element model was analyzed using SAP 2000® to check the accuracy of Noetzli’s 
values.  These results are also given in Table 8.1.  In general, the fi nite element 
results compare favorably with those obtained by the simplifi ed hand analysis, 
indicating the applicability of this method for approximating the behavior of arch 
dams under the combined effects of temperature and water load.
 After giving the details of his analysis of the Pathfi nder Dam, Noetzli 
went on to point out that pure  gravity dams rarely have a safety factor against 
overturning of over 2.0 and usually it is close to 1.0 (see 8.8).  This surprising 
claim allowed him to make a strong criticism of such dams, i.e. “no other 
engineering structure of acknowledged good design has such a small factor of 
safety as a pure gravity dam.”10
 The paper, which drew vigorous discussions from major fi gures of the 
period, established the Swiss engineer as a leading theoretician for dams, and the 
discussion largely confi rmed Noetzli’s reputation.  Running through  Noetzli’s 
writing was the two-part theme, prototypically Swiss, that good design implies 
form over mass and that analysis—often graphically done—can be greatly 
simplifi ed to improve understanding as well as to encourage designers to think in 
terms of form over mass.  He was at great pains to stress the historical fact that 
8.7.  Defl ection of Pathfi nder Dam, based on Noetzli’s analysis.  Defl ection of arches and 
crown cantilever under combined 20o temperature change and a) full water load, b) under 
partial water load, and c) under partial water load and reaction from cantilever.
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mass did not mean safety, but that form, properly conceived, did so—and with 
greater economy as well.
 Much of the discussion revolved about the relative simplicity of the 
graphical approach as compared to the complexity of the mathematical one.11  One 
factor in the form versus mass debate was the perception that lighter forms needed 
more rigor in solution.
The  Trial-Load Method
 The writings on curved dams continued throughout the 1920s as the nation 
was beginning to move into the largest program of dam building ever attempted.  
The articles and discussions up to 1929 discussed both arch and cantilever 
behavior and hence qualify as  trial-load methods.  However, not until publication 
of an article in the 1929 ASCE Transactions by  C. H. Howell and  A. C. Jaquith 
does the method acquire publicly the name of “trial load.”12  Both authors had 
worked for the Bureau of Reclamation in Denver where they had begun to study 
the method in 1923.
 In the paper they defi ned the method as one which considers the dam to 
be made up of a series of horizontal arches and a series of vertical cantilevers 
with part of the water load carried by the dam considered as arches and part 
by the dam considered as cantilevers.  The arch loads and the cantilever loads 
are adjusted so that the defl ections of the arches are nearly the same as the 
defl ections of the cantilevers at the same points.  They distinguish the trial-load 
method from previous similar methods by the fact that they were considering 
more than the one single cantilever, which is what Wheeler, Noetzli, and others 
had done.  By considering a series of cantilevers, rather than one cantilever only 
at the centerline of the dam, the Bureau engineers created a detailed procedure 
which was used for later dams.  In their paper, the authors began by noting the 
Table 8.1.  Comparison of Pathfi nder Dam defl ections from several analysis methods.
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variations in the shapes of canyons in which dams appear and thus they 
established the need to use more than one cantilever for more realistic analysis.
 As with Noetzli’s paper, the Howell and Jaquith paper brought forward 
much substantial discussion.  Noetzli and Jakobsen both observed that Alfred 
Stucky had used the trial-load method for a Swiss dam in 1922 although the 
method was not so named.  In fact Robert Maillart had used the same idea 
in 1902 for a water tank also in Switzerland.13  Probably the most signifi cant 
discussion from the point of view of federal dams came from  John Savage and 
 Ivan Houk, both of the Bureau.  They gave a more detailed discussion of  Gibson 
Dam and gave also results from their analysis of the 405 ft. high  Owyhee Dam 
in eastern Oregon.  Savage had assumed a dominant role in the Bureau and was 
already in 1929 deeply involved with the Boulder Canyon project.  But as the 
dams got higher and higher, the Bureau recognized the need to develop not just 
mathematical analyses but also  physical model testing, and the instrumentation of 
full scale dams.
The  Stevenson Creek Test Dam
 During the fi rst three decades of the twentieth century engineers focused 
intently on concrete arches, creating numerous designs for bridges as well as 
dams, and stimulating more mathematically complex analytic schemes.  In 1924, 
four of the twenty Transactions papers dealt with concrete arches and many 
8.8.  Factor of safety against overturning.
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of these pages were fi lled with formulas and tables.  The 1925 Transactions 
contained two extensive articles on arch analysis, in total about 20% of the entire 
volume.
 But already by 1922, some engineers became uneasy with so much 
abstraction and began to worry about fi eld performance as opposed to offi ce 
abstractions.  Particularly engineers in the western states saw the need for a 
different approach to analysis which led  Fred Noetzli to request fi nancial support 
from the Engineering Foundation for collecting performance data on existing arch 
dams and for designing new tests and experiments.14  Noetzli noted the national 
signifi cance of arch dams by referring to two recent papers on the subject which 
had won the Croes Medal in 1920 and 1921 (the second highest award given by 
the ASCE; it recognizes special commendation as a contributor to engineering 
science).  He urged aid for physical testing because “the methods by which most 
existing arch dams have been designed are defective and more or less unreliable.”  
Noetzli had been worried about the lack of fi eld data and later that year would 
publish a paper on tests results in full size dams.15
 It was becoming clear then that the Service would have to play a major 
role in the project.16  In December 1923 W. A. Brackenridge, senior vice president 
of the Southern California Edison Company, proposed the building of a large 
scale concrete arch dam designed expressly for research, and he further offered 
to provide a large amount of the money for it as well as the use of his company’s 
facilities.  Located on Stevenson Creek, a tributary of the San Joaquin River about 
60 miles east of Fresno, California, this dam was approved by the committee and 
construction began in August of 1925.17
 The test arch design was startlingly thin.  The physical structure was set 
in a V-shaped canyon, and was 60 feet high with a thickness throughout the top 
half of only 2 feet tapering from mid-height to the base from 2 feet to 7.5 feet.
The arch is of a constant 100 ft.  radius throughout (see 8.9).18  The tests used 
mechanical strain gages and from these measurements stresses were calculated.
Defl ection and temperatures were also measured.
 Meanwhile engineers had been collecting measurements from existing 
dams as part of the overall program, and they had found discouraging results 
because of the diffi culties in relating strains and displacements to loading and 
temperature changes.  They debated the materials from the test dam construction 
and instrumentation at a meeting in Fresno in early December 1925.19
 The Bureau was becoming convinced that the test dam alone would not 
be suffi cient and that a series of small scale models ought also to be included in 
the program.20  In early 1926 the Commissioner of the Bureau, Elwood Mead, 
approved funding for part of the work with small scale models.21  A full report on 
all this work appeared in November 1927 and on December 8, 1928, a concrete 
model of the  Stevenson Test Dam was loaded to destruction.22
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 We can summarize the conclusions reached by the committee in late 1927 
under three categories: fi rst, the great strength of the arch dams; second, physical 
experiments have given data useful to engineers developing mathematical 
analyses; and, third, arch dams may be designed more economically (by being 
thinner) in the future.23
 The full report included an analysis by Noetzli following his 1921 paper.  
The results are tabulated in Table 8.2.  An independent crown-cantilever analysis 
was also carried out by the authors of this paper, based on the procedure outlined 
in his 1921 paper.  The fi nal defl ection of arches and crown cantilever under 
the  combined effects of temperature and water pressure are shown in 8.10.  
Additionally, a fi nite element model of the arch under water load was constructed 
as a comparison to the crown-cantilever method.  These results are also tabulated 
in Table 2, along with actual measurements (excluding temperature effects) taken 
from the dam itself.  As can be seen from 
the results, the crown-cantilever method 
overestimates the actual defl ections 
whereas the SAP 2000® analysis is 
relatively close.  However, the crown-
cantilever method provides a reasonable 
and conservative approximation of the 
behavior.
Hoover and  Glen Canyon Dams
 During the early planning stages 
for what became the  Boulder Canyon 
Project, the Director of the Bureau of 
Reclamation,  A. P. Davis, and his staff 
made an effort to consider a range of 
possibilities for the design of the big 
storage dam on the Lower Colorado.
Based upon the Service’s experiences 
with the Roosevelt, Elephant Butte, and 
Arrowrock dams, it is not surprising 
that a massive concrete/masonry gravity 
8.9.  Stevenson Creek Dam:  Plan, section, and profi le along upstream face.
8.10.  Defl ection of arches and crown 
cantilever in Stevenson Creek Dam, 
based on Noetzli’s analysis method.
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design attracted the interest of Davis, his chief engineer  Frank Weymouth, dam 
design engineer  John L. Savage, and project engineer Walker Young.  At the same 
time, the Service had experience building massive embankment dams (such as 
Belle Fourche in South Dakota and Strawberry Valley in Utah) as well as thin 
arch concrete masonry dams (Pathfi nder and Shoshone, both in Wyoming); in 
this context, the decision to utilize a curved gravity concrete design did not come 
without some consideration of alternative designs.  However, the selection did 
come quickly and without a laborious public review of alternative designs.
 These plans were ultimately carried out and the Hoover Dam was designed 
as a pure gravity dam (see 8.11), although later the Bureau made a trial load 
analysis of the structure.
 The calculation of the factor of safety against overturning, based on the 
equations given in 8.8, shows the considerable overturning resistance of the cross-
section.  Based on the fi nal dimensions of the dam (height H = 727’ and base 
width B = 660’), the factor of safety is S.F. (2.25)(2) 660
727
3.7,
2
2= × = neglecting uplift.
Considering uplift, the factor of safety decreases to S.F. (1.25)(2)
660
727
2,
2
2= × =   still 
reasonably safe.  Although the fi nal design utilizes an arched plan, the additional 
resistance provided by the arching action is unnecessary to carry the loads 
imposed on the structure.  The fi nal structure is shown as built in 8.12below.
 Unlike Hoover Dam, the Glen Canyon design did benefi t from the  trial 
load analysis method that had developed in the 1920s and for the site (located 
on the main stem of the Colorado River only a few miles upstream from the 
spot marking the division between upper and lower basins), the Bureau made 
a design for a thin arched dam.  The site had long been familiar to the Bureau.  
In fact, it had fi gured as a possible alternative to Boulder/Black Canyon in 
Table 8.2.  Comparison of Stevenson Creek Dam defl ections from several analysis 
methods.
266
the early 1920s.  By the 1950s, 
the Bureau was eager to begin 
construction of a huge 700-foot 
high dam at Glen Canyon that 
would represent another major step 
in the development of the Colorado 
as a source of hydroelectric power 
for the burgeoning Southwest.  
Whereas  Echo Park lay within a 
part of the National Park System 
and thus comprised a site well 
suited for wilderness advocates to 
defend, the Glen Canyon dam and 
reservoir site simply encompassed 
federally-owned land and thus was 
8.11.  Hoover Dam, preliminary design of 
gravity section.
8.12.  Hoover Dam:  Downstream face showing powerhouses. 
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easier to justify in terms of inundating for the greater public good.  Although the 
canyon lands upstream from Glen Canyon could certainly have been characterized 
as a natural (and national) treasure, they held no place in the national public 
consciousness and no great movement developed to protect them.  Thus, when 
Congress agreed in 1956 to protect Echo Park, wilderness advocates offered little 
protest against approval of  Glen Canyon Dam in what could later be understood 
as a de facto compromise regarding development of the two dam and reservoir 
sites.24
 In terms of design, the  Glen Canyon Dam differed from Hoover in its use 
of an arch design featuring a profi le insuffi cient to stand as a gravity dam; in this 
strictly technological context it diverged from the precedent set by the Boulder 
Canyon Project and instead drew from the Bureau’s work in building thin arch 
dams that extended as far back as Pathfi nder and Shoshone dams prior to 1910.  
The fi nal structure (see 8.13), with a height of 690 ft. and a base thickness of just 
290 ft., had a factor of safety against overturning of just 0.80 without uplift and 
0.44 with uplift.  Thus the design relied heavily on arch action to resist the loads.
 The early version of the trial-load analysis, improved on by Noetzli in 
1921 and further refi ned by Bureau engineers in the late 1920s laid a basis for its 
use on the Glen Canyon Dam.  This confi dence helped lead the design engineers 
to design and construct a dam far thinner than Hoover and thus rely on arch action 
instead of only cantilever behavior.  There were other reasons too.  Concrete 
quality had improved since the 1920’s so that 415 psi stress limit at Hoover could 
be increased 1000 psi for Glen Canyon.25
 However, compensating somewhat for the improved concrete, the canyon 
walls at Glen Canyon were sandstone, a weaker material than the granite walls of 
Black Canyon.  Therefore, the stress at the arches abutments was kept at 
600 psi by thickening the arches as they approached the canyon walls.  The 
weaker walls also required the injection of a grout curtain to strengthen the 
foundations and prevent seepage under and around the dam.  These are the hidden 
dam components that are as essential to safety as the more visually obvious 
shaped and solidity of the concrete structure itself.
Concrete Forms and Complex Analysis
  Fred Noetzli, whose primary aim had been to use tests and calculations, 
predicted in 1924 that gravity dams would be replaced by thin arch structures; he 
quoted several engineers saying that “the gravity dam is a thing of the past” and 
“the gravity dam is an economic crime.”  He held the belief common to many 
in the 1920s that “engineering science is advancing” and that a more rational 
analytic base would lead to thinner and less costly structures.26  But Noetzli did 
not imply that more rational would necessarily mean more complex.  He worked 
with graphical methods typifi ed by his education at the Federal Technical Institute 
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in Zurich.  He did not publish the detailed mathematical formulations that had 
begun to appear in the 1920s and would culminate in the Bureau’s 1938 report.27
 This type of mathematical complexity was criticized sharply by one of the 
most famous structural engineering teachers,  Hardy Cross of Illinois University.  
In discussing a highly mathematical 1925 paper on concrete arches, Cross noted 
the uncertainties of loadings, of actual stress, and of foundations none of which 
were dealt with in the paper which “having swallowed these ‘camels’ only the 
‘gnat’ of mathematical analysis remains.  The ‘gnat’ should be an hors d’oeuvre 
and engineers are giving abnormal gustatory attention to it.”  He goes on to 
proclaim that “the theories of arch analysis which are now being elaborated 
in engineering literature are distinctly ‘high brow’ in that their elaborateness 
camoufl ages with erudition uncertainties and inaccuracies which are inevitable.”28
 In spite of Noetzli’s hope and Cross’s warning, the profession charged 
ahead with complexity of analysis and the result was that the Bureau of 
Reclamation dams did not get thinner but thicker until after World War II when 
the trial-load analysis would be used to justify the Glen Canyon Dam design.  A 
recent summary of this period stated that:
8.13.  Glen Canyon Dam.  View towards downstream face showing powerhouse. 
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Many arch dams built at the time showed a tendency for increasing 
thickness.  On the one hand the failure of St. Francis Dam in 
California in 1928 had raised questions regarding the safety of 
any proposed dam of large size.  On the other hand, it seemed 
that the excellent results obtained at Stevenson Creek, including a 
verifi cation of the trial load method, were not carried forward with 
these arch gravity-type dams.29
 By 1927 there had emerged well documented traditions of massive and of 
structural dams.  The structural tradition brought forth new methods of analysis 
both by physical test and by mathematical calculation.  The goal had been to build 
lighter, less expensive, and safer dams.  But as the methods of analysis got more 
complex there seemed to grow an anxiety about uncertainties in the analysis itself 
and the Federal agencies addressed these worries by designing heavier structures 
which they believed to be safer even though the lighter ones were performing at 
least as well.
 It seems to be a natural characterization of centralized agencies that they 
seek to avoid risks, to question innovations, and to justify heavy expenditures 
by invoking the specter of failure.  But behind this apparent criticism, there lay 
a deep  cultural ideology that was characterized by the new and prototypical 
building material of the twentieth century.  American society and indeed western 
society as a whole reacted to reinforced concrete in a profoundly ambiguous way.
 Modern concrete clearly stimulated the search for new forms that would 
carry loads with less material and at least as much safety as heavier designs.  But 
many engineers, not seeing these possibilities or not valuing them, sought to 
discredit this search for innovation.  They saw concrete as a mere substitute for 
stone masonry rather than a new material which, when cast monolithically, made 
the building of integrated structures possible leading to great savings of materials 
and weight.
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Origins of Boulder/Hoover Dam:  Siting, Design, 
and Hydroelectric Power
By:
Donald C. Jackson
 Boulder/Hoover Dam is the most prominent structure ever built by 
the Bureau of Reclamation and arguably the most famous dam in the world.  
Authorized by Congress and President Calvin Coolidge in December 1928, the 
structure was commonly referred to as Boulder Dam throughout the time it was 
under congressional debate.  In 1930 
it was  designated  Hoover Dam by 
Ray Lyman Wilbur (President Herbert 
Hoover’s Secretary of the Interior) 
and construction contracts were issued 
under that name.  In 1933 Harold 
Ickes (President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
Secretary of the Interior and no great 
admirer of the prior president) decreed 
that the name Boulder Dam be used 
in place of Hoover Dam.  In 1947, 
Congress passed legislation, signed 
by President Harry Truman, formally 
designating the structure Hoover Dam, 
the name it still retains.  But whatever 
the nomenclature, the curved gravity 
concrete structure was built in essential 
accord with plans developed in the 
1920s—a time when the name Boulder 
Dam held currency.  
This essay describes: 1)  the relation of the dam to agricultural development of the 
Imperial Valley; 2) the role played by hydroelectricity in the dam’s early history; 
3) why and when the decision was made to relocate the dam from Boulder 
Canyon (where it was originally proposed and from whence its original name 
derived) to Black Canyon, the site of its actual construction; 4) the adoption of a 
massive, curved gravity concrete design for the structure; and 5) the importance of 
Los Angeles and urban development to the dam’s authorization and construction.  
These are prosaic goals, perhaps, but worth addressing because of the dam’s 
importance within the history of the Bureau and within the larger history of 
twentieth century western water development.  Because this essay primarily 
involves events that occurred at a time when the proposed structure was known as 
Boulder Dam, that is the name used in the following discussion. 
9.1.  Secretary of the Interior Harold 
Ickes.
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Imperial Valley
 The conception of  Boulder Dam is rooted in a privately-fi nanced project 
to irrigate Southern California’s  Imperial Valley.  As conceived by the Colorado 
Development Company in the 1890s, this scheme diverted water from the 
Colorado River to nourish a huge tract of desert land just north of the California/
Mexico border.  Much of this land lies below sea level making it relatively 
easy for water to fl ow to the valley.  Conversely, this distinctive topographical 
condition also makes the valley susceptible to fl ooding.  In the 1850s, the Anglo-
American pioneer Oliver Wozencroft perceived the agricultural possibilities 
afforded by the topography of the lower Colorado River delta.  In particular, 
Wozencroft realized that the “ Alamo River,” an ancient silt-fi lled channel of the 
Colorado River about 50 miles long had once carried fresh water directly into the 
expansive valley known as the “Colorado Desert.”  And he appreciated that, with 
a little human assistance, it could readily do so again.  In the 1890s Wozencroft’s 
idea was picked up by the  California Development Company, an enterprise 
masterminded by  Charles Rockwood in partnership with  George Chaffey, and 
marketed as irrigating the bright sounding “Imperial Valley” rather than the more 
foreboding “Colorado Desert.”1
 Just north of the Mexican border the company dug a short canal (about 
four miles long) to connect the existing mainstem of the lower Colorado River 
with the ancient channel.  Fitted with wooden headgates designed to regulate 
fl ow and block excessive fl oods, the Alamo Canal provided an effective and 
inexpensive way to divert  Colorado River water into the Imperial Valley.  In 
the short term, the company’s plans to “make the desert bloom” proved easy 
to implement because, in centuries past, nature had accomplished most of the 
excavation work needed for the lengthy waterway.  By 1902 thousands of acres 
of prime agricultural land was “under the ditch” and the company’s prospects 
appeared bright.  However, a serious problem loomed, as the “cut” connecting 
the Alamo Canal and the mainstem of the Colorado kept clogging with silt, thus 
impeding water fl ow to farmers in the valley.2   Because silt accumulation proved 
particularly troublesome in the section of the canal closest to the river—and 
because interests allied with the company sought to move the headgates beyond 
U.S. jurisdiction in order to more readily irrigate land in Mexican territory—the 
company excavated a larger, more direct opening to the river at a site a few miles 
south of the U.S./Mexico border.  Completed in 1904, this new cut also relied 
upon wooden headgates to protect the canal from heavy fl oods.3
 To the company’s dismay, in June 1905 heavy storms in the Gila River 
watershed of central Arizona unleashed huge fl oods into the Lower Colorado, 
washing away the headgates protecting the Alamo Canal.   Soon a tremendous 
surge of water washed into the Imperial Valley.  As fl ow from the Colorado River 
accelerated, the Alamo Canal deepened and widened, allowing yet more water 
to be diverted out of the mainstem.  Although the Southern Pacifi c Railroad (a 
corporate ally of the California Development Company whose trackage served the 
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valley) dumped trainload-after-trainload of rock to close off the canal entrance, 
it achieved little short-term effect.  Despite appeals to the federal government to 
help stanch the deluge, President Teddy Roosevelt declined to interfere in what 
he considered the affairs of a private corporation.  Eventually, the fl ooding was 
brought under control by the Southern Pacifi c, but it took almost two years and an 
expenditure of 2 million dollars to close the breach.  In the meantime, thousands 
of acres of low lying land were inundated under what is now known as the  Salton 
Sea.4
 In 1909, the California Development Company entered bankruptcy 
after transferring most of its assets to the  Southern Pacifi c Railroad.  In 1911, 
landowners north of the international border formed the Imperial Irrigation 
District and fi ve years later the district purchased the water supply system from 
the railroad.5  Once the fl ooding stopped, agricultural production resumed in the 
valley.  Nonetheless, fear that a devastating uncontrolled “break” might recur was 
never far from the minds of residents and investors alike.  Soon the district and 
its boosters began clamoring for federally-supported fl ood protection and, in the 
midst of the uncertainty that followed collapse of the Porfi rio Diaz government in 
1910, for protection from possible Mexican interference with the valley’s water 
supply.
The  Fall/Davis Report
 Prior to the end of World War I, the Imperial Irrigation District sought 
assistance from the federal government for excavation of a completely new canal 
entirely within U.S. territory (designated the “All-American Canal”).6  As the war 
ended, the district also sought federal support for construction of a fl ood control/
storage dam somewhere in the lower Colorado River watershed that would protect 
the Imperial Valley from a recurrence of the disastrous inundation of 1905-07.  
In holding back fl ood water, such a dam could also increase water supplies for 
irrigation in the  Imperial Valley. 
 Although the Federal government had refrained from fi ghting the fl oods 
of 1905-1907, the lower Colorado River had not been ignored by the Reclamation 
Service.  As early as 1902  Arthur Powell Davis (at that time Assistant Chief 
Engineer of the Service) had considered development of the basin.7  However, for 
many years the issue of a major storage dam across the lower Colorado River was 
overshadowed by other Reclamation Service projects including Roosevelt Dam 
in Arizona, Arrowrock Dam in Idaho, and Elephant Butte Dam in New Mexico.  
By the end of World War I these large projects were complete and the Service 
was seeking new venues for its dam-building skills.  In 1915 Davis had ascended 
to become Director of the Reclamation Service: in that position he appreciated 
that controlling the lower Colorado could involve construction of one of the most 
prominent dams in the world.  In the words of California water historian Norris 
Hundley:
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The proposed legislation [for an All-American Canal] immediately 
caught the eye of Arthur Powell Davis… who saw it as a perfect 
opportunity to raise anew his dream of harnessing the Colorado River… 
the canal made sense, concluded Davis, but only if it were part of a 
larger design.  To build such an aqueduct without also constructing dams 
to control “the fl ood menace” would doom the canal to a short life… 
Davis told all who would listen [that the Imperial Valley problem] “is 
inseparably linked with the problem of water storage in the Colorado 
Basin as a whole.”8
 As a result of  Imperial Irrigation District lobbying and support from 
Davis, in May 1920 Congress authorized the Reclamation Service to develop 
preliminary plans for an All-American Canal and a Colorado River storage dam.9
Known as the  Kinkaid Act (it was sponsored by Nebraska representative Moses 
Kinkaid, Chairman of the House Committee on Irrigation), this law initiated 
practical planning for  Boulder Dam.10
 In 1922 the Kinkaid Act bore fruit in the form of the “Fall/Davis Report” 
a major study formally prepared under the auspices of Secretary of the Interior 
Albert Fall and Director Davis.  This landmark report proposed a large dam that 
would do much more than simply store fl oods and protect the Imperial Valley.  
Aware of objections that would arise if project fi nancing was perceived as a 
federal hand-out, Davis advocated hydroelectric power development as a key 
part of the project simply because only power revenues could repay construction 
costs with any degree of certainty.  From a strictly practical point-of-view, the 
development of hydroelectricity made much sense as a dam over 500 feet high 
and impounding more than 20 million acre-feet of water could generate many 
millions of kilowatt hours per year.  But from a political perspective, the use of 
power revenues as the primary means of fi nancing the dam was problematic.  
Specifi cally, it raised questions about the proper role of the Federal government in 
the generation and marketing of electricity. 
 Privately-fi nanced companies controlled America’s electric power grid in 
the 1920s and they viewed askance any legislation that would authorize a huge 
federally-fi nanced dam to be paid for by hydroelectric power revenues.  In the 
political environment of the pro-business 1920s—when the Republican Party 
controlled both the White House and Congress—the “public power” issue always 
loomed over the proposed Boulder Canyon Project.  As historian Paul Kleinsorge 
noted in the 1940s: 
The controversy over the power aspects of the [Boulder Canyon] 
project, however, was not a dispute that was confi ned to the relatively 
local ambitions of [California and Arizona].  It was a clamorous 
argument that took on the aspects of a nation-wide debate, chiefl y 
because it involved the whole question of whether or not the federal 
government should enter large-scale power production activities…11
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 In the face of possible objections from private power interests, the  Fall/
Davis Report nonetheless advocated construction of a high dam and hydroelectric 
power plant in the vicinity of Boulder Canyon.  The Reclamation Service 
recognized that there were other possible storage dam sites along the length of the 
Colorado River (including Diamond Creek, Bridge Canyon, and Glen Canyon) 
but quickly focused on Boulder Canyon because of its large storage capacity 
and its proximity to prospective water users and electric power consumers in 
Southern California.12  Both Boulder Canyon and the nearby Black Canyon (lying 
about twenty miles farther downstream) featured dramatic, narrow gorges with 
steep granite walls extending upwards for several hundred feet.  While initial 
investigations focused on  Boulder Canyon (hence the name historically attached 
to the project), Service engineers soon initiated studies at Black Canyon in order 
to discern the best possible site for the dam.
Selection of the Black Canyon Site
 Even prior to the release of the Fall/Davis Report, Davis had considered 
Black Canyon as an alternative to Boulder Canyon.  The two canyons offered 
similar possibilities of service to southern California, but, because Black Canyon 
lay about 20 miles farther downstream, it allowed development of a small (yet 
not insignifi cant) amount of hydropower that would otherwise be diffi cult to 
capture.  This issue was directly addressed in a December 1921 letter from Davis 
to Reclamation Service Chief Engineer Frank Weymouth:
I am inclined to think it best to make one or more borings at Black 
Canyon, because a dam at that point would utilize about thirty feet of fall 
[for power generation] which occurs between that point and our camp at 
Boulder Canyon, and this fall cannot be utilized in any other way.13
 At the same time, the Black Canyon 
dam site was close enough that it could 
inundate the expansive reservoir site lying 
above Boulder Canyon; in fact, the Black 
Canyon site could actually provide for 
greater storage capacity than the original 
dam site surveyed in Boulder Canyon.
By the beginning of 1922 geological 
explorations were underway at Black 
Canyon to discern the quality of bedrock 
and the depth of excavation necessary for 
dam foundations.14  In July Weymouth 
reported to Davis that initial investigation 
of the upper end of Black Canyon (termed 
line “A”) did not appear promising, 
advising him that: 
9.2.  Arthur Powell Davis while Director 
of the Reclamation Service.
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The foundation rock at line A in Black Canyon is not suitable for 
bearing pressures of 40 tons per square foot as used on the granite of 
Boulder Canyon, [and] the soft and porous structure of some of the rock 
may render this site entirely unsuitable for such a high dam.  In this 
connection I will say that I am personally very doubtful of the feasibility 
of a dam 600 feet high in Black Canyon, unless the conditions at the 
lower site prove to be very much better…15
 Despite this less than encouraging prognosis, exploratory work continued 
at the lower end of Black Canyon (line “D”).  Conditions at the latter location 
proved more agreeable to Service engineers and, following a two-day fi eld visit 
by the Director in November 1922, Davis could advise Weymouth:
No one doubts the feasibility of the Black Canyon site.  The rock in 
the bottom of line D is much better than that secured at the head of the 
canyon last year...  I think we should make a choice between Black and 
Boulder Canyons as soon as possible so as to stop expenditures at the site 
rejected.16
 With this endorsement by Director Davis, full attention soon shifted 
to Black Canyon.  In early 1924—after Davis had formally resigned and the 
Service was offi cially renamed the Bureau of Reclamation—Weymouth offi cially 
recommended Black Canyon as the site for the proposed Boulder Dam.  As 
the voluminous 1924 planning study for the project (commonly known as the 
“ Weymouth Report”) explained: 
An extensive geological examination has been made… [and while] 
both dam sites [Boulder and Black Canyons] are excellently adapted to 
the construction of a very high dam… , the granite of Boulder Canyon 
is superior to the breccia of Black Canyon for carrying great loads… 
[nonetheless] the investigations led to the adoption of the lower site in 
Black Canyon for the reason that it is more accessible [for construction 
equipment and materials]; the maximum depth to bedrock is less than 
at the upper site in Boulder Canyon and for the same height of dam the 
reservoir capacity is greater.17
 Thus, the selection of Black Canyon was not made because it offered 
better geological conditions (in fact, based on this criteria, it was judged a bit less 
desirable than  Boulder Canyon).  Rather, Black Canyon was preferred because 
it would allow for a less costly structure (based upon savings in site excavation 
and in connecting the site to  regional transportation networks) and provide for a 
larger reservoir.
 In this light, it is worth recalling that the decision in December 1921 to 
investigate the Black Canyon site had been rationalized in terms of an additional 
thirty feet of head available for hydroelectric power production.  This rationale 
was excluded from the recommendation presented in the 1924  Weymouth Report, 
but the omission was likely made more for political expediency than because the 
279
additional 30-foot power drop had somehow been forgotten.  Hydroelectric power 
generation remained at the core of the planning for the “high dam” but—in light 
of possible controversy related to “Public Power” development—it was often 
downplayed in the mid-1920s.  This is apparent in a description of the proposed 
dam provided to the engineer/author Edward Wegmann by the Bureau in 1927: 
The primary objects in the construction of this dam are: 1) To permit the 
use of the normal fl ow of the Colorado River in the upper Colorado River 
Basin without injury to prior rights below the reservoir by replacing 
such diversions from storage.  2) To extend the use of the waters of the 
Colorado River for irrigation and domestic purposes in and adjacent to 
the lower Colorado Basin.  3) To provide fl ood protection for lands along 
the Colorado River below the reservoir and in the Imperial Valley.  The 
accomplishments of these objects requires a reservoir of large capacity 
and a high dam, presenting attractive possibilities of power development 
incidental to the use of water for the primary objects of the reservoir.18
 Thus, the Bureau’s offi cial position was that hydroelectric power 
production was only “incidental” to the “objects” for building the dam.  But, in 
fact, this was not refl ective of the de facto role played by hydroelectric power in 
justifying the fi nancial underpinnings of the  dam.  As Kleinsorge later observed: 
The generation of electrical energy was given the last place in the list of 
purposes of the act [authorizing construction of the dam] and last place 
in the priority of uses.  Yet in spite of this ranking it is one of the most 
important phases of the project.  It is through the sale of electric power 
that the project is to be made a fi nancially solvent and self-supporting 
undertaking… The fact remains that no other practical method of 
fi nancing the project had been suggested and if the project could not have 
been made self-supporting through the sale of electric power it would not 
exist today.19
 Legislation calling for “construction of the All-American Canal and a dam 
at or near Boulder Canyon” was fi rst introduced in Congress in 1922.  Known 
publicly as the  Swing-Johnson Act (and more formally as the  Boulder Canyon 
Project Act), it remained in committee for the legislative session and never came 
up for a vote.  Undeterred, Congressman Phil Swing and Senator Hiram Johnson 
(both of California) revised and resubmitted their bill three more times over 
the next six years.  By the time of its passage in 1928 it called for a dam with a 
reservoir capacity of at least 26 million acre-feet and a power plant to be built by 
the federal government but leased to other entities (be they public or private) for 
operation and power generation.20
 By the time the fi nal site location for the lower Colorado storage dam 
was recommended in the 1924 Weymouth Report, so much effort already had 
gone into the promotion of a “Boulder Canyon Project” that no effort was made 
to transform the nomenclature to the “Black Canyon Project” or “Black Dam.”
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Nonetheless, from 1924 on, all work related to Boulder Dam revolved around the 
lower site (line “D”) in Black Canyon and this is where the structure stands today. 
The Design of Boulder Dam
 During the early planning stages for what became the  Boulder Canyon 
Project, Davis and his staff made an effort to consider a range of possibilities 
for the design of the big storage dam on the 
Lower Colorado.  Based upon the Service’s 
experiences with the Roosevelt, Elephant 
Butte, and Arrowrock dams, it is not surprising 
that a massive concrete/masonry gravity 
design attracted the interest of Davis, his Chief 
Engineer Frank Weymouth, and Dam Design 
Engineer John L. Savage.  At the same time, 
the Service had experience building massive 
embankment dams (such as Belle Fourche 
in South Dakota and Strawberry Valley in 
Utah) as well as thin arch concrete masonry 
dams (Pathfi nder and Shoshone, both in 
Wyoming).  Although the decision to utilize 
a curved gravity concrete design involved 
some preliminary consideration of alternative 
designs,  selection of a massive curved gravity 
design came quickly and apparently involved 
little  laborious review of alternative designs.
 In late 1920 Davis initiated correspondence with  Lars Jorgensen, a 
European-trained engineer who had become a prominent advocate of thin arch 
dam design (especially constant angle arch dams).  Davis wrote to Jorgensen in 
order to help determine whether a large thin arch dam might be feasible to build 
across the lower Colorado.21  While previously Davis had been prominently 
associated with massive gravity dams such as Roosevelt and Arrowrock, he 
also retained an interest in the arch designs (such as those used for the Service’s 
Pathfi nder and Shoshone dams in Wyoming) and his interaction with Jorgensen 
testifi es to this point.22  During the next year, the use of a thin arch design (either 
constant radius or constant angle) offi cially remained a possibility, but little action 
to promote or investigate such a design is evident in available records.23
 The idea that the Service would rely upon a massive design was publicly 
expressed by Davis as early as October 1920 (even before he corresponded with 
Jorgensen) when he wrote to J. W. Reagan, Chief Engineer of the Los Angeles 
County Flood Control District, in response to a “request for some information 
concerning tentative plans made for a dam in Boulder Canyon.”  In his response 
to Reagan, Davis indicated that “studies have been made for a section of masonry 
or concrete of the gravity type, and a rock fi ll and earth section, the latter not 
9.3.  John (Jack) L. Savage, 
Chief Design Engineer, Bureau of 
Reclamation.
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being regarded as certainly feasible.”24  In 1924 Volume Five of the  Weymouth 
Report focused specifi cally on “Investigations, Plans and Estimates” and 
presented the results of the Bureau’s dam analysis undertaken over the preceding 
four years.  In this study, no mention is made of any thin arch designs that may 
have been considered for the big storage  dam.  Instead, the Weymouth Report 
indicated only that “studies have been made of rock-fi ll and concrete dams of 
various types,” further explaining:
there is a grave question whether life and property below a dam of such 
unprecedented height and a reservoir of such enormous capacity should 
through the construction of a rock fi ll dam be subjected to a risk which 
could be removed by the adoption of a concrete dam… With all possible 
safeguards taken in the construction of a rock-fi ll of the height proposed 
it must be admitted that its overtopping would result in certain and 
sudden destruction with overwhelming disaster in the valley below.  The 
dams adopted are believed to be the safest that can be built—concrete 
dams of the gravity type built on a curved plan and estimates prepared 
indicate that the concrete dams could be built at less cost than rock-fi lls 
of the same height.”  [note: the use of the plural ‘dams’ in this quotation 
refers to three designs of various heights ranging from about 525 feet to 
over 700 feet developed for the same site].25
 Although the Bureau estimated some possible economic advantages 
for selecting a massive curved gravity design, concerns over the possibility 
that a rock-fi ll design might someday be overtopped comprised a key rationale 
for selecting a curved gravity design.  In fact, the Weymouth Report went so 
far as to advocate a curved gravity design that would not feature any spillway, 
noting that overtopping could probably be prevented by opening up all possible 
discharge outlets through the powerhouse and the dam.  But even if the fl ooding 
overwhelmed the capacity of the discharge outlets, the report reassured that:
Any overtopping would be of short duration and [designs for the concrete 
gravity] dams have been designed to pass rare fl oods over the top with 
safety which can not be done in the case of a rock-fi ll dam.26
 Instead of spillways drilled through the rock abutments, the Weymouth 
Report proposed that outlet pipes (controlled by huge valves) be built directly into 
the dam itself.  These could draw water from the lower depths of the reservoir 
and discharge it from the downstream face of the structure.  The other means 
of discharging water from the reservoir would be through penstocks drilled 
through the rock abutment along the Nevada side of the canyon; these would 
feed into a hydroelectric power house about a half mile downstream from the 
dam.  In formulating a basic plan for how best to construct the dam, Weymouth 
also proposed that the same tunnels used to carry water to the powerhouse could 
provide vital service during construction.  Specifi cally, they were to divert the 
fl ow of the Colorado River so that temporary rock-fi ll cofferdams could protect 
the site from fl ooding and facilitate excavation.
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 By the beginning of 1924 the  Weymouth Report laid out the basic features 
of what would become Boulder Dam.  The plan evolved over the next few years 
and by 1928 important revisions had been made under the supervision of dam 
engineer J. L. Savage.  These included: 
1) drilling of diversion tunnels through both the Nevada and 
 Arizona abutments (two tunnels on both sides of the river); 
2) construction of two “glory-hole” spillways that would connect   
 into the diversion tunnels and insure that the dam would never   
 be overtopped; 
3) construction of powerhouses immediately downstream and 
 adjacent to the dam structure on both the Nevada and Arizona
 sides of Black Canyon; these would tap into the diversion 
 tunnels and to other tunnels connected to outlet towers built 
 directly upstream from the dam.27
 Clearly, these changes represent important alterations to the Weymouth 
design and are of central importance in defi ning the form of the dam/powerhouse/
penstock/ spillway system as it was actually built.  But, beyond the drilling 
of spillway discharge tunnels to feed into the diversion tunnels, they do not 
constitute anything that cannot be understood as an evolution of the Weymouth 
design.  And even the addition of spillway tunnels represented an uncomplicated 
(yet certainly creative) expansion of Weymouth’s diversion tunnel concept.
 During the mid-1920s, the specifi c character of the Boulder Dam design 
continued to evolve as more was learned about geological conditions and as 
the Bureau became interested in utilizing the “Trial-Load” method of design to 
confi rm the safety of the massive curved gravity design.  While the “ Trial-Load” 
method of analysis undoubtedly fi gured into the fi nal dimensioning of the dam’s 
profi le, it did not prompt any dramatic changes or modifi cations.28  In fact, it is 
diffi cult to discern any radical differences between the preliminary profi le that 
accompanied Weymouth’s 1924 report and the design as built.  Both represent 
curved gravity designs featuring extremely ample gravity sections and the use of 
“Trial-Load” techniques of analysis did little in terms of altering the basic form 
of the design.  In the same way, research on scale models of the dam also fi gured 
into the Bureau’s analysis of structural safety and gave them greater confi dence 
in its stability, but it is diffi cult to perceive how the basic form of the design was 
altered by such work.29
 In May 1928—near the end of the approval process for the Boulder 
Canyon Project—Congress authorized the formation of a special “ Colorado 
River Board,” separate and distinct from the Bureau’s own board of consulting 
engineers, and charged it with providing an independent assessment of the 
proposed dam’s safety and feasibility.30  At the end of the year, just prior to 
congressional passage of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the Colorado River 
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Board approved the dam’s basic design, but recommended that the maximum 
allowable stresses in the massive structure be reduced from 40 tons per square 
foot to 30 tsf.  Although this might have appeared to the layperson as a rather 
simple way to increase the strength of the design, to the Bureau it presented a 
problem because strict adherence to a 30 tsf limit would signifi cantly add to the 
(already massive) bulk of the dam and signifi cantly increase its cost.  Without 
overtly resisting this directive, the Bureau nonetheless made no meaningful 
alteration to the existing design.  Instead, the Bureau opted to claim that more 
sophisticated mathematical analysis (in line with the “Trial-Load” method) 
indicated that the proposed design in fact did not exceed a maximum allowable 
stress of about 34 tons per square foot and this was considered adequate to meet 
the 30 tsf criteria.  In Mead’s words: “It is not believed that the maximum stress 
as fi nally calculated will appreciably exceed the 30-ton limit.  It is believed that 
the general plan of the dam can be agreed upon without serious diffi culties.”31
The Colorado River Board’s recommendation thus had no substantive effect on 
the fi nal design as the Bureau simply asserted that they could adhere to the 30 tsf 
limit without making any substantive design changes.32
 In his 1928 “Revised Plan” for the dam, Savage took care not to criticize 
the Weymouth Report as being somehow faulty and in need of correction.  Rather, 
he stated that “The Weymouth plan for the dam and power plant… constitutes 
a preliminary study on which to base an estimate of cost.  The plan was not 
considered as a fi nal design and should not be considered as such.”33  In this 
context, the design of  Boulder Dam cannot be ascribed to any single individual, 
but instead represents a collaborative effort that extended over several years’ 
time.  Davis, Weymouth, and Savage all played important roles in overseeing 
preparation of the basic design, and, in concert with other Service/Bureau staff 
members, deserve credit as designers of Boulder Dam.34
Los Angeles
 The preceding discussion has focused on engineering aspects of the basic 
dam design.  In contrast, the architectural treatment of the dam’s surface features 
was handled in a very different manner and emanated from a source separate from 
the Bureau’s Denver offi ce.  During the 1920s the architectural treatment of the 
dam was assumed to adhere to a neo-classic style featuring design motifs such as 
eagles with wide-spread wings.  In 1931, long after all the major technical issues 
involving the design had been determined, the Bureau commissioned Los Angeles 
architect  Gordon Kaufmann to develop a more modern appearance for the dam.  
By simplifying the surface treatment of the design and adopting a monumental 
“art deco” style, Kaufmann created an evocative, streamlined facade for the 
massive structure.  While the prominence of the dam in American culture is no 
doubt tied in part to its modernistic design motif, the circumstance of hiring a 
non-government architect to carry out this work occurred very late in the design 
process and was very much separate and distinct from the rest of project.35
284
 In many ways it is appropriate that the surface treatment for the 
Boulder/ Hoover Dam emanated from a Los Angeles architect because, in the 
interim between the initiation of the project by Imperial Valley advocates after 
World War I and its fi nal authorization in the late 1920s, the City of Los Angeles 
and other southern California communities came to play an increasingly vital role 
in promoting the Boulder Canyon Project.  As early as July 1921  Los Angeles 
had expressed interest in helping build Boulder Dam in return for control over the 
hydroelectric power plant.36  And by 1924 this interest had expanded into a formal 
water claim fi led on the city’s behalf for 1500 cubic feet per second of Colorado 
River fl ow.37  With this claim, the City of Los Angeles served as the catalyst for 
the  Colorado River Aqueduct and for what soon evolved into the  Metropolitan 
Water District of Southern California (MWD).
 Perhaps most importantly in terms of Congressional approval for the 
Boulder Canyon Project, the MWD was to comprise the most important customer 
for hydropower.  As noted in the MWD’s fi rst annual report: 
It was early recognized that to secure favorable [congressional] 
consideration [the Boulder Canyon Project] must be self-supporting 
and that the power to be generated from any development… must fi nd 
a market which would eventually return all costs of the entire project to 
the Government.  As additional engineering work for a Colorado River 
Aqueduct was done it became evident that any practicable diversion of 
the river must… involve pumping.  Such pumping was practicable only 
if a large amount of power could be obtained at low price.  This created, 
at once, a potential market for a substantial part of the power from any 
major Colorado River development.  When these facts… were laid 
before Congress support for the Swing-Johnson measure became easier 
to obtain.38
Put another way, the need to use huge amounts of electric power to pump 
water through the Colorado Aqueduct helped convince hesitant Congressmen 
that Boulder Dam would not become a fi nancial white elephant, generating huge 
quantities of unmarketable power.  The MWD could sign contracts guaranteeing 
power sales, and, in turn, the Federal Government (and Federal taxpayers) could 
rest assured that such contracts would be honored because the MWD possessed the 
right to directly tax land within its service area.  In 1930, when Secretary of 
the Interior Wilbur authorized 50-year leases governing use of Boulder Dam 
power, 64 percent of the dam’s power was reserved for use in Southern California, 
36 percent went to the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California to 
pump water through the Colorado Aqueduct, a little more than 9 percent to the 
Southern California Edison Company and other private power companies, and 
about 18 percent to the City of Los Angeles and other municipally-owned utilities 
in Southern California (Los Angeles and Southern California Edison were to share 
primary responsibility for operating the dam’s power plant).  Although Arizona and 
Nevada were each allotted 18 percent of the dam’s power, many years would pass 
before these states developed markets large enough to utilize their full share.39
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 Thus, the primacy of hydroelectric power that energized Davis’ initial 
promotion of the Boulder Canyon site because of its relative proximity to southern 
California—as well as the initial investigation of the Black Canyon site because it 
allowed for the capture of an additional 30-foot water drop — proved key to the 
dam’s legislative and fi nancial success.  While the project may have been born out 
of the fl ooding of the Imperial Valley by a rampaging Colorado River, its long-
term viability rested upon the ability of urban interests in greater Los Angeles to 
absorb its enormous cost— budgeted at a minimum of $165 million in the 1928 
Boulder Canyon Project Act.40  And because of the tremendous revenue that could 
be generated by power sales to an urban market, the Bureau could readily adopt 
a massive curved gravity design requiring more than 4 million cubic yards of 
concrete.
 Fostered by a desire to promote and protect irrigation in the Imperial 
Valley, Boulder/ Hoover Dam ultimately depended upon the urban development 
of Los Angeles to effect its construction.  In this, the dam’s history highlights 
how in the 1920s the Bureau’s mission was shifting away from support for 
irrigated agriculture (as called for in the 1902 National Reclamation Act) and 
towards a broader involvement in western economic development encompassing 
hydroelectric power generation and urban growth.
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The First Five:  A Brief Overview of the First 
Reclamation Projects Authorized by the Secretary 
of the Interior on March 14, 1903
By:
Shelly C. Dudley
 While Frederick Jackson Turner might have declared that the frontier was 
at an end in 1893, countless lands within the American West had not yet been 
reclaimed or made productive.  In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the 
federal government surveyed the country in the western states and territories, 
examining potential diversion and storage sites while calculating irrigable 
acreage.  The U.S. Geological Survey estimated that 30 million acres could be 
irrigated, but by 1890, only 3.6 million acres were being farmed.  Because of the 
vision of certain individuals who knew that for America to reclaim its arid western 
lands required the involvement of the national government, the fertile acreage in 
the Salt River Valley in Central Arizona, the lands in western Nevada, the valley 
of the North Platte River in Nebraska and Wyoming, the farmers along the Milk 
River situated in northeastern Montana, and the region along the Uncompahgre 
River in Colorado would have the necessary water to promote and sustain growth. 
This is a brief overview of the fi rst fi ve projects authorized by the Secretary of the 
Interior under the national Reclamation Act from their beginning, to their place 
today in the settlement of the West.
10.1.  Reclamation’s fi rst fi ve projects.
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  John Wesley Powell, Civil War veteran, explorer of the Grand Canyon, 
surveyor of Western lands, and head of the U.S. Geological Survey, believed 
that the federal government should reserve lands for the small family farmer and 
assist in the development of irrigation projects.  Powell wanted settlement of 
the West to be in the hands of the individual homesteader even though it would 
require support by Washington, yet not all the lands were still available; land 
speculators claimed much of the potentially good farm acreage.  But neither the 
early small landowning farmer, nor land developers or eastern entrepreneurs, had 
the necessary resources to fi nance the construction of dams to store additional 
water to reclaim the western lands.  In his report on arid lands, Powell wrote that 
he considered the character of the lands themselves, the engineering problems 
and suggested “legislative action necessary to inaugurate the enterprises by which 
these lands may eventually be rescued from their present worthless state.”1
 Promoters of western irrigation, including the infl uential National 
Irrigation Congress, maintained that the federal government should be involved in 
developing the arid lands.   George Maxwell, a leading spokesman for the national 
irrigation movement, believed that settlement of western lands by yeoman farmers 
would solve the social ills of the eastern urban centers with the movement of 
the population and met with  Frederick Newell, chief hydrographer with the U.S. 
Geological Survey.  Newell, a protege of  John Wesley Powell, surveyed the arid 
lands of the West and understood the plight of the homesteader who could not get 
enough water to irrigate his lands and grow crops to support his family.  Maxwell 
and Newell met frequently with Wyoming Senator  Francis E. Warren and Nevada 
Congressman  Francis G. Newlands to devise a plan so that the government could 
sponsor federally funded water projects.”2
 At the turn of the century many in Congress realized that, without the 
support of the national government, settlement of additional lands in the West 
would not be possible; various congressman supported a reclamation act which 
would provide federal monies to construct irrigation works and further the 
development of the arid lands.  Yet, only after the assassination of President 
William McKinley and the ascendency of  Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency 
did Congress enact the national  Reclamation Act.  The statute, by authorizing the 
use of federal money from the sale of public lands, would make extensive areas 
of the West suitable for irrigation, provide homes for America’s citizens, increase 
the agricultural production of the nation, and “make benefi cial use of two of its 
national assets, land and water.”3
 Although the national Reclamation Act was not signed until June 17, 1902, 
government engineers prior to its passage had already investigated the western 
landscape for potential dam sites and irrigable farmlands.  After the measure’s 
enactment, the engineers of the U.S. Geological Survey and then the newly 
created U.S. Reclamation Service prepared a list of potential projects for the 
Secretary of the Interior to authorize.  The Reclamation Service considered certain 
criteria, such as water supply, storage facilities, alignment of canals, and selection 
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of feasible lands.  While the engineers usually required several years of study to 
make these necessary determinations, the western settlers were eager to begin the 
work of reclaiming the land and wanted projects announced as soon as possible.
 The Reclamation Service, aware of the current circumstances, 
recommended fi ve projects that could be clearly defi ned with the costs and results 
estimated.  As early as 1889 John Wesley Powell had explored the arid lands of 
the West, noting potential storage dam sites and the fertility of the land.  Fellow 
geological engineer, and later offi cial in the Reclamation Service,  Arthur P. Davis 
surveyed the land in the West by the turn of the century.  With this background in 
place, it would not take long for the fi rst projects to be selected by the Secretary 
of the Interior.
 On March 7, 1903,  Charles D. Walcott, Director of both the U.S. 
Geological Survey and the U.S. Reclamation Service recommended the fi rst fi ve 
projects to the Secretary of the Interior: Sweetwater (North Platte) situated in 
Wyoming and Nebraska, Milk River in Montana, Truckee (Newlands) in Nevada, 
Gunnison (Uncompahgre) located in Colorado, and the Salt River Project in 
central Arizona.  On March 14, 1903, Secretary Ethan A. Hitchcock concurred 
with the suggestions, stating that the Reclamation Service should concentrate its 
efforts upon these fi ve projects, secure the lands needed for the dams, reservoirs 
and appurtenant irrigation works, negotiate with current owners of irrigable lands, 
and prepare contracts for the construction of the reclamation works.4
 Each project presented both unique conditions while being similar in other 
respects.  All fi ve projects contained both private and public lands.  A few projects 
had some irrigation works, while others needed the construction of storage dams 
to provide additional water supply as well as canals and ditches to bring the 
water to the land.  Towns and communities were created within the reclamation 
projects while the opportunity for others to grow and become major cities became 
a reality.  By examining individually the fi rst fi ve projects, we can appreciate the 
impact of the national Reclamation Act on western America.
The First Five
Newlands Project (Truckee)
 Is it any wonder the  Newlands Project was selected by the staff of the 
Geological Survey, considering the national Reclamation Act was sponsored by 
Nevada congressman Francis Newlands and much work was already done in the 
state by government and private engineers?  Even though the money available 
from Nevada’s reclamation fund was the smallest of all the western states and 
territories, the need was great.  At the turn of the century, farmers irrigated 
approximately 500,000 acres throughout the state, but the potential was limited 
because a few settlers and cattlemen controlled much of the land around the water 
sources.  The Humboldt, Truckee, Carson, and Walker streams provided most 
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of the water during the winter months, but water storage was necessary for the 
successful reclamation of the desert lands year round.5
 As early as 1860 ranchers arrived in the Lahontan Valley in northwestern 
Nevada and gradually started to farm, with cultivated land reaching 5,000 acres by 
1880.  The Powell Irrigation Survey examined the resources in Nevada, indicating 
that the Truckee River could be diverted through a canal to the Lahontan Valley, 
but beyond this study, no viable action was taken.  At approximately the same 
time,  Francis G. Newlands, son-in-law and trustee of the William Sharon estate 
which held extensive acreage in Nevada, moved to Carson City and started to 
acquire his own land along the Truckee River in 1889.  Newlands expanded his 
holdings and commissioned surveying parties to examine reservoir and canal 
sites; the entrepreneur also used reclamation as an issue in his bid for political 
offi ce.  Between1899 and 1900, L. H. Taylor, an engineer and director of the 
University of Nevada Agricultural Experiment Station, investigated a number 
of reservoir locations and, after the passage of the Reclamation Act, surveyed 
additional sites, including those along the Carson and Truckee rivers.  Rainfall in 
the Carson Sink Valley averaged approximately six inches a year, not enough to 
provide a stable water supply without the construction of storage reservoirs.6
 The initial irrigation structures of the project designed by the reclamation 
engineers included the earthen  Derby Diversion Dam on the Truckee River, the 
thirty-one-mile  Truckee Canal, with a carrying capacity of 1,200 to 1,500 second 
feet, the  Carson River Diversion Dam, and a distribution system of canals and 
laterals carrying water to the farm units.  The original plan for a storage dam 
on  Lake Tahoe was halted by the property owners along the lake who feared 
the water levels would fl uctuate greatly, so federal engineers constructed the 
Lahontan Dam and Reservoir in 1911.  A legal settlement was fi nally reached with 
the Truckee River General Electric Company concerning storage of water at Lake 
Tahoe, and the federal engineers proceeded with construction of a dam on the 
lake.  As part of its work to insure the productivity of the lands, the Reclamation 
Service constructed a network of drainage ditches to prevent rising groundwater 
levels from causing alkali damage to the land and to crops.7
 With designation 
of the Newlands Project 
as one of the fi rst projects, 
changes occurred that could 
only happen when enough 
water is available.  Prior to 
its selection as a reclamation 
project, Churchill County, 
being the slowest growing 
county in the state, contained 
only 830 people within 4,883 
square miles, but within ten 10.2.  Levelling land on the Newlands Project.
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years  Fallon alone, the county seat, boasted a population of 1,000 people in 1913.  
The community, which had originally served as a supply depot for the nearby 
mining districts, experienced real growth and a building boom.  By 1926 Fallon’s 
residents doubled to 2,000 as the town’s population increased due to construction 
workers on the reclamation project, suppliers providing needed livestock and 
equipment to Reclamation, and new homesteaders eager to farm the land with 
the newly developed water.  The City of Fallon contracted with the Reclamation 
Service to supply residents with electricity produced by the Lahontan hydropower 
plant.  The system had grown to such an extent that eighty-fi ve percent of possible 
customers were receiving power from the reclamation project.8
 By the mid-1920s alfalfa was the principal crop, still providing for the 
original livestock industries focused on cattle, sheep, and hogs, while dairy farms 
started to make an ever growing appearance in the region.  Farmers also grew 
wheat, barley, potatoes, sugar beets, and garden truck with celery and cantaloupes 
harvested commercially.  With the assurance of a stable water supply for growing 
sugar beets, the Hinze Brothers of California organized the Nevada Sugar 
Company in 1910 and opened a factory in the center of Fallon, providing new 
opportunities for the farmers and factory workers.9
 The acreage on the Newlands Project encompassed over 200,000 acres, 
and boosters, including the Central and Southern Pacifi c Railways which owned 
approximately 10,000 acres, expected to have all that land farmed.  Within ten 
years of the selection of the Newlands Project, however, farmers irrigated just 
43,000 acres, and that amount increased to only 45,000 a decade later despite 
water right applications having been fi led for 70,000 acres in 1923.  While at least 
half the farmland held was in private ownership, the remaining public lands were 
open to homestead entry, providing opportunities for new settlers.10
Uncompahgre Project (Gunnison)
 First described by Captain J. W. Gunnison in 1853, “as a desert unfi t 
for cultivation and inhabitation only by savages,” the southwestern Colorado 
territory attracted new people beginning with the westward movement of miners.
The Ute Indians were forced to give up their lands between 1868 and 1881 and 
relocate to the Utah Territory, while their homelands opened to the public for 
settlement.  With the development of the mining industry and the necessity for 
foodstuffs to be near at hand, enterprising farmers seized the opportunity to move 
into the Uncompahgre Valley and construct ditches, diverting water from the 
Uncompahgre River to irrigate the crops; the fi rst shipments of hay were delivered 
to the mines.11
 The valley contained approximately 175,000 acres of irrigable land and 
the new settlers believed the river contained enough water for the fertile acres.
In the early 1880s the immigrants formed several canal companies, including 
the Montrose and Uncompahgre Ditch Company and the Delta Ditch Company, 
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constructing over 110 ditches and 475 miles of canals.  Besides providing water 
to the farmlands, a number of these companies delivered water to the burgeoning 
towns.  As was typical in many western regions, the farmers and canal companies 
overestimated the amount of land that could be irrigated by the 1890s, putting 
only 30,000 acres under the plow.  Water was in short supply, especially during 
the summer growing season, and there was not enough to irrigate the agricultural 
lands.12
 The farmers started looking elsewhere for an additional water supply, at 
fi rst considering taking water over the divide from the Cimarron River.  Then in 
1890, F. C. Lauzon conceived the idea of building a tunnel from the  Gunnison 
River to the Uncompahgre Valley.  Although the U.S. Geological Survey 
conducted a reconnaissance survey of this project, the implementation of any 
plan involving the construction of a tunnel was beyond the means of the people 
in western Colorado.  The Colorado Legislature was approached about assisting 
in this project, and in 1901 the Legislature set aside $25,000 for the construction 
of the tunnel.  That same year, Frederick Newell allocated $4,000 to survey the 
tunnel and canal location.  The Geological Survey mapped the region as well 
as conducted several additional surveys, including the geologic structure of the 
tunnel route and the elevations of the region.  The State of Colorado started 
construction on the tunnel in the fall of 1901, but the project was abandoned due 
to lack of funds.13
 On Secretary of the Interior Ethan Hitchcock’s initial list of fi ve projects 
was the Gunnison Project.  Beyond the initial expenditures made on surveying 
possible irrigation sites in southwestern Colorado, Walcott may have had other 
reasons for suggesting the Uncompahgre Valley as the location of one of the 
fi rst reclamation projects selected.  Congressman  James Shafroth of Colorado, 
besides being a member of the House Committee on Irrigation, met extensively 
with Representative Newlands, Senator Henry Hansbrough of North Dakota, 
and Senator Warren and Congressman F. W. Mondell of Wyoming, following 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s decision that reclamation would be a priority 
in his administration.  While Shafroth initially introduced his own reclamation 
legislation, he worked with these men on a congressional conference committee 
that eventually drafted the measure that became the national Reclamation Act; 
Shafroth was also the fl oor manager of the House when the Newlands bill came to 
a vote in Congress.14
 To supplement the fl ow of the Uncompahgre River, the federal engineers 
used the original plan of diverting the Gunnison River by a tunnel six miles in 
length and a canal almost twelve miles long.  The Reclamation Service started 
work almost immediately and over the next several months the government 
acquired the rights to the tunnel, although it took several years before the 
arrangements became fi nal.  Under the aegis of the Reclamation Service, 
contractors began digging the tunnel, but within a year, the builders went bankrupt 
and the federal engineers continued to direct the crews on the project, having to 
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change the location of the tunnel.  As a testament to the engineering efforts, a 
model of the Gunnison tunnel was prepared and shown at the Louisiana Purchase 
Exposition in St. Louis in 1904, and President  William Howard Taft was the guest 
of honor at the grand opening ceremonies for the Gunnison-Uncompahgre Tunnel 
on September 23, 1909.  During the ensuing decades, the Reclamation Service 
built additional diversion dams and either purchased private canals or constructed 
new ones, totaling approximately 470 miles, to bring water to the project lands.
In 1932 the Uncompahgre Valley Water Users’ Association accepted control of the 
project from the federal government.15
 When the Uncompahgre Project was authorized in 1903, the reclamation 
engineers estimated that approximately 171,000 acres could be irrigated, with 
116,000 acres being already in 
private ownership and most of 
the balance open for reclamation 
homestead entry.  As construction 
continued on the irrigation works, 
water was delivered as soon as the 
Gunnison tunnel was completed.
Although Charles Dana Wilber’s 
epigram that “rain follows the 
plow” was part of the Myth of the 
Garden in the nineteenth century 
Great Plains, in the West “where 
there is water people will come” 
is a truism.  The population of the 
Uncompahgre Valley grew as did 
the acres of cultivated lands.  The 
population in the Uncompahgre 
Valley was 5,171 in 1912 with 3,464 
living on the project farms, which 
increased to over 6,000 in 1923.  In 
1913, the Uncompahgre Project 
canals delivered water to 37,000 
acres while the private irrigation 
structures transmitted water to 
13,600 acres.  While the major crops 
were alfalfa, potatoes, oats, wheat, 
sugar beets, and apples, the Project 
Engineer suggested the farmers diversify their products to include dairy stock.  He 
also suggested settlers better prepare the soil, acquire better seed, and improve the 
methods of water delivery and use.  Within the next decade, the acreage increased 
to 64,180 acres irrigated within the project.16
10.3.  About 1914, “Slim” Pickins, an 
Uncompahgre Valley farmer, displayed 
produce from his farm at the county fair in 
Montrose, Colorado.
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Milk River
 As in most western territories, farming in the Montana region saw little 
activity until the 1860s, although limited agriculture occurred earlier near the 
fur trading posts.  The gold miners rushing to stake and work their claims did 
not want or have the time to till the soil for vegetables and grains, requiring 
others to provide those commodities.  Farmers soon came to cultivate the land 
and construct small water delivery systems.  Although the Milk River Valley in 
northeastern Montana receives approximately 20 inches of rainfall, irrigation was 
a necessity.  The communities of Chinook and Harlem developed canal systems 
with a communal diversion dam, as did the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the 
Assiniboine and Gros Ventre tribes on the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation.  By 
the turn of the century farmers irrigated 35,000 acres, growing oats, vegetables, 
and pasturage for livestock.  But without a stable water supply, the economic 
growth of the region could not be assured.17
 Under the instructions of Frederick Newell, Geological Survey Engineer 
Gerard H. Matthews studied the feasibility of diverting water from the St. 
Mary River to the Milk River in 1900.  The engineers determined that with the 
construction of a gravity canal between the two rivers, it was possible to transport 
water from one river to the other.   Cyrus Babb continued the survey of the region, 
investigating various diversion points and identifying what lands needed to be 
withdrawn.  Eventual plans depended, however, on an agreement between the 
governments of Canada and the United States, because the waters of the St. Mary 
River traveled through Canada before returning to the United States.  Although 
a treaty would not be reached for almost a decade, the Reclamation Service 
suggested that the Milk River Project be among the fi rst approved.  The waters 
of the Milk River Project also created problems within the continental United 
States when, as requested by the Reclamation Service, a determination of water 
rights was set in motion in 1905.  The U.S. Supreme Court, in deciding the case of 
Winters v U.S. in 1908, established the Indian and federal reserved rights doctrine, 
a precedent followed by today’s judicial system.
 Although it is not clear why the Milk River Project was among the fi rst 
chosen, the United States government may have wanted to protect the water 
supply of the Milk River from overuse by Canadian farmers or possibly guarantee 
it as a stable source of water for the Indians on the Fort Belknap Reservation.  In 
his autobiography, Newell noted that the Milk River Project had “international 
complications,” and like the other fi rst projects, he was instrumental in sending 
out the engineers to survey potential reservoir sites and alignments for canals.18
 The Reclamation Service engineers designed a system of irrigation canals 
and dams which would deliver water to the farmers for the irrigation of 120,000 
acres.  Beginning with the construction of  Lake Sherburne Dam, the stored water 
would be released into the St. Mary River before being diverted into the twenty-
nine mile long St. Mary Canal and then discharged into the Milk River.  The water 
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continues to fl ow northward 
into Alberta, Canada, before 
re-entering the United States, 
traveling more than 200 miles 
where it is stored in the Fresno 
Reservoir until it is needed by 
the farmers, proceeding through 
a series of diversion dams having 
journeyed through 200 miles of 
canals, 219 miles of laterals, and 
295 miles of drains.19
 As construction of the 
engineering features continued 
through several decades, settlement of the lands progressed slowly.  Even though 
there was no formal opening of the Milk River Project by the Secretary of the 
Interior for many years, the Reclamation Service allowed World War I veterans to 
fi le entries on the public lands in 1920.  During the next decade, landowners with 
large holdings, not eager to divide their land into the smaller units as required by 
the Reclamation Act, hindered development on the Project.  New farmers also 
had a diffi cult time adjusting to the farming conditions and many left within the 
year after planting their fi rst crop.  Those that remained produced good yields 
of grains, hardy vegetables, and alfalfa, which supported the local livestock 
industry.20
 Throughout the Montana drought of the late 1920s, and the Dust Bowl 
of the 1930s, the Milk River Project acted as a haven for those farmers who lost 
everything.  The federal government assisted in relocating both the “dry land 
farmers” who had tried to make a living in other parts of Montana and Texas and 
Oklahoma settlers who saw their lands blown away.  The Bureau of Reclamation’s 
mission was still helping the small farmer make a living and settle the arid West.21
North Platte
 When the early fur trappers and traders traveled through the North Platte 
Valley seeking beaver in the fi rst decades of the nineteenth century, they were 
among the fi rst Euro-Americans to visit the region west of the 100th meridian.  
The trails they helped blaze led later immigrants across the land to the northwest 
territories and established the fi rst trading posts at Fort Laramie and Fort Casper 
in the Wyoming region.  Following in the wake of the pioneers, who crossed the 
prairies to the green lands of Oregon and Washington, were the cattlemen who 
saw the open range as the space necessary for their livestock.  But within the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century, homesteaders decided to stay in Wyoming 
and Nebraska, fi ghting the cowmen, the blizzards, and the droughts.
10.4.  Freighting a portable engine to a sawmill on 
lower St. Mary Lake in June of 1906.  The lumber 
was to be used in construction work on the Milk 
River Project.
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 Although not initially receptive to the idea of irrigation as a means 
of watering the land, the farmers along the North Platte saw that increases 
in agricultural production were possible when they no longer relied solely 
on rainfall.  They dug canals, used water wheels, and while envisioning the 
cultivation of 60,000 acres along the North Platte, they were lucky to irrigate 
between 5,000 and 8,000 acres with the limited water supply.  As with most 
locations in the arid West, local capital or private investors could not raise 
the funds necessary to construct dams to store enough water for the irrigable 
lands.  Surveys had been prepared at the turn of the century for the construction 
of irrigation works, but it was not until Wyoming Senator F. E. Warren helped 
with the passage of the national 
reclamation bill that there was hope 
for the lands along the North Platte.22
 As possible recognition for 
Warren’s assistance as well as the 
Nebraska congressional delegation’s 
efforts in enacting the national 
reclamation law, Secretary of the 
Interior Hitchcock authorized the 
Sweetwater Project, later known as 
the North Platte, as one of the fi rst to 
be developed by the newly formed 
Reclamation Service.  Within the 
space of ten years Reclamation completed the  Pathfi nder Dam, cornerstone of 
the project and named after the early explorer, John C. Frémont, who traversed 
the North Platte River and perchance thought one day that the river would be 
tamed and provide the necessary life-giving water to the land.  Over the next 
two decades, federal engineers constructed a diversion dam and irrigation 
system, including the 130-mile long  Fort Laramie Canal and the  Interstate Canal.  
Reclamation delivered water to farmers as early as the 1908 irrigation season.23
 There were immediate signs of success on the North Platte Project with 
the construction of the Pathfi nder Dam.  Agriculture expanded with over a 
thousand newly irrigated farms by 1912, and during the next two years, the farm 
population increased by fi fty percent.  Livestock, both cattle and sheep, were 
brought to the project lands to feed on the crops during the winter.  By the mid-
1920s, over two thousand miles of canals and laterals were constructed on the 
North Platte Project, bringing water to about 220,000 acres in both Wyoming 
and Nebraska.  Reclamation engineers resurrected an earlier idea to construct a 
regulating reservoir with  Guernsey Dam, at Goshen Hole, Wyoming, and built 
additional reservoirs at Lake Alice and Lake  Minatare in Nebraska.  With the 
assurance of a water supply, the farmers started growing “speciality crops,” such 
as sugar beets and alfalfa while continuing to raise potatoes, oats, corn, wheat, and 
barley.  Under Warren Act contracts, the waters from the North Platte Project’s 
storage dams are delivered to an additional 100,000 acres.24
10.5.  Pathfi nder Dam on the North Platte 
(Sweetwater) Project.
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 Although the early reclamation settlers on the North Platte Project now 
had a water supply, they still faced other hardships, especially if they were 
unfamiliar with irrigation farming.  The strong winds often blew the topsoil away 
with the newly planted seed, and uneven application of water could send it all 
down the drainage ditch to the canal or river.  Bounties were often placed on 
grasshoppers and gophers.  Many of the new farmers could not produce enough 
crops to pay for all the costs of keeping a household and paying the reclamation 
charges too.  Those who were successful were usually the farmers who came from 
neighboring states or regions and were familiar with agricultural techniques, such 
as soil preparation and crop rotation.  After the First World War, the United States 
gave returning servicemen the opportunity to farm on the North Platte Project, 
but while these soldiers and sailors could survive on the battlefi eld, few would 
be productive in raising crops.  Farming was not always an easy enterprise on a 
reclamation project.25
Salt River Project
 The early travelers crossing southern Arizona on their way to California 
followed the Gila River, not usually proceeding up the Salt River.  But when 
the miners discovered bodies of ore along the Hassayampa River and then the 
military came to keep the hostile Indians away, Jack Swilling found the remains 
of prehistoric canals in what became the Salt River Valley.  By the 1870s other 
farmers and settlers found the land along the Salt River to be fertile and stayed 
to cultivate the soil, growing extensive fi elds of grain or alfalfa, or establishing 
commercial businesses, but within thirty years the fl ow of the river was over-
appropriated and growth could not be maintained.
 At least a half dozen companies constructed canals, and most were 
cooperative organizations of local farmers who worked together to build the 
irrigation channels to deliver water to their own land.  In 1883 the Arizona Canal 
Company sold bonds to investors around the country in order to construct the 
Arizona Canal in the northern area of the Salt River Valley.  This canal company 
expected to make a profi t from the sale of land and water rights to new settlers 
and with its chief construction contractor, W. J. Murphy, and original incorporator, 
Clark Churchill, formed the Arizona Improvement Company.  Sitting on the fi rst 
Board of Directors were local businessmen, Murphy, Churchill, and William 
Christy, along with California and Nevada entrepreneurs, Frederick W. Sharon 
and Francis G. Newlands.26
 W. J. Murphy and his family purchased several tracts of land under the 
Arizona Canal and started an experimental citrus orchard with over 1,800 young 
orange and other fruit trees from southern California.  The trees proved so 
successful that other varieties were planted including olive and lemon.  Because 
the Arizona fruit ripened prior to the orchards in Southern California, Arizona 
landowners could sell their produce to the eastern markets fi rst.  By the mid-1890s 
over 150,000 citrus trees were growing on 1,500 acres, and farmers learned they 
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could grow the trees with less acreage 
and work than the traditional harvests of 
grain.27
 W. J. Murphy built the Ingleside 
Club, complete with a golf course, near 
the Arizona Canal to bring investors 
and potential landowners to the Salt 
River Valley.  With the help of men like 
Murphy, the population of the Salt River 
Valley doubled between 1890 and 1900, 
reaching almost 20,000 residents, and 
irrigated acreage increased from 111,000 
to 130,500 acres.  By the turn of the 
century, however, the landowners realized that a storage dam was needed on the 
upper Salt River for growth to continue, but private enterprise could not provide 
the needed funding.28
 Arizona’s struggle for a permanent water supply moved to Washington, 
D.C., at the beginning of the new century.  Benjamin Fowler, chairman of the 
Maricopa County Water Storage Committee, had been in the federal Capitol at 
various times since 1900, lobbying for passage of a bill to permit the county to 
issue bonds for construction of a dam, and he then stayed to fi ght for a federal 
reclamation act.  Through the efforts of national reclamation lobbyist George 
Maxwell, Fowler, who later became the fi rst president of the  Salt River Valley 
Water Users’ Association, became well acquainted with Frederick Newell and 
Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester.  Fowler offered the U.S. Geological Survey 
$1,500 in matching funds to continue its earlier investigation of the Salt River, 
including a survey of a damsite at the confl uence of the Salt River and Tonto 
Creek.  Maxwell moved to the nation’s Capitol, leasing a house near Newell to 
aid Francis Newlands in his congressional fi ght for a reclamation act.  At his 
Washington residence, Maxwell gathered Newell, Fowler, and Pinchot to discuss 
the national irrigation movement and a possible Salt River Valley reclamation 
project.29
 Gifford Pinchot and George Maxwell were good friends with vice-
president Theodore Roosevelt, a strong supporter of the reclamation and 
conservation movements.  Following the ascendency of Roosevelt to the offi ce 
of President, the reclamation measure passed Congress and received Roosevelt’s 
signature.  The Secretary of the Interior was authorized to choose the fi rst projects 
from a list supplied by Newell.  The infl uence of Newell, Pinchot, and Maxwell, 
with Fowler’s organization in the Salt River Valley, made the  Tonto Project an 
attractive enterprise to the federal government,  although most of the land was in 
private ownership.
10.6.  The Granite Reef Diversion Dam 
diverting water into the Arizona Canal in 
1908.
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 Within months of the passage of the Reclamation Act, engineers arrived 
in the Salt River Valley to survey the lands and possible location of irrigation 
works.  Prior to the construction of what would become Theodore Roosevelt 
Dam, the engineers constructed a sixty-mile road through the rugged Superstition 
Mountains and the canyons of the Salt River to bring supplies from the railhead 
at Mesa to the dam site.  Building the “ Apache Trail” would be one of the 
most dangerous tasks of the dam construction process, and in its fi rst month of 
operation, over a million and one half pounds of freight would be hauled over 
it.   Louis C. Hill, the supervising 
reclamation engineer traveled the 
Apache Trail while overseeing 
construction of the Roosevelt Dam.
Built between 1905 and 1911, crews 
laid stone quarried from the neighboring 
canyon walls for the rubble-masonry 
thick-arch structure which spanned 
the Salt River to an original height of 
280 feet and crest length of 723 feet, 
holding back over 1,300,000 acre 
feet of water.  Stonemasons cut the 
upstream and downstream faces of the 
six to ten-ton blocks which were laid 
in a stair step fashion, giving the dam 
its identifi able appearance.  President 
Theodore Roosevelt attended the dam’s 
dedication, traveling over the Apache 
Trail, on March 18, 1911.30
 Flooding would delay construction at the dam site, but would also lead to 
the present confi guration of the Salt River Project.  The  Arizona Dam, just below 
the confl uence of the Salt and Verde rivers, diverted water to the north side canals 
but was prone to damage by fl oods, and in 1905 a major fl ood swept down the 
Salt River.  The Arizona Dam was washed away and the farmers north of the Salt 
River approached Louis C. Hill for assistance.  To unify the lands in the Salt River 
Valley, the Reclamation Service constructed the 1,000 foot long  Granite Reef 
Diversion Dam which diverts water to both the north and south side canals.  The 
federal government  purchased many of the existing canals within the Salt River 
Project boundaries and built additional ones to bring the waters of the Salt and 
Verde rivers to 170,000 acres.
 After prolonged conferences on irrigable acreage and repayment costs of 
the project, Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane signed over operational 
control of SRP to the Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association in 1917.  
Signifi cantly, the September 6, 1917, agreement permitted the Association to 
retain the power revenues generated at SRP facilities, thus allowing for its future 
growth.  Conceived by the Reclamation engineers as a source of electricity for 
10.7.  By 1907 the aerial tramway was 
delivering concrete from the batch plant 
to the Theodore Roosevelt Dam site.  In 
order to reduce the cost of the project, 
Reclamation built a plant to manufacture 
cement at the dam site and even shipped 
cement down the Apache Trial to the 
construction at Granite Reef Diversion 
Dam.
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construction of Roosevelt Dam, power generation, developed at fi rst through 
construction of a power canal and later as part of the dam, was in the drawings 
almost from the initial plans.  During the 1920s,  Salt River Project management 
expanded its hydropower installations with the construction of three additional 
dams on the Salt River, and more lands joined the Association, bringing its 
membership up to 242,000 acres.
2002
 In 1902 the authors of the national Reclamation Act provided a way for the 
settlers to support their families and develop the West through farming.  The fi rst 
fi ve reclamation projects encountered varying degrees of success, but all managed 
to transform the land, some as originally intended, others with certain limitations, 
and at least one changed a fertile agricultural valley into a major metropolitan 
center that sparked development of the whole state.
 While the men of the  Newlands Project envisioned irrigating 200,000 
acres at its inception, only 62,000 acres received project water by 1970.  Today 
claims by others to the waters of the Truckee and Carson rivers and Lake Tahoe, 
including land and water set aside for a wetlands project in Lahontan Valley and 
settlement of water rights with the  Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, limit the amount 
available for farming.  Despite these water woes, the population has increased 
from under 1,000 people when the Newlands Project was authorized to over 
18,000 people living within the Project lands.  The “businessman/farmer” has 
become a part-time entrepreneur and more than 4,000 part-time farms, averaging 
thirteen acres, contribute approximately 35% of the current economy in Churchill 
County with a total crop value of a little over $13 million in 1992.  The waters of 
the Newlands Project also support the growing recreational activities of camping, 
boating, and fi shing.31
 Currently farmers irrigate approximately 70,000 acres on the 
 Uncompahgre Project, more than double the amount prior to its selection as a 
reclamation project, but less than the 130,000 acres planners imagined could be 
cultivated.  Following the transfer of the operation and maintenance of the project 
to the Uncompahgre Valley Water Users’ Association in 1932, additional irrigation 
works were constructed, including the  Taylor Park Dam to regulate the water for 
the  Gunnison Tunnel.  With the exception of sugar beets, crops grown today are 
principally the same as when the project started.  In the 1960s project farmers 
started growing malt barley for the manufacture of beer by the Adolph Coors 
Company.  Today the population is closer to 20,000, whereas a century ago, the 
region contained fewer than 5,000 residents.32
 Farmers on the  Milk River Project cultivate about 100,000 acres, more 
than three times the amount irrigated 100 years ago.  Project lands, stretching 165 
miles, are divided into the Dodson Pumping Unit, and the Chinook, Malta, and 
Glasgow Divisions with individual irrigation districts operating the transmission 
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and distribution facilities and the Bureau of Reclamation retaining control over 
the storage works.  Like the Newlands Project, many of the current farm sizes 
provide income for only a part-time living, while owners have jobs in nearby 
cities.  The irrigated acreage has remained relatively stable in recent years, with 
ranching and farming the main industries on project lands.33
 Urbanization has not been a factor on the Milk River Project, but other 
elements have infl uenced this reclamation project.  Over the years, changes in 
crops grown have impacted the neighboring communities.  Sugar beets, once a 
major crop that required a large labor force as well as producing feed for sheep, 
are no longer grown on the project lands.  The elimination of this crop had a 
trickle down effect—without the sugar beets, the large numbers of migrant 
workers have not been needed and the sheep industry left the Milk River area.
Extreme weather conditions, ranging from 100 degrees in the summer to minus 
40 degrees in the winter, have aided in the reduction of population on the Milk 
River Project.  Farmers also have to contend with endangered or threatened 
species issues in the future to keep their irrigation water.  Recreation is a major 
growth industry in the West and the creation of the Fresno and Nelson reservoirs 
and Lake Sherburne, have provided a favorite venue for boaters and fi shermen 
who can also enjoy the waters of this reclamation project.34
 Since a handful of mountain men began trapping beaver, to the early 
immigrants looking for a better life, to the rancher seeking grazing lands, to the 
farmer searching for the fertile acreage and enough water, the  North Platte Project 
transformed the prairies into a part of America’s farmland.  At the turn of the 
century, the population of Scotts Bluff County was less than 3,000 people, while 
in 2002, in the city of Scottsbluff alone, there are over 14,500 residents.  With 
the North Platte Project, the irrigated acreage increased from 3,000 acres to over 
300,000 acres and encouraged the development of the sugar beet industry worth 
over $47 million in 1991.  Besides being a cash crop, sugar beets also provide 
feed for the traditional western occupation of ranching; nearly a half a million 
head of cattle, sheep and hogs are raised on the North Platte Project.  Almost from 
its start, the waters of the North Platte have been a safe haven for wildlife because 
President William Howard Taft created the Pathfi nder National Wildlife Refuge.  
Project lakes continue to provide a resting place for migratory fowl as well as a 
setting for recreational activities, including boating and fi shing.35
 From its foundation, bringing water and power to its shareholders in the 
Salt River Valley,  SRP has become the largest raw water supplier in the  Phoenix 
metropolitan area and the nation’s third-largest public power utility, delivering 
power to over 745,000 customers.  Maricopa County is the major population 
center of Arizona, increasing from 20,450 people in 1900 to over 3 million in 
2000.  Phoenix, in the heart of the Salt River Valley, is the county seat, the state 
capitol of Arizona, and now the 6th largest city in the United States.  
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 For almost one hundred years, the Association has continued to provide 
water to over 300,000 acre member and neighboring lands and has evolved into 
a multi-dimensional water service provider.  Although only 44,000 acres are still 
being farmed in 2002 within the Project, SRP delivers water to urban irrigators 
and several municipalities which treat the water and distribute it to SRP’s urban 
shareholders.  To this end, ten water treatment plants operated by eight cities dot 
the SRP water system.
 SRP’s stewardship of central Arizona’s water supply has made it a 
leader in the management of water resources, encompassing a wide range of 
activities.  In partnership with several Valley cities, SRP jointly owns and operates 
the  Granite Reef Underground Storage Project (GRUSP), one of the largest 
recharge projects in the United States.  GRUSP stores Central Arizona Project 
water on behalf of the Arizona Water Banking authority and others for use in the 
future when dry conditions will prevail.  To assist various Valley entities, SRP 
cooperated with the Bureau of Reclamation in the delivery of Central Arizona 
Project water with the construction of the CAP/SRP Interconnect Facility near 
Granite Reef Dam.  Operated by SRP, the interconnect links the CAP canal with 
SRP’s irrigation system, further allowing for the purchase of surplus Colorado 
River water to meet the demands of our shareholders during times of water 
shortage as well as to assist in water exchanges.
 At the end of World 
War II, the Salt River 
Valley experienced a major 
explosion of growth which 
impacted SRP’s traditional 
farming community.  The 
returning veterans wanted 
homes, and farmers sold 
agricultural lands for 
thousands of houses in 
the newly developed 
subdivisions.  With 
increased urbanization, 
the Association had to 
10.8.  The Salt River Project’s modern control room for 
its water system. Courtesy of the Salt River Project.
10.9.  The SCADA system on the Salt River 
Project controls this canal control structure. 
Courtesy of the Salt River Project.
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fi nd new ways to operate and maintain its canal system.  Under the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s Rehabilitation and Betterment Program, SRP started construction 
and implementation of the Supervisory Control System in the late 1960s.  The 
advances in electronic equipment allowed for the design of a water distribution 
system covering 138 miles to be handled by a single operator.  By the mid-1970s, 
computer equipment monitored telemetered data which displayed water levels 
and gate positions.  The dispatcher could regulate 331 radial gates and almost one 
quarter of the deep-well pumps belonging to SRP.  With this system, the water 
levels of the canals and laterals could be maintained at a constant level.  Gone are 
the days when bells rang at the home of the gate operators to warn about pending 
trouble.
 Keeping pace with new technology allowed SRP to utilize the new water 
 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system developed between 
1989 and 1991.   SCADA is a complex computer-based system which allows 
remote control and monitoring of the entire water canal system, a major portion 
of the deep-well system, and numerous sites of interest to water accounting 
concerns.  The system remotely scans and operates over 120 sites on the  canals 
and controls over twenty off-project fl ow and special-delivery sites and an ever-
expanding number of water quality monitoring stations throughout the system.
 With thousands of homes adjacent to the canals, SRP continues to 
maintain the physical appearance of its irrigation facilities.  No longer are 
sheep seen eating the grass along the canal banks or Yaqui laborers leading 
the horses in the ditches to eliminate aquatic moss and weeds.  In 1989 SRP 
instituted a program of stocking its canals with white  Amur, a sterile weed-eating 
fi sh that originally came from China and is considered an economically and 
environmentally safe alternative to chemical and mechanical weed control.  SRP 
crews trim the trees and remove brush and other vegetation along the canal banks, 
not only for its own maintenance vehicles, but for the thousands of bicyclists, 
joggers, and horseback riders who use the paths for  recreation.  As part of a 
program completed in 1989, SRP installed safety steps and ladders providing a 
quick exit for stray animals and people who accidently enter the canal system.
 From its earliest development providing electricity for the construction 
of Roosevelt Dam, power generation has been an integral part of the  Salt River 
Project.  The Association constructed its fi rst hydropower plants on the Valley 
canals between 1911 and 1913, expanding its production with the construction of 
three additional dams, Mormon Flat, Horse Mesa, and Stewart Mountain, on the 
Salt River between 1923 and 1930.  SRP had forty-nine power customers in the 
1920s; by 1947 it delivered electricity to over 12,000 customers, and by 2003 it 
should transmit power to close to 800,000 people.
 To meet this continually growing demand for electricity, SRP upgraded 
its transmission and distribution systems over the years, converting from 25 cycle 
power to 60 cycle after World War II and building non-hydropower plants.  Within 
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the Salt River Valley, SRP built several oil or natural gas generating stations and 
participated in several coal-fi red power plants in the southwest region, including 
Mohave Generating Station and the Four Corners Power Plant.  As part of the 
Central Arizona Project, SRP was chosen as the construction manager and plant 
operator of the Navajo Generating Station near Page, Arizona, participating 
with other utilities and the federal government.  During the 1970s, SRP decided 
to construct the coal-fi red Coronado Generating Station alone, while being a 
partner in the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station southwest of the Salt River 
Valley.  In order to provide its customers with a reliable source of power in the 
future, SRP is expanding its Valley generating stations and fi nding new and 
environmentally compatible methods for the production of power, including 
landfi ll gasses and solar energy.  From its inception to the present day, Salt River 
Project has supplied both water and energy that helped fuel the growth of the 
Association and central Arizona.
 The passage of the national Reclamation Act heralded a new era in the 
development of the arid West.  While some might argue that the rhetoric of its 
passage is mythic, nonetheless, the act President Theodore Roosevelt signed 
on June 17, 1902, transformed the West.  Prior to selection by Secretary of the 
Interior Ethan A. Hitchcock as the fi rst fi ve reclamation projects, the lands in 
Nevada, Colorado, Montana, Wyoming-Nebraska, and Arizona, were being 
farmed, but without a stable water supply sustained growth could not be achieved. 
The federal government, in the name of the Reclamation Service and later the 
Bureau of Reclamation, provided the funding and the engineering expertise to 
construct the necessary storage works, to allow for that development, whether in 
actual increased irrigated acreage, population, or economic value.  The success 
of the national Reclamation Act can be measured by the accomplishments of the 
Newlands, Uncompahgre, Milk River, North Platte, and Salt River reclamation 
projects.
 John Wesley Powell surveyed the American West more than one hundred 
years ago and saw thirty million acres that could be irrigated.  Because of the 
vision of a few men and the Bureau of Reclamation, nine to ten million acres 
are productive, whether growing crops, homes, communities, or industries.
Reclamation is the cornerstone of growth in the West: providing a stable water 
supply for crops, transforming the desert to farmlands, and now farmlands to 
cities, businesses, and communities; producing electricity to operate the irrigation 
pumps, light the homes, and now power our industries.  Reclamation’s objective 
hasn’t ceased, but instead becomes more fully developed: the foundation of 
growth in the American West.
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Creating an Irrigator’s Reclamation Service:  
 I. D. “Bud” O’Donnell, Civic Capitalism, and the 
U.S. Reclamation Service in the Yellowstone Valley, 
1900-1930
By:
Carroll Van West
 The capitalist transformation of rural America in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries is a central issue in American history.  The economic 
development of the  Yellowstone Valley of the northern plains between 1880 and 
1920 mirrors the wider American experience in its intersection of governmental 
policy, the decisions of major corporate interests and international bankers, and the 
actions of local leaders.  Throughout the Yellowstone, the passage of the Newlands 
Reclamation Act in 1902 and the creation of the United States Reclamation Service 
(USRS) encouraged local interests to think of their communities and their futures in 
new ways.  Twenty years of agriculture in the valley was proof enough that farmers 
could not tame the region=s demanding environment, but they could replace nature 
with massive engineering works that they could control.  Although privately funded 
ventures had started the valley=s irrigation, key civic capitalists in the Yellowstone 
were eager to exchange private development for federal funds and expertise to 
build a physical infrastructure for modern, market-driven farming.  This exchange, 
however, was not a simple top-down reordering of the landscape and local economic 
priorities as dictated by federal policy.  Rather, the goals and needs of local interests 
shaped the reclamation projects of the Yellowstone from the beginning, and the 
interaction between federal policy and local interests eventually led to basic 
change—a heightened regard for both irrigation and the individual farmer—in the 
United States Reclamation Service itself.
The central fi gure in the Yellowstone=s search to build an irrigated empire, and a 
central fi gure in the history of the irrigation in the U.S. Reclamation Service, is 
I. D. O’Donnell of Billings, the service=s fi rst Supervisor of Irrigation.  The USRS=s
Thirteenth Annual Report announced O’Donnell’s appointment and praised his 
contributions.  The report=s authors noted:
The underlying thought which prompted the creation of this offi ce and the 
appointment of Mr. O’Donnell as the fi rst incumbent was that there should 
be in the fi eld, connected with the service, a practical business farmer, who 
could look at questions involved in the operation and management of the 
projects from the standpoint of the water user as well as from that of the 
service; who could advise the other offi cers of the service on all matters 
having to do with the effi cient operation of the projects, and assist the water 
users on all matters coming under the general head of “better farming” 
methods.1
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 For the rest of the decade O’Donnell would push the interests of irrigators, 
and “practical” farmers before local, regional, and national forums, culminating in 
the 1918 publication of his treatise Better Business, Better Farming, Better  Living: 
Hints from a Practical Farmer to the Settlers on the Projects of the United States 
Reclamation Service by the Reclamation Service.  Although recognized today as 
“the father of irrigation in Montana,” he is a neglected, largely forgotten fi gure 
within the history of the Reclamation Service and the later Reclamation Bureau, 
even though he continued to preach his vision of an irrigated West into the 1930s.
 O’Donnell came to the west as a cowboy, not an irrigator.  Ignatius Donnelly 
“Bud” O’Donnell was born in Ontario, Canada, on September 19, 1860; he was the 
second child of second-generation Irish immigrants, Daniel and Margaret McIntosh 
O’Donnell.  His family moved in 1864 to Michigan where his father worked in the 
timber industry for several years before buying his own farm in Midland County, 
Michigan.  Young Bud O’Donnell worked the farm and attended school in Saginaw, 
Michigan, until his early teen years, when he took up full-time work in the local 
timber business.  He continued working in Michigan until he was twenty-one years 
old and he left with a friend for work in Chicago.  Jobs were lacking there, however, 
and the lure of the west proved irresistible.  O’Donnell took a Northern Pacifi c 
Railroad train to Dakota and Montana, where he looked for construction work.2
 O’Donnell=s fi rst stop in Montana was at Miles City, where the Tongue 
River joins the Yellowstone River.  A natural with an axe, he took a job cutting ties 
for the railroad, which was then streaking westward towards the Rockies.  With 
that grubstake in hand, O’Donnell left for the gold and silver mines at Maiden, 
to the north of the Yellowstone.  Quick riches proved beyond his reach, and once 
his grubstake was gone, O’Donnell was on the move again, and accepted his fi rst 
cowboy jobCputting up hay for a federal government contractor.  He effi ciently built 
corrals, stables, and fences and his experience qualifi ed him for the next jobCbeing
a cowboy at the I J Ranch, a stock-raising enterprise owned and operated by a bunch 
of rich kids from back East—including  Parmly Billings and  Edward Bailey, the son 
and nephew, respectively, of railroad capitalist  Frederick Billings, a former president 
of the Northern Pacifi c Railroad and the largest private landowner in the newly 
established Yellowstone County.3
  O’Donnell proved to be the right man, in the right place, at the right time.  
Frederick Billings had long been interested in agricultural reform, and in making his 
sizeable interests along the Northern Pacifi c line, especially in Yellowstone County, 
highly profi table.  While Northern Pacifi c president, he had encouraged the creation 
of the Cass-Cheney demonstration farm, which popularized the “bonanza farm” 
boom of the late 1870s and swelled land sales in Dakota Territory.  He operated 
his own farm in Vermont as a demonstration farm, especially one that touted the 
value of hybrid seeds, purebred livestock, conservation, and diversifi cation.  But in 
Montana Territory his son and nephew soon tired of the hard work of ranch life, and 
Frederick Billings had a problem of his own in the city of Billings where his agent, 
Congregational minister Benjamin F. Shuart, had proven to be unreliable.  In 1885 
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the elder Billings rearranged his business ventures in the Yellowstone Valley.  He 
ordered his son and nephew to move to Billings, where they took over management 
of the family’s land and development company, the Minnesota and Montana Land 
and Improvement Company, and established a private bank, the Bailey and Billings 
Bank.  Frederick Billings then placed his various agricultural interests under 
the supervision of O’Donnell, who was placed in charge of the I J Ranch, along 
with other valley ranch land, and Reverend Shuart, who moved to his own ranch 
along Canyon Creek and the land company’s “Big Ditch” irrigation system, east 
of Billings adjacent to large parcel of Billings family land, where he started the 
famed  Hesper Farm.  Shuart too followed the lead of his patron, Frederick Billings, 
and operated Hesper Farm as a model agricultural landscape, with irrigated fi elds, 
diverse crops, and modern soil conservation techniques.4
  O’Donnell made the most of his opportunity to impress his patrons and after 
Parmly Billings’s death in 1886, Edward Bailey sold O’Donnell the agricultural 
interests owned by Parmly Billings and they became partners.  By 1890 Bailey 
and O’Donnell was a well established livestock fi rm; as O’Donnell later recalled, 
“we fed a number of bands of sheep, took up various land holdings, and kept a 
quantity of range.  It was through these experiments that I caught a glimpse of 
a great future for farming in the Yellowstone Valley.”  Since the Billings family 
trusted his management instincts, and O’Donnell had already proved to be a quick 
study, the family named him as manager of the  Minnesota and Montana Land and 
Improvement Company.  By default, he became an irrigator since the land company 
had established and operated the “Big Ditch,” the largest private irrigation effort in 
the region since 1883.5
 For a cowboy, O’Donnell took to irrigation quickly, and by decade’s end, 
he was considered one of the region=s irrigation experts.  He helped to establish 
the Montana Irrigation Society and served as its president.  O’Donnell became 
an aggressive spokesman for northern plains irrigation.  In the 1894 national 
publication, The Irrigation Age, O’Donnell bragged about the potential of the 
Yellowstone Valley’s Clark Fork Bottom (where his Hesper Farm was located), 
predicting that due to irrigation the land was “destined to be the great feeding center 
of this section of the country.”  He improved and expanded the works of the “Big 
Ditch” and improved the land company=s image and reputation among the farmers 
who relied on it.  In 1892 he and Bailey purchased the Hesper Farm for $10,000 
and O’Donnell began his own experiments with irrigation, with a special concern 
about what crops would grow most effi ciently.  The Billings Gazette Illustrated 
Edition of July 1894 approvingly commented that O’Donnell “enlists science to his 
aid in farming, irrigation and stock ranching, with the best results.”  Also in 1892, 
O’Donnell founded the  Yellowstone Fair Association, where he began an annual 
ritual of promoting irrigation, scientifi c agriculture, and the cultivation of alfalfa and 
sugar beets, which he had successfully cultivated at Hesper Farm.6
 O’Donnell is credited with producing the Yellowstone’s fi rst successful sugar 
beet crop and the fi rst alfalfa crop in Montana.  Both products, however, needed 
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more water than other crops typically cultivated in the northern plains—a fact that 
also drove O’Donnell to support irrigation development.  In 1893-1894 he began to 
serve as a lecturer for the Farmers’ Institutes, sponsored by the Experiment Station 
of Montana State University, with alfalfa and irrigation being his favorite topics.  
 O’Donnell also established new local irrigation ventures; the High Line Ditch 
Company, capitalized at $10,000, came in 1895 and fi ve years later he joined with 
Preston Moss and others to create the Big Ditch Company, capitalized at $64,000.  
In 1898 he applied for a patent for his own improved headgate design.  He served 
as a Montana delegate to various regional and national irrigation congresses; a 
meeting in Cheyenne, Wyoming, he recalled, was where “I gave my maiden address 
in the interest of an [federal] irrigation law” several years prior to the passage of the 
Newlands Reclamation Act.7
 By the end of the nineteenth century, O’Donnell had proven sugar beets 
could withstand the harsh Montana climate—and that a Montana beet was higher in 
sugar content than those from other sections of the country.  He had patched together 
a network of fellow irrigators across the region; and he had improved the effi ciency 
of the Big Ditch as a water provider.  He was ready to launch his holdings, and 
those of many other Yellowstone farmers, into a new agricultural age, one based on 
irrigation and the production of sugar beets.  As horticultural expert S. M. Emery, the 
director of the Montana State Experiment Station, predicted to O’Donnell in April 
1900: “The time is surely coming when Montana will produce its own sugar.  You 
have all the conditions down there to make such a plant a success.”8
 To make that success, O’Donnell needed help from a variety of quarters.  
First, he needed new partners.  The Billings family and Edward Bailey had 
bankrolled his ventures for over ten years, but with the new century on the horizon, 
the Billingses and Bailey had both tired of their western adventure.  They were 
willing to sell the land company to  O’Donnell, if he could fi nd the partners.  
O’Donnell formed an alliance with the president of the First National Bank in 
Billings,  Preston Moss, and together they bought out the Billings and Bailey 
interests.  Moss and O’Donnell, soon joined by engineer  Henry W. Rowley, became 
powerful business partners, and good friends.  (In the early 1900s they all built 
architecturally distinctive homes next to each other in a new trendy neighborhood 
of Billings.)  Moss was a native of Missouri, who moved to Billings in 1892 to 
be the vice-president of the First National Bank.  Four years later he became the 
bank’s president and invested in new Billings enterprises and agricultural projects 
in the Yellowstone Valley.  He also owned a local telephone company, the Northern 
Hotel, the Gazette Printing Company, and the Billings Utility Company.  Trained 
in civil engineering at the University of Minnesota, Rowley had been the original 
engineer of the Big Ditch and a Billings resident since 1882.  He too brought money 
(gained from real estate investments and the Billings Water Power Company) to 
the partnership, along with experience with building large irrigation systems from 
scratch, something that O’Donnell had never done.9
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 The importance of the  O’Donnell-Moss-Rowley alliance should not be 
underestimated; all three were classic examples of what historian John Cumbler has 
called “civic capitalists,” who sought their “own profi t, but each understood that 
his welfare was bound up with the welfare of others of his kind and the city that 
nourished them.”  The fi rst major venture of these three civic capitalists was the 
Billings Land and Irrigation Company.  They also jointly ventured into banking, 
commercial, and manufacturing enterprises while demonstrating their civic duty 
through support of such institutions as the new Parmly Billings Library.  Due to 
his prior career within the Billings family’s business circles, O’Donnell perhaps 
understood better than the others the need for reciprocal arrangements to nurture the 
fragile economy and settlements of the northern plains.  As argued by an editorial in 
the Billings Gazette, after his appointment to the Reclamation Service in December 
1913,
 In Billings, there are many men, who are really doing things, who 
have the right mental attitude.  They make up the predominating infl uence 
of society, they lead, and the result is that the right mental attitude, the 
spirit, the loyalty of the Billings citizen has become proverbial throughout 
the land.
 The “Doctor of Mental Attitude,” concluded the editorial writer, was “I. D. 
O’Donnell.”  A later contemporary account of O’Donnell=s career, published in 1919 
after his years with the Reclamation Service, noted that O’Donnell “is the city=s
principal booster and has had more to do with organizing and getting new businesses 
started than almost any other man there.”  And a 1923 story praising O’Donnell in 
the Great Falls Tribune concluded that “in Billings whenever money is needed to 
build an addition to the public library or money is needed for something of historical 
importance [or] the help is needed of some public spirited citizen, the community 
instinctively turns to Mr. O’Donnell.”10
 To build a Yellowstone empire, O’Donnell needed more than strong local 
allies.  He also needed, at least, federal recognition of the potential of an irrigated 
Yellowstone, if not federal support and money for Yellowstone irrigation.  Through 
his offi ce as president of the Montana Irrigation Society, and by attending various 
irrigation conferences, he had connected with various federal offi cials then exploring 
the possibility of new irrigation programs for the arid West.  In particular, he 
assisted and supported the efforts of Elwood Mead to promote irrigation within the 
Department of Agriculture.  He had met Mead at an 1897 irrigation conference, 
a key meeting that encouraged Congress to establish a division of Irrigation 
Investigations within the Agriculture department’s Offi ce of Experiment Stations 
in 1898.  Under this program, Samuel Fortier and Elwood Mead came to the 
Yellowstone in 1900 and investigated the Big Ditch, while interviewing O’Donnell 
at Hesper Farm.  In their follow-up report, Fortier and Mead acknowledged the 
assistance of O’Donnell, approvingly noted the 10,000 acres of alfalfa currently in 
the irrigated Yellowstone, and discussed how O’Donnell paid for Mead to install a 
weir at Hesper Farm in order to measure the water fl ow.11
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 Federal recognition, strong local allies, and a marketable crop were all 
important, but most importantly, O’Donnell needed more land than what the 
scattered holdings of the old Minnesota and Montana Land and Improvement 
Company provided.  To acquire the needed land at the lowest possible cost, 
O’Donnell and Moss initially turned to the  Carey Act of 1894, which granted free 
federal land to states for major irrigation projects.  In 1903, a group of Washington 
state investors arrived in Billings to investigate the possibility of establishing an 
irrigation project on the Billings Bench northeast of the city.  O’Donnell toured the 
capitalists around the city and county, convincing them that indeed the Yellowstone 
was the right place for such a project.  In mid-October 1903 John Schram and W. 
T. Clark of Washington State, in partnership with Preston Moss, I. D. O’Donnell, 
and Henry Rowley, incorporated the  Billings Land & Irrigation Company. The 
Washington investors put up $75,000, which was matched by a $50,000 loan from 
Moss and his First National Bank and $12,500 each from Rowley and M. A. Arnold, 
the cashier at Moss=s bank.  By 1905, the construction of the irrigation system was 
largely complete, cultivation was underway, and in April 1905 the company received 
its fi rst land deeds from state offi cials who administered the Carey Land Act board.  
The project eventually irrigated over 24,000 acres.12
 O’Donnell and Moss, however, did not plan to stop with Carey Act 
largesse—Bud O’Donnell had argued for a more comprehensive federal reclamation 
law for several years, and when the Newlands Reclamation Act became a reality in 
1902, he immediately began to look for a suitable Yellowstone project.  He located a 
perfect site: 35,000 acres of “open” land south of the Yellowstone River, bordered by 
the Big Horn River Valley, and serviced by the rails of the Northern Pacifi c Railway 
(NP) and the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy (CBQ or Burlington Route).  There 
was one hitch—and in the West of those days it was viewed as a hindrance more 
than an obstacle—the preferred land was on the Crow Indian Reservation.
 CBQ offi cials had pushed their railroad through the Crow reservation in the 
mid-1890s, where the line linked with the Northern Pacifi c, and spurred growth in 
the Yellowstone Valley.  That cession had proven easy enough to negotiate, but the 
railroad merely passed through the reservation and could do little to develop local 
traffi c along the line. After railroad magnate James J. Hill, international fi nancier J. 
P. Morgan, and others combined the interests of the Burlington Route with those of 
the Northern Pacifi c and the Great Northern Railway at the turn of the century, the 
new Hill-Morgan empire became even more interested in cracking open the Crow 
reservation to settlement.  The railroads strongly supported the reclamation project, 
and for more reasons than mere traffi c on the line.  In 1900, a worried Montana 
Senator T. H. Carter warned James J. Hill: “This state will be dominated by a mob 
until the reclamation of the arid lands transfers the balance of power of the farmers.”  
Hill, in particular, wished to boost agricultural production for both political and 
economic reasons, and his correspondents in 1902-1903 periodically informed him 
of developments in Montana.13
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 In April 1904 Congress approved a bill to amend current agreements 
with the Crow Indians to permit the withdrawal of land from the reservation to 
be used for the reclamation project in exchange for $1.15 million. The Crows 
already living in the ceded area had a choice: stay or accept compensation for their 
improvements and leave.  Only three Crow settlers stayed.  Engineers from the U.S. 
Reclamation Service soon surveyed the ceded land, and in May Assistant Chief 
Reclamation Engineer Arthur P. Davis came to Billings, where he met with X. H. 
Fitch, Supervising Engineer, and Robert Stockman, Engineer of Billings, to assess 
the engineers’ fi ndings.  Davis ruled that the preliminary surveys were promising 
enough to justify the creation of a reclamation project and he ordered more intensive 
survey work under Stockton’s supervision.14
 Billings interests carefully monitored the work of the federal engineers; 
Moss and O’Donnell began their plans for creating a sugar beet refi nery in earnest.  
On February 26, 1905, the USRS’s Board of Engineers ratifi ed the feasibility of the 
project—all that was needed now was an offi cial authorization from the Secretary 
of the Interior.  The approval of the engineering board was enough for Moss, 
O’Donnell, and Rowley.  Less than three weeks later, on March 14, 1905, the three 
allies, together with M. A. Arnold and F. W. Shaw, incorporated the  Billings Sugar 
Factory, with a capitalization of $750,000.  Moss put up $650,000 while O’Donnell, 
Rowley, Arnold, and Shaw pitched in with $25,000 each.  After Secretary of Interior 
E. A. Hitchcock signed off on the construction of the $900,000  Huntley Project (so 
named after an early settlement in the project area) on April 18, 1905, the creation 
of an expanded irrigated Yellowstone empire was formally underway.  In May 
the Billings group signed a contract with the newly created  Great Western Sugar 
Company (incorporated in New Jersey in January 1905) to provide sugar refi ned 
from Yellowstone-grown sugar beets.  O’Donnell and his allies had used their own 
moxie, engineering expertise, boosterism, irrigation experience, federal land, and 
federal dollars to establish a potential powerful economic engine of change, where 
federal support made private enterprise possible.  Billings now had its fi rst truly 
large locally owned and operated industry, which depended totally on the success of 
irrigation and sugar beet cultivation.15
 In 1906 the sugar company signed contracts with local farmers for seven 
thousand acres of beets.  With the building of the Billings Sugar Factory—with a 
capacity of converting 55,000 tons of beets into 161,000 bags of sugar—a new age 
of reciprocal agricultural-industrial partnership was underway.  The completion of 
the Huntley Project did not come as quickly as local interests had wished, although 
from the perspective of USRS engineers, the project had the sort of delays common 
to the service’s initial projects.  Local historian William Hancock observed:
They all had problems common to construction today including wages, 
strikes, delays in the delivery of materials, adverse weather, fl ooding 
conditions and soil and drainage problems not contemplated.  Horses and 
men were hard to fi nd.  One contractor shipped in two carloads of horses 
from Iowa and inexperienced Indian labor was often used.
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 On May 21, 1907, progress had proceeded to the point that President 
Theodore Roosevelt offi cially declared the Huntley Project acreage open for 
settlement, a total of 28,921 acres, enough for 585 farms between 40 and 160 acres 
in size.  The remaining project acreage had too high of an alkali content, and the 
USRS only allowed settlement if prospective settlers knew they were claiming land 
of dubious value.  To serve as trade centers for the Huntley settlers, the Reclamation 
Service also platted towns, such as Huntley, Ballantine, Worden, Osborn, and 
Pompeys Pillar, and opened lots for sale in August 1907.16
 That most of the Huntley Project properties were small—40 or so acres in 
size—refl ected a shared assumption by both O’Donnell and F. B. Linfi eld, director 
of the Montana Experiment Station and later dean of the College of Agriculture at 
Montana State University.  Small acreage forced farmers to cultivate thoroughly and 
carefully as well as showing restraint in using the all-too-valuable supply of water.  
It also called for some diversifi cation: small garden plots to provide food could exist 
adjacent to the sugar beet fi elds (indeed the small plots were a convenient way to 
force farmers to rely on sugar beets for their primary cash crop).  Small lots also 
meant more settlers—and increasing the population was always a goal of O’Donnell 
and other like-mind investors in Yellowstone County.17
 Forty-acre farms, however, did not please other Billings residents.  The 
publisher of the Billings Gazette, E. H. Becker, pointedly referred to O’Donnell 
when he complained that the 40-acre tract refl ected “a pet hobby of the reclamation 
service, backed by a very small minority of those who call themselves experienced 
farmers in irrigated districts.”  Becker insisted that there was “no demand in eastern 
Montana for 700 40-acre tract farmers at the very doors of this city.”  Admitting 
that the goal of the project was to produce sugar beets for the local factory, Becker 
pointed out that the “lands under the Huntley ditch alone, if intensely cultivated, 
would supply a suffi cient number of beets to supply the demand of four factories,” 
but there were no other factories on the horizon.  To “protect the best interests of 
the settlers, but the best interests of the community commercially as well,” he urged 
local residents to demand that the federal government grant larger farms.18
 Becker=s comments refl ected the concerns of the region’s large stockgrowing 
interests—some of whom had been grazing on Crow land for years—as well as the 
interests of real estate speculators who wanted to grab as much of the cheap irrigated 
land as possible when it became available.  When the Huntley lands were made 
available to settlers, most registrants were merely interested in seeing how high a 
number they would draw in order to select the best available land. 5,491 individuals 
registered for the fi rst 582 farms, but of the fi rst 1,000 names drawn, a mere 76 
completed fi ling and claimed a farm.19
 Those who were serious about settling at Huntley soon discovered that while 
water had been diverted into the system, it was only for the priming and puddling 
of the canals, laterals, and structures.  It would be months—April 6, 1908—before 
water was actually delivered to the farms.  Then the Reclamation Service did little, 
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in the farmers’ eyes, to help the settlers.  Since the irrigation system only delivered 
water to the high point of the farm unit, farmers had to build their own ditches, and 
most knew nothing about irrigation technology or even when and how to irrigate 
their fi elds to best advantage.  Alex Kimonth, who lived near Ballantine, recalled his 
problems that fi rst summer of water in July 1908:
After a lot of hard work correcting mistakes made by ourselves and, also, 
by the government in placing ditches in the wrong place, we ordered water.  
Having never done any irrigating, we had a hard time to get the water in 
the places where it did any good. . . Our ditches were too small and we had 
to build them larger.  By the time we had worn out two shovels, we got the 
ditches so that they could carry water.
The fi rst year of cultivation at Huntley was generally a bust.  While fi elds were 
planted by April, grains were largely produced, and yields were disappointing.  
Sugar beets would have to wait until the 1909 season.20
 The delays and controversies of 1907-1908 troubled O’Donnell.  The 
Reclamation Service had built the irrigation machine he always wanted for the 
Yellowstone, but now it seemed the machine did not immediately produce the 
garden that he and his allies envisioned.  True to his personality, however, O’Donnell 
aggressively sought solutions.  In 1907 he moved to shore up support for the project 
within the Billings business community by leading the transformation of the city’s 
old Commercial Club into the Billings Chamber of Commerce, with himself as 
President.  The chamber strongly supported the sugar factory and beet farming in its 
early publicity.21
 O’Donnell also joined with others to establish a new educational institution 
to further the cultural process of turning cowboys into farmers.  As early as 1904 
Billings merchants John Losekamp and Christian Yegen had joined forces with 
educators Ernest T. Eaton and Lewis Eaton to establish a private high school, which 
operated out of various downtown buildings for its fi rst four years.  In late July 
1908 the school was reorganized as the  Billings Polytechnic Institute, with fi ve 
individuals providing the vast majority of its capital: Losekamp and Yegen with 
$10,000 each, and O’Donnell, Preston B. Moss, and Henry W. Rowley with $5,000 
each.  The latter three also helped to provide the location for a new 60-acre campus, 
north of town along the Big Ditch.  The announced educational goal of the Billings 
Polytechnic was 
industrial and technical education.  It is now realized that hand training is 
mind training and that the young man or woman who is not trained to do 
something and to do that something well, has not been half educated.
The new school would have machine shops, home economics classes, and (not 
surprisingly) a demonstration farm where about 40 acres “will be put into crops 
under the direction of an expert in intensifi ed farming.”22
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 Another goal of the institute was to transform cowboys into farmers by 
replacing the region=s early dependency on stockgrowing with industrial and 
agricultural ventures.  This theme became predominant in 1911 as the institute’s 
founders approached railroad magnate James J. Hill to donate 100 acres to the 
school.  Hill’s Great Northern Railway had operated a small dry land farming 
demonstration next to the school’s 40 acres of irrigated land in 1909.  School 
offi cials promised that with Hill=s donation these efforts would be magnifi ed into 
a “Model A” demonstration farm.  “To bring about a solution to the agricultural 
problem here,” a 1911 memorandum to Hill explained, “the Institute would conduct 
a series of model demonstration farms.  These farms would be placed under average 
condition and on an entirely practical basis.  It would have them so arranged that 
the farmers could come and study the methods for themselves.  Not experiment but 
demonstration would be the work of these farms.” This mailing to Hill included 
mock “before and after” photographs, with one showing three boys in cowboy hats 
and chaps, labeled as before, and the after photograph showed the same boys in 
farmer clothing and caps, with a big stack of sugar beets in front of them, as happy, 
healthy farmers.23
 Also in 1908 O’Donnell directly helped the Huntley Project settlers by 
bankrolling its fi rst experiment station, so the farmers could learn proper irrigation 
and cultivation techniques.  In the summer of 1907 USRS engineers stationed at 
Huntley understood that many of the settlers who claimed units needed help.  They 
contacted the Montana Agricultural Experiment Station and asked state offi cials to 
create a demonstration program for the project.  When in 1908 the state refused to 
step forward—budgets were tight already and the experiment station was actively 
promoting dry land farming—USRS Supervising Engineer H. N. Savage asked 
O’Donnell to help immediately before the growing season was over.  “I know it 
would profi t the settlers very much to have this demonstration farm operated by 
you,” claimed Savage, “in order that they might have the benefi t of your experience 
and example, and also opportunity to consult with you about the crops growing 
under your management and their own within the project.”  Savage could offer 
O’Donnell little in return for his assistance.  He promised to supply a “suitable” 
barn, a couple of small residences, four horses, a wagon, plow, disk harrow, 
tooth harrow, and plank smoother, and about 45 acres, of which the Reclamation 
Service only wanted fi ve acres planted in sugar beets and a “few” acres in alfalfa.  
O’Donnell would be liable for everything else, including “all the running expenses 
and furnish the labor and seed.”24
 O’Donnell had too much tied to the future of the Huntley Project to say no; 
he accepted the arrangement and the  Huntley Project Demonstration Farm became a 
reality.  In 1910 O’Donnell=s control passed to a partnership of the USRS, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, and the Montana State Experiment Station.  The property 
was expanded to 300 acres and renamed the Huntley Project Experiment Station.
Over the next decades, especially during the administration of Dan Hansen, who was 
superintendent between 1910 and 1949, the various programs at the demonstration 
farm proved of great benefi t to the settlers.  By 1910-1911 sugar beets had fi nally 
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become a dominant crop, with approximately 4,000 acres planted, and even railroad 
promotional brochures were passing on the O’Donnell doctrine of intensive 
agriculture to prospective settlers.  “After beets have been grown for three years,” 
a Northern Pacifi c Railway pamphlet recommended, “some other crop should be 
planted, and a proper rotation of grain, alfalfa, and sugar beets will retain the fertility 
of the soil and make maximum yields possible.”25
 The early diffi culties at Huntley opened O’Donnell=s eyes, and purse strings, 
to the possibility of dry farming as a complementary method of cultivating the vast 
bench lands of eastern Montana.  In 1909 Billings was the host city to the Fourth 
Dry Farming Congress and International Dry Farming Exposition.  Preston W. Moss 
was the local chair, and  I. D. O’Donnell was the treasurer.  Dry farming was all 
the rage in Montana in the fi rst two decades of the twentieth century, and incessant 
boosting of dry farming encouraged hundreds of thousands of settlers to come to 
the state and try their luck.  O’Donnell and Moss were never vocal dry farming 
proponents, but they accepted that dry farming, in addition to the irrigated lands 
of the Yellowstone Valley, could open up a potential 2.5 million acres “directly 
tributary” to Billings.  Moreover, supporting the congress would be good for local 
business, and their various other local ventures.  For example, the conference was 
a perfect way to boost the Huntley Project (a tour was planned), the Billings Sugar 
Company (a photograph was included in the conference book), and Moss’s Northern 
Hotel, where the important national and international delegates and offi cials 
would stay.  Since the Great Northern’s James J. Hill was going to give one of the 
congress=s major addresses, Moss also would have an opportunity to discuss with 
Hill his development plans for “Mossmain,” a planned community that never really 
developed, located near the new railroad yards at Laurel in Yellowstone County.  
Their involvement in the successful dry farming congress is an excellent example of 
the civic capitalism of Moss and O’Donnell in these crucial decades of expansion in 
Yellowstone County.26
 The early years at Huntley showed O’Donnell both the potential and the 
problems inherent in the initial USRS irrigation projects.  He was not alone in 
realizing that while the projects were impressive engineering feats, mere engineering 
alone would not transform the arid West into an agricultural garden.  In fact, as 
more of the initial projects went into operation, criticism of the Reclamation Service 
grew among the settlers and adjacent local leaders who had hoped to substantially 
benefi t from the federal largesse.  The criticism had grown to a storm of protest by 
the time the administration of President Woodrow Wilson took offi ce in March 1913. 
A series of conferences took place in Washington in 1913-1914, and Congress took 
action to amend the payment schedule for settlers while the USRS itself looked to 
internal reforms.  In its Thirteenth Annual Report, the Reclamation service reminded 
readers (and quite likely its own staff) that “home making” was its primary goal:  
“increasing the number of farm homes and extending the area of productive lands 
in the United States are the objects of the work of the Reclamation Service.”  The 
USRS then admitted “that in order that the greatest possible good may be realized 
from the efforts of the Government and the irrigators, it is necessary that the 
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irrigators appreciate the efforts of the United States to further their interests and that 
offi cials responsible for the administration of the irrigation projects fully understand 
the needs of the irrigators.”27
 In late 1913 Secretary 
of Interior Franklin K. Lane 
addressed the problem 
aggressively by appointing 
a Reclamation Commission, 
a fi ve-member panel headed 
by USRS Director F. H. 
Newell and including  I. D. 
O’Donnell in a new position, 
titled Supervisor of Irrigation.  
Bud O’Donnell now had an 
opportunity to do on a national 
stage what he had been doing 
in the Yellowstone Valley 
for twenty years—promote 
reciprocal partnerships 
between farmers, agricultural 
experts, and irrigation 
specialists; teach farmers the value of scientifi c agriculture; and demonstrate how to 
best use irrigation technology to cultivate individual crops.28
 From all accounts, he entered his new career with missionary zeal.  
Numerous meetings have been held with the farmers and the offi cials 
of the water users’ associations for the purpose of discussing on the 
ground questions of interest to the water users, stress being laid upon the 
improvement of farming methods,
reported the Reclamation Service.  He became a regular contributor to the agency’s 
offi cial magazine, the Reclamation Record, where published versions of his favorite 
lecture topics appeared.  His family kept news stories about his appointment and 
travels across the irrigation systems of the west in a large scrapbook.  The local 
Montana press carefully reported his various trips and his frequent proclamations.
In its 1914 anniversary edition, the Billings Gazette published O’Donnell’s overview 
of his fi rst months in offi ce, ending with a message that he constantly repeated over 
the next four years:
To view as a whole the magnifi cent constructive work of the government 
irrigation plan is to forget the small and relatively unimportant irksome 
details involved in the administration of this work.  With a knowledge of 
the good that may be accomplished, I fi nd unending pleasure in helping 
the farmers on all the projects with their diffi culties.  I fi nd that these 
men and their families who have with confi dence in the integrity of the 
11.1.  The Reclamation Commission, left to right, 
W.A. Ryan, Comptroller; I.D. O’Donnell, Supervisor 
of Irrigation; A.P. Davis, Chief Engineer; Will R. King, 
Chief Counsel; F.H. Newell, Director; Franklin K. Lane, 
Secretary of the Interior.
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representatives of their government settled on these government irrigation 
projects do not expect our Uncle Sam to demonstrate a paternal interest 
in their affairsCall they expect is opportunity to make good under the 
conditions in which they are placed.
O’Donnell saw his responsibility as providing them with that opportunity through 
instruction, demonstration, and preaching the virtues of being a “practical business 
farmer.”  He relished this role as a national farm advisor.  By organizing and 
hosting a major national meeting on irrigation in Billings in March 1915, however, 
O’Donnell showed that he had not forgotten his role as a Yellowstone civic 
capitalist.  The business generated by those who attended the meeting, and the 
positive national exposure of a rapidly booming Billings, brought added, and direct, 
benefi ts to the various business ventures of his local partners.  The following year, 
1916, he extended his help to the immediate region by creating the Midland Empire 
Fair, a huge celebration of the greater Yellowstone region, with particular emphasis 
on the areas included in the USRS projects at Huntley and at Shoshone, south of the 
Montana-Wyoming border, land that O’Donnell referred to as the Midland Empire 
with Billings as its urban commercial and industrial center.  In the eyes of O’Donnell 
and his allies, the two Reclamation Service projects created the potential for an 
agricultural bonanza rarely equaled in the northern plains.29
 The Reclamation Service at fi rst provided O’Donnell with considerable 
praise. The Thirteenth Annual Report, published in 1915, observed 
It may be safely stated that the work of the Supervisor of Irrigation had 
aided materially in bringing out a feeling of confi dence among the water 
users in the administration of the Reclamation Service and a desire on the 
part of the water users to cooperate to the fullest extent with the service in 
the interest of the projects.
But support within the agency waned over the next three years; by the time the 
Reclamation Service published O’Donnell’s Better Business, Better Farming, Better 
Living: Hints from a Practical Farmer in the summer of 1918,  O’Donnell resigned 
as Supervisor of Irrigation.30
 Agriculture groups outside of the agency acknowledged the signifi cance of 
O’Donnell’s years in the Reclamation Service.  In his 1919 article for The Country 
Gentleman, Philip S. Rose praised O’Donnell as the best farmer in Montana, but 
reserved his highest commendation for his USRS service: “the humanizing of the 
Reclamation Service has been Mr. O’Donnell’s greatest public service.”  While he 
may have resigned from the Reclamation Service, he “had not resigned from doing 
what he can for the general public welfare.”31
 O’Donnell’s work in the next decade showed his continued commitment to 
his early civic capitalist philosophy.  While no longer a federal employee, O’Donnell 
continued as a voice for irrigation and diversifi ed farming for the remainder of 
his career.  He signed on as an agricultural specialist and spokesman for the Great 
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Northern Railway, and the extended 
Hill railroad interests, during the 
1920s.  He watched as an outsider 
as the Reclamation Service was 
reorganized and renamed the U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation in 1923.  He 
continued to write articles supporting 
reclamation and irrigation.  In a 1925 
article in the New Reclamation Era 
titled “Irrigation Hints from a Practical 
Irrigator,” he once again sounded 
a favorite theme: “the better the 
farming the less irrigation required . . . 
Cultivation before and after irrigation 
should be your motto.”  O’Donnell 
approved when in 1928 a local group 
of farmers and settlers created the 
Huntley Project Irrigation District, 
ending the federal government’s 
twenty years of administration.  In 
the decade, he also became one of the 
Yellowstone’s fi rst serious collectors 
of the valley’s early history.  He 
paid for a stone obelisk to be placed 
at the fi rst cemetery in the Billings 
area; he collected stories from other 
early settlers and published them as 
Montana Monographs in 1927.  He 
began to enjoy a semi-retirement, 
taking a world tour with two of his 
daughters in 1931.  When the New 
Deal came in the 1930s, some of his 
early friends in western agriculture, 
such as Elwood Mead and M. L. 
Wilson, held important national 
positions.  O’Donnell, however, 
accepted only local responsibilities, 
with an appointment to the state’s fi rst 
Water Conservation Board in 1934.32
 By the Depression decade, his friend Elwood Mead was commissioner of 
the Reclamation Bureau and historians stressed that the future of the agency was to 
return to its original focus on home making as the true purpose of the Reclamation 
Bureau.  But few now remembered O’Donnell’s contribution to reclamation as 
a “home making” endeavor.  O’Donnell himself, in interviews in his last years 
and in his stab at writing his memoirs, emphasized his cowboy days and the early 
11.2.  Pursuing his belief in education of 
Reclamation settlers, I. D. O’Donnell wrote this 
article “Common Birds Around the Farm,” for 
the June 1915 issue of Reclamation Record.
329
settlement of Montana, going so far as to pose on the cover of the Western Humane 
News of December 1940 in full cowboy regalia, complete with chaps.  After his 
death in 1948, his family continued Hesper Farm and today his grandson, Harley 
O’Donnell, still farms the land and maintains the homestead much as it was eighty 
years ago.  But by the end of the century, his contributions had been mostly forgotten 
even in his home of Yellowstone County.  Yet, when the Agriculture Committee of 
the Billings Area Chamber of Commerce recently planned a one-day guided tour of 
the now “historic” Huntley Project, “one of Montana=s most productive agricultural 
areas,” its schedule included a stop at one of Huntley’s best farms, where “the 
careful rotation of corn, malt barley and sugar beets helps these producers maximize 
productivity, while combating disease and insect threats.”  Bud O’Donnell’s legacy 
as the “practical farmer and irrigator” of the early twentieth century is not in the 
history books, but in the land itself.33
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“Did The Secretary Sell Us ‘Blue Sky?’”:  Inclusion 
of Warren Act Contractors in the North Platte River 
Project
By
Alan S. Newell
Introduction
 Construction of  Pathfi nder Dam on the North Platte River beginning in 
1905 suggested the dawn of a new era of economic growth and prosperity for 
farmers in Wyoming and Nebraska.  Since the early days of settlement in the North 
Platte River Valley in the 1880s, irrigators had contended with excess water during 
the spring and early summer months and with water shortages during the months 
of July through September.  Pathfi nder Dam and its one million acre foot reservoir 
offered the hope of a more regulated and predictable water fl ow, particularly in the 
critical late summer months.
 The  North Platte Project (authorized in 1903 as the  Sweetwater Project) 
involved the construction of numerous dams and canals along a 111-mile stretch 
of the North Platte River between Guernsey, Wyoming, and Bridgeport, Nebraska.  
(See Figure 1)  Reclamation Service engineers anticipated storing suffi cient water 
behind Pathfi nder to irrigate more than 300,000 acres of public land downstream 
from the project.  However, as conceived, the North Platte Project offered little 
benefi t to existing downstream irrigators; those who held water rights to the natural 
fl ow of the North Platte River.  Established farms, some with water rights dating 
to the early 1880s, were not considered in the initial legislation.  The benefi ts of 
Pathfi nder and similar Reclamation Service projects were readily apparent to these 
North Platte farmers, who looked to the project to supplement their precarious 
supply of water.  Congress responded to this interest by enacting the  Warren Act in 
1911 (34 Stat. 925).  Legislators viewed the statute as a vehicle for incorporating 
existing private district irrigators into the new government sponsored units, thereby 
more effi ciently utilizing the public project.
 The Warren Act, similar to the Reclamation Act, received overwhelming 
support in both houses of Congress.  Yet few supporters of the bill gave much 
thought to just how these existing irrigation districts would be integrated into the 
federal project.  This task was left to Reclamation Service offi cials, who, during 
the fi rst year following passage of the act, addressed three threshold administrative 
issues—all three of which fundamentally altered operation of the North Platte 
Project and eventually spawned protracted litigation. The fi rst issue focused on 
the nature of “surplus water” as envisioned under the Warren Act.  Was this to 
be a temporary disposal of water, contingent upon a determination of the yearly 
surplus prior to the sale?  Or, would lands in private irrigation districts be able to 
acquire permanent rights to surplus water and be integrated into public district 
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12.1.  North Platte Project map.
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lands?  Potential contractors overwhelmingly favored the later approach, and as 
the spokesmen for a private irrigation company remarked in 1931, without this 
guarantee of permanency, the United States would be selling farmers “blue sky.”
 The second issue followed closely on the heels of the secretary of the 
interior’s decision in November 1911 to provide permanent surplus water to 
 Warren Act contractors.  At that time, the fi nal design of the North Platte Project 
was not yet complete.  But, it was clear to Reclamation engineers that providing 
permanent water to Warren Act contractors would necessitate a reduction in the 
size of future government units.  The secretary made the decision to reconfi gure 
the project and to reduce the size of prospective government districts during the 
fi rst few months after passage of the Warren Act.
 The disposal of permanent water and the reconfi guration of what became 
the  Fort Laramie Unit structurally incorporated the Warren Act irrigators into 
the North Platte Project.  The operational integration of them into the project, 
however, required an additional threshold decision.  Facing pressure from its 
fi rst potential contractor, Tri-State Land Company (later Farmers’ Irrigation 
District), early in 1912 to allow for future as well as existing lands to be served 
by Pathfi nder water, the Reclamation Service imposed a limit on the maximum 
amount of water that would be delivered to Tri-State by the government.  As a 
practical matter, the imposition of this “cap” required the commingling of natural 
fl ow and storage water.  The contract provision was readily agreed to by Tri-State 
and future Warren Act contractors.  But, it had little signifi cance until the drought 
years of the 1930s.
 Faced with periodic water shortages, beginning in 1931, the Bureau of 
Reclamation allocated water to government and Warren Act districts on a prorated 
basis.  In doing so, the Bureau was consistent with the decisions made in 1911 and 
1912, that Warren Act contractors were equal partners in the North Platte Project.  
From the perspective of management, the Bureau of Reclamation believed that 
such an allocation was the only way practically to administer the North Platte 
system.  Despite peripheral legal and other challenges to their interpretation of the 
Warren Act, Bureau engineers consistently followed this allocation system.
The Origins of the Warren Act
 Historians have long recognized the importance of the National 
 Reclamation Act of 1902.  Some have argued that the act represented the 
expectations of a technical elite, focused on directing the effi cient use of the 
nation’s resources in a “progressive era.”  Others have seen the act as a triumph 
of established western interests seeking to utilize public money to encourage 
economic prosperity in the nation’s arid region.1  Given the diffi culty in separating 
realistic economic goals from political decisions, it is no wonder that the 
legislative and administrative history of the 1902 act soon assumed an identity 
distinct from its legislative history.
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 One of the progeny of the Reclamation Act of 1902 was the “ Warren Act”, 
passed by Congress on February 21, 1911.  This rather short statute provided for 
the distribution of surplus storage waters from reclamation projects to existing 
private irrigation districts within federal project areas.  It authorized the secretary 
of the interior to contract for the storage and delivery of surplus waters conserved 
by any reclamation project in excess of the requirements of the project.  Three of 
the nation’s leading proponents of federal irrigation projects,  Francis E. Warren 
of Wyoming,  William Borah of Idaho, and  Thomas Carter of Montana, were 
the principal fi gures behind passage of the Warren Act.  All three men saw the 
advantage of incorporating private irrigation ventures into the federal projects 
then being constructed by the Reclamation Service.
 Wyoming’s Republican Senator 
Francis Warren was particularly interested 
in developing as much of the North 
Platte River Basin as possible.  Warren, 
longtime Wyoming merchant, rancher, and 
the state’s fi rst elected governor, lobbied 
the federal government for construction 
of Pathfi nder Dam, but also advocated 
funding other reclamation projects, such as 
the Shoshone Irrigation Project in the Big 
Horn River Basin of northern Wyoming.  
As Warren explained to one supporter 
from Wheatland, Wyoming, eventually all 
of the arable land in Wyoming would be 
occupied and developed either by dry-
land or irrigated farms. The senior senator 
visualized:
The full development of the water 
in Wyoming … to have it as an adjunct to reinforce the rainfall and the 
conservation of rain and snow fall, so that, while certain crops may be 
raised without irrigation, there will be water on hand for other crops that 
demand partial irrigation, complete irrigation, or a little bit of help—say 
once in the course of the summer;2
Such an optimistic view of the state’s agricultural potential led Warren to believe 
that Pathfi nder Dam had “ample capacity to irrigate all of the lands under it in the 
North Platte Valley in Wyoming and Nebraska which can be reached by irrigation 
works of reasonable expenses.”3
 Warren was an early proponent of allowing existing private district lands 
to benefi t from Pathfi nder storage water. The Wyoming senator may have viewed 
the incorporation of these irrigators, many of whom resided in Nebraska, as a 
means to resolve downstream irrigators’ claims to early direct fl ow water rights.  
Indeed, Warren expressed both concern and uncertainty as to the extent of these 
12.2.  Senator Francis E. Warren of 
Wyoming.  Courtesy of the U.S. Senate 
Historical Offi ce.
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potential rights.4  However, Warren’s interest in expanding the North Platte 
Project was driven principally by his desire to see lands south of the river, in what 
was termed the “Goshen Park” area, benefi t from the planned Fort Laramie Canal. 
It appears likely that Warren believed that by broadening the scope of the North 
Platte Project through such measures as incorporating private district lands into 
the project, he could ensure the greatest development possible at Goshen Park.
Ironically, it would be the need to serve these “ Warren Act” contractors that would 
later require the Reclamation Service to scale back the extent of lands that would 
be irrigated by water from the new canal.5
 The salient feature of the various bills introduced by Warren beginning in 
December 1909 was the authority given to the secretary of the interior to 
(1) deliver surplus storage water to non-project entities and (2) to cooperate with 
individuals, districts and associations in enlarging existing project facilities to 
accommodate additional non-project lands.  Opposing this effort were various 
western interests who either feared federal control over the distribution of water 
or who were concerned that the already ambitious plans of the Reclamation 
Service would be expanded to include new federal projects that served only 
private lands.
 Both the title and the text of the original bill as introduced in 
mid-December 1909 (S. 4002), and later under new numbers in late February and 
March 1910 (S. 6723 and S. 6953 respectively), clearly stated the proponents’ 
objectives.  The proposed legislation authorized the secretary of the interior 
to contract for the delivery of “surplus water” from any reclamation project to 
private projects that had been established under the Carey Act of 1894 “or under 
the laws of any State or Territory.”6  The various bills as introduced also suggested 
that the sponsors envisioned expanding current federal projects to serve existing 
private district lands.  This clause specifi cally authorized the secretary to enter 
into agreements “with persons, irrigation districts, associations, or corporations” 
to deliver water from enlarged federal facilities (dams, canals, etc.).  As explained 
in the bill, these structures could be expanded because the government had 
secured a favorable site where a dam could be raised to store additional water, or 
canals widened to convey water to additional acreage.7
 The purpose of S. 6953 and its predecessors may have been a bit too clear 
for members of the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation of Arid Lands, who 
at the urging of the Interior Department amended the title of the bill to remove 
the term “surplus” water and to be less specifi c about the nature of a project site 
that might benefi t from the legislation.  Secretary of the Interior Richard Ballinger 
made clear his understanding of section 2 of the bill however, when he stated that:
In some cases the Government has secured available sites whereon 
reservoirs may be erected of such dimensions as will irrigate a much 
larger area of land than it is deemed advisable to include within a 
government project. In the construction of a government reservoir the 
reclamation fund should only be used to construct it of such dimensions 
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as will impound a quantity of water suffi cient to supply the lands within 
the government project.  Hence, unless the Secretary of the Interior can 
cooperate and contract with companies, associations, or districts to the 
end that reservoirs may be erected of such dimensions as to irrigate 
larger areas than the Government has included within its own project, 
great quantities of arid lands capable of irrigation will necessarily remain 
barren.8
Ballinger’s concept was to allow federally-funded reclamation projects to expand 
by incorporating existing privately irrigated lands into the government project.
The implication in this idea that public money might be used to fi nance private 
district irrigation or that, under state law, there could even be such a thing as 
“surplus water” fueled much of the congressional debate over the Warren Act.
 Senator  Weldon Heyburn of Idaho addressed the issue of “surplus water” 
in the spring of 1910.  Heyburn was a resident of Wallace, Idaho, and represented 
industrial water users, such as mines and smelters, rather than irrigators.  His 
Senate colleague, on the other hand, William Borah, lived in Boise in the Snake 
River Basin and had long been interested in irrigation ventures.  Borah strongly 
supported Warren’s bill.  But Heyburn viewed it as an assault on state control of 
water, which he proudly claimed was sanctifi ed by the Idaho constitution.  Much 
of the lengthy and, at times, raucous debate, on S. 6953 centered on Heyburn’s 
assertion that Congress was allowing the federal government to usurp a state 
right.9  Heyburn was particularly intrigued by the Committee on Irrigation’s 
amendments to the original bill and charged that “They took out the word 
‘surplus’ in order to disarm those who are opposed to the bill.”10  Heyburn may 
have been correct about why the language of the bill was changed.  However, 
the bill’s supporters maintained that these changes clarifi ed the purpose of the 
legislation, which remained consistent throughout the debates; i.e., to allow the 
Reclamation Service to derive revenues from existing excess storage capacity and 
to utilize fully prime reservoir sites that were under federal control.11
 In the end, Senator Heyburn convinced few that his concern for federal 
infringement on state water law was a real threat.  Indeed, this issue had been 
addressed earlier in passage of the Reclamation Act, and most congressmen 
seemed satisfi ed that supplementing that legislation would not pose additional 
problems.  Given the senatorial sensitivity to this issue, however, Heyburn 
extracted a concession in the form of a proviso to section 2:
That nothing contained in this Act shall be held or construed as enlarging 
or attempting to enlarge the right of the United States, under existing law, 
to control the waters of any stream in any State.
This did not mollify Heyburn who quipped, “The amendment is an apology, and 
only adds to the confusion as to what the statute will mean.”12
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 Of more concern to proponents of the Warren Act and more illuminating 
as to the legislation’s provisions is the skepticism of Nebraska Senator  Elmer 
Burkett.  Burkett distinguished between the purposes of sections 1 and 2 of the 
bill.  While voicing support for section 1, he had reservations about the wisdom of 
section 2.  Burkett was not concerned about Heyburn’s charge that, by passing the 
bill, Congress was authorizing the secretary of the interior to sell surplus water.  
At the same time, the Nebraska senator was not misled by phraseology.
The fact is we can call what we are selling the delivery and charging a 
price for it, or we can say we are selling water and charging a price for it. 
But the result is just the same. We are going to charge the people who get 
the water, call it whatever we may.13
What one called the process of “selling … excess water,” as provided for in the 
bill did not bother Burkett.  However, section 2 of the proposed bill, according to 
the senator, provided “for another and a distinct thing.”14
 Burkett believed that section 2 would allow the United States to invest 
in private irrigation projects, even if that investment involved no public domain 
lands.  He explained: 
The fi rst section [of the bill] provides that they [Reclamation Service] 
may use the water for private lands, but the second section provides that 
we will go into partnership with private concerns, and we will build these 
reservoirs, we will dig these canals, we will construct these ditches, for 
what?  For private lands.15
While supporting the sale of truly “surplus” water, Burkett had grave concerns 
about the effi cacy of promoting broader ventures between public and private 
entities.  Burkett noted during the debate that the Reclamation Service was 
already strained by the cost of projects that it was presently involved in, and he 
saw little value in further expansion.16
 Most senators did not share Burkett’s concern for over-extending the 
reclamation fund.  They understood section 2 to simply allow the secretary of the 
interior to enter into agreements to extend existing or planned federal projects.
Indeed, given the requirement of the Reclamation Act that federal projects be 
designed to reclaim public domain land, they could not envision the scenario 
contemplated by Burkett.17  Wyoming Representative  Frank Mondell clearly 
articulated what he saw as the two prong benefi ts of S. 6953.  In making his 
comments, Mondell was thinking specifi cally of the North Platte River Project.
The fi rst section of the bill relates primarily to those works which have 
been constructed.  As I have said, it is an income to the service which 
otherwise the service could not acquire, and without this law, in the case 
of the North Platte Dam, the additional impounded water not needed for 
the irrigation of the lands under the project would simply be turned into 
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the stream and the service would receive no benefi t from it. This is the 
fi rst section.
Now, the second section contemplates two essentially different 
operations: First, that the settlers on a unit of a reclamation project who 
are anxious to have immediate construction and do not care to wait for 
the time when the service in the expenditure of its funds can build their 
canals may make contracts with the Reclamation Service under which 
they build their own works on the unit, and the contract with the service 
in fi xing their water-right charges gives them credit for the work they 
have done at their own expense, and which otherwise would have to be 
done by the Government.18
Mondell considered this provision of section 2 to be the most important feature of 
the bill and he understood that it gave the secretary of the interior broad authority 
to maximize irrigable acreage.
 Congress clearly expected private irrigation companies and the federal 
reclamation project to benefi t from this new legislation.  However, in only 
one instance during the entire debate on the  Warren Act did Congress actually 
consider how the integration of a private system into a federal reclamation project 
might actually work.  In the fi nal House debate on S. 6953 on February 17, 1911, 
Illinois Representative James Mann queried Kansas Representative William 
Reeder, “Suppose there is a shortage of water in the end—who loses the water, the 
private parties, or the parties on the Government project?”  This question would 
plague Bureau of Reclamation engineers for the next 50 years, and it immediately 
perplexed Reeder, who could only respond by hypothesizing that the fi rst unit of 
the government project would be served fi rst.  However, if private existing lands 
were added to the project before completion of the federal portion, those earlier in 
time would be served before the public entity.19
 Wyoming Congressman Frank Mondell again stepped in to clarify 
Reeder’s response by explaining that the contracts entered into pursuant to the 
bill “can not affect the water right of any entryman under a reclamation project, 
for this reason, that when the reclamation project is inaugurated or initiated the 
water rights for the entire project and all units of it are fi led, and the right dates 
from the time when the water-right application is made, provided due diligence is 
used in building works.”20  According to Mondell, all users of project water would 
have the same priority under state law and would be served equally by the United 
States.
 Mondell’s reference to the “relation back doctrine,” as with Reeder’s 
adherence to priority, underscored Congress’ concern for ensuring that the Warren 
Act did not undermine state water law.  However, the job of delivering water to 
the various government and “Warren Act contractors” was left to the discretion of 
the secretary of the interior.  This task would require the Bureau of Reclamation 
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to develop fl exible procedures to ensure that all parties were dealt with equitably, 
particularly during periodic dry weather cycles on the Great Plains.
Creating and Administering Warren Act Contracts on the North Platte 
Project
 Passage of the  Warren Act in 1911 provided a statutory mechanism to 
incorporate lands within private irrigation districts into the publicly fi nanced 
North Platte Project.  Numerous questions remained, however, as to the number of 
potential irrigators who might elect to contract for surplus water.  Moreover, since 
the only water that could be disposed of was “surplus water,” the Reclamation 
Service had to determine the available supply from Pathfi nder Reservoir, as well 
as the ultimate demand from future government project units that would be part of 
the North Platte Project.  What indeed was “surplus water”?  The answer that the 
Service found to this and other questions led to interpretations of the Warren Act 
that guided federal reclamation policy for much of the twentieth century.
 The clamor to incorporate existing private irrigation district facilities into 
the North Platte River Project began even before passage of the Warren Act.  A 
number of private irrigation companies and districts petitioned Secretary of the 
Interior Richard Ballinger during the winter of 1910-1911 to purchase water from 
Pathfi nder Reservoir.21  The secretary responded by explaining that legislation 
was pending to allow such a sale, but, at present, he was without authority to do 
so.  Ballinger argued that, even with legislative authorization, he would need to 
be assured that there was suffi cient water available in the reservoir to serve new 
irrigators on the government project before providing water to existing private 
lands.  Unfortunately, Secretary Ballinger explained that the Board of Army 
Engineers had already prepared a report in 1910 indicating that there would be 
no surplus water available after meeting the needs of the North Platte Project 
as then contemplated.22  Notwithstanding the secretary’s fi nding, requests to 
purchase water from Pathfi nder increased after passage of the Warren Act in late 
February 1911.23  The Interior Department continued to base its response on the 
1910 Board of Army Engineers report that had concluded that a surplus of storage 
water was unlikely, given current plans for the  North Platte Project.  Accordingly 
it would not agree to requests to sell storage water.24
 The departure of Ballinger in March 1911 signaled a change in department 
policy.  Beginning in June 1911 the secretary’s offi ce started forwarding 
applications for surplus storage water to the Reclamation Service.25  That summer, 
Reclamation engineers began working on adjustments to the North Platte Project 
in order to free water for private use. The Board of Engineers determined in its 
July 24, 1911, report that Pathfi nder Reservoir could provide 600,000 acre feet of 
water.  Approximately 200,000 acre feet was committed to the Interstate Canal, 
40,000 acre feet to a pending contract with North Platte Irrigation Company and 
240,000 was to be reserved for the planned Fort Laramie Canal.  The balance of 
surplus water was thus estimated to be 120,000 acre feet annually.  The board 
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recommended that the best use of this surplus was its “disposal” to existing canals 
on some equitable basis.26
 The federal government’s 
initial policy was to “rent” water 
to private district irrigators on 
a temporary, one-year basis 
until engineers could make a 
determination of what surplus 
water was available.  As 
Reclamation Service Director 
Frederick Newell explained to 
Nebraska Senator Norris Brown 
in July 1911, “The system for 
utilization of the surplus stored 
water in the Pathfi nder Reservoir 
will not be completed for several 
years and the Department feels 
that pending such completion it should not provide for any permanent rights for 
these canals.”27  Although most irrigators desired a more secure supplemental 
water supply, the Interior Department was soon inundated with petitions for 
temporary contracts.28
 Newly appointed Secretary of the 
Interior Walter L. Fisher and Reclamation 
Service Director Newell were well aware of 
the importance of the North Platte Project 
when they met with irrigators at Mitchell, 
Nebraska, on August 4, 1911.  At that meeting, 
the secretary heard testimony concerning the 
development of the North Platte River Valley.  
He learned that the sugar beet processing 
industry had focused its interest on intensifying 
agriculture in the region through access to 
government and private irrigation projects.
Secretary Fisher also was informed of the need 
for late season water.  F. M. Sands of the Gering 
district explained that:
I believe we are all agreed as to the great benefi t coming to this country 
when the Government came in and constructed the Pathfi nder reservoir.  
But in the administration of the reservoir, there is a chance that the 
waters withdrawn from use by the early ditches during the fl ood season 
will not revert to them later in the season….  In other words, without 
any intention in the matter, there is a possibility that the Government 
will take waters from us in June and not give it to us in August.  A gallon 
12.3.  Pathfi nder Dam on the North Platte Project.
12.4.  Walter L. Fisher while Sec-
retary of the Interior.
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of water in August is worth two or three gallons in June.  It is right and 
proper that the excessive June fl ow should be reduced—but I think we 
have a right to ask that the Government sell us at a fair price water that 
they have withheld from us in June.29
 The secretary also heard from those who wanted the Reclamation Service 
to begin construction on a long-sought southside canal.  The Fort Laramie or 
Goshen Hole Canal was considered by many to be part of the initial plan for 
the North Platte Project.  Secretary Fisher noted a distinction between those 
mostly private district lands on the southside of the river from the largely public 
district lands on the northside.  He questioned whether the participants in the 
Fort Laramie Canal would allow the federal government to place liens on their 
property to secure payment for the cost of construction and operation of the canal.  
The project’s supporters assured the secretary that they would agree to such a 
condition.30
 The interests of the Fort Laramie Project participants were potentially in 
confl ict with the private district irrigators who sought permanent rights to surplus 
water from Pathfi nder Reservoir.  As noted above, consistent estimates placed 
the supply from Pathfi nder at 600,000 acre feet annually.  If those estimates were 
correct, there was potentially 160,000 acre feet available annually for private 
projects.31  Estimates did not always prove correct, however, and Secretary Fisher 
wanted assurances from the private district irrigators that their right to surplus 
storage water under the  Warren Act was second to that of the government project.
One of the questions raised is what would be the situation of the present 
settlers or those coming in under the Government canal as compared with 
those holding land under the old ditches, if in the future there should be 
an actual shortage of water in the Pathfi nder reservoir, and there would 
not be suffi cient for all.  Under those circumstances, you recognize 
you would probably have to concede the prior right of those under the 
Government canal.  That seems to be the purpose of the law.32
 The North Platte River Valley irrigators agreed with the secretary, but 
they also believed that the federal government would not sell them a water supply 
that was not dependable.  Private district irrigators sought permanent rights to 
Pathfi nder storage water and expressed a willingness to pay a fi xed sum for the 
cost of construction and operation of the reservoir.  They did so, as Fred Wright of 
Farmers’ Irrigation District explained, “In view of the permanency that would be 
given us by the lump sum payment …”33
 Secretary Fisher also had to insure the permanency of the government 
project, specifi cally, the Interstate Canal.  He did so by 1) confi rming a secure 
supply of water for the “Government [Interstate] canal” and 2) by suggesting 
that future confi guration of the federal project be determined by the need to serve 
Warren Act contractors as well as government district irrigators.  An exchange 
between Fred Wright, one of the fi rst Warren Act contractors, and Secretary Fisher 
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is illuminating.  In responding to the secretary’s concerns about a government 
district needs in water short years, Wright offered the following:
MR. WRIGHT: In regard to that I take it that the Government knows 
better than any one else as to what the probabilities are and as to whether 
they were selling us anything of value or not.  If the reservoir supply 
of water is taken up—that is a matter that the Government would be 
able to determine and regulate.  I would assume that the position of the 
Department would be not to do anything intentionally that would bring 
hardship upon any one.
THE SECRETARY: That is one of the serious questions on the south side 
[Fort Laramie Canal].  It would be a very serious thing if the Government 
should establish a project and invite settlers to take up the lands and build 
their homes, and there was a liability of being a shortage of water.
I must say frankly that I concur in the general proposition stated—that 
the existing settler on the ground, even though he may not have come in 
under a Government canal, but coming under a private enterprise, if they 
are willing to do what is fair and reasonable, is entitled to a priority of 
right over an unknown settler who has not got here. …
Secretary Fisher’s view was that Warren Act contractors would be sold a 
permanent water supply from Pathfi nder, recognizing the preference to the 
existing government districts.  He did not anticipate, however, the irrigation of 
any new government district lands so as to threaten the supply to Warren Act 
contractors.  The secretary’s views were welcomed by those potential contractors.  
According to the reporter, the secretary’s statement was met with “unanimous and 
hearty applause.”34
 With this statement, Secretary Fisher initiated a policy that would govern 
the Bureau of Reclamation’s future operation of the  North Platte Project with 
respect to water delivery during years of shortage.  Henceforth, Warren Act 
contractors would be considered part of the North Platte Project and would 
receive a guarantee of water delivery alongside the government district lands.
The key to understanding of the government’s position is the recognition that 
Secretary Fisher, adhering strictly to the terms of the Warren Act, protected 
the Interstate Canal, while providing for Warren Act contractors through a 
reconfi guration of the future North Platte River Project.  The importance of this 
compromise was apparent soon after the August 4 meeting.
 Early in October 1911 R. F. Walter, Reclamation Service supervising 
engineer in Denver, wrote to Chief Engineer A. P. Davis in Washington, D.C., 
acknowledging the latter’s request for a recommendation on departmental policy 
with respect to the sale of surplus Pathfi nder storage water.  Walter claimed that it 
was premature to fi x the amount of surplus water that would be available from the 
project.  He acknowledged that there were senior water rights to the project held 
by downstream irrigators in Nebraska, and, until they were determined, he (Walter) 
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would be unable to render an opinion.  Walter recognized that “People under these 
Nebraska ditches as well as the people under the proposed Fort Laramie unit are 
clamoring for water and are very anxious to make a contract at this time.”  The 
Denver engineer thought that the Reclamation Service could use this anxiety “as 
a lever” to secure a fi nal determination of senior water rights.  To that end, Walter 
reported that his offi ce had begun an investigation of Nebraska water rights, albeit 
without the cooperation of the State of Nebraska.35
 A few days later, North Platte Project Engineer Andrew Weiss echoed 
Walter’s concerns, but acknowledged that “It is probable that extremely strong 
pressure will be brought to bear on the Government to sell excess water rights from 
the Pathfi nder, and it seems doubtful to me that if in the end this pressure can be 
successfully resisted.”  Weiss also noted that if the Reclamation Service did not 
prevail and continue to issue temporary, rather than permanent rights, then “it is 
exceedingly doubtful if the Fort Laramie unit can be undertaken at all.”36
 Neither Weiss nor Walter had to wait long for a response. Chief Engineer 
Davis reacted angrily to Walter’s plea to allow more time to assess the volume of 
surplus water available in Pathfi nder Reservoir.  Davis charged that Walter was 
forgetting “that the Departmental policy in this matter was carefully considered 
and decided by Secretary Fisher last June.”  The secretary had determined that 
“preference should be given to lands already irrigated which require additional 
water supply, and that the irrigation of new lands should be secondary to their 
requirements.”37  Davis placed the future Fort Laramie canal in the same category 
as other new government or private district projects.  He stated emphatically that 
“you … appear to assume that we must build the Fort Laramie project to its full size 
and then perhaps have a little water to sell to old ditches.  This is the reverse of the 
present policy.”  Rather, surplus water should be offered as soon as possible so that 
the Reclamation Service could determine the size of the Fort Laramie unit.38
 Walter’s caution was not only unwarranted, but also politically ill timed.  
Davis informed Walter that the secretary had approved a letter drafted for Nebraska 
Representative Moses P. Kinkaid to be used at a public meeting in Bridgeport, 
Nebraska.  That speech adhered to the policy of using surplus water for “old 
irrigated lands.”  By this, Davis meant that only existing privately irrigated lands 
would have a preference.  Projected irrigable lands within the potential Warren Act 
contracts would not be considered comparably.  Davis added that Walter would 
have to show a very good reason to reverse departmental policy on this issue.39
 Both Walter and Weiss quickly responded to the chief engineer in a joint 
letter dated November 1, 1911.  They claimed that they were in complete accord 
with departmental policy and had only raised this issue because they assumed 
“that the Fort Laramie Canal like the Third Lateral District under the Interstate 
Canal is part of the North Platte project.”  The engineers expressed concern 
about a possible confl ict with the Warren Act.  However, absent such confl ict, 
they concurred in the plan to offer surplus water as soon as possible and “before 
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the construction of the Fort Laramie extension is authorized.”40  With all project 
personnel in line, Secretary Fisher announced his policy on November 6, 1911, 
and, soon thereafter, the North Platte Project declared its intention to enter into 
contracts for the supply of permanent surplus water.41
 The United States entered into its fi rst  Warren Act contract with existing 
water users on the North Platte River before the fi rst major canal (the Interstate 
Canal) was completed on the north side of the river in 1915.  That contract, 
executed in 1912, was with Tri-State Land Company, predecessor to Farmers’ 
Irrigation District.  By the end of 1912, “practically all the representatives of the 
older canal systems west of Bridgeport [had] expressed a desire to supplement 
their water rights to the direct fl ow from the river by Pathfi nder storage.”42  In 
1913 the United States signed fi ve more Warren Act contracts with irrigation 
districts and companies that were using natural fl ow water from the North Platte 
River.43  In 1914, 1915, and 1917 three more Warren Act contracts for North 
Platte Project water were signed with existing irrigators, bringing the total to nine 
contracts (see Figure 1).44
 All nine of the contracts contain the proviso from section 1 of the Warren 
Act that the government projects shall be “prior to” the Warren Act contractors 
in the right to the use of storage water.45  Of course, as noted above, the 
availability of surplus water through the reconfi guration of the project had already 
been decided through secretarial policy.  Thus, all of the contracts confi rmed 
that surplus storage water was available from Pathfi nder Reservoir with the 
expectation that existing government district irrigators and Warren Act contractors 
could be satisfi ed with the available supply.  The contracts provided for the 
government to deliver a supply of water to the Warren Act contractors in exchange 
for a fi xed purchase price from the contractor plus the contractor’s commitment 
to pay a set percentage of operation and maintenance costs connected with the 
storage facility providing the water.  A delivery schedule with amounts and dates 
was included in each contract, together with the cumulative amount of water that 
each contracting district was to receive each year.46
 Soon after execution of the fi rst contract, private irrigation companies 
began raising issues that strained Secretary Fisher’s accommodating policy.  
Fisher had initially approved the sale of surplus water under the Warren Act with 
the proviso that only currently irrigated lands would receive water.47  Tri-State 
approached the Interior Department in 1912 with a proposal to include “lands 
which, although never irrigated, are under existing ditches or ditches existing at 
some particular time.”48  Responding to this request, the Reclamation Service 
established a new policy of setting a “maximum limit” on “the total water rights 
of the purchasing company after purchase shall have been completed.”49  This 
new policy allowed Tri-State and other potential Warren Act contractors greater 
fl exibility in defi ning the lands that would receive surplus water, while providing 
a measure of certainty to the Service of the total demand for water.
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 The issue for Tri-State 
and other private companies was 
how much control the federal 
government would have over the 
total water supply (natural fl ow and 
storage) to their lands.  Although 
the Interior Department consistently 
deferred to valid early rights 
to natural fl ow from the North 
Platte River, Reclamation Service 
engineers also recognized that, with 
construction of Pathfi nder Dam, the 
North Platte no longer operated in a 
natural state.  Reclamation’s answer 
to the problem was to incorporate 
the “maximum” natural fl ow and 
storage water into the Warren 
Act contracts.  This solution was 
apparent in the Tri-State contract.  
In reviewing a draft of that contract 
in July 1912 Reclamation Engineer Morris Bien informed the director that he had 
objected to Article 11 as initially drafted.  That article stated that:
In order to enable the United States to deliver the supply of water herein 
specifi ed on the basis of payments as herein provided it is agreed that the 
United States shall hold in trust for the benefi t of the lands of the District 
all claims of the Company to the waters of the North Platte River and 
that the said Company shall assist the United States in the defense of 
said claims by the furnishing of all evidence and other like matters in its 
power or knowledge.50
Bien objected to this clause “because it places upon the United States the 
responsibility of acting as trustee in regard to these waters for the benefi t of the 
lands of the District.”51  The Interior Department in Washington suggested a 
change in the language of Article 11 to provide for the company assigning its 
“rights, title and interest to the waters of the North Platte River” to the United 
States.52  But this proposed change did not satisfy Bien.  Rather, he suggested the 
following contract revision.
The delivery of the water supply provided for in this contract will be 
accepted by the Company as in full satisfaction of all its rights to water 
of the Platte River, both natural fl ow and surplus storage from the 
Pathfi nder reservoir and other reservoirs of the Reclamation Service 
constructed in connection with the North Platte Project.53
Although Bien’s suggested language was used in the fi rst Warren Act contract 
with Tri-State (August 20, 1912), subsequent contracts employed the substitute 
12.5.  Morris Bien of the U.S. Reclamation 
Service.
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language originally proposed by the Interior lawyers in Washington.54  The 
Reclamation Service’s practical approach to providing storage and natural fl ow 
water apparently satisfi ed North Platte irrigators in 1912.  However, the legal 
validity of assigning natural fl ow rights to the United States would be contested 
by those irrigators during the years of low water supply beginning in the 1930s.
Completion Of the North Platte River Project
 Prior to passage of the Warren Act, the Reclamation Service had 
calculated the annual storage supply from Pathfi nder Reservoir at a minimum of 
600,000 acre feet.55  In its July 1911 estimate of water supply requirements for 
anticipated projects, the Board of Army Engineers concluded that lands irrigated 
by the Interstate Canal system would require 200,000 acre feet and the proposed 
Fort Laramie Unit would use 240,000 acre feet.56  Reclamation engineers also 
considered that, in the future, more surplus water might be available because of 
1) more economical methods of water use; or 2) the Goshen Park unit of the 
project might not be constructed.  One month later, Reclamation Service Director 
Newell stated that “no man is safe in prophesizing what will happen,” but he 
reiterated that the Service would be “reasonably safe in disposing of 600,000 acre 
feet [from Pathfi nder] as a minimum.”  Of this amount, he said, “250,000 [acre 
feet] goes to the Project, and under the terms of the law, this Project has a prior 
right.”57
 North Platte Project Engineer Andrew Weiss concluded in 1912 that 
250,000 acre feet of Pathfi nder water would eventually be sold to Warren Act 
contractors, including an anticipated 120,000 acre feet of storage water to the Tri-
State Canal.58  Estimates for the Interstate Unit remained at 200,000 acre feet of 
Pathfi nder’s storage water.  The total of committed water was thus established at 
450,000 acre feet.  Engineer Weiss acknowledged that this amount could change 
if additional lands were to be irrigated, either by enlarging the North Platte Project 
or the private irrigation districts.  However, based on current reports, Weiss 
expressed concern that all of Pathfi nder’s minimum fl ow of 600,000 annually 
would be utilized.59
 The Board of Engineers reviewed the North Platte Project again in May 
1912 and concluded that the Fort Laramie Canal would cover 125,000 acres.60
The board added that selling storage rights to existing irrigators who had applied 
for storage water would not jeopardize the Pathfi nder’s water supply for the new 
unit under the anticipated scenario.61  This optimistic view of the project’s water 
supply changed quickly following the close of the January 1, 1913, deadline for 
Warren Act applications.  By 1913 construction of two of the three canals making 
up the Interstate Canal system were completed.  The  Highline Canal diverted 
water from  Lake Alice, which had a storage capacity of 11,015 acre feet, and 
the Reservoir Supply Canal carried water from Lake Alice to  Lake Minitare (see 
Figure 1).62  Also, by the end of 1913, six private irrigation districts had entered 
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into Warren Act contracts for surplus storage water from Pathfi nder.63  The total 
amount of storage water sold to the Warren Act users was 143,465 acre feet.64
 With these additions to the project, computations of available water and 
irrigation needs in 1914 showed that there was an inadequate supply of water 
for the proposed Fort Laramie Unit, which by then had been reduced from the 
1912 estimate of 125,000 acres to 107,000 irrigable acres.  According to the 
new calculations, the planned unit could now only accommodate 84,000 acres.
Accordingly, consultants to the Reclamation Service recommended suspending 
further Warren Act contracts, except those in progress, until more water supply 
studies could be completed.65  The consulting board also suggested that the Fort 
Laramie Unit be reduced to a smaller size and that the planned Goshen Park Unit 
be eliminated.66
 Further analysis of the 1914 study, as well as additional studies, were 
completed in 1915 by three of the four members of the 1914 consulting board.
This new board considered the storage water demand by Warren Act and project 
users to determine the total amount of required storage water.  The board also 
reassessed the amount of storage water available.  It’s analysis involved use 
of a “more correct method of applying actual demand,” assumption of a larger 
diversion into the Interstate Canal at the beginning of the irrigation season, and a 
slightly smaller amount of storage water per acre for any new project land to be 
irrigated.67
 In their 1915 recalculation, engineers determined that there was an 
adequate water supply to irrigate 116,000 acres of new project land.68  They 
recommended that the 116,000 acres of land be divided between a unit to be 
irrigated by the proposed Fort Laramie Canal and a new project district that would 
be irrigated by an anticipated extension of the Interstate Canal, via the Warren 
Act Tri-State Canal (Northport).  Despite their higher estimate of available water 
supply, they affi rmed the earlier recommendations that there be a moratorium on 
new Warren Act contracts and that the proposed Goshen Park High Line project 
be cancelled.69
 Construction of the  Fort Laramie Canal system started in 1915, after 
liens were placed on 90 percent of the deeded land to guarantee repayment of 
construction costs.  The Reclamation Service estimated that the canal would 
irrigate 100,000 acres when fi nished.70  Upon its completion in 1924, the canal 
actually was capable of delivering water to 107,000 acres.71  By that time, the 
secretary had entered into agreements with the Gering and Fort Laramie District 
of the North Platte Project covering all of the Fort Laramie division in Nebraska 
and the Goshen Irrigation district covering all of the Fort Laramie division in 
Wyoming.72  Also by the time of completion of the Fort Laramie Unit other 
project units were operating.  In accordance with the 1915 Board of Engineers 
report, the secretary of the interior signed a contract with the Northport Irrigation 
District in 1919, agreeing to construct a canal that would provide water to 
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15,000 acres of land in the new project unit.  Construction on the  Northport Canal 
started that year and was completed in 1923 (see Figure 1).73
 The constant 
recalculations and revisions 
to the North Platte Project 
ultimately allowed the Bureau 
of Reclamation to meet most 
irrigator demands, at least 
partially.  By 1924, the Bureau 
had completed construction of 
the principal components of 
the project, which included the 
four government units and the 
nine Warren Act contractors.  
To accommodate these interests, the Bureau had to redesign portions of the 
government units as originally conceived in the early 1900s.
The Bureau of Reclamation’s Delivery of Water During Water-Short 
Years
 The Bureau of Reclamation, delivered storage water to Warren Act 
contractors by following the delivery schedules in the specifi c contracts for 
the eighteen years following the fi rst Warren Act contract—1912.  Warren Act 
irrigators used their appropriated natural fl ow waters from the North Platte 
until that water ran out.  Then they requested the delivery of their storage water 
according to the schedule in their respective contracts.  Sometimes, when demand 
was particularly heavy, the Bureau implemented a rotation system.  In 1912, for 
example, the rotation period was four days.74
 Even though there was no shortage of project water during the 1920s, 
the Bureau  faced questions as to  whether or not government districts should 
have a “better right” than other users to project water, based on the  Warren Act’s 
acknowledgment of government contractors’ “fi rst right” to the use of storage 
water.  In addressing this question in 1924, the Bureau suggested that water sold 
under the terms of the Warren Act were “permanent water rights.”  It noted, “It is 
argued by some that the water users under the projects proper [government units] 
should have a better right than the water users outside of the projects [the Warren 
Act users].”  The Bureau acknowledged that Warren Act contracts “are now rather 
generally being made under section 2 of the [Warren] Act, and provide for rights 
having the same priority as those on the project from which the water is sold.”
In cases of existing Warren Act contracts, the Bureau dismissed the position that 
the government projects should have any better right than the Warren Act users.  
“There does not … seem to be any good reason to uphold this position,” the 
Bureau concluded.  “The Warren Act contractors outside of the projects pay in full 
for what they get in the same manner as do the water users under the projects.”75
12.6.  The Frank Vanchura homestead on the Fort 
Laramie Division of the North Platte Project.
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The drought that visited the high plains beginning in the early 1930s added 
poignancy to this academic discussion.
 In 1931 lack of snow in the mountains and an absence of rain the previous 
summer, resulted in signifi cant shortages of water in the North Platte River.  
Storage water from Pathfi nder Reservoir was predicted to be exhausted before the 
end of August 1931, if withdrawals were to continue as in the past.76  Anticipating 
drought, early in 1931, Farmers’ Irrigation District fi led a request with the Bureau 
of Reclamation to change its summer delivery schedule.  Farmers sought to defer 
receiving early water in April and May and, instead, receive a greater allocation 
than its contract allowed between June and September.77
 The Bureau’s response to the predicted drouth was to initiate its allocation 
system.  Bureau offi cials explained this plan at a June 17, 1931, meeting with 
irrigators in Mitchell, Nebraska.  At that meeting, W. J. Burke, the Bureau’s 
district counsel, advised the four North Platte Project irrigation districts that “the 
Warren Act contractors had purchased a water right and were entitled to their 
share of water.”  During the same meeting, the Bureau’s Superintendent of Power 
C. F. Gleason advised the North Platte districts that he expected to “pro rate the 
water on an acreage basis, [and that] the acreage to be used would be the same as 
the acreage used in computing the O. & M. payments for the reserved works.”78
 Within days of stating this position, Bureau engineers began refi ning an 
allocation system to address the water shortage.  They apportioned a prorated total 
supply to the various users, allowing the districts to determine when and at what 
rate to divert the apportioned amount.  Under this system, the Bureau allotted 
approximately one-eighth of the total water supply to Warren Act contractors, 
after “carefully” studying the matter of how to apportion the available water 
among them and the government project districts.  The Warren Act apportionment 
was “prorated upon their [the districts’] several contract schedules according to 
the percentage of a full reservoir supply” at Pathfi nder on May 12, 1931.”  As a 
result of the proration, each Warren Act contractor received 62.5% of the water 
in its contract schedule.  The Bureau notifi ed the project users of the allocation 
system in late June.79
 Later in the summer of 1931, Acting Chief Engineer S. O. Harper restated 
his intention to supply Warren Act irrigators in water short years.  Harper 
responded to project users’ arguments that Warren Act contractors should not 
receive any storage water until the project users received their full amounts.  He 
stated that the uncertainties inherent in the contracts “leaves the way open for the 
adoption of a policy that would not result in direct confl ict with the provisions 
of the contract and yet result in the most equitable use and distribution of the 
available water in a year like the present.”80
 While Bureau offi cials were implementing their allocation system, the 
Farmers’ Irrigation District’s earlier request to change its delivery date remained 
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pending.  In late December 1931 the Bureau’s chief engineer addressed a letter 
to all  North Platte Project water users (government projects and Warren Act 
contractors) seeking their views on the Farmers’ request.  Most of the districts 
responded by opposing Farmers’ request and raising various interpretations of 
Warren Act contracts.  Two government units—the Pathfi nder and the Goshen 
districts—contended that language in the Warren Act “preserving a fi rst right 
to lands and entrymen under the project” gave the government districts a prior 
right to project storage water over Warren Act contractors.81  Gering Irrigation 
District, a Warren Act contractor, contested that position, arguing that such an 
interpretation amounted to saying that the Warren Act “authorized the secretary 
to sell blue sky.”82  The Bureau supported Gering’s view and rejected the 
government projects’ interpretation.  Seeking an equitable distribution to all 
irrigators, Chief Engineer R. F. Walter eventually rejected Farmers’ request for a 
contract modifi cation.83
 The Bureau continued to allot a partial schedule of storage water to 
Warren Act and government project users throughout the dry years of the 1930s.84
Yet, government districts persisted with their position that they had rights to 
storage waters that were superior to Warren Act users’ rights.  Pathfi nder Irrigation 
District objected to the Bureau’s allocation system in 1934, continuing to insist 
that stored water could not be delivered under those Warren Act contracts unless 
there was “more than suffi cient to supply the project lands.”85  Commissioner 
Elwood Mead concluded that the matter probably could be settled “only by a 
court decision in a case where all parties affected will have had an opportunity 
to be heard.”86  Nebraska offi cials weighed in on the side of the Warren Act 
contractors arguing that:
No responsible person would enter into a contract if he knew that the 
rights obtained by him through such contract could be taken away 
from him at any future time.  Neither would the Nebraska Warren 
Act contractors have contracted to pay one million dollars for storage 
capacity in the Pathfi nder Reservoir if that storage capacity could be 
taken away from them for the use of any government canal that might be 
constructed in the future.87
 In 1940 Bureau offi cials again debated how to treat Warren Act contractors 
in water shortage years, tying the debate to the issue of whether the Warren 
Act districts had rights to storage water that were junior to North Platte Project 
districts.  They anticipated a water supply of about 45 percent for the 1940 
irrigation season.  District Counsel W. J. Burke initially signaled a reversal of 
the government’s position when he suggested that Warren Act users had rights to 
storage waters that were junior to the government districts.  On instruction from 
the commissioner, Burke, joined by other Bureau offi cials, drafted a new position 
paper more in line with Bureau policy.  That paper confi rmed the Bureau’s earlier 
view, as refl ected in a commissioner’s decision in 1932, that Congress did not 
intend project lands to have a priority over Warren Act lands.88  Burke and his 
co-authors proposed that Warren Act schedules for storage water be reduced 
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to a percentage of the total contract amounts, as an administrative method of 
addressing water shortages.  Warren Act contractors would receive their natural 
fl ow water as they saw fi t, with storage water being used to supplement that 
natural fl ow up to the established percentage of the total amount as refl ected in 
the individual contracts. The Bureau would apply the pre-determined percentage 
equally to Warren Act and government project contractors.  This proposal was 
accepted on a temporary basis by the secretary of the interior.89
 In accordance with this policy, storage water for the 1940 irrigation season 
was again allotted to Warren Act contractors on a prorated basis.  Rather than 
basing the amount on the relative interest that contract holders had in Pathfi nder 
Reservoir, however, the basis of the proration was now a percentage of the total 
contract schedule, which had been determined to be 41 percent of the amount in 
the contracts with the government.90  Farmers’ Irrigation District protested the 
method of allocation for 1940 claiming that it improperly deprived the district of 
storage water from Pathfi nder.91  In 1941 water again was allotted to Warren Act 
contractors based on a percentage of the total contract amount, which in 1941 
was 68 percent of the schedule.  There were no water shortages during the years 
1942-1944 and Warren Act contractors had their full contract amounts available to 
them.
 The protests of Farmers’ Irrigation District and others to the Bureau 
of Reclamation’s water allocation system did not end with verbal or written 
exchanges.  Beginning in the mid-1930s, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Warren 
Act contractors, and the States of Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado were 
involved in legal action seeking answers to questions that were fundamental to the 
operation of the North Platte Project.  Although neither of the two principal cases 
(United States v. Tilley,  et al. and Nebraska v. Wyoming) specifi cally addressed 
the nature of Warren Act contracts, the courts’ conclusions forced the Bureau to 
incorporate new factors in its water delivery method.
 The issue of whether Warren Act contractors had transferred or assigned 
their natural fl ow rights to the United States in exchange for their Warren Act 
contract rights was before the court in the case of United States v. Tilley, et al.
Establishment of the Northport Unit in 1915 required an agreement with Warren 
Act contractor Farmers’ Irrigation District’s predecessor, Tri-State Land Company 
to carry 250 cfs through its canal to the government project.  The Bureau 
negotiated this agreement and Farmers’ complied with it until the drouth year 
of 1936, when Farmers’ failed to deliver suffi cient fl ow downstream to Northport.  
The Bureau took the position that the Warren Act contractors had assigned their 
appropriative rights to the United States, and that this water was available to the 
United States for storage and delivery back to the contractors.  The Bureau of 
Reclamation protested Farmers’ action, but failed to deter the irrigation district.  The 
State of Nebraska appealed the Bureau’s interpretation of the Warren Act contract 
to the secretary of the interior, arguing that Nebraska’s water rights could not be 
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legally assigned to the United States or any other entity.  In a June 1937 decision, the 
secretary found in favor of the Bureau and against Nebraska.92
 The issue eventually ended up in federal court in Nebraska, when the United 
States sought injunctive relief against Nebraska and Farmers.  The district court 
ruled in 1938 that a Warren Act contractor did not convey its natural fl ow rights 
to the United States under its Warren Act contract.93  The case was appealed to 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which, in 1941, also held that a Warren Act 
contractor’s appropriative rights did not transfer to the United States.  The circuit 
court reasoned that the language in Article XI of the Tri-State contract “does not on 
its face purport to transfer anything directly to the United States.”94
 The Tilley decision forced the Bureau to reconsider the validity of its 
allotment provisions for water short years.  Specifi cally, the Bureau questioned the 
propriety of restricting natural fl ow diversions to the contract schedules and using 
a percentage of the contract amount as the basis for water allotments to Warren Act 
contractors in water short years.  The Bureau interpreted the decision as requiring it 
to adopt a policy of supplementing natural fl ow water with storage water up to the 
amount of water provided for in the delivery schedule in the Warren Act contracts at 
any given time.  From its reading of the Tilley case, the Bureau determined that the 
1940 method of allocation for water-short years, based on contract schedules alone, 
could not be used as a basis for a water allotment.95  Prior to the decision in Tilley,
the Bureau apportioned natural fl ow and storage water.  After Tilley, the agency 
revised its procedures to apportion only storage water in the North Platte River 
system.
 The Supreme Court in its initial decision in  Nebraska v. Wyoming (1945) 
also briefl y addressed the Warren Act when it spoke about “surplus water.”96  In 
that litigation, the United States argued its long held position that a determination 
that there was surplus storage water available for use by Warren Act users was 
made prior to entering the Warren Act contracts.  The United States contended that 
“surplus water” was “storage water in excess of that believed to be needed for the 
North Platte Project as then constructed and as proposed for extension.…”97  The 
opinion and decree that resulted from the original Nebraska v. Wyoming litigation 
addressed only the interstate apportionment of the natural fl ow of the North 
Platte River.98 Nonetheless, the court stated that storage water “should be left 
for distribution in accordance with the contracts which govern it,” and generally 
acknowledged that the contracts were to be honored, including in times of low water 
supply.99  The court also considered the management issues facing the Bureau and 
confi rmed that a pro rata distribution among contractors was appropriate.  In its 
opinion, the court recognized “the nature of the problem of apportionment and the 
delicate adjustment of interests which must be made.”100
 The Bureau’s system for delivering water since 1945 has recognized the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncements in the Tilley and the Nebraska v. Wyoming
decisions.101  In making adjustments to its allocations, the Bureau continued to 
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maintain the same essential delivery system that it had established during the fi rst 
year of water shortage, whereby it delivered pro rata shares of all contractors’ 
water.  During water short years, the Bureau designed and implemented an 
equitable method of ensuring that the four North Platte Project districts and the 
nine Warren Act districts all received a portion of their full amounts of water. But, 
following these decisions, Bureau offi cials also were more fl exible with Warren 
Act and government unit contractors.
 In 1954 the Bureau established a water allocation system when the 
storage water reached its maximum.  The stated purpose of setting up the system 
of allotment was to “allow both the Warren Act contractors and the Project 
districts to participate in the storage with benefi ts to both groups.”  The advantage 
described for the Warren Act contractors was that it gave them “an opportunity 
to receive storage at a later date in lieu of natural fl ow.”  The advantage to the 
projects was that they would be able to “participate indirectly in the natural fl ows 
and thus supplement their storage during the entire season.”102  The formula 
used to compute allocations included documentation and averaging of previous 
years’ storage water and diversions.  After making adjustments for credits and 
improvements, Bureau offi cials determined the amounts for each of the thirteen 
districts.103  The formula established for computing the water allotments for all of 
the districts was developed by Peter Anker, Chief of the North Platte Irrigation 
Operations, and has continued to be used since the 1950s.
Conclusion
 Existing private irrigators within planned federal reclamation projects at 
the turn of the century recognized the value of partnering with the public projects 
in providing an adequate and dependable water supply from the North Platte 
River.  Following passage of the Reclamation Act in 1902 and authorization 
for the North Platte Project less than one year later, irrigation companies along 
the river in Wyoming and Nebraska quickly moved to ensure their place in the 
reclamation plan.  Passage of the Warren Act in 1911 confi rmed the importance 
that Congress placed on responding to these needs and to garnering broad support 
for ambitious projects like the one planned for the North Platte River.  It was left 
to the Bureau of Reclamation, however, to devise a mechanism to incorporate 
these private companies into the public project and, at the same time, not diminish 
the importance of reclaiming public lands for a new generation of farmers.
 During the fall and summer of 1911, Interior offi cials faced the problem 
of reconciling the needs of potential Warren Act contractors for “surplus water” 
with expectations for the ultimate size of the North Platte Project.  They reached 
an accommodation by 1) negotiating contracts for a permanent supply of storage 
water for Warren Act irrigators; 2) reconfi guring the remainder of the project 
to meet the needs of all irrigators; and 3) placing a “cap” on the total amount 
of water that would be delivered to Warren Act contractors.  This approach 
satisfi ed the needs of all parties until the water short years of the 1930s.  Faced 
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with the prospect of diminished supplies throughout the system, the Bureau 
of Reclamation allocated water on an equitable basis both to government and 
Warren Act districts.  Although both government and private irrigation districts 
complained about the system of allocation, and eventually fi led lawsuits to stop 
or alter it, the Bureau continued to use the approach while refi ning the methods 
of calculation.  To have done otherwise would have jeopardized the tripartite 
relationship between the Bureau of Reclamation, the government districts, and 
the Warren Act contractors. To not provide the Warren Act contractors with a 
permanent water supply would have been to admit that the United States had sold 
them “blue sky.”
Alan S. Newell is the founder of and a Senior Associate Historian with 
Historical Research Associates, Inc., in Missoula, Montana.  He is active in and 
past-president of the National Council on Public History.
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The Path Not Taken: The Development Company 
of America’s Hudson Reservoir Project, Arizona 
Territory, 1898-1902
By:
Robert L. Spude
 During the early summer of 1900, a group of businessmen held 
clandestine meetings over lunch or in private offi ces in New York City to discuss 
the building of the nation’s highest dam and creation of a thirty-three square mile 
reservoir.  Among them was  Elton Hooker, the chief engineer of New York state’s 
Public Works and a just returned member of the U.S. investigatory commission 
that studied the possibility of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama.  Ex-Secretary 
of War  Russell Alger, soon to be Senator from Michigan, was in attendance 
as was  Henry M. Robinson, New York City corporate lawyer and player in 
the consolidation then underway to create U.S. Steel, the fi rst billion dollar 
corporation.  Two westerners, Governor  Oakes Murphy of Arizona Territory and 
his brother  Frank, a rising fi nancier of the territory’s mines and railroads, brought 
the group together to negotiate with Henry Man, of Man & Man, New York City 
lawyers, and possessors of the right to build a dam on the Salt River upstream 
from Phoenix.
 The editor of the Arizona Republican, the Phoenix newspaper, shadowed 
the group in New York and leaked the story.1  It appeared that the long-awaited 
storage dam and reservoir to ease all water shortages in the Salt River Valley were 
to be built, if, the editor asked, the citizens would agree to supply a $500,000 
bonding subsidy.  In the months following, two factions in the Salt River Valley 
soon coalesced, one supportive of the private project, another demanding that the 
federal government take charge of the site and build the dam.2
 Instead of supporting the Murphy brothers, the other group in Phoenix 
accused the governor and his brother of trying to bilk taxpayers of $500,000 
and defraud the Salt River Valley’s residents.  For the next two years the two 
factions clashed, one pro-Murphy and private enterprise, the other in opposition 
and pro-federal control.  Today, the tale of the passage of the Newlands Act in 
1902 and the federal construction of Roosevelt Dam at the site on the Salt River, 
1903-1911, is well known.  What is left out is the other group, the proponents of 
corporate dam building projects, of the path not taken.3
 The leading promoters of the private project were the Murphy brothers, 
Frank and Nathan Oakes.  Born in Maine, but raised in the lumber camps of 
Wisconsin, the two men followed separate paths West, sometimes together 
in Kansas or California, sometimes not.  In December 1877 Frank moved 
to Prescott, Arizona Territory.  After a period of varied jobs—stage driver, 
haberdashery clerk, scribe for the territorial legislature—Frank found his calling 
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as a mine promoter.  In 1883, his older brother Nathan Oakes Murphy, always 
known as Oakes, joined him in Prescott.4
 Oakes had taught school, served in the military, then joined his brother 
in the fi rm of F. M. Murphy & Brother.  One of the properties they acquired was 
the hydraulic gold mining operation along Lynx Creek, ten miles east of Prescott.  
Hydraulic mining used a stream of water to cut down stream banks, which then 
fl owed into sluice boxes where the gold nuggets and fl akes were washed out of 
the gravels.  In the late 1880s, F. M. Murphy & Bro. operated their diversion dam, 
fl ume, and hydraulic nozzles during the high water of each spring.5
 As others have pointed out, the basics of western water law came from 
the experience of hydraulic miners in the placer gold mining regions of Colorado 
and California.  The experience at the Lynx Creek hydraulics would be used by 
Oakes, in training to be a mining lawyer and in his later irrigation views.  He 
also understood the engineering basics as evidenced in his promotional pamphlet 
printed ca. 1889 in an effort to sell the mines.  A British company, the Lynx Creek 
Gold & Land Co., Ltd., bought the property, built a sixty foot dam, cleared a 
storage reservoir site, and by 1891 began working the Arizona gold fi elds.  By 
then Oakes had taken his profi ts and moved to Phoenix.6
 Oakes had become active in Republican politics and rose through various 
appointed positions, fi rst as personal secretary to the governor, then secretary of 
the territory, similar to a lieutenant governor today, and then, fi nally, governor 
in his own right in 1892.  Forced to move to Phoenix with the removal of the 
territorial capital from Prescott, Oakes soon became a leader in the growing 
agricultural community in the Salt River Valley.7
 Phoenix had risen upon the ruins of the prehistoric Hohokam peoples’ 
homes and irrigation system.  After 1867 a series of ever larger and longer ditches 
and canals supported the new farms and ranches along the Salt River.  Phoenix 
became a territorial trade and political center, especially with the arrival of the 
capital in 1889.  The 1890 census takers counted 3,152 residents.8  When Oakes 
arrived in the small town, the city fathers had been working to build a railroad 
connecting the northern and southern parts of the territory via Phoenix.  He 
organized a company, ushered through a twenty year tax exemption from the 
territorial legislature, and ceremoniously broke ground for the  Santa Fe, Prescott, 
& Phoenix Railroad.  Because of his gubernatorial duties, he passed the leadership 
of the project to his brother Frank, who completed the line to Phoenix between 
1892 and February 1895.  Wealthy investors from Chicago and Detroit, backing 
the Murphy brothers’ railroad, also invested in Salt River Valley canal companies 
and land.9
 During the 1890s the water diverted from the Salt River did not meet 
demands of boosters and land speculators, especially during drought years.
Oakes Murphy became a leader in the political debate over water and irrigation, 
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especially governmental support.  At the 1892 National Republican Convention, 
Oakes was able to have included as part of that major party’s platform the fi rst 
call for federal support of private irrigation projects.10
 In 1894 Oakes ran for and was elected to the U.S. Congress as Arizona 
Territory’s delegate or non-voting member, and again pushed for support for 
irrigation projects in the territories.  During his tenure as a member of the U.S. 
Congress, Phoenix hosted the National Irrigation Congress, one with many ideas 
but dominated by disputing factions and many resolutions.  Murphy pushed for 
the cession of lands for irrigation projects, in line with the 1894 Carey Act.11
  When Oakes left offi ce in 1897, he turned to developing a resort 
and opening a land offi ce in the Adams Hotel, Phoenix.  Among the investors 
who had backed the Santa Fe, Prescott & Phoenix Railroad were some of the 
nation’s most prominent businessmen, who now invested in his new projects.  
These investors included Dexter M. Ferry and C. C. Bowen of Detroit, the 
nation’s largest seed producers.  Through a fi eld man, Dr. Alexander J. Chandler, 
they had bought Salt River Valley lands and built a major canal.   Simon Murphy, 
a millionaire timber man from Detroit and “uncle” of Frank and Oakes, also 
invested in Salt River Valley lands, and supported the canal and land promotions 
of the Ferry and Bowen crowd through Simon’s ranch manager A. C. McQueen.12
 Included in the group of Detroit men was Russell Alger, another 
millionaire timber man.  Alger had been a one-time candidate for U.S. President, 
but relinquished his bid to aid the Republicans and elect Benjamin Harrison.
Eight years later, as payback, President William McKinley appointed Alger as 
his Secretary of War.  Alger provided access to the White House for the Murphy 
brothers, and, in 1898, helped  Oakes Murphy receive a second appointment as 
governor of Arizona.13
 Upon his return to offi ce Governor Murphy joined other residents in 
stating that the biggest need in the Salt River Valley was a means to store 
enough water to ensure that a steady stream could be provided for the expanding 
farmlands.  He spoke at national arid lands meetings, raised awareness within the 
federal government, and sought incentives to assist private enterprise.  By 1898 
too, he, with his brother Frank, looked at ways to take over the company owning 
the best dam and reservoir site along the Salt River, the foundering  Hudson 
Reservoir & Canal Company.14
 Some sixty air miles east of Phoenix, the Salt River fl ows from a broad 
twenty-six mile wide valley into a narrow canyon barely two hundred feet across, 
an ideal water storage dam site.  An 1889 visit by a Senatorial committee to 
Phoenix spurred the fi nding and description of the dam site, followed by a savvy 
New York lawyer who lay claim to it under the revised 1891 Federal land laws.  
In 1893 Wells Hendershott organized the Hudson Company Reservoir & Canal 
Company to build the dam and create a reservoir estimated, at fi rst, at eighteen 
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square miles.  U.S. Senator  John Martin of Kansas became president and secured 
the company’s claim from the federal land offi ce.15
 However, 1893 was the worst time in the nineteenth century to promote 
new ventures.  Across the nation railroads, banks, and canal companies went 
bankrupt as the country entered a depression that lasted from 1893 to 1897.
Hendershott, a tall handsome promoter with personality, raised only $3,900.   Sims 
Ely, secretary for Senator Martin, recalled that Hendershott had borrowed from 
the New York City law fi rm of Man & Man in order to keep an offi ce open in 
Phoenix, take water measurements, and do minimal engineering assessments for 
the Hudson Company.  The amount of capital needed—the Hudson Company 
had estimated $2.5 million—was beyond the reach of the Salt River Valley 
fi nancial world at that time.  Overextended, Hendershott transferred his control 
of the company to the Man brothers, particularly Henry Man.  Sims Ely moved to 
Phoenix in 1895 as manager for the company.16
 The company received a boost two years later when the U.S. Geological 
Survey published a report that confi rmed that the site was the best along the 
river—indeed, was one of the best sites for a reservoir and storage dam in the 
West.  That year Frank Murphy with Dr. Chandler visited the Hudson site.  In 
addition, Sims Ely, Hudson Company manager, became part-time reporter for 
Frank Murphy’s Arizona Republican newspaper.  The following spring of 1898, 
Ely also became personal secretary to Governor Murphy.17
 In his fi rst report as governor, Oakes Murphy outlined in optimistic terms 
the products of the Salt River Valley, but added that without the Hudson Reservoir 
the limit of water for irrigation had been reached.  His report also contains a 
lengthy description of the potential of the Hudson Company project, written as 
a promotional tract by secretary Ely.  It stated “the further development of water 
supply is, therefore, one of the most absorbing problems with which the people of 
this Territory have to deal with.”18
 The Governor proposed several legislative initiatives to help build the 
dam, which was to remain a private enterprise.  The territory should be given 
federal lands which it could then sell and use the revenues for irrigation projects.
Also, the dam project should receive subsidies like railroad projects had, 
including tax breaks and county or territorial bonds.  Frank Murphy had been in 
Washington asking Congress to allow the territory to issue gold bonds for public 
improvement projects, including water systems.  He also boasted to a New York 
Times reporter that Arizona oranges could reach eastern markets two days ahead 
of those grown in California.19
 Frank was the key to raising capital to build the dam.  Ferry, Bowen, 
Simon Murphy, and Alger all helped back Frank Murphy’s Santa Fe, Prescott & 
Phoenix Railroad.  These men owned large tracts of land southeast of Phoenix.  
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They also pushed for a railroad extension to these undeveloped farmlands.  The 
railroad could also support the dam building effort.20
 In 1900 Frank Murphy and his partners owned the territory’s richest gold 
mine, were consolidating its richest silver mining district, and held one of its most 
profi table railroads.  They also owned newspapers, banks, mercantile, and other 
support business.21  Imitating others, they began discussing the formation of a 
large holding company, ultimately called the  Development Company of America 
(DCA), to transfer their operating companies to and then seek other opportunities 
for investment.  The DCA would investigate new business proposals and, when 
one had promise, undertake its initial fi nancial support by setting up an operating 
company.  They would control the operating company by holding half its stock 
and bonds, but selling shares and mortgage bonds to the general investing public 
to raise funds.  The Hudson dam project was an obvious choice for the group.22
 The meeting in New York City in the summer of 1900 was followed 
by the drafting of the proposed company’s documents.  George W. Kretzinger, 
Chicago attorney and a director of Murphy’s railroad and investor in Arizona 
mines, described the best way to organize the company.  The Hudson Company 
was to be taken over by a new corporate entity, all the canals in the valley were 
to be acquired, the canals were to be improved and extended, all water franchises 
acquired, and the operation of an electric power system begun.  This company 
would be controlled by a holding company, the Development Company of 
America (DCA).23
 The DCA would be presided over by Frank Murphy.  Engineer Elton 
Hooker would serve as vice president and general manager; he also represented 
his father-in-law Dexter Ferry.  Making up the rest of the holding company 
directorate would be Senator Alger of Michigan; New York City lawyer Henry 
M. Robinson; N. K. Fairbank, Chicago grain and fl our millionaire; Benjamin P. 
Cheney, representing the Santa Fe railroad and a Boston millionaire; Clement 
A. Griscom, Philadelphia shipping magnate; Eliphalet B. Gage, president of 
the Phoenix National Bank, Tempe Land Co., and the Tombstone Consolidated 
Mines Co., Ltd.; and seven other directors.  Each had holdings in Arizona, were 
participants in earlier Murphy projects, and controlled wealth in their own fi elds.24
 More importantly, while they were discussing possible projects in Arizona, 
they were ready to come into massive amounts of investment funds.  Robinson 
was negotiating for steel and coal men in Michigan and Ohio with banker J. P. 
Morgan, who would buy them out to form U.S. Steel in 1901.  At the same time, 
Frank Murphy was negotiating the sale of the Santa Fe, Prescott & Phoenix 
Railroad to the Santa Fe Railway for a reported three million, consummated 
in October 1901.  These funds would be directed through the DCA to Arizona 
projects.25
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 The fi rm of Man & Man stood as ready and willing sellers of the Hudson 
project.  Man & Man had continued to hold claim to the site and had funded Sims 
Ely, its Phoenix agent, to monitor water fl ow, collect statistics, and to work with 
local canal companies to ensure, if built, there would be water for all.  In 1899 he 
had arranged an agreement with the canal companies that ensured certain water 
levels and levels of profi t for the Hudson Company.26
 The canals on the south side of the river, controlled by the Michigan 
group, would come into the new DCA operating company.  Murphy was 
discussing cooperation with lawyer W. B. Cleary, manager of the New York 
controlled Arizona Water Company, owners of the Arizona, Grand, Maricopa, 
and Salt River canals, all the major canals north of the river.  Also in support 
was Moses H. Sherman, now of Los Angeles, but major owner of the Phoenix 
municipal water and electric power system, trolley line, and an extensive land 
owner.27
 Governor Oakes Murphy pushed the territorial legislature to pass a 
tax break of 15 years for new reservoir projects and then began pushing for a 
bond package of up to $2 million.  During 1900-1901, various backers of the 
consolidation and holding company visited Phoenix.  Senator Alger visited as 
did others including Chicagoan Marshall Field, backer of Murphy’s railroad and 
one of the ten richest Americans of all time.  Most importantly, in May 1901, 
President William McKinley visited Phoenix and the Congress gold mine, owned 
by Frank Murphy’s group.  McKinley made quips about Arizonans backing the 
gold standard, but, unstated, he supported his governor and his pro-business 
political attitude.28
 During fall 1901 the fi nishing touches on organizing the  Development 
Company of America were completed, and the initiation of construction of 
the Phoenix & Eastern Railroad began.  The railroad would support valley 
communities and the dam construction.  Papers were drawn to transfer the Hudson 
Company to the DCA.  DCA vice president and engineer Elton Hooker readied 
himself to take charge of the DCA’s many projects, including building the nation’s 
largest dam.  Construction engineer F. S. Washburn of Tennessee, expert in water 
control systems, joined DCA.29
 As Oakes Murphy pushed for bonding legislation and Frank Murphy 
drafted papers for the organization of a strong operating company, advocates 
of federal irrigation continued to oppose private projects.  Fate would be on 
their side.  Outspoken leader of the group  George Maxwell, a California lawyer 
specializing in water and irrigation law, was adamantly opposed to private sector 
involvement.  The residents of Phoenix were of mixed minds; some, when 
meeting with Maxwell, followed his lead.  Just as easily, when meeting with 
the Murphys, the same groups backed the Murphys’ program of bonds and tax 
support for private projects.  The name calling, begun in the summer of 1900 
when the Murphys’ newspaper fi rst announced the plan, had died down—one 
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can speculate that this abusive rhetoric was part of a political attack on Oakes 
Murphy, then the Republican candidate for Delegate to Congress (he lost).  But 
the desire for public ownership and control continued to grow.30
 In 1901 events took a decided turn.  In September 1901 President 
McKinley was assassinated and Vice President  Theodore Roosevelt took offi ce.  
Unfortunate for the old guard, including Oakes Murphy, their access to the White 
House closed (Roosevelt had been a major critic of Secretary of War Alger 
during the Spanish-American War).  In his fi rst message to Congress, December 
1901, Roosevelt also became a friend to federal irrigation project proponents by 
including a strong pro-federal reclamation statement and concluding that such 
projects were “too vast for private effort.”  The president’s speech was followed 
by resolutions and outpourings of popular western support of a federal program.31
 At that time, Frank Murphy wrote to a business partner,
I have about made up my mind there is not much use trying to organize 
a local company on the lines we discussed, as I am inclined to believe 
we would fi nd great diffi culty in placing the securities of a reservoir 
company if controlled by local infl uences.  I am about convinced that 
if the water consumers and tax payers are not willing to let a private 
enterprise take hold of the reservoir proposition on a fair basis, the next 
best thing for them to do is to get authority to issue their county bonds 
for enough money to construct the dam …32
 As the Maxwell contingent gained access to the White House through 
Roosevelt’s friend Gifford Pinchot, Governor  Murphy was rapidly falling out of 
favor.  Oakes met his new boss at the Grand Canyon April 6, 1902, and announced 
his resignation the next day.  In a letter to a friend two weeks earlier, Governor 
Murphy had written that he would be relieved to quit the “very unprofi table and 
thankless offi ce.”33
 The Murphys continued to push for support of the bond issue for the 
reservoir project.  In May 1902 Frank met with some 300 business leaders in 
the Adams Hotel, Phoenix, asking their support for bonding their county for $1 
million in order to get the reservoir built.  At the same time, Governor Murphy, 
not offi cially out of offi ce until July, was in Washington as part of a lobbying 
effort to infl uence reclamation legislation.  The group worked with Senator 
Francis Warren of Wyoming for a reclamation bill friendly to the territory, 
especially its businessmen.  Unfortunately, Senator Warren left suddenly because 
of his wife’s death, and Oakes Murphy wired Phoenix that there would be no 
passage of the bond bill—it would not even make it to the fl oor of the House.34
 As we know today, another group, led by George Maxwell, inserted 
instead the legislation introduced by Francis Newlands, Representative from 
Nevada, which passed June 17, 1902.  At the last minute the initial proposal to 
provide support for only undeveloped federal lands was changed to allow for 
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aiding private lands.  As Karen Smith wrote, with this change, Salt River Valley 
land speculators “saw their land turn golden.”35
 With the passage 
of the Newlands Act, if not 
before, the  Development 
Company of America halted 
the Hudson Dam project, 
a project later completed 
by the U. S. Reclamation 
Service as the  Roosevelt 
Dam.  Elton Hooker left in 
the fall of 1902 to become 
a leader in chemical 
manufacturing.  The 
Murphy brothers continued 
to promote land deals in the 
valley, Oakes opening an 
offi ce in the Adams Hotel.  He profi ted from his speculations, sailed to Europe, 
and died in 1908 at the Coronado Hotel in San Diego.36
 Frank Murphy and the DCA turned primarily to mining and operated some 
of the territory’s largest mines.  Unfortunately, the holding company’s Tombstone 
Consolidated Mines, Ltd., hit an underground river equivalent to the fl ow of the 
Salt River and spent $8 million trying to pump the mines dry.  The fi rm lost nearly 
as much as the Roosevelt dam would cost in the unsuccessful attempt and closed 
operations in 1911, the year Theodore Roosevelt dedicated his namesake dam.37
 The different tracks followed by the Murphys from the well known 
triumphal story of the events leading to the passage of the Newlands Act and the 
construction of Roosevelt Dam brings up the question, could private industry have 
built and profi ted from the project?  Were 90% of canal and irrigation companies 
in fi nancial straits in the 1890s, as proponents of the federal act claimed?  
Evidence suggests that proponents of federal reclamation over-stated the crisis 
of the time.  They claimed that not enough capital existed to build such works.  
Obviously, the Development Company of America had the funds.
 The muckraking critics of the era pointed to the government’s Roosevelt 
Dam project as being a scandal, called Uncle Sam a lawbreaker.  The government 
by its lax regulation of land laws, one muckraker wrote, had encouraged 
fraudulent irrigation of thousands of acres of the public domain held by Dr. 
Chandler and his backers, when the water was to aid small farmers and owners 
of 160 acres or less.  Further accusations were aimed at giveaway electricity.  
The Reclamation Service’s contracts with Pacifi c Gas & Electric, heir of Moses 
Sherman, Murphy and other investors’ Phoenix Light & Water Company, the 
muckraking critic pointed out, were scandalously low priced.38
13.1.  This 1909 Phoenix orange grove is typical of the 
agriculture local farmers expected to be able to support 
with water from the Salt River Project.
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 Finally, Man & Man, through Sims Ely and ex-Governor Murphy, gained 
less than they hoped but their rights were bought out for a profi table $40,000.  The 
New York, Michigan, and Chicago investors also made money in selling their 
canal companies to the government.  In short, the Murphys and their friends were 
not hurt by the passage of the Newlands Act.39
 The Development Company of America’s Hudson Reservoir project 
fi t well into the politics-as-handmaiden-of-business outlook of the William 
McKinley era of the 1890s.  But, like many such projects, it was never undertaken 
by private enterprise.  Instead, Teddy Roosevelt and the progressives brought new 
ideas and legislation, and for the West, irrigation projects beyond the imagination 
of any nineteenth century empire builder.
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Irrigation and Early Hydropower Development in the 
Salt River Valley
By:
Stephen Sloan
Abstract
Water and power have always had an intricate relationship 
throughout the modern history of the American West.  The limited 
availability of reliable sources for irrigation and accessible traditional 
means of energy production led residents of Arizona’s Salt River Valley 
to take extreme measures to guarantee water and power.  Without the 
development of these two resources in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, the post World War II boom in central Arizona would have 
remained an impossibility.
 Experiments with hydropower development in western U.S. 
reclamation projects at the turn of the century provided a glimpse of the 
dividends water storage could offer in energy production and revenues.  In 
the Salt River Valley, the success of early power generating plants on the 
canal system and at Roosevelt Dam led developers to seek an expansion 
of reservoir capacity and hydropower generation.  As a result, the  Salt 
River Project constructed three dams below Roosevelt and above the 
canal diversion dam at Granite Reef.  Through the operation of generating 
stations at these sites, the Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association sought 
a rapid and signifi cant increase in power revenues to fuel further project 
expansion and ease governmental debt.
 In the case of the Salt River Valley, however, the goals of 
hydropower generation and effi cient irrigation were divergent during 
periods of the 1920s and 1930s.  In times of drought, farmers often 
demanded additional water to be released from dams on the upper Salt to 
water their fi elds.  When requests went unheeded, many of the farmers 
claimed that SRP was holding water to be used for power generation, which 
provided much higher revenues than irrigation.  Farmers’ organizations 
argued that the project was catering to power buyers rather than focusing 
on their primary mission, providing a reliable and suffi cient water supply 
for irrigation.  Until the development of additional reservoirs and the 
implementation of pump storage technology, times of drought renewed the 
underlying tensions between hydropower and irrigation.
 Although much has been written on water in the West, the 
relationship between western irrigation and hydropower is a topic often 
neglected.  Focusing on the decades of the 1920s and 1930s, the paper 
reveals how the character of a project changes when irrigation and 
generation not only coexist, but compete.  Such a study offers needed 
insight into not only the history of the Bureau of Reclamation, but reveals 
much about the nature of the twentieth-century arid West.
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 Water and power have always had an intricate relationship in the history of 
the American West.  These two elements were the cornerstone for the creation of 
modern Arizona and the Salt River Valley.  Without the development of each of these 
resources in the early twentieth century, the reality of the post World War II Valley 
boom would have remained an impossibility.
 Aridity, according to many western scholars, is the defi ning characteristic of 
the American West.  For early residents of the Valley in the late nineteenth century, 
aridity represented a primary obstacle to permanent settlement.  The Salt River, the 
major water source for central Arizona, varied in fl ow from raging torrent to a small 
stream.  Early settlers, such as the Swilling party, based the fi rst recorded attempts 
to irrigate the fl atlands along the Salt River upon a system of irrigation ditches 
constructed by prehistoric Valley residents.  The  Hohokam left a legacy of 600 to 
700 miles of primary irrigation canals and laterals.  Many of these ditches became 
the foundation for the modern network of Valley waterways.1  Like the Hohokam, 
modern settlers began damming, diverting, and ditching the Salt to make the most 
effi cient use of limited water resources.
 As the population grew and more irrigation enterprises depended on the 
erratic fl ow of the Salt, better control over the water supply became a necessity.  
Farmers along the river witnessed cycles of fl ood and drought that compromised 
their ability to prosper.  Flood meant not only damage to crops, but, more 
importantly, was seen as a waste of valuable river water.  Drought brought confl ict 
over water rights and dramatic drops in farm production.  A solution to the problems 
of fl ood and drought required a comprehensive irrigation plan for reducing loss 
and increasing supply.  An answer to the question of how to develop the irrigation 
resources of the Valley came with the passage of the federal Reclamation Act 
of 1902.  The act allowed funding for the construction of Roosevelt Dam at the 
confl uence of the Salt River and Tonto Creek, seventy-seven miles east of Phoenix.  
The dam impounded fl oodwaters for agricultural use during dry years and served as 
the keystone of the new irrigation system.  With creation of the Salt River Project, 
local farmers had hope that triumph over the obstacle of aridity was close at hand.
 Along with the challenge aridity presented in much of the West, western 
power generation development was an equally formidable task.  In the Salt River 
Valley, the inaccessibility of traditional power sources, such as timber and coal 
deposits, caused developers to look for alternatives for energy.  Steam plants 
that used fuel oil to operate boilers provided an early, yet expensive, alternative.  
The development of western U.S. reclamation projects provided glimpses of the 
dividends that water storage could provide in energy production and revenues.  
The fi rst reclamation projects, including the  Salt River Project, used hydroelectric 
power in the construction of irrigation features.  As Bureau of Reclamation Director 
Elwood Mead would later note, the earlier government effort made “extensive use 
of the opportunities which existed on many mountain streams, to cheapen the cost of 
excavating canals by employing hydroelectric power to displace coal and gasoline, 
horses and mules.”2
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 Soon after planning began 
for Roosevelt Dam construction, 
reclamation engineers realized 
that hydropower could provide 
the most reliable and effi cient 
source of energy for construction.  
Developers noted that the energy 
produced at Roosevelt could not 
only be used for construction, 
but also wholesaled to the nearby 
Globe area mines, sent to the 
Valley as power for pumping, 
or transmitted to Phoenix as a 
municipal energy source.3  The 
hydroelectric units installed at 
Roosevelt started the  Salt River 
Project in the power business 
and created the fi rst multipurpose 
project under the Reclamation Act.
 As the Bureau of Reclamation continued to develop irrigation features 
throughout the Valley, the work at Granite Reef Diversion Dam and along the 
canal system required a new network of transmission lines to power construction 
and excavation equipment.  The lines erected during this period would later form 
the main distribution system reaching out to all corners of the Valley.4  The water 
distribution network thus determined the structure of the early power grid for the 
valley.  As work continued, additional hydropower plants were created along the 
canal system to supplement the primary generation at Roosevelt.
 In 1917, U.S. Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane insisted that the project 
cease to be federally operated and that control be turned over to the landowners.  He 
argued that government paternalism had no place in such a local concern.  Although 
many local representatives were hesitant about the change, Karen Smith argues 
that one of the factors that led them to agreement was a recent “reinterpretation of 
reclamation policy which allowed profi ts from the sale of power to be used in any 
way the water users wanted.”5
 The prospect of future hydropower development was an important factor 
in rallying local support for the Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association’s 
assumption of project control.  The revenues created by hydropower sales could be 
used by the Association to pay off government debt and subsidize the cost of water 
storage and transmission.  Although plans for expanded power production were not 
yet widely considered, the revenues being generated by the power production system 
in place indicated the profi t potential that might be available from an expanded 
system.
14.1.  Roosevelt Dam and Powerhouse in August of 
1909.
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 In 1917, the generation 
system included the Roosevelt 
units and four small hydro plants 
in the canal system.  The principal 
power development of the project 
remained at Roosevelt, where the 
Association operated a generating 
station with an installed capacity 
of 16,000-horsepower.  The 
Association, in accordance 
with a 1910 contract with the 
government, created the four 
smaller plants, Crosscut, South 
Con, Arizona Falls, and Chandler. 
Built in 1914 at the junction 
of the New Arizona Crosscut and the extension of the Grand Canal, the Crosscut 
hydro-plant was the closest generating station to metropolitan Phoenix.  The South 
Con, built in 1910, served as a generating station at the junction of the Eastern 
and Consolidated Canals, a few miles below Granite Reef diversion dam.  Arizona 
Falls, an older facility on the Arizona Canal, was fi tted with two hydroelectric units 
in 1912.  Originally a steam plant, the Chandler Power Plant was converted to 
hydropower around the beginning of the decade at the existing site on the Tempe 
Canal.6  All four generating stations operated on the existing canal network and did 
not involve any signifi cant retention or diversion of water that was to be used for 
irrigation.  Together with Roosevelt, the fi ve generating stations had a total capacity 
of 27,000-horsepower.7  The small network of power producing hydro-plants would 
soon prove inadequate to satisfy the growing demand for industrial and residential 
power.
 Soon after taking control of the project, the leadership of the Association 
began to realize the unique positioning of the project in relationship to power for 
Arizona.  T. A. Hayden, an Association engineer, noted that, in 1920, 80% of the 
total annual power load for the state of Arizona was “used within a radius of less 
than 100 miles of the Association=s plants; half of this load being already in touch 
with the Association=s existing transmission lines.”8  Project leadership recognized 
that a ready and accessible market needed new power sources and the unused 
hydropower potential of the Salt could provide the answer.
 One of the leading proponents for the expansion of hydropower generation 
on the  Salt River Project was  C. C. Cragin, the general superintendent and chief 
engineer of the Association in the 1920s.  Cragin, who was recently named one of 
Energy Markets Most Infl uential People in Electricity and Gas, had a bold vision 
of what the Association generation system could become with new developments.  
In a proposal for additional hydropower development submitted to the Association 
board in 1922, Cragin provided a detailed analysis of the power situation for the 
Association board.  His Report on “Proposed Additional Hydro-Electric Power 
14.2.  Granite Reef Diversion Dam in 1910.
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Development in the  Salt River” included a brief analysis of the early relationship 
between hydropower and irrigation.  In the report, the engineer acknowledged 
that the superior right to the waters of the Salt had been and should always be for 
irrigation.  Cragin argued, however, that the centrality of irrigation did not preclude 
the development of power resources.  For Cragin, the Association could no longer 
ignore the unused power potential of the Salt.  He noted that it had become “quite 
evident that large quantities of power are now going to waste while the water drawn 
from Roosevelt Reservoir, for irrigation use, drops to the lower level of the Valley.”9
 Early proponents of energy development such as Cragin recognized 
the diffi culties of matching the goals of an irrigation project and a hydropower 
generation venture.  The water movement patterns for irrigation were by no 
means ideal for power generation.  Water releases through Roosevelt and the 
canal system vary greatly throughout the year.  In summer, when the agricultural 
demand for water was high, generation capacity could exceed demand, while in 
winter electricity available plummeted with the drop in irrigation.  Any future 
development of hydropower had to deal with a heavy water fl ow for seven months 
of the year and a very light fl ow for fi ve months.  Cragin argued that the relationship 
between irrigation demand and hydropower production forced the Association to 
choose between three alternatives: contract for a variable power supply depending 
on irrigation demand, waste water for power, or build additional storage to 
regulate water releases for power purposes.10  In considering a course of action, 
the Association=s concern regarding competing power suppliers made contracting 
for variable power an unattractive alternative and wasting water went against the 
fundamental nature of the project.
 Although proponents of hydropower expansion spoke of the usefulness of 
the new power for residential and agricultural purposes, a large consideration in 
pursuing additional energy development was the potential industrial load.  Some of 
the larger enterprises in the market for additional hydropower at the time included 
the Inspiration Consolidated Copper Company, Ray Consolidated Copper Company, 
Magma Copper Company, and Southwest Cotton Company.  These fi rms represented 
potential markets for power as well as partners that could be used to help fi nance 
new developments.  As H. J. Lawson, president of the Association in the 1930s, 
would note, “the Project was most fortunately situated as regards to power 
development, being far from any other source of power or fuel supply and in a fast 
developing country with a very considerable and industrial mine load.”11
 It became evident by the early 1920s, that a new source of energy was 
required to supply the growing needs of the developing Valley.  Many members of 
the Association were of the opinion that if the Project did not provide the desired 
energy, outside interests would take advantage of the opportunity.  The introduction 
of new competitors in power production could not only have resulted in a loss of 
revenue due to lower rates and less customers, but could have caused an interference 
with the existing irrigation system.12  Additional hydropower development was 
necessary both to reach new markets and protect established ones.
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 Additional reservoir construction along the  Salt seemed to be the only 
acceptable solution for the power generation situation encountered by the 
Association.  More storage could ease the complications presented by attempting to 
generate hydropower on a system with a single dam.  With additional water storage, 
irrigation water passed through Roosevelt Dam could not only generate power and 
be captured by lower dams until needed, but also generate additional hydropower 
when passed through the lower dams.  The additional water storage would bring 
power production to an underutilized 45-mile long, 604-foot drop from Roosevelt 
Dam to Granite Reef Diversion Dam.  Once water left Roosevelt, it could be used 
for power several times before entering the canal system.  Just as waste had been an 
overriding concern in developing the irrigation system, it became a central theme in 
developing the Valley’s power resources.
 The fi rst dam constructed on the new system was built approximately 
seventeen miles below Roosevelt in a box canyon near Mormon Flat.  The 
construction of Mormon Flat Dam, 1923 to 1925, began the fundamental shift of 
the project from one devoted exclusively to irrigation to an irrigation/hydropower 
development.  According to Cragin, the value of the  Mormon Flat Dam would 
be that it “permits the generation of hydro-power during times when there is no 
irrigation draft on Roosevelt.”13  Of secondary importance, the new dam could 
stabilize the daily and weekly fl uctuations in power development at Roosevelt by 
offering additional irrigation storage downstream.
 Along with the Mormon Flat Dam, the Association constructed two 
additional storage reservoirs on the lower Salt and gated the Roosevelt spillways in 
the 1920s.   Horse Mesa, located between Mormon Flat and Roosevelt, 1924 to 1927, 
and  Stewart Mountain, constructed 1928 to 1930, completed a seven-year period of 
construction, and Stewart Mountain, built below Mormon Flat above the Granite 
Reef Diversion Dam, contributed both additional water storage and hydropower 
generation to the Project.  Manipulating the water levels at the four generating dams 
on the Salt, the Association could better maximize energy production.
 Power, which in the early days of reclamation was viewed as primarily 
for construction and pumping, was now supplied to towns, homes, cotton gins 
and mines.  As a result of the additional development, the Project increased 
the generating capacity of the hydroelectric system from 23,000-horsepower 
to 103,000-horsepower.  The gross annual power revenues escalated from 
approximately $500,000 annually to yearly revenue of nearly $2,500,000.14  The 
additional revenue proved important in many ways: to subsidize water delivery 
costs, to pay portions of the expansion costs, and to repay government debt.  As 
Association President H. J. Lawson would later note, “the only reason why the Salt 
River Project has been able to meet its obligations to the government can be given in 
one word—power.”15
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 The expansion of the power system increased the electricity available to both 
the urban and rural areas of the Salt River Valley.  For the Salt River Valley farmer, 
the benefi ts provided by the new development were many.  By 1930 2,000 farms had 
electricity with approximately fi fty new connections per week.  Power was used not 
only for pumping, but for “cooking ranges, water heaters, ensilage cutters, milking 
machines, cream separators, feed grinders, incubators, brooders and a host of other 
farm appliances.”16  Advertisements for the latest in home electrical appliances were 
prevalent in local newspapers as retailers claimed the ways in which new products, 
such as the vacuum cleaner and the washing machine, could lessen manual work and 
improve the quality of life in the Valley.
 Despite the gains in rural electrifi cation realized through the expansion of 
the hydropower system, some argued that the irrigation/hydropower relationship 
remained strained.  The dual objectives of maximizing hydropower generation 
and effi ciently providing irrigation were often at cross-purposes.  Although the 
development of additional storage below Roosevelt Dam was proposed as a way to 
reconcile the variant goals of irrigation and hydropower, the expansion served to 
increase the tension within the relationship by raising the importance of hydropower 
to the Project.
 In a 1932 journal article in the American Society of Civil Engineers Papers,
C. C. Cragin refl ected on the dynamics of developing hydropower on an irrigation 
project.  He noted three fundamental restrictions that must be honored when 
embarking upon combined development: power development is justifi ed only when 
there is little or no interference with the irrigation system, generation expansion 
is only warranted when the profi t margin assured is signifi cantly greater than that 
required in an independent power concern, and an irrigation project is justifi ed 
to enter the general power business only in the most unusual of circumstances.17
Although he argues that the  Salt River Project’s hydropower expansion considered 
these three restrictions, Cragin was conscious of the many tensions inherent in the 
creation of a dual-purpose project.
 In the early 1930s some Salt River Valley farmers’ groups argued that the 
Project had forgotten its true purpose and lost its way.  Critics protested that the 
pursuit of hydropower distracted the Association leadership from the heart and soul 
of the Project, water storage and irrigation.  In times of drought, unmet demands for 
water releases from Valley farms caused some to accuse the Association of catering 
to power buyers over irrigation interests.  By holding water, critics argued, the 
Project was timing releases for the generation and sale of power, which provided 
much higher revenues than irrigation.
 In some cases, the Association offered to sell power to Valley farms for the 
pumping of irrigation water rather than release reservoir storage.  Farmers often 
objected to this new policy based on claims that the land was legally entitled to 
river fl ow, which they argued was of a much higher quality than pump water.  In a 
1936 court case, E. C. Adams vs. Salt River Water Users’ Association, the plaintiff 
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sued maintaining that “crop yields have for a number of years been gradually going 
down, down, down and that these things are a direct result of what the Association 
had done.”18
 Critics of the changing character of the Project contended that the 
relationship between hydropower and irrigation was irreconcilable.  Some argued 
that a farmers’ organization had no place in such a highly competitive business 
as energy; an endeavor that required a great deal of long term planning and 
management as well as the development of new sources of capital for expansion.19
The local division of opinion regarding the future role of the Association in 
hydropower was so prevalent that it eventually reached Washington.  In a 1937 
memo, Bureau of Reclamation Commissioner John C. Page noted that in light of the 
dispute, Association directors “might well consider the basis on which they would be 
willing to release all power facilities to the United States.”20
 The Association hydropower development of the 1920s became a heated 
political issue in Valley political debates during the 1930s.  The argument 
over the irrigation/hydropower relationship created warring factions vying for 
control.  Critics attempting to gain control of the organization contended that the 
leadership of the previous decade guided the Association down the incorrect path of 
hydropower expansion.  Defenders of hydropower countered that their reactionary 
opposition preferred to eschew progress for a return to the horse-and-buggy age.
They argued that, for whatever fl aws may exist in the hydropower system, “it is a 
utopian condition too good to be lost, just because some petty conspirators are trying 
to paint the picture far blacker than it really is.”21
 Tensions in the relationship between hydropower and irrigation remained 
high until several new developments in the Valley in the late 1930s.  Three changes 
that quieted the controversy were the creation of additional water storage on the 
Verde River, the implementation of pump storage technology, and the development 
of alternative power sources.   Bartlett Dam, completed in 1939, had no hydropower 
generation and offered water storage exclusively for irrigation.  The new dam on 
the Verde was also situated below  Salt River generation and could release water 
directly to Granite Reef and into the canal system.  Pump storage technology made 
it possible for the Project to use inexpensive, off-peak power to pump from the 
tailwaters below dams back up into the reservoir at night.  Pump storage allowed the 
Project to replenish reservoir capacity with waters that had already been released 
for power generation.   The development of additional steam plants in the late 1930s 
and the completion of transmission lines for Colorado River power in 1940 eased 
the reliance on Salt River generation by providing a variable load not dependent 
on irrigation demands.  The Association now had alternative answers to the often 
challenging problem of supplying a reliable source of energy.
 With the transformation of the Valley following World War II, the 
relationship between hydropower and irrigation changed dramatically.  In the context 
of the new rapid residential and industrial growth the earlier hydropower expansion 
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was seen as a critical development for the future success of central Arizona.  Upon 
refl ecting on the changes of the 1920s and 1930s, the period was not just one of the 
evolution of the Salt River Project, but the beginnings of a Valley metamorphosis 
from an agricultural/rural area with a priority of irrigation to a non-agricultural-
urban region with a need for energy.
 In 1998, only 22 percent of the water deliveries from the  Salt River Project 
went to agricultural customers.  Although agricultural production still exists in the 
Valley, the urbanization of the Valley has changed the basic function of the Project.  
In the 1930s, critics argued against attempts to build hydropower on a project 
devoted to irrigation.  By the end of the twentieth century, irrigation now exists as 
somewhat of an adjunct on a project much of the population perceives as devoted to 
power generation.
 Only through knowledge of the early relationship between hydropower 
and irrigation can one realize the dramatic changes that have taken place in the 
Salt River Valley.  Such awareness provides a new angle on the well told story of 
the West and its water.  Understanding the dynamics of the relationship between 
hydropower and irrigation offers needed insight into not only the history of central 
Arizona, but much of the twentieth century arid West.
Stephen M. Sloan is an assistant professor of history and co-director of 
the oral history program at the University of Southern Mississippi in 
Hattiesburg.
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Water, Culture, and Boosterism:  Albin and 
Elizabeth DeMary and the Minidoka Reclamation 
Project, 1905-1920
By:
Laura Woodworth-Ney
 In July 1904 thirty-three year-old  Albin C. DeMary traveled from his 
home in Boise, Idaho, to the Reclamation Service’s newly opened Minidoka tract.1
DeMary’s duties as clerk of the U.S. Assay Offi ce alerted him to the Reclamation 
Service’s fi rst Idaho irrigation project.  Proposed in 1903, the project would provide 
water to the arid sagebrush plains of southern Idaho’s Snake River desert.  DeMary 
returned with an enthusiastic vision for Minidoka’s commercial future and with a 
steadfast commitment to reclamation.  “The character of the soil is such that the 
establishment of a beet sugar factory upon the tract would prove an unbounded 
success,” DeMary told a Boise newspaper reporter.  He and his companions had 
been “struck” by “the absence of lava rock…upon the entire 60,000 acres.”2  Less 
than a year later, DeMary moved his parents and his wife of four years,  Elizabeth 
Layton DeMary, to Minidoka, where he established a homestead three miles 
northeast of present-day  Rupert.
 DeMary’s optimism, 
characteristic of a generation of 
early irrigation entrepreneurs in 
the arid West, stemmed from the 
notion that government aid could 
do what individual investors could 
not—turn Idaho’s windswept, 
lava-rock-strewn desert into an 
agrarian oasis.  Federally-funded 
irrigation projects, DeMary 
and other boosters reasoned, 
would provide small farmers 
an unprecedented opportunity 
for economic independence.
DeMary’s Commercial Club 
and Water Users Association, along with his wife’s Culture Club, represented the 
political and cultural infl uence that young, educated settlers exercised in newly 
established irrigation communities during the settlement period (1870-1920).  The 
efforts of the DeMarys and their like-minded associates—a self-styled Protestant 
“elite”—infl uenced the formation of city government, shaped community policy, and 
challenged gendered divisions of work.  The activities of the Commercial, Culture, 
and Water Users associations refl ected the political and social values of Progressive 
reform; their methods married coercive and positive environmentalist approaches 
to social change.3  While their methods and their technology represented the future, 
15.1.  The buildings on the east side of the square 
in Rupert, Idaho, on the Minidoka Project in July 
of 1906.
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their vision of agrarian utopia was grounded in the Jeffersonian past.  Dusty and 
desperate, reclamation towns offered middle-class reformers a unique opportunity to 
shape business and social environments..4
 After arriving on the Minidoka tract in 1905, Albin DeMary quickly built a 
modest house on his claim, where he and Elizabeth began raising their four-year-old 
daughter, Dorothy.  A photograph from this period shows Elizabeth and Dorothy 
DeMary standing on the packed dirt outside of their one-room house, dressed in 
their fi nest clothes and hats, seemingly oblivious to the blowing dust and sagebrush 
surrounding them.  Their ability to look beyond the dust to an agrarian paradise 
transcended economic development.  The future held more than accessible water–it 
also possessed a  Progressive culture.  Reclamation promised to turn the desert into 
an “irrigated Eden,” but new irrigation towns offered the promise of cultural, as 
well as land, reclamation.5  Irrigated settlement harkened back to a past of small 
farms in rural America, but irrigation’s entrepreneurial settlers challenged the social 
landscapes of the rural West.  The creative work produced by Elizabeth DeMary’s 
Culture Club resided at the center of cultural construction on the  Minidoka Project.  
The creative expressions of  Rupert clubwomen refl ected the unique circumstances of 
settling an arid land, and provided a contrast to the progress narrative articulated in 
booster literature.  Through their literary practices, Culture Club members redefi ned 
and shaped cultural perceptions of the 
irrigated landscape.6
 Albin DeMary had been a 
reporter for the Idaho Statesman and a 
clerk in the U.S. Assay Offi ce in Boise 
before coming to the project.  DeMary’s 
background, coupled with his degree 
from Illinois College, distinguished 
him as one of the Minidoka Project’s 
elite settlers. When suspicions of fraud 
and embezzlement forced the U.S. 
Land Commissioner for the newly 
platted town of Rupert to resign in April 1906, DeMary received the appointment to 
succeed him.  DeMary held the offi ce until 1924, and throughout his tenure served 
as an informal liaison between the Minidoka settlers and the Reclamation Service.
His various roles as land commissioner, charter member of the Rupert Commercial 
Club (became the Rupert Chamber of Commerce in 1917), and founding member 
of the Minidoka Settlers’ Association (later the  Minidoka Water Users Association, 
and one of the earliest water users’ organizations in Idaho and the Intermountain 
West), gave DeMary the authority to infl uence Rupert’s business environment.  At 
the same time, he negotiated with federal offi cials to achieve control of reclamation 
water for Minidoka settlers.  Like many Progressive reformers, DeMary believed 
in the scientifi c management of resources, and he remained committed to the ideal 
of federal reclamation.  He also believed that once the service completed a project, 
local control of water became essential for business development.  Reclamation 
15.2.  Harvesting potatoes in 1909 on the 
Henschied Ranch near Rupert, Idaho.
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could provide both agricultural and commercial opportunities, but only if local 
settlers and businessmen exercised authority over the project.7
 While Albin DeMary worked to achieve local control of the Minidoka 
reclamation project, his wife, Elizabeth DeMary, labored to provide the project’s 
fastest-growing community–Rupert–with an urban, Progressive culture.  DeMary 
seemed intent on proving that an early twentieth century reclamation town did not 
have to exhibit the abhorrent cultural characteristics of many frontier outposts.
Elizabeth DeMary was salutatorian of her class at MacMurry College, Jacksonville, 
Illinois, in 1893, and she had further literary training at the University of California 
and the University of Chicago.  Throughout her life she published poetry, essays, 
and travel articles.  Her work appeared in many local and national publications 
and anthologies, including Times Magazine, The Reclamation Era, Seeing Idaho,
Sunlit Peaks, Poems of the Northwest, Homespun, and The Book of American 
Verse.  Before coming to Rupert, DeMary organized the South Boise Improvement 
Society, which applied Progressive “city beautiful” principles to a section of the 
state’s capital city.  Reclamation towns, however, offered the kind of aesthetic and 
social control that could never exist in an established community.  Rupert possessed 
none of the problems “city beautiful” adherents associated with older, “decaying” 
environments.8
 The land that the DeMarys 
chose to homestead occupied a tiny 
portion of the Minidoka Project, 
designed to encourage agricultural 
settlement in the arid regions of the 
Snake River Plain in southern Idaho.  
The sagebrush desert and lava fi elds 
of the south-central Snake had long 
intimidated potential homesteaders.
Oregon Trail diarists told of the dust 
and heat of southern Idaho—for 
overlanders the trail through what 
would become Idaho’s “Magic 
Valley” signifi ed only hardship, an 
obstacle to bypass on the way to the Willamette Valley.  Because of its lack of appeal 
to homesteaders, the area did not experience large-scale agricultural settlement until 
late in the nineteenth century.  Much of this late-arriving settlement, moreover, came 
from the West, not the East.  Homesteaders who reached Oregon and California 
too late to procure land in those regions turned back to try their luck in the arid 
interior regions.  The fi rst non-Indian settlement in the Minidoka area began in the 
1880s and 1890s, when small numbers of farmers and ranchers came to the region 
and settled near the Snake River.  Farmers like Henry Shodde constructed private 
irrigation systems, some under the homestead provisions of the Desert Land Act 
of 1877, using water wheels in the river’s fl ow to irrigate up to about two-hundred 
acres.  With its vast elevation variation, hot summers, and a yearly rainfall of 
15.3.  The offi ce of the Minidoka Irrigation District 
in Rupert in 1927.
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between nine and twelve inches, the Snake River Plain defeated most individual and 
private irrigation enterprises.9
 The failure of private and state irrigation projects provided federal 
reclamation adherents with the ammunition to lobby for a federal reclamation act.
The national bill came in 1902 with congressional approval of the Newlands Act, a 
bold measure which created the United States Reclamation Service and authorized 
the federal government to fi nance and construct large-scale irrigation projects in the 
arid West.10  After passage of the Reclamation Act, the Interior Department withdrew 
130,000 acres of land from homestead fi lings north and south of the lower Snake 
River to create the Minidoka tract. Crews, including an all-female survey group, 
arrived to survey the Minidoka Dam site in March 1903.  In April 1904 the Interior 
Secretary appropriated $2,600,000 for the construction of a dam, spillway, canal 
system, power house, and pumping mechanism at Minidoka, making it the seventh 
project funded under the Newlands Act.  The Reclamation Service entered into a 
contract with Bates-Rogers Construction Company, Chicago, in August 1904 and 
within the year work on the dam commenced.  Bates-Rogers completed the dam and 
its supporting structures in 1909; at that time the project’s irrigation water impacted 
approximately 45,000 acres.  It 
was during this initial phase of 
construction that Albin DeMary, 
along with his father and two 
other interested businessmen, 
visited the Minidoka Project and 
became enthusiastic about the 
economic prospects of the region 
north of the Snake River—the 
territory that, through DeMary’s 
infl uence, became Minidoka 
County in 1912.11
 Homesteaders appeared in the Minidoka area almost immediately after the 
Reclamation Service chose the site.  Most of the early inhabitants of the project 
associated themselves with the  Rupert town site, though the Reclamation Service 
also created the towns of Heyburn and Paul as part of the project.  The Rupert
Pioneer announced in November 1905 that “Rupert is on the map, and is out for 
business, all she can get in a legitimate way.”  The boosters had their eye not only 
on the land north of the Snake River, at that time part of Lincoln County, but also 
on development opportunities south of the river, in Cassia County.  “… No ordinary 
stream will be permitted to become a barrier in extending Rupert’s commercialism,” 
the Rupert paper warned the neighboring community of Burley in 1905.  “Eight 
months ago a sagebrush plain, inhabited only by coyotes and long-eared jacks,” the 
Pioneer continued, 
now, at the close of eight months, a city of 400 inhabitants, a school of a 
hundred scholars, a business aggregation of 64 concerns, an opera house, 
15.4.  Minidoka Dam in 1911.
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two secret orders, a Methodist Church, a Sunday school, a lawyer to get 
people out of trouble … a doctor to cure people of their ills, and a glorious 
future that no man can doubt.12
 Albin and Elizabeth DeMary committed themselves to securing that 
“glorious future.” Elizabeth DeMary infl uenced the cultural climate of Rupert 
primarily through her founding of the Culture Club.  Rupert’s unformed social 
structure held great promise for DeMary and her associates, for they could engage 
in municipal building rather than in mere “Municipal Housekeeping,” the term then 
applied to women’s club reform.13  Instead of battling existing institutions, they were
the institution.  Considered “the fi rst rural community woman’s club in Idaho,” the 
Culture Club heralded Rupert’s entrance into the Idaho Federated Women’s Club 
movement.  The General Federation of Women’s Clubs, founded in 1890, served 
as a national umbrella for women’s organizations.  Though wide-ranging in size, 
location, and membership, the federated clubs shared a commitment to education, 
literacy, political activism, and environmental beautifi cation.  The clubs enjoyed 
their greatest membership in urban environments, but may have had their greatest 
relative infl uence in rural environments.  Isolation, blowing dust, unrelenting 
sun, and scarce water led many women on the reclamation frontier to seek female 
companionship through the club movement.  Throughout the irrigated West, these 
groups supported public libraries, city parks, and restrictions on certain behaviors, 
including sidewalk spitting and alcohol consumption.  The Culture Club and other 
federated clubs advocated a conservative political role for women, based on the 
moral exceptionality of women, rather than a more radical equal rights position.
They also took the majority of their membership from the ranks of white, Protestant, 
and well-educated women.  The General Federation motto “Unity in Diversity” 
referred not to the diversity of the women but to the variety of clubs—few 
immigrant, African-American, American Indian, or Hispanic American women were 
invited to join the ranks.14
 Women’s clubs in the reclamation West were particularly lacking in 
diversity.  In places like  Rupert, where everyone started out in the same dusty 
shack, “keeping up appearances” placed additional emphasis on associating with 
the “right people.”  By the early twentieth century, a certain level of consumption 
was required to maintain middle- or upper-class status, consumption that was 
often unattainable on the sagebrush fl ats.  The household manual Our Home, Or 
Infl uences Emanating from the Hearthstone, published in 1899, warned housewives 
that appropriate furnishings were essential for the proper rearing of children: “It is 
as much the duty of parents, then, to adorn and beautify their home as it is to keep 
the moral atmosphere of that home pure.”15  Nineteenth-century sentimental novels 
portrayed the degraded and “uncivilized” conditions of frontier life.  Women in 
irrigated settlement areas attempted Victorian and Progressive domesticity without 
gas lighting, indoor plumbing, or household help, at a time when their urban peers 
experienced a revolution in home convenience.  To avoid the grim demise of 
female protagonists in Victorian sentimentality—to lose status, refi ned taste, and 
thus authority—middle-class women in irrigated settlement communities founded 
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literary societies.16  If their living conditions placed them among the laboring 
masses, their creative endeavors set them apart from both the irrigated landscape 
and from association with the working class.  The societies also formed the basis for 
a political voice that infl uenced living conditions for all residents on the sagebrush 
plains.
 Elizabeth DeMary and six other women inaugurated Rupert’s Culture 
Club at the home of Anna LaRue, the wife of another of Rupert’s fi rst homestead 
fi lees and businessmen, in October 1905.17  The club chose to limit its membership 
to eighteen, ostensibly because it planned to meet exclusively in private homes, 
and committed itself to the cultural and artistic advancement of Rupert.  The club 
did not welcome immigrants or Catholics.  The group held its second meeting 
in the DeMary home, but by the spring of 1906 moved some of its meetings to 
the (relatively) prestigious dining room of the Rupert Hotel, located on the town 
square.  At the fi rst meeting, club members signed a petition requesting that the State 
Traveling Library include Rupert on its schedule.  The traveling library, founded by 
the Columbian Club of Boise in 1893, had become the primary source of literary 
material for over two hundred Idaho communities by 1905.  Hosted by women’s 
clubs throughout the state, the traveling library illustrated the connection between 
literacy, education, class and culture that infused rural women’s groups.  The Culture 
Club claimed the traveling library, which fi rst visited Rupert in 1906, as an early 
victory in its perceived struggle against frontier illiteracy and degradation.18
 The Culture Club engaged in a variety of other civic programs, and actively 
encouraged the literary and artistic pursuits of its own members.  The group funded 
a lyceum lecture series, sponsored an art exhibit, lobbied for women’s public 
restrooms, and spawned a plethora of other women’s clubs, including the Clionian 
Club, Fortnightly Club, Rupert Civic Club, and Merry Go Round Club.19  In 
advocating the institution of public restrooms, the club supported more than a place 
for a lady to use private facilities.  Public restrooms for women corresponded to a 
value system of domestic consumption–in order for women to shop in town, they 
needed to have access to a private place.  Women’s lounges offered an escape from 
street grime, and a place in which to gather, where literature and reading could be 
placed for the pleasure of the cultured woman.  Restrooms also enabled farm women 
to come to town with the knowledge that there would be somewhere to rest and, 
perhaps, to read.20  To further expand the minds of Rupert’s populace, Culture Club 
women also leant their support to Rupert’s Opera House and Dramatic Association, 
which hosted its fi rst production in November 1905.  The only such venue south of 
Boise, the opera house refl ected the cultural idealism of Rupert’s clubwomen.  When 
it fi rst opened the town newspaper declared that the theater was “designed in such a 
manner that between acts out of town people can gaze upon it and be convinced that 
their wants can be supplied in our city.”21
 The ladies of the club did not, however, want all needs to be met in Rupert.
The club discouraged alcohol consumption and participated in the elimination of 
Rupert’s “Red Light District.”  Village trustees and “a large number of citizens,” the 
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Rupert Pioneer reported in September 1906, met to discuss the town’s “social evil.”  
The group informed red light district occupants that they had twenty-four hours to 
leave town or face arrest and fi nes; the “social evil” responded by leaving on the 
night train.22  Saloons also became a target of the Progressive spirit in early Rupert.  
In November 1909 three Minidoka project reclamation towns—Rupert, Heyburn, 
and Acequia—passed legislation illegalizing the sale of alcoholic beverages.23
 Elizabeth DeMary’s club drew upon the irrigated landscape to portray Rupert 
as a uniquely progressive urban center.  Yearly “moonlit excursions” to Minidoka 
Dam married the ideals of the Culture Club to the optimism of reclamation.24  A 
photograph housed at the DeMary Memorial Library in Rupert indicates that the 
Culture Club held meetings in the verdant, irrigated backyard of the DeMary home.
Eight well-dressed women in hats sit near an arbor while Elizabeth DeMary serves 
tea and cookies from a white-clothed table.25  In giving her 1907 presidential address 
to the Culture Club, Elizabeth DeMary declared that the club, like reclamation water, 
was responsible for breaking “the unspeakable quiet of the desert.”  Reclamation 
water turned the desert green; Progressive women’s clubs provided the appropriate 
social and cultural landscape.  The club had grown in membership “until a name 
upon our roll is a coveted possession,” DeMary explained in her 1907 presidential 
speech, because “our aim is one of mutual helpfulness and a reaching out for those 
things which broaden and enrich life.”  “Our vision is not bounded by the endless 
sage brush and the encircling hills,” DeMary continued; “We have penetrated 
beyond.”  The 1907 banquet ended with a series of lecture presentations by Rupert’s 
elite settlers.  Topics included “A Little Journey in the World: A Contrast of Naples, 
Italy, and Minidoka, Idaho,” “Reminiscences on Roast Turkey,” and “Art in a 
Shack.”  The latter speech emphasized the need for culture even in a “humble 
shack” in a “bleak desert.”26  DeMary later described her cultural contribution in the 
Reclamation Record.  Every reclamation woman, she emphasized, “had made a great 
sacrifi ce to come to this new land in order that she might help to create in the desert 
a new garden.”27
 The literary practices—the reading, writing, and poetry—maintained by 
the Culture Club, and other irrigated settlement women’s clubs, refl ected and 
defi ned cultural perceptions of the irrigated landscape.  DeMary’s poem “Irrigation” 
appeared in Reclamation Era magazine, and illustrates the connection between 
women’s literary work and the “reclaiming” of the desert:
Oh, Mesa, with those wise clear eyes of old
Could you have dreamed this vision to behold?
Long aeons you have gazed across the plain
And Man’s control have held in high disdain
But now where gone are deer and antelope
The stubborn sage that clung to every slope
The caravan that wound its weary way,
The lurching stage that would not brook delay?
Again where vanished tribes of warriors bold
Who bravely fought these native trails to hold?
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Gone to oblivion, and through the land
A magic wand is Irrigation’s hand.
From distant ports skilled birdmen
wing their fl ights
While desert dark gives way to myriad lights;
Where once the drifting dunes of sand held sway
The children gather fl owers as they may,
And tapestries are spread o’er all the fi elds
Where yellow ripening grain abundance yields
Oh, Mesa, with those wise clear eyes of old
Could you have dreamed this vision to behold?28
 Like DeMary, Irene Welch Grissom, a clubwoman appointed Idaho’s Poet-
Laureate in 1923 “in response to the request of the State Federation of Women’s 
Clubs,” portrayed a gendered irrigated landscape in her work.  DeMary’s desert is 
transformed by “Man’s control”; Grissom’s desert yields to masculine engineering:
A dreamer comes–as dreamers will–
To watch the swirling torrents spill
Between the steep, black lava walls, 
And on the foaming, crashing falls.
He sees the desert, vast and grand,
Give way before a man-made land,
The sparkling streams fl ash here and there,
And life is springing everywhere.29
With the desert’s greening comes feminine infl uence; DeMary’s “children gather 
fl owers as they may,” while Grissom’s irrigated landscape is dotted “with houses set 
in misty green, And church spires lifted high.”30  These gendered portrayals defi ned 
the position of women’s clubs on the irrigated frontier.  First, men tamed the desert 
with engineering marvels.  Then, women “settled” the new “garden” by introducing 
the elements of civilization—children, homes, and churches.31
 In providing a forum for women’s views, supporting women’s literacy and 
education, and by sponsoring women’s creative practices, the Culture Club indirectly 
supported other Progressive reforms, including suffrage.  No evidence exists 
that the club openly endorsed national suffrage.  Indeed, many Minidoka settlers 
viewed the group as narrow and elitist.  But, as the fi rst women’s organization on 
the Minidoka Project, the club inspired a host of other organizations that supported 
more radical reforms.  The Federation of Women’s Clubs, of which the Culture Club 
was a member, endorsed suffrage at its 1910 national convention.32  A photograph 
of the Rupert square, taken during the early 1910s, reveals that the reclamation 
community hosted a suffragette parade.  Finely dressed women march down the 
dusty street, carrying signs with slogans such as “Rupert for Suffrage” and “Votes 
for Women.”  The parade appears to be well-attended; rows of men and women line 
the streets of the square.  Minidoka Project suffragettes already possessed the right 
to vote, because Idaho became the fourth state to grant that right in1896.  Rupert’s 
suffrage parade suggests that women in states and communities that already had the 
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vote were essential in procuring the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.  They actively 
lobbied for a right that they already possessed, so that women who could not safely 
fi ght for that right would eventually possess it as well.  Many of the women who 
already had the vote lived in the arid West, the area served by the Reclamation Act.  
Wyoming (1869), Utah (1870), Colorado (1893), Washington (1910), California 
(1911), Oregon (1912), Arizona (1912), Montana (1914), and Nevada (1914) all 
granted full suffrage to women before 1920.  Women in reclamation communities 
used their unique relationship with the federal government to support national 
suffrage.  Reclamation communities received unprecedented federal attention; 
suffrage advocates used this attention to lobby for women’s voting rights.33
 Elizabeth DeMary’s infl uence extended beyond the cultural landscape to 
the built environment.  Rupert’s central green, the only town square in the state 
of Idaho, recalled the city squares of Midwestern towns, where both DeMarys 
spent their childhoods.  The Reclamation Service platted Rupert in 1904; by 1905 
businesses had sprung up on four streets facing a square, where Reclamation 
offi cials planned to dig the fi rst well on the Minidoka tract.  Settlers called the town 
Wellfi rst, or Wetfi rst, until the service offi cially changed the name to Rupert.34  The 
earliest businesses to locate on the town square did so illegally, as the lots were not 
appraised and sold until 1907 and 1908.  Pressure from concerned citizens, like the 
DeMarys, helped to maintain the integrity of the square throughout 1905 and 1906, 
despite problems with squatters and a lack of water.  When, during the spring of 
1906, an enterprising businessman attempted to erect a building in the center of the 
square, a group of concerned citizens formed a committee to halt the construction.
Albin DeMary participated in the group, which convinced Cal Masterson to 
move his building and collected six dollars in donations to help defray the cost of 
relocation.35
 In June 1907, with the fi rst irrigation water in sight, Rupert surveyed, 
cleared and graded its streets and planted poplar trees throughout the central 
green.  “In the center will be a circle of 75 feet in diameter surrounded by trees,” 
the paper explained, “in which seats will be placed for summer lounging, and to 
which walks will lead diagonally from each corner, and one from each side of the 
four side centers.”  To further enhance the irrigated landscape of the town square, 
town trustees forbade carriage traffi c on the immediate side streets, so that women 
would not have to step over steaming clumps of manure, and instituted an ordinance 
requiring teams to be “properly tied either to a hitching post or suitable weight.”
In 1910, Rupert’s trustees issued contracts to build sidewalks around the square; 
the town voted to pave its streets in 1919.  By 1947, the Minidoka County News
declared, “no city of comparable size in Idaho has as many hard-surfaced streets 
as the City of Rupert, and every one of them oiled since 1919!”  The Rupert town 
square remains a testament to the Edenic idealism of reclamation settlers.  An elite 
corps of Rupert founders managed to make the city green a priority, even when 
water was scarce and intended for crop irrigation, not aesthetic use.  In January 2001 
the National Park Service listed the Rupert town square and its surrounding historic 
district on the National Register of Historic Places.36
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 Albin DeMary’s infl uential civic organizations overlapped and 
complemented the efforts of the Culture Club, blurring the lines between the 
political and domestic spheres of men’s and women’s activity.  In February 1906 
DeMary and twenty-three other men, many fl edgling  Rupert business owners, 
gathered at the Benton building on the square to form the Commercial Club.  The 
group committed itself to procuring a water works, electric power plant, fl our 
mill, sugar factory, and graded city streets.  Throughout the 1910s and early 1920s 
DeMary and his colleagues never missed an opportunity to further Rupert’s business 
environment.  The establishment of the Amalgamated Sugar Factory between the 
towns of Rupert and Paul in 1917 provides an example of the Commercial Club’s 
accomplishments.  The Minidoka Project’s vast acreages of irrigated land and 
small family farms attracted the Amalgamated Company; the Commercial Club 
provided the push to bring the 
plant to Rupert.  The Commercial 
Club helped convince Minidoka 
farmers to appropriate over 5,000 
acres for sugar beet production.
DeMary’s organization also 
secured the right-of-way for 
a road leading directly from 
Rupert to the processing plant.
Throughout 1917 the Commercial 
Club collected donations to 
compensate farmers for the land 
they surrendered for the road.37
 In spite of victories like the traveling library, Rupert town square, and 
sugar factory, organized optimism and boosterism did not create the kind of 
cultural agrarian paradise that the DeMarys envisioned.  The  Minidoka Project 
remains one of the most successful in reclamation history—Rupert and the other 
project settlement communities are still viable communities with economies 
based on irrigated agriculture.  But the DeMarys were not successful in fending 
off the “frontier image,” or in preventing dangerous settler squabbles.  Elizabeth 
DeMary’s club activities could not, in the end, produce a permanent Protestant-
controlled culture.  In many ways, the idealism of Progressive settlers like the 
DeMarys stemmed not from actual successes, but from the desire to appear to be 
succeeding in their efforts to turn irrigation projects into Progressive garden oases.  
Observations by visitors to the project during the fi rst decade illustrate the diffi culty 
of this endeavor.   Henry A. Wallace, who toured the Minidoka project in 1909 as part 
of his investigation of irrigated farmland for the family journal Wallaces’ Farmer,
found little to praise in Rupert and its surrounding farmland.  Wallace attributed the 
slow development of irrigation and urban culture in the Minidoka area to the very 
fact that it was a federal project—as opposed to the more developed, private Carey 
Act project in Twin Falls.  “Rupert is a government townsite [sic], and shows the 
effects of it,” Wallace wrote, “for it is one of the most dilapidated little towns which 
I have ever seen.”  His description must have horrifi ed Rupert’s boosters:
15.5.  Irrigating sugar beets on the Minidoka 
Project.
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All the buildings are little square frame affairs with just enough ambition 
to be painted.  The ramshackle buildings are arranged on four sides of a 
square which has a fi ne stand of blue grass and white clover which the town 
hasn’t had energy enough to mow.  There are a few poplar and locust trees 
which may make some shade some day.
After observing the Rupert square, Wallace toured the countryside and interviewed 
individual homesteaders, many of whom expressed frustration with the landscape 
and with reclamation.  “At fi rst we didn’t get water when the government promised 
it to us,” a woman from Iowa told Wallace, “then when we did get water the wind 
was so strong that we could hardly get anything seeded down before the wind would 
come along and blow it out or cut it down.”  The owner of a three-year old claim, 
a man from Montana, explained that Minidoka farms had a ramshackle appearance 
because “these people around here are not a very high class of irrigators.”  Most of 
the homesteaders came to the country without capital, and “for the fi rst two years 
they had an awful hard time hanging on, for the water wasn’t ready yet and on their 
own places there wasn’t anything but sage brush … then when the water did come 
they didn’t have enough money to fi x their land right, and they just stuck in their 
crops haphazard.”  Another settler complained of the wind, and to illustrate told 
Wallace the already mythic story of the  Minidoka project.  A man on one side of the 
project, the tale went, planted a garden.  The wind came up and blew it fi fteen miles, 
across the river, to another settler’s claim, who then raised the garden himself.38
 Despite Wallace’s grim observations and disgruntled interviewees, he looked 
beyond the poverty of the present to a prosperous, well-watered future.  Wallace saw 
potential in the Minidoka soil, even as he wrote that “it is a backward country, the 
people are without money, and there is no booming whatever.”  The country “should 
grow steadily,” he predicted, “and a thickly populated little farming community 
should develop here.”  He also shared Albin C. DeMary’s Progressive commitment 
to scientifi c solutions.  While the town and homesteads disappointed Wallace, the 
Minidoka dam did not.  The structure “is a tremendous affair,” Wallace proclaimed, 
with “3,200 feet of spillway” on the south of the main dam which makes up “the 
prettiest part of the whole thing.”  Wallace’s description of the concrete spillway as 
creating a “beautiful parabola in going over” mixed natural imagery with scientifi c 
accomplishment, an integral characteristic of the reclamation vision.  Terms like 
“tremendous,” “prettiest,” and “beautiful” presented Wallace’s Midwestern readers 
with an image of the Minidoka Dam as a natural wonder.39
 Wallace’s research uncovered the contradictions inherent in the reclamation 
vision.40  Homesteaders desired government-supplied water, but they wanted to 
control it; claimants took advantage of accessible land, but they didn’t possess 
the capital to develop it; settlers envisioned an agrarian Eden but lived in one-
room houses on plots of blowing dirt; Progressive ideals competed with the needs 
of immigrant farmers; and a growing schism between middle-class irrigation 
professionals and impoverished farmers threatened the cooperation necessary to 
make reclamation work.  These problems reached a fever pitch during the early 
1910s, creating the need for settlers’ and water users’ associations to negotiate 
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directly with the Reclamation Service.  DeMary served as the settlers’ representative 
throughout this period.  As reclamation settlers and government offi cials 
institutionalized the patterns of irrigation on the Minidoka tract, Progressive ideals 
began to take a back seat to water allocation, control, and development.
 From the project’s inception, the confl ict between vision and reality 
contributed to the disillusionment of settlers and deteriorating relations between 
the Reclamation Service and water users.  The geographic characteristics of the 
Minidoka project created diffi culties for water users.  Most of the land suitable for a 
gravity-fl ow canal system lay on the north side, or Rupert side, of the Snake.  Terrain 
on the south side of the river necessitated construction of a pumping system to lift 
the water to farmland.  Construction of both the gravity canals and the south side 
lifts proceeded slowly, while reclamation offi cials struggled to work out the complex 
allocation and payment schedules of both sides of the river.  Settlers who fi led and 
moved onto their claims waited for several years before they received irrigation 
water.  The dam at Minidoka reached partial completion in the fall of 1906, but a 
scarcity of available labor forced delays in the construction of the north side canals, 
which did not deliver water until July 1907.  Many north side settlers planted seed 
in anticipation of water that year, but did not receive it in time to save their crops.  
North side settlers complained, but they were fortunate; on the south side, settlers 
waited until 1912 and 1913, when reclamation offi cials completed the lift stations.41
 Dam and lift completion inaugurated new problems.  In November 1906, 
only two months after Minidoka Dam began service, the Snake River shrank to a 
trickle.  The Rupert Pioneer declared that “for many miles below the Minidoka dam, 
there was hardly enough water fl owing to fl oat a toothpick.”  Dam gates were closed 
and ferry service was interrupted until reclamation offi cials released water from 
the Minidoka reservoir, Lake Walcott.  Canal erosion and seepage wasted irrigation 
water, which bled the Snake dry.  By 1906 the Reclamation Service employed one 
water master and eleven “ditch tenders” or “ditch riders” to monitor canal banks 
for bank erosion.  During the early years of the project, before the canal banks 
were packed solid and sodded, waves created by southern Idaho winds constantly 
threatened to wash out their banks.  Ditch riders patrolled about six miles each of the 
main canals.  If they encountered a wash or bank erosion, they notifi ed the service 
and made the necessary repairs.  Seepage, or water leakage through soil infi ltration, 
represented a more insidious, and invisible, threat to water control.  Nearly 100,000 
acre-feet of water seeped out of canals on the  Minidoka Project’s north side in 
1912.  Even after the early settlement years, seepage and erosion continued to haunt 
Minidoka settlers, necessitating the eventual lining of main canals with stone and 
mortar or concrete.42
 Other unexpected environmental consequences accompanied the Minidoka 
construction.  Canal digging and fi eld plowing stirred up enormous clouds of dust, 
which combined with strong southern Idaho winds to make the project nearly 
uninhabitable.  Dust settled in homes, destroyed machinery, and blocked out the 
sun, requiring the use of oil lamps during the middle of the day.  “When we looked 
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toward the west,” Minidoka settler Gerhard A. Riedesel recalled of a 1914 dust 
storm, “we saw a dark, threatening wall of dust advancing with a vertical front 
perhaps 1,000 feet high, extending from the southwest to the northwest as far as 
we could see.”  Riedesel’s family sought cover in the house, but the “dust sifted 
through the cracks around the door and windows and soon the entire fl oor and all 
the furniture were covered with a dusty, dry, gritty layer of yellow silt.”  Respiratory 
problems plagued Minidoka homesteaders.  Dry winds and dust often forced farmers 
to reseed, as they did across the project in 1908 and 1909.  Since most settlers 
lived in one- or two-room houses, often without adequate windows or door frames, 
homesteaders could not escape the fi ne silt that invaded their private oases.43
 Frustrated by delays and dust storms, settlers eager for water found that 
once they had it, they couldn’t get rid of it.  Water seeped out of the canals only to 
cause saturated fi elds to fl ood.  Drainage on the north side of the Snake presented as 
great an engineering challenge as construction of the original gravity canals, forcing 
water users to pay additional funds to the Reclamation Service in order to fi nance 
the construction of miles of drainage ditches.  “Funny, how we hurried to get water 
on the land and then had to spend a lot of money in drainage to get it off again,” 
Albin DeMary recalled in a 1944 letter to a former reclamation offi cial.  “Just now,” 
DeMary added, “we have the promise of another drain a mile south of Rupert to take 
care of some wet land.”  By 1909 more than 10,000 acres of Minidoka soil were no 
longer arable because they were too wet.  In August 1909 the Reclamation Service 
began construction of a $400,000 surface drainage system in order to regulate the 
elevation of the sub-water.  Surface drainage ditches did not provide adequate relief, 
so the service added drain wells and pumping stations to remove excess water.  More 
than seventy miles of drainage ditches had been dug on the project by 1912.44
 Settlers on the north side battled drainage problems, while on the south 
side pump division settlers found that they had to construct their own lateral canals 
when the service diverted part of the  Minidoka Project’s funds to the Boise-Payette 
Project.  Beginning in 1906 the service envisioned a cooperative effort between 
water users, who were supposed to dig the lateral, or sublateral, irrigation ditches 
connecting individual farms to the main canals.  The service organized more 
than four hundred local districts to complete the work, but did not always get the 
cooperation it sought.  Farmers competed with each other for completion of their 
section of the lateral ditches.  Homesteaders hired someone else to build their 
section of the lateral canal, leaving their neighbors to complete the task on their 
own.  Disagreements between neighbors over lateral water distribution, in some 
cases, turned violent.  In July 1908 a settler referred to only as Mr. Landford and 
his neighbor, John Fleming, had a heated argument over who would have the use 
of the lateral water on that day.  Landford prevailed; Fleming went home to plan 
his revenge.  The following morning, Fleming hid himself in a fi eld of alfalfa and 
waited for his neighbor, the father of three, to arrive to check his ditches.  When 
Landford approached, Fleming shot and killed him.  Fleming received the sentence 
of death by hanging, but it was later reduced to life.  The guilty Minidoka settler 
served twelve years in the state penitentiary.45
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 Dust storms, water shortages, settler rivalries, and reclamation policy 
combined to create near rebellion on the  Minidoka Project in 1911.  Some 
discouraged water users relinquished their improved claims for sums ranging from 
$400 to $4000 (for eighty acres), while others worked through the settler association 
to achieve control of reclamation water.  Settlers openly questioned the authority 
of the Reclamation Service, despite the fact that their very existence on the desert 
tract depended on the service.  In March, one settler lamented in the Pioneer-
Record that the Reclamation Service’s “charges for operation and maintenance 
are assessed against the settler without his consent and expenditured [sic] without 
his knowledge.”  “No function of this United States government is self-contained 
enough, or big enough,” J. D. Akins continued, “that it can trample with impunity 
the rights of its humblest citizens.”  Settler anger increased in April when the service 
revealed that it intended to issue a new contract replacing the original water charge 
of $22.00 per acre with a charge of $26.00 per acre.  Albin DeMary’s Commercial 
Club rushed to form a committee to draft a statement to send to Idaho Senator 
William Borah, decrying the new policy and demanding graduated water payments 
“without any strings.”  Ignoring the fact that Minidoka businesses and farms had 
been the benefi ciaries of the government’s construction projects, the club issued a 
public statement declaring that if the service had overspent on construction, then it 
“should stand the loss the same as any individual would have to stand it . . .”  The 
Minidoka Water Users Association, which replaced the fi rst settlers’ organization, 
joined with the Commercial Club in rejecting the new contract.  DeMary, acting 
on behalf of both the Commercial Club and the Minidoka Water Users Board of 
Directors, prepared a series of resolutions to unite the settlers in their opposition.
DeMary recommended that the settlers agree to the new contract, provided that the 
service publish an itemized schedule of 
its operation and maintenance expenses; 
offer the settlers a graduated scale for 
water right payments; give the settlers fair 
representation in the management of the 
project; and pledge itself to help secure 
passage of legislation giving settlers patents 
to their lands (as it stood, patents could only 
be issued after water users had paid for their 
water right in full).46
 The water users succeeded in 
prompting the Interior Department to send 
“legal representatives” to Rupert in May 
1911 to meet with Albin DeMary and other 
members of the board.  On May 23 Morris 
Bien and Philip H. Wells met privately with 
DeMary and several other men from the 
water users’ executive committee; later in 
the evening they held a public hearing.  The 
executive meeting lasted several hours and 
15.6.  1920 portrait of Morris Bien who 
was sent to deal with settlers over 
charges on the Minidoka Project.
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threatened to erupt when one board member accused local reclamation offi cials of 
making false statements.  DeMary outlined the settlers’ position, emphasizing that 
“a good many of the settlers when they fi led on this project … believed that the 
government would take it and operate it at its expense.”  Now, DeMary explained, 
the settlers resented what they viewed as “improper use of money in the operation 
and maintenance of the project.”  Reclamation offi cials made no apologies for the 
policies of the service, noting instead that “it is easy to say that this should have 
been done better. … Everybody knows if they look back, they could have done 
differently.”  Still, the federal offi cers concluded that they intended to “work up a 
public notice … that will settle everything.”47
 Albin DeMary’s proposals and his representation of the settlers at the 
users’ meeting did not meet with the satisfaction of all of the project’s farmers.  
Some settlers refused to participate in the association, which they viewed as a 
self-interested, elitist institution.  “We are sick and tired of the antics of the men 
who style themselves the Minidoka Water Users Association …,” P. O. O’Rourke 
bellowed in an editorial in the Pioneer-Record: “There will be no treaty making 
[sic] with the truce breakers, there will be no surrender.”  Despite the opposition 
of settlers like O’Rourke, DeMary and the water users could claim at least some of 
the credit when Interior Secretary Walter 
L. Fisher and Reclamation Director 
Frederick Newell visited the project in 
September 1911.  Fisher and Newell met 
with the water users and listened to their 
grievances; by October, the water users 
had a new contract which addressed 
some of the settlers’ concerns.  The new 
contract allowed for graduated payments 
and divided water and drainage payments 
equally throughout the project.  It also 
grandfathered any settler who had an 
original contract at the $22.00 per acre 
rate.  Interior Secretary Fisher refused 
to reconsider the loathsome $26.00 per 
acre amount, however, and he further 
maintained that the authority of the 
Reclamation Service could not be divided 
by providing for offi cial representation of 
the water users in the governing body of 
the agency.48
 The new contract and visit by reclamation offi cials met with criticism in the 
Pioneer-Record; one editorialist declared that “this city was infl icted last Tuesday 
with the presence of a bunch of high reclamation offi cials, whose visit amounted 
to about as much as ___(fi ll in the blanks for yourself).”  Nonetheless, the new 
contract heralded a better relationship between the water users and the Reclamation 
15.7.  Frederick H. Newell visited the 
Minidoka Project in 1911 with Secretary of 
the Interior Walter L. Fisher.
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Service.  The years following 1911 were good ones for Minidoka farmers.  By 1913 
DeMary estimated that 8,700 people lived on the project, which also boasted 1,684 
farms at an estimated average value of $6,454.  DeMary’s boosterism paid off when, 
in November 1914, voters on the Minidoka Project voted to make Rupert the seat 
of Minidoka County.  DeMary’s 1913 history of the project credited the Interior 
Department with giving settlers “more latitude,” extending the time for water 
payments, and limiting the number of cancellations made on homestead entries.
DeMary also recognized his wife’s efforts at shaping the culture of the reclamation 
community.  Several women’s clubs engaged in “serious literary work,” DeMary 
noted, and exerted “a large infl uence in moulding the character of the citizenship.”49
 DeMary’s efforts at forming an infl uential water users’ association laid the 
groundwork for future organizations, including the  Minidoka Irrigation District, 
founded in 1917, and the  Burley Irrigation District, formed in 1918.  The power 
these groups wielded, however, declined by the late 1910s.  As more watered 
acreage was added to reclamation projects along the Snake River, competition 
for water from homesteaders outside of the Minidoka tract increased.  Scientifi c 
engineering complicated the river’s fl ow, and made water allocation for all Snake 
River users more complex.  Throughout the 1910s, water users upriver, in Rigby and 
Idaho Falls, decried what they viewed as unfair allocation of the water to “Magic 
Valley” (Minidoka and Twin Falls) users.  Reclamation offi cials attempted to 
preserve the Minidoka Project’s water in the Jackson Lake reservoir (completed in 
1907 and expanded in 1910 and 1916), but this allocation had to travel downstream, 
past Idaho Falls and Rigby farms, to reach Rupert farms.  The service could not 
specifi cally identify, of course, what part of the living river was Minidoka water.  
Confl icts up and down the Snake resulted in the creation of intra-cooperative 
water users’ associations.  Groups like the Snake River Committee of Nine utilized 
attorneys, water engineers, and relations with the Bureau of Reclamation (the 
Reclamation Service became the Bureau 
of Reclamation in 1923) to negotiate 
water allocation between projects on the 
upper and lower Snake.  At the same 
time, the bureau increasingly relied on 
technical experts to manage its projects, 
particularly after creation of American 
Falls reservoir in 1927.  These trends 
limited the ability of small, project-
oriented settlers’ groups to negotiate, 
like the Minidoka Water Users did in 
1911, directly with the government 
agency.50
 Changes in the political environment also affected the Culture Club.  
Like many federated women’s clubs, the group disbanded during World War I.  
Competition from other women’s organizations, the transfer of club goals from 
cultural advancement to the support of the war effort, the debate over women’s 
15.8.  American Falls Dam in 1927, soon after 
completion.
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suffrage and pacifi sm, and a perceived linkage between socialist groups and 
organized women’s clubs hurt attendance nationwide.51  The demise of the Culture 
Club may also have been refl ective of a population shift on the project.  Despite 
Albin DeMary’s best efforts to expand reclamation on the north side of the river and 
to attract businesses to the city, by 1920 it became clear that Burley, the community 
on the southern side of the Snake River, would outstrip Rupert in population and 
become the premier commercial center on the Minidoka tract.  Burley’s proximity 
to Twin Falls, Paul, and Heyburn gave it a strategic geographic advantage.  Between 
1920 and 1930, the town of Rupert lost population, dropping from 2,372 to 2,250 
inhabitants.
 Some of DeMary’s commercial projects confl icted with the values of his 
wife’s Culture Club.  The Amalgamated Sugar Factory stimulated the production of 
sugar beets; sugar beet farmers employed children to do the monotonous hoeing that 
beets required, at a time when federated clubs worked to limit child labor.  Snake 
River farmers hired immigrant workers, changing the original demographic structure 
of reclamation towns like Rupert.  German and Russian Catholic immigrants came 
in large numbers to take advantage of homestead claims, particularly on the “North 
Side” of Rupert, where it was found that a natural aquifer made dryland farming 
possible.  These immigrants found the kind of opportunity advocated by Progressive 
women’s clubs, but, at the same time, their presence diluted the infl uence of Rupert’s 
elite Protestant settlers.  Moreover, these new immigrants failed to adhere to the 
domestic and cultural standards maintained and supported by clubwomen.  By the 
1920s, the Idaho State Federation of Women’s Clubs was advocating a fi rm stance 
on the issue of immigration and Idaho communities.  “Throughout the Federation 
this term emphasis was on Americanization,” the Federation’s historian explained, 
“for war had shown the need for assimilating into American life the foreign born 
upon her shores.”52  It may have seemed to Elizabeth DeMary that the urban 
evils she had tried to escape–child labor, corporate infl uence, Eastern European 
immigration, poverty–had followed her to the desert.53
 The efforts of Elizabeth and Albin DeMary to create a locally-controlled 
irrigated oasis with a Progressive culture on the Minidoka Project revealed the 
complex ideology underlying reclamation settlement. Albin DeMary’s careful 
negotiations between water users and the Reclamation Service, his relentless support 
of commercial enterprises, and his involvement in southern Idaho’s earliest water 
users association made Rupert the business center of the Minidoka Project until 
the 1920s.  In founding the Culture Club, Elizabeth DeMary created one of rural 
Idaho’s fi rst women’s organizations.  Her support of Progressive aesthetic values 
helped to preserve Idaho’s only town square.  Rupert’s opera house staged the only 
live musical performances south of Boise; its streets played host to suffrage parades; 
its elite Protestant founders outlawed houses of prostitution and saloons; and its 
paved streets offered shaded, manure-free walking. Through their literary practices, 
clubwomen shaped and defi ned cultural perceptions of the irrigated landscape.
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 The reality of life on the sagebrush fl ats often interfered with the Progressive 
vision.  Rupert’s position as the lead Minidoka city faded as the relationship between 
local water users and the Bureau of Reclamation became more complex.  By the 
mid-1920s, large, multi-project water users’ organizations had overshadowed 
their smaller, project-based antecedents.  New reclamation dams and reservoirs, 
population growth, and greater demand for power generation limited the relative 
power of small users’ associations in reclamation settlement towns.  The demise 
of the DeMary vision for Rupert paralleled a decline in the relative authority of 
small farmers on the projects.  During the brief settlement period, however, the 
DeMarys demonstrated that water users and reclamation homesteaders possessed a 
considerable amount of authority in determining the shape of their projects and the 
cultures of their towns.
Laura Woodworth-Ney prepared the original of this paper for the history 
of Reclamation symposium on June 18-19, 2002, at the University of Nevada–Las 
Vegas.  In September of that year she revised the paper.  A different version of 
this paper, one based on Elizabeth DeMary, was published as “Elizabeth Layton 
DeMary and the Rupert Culture Club: New Womanhood in a Reclamation 
Settlement Community,” in Dee Garceau-Hagan, editor, Portraits of Women in the 
American West (New York: Routledge, 2005).  Dr. Woodworth-Ney is chair of the 
Department of History at Idaho State University in Pocatello.  She is the author of 
Mapping Identity: Creation of the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation, 1805-1902
which was published by the University Press of Colorado in 2004.
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“LAW OR NO LAW!”—Elwood Mead and The 
Struggle Over Power Plant Revenues,
Shoshone Project, 1926-1953
By:
Robert E. Bonner
 On January 11, 1912, the fl edgling Water Users Association on the 
 Shoshone Reclamation Project held its third annual meeting.  Following an 
animated discussion and the passage of resolutions in support of such things as 
an extension of the repayment period and public accounting for operation and 
maintenance expenses, they offered their fi nal resolution of the evening.  Their 
outgoing president referred to the matter as their “birthright,” and urged them to 
look well to it.  They resolved
 To the end that all waterpower rights, privileges and possibilities 
may be conserved to the people of this project we ask that no step in 
relation to same be taken which may have within it the possibility, 
however remote, of either loss or deterioration in respect to such 
property rights.  That absolute ownership and control of all power 
sites, perquisites and privileges, within the limits of this Project, must 
ultimately repose in the aggregate body of land owners or water users.
Our heritage in this connection must not in any wise or at any time be 
placed in jeopardy.1
 Much of the discussion among historians of the waterpower developed by 
the Bureau of Reclamation at its damsites throughout the West has centered upon 
the big question of the relation of this publicly-produced power to the private 
power industry.2  Indeed, the issue of  public vs. private power was of concern to 
Reclamation leaders from the passing of the Waterpower Act of 1920.  Settlers on 
Reclamation projects, however, had a quite different view of the power question.  
The prospect of hydroelectric  power development on a project meant a signifi cant 
increase in the standard of living of the local farmers, and as such was advertised 
heavily in publications like Reclamation Record.  But the Shoshone water users in 
January of 1912 were not thinking of electric lights in their houses.  Since April of 
1906 every person who bought a water right on a Reclamation project purchased 
at the same time a future interest in the profi ts of any power development on the 
project.  Tacked on (section 5) to the act governing the withdrawal of townsites 
on Reclamation Projects was a provision directing that the money derived from 
the lease of power on a project be “placed to the credit of the project” in the 
Reclamation Fund.3
 From 1906 to 1939, according to the offi cial historian of the Bureau, 
Reclamation policy with respect to the distribution of profi ts from power plants 
was governed by that provision.4  Power revenues on many projects were handled 
in this way.  And it is true that the only general legislation on power revenues 
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between 1906 and 1939 merely confi rmed the 1906 law.5  However, the policy 
was frequently a subject of controversy and required authoritative redetermination 
more than once.6  Moreover, the offi cial account ignores the facts that there 
were legislative interventions for a decade before 1939 designed to direct power 
revenues away from projects, in contravention of the Act of 1906, and a serious 
sustained effort to rewrite Reclamation law to separate water and power income in 
the early 1930s.
 As it happened, 
the legal storm over 
power plant revenues 
broke on the  Shoshone 
Project in northwestern 
Wyoming.  The Project 
consists of four divisions.  
The fi rst to open, in 
1908, was the  Garland 
Division, approximately 
35,000 acres divided into 
roughly 650 farms on the 
fl at bench land around the 
town of Powell.  A decade 
later the  Frannie Division, 
north and east of the Powell fl at and less than half the size of Garland, was opened 
to homesteading.  Settlers in both of these areas took land in full knowledge of the 
1906 act.  They were paying the costs of the dam in the canyon west of Cody, and 
they expected to benefi t someday from the development of a power plant there.  
The Reclamation Service put off building the power plant until they needed a 
source of power to operate construction machinery on the third unit of the project, 
 Willwood.  The power plant was completed in 1922, as construction began on the 
Willwood Diversion Dam and canal system.7
 The twenties were a 
diffi cult period for American 
agriculture, especially on 
Reclamation projects saddled 
with rising construction 
costs.  The major effort of the 
Reclamation Service in the early 
20s was the so-called  Fact-
Finders’ Commission, a kind of 
Domesday inquest into every 
facet of every project to fi nd 
solid ground of agreement on 
costs and procedures between 
farmers and administrators.  This 
16.1.  The “Claim shanty of Roderick Seaton, Garland 
Flat,” Shoshone Project, Wyoming, April 13, 1906.
16.2.  School children on the Willwood Division of 
the Shoshone Project in September of 1930.
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was Interior Secretary  Hubert Work’s great effort to refound Reclamation.  Out 
of it came a new name, the Bureau of Reclamation, a new leader ( Elwood Mead, 
who had been prominent on the Commission), and comprehensive legislation 
known as the  Fact Finders’ Act, passed December 5, 1924.  Many changes were 
embodied in the Act, but power policy remained unchanged.  Subsection I of the 
Act provided that whenever water users take over the operation of a project, the 
profi ts “as determined by the Secretary” of any power plant on the project will 
be credited annually to the construction charges of the water users, confi rming 
thereby the Act of 1906.8
 The same Act provided for a new and more generous method of repaying 
construction charges, limiting the payment per acre to fi ve per cent of the average 
gross annual income over the past ten years.  However, in order for settlers to 
take advantage of the provisions of this act they needed to form an irrigation 
district under state law.  The farmers of the Garland Division had generally 
resisted forming such a district, but the enticement of the 5% provision plus the 
confi rmation of the power plant rights convinced them that it was time to take on 
the responsibility.  They formed the  Shoshone Irrigation District November 28, 
1925, and then entered upon lengthy negotiations with the Bureau for a contract.
Almost a year later they completed those negotiations, and the Irrigation District 
took over the operation of the works for the Garland Division.  Paragraph 31 of 
their contract, in language that directly repeated Subsection I of the Fact Finders’ 
Act, guaranteed that any net profi ts realized by the power plant would be credited 
to the construction charges owed by the district.9
 The Frannie Division of the Project also organized itself into an irrigation 
district, the  Deaver Irrigation District (so-named for the major town in that part 
of the project) and worked out a contract with the Bureau in the fall of 1926.  The 
contract with Deaver contained a signifi cant new provision with respect to the 
power plant, whereby the Deaver district obligated itself to pay a proportionate 
share of the costs of the Shoshone power plant, “in order to receive its share of 
net profi ts of said plant.”  This provision was to be effective only if the Shoshone 
Irrigation District similarly agreed to accept a share of the power plant costs, 
which they had not done in their contract.10  Commissioner Mead stated that the 
idea to include this provision arose from the district negotiators, although since 
similar provisions had been showing up in contracts with other districts, it seems 
likely that the government negotiators had some role in it.11
 The Deaver contract caused some consternation among Shoshone unit-
holders.  Some felt their own contract language protected their rights in the power 
plant, believing that they were already being charged those costs as the plant was 
an integral part of the project, while others thought it best to amend the contract 
to accept specifi c obligation for the costs of the power plant.  At the same time, 
offi cials of the Bureau were trying to sort out their own position.   E. E. Roddis, 
District Counsel, offered his opinion that the law gave the Secretary no power to 
build a power plant without a repayment contract, and therefore the water users 
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were implicitly understood to have contracted for it and could expect profi ts from 
it to be applied to their construction charges.  This was not how  Elwood Mead 
saw it.  Whatever the legal theory of Reclamation might be, it was the policy of 
the Commissioner from December 1927, that districts had to accept a specifi c 
obligation to repay the additional construction expenses of building a power plant 
before they could expect to benefi t from power revenues.12
 Among other developments, the impending construction of Boulder Dam 
made it imperative, in Mead’s mind, to  separate power revenues from irrigation 
repayments; power was no longer simply incidental to irrigation construction.
The power plant on the Salt River Project had shown for years the potential for 
commercial power sales.13  Although the Shoshone power plant was smaller than, 
say, Minidoka, none of the power was required for pumping for irrigation, and 
the potential commercial development was consequently larger.  The Bureau was 
pursuing plans for expansion of the Shoshone power system, but found itself 
ensnarled in legislation from an earlier time.
 The news about power plant repayment was unwelcome to the  Shoshone 
farmers, but they quickly overcame their disappointment and began to negotiate 
a new contract to assure their rights.  Everyone knew that their power plant was 
now a profi table venture and was likely to become a cash cow very soon.  Bureau 
offi cials in Powell, Billings, Denver, and Washington continued to grapple with 
the meaning of Subsection I of the Fact-Finders’ Act.  Some wanted to hold off 
payment to Deaver and Shoshone until all power project costs had been repaid.
Since there were still three units of the project to be constructed, each of which 
presumably would incur a share in the power system expenses and profi ts, 
that position would mean the fi rst two districts would have to wait decades to 
receive any benefi ts.  Others said that the 1924 legislation clearly directed that 
surplus revenues be applied as soon as they became available, which would 
be very soon.  This was the position of the Denver offi ce, stated forcefully in a 
letter accompanying a draft contract dated March 5, 1928.  Powell, Billings, and 
Washington offi cials were, however, increasingly uncomfortable with the prospect 
of so much money going to the credit of these unit-holders.  They began to search 
for a means to hold it back.14
 The District Counsel in Billings initially proposed that a repayment 
contract be made for 20 years or less, presumably to prevent it from being too 
generous a deal for the farmers.  He based his position on the theory that power 
plant repayment was an entirely separate contract rather than an amendment to 
the 1926 contract, and therefore the repayment could not be made on the 5% 
of crop-return basis embedded in that contract.  Congress had repealed the 5% 
crop-return repayment method in the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926.  The 
Commissioner, in seeking clarifi cation from the Interior Department, pointed 
out that if their current contract were applied to the power plant the unit holders 
would pay nothing for the power plant until 1986, when the plant would probably 
be obsolete, but they would collect at least fi ve cents per acre immediately based 
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on present prices.  The Department solicitor ruled that while a contract could not 
be made on the basis of the 1924 repayment method, a new contract might go 
forward on the basis of a 40-year repayment period, according to the provisions of 
the 1926 act.15
 Knowing the water-users’ antipathy to increased assessments, the 
Bureau believed no contract would be acceptable to the Shoshone District that 
did not simply extend their 5% crop-return payment schedule to cover the new 
indebtedness.  Moreover, when the Commissioner instructed the Denver offi ce 
how to proceed with the contract he stipulated that any new contract include a 
provision for paying depreciation on the plant, estimated at fi ve to seven per cent, 
as a matter of operation and maintenance.  He also interpreted the forty-year 
repayment provision as having begun when the fi rst water-right contracts were 
taken out, in 1908 (more than a decade before the plant was even designed!), 
leaving a twenty-year period for the district to accomplish the repayment of power 
system costs.  Acting Commissioner Dent suggested to the Chief Engineer in 
Denver that he remind the water users that the plant is not presently showing a 
profi t if depreciation is fi gured in, as that “may make the district disinclined to go 
on with the purchase of an interest in the power plant.”16
 R. F. Walter, the Chief Engineer, seems to have been uncomfortable with 
his colleagues’ strategy of discouraging negotiation.  He proposed terms more 
attractive to the water users and continued to deal with them in apparent good 
faith.17  The Bureau sustained an appearance of serious negotiation throughout 
the spring and summer.  In August Elwood Mead himself met with the Shoshone 
District board at the Burlington Inn in Cody, and in September Secretary Ray 
O. West visited the Project with Mead and discussed the contract.  District 
negotiators worked to secure a 40-year repayment schedule that would begin in 
1929, but the Bureau resisted.  It seems clear that as the negotiations began both 
District and Bureau negotiators assumed that not only Shoshone and Deaver but 
the yet-to-be-built divisions of the project would share in the costs and benefi ts 
of operation of the power system.  But as contract negotiations stretched out, 
 Elwood Mead developed other ideas.  In the negotiations he was driving a hard 
bargain, apparently hoping to discourage the District.  At the Cody conference, 
for instance, Mead took the position that the District must agree in 1928 to pay as 
much as it would have had to pay if they had agreed in 1926, meaning they would 
have to make up two years’ payments when a new contract was signed and cover 
any operating losses during that same period of time.18
 On November 16, 1928, Mead made public his new view, in his 
introductory message to the Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Appropriations in charge of Interior Department appropriations for fi scal year 
1930.  He had previously circulated it within the department, particularly to 
those engaged in the Shoshone negotiations, as a confi dential memo, in search 
of responses.  The core of the matter, as Mead presented it, was that projects 
with power plants were deriving a subsidy from their power sales that gave 
412
them a striking advantage in repayment over water users on projects without 
power plants, and this problem could only be expected to grow worse as power 
revenues increased.  He cited situations on the Newlands and Minidoka projects, 
and dwelt on the Shoshone negotiations at some length.  He noted that expansion 
of the Shoshone power system was under consideration, the money for which 
would come from the Reclamation Fund, but that under current law the eventual 
profi ts would all go to the farmers, “and the revenue promises to be large.”  He 
proposed a legislative remedy, in which power revenues would be applied fi rst to 
power system expenses, then to construction debts of the project on which it is 
located, and fi nally back into the Fund to recover losses incurred in Reclamation 
development.19
 It seems unlikely that  Mead was as concerned with disparities among 
project repayment situations as he was horrifi ed at the possibility of power 
revenue leaking away into the hands of so many farmers.  Experience seemed to 
be showing him on every side that control of falling water was more important to 
the future of his Bureau than control of spreading water.  The Chief Engineer and 
he had already initiated specifi c studies for doubling or tripling of the power to be 
generated from Shoshone Dam, all of which was to be sold commercially.20  If he 
was to build a mighty Bureau, as indeed seems to have been his determination, 
he would need to seize control of power profi ts wherever they were not already 
contracted away.  It was in this 
environment that the end-game 
of the Shoshone power plant 
negotiations was played out.
 Mead’s was truly a 
move to cut the Gordian knot.
Power policy was ensnarled in 
old laws, arcane theories, and 
complicated interpretations 
of precedent.  Reclamation 
offi cials were uncertain how to 
proceed.  The superintendent in 
Powell, who had argued from 
the beginning for delaying 
power revenues until all 
construction costs had been 
repaid, nevertheless reminded 
Mead that power generation 
on the Shoshone project 
would have been impossible 
without the dam and reservoir, 
the cost of which the farmers 
were already repaying.  That 
common sense consideration 
16.3.  Buffalo Bill (Shoshone) Dam and the 
Shoshone Powerplant, Shoshone Project, Wyoming.
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was brushed aside at higher levels.  Chief Engineer Walter recognized the 
importance of capturing the power revenues, but wrote of it as something to be 
considered when entering into further investments in power.21  On the other hand, 
District Counsel Roddis encouraged Mead by referring to the law of trusts.  The 
power plant had been built by the Reclamation Fund, which was a trust.  Putting 
revenues from power directly into the Fund would result in faster repayment than 
would result from repayment contracts with the farmers, and as trustees of the 
Fund they were obligated “to use the trust estate to the best possible advantage.”22
 The  Shoshone water users, however, surprised Washington by their 
determination to contract for power plant construction expenses.  They were 
receiving active encouragement from the farmers on the Deaver District, whose 
own interest in the power plant depended upon a satisfactory contract being 
reached with the Shoshone people.  The District submitted a contract proposal 
abandoning their stand on repayment on a crop-return basis, accepting the 
Bureau’s insistence on a new, 40-year contract.  As they in effect called the 
Bureau’s bluff, Mead’s solution seemed the only way out for a Bureau desperate 
to retain power revenues.
 Late in November Assistant Secretary of the Interior  E. C. Finney wrote 
to the District’s attorney, Ernest Goppert of Cody, who had written him to try to 
move negotiations ahead,
It is believed that at the next session of Congress legislation will be 
proposed which would affect the disposal of the unsold interest in 
the Shoshone power plant.  Under the circumstances it is considered 
advisable to await the possible action of Congress at the next session 
before defi nite reply is made to your letter.23
In this manner Mead’s sword descended upon the knot.  He showed the House 
subcommittee overseeing Interior Department appropriations how power revenues 
could be redirected and they accepted his formulation before the end of 1928.
The change in policy, while not general, affected other projects besides the 
Shoshone.24
 The offi cial Bureau history of these events crystallized within the year 
1929.  Ignoring the genuine attempts of the District to negotiate a contract, Bureau 
apologists—notably Elwood Mead himself—put the onus on the water users, 
claiming that they had never been willing to repay construction costs on the power 
system.  He never mentioned the terms under which negotiations were terminated. 
The Bureau then treated the Interior Department Appropriation Bill passed 
March 4, 1929, as if it were a Congressional intervention rather than a clear result 
of Bureau policy.  It is true that Congressman Cramton had a record of watching 
carefully over the Bureau’s handling of the Fund, and there can be little doubt that 
he genuinely supported the change, but it was obvious then and it is obvious now 
that the Bureau did not negotiate in good faith.
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 Mead’s candor in the Interior Department appropriation hearing makes this 
perfectly clear.  In his introductory presentation he expressed his dismay that the 
Newlands project received $16,000 a year from  power while they only paid $8000 
a year in assessments for the power plant.  More shocking still, the South Side of 
the Minidoka project received an excess of more than $100,000 a year to apply to 
extension of their system, with no obligation to repay.  Later in the hearing, when 
Representative Cramton argued that the Bureau should never have entered into 
the contract they did with Deaver, Mead blurted out, “I am clear that, law or no 
law, we do not want to make any more contracts of that kind.”25  He went on to 
argue forcefully that the increased demand for power due to oil development near 
Powell made it likely that power would bring in more money than irrigation soon, 
and if it were developed in a business-like way it would be very large indeed, 
which he believed ought properly to belong to the Government.26  In light of such 
statements, the letters water users received from Washington during the year after 
the Mead coup were arrogant as well as insulting to those who knew how things 
had gone.27  Nevertheless, agents of the Shoshone Irrigation District continued to 
pursue the matter with the Department of the Interior.
 During 1930 and 1931 the District sent members to Washington to 
talk with Interior Department personnel, and set about preparing an elaborate 
legal appeal to the Solicitor.  The success of water users on the  North Platte 
Project in securing their own rights to the power plants there, which Mead had 
also attempted to terminate, gave them courage for this effort.  Briefs from the 
District and the Bureau were presented and a hearing held before the Solicitor 
in the spring of 1931, and on July 29, 1931, Solicitor E. C. Finney handed 
down a decision supporting the Bureau, denying the District any share in the 
power revenues.  The District’s appeal argued that the Act of March 4, 1929, 
was unconstitutional, in that it deprived them of rights guaranteed by the Fact-
Finders’ Act and their contract, but since neither of those instruments specifi cally 
mentioned payment for the costs of power system construction the Bureau’s 
defense was successful.  Apparently the District realized they could not get any 
farther by claiming treachery on the part of the Commissioner, so they fell back 
upon this much shakier ground of constitutional argument.28
 While pursuing administrative relief, the water users also turned to their 
Congressional delegation for help.  Senator  Robert Carey introduced a bill 
December 11, 1930, that would have provided a legislative remedy to the situation 
created by the Act of March 4, 1929, compelling the Department of the Interior to 
follow the provisions of the Fact-Finders’ Act insofar as the Shoshone Project was 
concerned.  The Bureau believed that the process of appeal to the Solicitor had in 
fact been undertaken primarily to obtain the Bureau’s brief so they could attempt 
to get favorable legislation passed.  Mead’s response to this legislation was swift 
and powerful.  He drafted an 8-page memo for Secretary Wilbur to employ in 
response to the House Committee, detailing the write-offs and adjustments that 
had benefi ted the Shoshone settlers already amounting (in the always-suspect 
Bureau calculations) to over $2½ million, and underlining the extent of the 
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subsidy they would receive if they got power revenues in addition.  He developed, 
in December 1930, the strongest argument yet for separating power and irrigation, 
embracing fully the potential of commercial power development.  This was the 
fi rst blast of the full-scale legislative initiative that was to occupy the Bureau for 
the next three Congresses.29
 Senator Carey tried to mediate some resolution between Mead and the 
water users toward the end of 1931 but found Mead infl exible.30  Ernest Goppert, 
the District’s attorney, in consultation with a Washington law fi rm, determined 
to fi le a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of the Interior, now Ray Lyman 
Wilbur, hoping to compel him to perform his duty to pay out proportionate 
power revenues to the District annually under the 1924 act.  To make this case 
they had to argue that the 1929 act was unconstitutional, a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment provision against taking property without due process.  The property 
in question, they alleged, was their right to power plant revenues guaranteed them 
by the 1924 act and the 1926 contract.  This was a far stretch, since the Bureau 
could argue in response, ironically, that the very efforts to negotiate for a share of 
the power plant costs that Mead had interrupted showed that the District knew it 
had no vested interest without agreeing to pay for the construction costs.  Blandly 
brushing aside the complicated negotiations discussed above, the Bureau simply 
noted that the Congressional intervention of March 4, 1929, made it impossible 
for them to comply with the 1924 act.  They did not need to argue that the 1929 
legislation was constitutional.
 The District tried to show, what District Counsel Roddis had seen at the 
outset, that there was no authority for the Bureau to build power plants except as 
part of irrigation projects: the construction charges, therefore, that they had been 
paying for two decades gave them those rights implicitly.  They also produced 
considerable evidence that all conversations regarding power plant revenues held 
between the District and the Bureau until late in 1927 had regarded the power 
plant as part of the Shoshone Project upon which they were paying construction 
charges and to which they had clear legal rights.  This should have been a strong 
argument, and might have been in another legal process, but not in this one.  The 
attempt to enforce a writ of mandamus was a diffi cult legal strategy.31
 The Bureau, perhaps stung by having lost the North Platte case, pulled out 
all stops to defend its position in this suit.  Their position here was stronger, of 
course, because of the Act of March 4, 1929, and a slightly different contractual 
history.  They bombarded Judge Graves, the solicitor defending the Secretary of 
the Interior, with advice and documents, even offering to send offi ce employees 
who were present at the 1926 contract negotiations to testify that the District had 
not then been interested in purchasing an interest in the plant.  The most useful 
of these communications was probably the suggestion by Acting Commissioner 
Porter W. Dent that mandamus cannot be used to enforce a contract right, but 
only a duty imposed by law.  The Shoshone case, he suggested, is a contract case, 
by their insistence that Article 31 of their 1926 contract is the ground for their 
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property right in the power plant.  Dent also reminded Graves that the District 
would not be without remedy if their petition were denied, since the Court of 
Claims exists to adjudicate contract disputes.  After noting that Congress was 
well within its constitutional rights when they passed the 1929 act, Justice Atkins 
appropriated Dent’s legal argument and rejected the District’s petition for a writ of 
mandamus on June 13, 1933.32
 The District and their lawyers immediately appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia.  They ignored the suggestion of contract 
adjudication in the Court of Claims and persisted in their pursuit of a mandamus 
ruling.  This was clearly not a good idea.  Justice Atkins had made it clear that he 
thought the merits of their case were worth considering, but not in this way, and 
they chose to ignore him completely.  The result should have been predictable.  
The appeal was argued February 5, 1934, and decided April 9, 1934.  Associate 
Justice Van Orsdel reaffi rmed every point of the Supreme Court’s decision.  He 
dwelt emphatically upon the fact that the Secretary of the Interior has discretion 
to determine the matters at issue, that mandamus does not extend to discretionary 
matters, and he reminded the District that the federal government cannot be 
sued without its own consent.33  Even then the District did not give up the legal 
fi ght.  In June they fi led a petition in the Supreme Court of the U.S. for a writ of 
certiorari, but it was quickly denied and they turned instead to Congress.34
 Congress was at that very moment engaged in the fi nal stage of deciding 
the fate of Commissioner Mead’s attempt to achieve a statutory basis for his new 
power policy.  When the fi rst attempt by the Wyoming delegation to overturn the 
Act of March 4, 1929, failed, Congressman Cramton introduced a bill, written in 
concert with Mead, to provide that power plant revenues on reclamation projects 
everywhere should be handled as they were after 1929 on the Shoshone Project.
H.R. 16976 was introduced February 9, 1931.  It was sent to the Committee 
on Irrigation and Reclamation, from whence it returned two weeks later with a 
favorable report.  Mead had drafted not only the bill but also Secretary Wilbur’s 
letter in support of the bill.  He argued that changing circumstances required this 
bill’s adoption, noting in passing that the policy developed with respect to the 
Shoshone Project had also been adopted on the Black Canyon Power Plant on 
the Boise Project and the Kennewick Highlands unit in Washington.  Mead was 
walking a fi ne line, trying to convince the Congress that power on the projects 
should be developed in a business-like manner while at the same time attempting 
to pacify critics of government entry into the development of commercial power.  
He also needed to reassure his audience that contracts presently in force would be 
honored.  Still, his goal was clear; as he told the committee, it was of “the utmost 
importance that a uniform law be adopted.”35
 The effects of the  Depression and the continuing problems of Reclamation 
fi nances had combined to drive Mead to search for a solution through power 
income.  There was an obvious fi nancial crisis within Reclamation.  They had 
been operating on loans from the general fund which stipulated returns to the 
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Treasury of $1,000,000 per year, they faced demands from Western interests 
for maintaining and even extending construction, and crop values, the basis of 
returns to the Reclamation Fund, had fallen by $3,000,000 in the last year.  Power 
revenue offered the possibility of meeting the loan obligations and funding 
continued development as nothing else could do.  In fact, it was almost certainly 
the desire to expand power production and sales at the Shoshone plant that forced 
his hand in 1928; he needed to increase revenue but could not do it while the 
disposition of power revenues was uncertain.36  Mead campaigned aggressively 
with members of Congress for his new law, showing them the amounts of 
money now being generated by Reclamation power plants, detailing the losses 
of ordinary Reclamation revenue, and painting Reclamation settlers on projects 
with power plants as undeserving government debtors about to collect unearned 
dividends in perpetuity.  It was a good case, and he made it outside Congress to 
such people as the editor of the Saturday Evening Post as well.  It failed, however, 
to overcome political opposition in the Congress.37
 The House, as will be seen below, carried a grudge against the Bureau 
for the manner in which earlier legislative maneuvers had been carried out.  The 
Senate, it seems, was more circumspect.  Senators seem to have been much less 
concerned with the details of Reclamation fi nance than Congressmen.  Senator 
Thomas Walsh of Montana, for instance, expressed surprise, in a letter to Mead 
in April 1932 that the Bureau was building power plants to subsidize irrigation 
on some projects.  When the Casper-Alcova project was authorized that month, 
Senators removed from the bill a provision that would have enacted Mead’s 
policy of returning power revenues to the Reclamation Fund after construction 
charges had been met.  They substituted an article stipulating that future profi ts 
“shall be disposed of as Congress may direct.”  Senator C. C. Dill of Washington, 
the author of that amendment, maintained that the Congress was not ready to 
decide Federal policy on this question.38
 When the Roosevelt administration was fully settled in Mead tried again, 
this time in 1934.  Administratively, the landscape had changed dramatically, with 
Harold Ickes now running the Department of the Interior.  The bill that went to the 
73rd Congress was a much more forthright assertion of a new order than the fi rst 
bill had been, and Ickes clearly had a large role in preparing it.  The core of the 
Secretary’s position may be found in his letter to the Senate committee hearing 
the bill:
Now that power development has become a more important feature of 
irrigation and community development, provision should be made for 
the full utilization of the latent and possible power developments created 
by the construction of irrigation projects.  The Government should be 
the agency to determine the economic and social benefi ts that may result 
from the full utilization of these power possibilities, and to use these 
latent and possible power developments in the upbuilding of the project 
and surrounding communities.  Operations of the past and present enable 
the Government to estimate the economic benefi ts and fi nancial returns.
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  Absence of some uniform legislation of the kind proposed by 
this bill has prevented the full utilization of possible power development 
at several large reservoirs.  Under existing general legislation the 
repayment of this development must be underwritten or guaranteed.
Repayment requirements of irrigation costs are such that agriculture will 
not carry the added burden of power development.39
This bill put power fi rst in a wholly new way.  Not only was he proposing to 
separate the power and irrigation functions of the Bureau of Reclamation, he was 
proposing to do it in the pursuit of an aggressive development of public power 
resources that subordinated the traditional irrigation mission of the Bureau.  In 
retrospect, Ickes made Mead’s 1931 bill look rather timid, more of a bureaucratic 
defensive ploy than a major policy initiative.
 Not surprisingly, Ickes’s bill met with virtually no resistance from the 
Senate.  S. 3375 was introduced April 13.  Ickes’s letter to Senator Alva Adams, 
Chairman of the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, was sent May 10.
On June 6, S. 3375 was read for the third time and passed by the Senate without 
a nay vote.40  It was a different story entirely in the House.  Introduced the same 
day, H.R. 9124 was sent to the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 
chaired by Representative Dennis Chavez of New Mexico.  Where the Senate 
Committee had seen no need for hearings, the House Committee scheduled full 
committee hearings starting in early June.  Determined opponents of Elwood 
Mead like Representatives Vincent Carter of Wyoming and Terry Carpenter of 
Nebraska led the charge against the bill, supported frequently by other western 
congressmen.  Taking away the actual and potential assistance power revenues 
offered to struggling farmers on Reclamation projects did not set well with them.  
Others were opposed to the idea of the Department of the Interior setting itself up 
in the power business.  The spectre of large power companies taking cheap power 
from these projects and selling it back at exorbitant rates haunted the hearings.
Things went so badly that Marshall Dana, president of the National Reclamation 
Association, a hand-picked mouthpiece of Mead’s, offered the suggestion that the 
committee not proceed to a vote on the bill until they had had a chance to talk it 
over with their constituents.  When the committee adjourned on June 14 
H.R. 9124 was clearly dead.41
 It could be that the House was more hostile than the Senate because it 
was more closely tied to local interests.  It could also be because there was a 
palpable current of hostility to the Bureau of Reclamation among the members 
of the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation.  At several points in 
the hearings on H.R. 9124, Representative Carter referred with a nasty edge to 
the proceedings by which Mead had got his way on the Shoshone Project power 
plant.  Within the fi rst hour he had drawn the Committee’s attention to the actions 
of Representative Cramton back in 1928, slipping the Shoshone provision into the 
Interior Department appropriation bill “the night before Congress adjourned… 
with no committee having had a chance to have a hearing on it.”42  On the fi fth 
day of hearings he interrupted the testimony of the Bureau’s chief accountant 
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to remind everyone that “the Cramton amendment” had never come before the 
Reclamation Committee, and that if a point of order had been raised against it 
when it was attached to the Appropriations bill the point of order would have been 
sustained.  He concluded, “I know that if the question of that policy had come 
before the Reclamation Committee it would never have been adopted.”43  Among 
the many reasons the bill died, this resentment surely bulked large.
 As the Bureau effort ground to a halt, the District resumed its attempt to 
get the 1929 act overturned in Congress.  In fact, they had never really abandoned 
this course.  Senator  John Kendrick took up the cause in 1932, when the Senate 
Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation held hearings on a bill to relieve the 
Shoshone District.  In these hearings an alternative vision to that of the Bureau 
regarding the events of 1928-1929 was developed, with Mead and Cramton as 
the villains.  J. T. Whitehead, spokesman for the Shoshone Irrigation District, 
testifi ed that Cramton and Mead worked together to produce the language for the 
1930 appropriations bill.  “Those hearings under Mr. Cramton were never open 
hearings.  Judge Winter was the Congressman from Wyoming at the time.  He 
did not know that that provision was in the appropriation bill.”44  The bill went 
through the House in four days and only ten days in the Senate.  The provision 
for the Shoshone Project was not germane to the appropriation bill, i.e. there was 
no money being appropriated for power.  Mead attempted the same thing with the 
North Platte Project power revenues, but the Nebraska congressman saw it and 
insisted on having it removed.  Senator Kendrick learned of it just before it passed 
and notifi ed the Shoshone people, but by the time they got back to him the bill had 
passed the Senate.  In testifying to this view of the facts Whitehead was careful 
not to challenge the wisdom of the new policy with respect to power revenues, but 
to focus on the sanctity of contract and the deviousness of Mead and Cramton in 
pursuing the overthrow of valid contracts.45
 These early efforts did not succeed, but they established the ground 
of a continuing attempt to get justice for the Shoshone District.  In 1933 
Representative Carter introduced H.R. 17, identical to the Kendrick bill of the 
previous year.  The following year was spent defeating the Interior Department 
bill, but 1935 saw a renewed offensive from Wyoming.  Representative Paul 
Greever introduced H.R. 6875 in March, and Senator Joseph O’Mahoney 
introduced S. 2286.  These bills tried to meet the Bureau half way by providing 
that the power revenues on the project that were properly allocable to the 
unconstructed divisions be handled according to the terms of the 1929 act, but 
that the revenues allocable to the divisions that had contracted with the Bureau 
be handled according to the terms of the contracts.  The House committee gave 
Greever’s bill a full hearing in May.  The Department of the Interior, in opposing 
the bill, denied that existing contracts in fact gave any rights to the districts.
They also insisted that it was bad policy, contrary to the principles set forth in 
H.R. 9124.  Since that bill had failed to pass, it seems strange that the secretary 
would be relying upon it in this way, but it is surely revealing of the mindset of 
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the administration.  They had, after all, been following the principles of Mead’s 
Shoshone policy without legislative approval on other projects since 1930.46
 The argument for the Shoshone District was carried by Ernest Goppert 
again.  Their strategy this time was to insist that the 1926 contract was valid 
even without specifi c language regarding the power plant, and the 1929 act 
was an abuse of Congressional procedure and administrative power.  Goppert 
repeated arguments developed in the court cases.  The water users had actually 
been charged enough to cover the power plant costs in addition to the irrigation 
system, but Bureau accounting procedures had kept the money in a separate 
account.  The Bureau had no authority to set up a separate power account.  All 
features constructed on the project were covered by the public notices of original 
and supplementary construction costs, and that was the only way the Bureau 
could legally proceed.  The District could fi nd no remedy in court only because 
they were prevented from suing the government without its permission.  In fact, 
Goppert testifi ed that Justice Atkins stated from the bench “that if this was a suit 
against a private individual, he would have no diffi culty in entering a decree in 
our favor.”47  Since the Department of the Interior had relied upon the 1929 act to 
rule against Shoshone while they ruled in favor of North Platte water users on a 
similar case, Goppert appeared confi dent that removing the 1929 act would result 
in a decision favorable to the District.
 On the second day of these hearings Goppert had the opportunity to 
question R. M. Patrick, of the Bureau legal division.  It was a very hard-nosed 
examination, in which Goppert pursued the way the Bureau handled its accounts, 
hoping to show that the 1929 act was part of a change in procedure that was 
unauthorized by Congress and kept secret from the water users.  Patrick admitted 
that original construction charges on the Shoshone Project did contemplate 
repaying the cost of the dam and reservoir, but since 1929 they were no longer 
charged against the irrigation districts.  More signifi cantly, he stated that the 
Bureau had had no objection to the provision in the Shoshone District contract 
(Section 31) for distribution of surplus power revenues, “because the amount 
was to be determined by the Secretary, and we felt perfectly safe that if a net 
profi t came to the district from the operation of the power plant, no portion of the 
profi t would be allowed to go to the Garland Division.”48  He tried to place all 
the responsibility for the midnight legislation of the 1930 Appropriation bill on 
Representative Cramton, exonerating Mead in particular.  And he attempted to 
dodge Goppert’s contention that the District had paid enough to cover expenses 
for the plant by saying that it was only money; if they were not charged for the 
power plant they could not have paid for it.  This straightforward exposure of the 
way the Bureau did business did not help their case.49
 The issues on both sides had by this time been fi nely distilled, and 
the questioning brought them out very clearly.  The committee, particularly 
Representative Robinson, seemed determined to fi nd the equity of the matter, 
inquiring into just what the water users themselves had been led to believe about 
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power revenues.  Both the Bureau’s goal of using power for development when 
irrigation repayment could not manage it and the District’s goal of re-establishing 
a right they felt was theirs by custom and contract got a full hearing.  The 
testimony from both sides showed quite clearly how the Bureau had pursued 
its policy by manipulation of its own cost accounting procedures, and Goppert 
was much more persuasive than Patrick on the matter of the District’s legal 
rights.  The simple, eloquent letter from Herman Krueger of Deaver, detailing the 
1928 negotiations and Mead’s public promises in Powell and Deaver that their 
interests would be taken care of carried considerable weight.50  The committee 
unanimously agreed to provide the Shoshone District the relief they sought.
In spite of that, and in spite of its having passed the Senate in June, the bill 
never came to a fi nal vote in the House in that Congress.  In the 75th Congress, 
however, Representative Greever and Sen. O’Mahoney brought it back.  The 
Bureau seemed resigned to its passage and put up little resistance, and without 
much ado in the way of hearings or debate the bill received President Roosevelt’s 
signature on April 8, 1938.51  After nearly a decade of combat in a variety of 
theaters, it seemed that the water users of the Shoshone Project had won their war.
 Although there was great celebration in Powell in the spring of 1938, 
it soon dissipated.  One-fourth of the unit-holders on the Shoshone Irrigation 
District held back the fi rst installment of their 1937 construction payment in 
expectation of some help from the legislation.  But the Bureau informed the 
District by telegram only a week after the bill was signed that they would do 
nothing without an opinion from the Interior Department solicitor, and concluded, 
“Believed very doubtful that it will result in any credits to water users at this 
time.”  They then passed the matter to the Interior Department.52
 The Bureau asked for a solicitor’s opinion, but Secretary Harold Ickes 
took the matter upon himself to pronounce as a matter of policy, rather than 
simply a legal interpretation.  He took a great deal of time to prepare it, while 
the Shoshone District wrote and cabled Commissioner John Page and Ickes 
repeatedly to learn where they stood.  Page tried to be polite and helpful, but 
Ickes was not cut from the cloth of those early Interior Secretaries who had 
nurtured government settlements all over the west.  He resisted the farmers 
and their political representatives, and it was not until September 1940, more 
than two years after the relief legislation had passed, that he communicated his 
determination to the Bureau and the District.53
 The legislation of 1938 had in effect done away with the infamous 
appropriation bill rider of 1929, authorizing and directing the Secretary to 
apportion power revenues according to the contract of 1926.  Commissioner Page 
had warned the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation that this was not likely 
to produce any result: “the bill in effect merely proposes to grant something, 
providing the contracts grant it.  But according to the Department the contracts 
do not do so, while the districts contend that they do.”54  Ickes emphatically 
closed the door.  No stranger to high-handed administrative action, he endorsed 
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completely the Mead history of the contract negotiations.  Ignoring the fact that 
the water users had understood themselves to be paying for the dam and reservoir 
for twenty years, he denied that they had paid anything for the power system 
and therefore they were not entitled to any of the profi ts.  Power was a separate 
element of the Project, he said, conveniently overlooking the fact that there was 
no legislative authority to do that in 1929; the Government alone had taken the 
risk and to them belonged the profi ts.  Point by point he rejected the District case, 
and brushed aside the clear intent of Congress.55
 The door so emphatically slammed did not stay shut, but the details of 
negotiations over the next 14 years need not weigh us down here.  In the end, 
by Act of Congress dated July 14, 1954, the Shoshone District was awarded a 
credit of $426,000 on their construction charges, an approximation of what they 
might have earned had the 1938 legislation been honored in spirit.  Deaver also 
received their proportionate share.  For their part, the Bureau cleared their claim 
on Shoshone power revenues and strengthened the fence around them where the 
other districts of the Project were concerned.  The Bureau resisted only feebly in 
the end, but the damage had been done long since.56
 What are we left with, then, at the end of what one Interior staffer called 
“this long, bitter controversy?”  Looking at the history from the local viewpoint, 
the settlement may be viewed as a testimony to the determination of the Shoshone 
settlers.  Certainly, from start to fi nish, they never abandoned their conviction that 
the dam and its attendant power revenues were part of what they had bargained 
for when they took out water rights in that valley.  It is interesting to note that 
one of the principal spokesmen in the 1954 hearings was one C. W. Fowler, 
then an attorney in Washington but also the owner of a farm near Powell that 
he homesteaded in 1910; he had been secretary of the water-users association at 
that January 1912 meeting when power revenues were fi rst formally discussed.57
These farmers were more than ordinarily stubborn in defense of right as they saw 
it.  They convinced three generations of Senators and Congressmen to carry their 
case in Washington, and ultimately achieved a good part of what they set out for.  
Perhaps we could say they won.
 If they won, however, it was at a terrible cost.  Twenty-six years of settled 
hostilities between the settlers and the Bureau left a residue of virulent anti-
federal sentiment in the Shoshone Valley that is a feature of life there to this day.  
The  Shoshone Irrigation District paid off its construction charges to the federal 
government in 1978.  The water-users knew they were paying off sooner than 
they would have done without the settlement, but they could not forget that they 
would have paid off even sooner and still be enjoying income from the plant if 
the original contract as they understood it had been honored.  There are people on 
the Project today who talk of legal action to restore those rights.  It is perhaps no 
surprise that the Shoshone Irrigation District built its own low-head power plant 
on its main canal and subsidizes its irrigation operations today with power plant 
revenues.58
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 Looked at as a piece of the history of the Bureau of Reclamation, this 
story should be chastening.  The staff of the Bureau seems to have groped their 
way through the matter of power plant revenues in general and certainly fumbled 
the Shoshone case.  They had to work out the law and policy of power revenues 
more or less by the seat of their pants; theirs was not the arrogance of power but 
the desperate bluff of people who know they are on shaky ground.  Elwood Mead 
grasped an essential point about Reclamation fi nance but pursued it with such 
devious arrogance and defended it with such blind passion that he alienated not 
only project settlers but a generation of powerful men in Congress.  In terms of 
his drive to bureaucratic dominance, Mead would give nothing away to Floyd 
Dominy.59  There were real obstacles to shifting the basis of Reclamation fi nance, 
but violating law and contract and exposing the underside of Reclamation 
bureaucratic methods in Congress surely made things worse.  It is quite possible 
that if he had acted in good faith with the people of the Shoshone Project, and 
with their elected representatives, Mead would have got his power revenue bill 
passed in 1935 or even earlier.  The merits of the policy change, after all, were 
recognized by Congress with the passage of the  Reclamation Projects Act of 1939, 
after they had dealt with the equities of the Shoshone matter.60
 Because Mead and Ickes were in the business of building powerful 
bureaucratic entities to compete in the modern world, and because the issues at 
the center of this story were key to that growth, this story also reveals in passing 
the processes and consequences of developing big government.  In 1928 Mead 
and Secretary West went to Powell and Deaver to meet with the people, as 
Secretaries and Commissioners had been doing for two decades.  By 1940 no one 
would have thought of such a thing.  Mead had been a very popular choice for 
Commissioner in 1925, but there was open enmity between him and Shoshone 
Project leaders from 1929 on.  In 1933 S. A. Nelson, President of the First 
National Bank in Powell and a pioneer homesteader, published his own account of 
the negotiations; he had been present at every conversation affecting the Shoshone 
water users since 1909.  It is perhaps enough to note the title, “The High-Water 
Mark of Bureaucratic Racketeering,” to catch the fl avor of this pamphlet.61  Both 
the pamphlet and this larger story seem to show that people were moved out 
of the center of Reclamation during the New Deal; power, under a variety of 
descriptions, moved in.
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From Self Suffi ciency to Colony: The Bureau of 
Reclamation and Wasatch County, Utah
By:
Jessie L. Embry
Abstract
 Wasatch County, Utah is the home of three Bureau of Reclamation 
projects, Strawberry, Deer Creek, and Jordanelle reservoirs.   All three transfer 
water from the county to Utah’s more populated areas.  The dams provide essential 
water for Utah and Salt Lake counties, but they have a negative impact on Wasatch 
County.  Residents lost grazing lands and the use of water.  Farmers adjusted their 
businesses.  Land was buried.  Once self-suffi cient farming and ranching towns 
are now bedroom communities for the Wasatch Front.  The reservoirs are Utah’s 
playgrounds, increasing the population with day visitors who require services but 
spend little or no money in the county.
 Welcome to Wasatch County, Utah, a series of mountain valleys with 
changing reputations.  First, they were the impossible to settle.  Then, they were 
the sheepmen’s paradise.  According to some records, ranchers shipped more sheep 
from the railroad depot in Heber City than anywhere else in the United States in 
the late nineteenth century.  Recreation was always important with fi shing in the 
Strawberry and Provo rivers.  But dairy farms and creameries were also important 
industries.
 All that has changed, and the Bureau of Reclamation played an important 
part in that transformation.  Heber City, Midway, and Charleston, once known for 
their sheep, horses, and cows, are now bedroom communities for the Wasatch Front.
Settlement of Wasatch County1
 When the Mormons arrived in the Great Basin in 1847, they settled on the 
easily accessible lands.  But areas such as the Salt Lake and Utah valleys fi lled 
quickly, and newcomers and a second generation looked elsewhere for land.  In 
1857, Provo (Utah Valley) residents working at sawmills in Big Cottonwood 
Canyon, southeast of Salt Lake City, crossed over the mountains to the south and 
examined a valley formed by the Provo River.  They were impressed.  When they 
announced their fi ndings in Provo, other residents rejoiced and some hoped to 
move.
 The sawyers were not the fi rst to see the valley.  Others had considered 
settlement, but there were two major obstacles.  First was climate.  There were 
rumors of frost every month of the year.  Despite these fears, cattlemen took their 
animals to the south side of the valley and started harvesting meadow grasses for 
winter feed.  During the spring and summer of 1857 other Utah Valley residents also 
explored the area and considered permanent settlements in the valley.
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 An even more pressing concern was the diffi cult mountain pass.  Provo 
Canyon, formed by the Provo River, was steep and narrow.  The fi rst attempt 
to build a road failed in 1852.  In 1855 the Utah Territorial Legislature passed 
a bill allowing the Provo men to construct a road.  The “Utah War” in 1857, a 
confrontation between the United States army and the Mormon pioneers over the 
attempt to replace Brigham Young as territorial governor, halted all road work.  
But before the “war” was over, a group of Utah County residents proposed the 
road again to Brigham Young.  Young met with Provo citizens on June 6, 1858, 
and the next day the group formed the “Provo Kanyon Company.”
 When the road was completed, Provo residents made plans to settle 
at the head of the canyon.  They held planning meetings during the winter of 
1858-59, and in that spring eleven adventurers moved.  Of the nine men there is 
information on, eight were born in England and one was born in Canada.  They 
were between twenty-three and sixty-two years of age.  By the end of 1859 
eighteen families lived in the fort that the settlers built to protect themselves from 
the Ute Indians.  The next spring there were sixty-two homes in the fort.
 The fi rst settlers named their valley Provo after the river, but then changed 
it to  Heber, after a Mormon Church leader Heber C. Kimball, to avoid confusion 
with Provo City in the lower valley.  They established communities where they 
could fi nd irrigation water along Center, Daniels, and Snake creeks.  Later, others 
established communities such as Lake Creek, Center Creek, Buysville, Daniel, 
and Hailstone, near available water, but even those farmers had to transport water 
to their farmland.  Those not close to a stream had to move the water farther.  
Lacking capital, farmers banded together in cooperative efforts to dig irrigation 
canals.  The limited water was then shared by all.
Strawberry River and Reservoir
 The settlers were always looking for additional water sources, and more 
were found in the mid-1860s.  Then some Utes, led by Black Hawk, responded to 
a smallpox epidemic and a cold winter and started stealing Mormon cattle.  While 
most of the raids occurred in central Utah in Sanpete and Sevier counties, there 
were some in Wasatch County.  To control the attackers, some residents followed 
the Utes east into the Uinta Basin.  There they also saw water and grazing 
opportunities.  They started working on a canal in 1872, using territorial and 
federal laws for fi nancial assistance and land ownership.  Then in the late 1880s 
farmers engineered and constructed a 1,000 foot tunnel through the crest of the 
Wasatch Mountains, thereby diverting water from the  Strawberry River to their 
farms.  At the turn of the century, they also converted lakes into reservoirs despite 
concerns from those in the lower valleys that their water supplies would be cut 
off.2
 Water was limited throughout the state, and other farmers were also 
looking for more water sources.  At the turn of the century, desperate Utah Valley 
farmers turned their attention to the Strawberry River for water, made possible 
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after the federal government removed the Ute Indians further east to the Uintah 
Indian Reservation.  Seeing the earlier success of the Heber Valley farmers, Henry 
Gardner of Spanish Fork in Utah County envisioned a similar effort to transfer the 
water from the Strawberry River only on a much grander scale.
 Gardner’s project proved to be too expensive and too complex for the 
farmers of Utah Valley.  But the passage of the 1902 Newlands Act which 
established a revolving fund as well as the predecessor of the Bureau of 
Reclamation made the project possible.  In 1903 the Utah County farmers 
presented their plans to the federal government, and within a year work began on 
the Strawberry Valley Reservoir.
 For the farmers of Utah Valley, the Strawberry Reservoir was a savior; 
they developed new farm land, older farms received additional water, and 
residents returned to the community of Payson which had been withering from 
lack of water.  As a result, historian Thomas G. Alexander concluded, “It is 
diffi cult to conclude that the  Strawberry Valley Project has been anything but 
successful.”3
 The project, however, cost the people of Wasatch County.  Besides the loss 
of water, they also lost grazing rights.  For nearly a quarter of a century, ranchers 
and farmers from the valley had leased summer grazing land in Strawberry 
Valley from the Utes.  The development of the Strawberry Reservoir limited 
summer grazing opportunities for the livestock of the ranchers and farmers 
of Wasatch County.  While the reservoir was under construction, the federal 
17.1.  This August 1910 photograph of a peach orchard on the Strawberry Valley Project 
south and east of Utah Lake.  The picture is looking toward the Wasatch Mountains.
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government leased the surrounding lands to sheepmen.  John C. Cummings 
from Wasatch County held the lease from 1905 to 1907.  During this time Utah 
County sheepmen tried to obtain permission to run sheep on the project, but the 
government told them that there were too many sheep and cattle already on the 
land.
 In 1907 Heber City residents acquired a lease from the Reclamation 
Service which allowed them to be on the land from June 1 to December 31, 1907.  
The Heber men were able to hold on to their leases by outbidding sheepmen 
from Utah and Salt Lake counties as well as other sheep owners from Wasatch 
County.  When the group did not exercise its option to renew in 1909, the property 
came open for bid again, and although the same group got the land, the cost went 
from $10,408 to $10,600.  In 1911 the highest bid was only $6,126.  The project 
engineer claimed that the sheepmen had kept the bids down, and he refused to 
accept any of them.  A group from American Fork and Lehi in Utah County fi nally 
bid $9,126, and Wasatch County residents lost the use of the Strawberry lands to 
Utah County ranchers.4
 A further limitation developed when Utah’s U.S. senators,  George 
Sutherland and  Reed Smoot, pushed through a bill in 1910 to protect the 
Strawberry watershed from overgrazing and to raise additional money to help 
repay the construction costs of the reservoir.  Wasatch County stockmen opposed 
the withdrawal of additional acres from grazing.  In a pamphlet, “Some Facts 
You People of Wasatch County Should Know,” some county residents claimed 
that Smoot was not being honest.  The pamphlet authors encouraged residents 
to vote for men who “by their deeds have demonstrated that they are for you 
good people” and not the “kind that sit idly by while big interests grab up your 
birthrights.”5
 The pamphlet authors’ efforts were unsuccessful.  Smoot continued to 
be a senator, and the Strawberry Water Users continued to control the lands 
surrounding the reservoir.  The confl ict between the Strawberry Water Users and 
the Wasatch County livestock men, represented by the Heber Horse and Cattle 
Growers Association and the Wallsburg Grazing Association, came to a head in 
1919.  The water users from Utah County and the Wasatch County residents both 
appealed to national organizations to resolve their differences.
 Wasatch County people felt that they had rights to the lands based on 
their leases with the Native Americans for the past forty years.  They questioned 
whether the government had purchased the lands properly from the Utes.  They 
contended that they could not survive fi nancially without  grazing rights in the 
area.  In a passionate appeal to the director of the Reclamation Service, the 
Wasatch County residents explained, “A grave injustice would be done the people 
of Wasatch County if these lands were again thrown open for competitive bids and 
they were refused these grazing rights which they have so long enjoyed and which 
are essential to the welfare of these entire communities.”  The letter continued 
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that the Utah County water users were mainly farmers, and “these grazing lands 
are not now and never were essential to the prosperity of these farmers and water 
users.”6
 The U.S. Forest Service agreed with the Wasatch County residents.  The 
acting forester wrote to the Reclamation Service that the watershed around the 
Strawberry Reservoir was “one of the most important in the State of Utah” and 
needed to be protected.  He described the cooperation that he had always received 
from the Wasatch County stockmen, adding that the Forest Service policy was 
to “give preference to small nearby stockmen who are so situated that they are 
dependent upon the use of the range for their livelihood.”
 The Strawberry project manager, however, favored the water users, telling 
the chief engineer, “I cannot see any good reason for considering the desires 
of the Heber people who have no interest in the project.”  He complained that 
Wasatch County residents had not bid the highest for the use of the land, resulting 
in “material loss to the water users.”  He insisted that the water users were as 
interested in the watershed as the Wasatch County stockmen and would work with 
the Forest Service.  The disputes continued, and the Secretary of the Interior, 
F. K. Lane, attempted to resolve them by asking the water users to lease land to 
the small livestock operators from Heber, arguing that there ought to be enough 
range for small operations from both counties.7
 The Utah County water users and the Wasatch County livestock 
organizations held a face-to-face meeting on October 24, 1919.  The livestock 
group wanted to see the land divided so that each group had control of an 
area.  The water users were willing to lease some property but not to divide the 
land.  The debate continued, and in November the two groups met again and 
fi nally came to an agreement.  At the end of the current lease, the Bureau of 
Reclamation would give the Strawberry Water Users a fi ve-year lease on the 
land, and the water users would sublease part of the area to Wasatch County 
residents.  Water users would be treated as other lessees until the reclamation 
project was completed and turned over to them.  Wasatch County residents 
complained because as sublessees, they had to work through the water users.    
The Reclamation Service refused to answer direct questions.8
 The battle continued.  Wasatch County residents asked Utah congressman 
 Don B. Colton to introduce a bill to put the grazing lands back into the Unita 
Forest jurisdiction.  In 1922 the Strawberry Water Users sent representatives to 
Washington, D.C., to prevent passage of the bill which they felt violated their 
contract with the Reclamation Service.  At the meeting George Fisher spoke on 
behalf of the Wasatch County residents.  After explaining that the Strawberry 
Reservoir took valuable lands away from stockmen, Fisher concluded, “The 
whole record of the people of Wasatch County is one of infi nite patience and 
forbearance as step by step their public lands were either disposed of or their 
use abridged.”  Senator  William H. King of Utah countered that the water users 
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had the right to the private land and it should not be transferred to the federal 
government.  With the support of leaders like King, the Wasatch County plan to 
transfer the lands to the Forest Service did not make it out of committee.9
 By 1926 when the sublease with Wasatch County grazers expired, 
the water users wanted to cancel any association with the Wasatch stockmen.  
Pointing out that the Wasatch County people were to have adjusted their grazing 
needs so they didn’t need the land and that the people had “no interest or right 
whatever in the lands,” the water users complained to the project engineer that 
they had suffered because of the sublease.  The lease was not renewed, and the 
Wasatch County stockmen lost all use of the land.10
 Wasatch County residents 
not only used Strawberry Valley 
for grazing; they also went there 
for recreation, mainly hunting and 
fi shing.  The fi lling of  Strawberry 
Reservoir provided additional 
opportunities for county residents 
and people from the Wasatch 
Front to fi sh and boat.  Within a 
few years, Strawberry became a 
prime fi shing hole in the state, 
attracting anglers by the thousands. 
In 1926 the  Strawberry Water Users Association took over the management 
of the reservoir and began developing its  recreational possibilities.  With no 
established guidelines, the fi rst fi shing villages sprang up at random along the 
reservoir’s shores.  By the late 1970s old house trailers, buses, cabins, and boats 
dotted the landscape in an unsightly clutter.  Uncontrolled development along the 
shores threatened to pollute the reservoir.  For nearly a decade there was a debate 
between Wasatch County offi cials, the Strawberry Water Users, the state board of 
health, and the Bureau of Reclamation on who was responsible for establishing 
and maintaining cabin regulations.11
 In 1978 an expanded Strawberry Reservoir threatened to fl ood out some 
cabins.  Cabin owners had three years to move their homes, but some simply 
abandoned them.  The county and water users argued over who should remove the 
buildings.  The water users said the county should because it had collected taxes.  
The county offi cials contended that the water users had collected the fees for the 
cabins.  In the end, the water users moved them under the direction of the Bureau 
of Reclamation.  Because of continued disputes with the water users, the National 
Forest Service now manages the recreational uses at Strawberry.12
 What has been the recreational impact of Strawberry Reservoir on Wasatch 
County?  It has brought visitors.  In the late 1970s the Bureau of Reclamation 
called it “Utah’s fi nest fi shing hole.”  Visitation increased from 168,629 in 1973 
17.2.  Rainbow trout caught in Strawberry 
Reservoir in 1918.
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to 248,338 in 1975.  A study showed that it was the sole destination for most of 
the visitors.  At fi rst glance it might appear that Strawberry added to the economy 
of Wasatch County, but that was not the case.  A Utah State University study 
found that these visitors spent very little money in the county.  About 80 percent 
spent fewer than fi ve dollars while they were at the reservoir; 44 percent spent 
nothing at all.  Most people came with their own supplies; they did not stop in 
other parts of Wasatch County to buy them.  While Wasatch County received very 
little revenue from Strawberry, its expenses were high.  The county offi cials were 
responsible for public health and safety, fi re protection, and law enforcement.13
 While the overall effects of the Strawberry Reservoir were negative for 
Wasatch County, Strawberry Valley was not where most county residents lived.  
The reservoir took away water and grazing rights and brought in additional 
tourists, but it did not affect residents’ homes.  However, the second Bureau of 
Reclamation project, Deer Creek, had a greater negative impact because it was in 
the Heber Valley.
Deer Creek Reservoir
 Plans for a reservoir on the Provo River developed slowly.  After World 
War I, water users from northern Utah and Salt Lake valleys turned their attention 
to Wasatch County in search of additional water for their growing cities and 
expanding farms.  One important source they saw was the unused high volume 
spring runoff in the Provo River watershed.  If this runoff could be stored, it 
would help solve a water crisis.  In 1922 water users from Utah and Salt Lake 
counties looked for a place to build a reservoir.  The site they selected was in 
Wasatch County, a short distance downstream from  Charleston where Main Creek 
from Round Valley and Deer Creek joined the Provo River.  There were, however, 
problems with this site.  Much of the community of Charleston would be fl ooded, 
and the Denver and Rio Grande railroad line and the highway from Heber City to 
Provo ran through the center of the proposed reservoir.  Wasatch County farmers 
also feared that with the construction of the reservoir they would lose precious 
water rights.
 The Utah Water Storage Commission and the Bureau of Reclamation did 
not consider the Deer Creek project a top priority and delayed plans.  However, 
between 1931 and 1935 there was a severe water shortage in Salt Lake and Utah 
valleys.  Utah Lake dropped from 850,000 acre feet to 20,000 acre feet.  Residents 
again appealed to the federal government for assistance, and in 1933 the Federal 
Emergency Administration of Public Works gave the  Provo River Project 
$2,700,000 to build the reservoir and other facilities.14
 In surveying the site, the  Provo River Water Users Association, a 
committee formed to represent the newly formed municipal water users, found 
that the dam would cover much of Charleston.  Though the committee reported 
that Charleston had some of the most valuable ranching land in the state, it 
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determined that the people along the Wasatch Front needed the water and that was 
more important than preserving the ranch lands.15
  Allen M. Winterton recalled that the state was purchasing the land for the 
reservoir about the time he got married.  “Our farm was one of those affected 
by the backed up water.”  When the water users offered to purchase his farm, 
he saw no other option.  Max North recalled that the Provo River Water Users 
purchased his father’s farm.  His parents “got as much out of it as it was worth.”  
Others were not as happy.  The local newspaper, the Wasatch Wave, reported that 
60 percent of the Charleston residents wanted more money for their land.  Most 
settled though, and by the end of 1938 the Provo Water Users Association had 
purchased seventy-two tracts of land totaling 4,117.31 acres.  The association paid 
$364,462.66 for this land.  When the sale was completed, the association sold the 
land to the Bureau of Reclamation.16
 Still some people refused to sell their property unless they received more 
money.  The  Provo Water Users Association condemned the property and took 
the owners to court.  At the end of 1938, the water users’ legal counsel, with 
the help of the Bureau of Reclamation’s attorney, fi led eight cases.  During the 
next three years, the Wasatch County District Court recorded thirty-eight cases, 
some dealing with the same people, fi led against the Provo River Water Users 
Association.
 The fi rst case was heard in the Wasatch County District Court in 1938.  
The Arvil Scott trial lasted twelve days, and the jury awarded the defendant 
$24,417 for 102.2 acres and $4,961 for the damages to the remaining 600 acres.
The Bureau of Reclamation complained, “This was greatly in excess of the 
appraised value… and grossly unjust.”  The water users appealed eventually to 
the state supreme court, but then settled out of court for 14 percent more than the 
appraised value.  Although this was the fi rst case to go to court, it was one of the 
last resolved and was not completed until 1941.
 All the cases tried in Wasatch County resulted in awards higher than the 
appraised value.  Because the Bureau and the Provo Water Users Association felt 
that they could not receive a fair trial with Wasatch County juries, they requested 
a change of venue.  Their motion was successful in only one case; the courts 
moved that case to the Cache County District Court.  There the jury awarded 
$2,000 instead of the $800 appraised value.  Because it was less than the Wasatch 
County courts awarded, the Bureau called the settlement “satisfactory.”
      Eventually the Provo River Water Users Association agreed to settle 
most cases out of court.  The association, for example, offered John and James 
Ritchie 14 percent more than the appraised amount for their property.  They 
justifi ed the increase since they could not win a change of venue and court costs 
were high.17
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      Some Wasatch County 
residents were bitter about 
Deer Creek.  In 1946 when 
the Forest Service asked 
local residents to stop 
overgrazing to protect the 
Deer Creek watershed,  L. C. 
Montgomery remembered 
what the construction of Deer 
Creek meant to his family, 
arguing that “not one drop 
of water of the entire Provo 
River watershed is entitled to 
be stored in the Deer Creek 
Reservoir.”  He continued that 
his family owned “one-fourth 
of the water of the Daniel 
Creek project and it was necessary to confi scate my property to protect it.”  As a 
result, he concluded, “The hundreds of thousands of people [who] would get the 
benefi ts of that confi scation ought to pay me for it.”   Moroni Besendorfer’s family 
lived above the dam in Charleston, but he knew all the families whose property 
was taken.  He recalled, “Some people just died because they were affected so 
much.  It took everything they had.  Some of the ranchers had beautiful homes 
down there.… It took big barns.  It took livelihoods and wiped them out.”18
 Deer Creek Reservoir changed Wasatch County in many ways.  Its 
immediate effect was to cover hundreds of acres of rangeland and inundate two-
thirds of  Charleston.  That town’s population dropped from 342 in 1930 to 323 
in 1940, a 5.5 percent drop.  Overall the rest of the county grew, partly because 
construction workers moved into the area.  As the government continued to 
purchase land, Charleston’s population dropped to 175 in 1943, a decrease of 50 
percent.19
 The Wasatch Front population continued to expand and demanded more 
water.  Even though the Wasatch County area already provided 95 percent of the 
water for 84 percent of Utah’s population, the Bureau of Reclamation suggested 
taking more in 1959 with an expansion of the  Deer Creek Reservoir.  According 
to the Wasatch Wave, while the reservoir had “become a beautiful and permanent 
part of our valley,” the plan to raise the water level had “opened old wounds and 
recalled bitter memories of farms and yards and roads and familiar landmarks 
which went reluctantly under water.  It could happen again.”  The planned 
enlargement would destroy homes, displace ninety families, and require the 
railroad, the Charleston bridge, two highways, the Charleston community center, 
and the Midway fi sh hatchery to move.  The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saint meetinghouse in Charleston would be “accessible by rowboat.”  The 
editorial concluded, “Wasatch County, wake up and fi ght for your land.”  Later 
17.3.  This 1940 photograph by Ellis Armstrong, later 
a Commissioner of Reclamation, shows CCC forces 
dismantling the Atwood house in the Deer Creek 
Reservoir area near Charleston on the Provo River 
Project.
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the newspaper complained, “Deer Creek was just completed a few years ago.
The people did not have the foresight at that time for the enlargement. Why is it 
feasible now at additional costs?”20
 The expansion was not made, but Deer Creek Reservoir continued to 
impact Wasatch County.  All valley residents lost water rights.  One resident, 
Calvin Giles, recalled that before  Deer Creek Dam the residents had free use of 
the water, then “they started to put weirs to measure water.…  We were used to 
taking all [the water] we wanted.  But as time went on, they regulated the water 
and cut us down severely in the valley.”21
 In addition, the  reservoir raised the water table, and since its water went 
directly into the culinary systems in Salt Lake and Utah counties, governments 
along the Wasatch Front encouraged Wasatch County communities to upgrade 
their sewage treatment facilities.  In 1953 Salt Lake City threatened to sue if 
Heber did not clean up its sewage system.   Heber City residents passed a bond in 
1953, and the system was completed in 1955.  The Wasatch Wave boasted that it 
was one of the best in the nation.  Within fi fteen years the system was outdated.  
In 1970 the Wave reported that sometimes “manholes. . . [spewed] raw sewage 
out of open ditches and on into canals and then into Deer Creek.”22   Midway also 
needed a sewer system.  In 1965 the county commission formed a sewer district 
for Midway, and the town passed a bond in 1966.  Alvin Kohler, the mayor of 
Midway at the time, explained, “We had Deer Creek Dam to the south of us 
and that water was being diverted into culinary use.  We felt that we weren’t 
contributing to the water quality for people downstream.”23
17.4.  Construction at Deer Creek Dam.
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 Communities also had to improve their water systems.   Charleston had 
unique problems because it was so close to Deer Creek Reservoir.  Residents 
there had used thirty shallow wells since 1875 to supply  culinary water.  In 1948 
the state board of health condemned the wells, claiming “hazardous surface 
contamination.”  The Salt Lake City Board of Health threatened not to use the 
milk from the town’s sixty-fi ve farms if the water supply was not improved.  
Charleston received grants from the Utah Water and Power Board and developed 
springs east of town.  The new pipeline served 270 people and 450 cows.24
 Eventually all of  Heber Valley’s cow population disappeared as 
technology changed and small farmers could not afford to upgrade their systems.  
Although the reasons were complex, protecting the water supply in Deer Creek 
Reservoir was one argument.  Elmer Kohler remembered that in the early 1930s 
many Midway residents started producing milk for the Salt Lake market.  For 
example, Kohler had 25 head.  However, in 1970 he explained,
I was crowded out.  We were on Salt Lake City’s drinking watershed.  
More of Deer Creek’s water was used for culinary.  Salt Lake was quite 
concerned about the drainage from corrals and farms going… into 
Deer Creek.  It would pollute their drinking water.  They just made the 
requirements tougher until we had to quit.
Kohler continued that the Salt Lake City Board of Health gave him a year to 
upgrade his facilities and recommended he visit a milking parlor in southern Utah. 
He complained, “I was only making about $4,000 a year profi t on the milk.  You 
can imagine how many years it would have taken to pay off a $100,000 place just 
to milk the cows.”25
 Unlike Strawberry, initially Deer Creek was not used for recreation.  
According to county planner Robert Mathis, “For the fi rst thirty years or so of its 
existence,  Deer Creek Reservoir was ruled off limits.  Commissioner [Moroni] 
Besendorfer always says that he wasn’t allowed to go swimming in Deer Creek 
Reservoir because he’d pollute the water.”  That policy changed, and as a result, 
tourists came.  In 1989 314,532 visitors came.  Those numbers dropped with the 
development of other state parks.  In 1999 197,547 visitors went to Deer Creek 
State Park, and 73,325 visited between January and July 2000.
 There were some cabin and camping facilities near  Deer Creek Reservoir, 
but they were never the problems that they were around Strawberry.  Even then 
the Utah Division of Parks and Recreation eventually removed any cabins and 
only allowed camping at Snow’s boat camp.
 However, many visiting Deer Creek are day users, coming up Provo 
Canyon with all their supplies and not going into Heber City or Midway.  As 
Robert Mathis explained, “The type of recreation that we’ve had in the county 
has largely been people packing picnic baskets and driving to the county.”  He 
compared recreation in Park City and Wasatch County, pointing out, “They are 
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milking the tourist business.  Wasatch County is not.  Despite some businessmen 
that would like to encourage it, I still see skepticism.”  Then referring to the study 
about the expenses at Strawberry, he continued,
But I think the point that was made in that study is real.  In our county 
we get a few dollars from the people that come through.  In Salt Lake 
City, they get $75 or $80 from the people who come through.  In Park 
City, they get more than $100 from each one.  We have an opportunity 
that we have not exploited to this point.26
Jordanelle Dam and Reservoir
 As the communities along the Wasatch Front continued to grow, residents 
demanded more water.  The Bureau of Reclamation considered several proposals 
including the Deer Creek Dam enlargement, but none were developed.  In 1963 
a dam was proposed for Jordanelle, six miles north of Heber.  The idea was not 
new; an engineer had suggested diverting Colorado River water from the south 
side of the Unita Mountains to the Wasatch Front as early as 1905.  The Colorado 
River Compact of 1922 and the Upper Basin Compact of 1948 guaranteed Utah 
a share of Colorado River water.  To transport this water to the populated area, 
Utah offi cials and Bureau of Reclamation engineers began planning the large 
and complex Central Utah Project in 1956 which included the Bonneville Unit, 
the largest section.  The Jordanelle Dam was to be “crown jewel” of the Central 
Utah Project.  It would help maintain a full Deer Creek Reservoir and store 
approximately 320,000 acre feet of exchange water which had been stored in Utah 
Lake for the Salt Lake Valley.27
 The Bureau of Reclamation planned to build the Jordanelle Dam near the 
border of Wasatch and Summit counties on land belonging to the Jordan family.  
John Jordan came to Heber in 1859.  He bought a ranch east of Heber and moved 
there in 1875.  John’s son George and his sons ran cattle and sheep there until 
George retired in 1931.  George also built a small resort with a store and cabins.  
The family brand was Jordan L, so they named the resort Jordanelle.28
 Before the dam could be completed, the U.S. Congress needed to approve 
the  Central Utah Project and seven counties—Juab, Utah, Summit, Wasatch, Salt 
Lake, Duchesne, and Uintah—had to approve a water conservation district.  In 
1962 fi ve of these counties—all except Duchesne and Uintah counties—approved 
the water district.   Walter Montgomery, Wasatch County commissioner, told the 
Midway Boosters that the county needed the conservation district to save its 
water interests.  “Wasatch County’s area is the birthplace of most of the water 
for the northern part of the state of Utah, and we can’t get a drink,” he lamented.  
Residents could not even drill wells because in 1921 the  Provo Water Users 
Association fi led on the underground water and claimed wells in Heber Valley 
affected their water use.29
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 By 1964 all seven counties approved the conservation district, but 
for the next ten years the  Bonneville Unit of the  Central Utah Project was a 
political football in the U.S. Congress.  In 1975 Clyde Ritchie, Wasatch County’s 
representative on the conservation district, supported plans for a dam at  Jordanelle 
because it would increase Heber Valley’s water supply by 20 percent and bring 
recreation to the area.30
 Other residents were not as supportive.  In 1978 the Bureau of 
Reclamation conducted a telephone survey of Wasatch County residents.  Many 
residents agreed with Ritchie that the dam would help the county:  30 percent 
felt it would bring tourism, 25 percent saw more employment opportunities, and 
21 percent said improved water.  On the negative side, 42 percent opposed the 
growth the dam would bring, 15 percent were concerned about safety, and 11 
percent expected an increase in crime.
 The Bureau of Reclamation study that year pointed out other benefi ts.  
Irrigation companies would receive 26 percent more water, which could boost 
farm income by a million dollars a year.  It would also bring 100 jobs and 
seasonal housing during construction.  Eventually the study pointed out that the 
reservoir would create 1,300 jobs but acknowledged most of the employees would 
probably commute from the Wasatch Front.  On the negative side, the study 
explained the reservoir would bury 3,060 acres and required use of another 3,000 
acres.31
  Jordanelle threatened the lifestyles of thirty-eight families, approximately 
100 people.  The dam’s water covered three businesses, farms, and a family 
cemetery, and also destroyed wildlife and river habitat.  County Commissioner 
Tom Baum complained, “Private land is continually being used here for public 
uses and we are losing out.  We have two reservoirs, fi sh and game land, 
mitigating land and with the possibility of the reservoir our private lands are 
slowly diminishing.”  Residents of Keetley protested that the relocated Highway 
40 would split their farms.  While the environmental impact statement talked 
about the recreational advantages for Wasatch County, some residents complained 
that the focus was all on leisure activities and ignored those who made their 
homes in the area.32
 The citizens had an even greater concern.  What would happen if the 
dam did not hold and the stored water dumped on Midway and Heber City?  Just 
before construction began, the Teton Dam, a large federally constructed project 
in eastern Idaho broke, fl ooding much of the downstream area.  Could the same 
thing happen in Wasatch County?  County commissioners were especially 
concerned when some geologists pointed out that a fault line ran through the 
proposed dam site.  One geologist, Leon Hansen declared the dam site was 
unsafe and said that if it broke “a minimum of 50,000 lives would be lost.”  Four 
geologists from Brigham Young University questioned the safety of the dam 
because of the geological conditions in the area.  The Bureau of Reclamation 
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geologists agreed there was a fault line in the area but argued “lay observers… 
and even experienced geologists are not qualifi ed to comment on whether or not 
engineering can compensate for site problems.”33
 As the groundbreaking date neared, many Wasatch County residents saw 
the disadvantages outweighing the advantages.  As Robert Mathis explained, 
“People were really unhappy.  They were unhappy about water rights, unhappy 
that the dam was here, and unhappy about the loss of tax base.  I thought most 
importantly they were unhappy about being left out of the basic planning.”  In 
1975, by a vote of 1,090 to 853, county residents voted against a request by the 
 Central Utah Water Conservancy District to enter a supplemental repayment 
agreement.  Along the Wasatch Front voters had agreed to the proposal by a 73 
percent margin.34
 Changes in the Central Utah Project continued, and Wasatch County 
residents became more upset.  While the original bill gave $20 million to 
provide pressurized irrigation systems for Heber Valley, in 1990 that was cut to 
a $500,000 feasibility study.  Other water projects would transfer water from 
Daniels Creek.  In March 1990 the Wave protested:
First Wasatch people lost rights to Strawberry water.  Then almost an 
entire community was uprooted from their family farms and homes 
to make room for Deer Creek Reservoir to store downstream water.  
Then the bureau took more homes and farms to store upstream Provo 
River water, and now their eyes are on Daniels water.  We’ll share our 
water—reluctantly, yes, but we will share.  However, we expect a fair 
deal, including a place in the front of the line for our own water and a 
sprinkling system, free of charge without having to grovel for it.35
 County commissioners Moroni Besendorfer and LeRen Provost went to 
Washington, D.C., to protest the loss of water rights in Wasatch County.  They 
claimed, “It would take twenty percent of the county’s irrigation water and 
dry up Daniels Creek in order to increase fl ows in the Upper Strawberry River 
tributaries.”  The county offi cials formed an unlikely partnership with state 
environmentalists and presented the argument that adapting the project to meet the 
needs of Wasatch County residents would also preserve the wetlands.  Congress 
modifi ed the legislation.  In 1996 the county had two representatives on the 
Central Utah Water Conservancy District Board, but “people were still somewhat 
distrustful.  They felt that by getting the [ Central Utah Project] Completion Act 
through that a deal had been struck which allowed us to receive some benefi ts 
from the project and prevented further changes in lifestyle.”36
 In 1994 Besendorfer thought people still worried about the location of the 
dam.  He said he tried to watch the construction, and “a couple of times they kind 
of ushered me away from the areas because they did not want me to see what was 
there.  Hopefully nothing ever happens because if it does, it’s not just going to 
affect our county.”37
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The construction of 
Jordanelle prompted the 
Bureau of Reclamation 
to look at recreational 
possibilities not only on 
that reservoir but also on 
the  Provo River between 
Jordanelle and Deer Creek.
The bureau fi rst asked for 
a fi fty-foot access right-
of-way.  Property owners 
protested that they did 
not want to deal with the 
trespassers and garbage 
that would come with the public access and that they did not want the area fenced 
off because they wanted their animals to be able to get to the river.  According to 
Tom Baum, “We are tired of giving up our land in Wasatch County so that others 
can come in here.…  We have already given up hundreds of acres of land here for 
recreational use and it’s our economic loss.”  Later the government condemned 
the fi fty-foot access area.38
 The river continued to be an issue.  In 1996 the Utah Reclamation and 
Mitigation Conservation Commission made plans to return the Provo River to a 
“meandering, blue-ribbon trout stream.”  The environmental impact statement 
talked about the benefi ts to those fi shing along the river and not the effects it 
would have on Wasatch County.  According to a Salt Lake newspaper article, 
“The county’s population is subject to dramatic seasonal surges.  Counting day 
visitors, the population could grow from 12,000 to over 100,000.”  When asked 
what could be done to deal with the impact, locals responded, “Pay an honest 
price for condemned land.… and then cough up a few million to help fi nance 
law enforcement, garbage collection, road maintenance and the other services 
visitors now get for nothing.”  The problems only got worse.  In 1998 the “series 
of meanders” were enlarged from ten to twelve miles.  Wasatch County residents 
again protested.  As Bill McNaughtan, who would lose 34 acres explained, “It’s 
an emotional impact, knowing your father and grandfather worked the land.”39
 The  Jordanelle Dam was completed in 1993 and the reservoir was fi lled 
by 1996, a year ahead of schedule.  Tourists immediately started arriving, fi lling 
the 180-reservation campground each weekend and meeting the 300-boat limit by 
11:00 a.m., with hundreds being turned away.40  In 1999 338,200 people visited 
the park; for the fi rst six months of 2000, the state park recorded 58,938 tourists.  
Boating continued to be popular, so in 2000 the State Parks cut the boats allowed 
on at any one time.  But Jordanelle, like the other reservoirs, provides day trips for 
Wasatch Front residents and does not bring a lot of money to the county.
17.5.  Jordanelle Dam and Reservoir
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 There is one difference though between Deer Creek and Jordanelle.  
Jordanelle is in an undeveloped area on the edge of Summit and Wasatch County.  
Park City is only a few miles down the road and has grown rapidly with seasonal 
homes.  Developers see great potential for similar subdivisions around Jordanelle.  
Wasatch County approved construction that would create a city larger than any 
other in Wasatch County and double the homes in the county.  Wasatch residents 
were concerned about who would provide the services such as building a fi re 
station at Jordanelle and handling sewage.  While the county issued bonds to 
cover these expenses, offi cials insisted that those receiving the services would pay 
off the debt.  Some Wasatch residents questioned that and were afraid they would 
pay as well.41
Summary
 During the summer of 2000, Deer Creek and Jordanelle were both down, 
and the water users’ association explained that if there is not an above average 
snow fall, water use will have to be restricted along the Wasatch Front.  Residents 
of Salt Lake and Utah valleys may no longer have green lawns and all the water 
they want.  They dread the loss of water resources.42  They have come to depend 
on the water from these two reservoirs just as residents of southern Utah Valley 
depend on Strawberry Reservoir.  Yet, Wasatch County residents have experienced 
the same losses throughout the twentieth century so that the more populated 
Wasatch Front could have water.  Over the years the communities in Wasatch 
County have changed from self suffi cient ranching and farming communities to 
bedroom communities and playgrounds for Utah.
Jessie Embry is associate director of the Charles Redd Center for Western 
Studies at Brigham Young University and has written numerous books and 
articles, including A History of Wasatch County (Salt Lake City: Utah State 
Historical Society, 1996).
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Private Power at Boulder Dam:  Utilities, 
Government Power, and Political Realism
By:
Sarah S. Elkind
 Several years ago, I toured  Hoover Dam.1  I was unprepared for its scale 
and was struck by the bare logistics posed by its construction.  The thing that 
stayed with me most, however, was the fact that  Southern California Edison and 
several other private fi rms operated turbines in the dam.  Indeed, I am not the only 
one who has been surprised by this.  The Water Power Act of 1920 specifi es that 
all hydroelectric power developed in association with federal fl ood control and 
irrigation go fi rst to publicly-owned power distributors.  Many early supporters of 
the dam assumed it would contribute to the growth of public power in the United 
States.  So how did this dam come to symbolize the triumph of public-private 
cooperation instead of public enterprise?
 Boulder Dam, as Hoover Dam was known throughout the 1920s, was 
conceived in the height of the Progressive Era’s public power campaign.  The 
most important proponents of the dam did not, however, emphasize the dam as 
a boon to public electrical systems.  Boulder Dam forced southwestern leaders 
into heated discussions of water rights and the relations between the states and 
Washington.  They conceded use of the dam to private utilities, rather than waging 
two political battles: one for the dam and a second for public hydroelectric 
power development at the dam.  Indeed, by itself the battle for the dam raised 
the specters of interstate and international rivalry, and an ever more imperial Los 
Angeles.2  It is this compromise that I wish to examine here.
 In 1928 Congress fi nally passed the  Boulder Canyon Project Act.  
Ostensibly to control fl ooding in Yuma, Arizona, and in the Imperial Valley, 
the dam promised to improve irrigation and urban water supply, curb Mexican 
claims to the Colorado River, and increase hydroelectric power available to local 
mines and, once the problems of long-distance power transmission were solved, 
to distant cities.3  Because the  Water Power Act of 1920 stipulated that all power 
from federal dams go fi rst to public utilities, early backers assumed that federal 
development of the Colorado would bring public power to the Southwest.  As the 
largest single water project undertaken in the 1920s, this was an important test 
case for federal dam construction and the politics of public ownership.
 By 1928 proponents of the Boulder Canyon Project Act no longer insisted 
on public hydropower on the Colorado because the private utility industry’s 
opposition threatened to defeat the project altogether.  For its part, the utility 
industry regarded a federal dam as direct competition, but also opposed federal 
construction on principle.  Any expansion of public enterprise, they argued, 
posed a general threat to private enterprise.  The utility industry had some special 
claims on the Colorado River because Southern California Edison had applied 
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for hydropower permits on the river long before Congressmember Philip Swing 
introduced the fi rst Colorado River bill.  In political terms, these private claims 
were most important when they stimulated Arizona’s and Nevada’s protests 
that a federal dam would help Southern California in trying to steal their water, 
power, and revenues.  In the end, private utilities won at Boulder Dam, gaining an 
important foothold in their efforts to forestall the wholesale substitution of public 
for private utilities in the United States.
  Boulder Dam stands as a compromise between the Progressives’ desire for 
comprehensive, public development of natural resources, and conservative fears 
of excessive federal power.  Federal funds paid for the dam, and the Bureau of 
Reclamation operates it, but private as well as public utilities use its hydropower.  
This arrangement evolved for three reasons: proponents compromised on the 
public power because they viewed other aspects of the dam as more important; 
rhetoric about the dangers of expanding federal authority threatened to scuttle 
the dam; and, fi nally, the need—again political—to limit the outlay of federal 
funds for construction of Boulder Dam made fi nding buyers of hydropower more 
important than protecting public utilities.  Boulder Dam, the fi rst cash-register 
dam and a strange amalgam of public and private enterprise, sprouted from the 
intersection of the Progressive Era and the Red Scare.
A River in Great Demand
 A number of overlapping natural resource desires inspired Boulder Dam.  
Farmers in Mexico and California’s Imperial Valley wanted water for irrigation.  
Residents of Yuma, Arizona, and the Imperial Valley also needed protection from 
the Colorado River fl oods and silt that threatened their fi elds, waterworks, and 
homes, but found that development in one part of the valley increased problems 
elsewhere.  Mining companies in Arizona and Nevada wanted cheap electricity 
from the river, as did the many Arizona farmers who used electricity to pump 
ground water onto their fi elds.  Los Angeles hoped for Colorado River water 
and power.  Meanwhile, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming eyed 
developments along the southern section of the river with deep suspicion.  They 
feared that these more rapidly growing communities would claim all the water 
rights fi rst, and thus preclude their own development.
 American irrigation along the lower Colorado River began in 1901 when 
Charles R.  Rockwood’s California Development Company brought water through 
Mexico into the Imperial Valley.4  In February 1905 fl oods breached Rockwood’s 
levees, swamping fi elds under silt and mud, tearing up railroad track, and surging 
into Salton Sink.  Two years later, the Southern Pacifi c Railroad repaired its 
broken track and some levees, but tensions between the California Development 
Company and offi cials in Mexico impeded efforts to fi x other problems left by 
the fl ood.5  By the 1910s political unrest in Mexico complicated repairs, and, 
naturally, Mexican irrigators resisted any changes that might reduce the water 
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reaching their fi elds.  By the 1910s these problems inspired proposals for an All-
American Canal.
 An  All-American Canal would carry Colorado water directly to Imperial 
Valley fi elds, without crossing the Mexico border.  This would eliminate many 
of the logistical complications of trying to build and maintain waterworks 
that crossed an international border.  Supporters expected the All-American 
Canal to increase the amount of water available to Imperial Valley farms by 
bypassing leaking canal sections south of the Border, and the Mexican farmers 
who had come to rely on the old waterworks.6  Proponents of the All-American 
Canal also lobbied for their project on purely emotional grounds.  In the years 
after Rockwood built the original Imperial County canals, American investors 
developed and leased thousands of acres of irrigated farmland in northern Baja 
California.  Wealthy Los Angeles businessmen, including Harry Chandler of 
the Los Angeles Times, routinely rented land to Chinese and Japanese farmers, 
even though Chandler decried the Asian presence in California.  Many southern 
Californians loathed Chandler for giving American water to Asians, and for 
supporting what they saw as an incipient, dangerous Asian colony so close to Los 
Angeles.7  That these wealthy Americans then also used the cloak of America’s 
international responsibilities to ensure their own profi ts reeked of political 
infl uence, profi teering, and cut-throat economics.  The legacy of these early 
confl icts over Mexican water rights, race, and the shape of the American economy 
continued to shape Colorado River policy for many years.
 The Colorado also attracted attention from federal reclamation engineers 
and hydroelectric utility corporations.  In 1902  Joseph B. Lippincott surveyed 
the lower Colorado River and identifi ed Boulder Canyon as one of the most 
promising sites for federal development.8  Representatives from  Southern 
California Edison joined federal surveys of the river in 1902 and 1921, but 
because of the costs of damming a powerful river like the Colorado, and because 
the Mojave mining district had only limited power needs, Southern California 
Edison concluded that it could not expect to make an immediate profi t from 
power sales.  Only with effi cient  long-distance power transmission technology 
developed in the early 1920s could Southern California Edison, or the Bureau 
of Reclamation for that matter, expect to sell power to a market large enough to 
recoup construction costs.9
 Once long distance transmission was possible,  Southern California Edison 
applied to the Federal Power Commission for permits to develop hydropower 
dams at Boulder, Glen, and Pyramid Canyons.10  By 1924 Southern California 
Edison had additional incentives for these permits.  A drought reduced their 
hydropower generating capacity in California.  Meanwhile, growing resistance 
to Los Angeles’ expanding demand for water and hydropower in California 
promised to make future development for Southern California consumers ever 
more diffi cult.  This crisis environment allowed Southern California Edison 
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to emphasize the public services it provided both in developing new irrigation 
resources and by meeting consumers’ power needs during the crisis.11
 Los Angeles began its own Colorado campaign about the same time as 
Southern California Edison.  The Los Angeles city council declared its interest “in 
the building of the dam at Boulder Canyon and allocation of the power privileges 
at that dam.”12  At a public hearing in 1922, Los Angeles representatives called 
for federal dam construction and municipal distribution of hydropower consistent 
with the 1920 Federal Power Act.13  Many other Angelenos, however, considered 
electricity from the Colorado so important, that they were not so picky.  They 
agreed that power revenue should subsidize dam construction even if this 
increased the cost of electricity.  They claimed to have no opinion about who 
should manage Colorado River fl ood control even though fl ood control could 
affect hydropower operations.  Most importantly, they professed not to care who 
else received electricity from the dam even though this, too, could increase power 
prices or reduce available supplies.14  In their ostensible indifference on these 
questions, Angelenos distanced themselves from some of the most contentious 
issues surrounding the Colorado River.  They also left open a door for the 
intermingling of public and private development that eventually evolved here.
 Power supplies outweighed other considerations because Los Angeles 
quickly outgrew the Department of Water and Power’s generating capacity.  In 
1914  Los Angeles voters approved bonds for a public power system.15  By 1919, 
and over the objections of the Los Angeles Times and utility fi rms, the city of 
Los Angeles had arranged to purchase Southern California Edison’s grid inside 
the city.  The Department of Water and Power planned to buy electricity from 
Southern California Edison until it completed the ill-fated hydroelectric plant and 
reservoir in San Francisquito Canyon.16  But even before the  Saint Francis Dam 
was fi nished, growing power consumption strained supplies so much that even 
the combined electric capacity of the municipal and private systems could not 
meet the city’ needs.  The Department of Water and Power could not guarantee 
power supplies to new “factories, smelters, or refi neries.”17  The projected power 
shortages under public management and the failure of the Saint Francis Dam 
allowed private utilities to paint public power as unsafe and badly managed 
throughout the Colorado River debates.18
 Los Angeles did not turn immediately to the Colorado River for additional 
electricity.  First, the Department of Water and Power went “prospecting for other 
power sites.”  Because Southern California Edison, Southern Sierras Power, 
and other utilities had long since claimed or developed the best power reservoir 
sites in the region, the city had few options.  At one point Los Angeles even 
tried to take a Southern Sierras Power Company facility in the Owens River 
Gorge by eminent domain.19  Detractors criticized Los Angeles for pursuing the 
Colorado River, frequently citing the Owens Valley confl ict as evidence of the 
city’s imperial heartlessness.  In fact, its plans for the Colorado did make Los 
Angeles look aggressive and over-confi dent.  Few cities, after all, challenged state 
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governments other than their own.  The decision to pursue the Colorado, however, 
decreased political confl ict in the arenas most important to Los Angeles’ future.  
By the 1920s Los Angeles could not expand its water or power networks in 
southern California without creating even greater opposition than they had in the 
Owens Valley.  Had the city turned instead to northern California’s streams, Los 
Angeles would likely have created determined enemies in state politics.20  Boulder 
Canyon represented a reasonable alternative because it solved Los Angeles’s 
problems without increasing political confl ict in California.
 Of course, Los Angeles wanted more than electricity from the Colorado 
River.  The 1923-1924 drought that threatened the city with power shortages also 
raised the specter of future water famine.  In this context, William Mulholland 
informed the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation in 1924 that 
Los Angeles wanted 1000 acre-feet a year of Colorado water to supplement 
its other supplies.  The drought prompted Los Angeles voters to approve both 
the aqueduct from the Colorado and the Metropolitan Water District.  Other 
cities in southern California also saw the Colorado as a solution to their water 
and power problems.  Riverside advocated construction of a dam “in response 
to the necessities of the cities and the people in these southwest states, with 
Government development and Government construction and Government sale, 
providing the waters cheaply at cost and the power to the people.”21  The City of 
Long Beach hoped Colorado River power would reduce electricity costs enough 
to help  it compete with Riverside, Los Angeles, and other Southern California 
communities.22  This interest in the Colorado changed the whole question of 
Colorado River development.  Los Angeles, Riverside, and Long Beach would 
buy enough electricity to make the dam economically feasible.  They had enough 
congressional representation and political pull to get the project built.  The city’s 
designs on the river confi rmed Arizona’s and Nevada’s worst suspicions about 
Los Angeles and the real purpose of the dam.23
 Interest in the Colorado, of course, was not limited to Imperial County 
and Los Angeles, but no major development could take place until all the 
seven states along the river reached an agreement on water rights.  The federal 
government had jurisdiction over the Colorado River as a navigable river, and 
as a hydroelectric power resource in the public domain.  So any community, 
state or private corporation that wished to develop the river needed federal 
approval.  In addition, any project would establish water rights on the river by 
prior appropriation that could interfere with subsequent development.  Federal 
jurisdiction gave state offi cials the opportunity to lobby against projects in other 
states, but thus blocking development was the only means by which state offi cials 
could protect their constituents’ interests in the Colorado.  So no project could get 
through Congress until state offi cials felt reasonably assured that their constituents 
would have access to Colorado River water when they needed it.  The  Colorado 
River Compact, signed by all the Colorado basin states except Arizona, and 
ratifi ed by Congress in 1928, fi nally resolved this deadlock, by allocating half 
of the water in the river to the so called Upper Basin States of Colorado, New 
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Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, and half to the Lower Basin states of Arizona, 
California, and Nevada.24
 The  Colorado River Compact did not entirely resolve interstate disputes.  
Because the Compact did not allocate water within each half of the basin, 
the states still had to agree on how to develop their half of the river.  Of the 
lower basin communities interested in the Colorado, only Los Angeles was 
actually poised to use waters impounded by a dam in Boulder Canyon.  Thus, 
only California had the means and need to establish rights to the lower basin’s 
portion of the river.  Arizona’s state offi cials had refused to sign the Colorado 
Compact because they feared that California, and specifi cally Los Angeles, would 
appropriate all of the lower basin’s water, and thus leave Arizona dry.  To protect 
its future access to the Colorado, Arizona therefore consistently disputed federal 
jurisdiction over the Colorado and dismissed California’s plans as Los Angeles’ 
illegitimate scheming.
 By the mid-1920s the fate of a dam at Black or Boulder Canyon rested on 
the resolution of several entrenched confl icts.  Los Angeles and Imperial County 
hoped for federal construction of a reservoir for hydropower, fl ood control, 
irrigation, and urban water 
supply.  Southern California 
Edison expected to build private 
hydroelectric facilities on the 
Colorado.  Arizona wanted to 
block any development that 
might establish water rights 
in California.  Colorado, New 
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, 
secure in the belief that the 
Colorado River Compact 
protected their futures, still had 
to decide whether to side with 
California or with Arizona in 
the dispute over Boulder Dam.
The upper basin states hoped federal construction at Boulder Dam would ease 
the passage of upper basin projects, but they had no assurance that California 
would support funding for these projects or that California would refrain from 
campaigning to limit upper basin use in violation of the Colorado Compact.25
Eastern voters and some residents of the upper Colorado Basin dismissed Boulder 
Dam as a lavish federal expenditure that served special interests in California 
rather than the national good.26  Meanwhile, the United States’ resolution of 
 Mexico’s claims to the Colorado, the Rio Grande, and other border rivers in 
1944 added to the demands for Colorado River water by guaranteeing Mexico 
1,500,000 acre feet of water from the Colorado each year without specifying who 
had to give up their water to meet this obligation.
18.1.  Black Canyon during early preparations for 
construction of Boulder Dam.
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The Limits of Federal Authority: The Hydropower Debate
 Clearly these confl icts complicated Colorado River politics.  A closer 
look at just one of the confl icts, hydroelectric power development, demonstrates 
that  Boulder Dam was a product of a national debate over political philosophy, 
not a localized dispute over water rights. Even so, the water resource confl icts 
were important.  Indeed, the very intractability of inter- and intrastate disputes 
over water made it possible, indeed necessary, for supporters of the dam to 
marginalize the power question.  Arizona’s unbending opposition to the Colorado 
River Compact magnifi ed the threat of utility corporation opposition to the dam 
and made the staunchest supporters of the dam all the more eager to compromise 
the Water Power Act of 1920 for the sake of the Colorado River project.  But 
public power development was not ancillary, and the evolution of debate over 
hydropower demonstrates how participants in that debate used contemporary 
political philosophy and rhetoric to shape public policy for the twentieth century.
 Although Arizonans’ objections to Boulder Dam emphasized the threat 
that outsiders—including California, federal offi cials and the private utility 
corporations—posed to their state, the hydropower development question must be 
considered in a broader context.  Philip Swing proposed a federal dam at a crucial 
moment in the negotiation between federal and local governments and between 
public and private enterprise in America.  Public utility advocates nationwide 
sought to strike a balance between the business-centered “normalcy” of Coolidge 
and Harding on the one hand, and public demand for public services on the other.  
This debate revealed deeply-rooted anxieties about federal authority.  In nearly 
every commentary on Boulder Dam, this fear of public authority appears in 
warnings of federal intrusion on local autonomy, and of government displacement 
of private enterprise.  So, when private utilities mobilized the rhetoric of limited 
federal authority, they bound their interests and the principles of private enterprise 
fi rmly to Americans’ desire to use federal monies to meet local priorities, without 
losing local autonomy.  The utilities’ ability to navigate these confl icting impulses 
about public services and private enterprise, and about federal assistance within 
local control ultimately left proponents of federal dam-building with little room to 
maneuver on hydropower development at the great dams.
 Even though westerners focus on the Colorado, debate over power 
development there echoed national discussions of the fate of Wilson Dam at 
Muscle Shoals, Alabama.27  Approved as part of the National Defense Act of 
1916, Wilson Dam was intended to power a cyanamid plant producing nitrate-
based explosives.  After the war, private companies sought control of the 
dam, even though the authorizing bill prohibited the federal government from 
privatizing the facility after the war.28  Alabama utility corporations sought to add 
Wilson Dam to their own power networks.  Henry Ford, meanwhile, promised 
to produce 40,000 tons of nitrate fertilizer for sale at only an eight percent profi t, 
if the federal government completed and maintained the dam, and gave him a 
hundred-year lease on the property.29  At the same time, public power advocates 
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suggested that the Secretary of War complete the dam, build distribution lines, sell 
electricity to public utilities, and use the proceeds to fund research on fertilizers.30
The senate debate on Muscle Shoals turned on two issues: should public agencies 
or private companies operate the dam; and, should the dam power the fertilizer 
production at the cyanamid plant or provide electricity to domestic and industrial 
consumers throughout the region?
 Presidents Coolidge and Hoover vetoed bills for public operation of 
Muscle Shoals in 1928 and 1930, despite the fact that both the Water Power Act of 
1920 and the National Defense Act of 1916 seemed to mandate public operation 
of the hydropower plant at Muscle Shoals.31  These vetoes, like the debate over 
public power at  Boulder Dam, refl ected deep divisions over private enterprise 
in America.  Americans wanted inexpensive power, but could not agree whether 
private or public power would yield the lowest rates.  They also responded to 
political statements about the benefi ts of small government, even as they looked 
to public offi cials to control the political, economic and social infl uence of major 
corporations.
 In Arizona this ambivalence appeared throughout the debate over the 
Colorado River Compact and the Boulder Canyon Project Act, even though 
Arizonans were more preoccupied with California.  California appeared 
frequently in the correspondence that Arizona congressional representative Carl 
Hayden received expressing alarm that the Bureau of Reclamation’s dam would 
only feed Los Angeles’ insatiable demand for water and electricity.  Many of 
these letters urged Hayden to push for a federal dam at Glen Canyon to better 
irrigate Arizona farms.32  Senator Henry F. Ashurst also complained that the 
Colorado River Compact and the Boulder Canyon Project disproportionately 
benefi ted California.  He complained that California had negotiated in bad faith 
during the conferences that yielded the Compact, and he cited the creation of the 
 Metropolitan Water District of Southern California in 1926, three years before the 
Boulder Canyon Project Act passed, as proof.33
 Some Arizonans favored the Colorado River Compact because they saw 
in federal development a means to counter California’s considerable political 
infl uence.  Arizona’s delegation to the American Association of Engineers, 
for example, projected that the Compact would promote growth for Arizona 
agriculture, mining, and industry by increasing energy supplies.34   Others 
expected the Compact to bring more federal fl ood control, irrigation, and 
hydropower to Arizona.35  More pessimistic Arizonans resigned themselves to 
California’s use of Colorado River resources for which Arizona had no immediate 
need, but proposed that California at least pay Arizona for the use of Boulder Dam 
electricity.36
 In keeping with the national debate in the late 1920s on the expansion 
of federal authority, the fate of Arizona’s autonomy featured prominently in the 
Colorado River debate.  The Phoenix Real Estate Board suggested that the dam 
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might bolster local control because the federal government could turn the dam 
over to an independent irrigation or power district.37  Other observers cautioned 
that private development would transfer even more resources to California than 
would the federal plan.  In this light,  Southern California Edison’s application 
for a permit to develop Glen Canyon Dam represented an “attempt to acquire 
control of the Colorado River,”38  because Southern California Edison had 
already declared and justifi ed its intention to sell Colorado River electricity to 
Los Angeles consumers.39  Although Arizona’s relationship with California, not 
private utilities or the growth of federal authority, dominated these discussions, 
the public power debate permeated the way Arizonans defi ned the threats to their 
own autonomy.
 In the national arena, the public power question fi gured more prominently 
and more directly in debates over Boulder Dam.  Given their defeat at Muscle 
Shoals, many public power advocates saw Boulder Dam as the last opportunity 
to reverse the policies that had led to enough “larceny of public assets to last 
a century or two.”40  The Los Angeles business community found itself caught 
between desire for Boulder Dam’s water and power, and their commitment to 
private enterprise.41  Meanwhile, the utility industry remained a signifi cant force, 
by funding the publicity campaigns in defense of private enterprise undertaken 
by such groups as the Better American Foundation and the Greater California 
League, and by successfully lobbying against both large federal projects like 
Boulder Dam and the local bond measures that cities needed to purchase or build 
distribution grids.42  Despite this considerable political infl uence, the utilities did 
not block Boulder Dam completely; it is not clear that they wanted to, whatever 
their rhetorical position in defense of private development on the Colorado.
 In 1928 Congress approved the Colorado River Compact and Boulder 
Dam over Arizona’s continuing objections.  The Boulder Canyon Project Act did 
not settle the question of hydroelectric power development, however, because 
it did not specify whether the Bureau of Reclamation would wholesale power 
from federally-operated turbines, lease machinery in a federally-constructed 
power plant, or lease the right to generate power in a power plant built and 
operated by lease-holders.43 Congress left this ambiguity in the bill in order to 
pass it.  The bill also required the Bureau of Reclamation to get power contracts 
signed to guarantee enough power revenue to underwrite construction before 
any construction began.44  So, regardless of the political expedients behind the 
ambiguities in the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the question of who would 
develop and distribute power from  Boulder Dam had to be settled quickly.  Los 
Angeles offered the only ready market for Boulder Dam electricity.  In fact, this 
market was so important that the Bureau of Reclamation based its contracts on 
the cost of steam-generated electricity in Los Angeles.45  This merely confi rmed 
Arizona’s worst fears, but for the rest of the country the Boulder Canyon Project 
Act provided an opportunity to continue the debate over public versus private 
enterprise.
456
 In the late 1920s the notion of the public interest fi gured prominently 
in the public discourse.  Periodicals like The Nation and The New Republic 
insisted upon federal involvement because state regulation provided inadequate 
public protection.46  During the presidential campaign of 1928 Al Smith insisted 
that private control of hydropower sites reduced public control of power rates, 
weakened regulatory authority over electric utilities, and exposed the public to 
unnamed future hazards.  Given these dangers, he argued, there was “nothing 
socialistic or revolutionary” about regulating utilities or developing public 
power.47  Franklin D. Roosevelt, unsurprisingly, praised Smith’s vision of public 
power.48  Hugo Black, then a senator from Alabama, accused the “power trust” 
of reaping excessive profi ts from the sale of a necessity.49 Gifford Pinchot 
maintained that public generation of power at Boulder Dam would curb the 
growth of the utility monopoly, and vilifi ed the opposition for playing into the 
hands of the utility corporations.50 Even years later, critics raged that private 
corporations “still claim[ed] the right to install their own generators in public 
dams, build transmission lines and retail the power.”51  These arguments all relied 
on Progressive faith in public enterprise as an antidote to the excesses of private 
capital, and a well-established tradition of portraying utilities as greedy, willful 
monopolies that refused to accept public ownership in spite of public opinion.
 Whatever Pinchot thought of them, private utility advocates used the 
rhetoric of the public interest just as readily as did Smith, Roosevelt, and The
Nation, but their defi nition of the public interest differed.  A pamphlet by the 
Ohio Chamber of Commerce exemplifi ed the private power advocates’ use 
of “public good” rhetoric.  The Chamber objected to Boulder Dam because it 
opened “this wide crack in the door for the entry of state socialism,” and because 
it allowed federal offi cials arbitrary authority.  The Chamber warned that the 
Boulder Canyon Project Act gave the Secretary of the Interior authority “at his 
own discretion, to engage the government of the United States in the manufacture 
and sale of electrical power.”  They called this a radical concentration of power in 
the hands of one man, and a “typical instance of the increasing centralization of 
authority and expenditures in federal bureaus.”  The Chamber went on to protest 
the Boulder Canyon Project Act as a threat to democracy and local control:  “This 
is a far cry from the ideas of the founders of this government.  If the present 
tendency to center power and administration in Washington for all sorts of power 
is not checked, the states of the Union will be reduced to the position of mere 
counties within the next two or three generations.”52  The implication, of course, 
was that the state governments were far more capable of serving voters than a 
remote Congress or Cabinet offi cer.
 The utility industry likewise warned that public ownership threatened 
democracy.  In 1927 American power corporations denounced public development 
at Muscle Shoals and Boulder Dam as “‘socialistic’ and ‘dangerous.’“53   Southern 
Sierras Power Company called federal dam-building defective and costly, 
concluding that “Political engineering, political banking, political railroading, 
and general public utility operating is usually unsound and dangerous.54 The
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utility insisted that private enterprise retain a role in Boulder Dam.55 Because
they paid taxes and could complete dam or hydropower plants without the “delays 
and excessive costs that are usually incident to the construction and operation of 
public owned works,” 56 Southern Sierras claimed private enterprise participation 
would reduce the overall burden on the national treasury, and thus would benefi t 
the public.
 Public offi cials issued similar warnings.  In a 1921 memo to President 
Harding, for example, Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall called the City of Los 
Angeles “socialistic” for pursuing a public power system.57  A few years later, 
New Jersey Congressional Representative Charles A. Eaton characterized Boulder 
Dam as “the adoption of a socialistic Russian Scheme of having the Federal 
Government go into the power business in competition with its own citizens in 
private fi elds.”58  Eaton reportedly endorsed only those river development policies 
that kept the federal government out of “the fi eld of private business.”59  Likewise, 
Elmer O. Leatherwood, a member of the House Committee on Irrigation, called 
the  Boulder Dam project “inimical to the best interests of the United States and 
the people of the whole country” because it violated the “principle of private 
industry in the country,” and might eventually allow groups to “practically 
federalize the entire development” of western streams.60
 Advocates of public power had a response to the implication that only 
the cooperation of business and government preserved American democracy.  
Drawing parallels to the Teapot Dome scandal, public power advocates alerted 
Americans to the “powerful interests” that exerted pressure on public offi cials.  
The Nation blamed campaign contributions by the nation’s private utilities for 
Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur’s and President Hoover’s willingness 
to undermine the Water Power Act of 1920 by permitting private utilities too 
much access to and control over hydropower facilities at federal dams.61 The New 
Republic cited as evidence a proposed amendment to the Swing-Johnson Bill 
that would have compelled the federal government to lease all power rights at 
Boulder Canyon.  Bad enough that this would have turned “over to private profi t 
without adequate compensation, not millions of dollars’ worth of government 
oil, but millions of dollars’ worth of government water power.”62  The real 
danger, however, lay in power of the utilities to create a “system of depriving the 
people… from sharing equally in the public domain resources.”63
 The utilities also wielded infl uence outside the halls of government.  The 
United States Chamber of Commerce, a bitter opponent of public power, had 
many ties to power companies.  In fact, the president of the Chamber from 1927 
to 1928, Lewis E. Pierson, served on the board of directors of several power 
companies and worked with executives from several powerful utility fi rms on 
the governing board of Nation’s Business.64  The utilities used media and public 
relations campaigns to promote their positions.  These efforts were so pervasive 
that The Nation raged, “There is no other fi eld of public interest in which 
there is so complete, effective, and continuously operating machinery for the 
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dissemination of misinformation and silencing of opposition as in the domain of 
the public utilities.”65  In 1929 the Federal Trade Commission investigated the 
political activities of the utility industry to see if a power trust  truly threatened 
American democracy and public interests.66
 By 1929 it was clear that the Bureau of Reclamation was going to build 
 Boulder Dam.  Opponents of federal dam-building had lost, the public interest 
had been defi ned to include an increased federal role in the development and 
distribution of western resources, and the still unresolved matter of power 
development was about to set important precedents for private and public 
enterprise.  The utilities adjusted their strategy accordingly.  Southern California 
Edison now argued for federal construction because the region would benefi t, not 
“in the emancipation of an oppressed people from the tentacles of an imaginary 
power trust octopus, but in the impetus that will be given the Lower Colorado 
Basin by fl ood protection, irrigation, and the disbursement of hundreds of millions 
of new money for material, labor and supplies in that territory.” 67  In other 
words,  Boulder Dam would serve the public by promoting growth; private power 
development was consistent with this program of economic development.68
The utilities’ political fl exibility in the face of shifting policies frustrated 
their opponents.  Many public power advocates cited the utilities’ changing 
strategy as a sign that the companies had always intended to profi t from dams 
built with the taxpayers’ dollar.  The utilities and their allies did not defeat the 
dam, but only because Congress left the public power question out of the fi nal 
Boulder Canyon Project Act.  The fact that many American’s suspected that the 
federal government had exceeded its authority by infringing on states’ rights 
as well as private enterprise clearly 
increased the infl uence of private 
enterprise in Colorado River policy.69
As Al Smith found, Boulder Dam, 
Muscle Shoals, and projects like them, 
went against too many currents in 
American politics.  Interstate disputes 
over power rights, and regional 
confl icts over the distribution of 
federal largess, forced advocates of 
both public utilities and federal dams 
to compromise.  The justifi cations for 
this compromise were explicit.   Philip 
Swing recognized that California 
interests had to remain united 
throughout the fi nal authorization of 
the dam because intramural confl ict 
would likely reduce the water available 
for Imperial County and the power 
available to Los Angeles.70
18.2.  The interior of Nevada Powerplant at 
Hoover Dam.
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John R. Haynes saw private operation of Boulder’s generators as an acceptable 
way to protect Los Angeles and other public agencies from taking on too much 
fi nancial responsibility for the dam.71  Although Boulder Canyon had presented 
an obvious opportunity to implement the Water Power Act of 1920 and to set 
a precedent for publicly-generated and publicly-distributed electricity, the 
diffi culties of so extending federal authority and of implementing the Reclamation 
Act and the Water Power Act made this politically impossible.
Anti-Federalism and Political Realism at Black Canyon
When Southern California Edison and the Bureau of Reclamation signed 
contracts for  Boulder Dam power, they all but settled the debate over public power 
in the United States.  Public ownership proceeded in the Tennessee Valley and 
parts of the Columbia River, but Boulder Dam did not herald a new age of public 
ownership.   Boulder Dam’s hybrid of public and private enterprise came to be 
portrayed as the acme of effective government, subject to far less criticism even 
than the participation of industry leaders in designing industrial regulations.  Yet 
this arrangement was at once an accident of politics, and the product of a very 
specifi c campaign by the utility industry to protect their interests in the nation’s 
hydropower resources.
 Philip Swing’s vision of the dam included public power development, 
but he considered the dam itself and the All-American Canal far more important.  
Others grafted their vision onto his, adding water supply for Los Angeles, 
hydroelectric power for Arizona mines and, ultimately, for Los Angeles’ industries. 
In order to justify the dam, early advocates emphasized the need for electricity 
in general, as much as they did the need for public sales of that power.  This was, 
perhaps, a crucial mistake for the public power movement because it divorced 
the dam from the question of who should generate power at the dam.  But given 
the early participation of Southern California Edison in river surveys, and given 
national resistance to a project of this magnitude in a region of the United States 
that contributed so little to the national economy, this may also have been very 
astute politics.
 So many groups opposed the dam for so many reasons that this 
compromise may have been the only way to get the dam built.  The utility industry 
astutely exploited the rifts in American politics.  They championed private 
enterprise against creeping socialism.  They offered themselves as mediators 
between federal and state authority, and perhaps even more importantly, between 
California and the other states of the Colorado River Basin.  National ambivalence 
about federal authority worked for the utility industry in a second way.  Many 
Americans feared government growth as much because increased federal activity 
would increase taxes as for any other reason.  So, Congress insisted that power 
revenues cover the costs of construction and so reduced the amount of tax funds 
spent on the dam.  This, too, made secure hydropower development far more 
important than publicly-owned generation or distribution of that power.
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 In the end, interstate rivalry, competitive envy of Los Angeles’ commercial 
expansion, and a generalized desire to limit federal authority permitted private 
utilities to retain major claims on natural resources—in spite of the Water Power 
Act and in spite of the fact that no private corporation had the resources to take 
on the Colorado River.  But the ambiguities in the Boulder Canyon Project Act 
and the resolution of those ambiguities in favor of the private power corporations 
reveal deeper patterns in American political thought.  News coverage of the 
utilities’ lobbying efforts against the Water Power Act, Muscle Shoals, and 
Boulder Dam portrayed the utilities as heavy-handed, greedy, and self-interested.  
Although a consensus had emerged against expanded federal authority, something 
of the Populist and Progressive concern about the tyranny of private enterprise 
remained.  This is why the “cooperation” between public and private entities 
met with such approval.  At Boulder Dam, the public sector checked the private 
sector, and the private sector checked the public, even as they both supplied the 
Southwest with extremely important public services.  This then, would be the 
model for development for many decades to come.
Associate Professor Sarah S. Elkind teaches at San Diego State University in 
the Department of History.  She was formerly at the University of Wisconsin–
Stevens Point.  She has written numerous articles as well as Bay Cities and 
Water Politics: The Battle for Resources in Boston and Oakland, 1880-1930,
University Press of Kansas, 1998.
Endnotes
1. I have no wish to engage the partisan dispute over the name of this dam.  Because most 
documents from the 1920s and 1930s refer to “Boulder Dam,” I have used that name throughout 
this paper.
2. Many documents of this time use ambiguous or confusing terms to refer to utility 
corporations.  For example, an editor emphasizing the public services provided by a publicly-
traded, for-profi t power supplier, might refer to Southern California Edison as a “public utility.”  
Although I retain original usage in direct quotes, I designate as “public” or “municipal” those 
utilities or power systems funded primarily by taxpayers.  I call stockholder-funded utilities such 
as Southern California Edison “private utilities,” “utility corporations,” or occasionally, simply 
“the utilities.”
3. Most histories of the Colorado River emphasize the water rights disputes that pitted 
California against Arizona, and the states of the upper basin against those of the lower basin.  
To a more limited extent, they explore the confl icts between urban and rural water use and 
development, or the relationships between Anglos, Native Americans, and Mexicans.  It is hardly 
necessary for me to replicate that work.
4. Norris Hundley, Jr., Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the Politics 
of Water in the American West.  Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975, 
20-2.  In less than ten years, the Imperial Valley boasted 400 miles of canals, 160,000 acres of 
cultivated farmland, and a population of 15,000.
5. Hundley, Water in the West, 20-9.
6. For descriptions of the bureaucratic problems, of the increase in costs due to import 
duties levied on materials carried into Mexico for canal maintenance, and the diffi culties of 
maintaining water quality in the canal, see Beverley Bowen Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder 
Dam.  Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1971, 12-4; and Hundley, 
Water in the West, 30-3.
7. The question of water deliveries to Mexico was used by both sides of the Boulder Dam 
debate.  In one congressional hearing, for example, Senator Fred T. Coulter protested that the 
461
Boulder Canyon Project would deliver water to two million acres of land in Mexico “belonging 
to a few powerful and rich Americans” who “are selling these cheap lands to… millions of 
Japanese in Japan” and thus “establishing a Japanese military and industrial base, endangering 
our peace.…”  (Senator Fred T. Coulter, “Defi nition of Colorado Compact—Its Defeat a Dawn of 
a New Year,” in “Protection and Development of the Lower Colorado River Basin: Information 
Presented to the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, in Connection with H.R. 2903,” 
Colorado River Hearings and Miscellaneous Documents vol. 1, 68 Cong., 1 sess. [1924] 
Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation.)  On the other hand, proponents of the bill cited the 
same rich American landlords and Japanese farmers to justify building the dam because the dam 
and the All American Canal would reduce the amount of water fl owing into Mexico.  (Burdett 
Moody, “The Colorado River Boulder Canyon Project and the All-American Canal,” Boulder 
Dam Association, November 1926, Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce Collection, Carton 
102, Regional History Center, University of Southern California, Los Angeles.)  Chandler’s 
interest in Mexican lands was widely reported.  See for example, Robert L. Dufus, “The Drama 
of the Colorado,” The New Republic, 42 (1 April 1925), 147-9.  For more on this subject, see also, 
Hundley, Water in the West, 33-4.
8. Hundley, Water in the West, 12-4.  Lippincott was in charge of southwestern Reclamation 
Service activities.
9. William A. Myers, “River of Controversy: A Review of the Involvement of the Southern 
California Edison Co. and Its Predecessors in the Development of the Colorado River, 1902-1942” 
(SoCal Edison, 1982), 4-6.
10. William A. Myers, “River of Controversy: A Review of the Involvement of the Southern 
California Edison Co. and Its Predecessors in the Development of the Colorado river, 1902-1942” 
(SoCal Edison, 1982), 12.
11. Annual Report to the Stockholders of Southern California Edison for the Year 1924
(Los Angeles:  Southern California Edison, 1924), 5, from Corporate Communications 
Department, Edison International.
12. Statement of Mr. Ralph L. Criswell, President of the City Council, Los Angeles, 
California, U.S. Congress.  House Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands, “Hearings on H.  R. 
11449,” Part III, 22-24 June 1922, 67 cong., 2 sess., 1922, 100-101, in “Development of the 
Colorado River Basin,” Huntington Library pamphlet volume.
13. Testimony of W. T. Matthews, “Problems of the Imperial Valley and Vicinity,” letter from 
the Secretary of the Interior… together with the proceedings of the conference on the construction 
of the Boulder Canyon Dam held at San Diego, Calif.”, Senate Document 142, 
67th cong., 2 sess.  (Washington: 1922), 282-3.
14. Statement of Mr. Ralph L. Criswell, representing the City of Los Angeles, “Protection 
and Development of the Lower Colorado River Basin,” Hearings before the Federal Power 
Commission and other matters relating to the Development of the Colorado River, Committee 
on Irrigation and Reclamation, House of Representatives, 68 cong., 1 sess. (Washington: 1924), 
78-79, 100-101.  Not all Angelenos accepted these priorities.  John Haynes and his fellow 
Progressives, for example, insisted on public distribution of power from Boulder Dam.  See Tom 
Sitton, “The Haynes Foundation and Urban Reform Philanthropy in Los Angeles: A History of the 
John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation,” unpublished manuscript, December 1997, 
p. 18 (Since published as Tom Sitton, The Haynes Foundation and Urban Reform Philanthropy in 
Los Angeles: A History of the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation (Los Angeles: 
Historical Society of Southern California, 1999.)
15. “Power Bonds Carry by Three Thousands,” Los Angeles Times 9 May 1914.
16. “Annual Report to the Shareholders of Southern California Edison for the year 1919,” 
(Los Angeles: 1919), 10-1, Corporate Communications Department, Edison International.  
Southern California Edison even offered to purchase power from the aqueduct to allow the city to 
offset its water system costs without competing with the private utilities.  See “Offer to buy Power 
Offi cially Recorded,” Los Angeles Times 6 May 1914.  The power bonds paid for construction of 
the Saint Francis Dam, which collapsed in 1928 killing some four hundred people in the Santa 
Clara Valley of Ventura County.  For more on the Saint Francis Dam disaster and its implications 
for Los Angeles water and power development and fl ood control, see  Donald C. Jackson and 
462
Norris Hundley, Jr., “Privilege and Responsibility: William Mulholland and the St. Francis Dam 
Disaster,” California History 82:3 (2004), 8-47, 72-78.
17. Statement of Mr.  Ralph L. Criswell, President of the City Council, Los Angeles, 
California, U.S. Congress.  House Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands, “Hearings on H.  R.  
11449,” Part III, 22 -24 June 1922, 67 cong., 2 sess., 1922, 100-101, in “Development of the 
Colorado River Basin,” Huntington Library pamphlet volume.
18. George L. Hoxie, “The Fictitious ‘Surplus’ of the Los Angeles Municipal Electric Power 
Department” November 1930, Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce Collection, ; “Dam Break 
Reveals New Tactics of Power Trust” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 26 Mar 1928 (editorial), Philip 
Swing Papers, Special Collections, University of California–Los Angeles.
19. Los Angeles tried to condemn the power plant in order to increase municipal power 
supply.  In 1922, the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed a lower court’s decision to permit Los 
Angeles to condemn the Southern Sierras’ Owens Gorge plant on the grounds that the decision 
would have allowed California’s major cities to “demolish, piece meal, the great hydro-electric 
systems of the state” and to steal water and power away from the communities that relied upon 
private water and power services. “Owens Gorge Case Decision Is Reversed,” Sierras Service 
Bulletin, 2:5 (November 1922), 4; E. B. Criddle, “What the L. A. Litigation Means,” Sierras
Service Bulletin, 1:5 (June-July 1921), 1, Corporate Communications Department, Edison 
International.
20. Statement of Mr. Ralph L. Criswell, President of the City Council, Los Angeles, 
California, U.S. Congress.  House Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands, “Hearings on H. R. 
11449,” Part III, 22 -4 June 1922, 67 cong., 2 sess., 1922, 100-1, in “Development of the Colorado 
River Basin,” Huntington Library pamphlet volume.
21. Testimony of Horace Porter, Mayor of Riverside, “Problems of the Imperial Valley 
and Vicinity,” letter from the Secretary of the Interior… together with the proceedings of the 
conference on the construction of the Boulder Canyon Dam held at San Diego, Calif., Senate 
Document 142, 67th cong., 2 sess.  (Washington: 1922), 284.
22. Testimony of George L. Hoodentyl, “Problems of the Imperial Valley and Vicinity,” 
letter from the Secretary of the Interior… together with the proceedings of the conference on the 
construction of the Boulder Canyon Dam held at San Diego, Calif., Senate Document 142,
67th cong., 2 sess.  (Washington: 1922), 286-7.
23. “Judge Borwon Notes of Interview with Don J. Kinsey,” 2 July 1963, p. 8, Fletcher 
Bowron Papers, “Metropolitan LA History Project:  Research Materials,” Box 65, Huntington 
Library.
24. For a complete discussion of the Colorado River Compact, its genesis, results and sources 
of dispute among the states involved, see Norris Hundley’s classic Water in the West.  Additional 
information on the Colorado River Compact may be found in Moeller, Phil Swing and Boulder 
Dam, 42-7.
25. Hundley, Water in the West, 171-4..
26. Hundley, Water in the West, xvii, 
27. In the northeast, an important confl ict over public power emerged in the early 1920s 
when a utility linked to Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon proposed to build power 
plants at the Saint Lawrence Seaway and Niagara Falls, resources that the New York Water Power 
Commission was charged with protecting and developing in the public interest.  Opponents argued 
that the New York Water Power Commission, charged with overseeing these resources, was 
intended to foster public utilities in the state.  “Public Power First” New Republic vol 45 
(17 February 1926), 346.
28. Preston J. Hubbard, Origins of the TVA:  The Muscle Shoals Controversy, 1920-1932
(New York: W W Norton, 1961), 1-2.
29. Ford offered Washington $5 million and an annual rent of $55,000 for this power 
complex.  George Norris, “Shall We Give Muscle Shoals to Henry Ford?” Saturday Evening Post
24 May 1924, 30-1 and passim.
30. On the Muscle Shoals debates, see Preston J. Hubbard, Origins of the TVA.
31. American Public Works Association, History of Public Works in the United States, 
1776-1976, ed. by Ellis L. Armstrong, (Chicago: American Public Works Association., 1976), 249. 
463
Coolidge was sharply criticized for his defense of private enterprise.  In 1926, Nebraska Democrat 
Edgar Howard denounced Coolidge for “murdering every piece of legislation which does not have 
advanced approval of the Morgan Mellon group.”  (Edgar Howard to Los Angeles Examiner,
4 June 1926, Philip Swing Papers..
32. R. B. Hovland to Carl Hayden, “Colorado River Development,” 31 March 1924, in  
“Statements by Citizens of Arizona relative to the Colorado River Problem.…,” Protection and 
Development of the Lower Colorado River Basin:  Information presented to the Committee 
on Irrigation and Reclamation, in Connection with H. R. 2903, Colorado River Hearings 
and Miscellaneous Documents, vol. 1, 68 Cong., 1 sess. (1924), Committee on Irrigation and 
Reclamation, (Washington, 1924), 59.  See also Ralph L. Criswell’s testimony for Los Angeles, 
“Protection and Development of Lower Colorado River Basin… Hearings before the Federal 
Power Commission and Other Matters Relating to the Development of the Colorado River,” 
(Washington, 1924), 78-9.
33. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, “Report on Boulder 
Canyon Reclamation Project, 69 Cong., 1 sess., Report 654, pt. 1, in Colorado River Hearings 
and Miscellaneous Documents, 13; Speech of Phil D. Swing of California in the House of 
Representatives,” 11 Mar 1926, Colorado River Hearings and Miscellaneous Documents, vol. 1, 
14.
34. “Report of the Colorado River Committee of Arizona State Assembly of the American 
Association of Engineers,” in “Statements by Citizens of Arizona relative to the Colorado River 
Problem…,” Protection and Development of the Lower Colorado River Basin:  Information 
presented to the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, in Connection with H. R. 2903, 
Colorado River Hearings and Miscellaneous Documents, vol. 1, 68 Cong., 1 sess. (1924), 
Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, (Washington, 1924), 21.
35. Kiwanis Club of Phoenix, “History of the Ownership of the Power Sites on the Colorado 
River,” 19 January 1923, in “Statements by Citizens of Arizona relative to the Colorado River 
Problem…,” Protection and Development of the Lower Colorado River Basin:  Information 
presented to the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, in Connection with H. R. 2903, 
Colorado River Hearings and Miscellaneous Documents, vol. 1, 68 Cong., 1 sess. (1924), 
Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, (Washington, 1924), 39-41.
36. See for example, American Legion of Prescott, Arizona, “The Power Royalty Issue and 
the Colorado River Compact,” 2 August 1923, or Dwight B. Heard, “Statements of Candidates for 
Governor of Arizona regarding the Colorado River Compact,” both in  “Statements by Citizens of 
Arizona relative to the Colorado River Problem.…,” Protection and Development of the Lower 
Colorado River Basin:  Information presented to the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, in 
Connection with H. R. 2903, Colorado River Hearings and Miscellaneous Documents, vol. 1, 68 
Cong., 1 sess. (1924), Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, (Washington, 1924), 49-50, 58.
37. Phoenix Real Estate Board, “Ultimate Control of Water and Power Resources of the 
Lower Basin of the Colorado River by a Tri-State Irrigation and Power District,” 2 July 1923, 
in Protection and Development of the Lower Colorado River Basin: Information presented to 
the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, in Connection with H. R. 2903, Colorado River 
Hearings and Miscellaneous Documents, vol. 1, 68 Cong., 1 sess. (1924), Committee on Irrigation 
and Reclamation, (Washington, 1924), 43.  The Board envisioned an interstate district, including 
parts of Arizona, Nevada and California.
38. “Speech of Honorable Charles H. Rutherford on the Colorado River Compact,” delivered 
in the Arizona State Senate, 20 February 1923, in “Statements by Citizens of Arizona relative to 
the Colorado River Problem… ,” Protection and Development of the Lower Colorado River Basin: 
Information presented to the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, in Connection with H. R. 
2903, Colorado River Hearings and Miscellaneous Documents, vol. 1, 68 Cong., 
1 sess. (1924), Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, (Washington, 1924), 73-84.  
39. In testimony before Congress, Edison’s general manager declared the utility ready to 
build a hydropower dam on the Colorado independent of federal efforts.  Southern California’s 
need for power, and the dearth of undeveloped power sites closer to Los Angeles not only justifi ed 
the expense of developing the Colorado, but made the project quite necessary.  See R. H. Ballard, 
in “Boulder Canyon Project: Excerpts from the Hearings before the Committees on Irrigation and 
464
Reclamation… of the 68th, 69th, and 70th Congresses on the Swing-Johnson Bill…,” Colorado
River Hearings and Miscellaneous Documents, vol.  1, (Washington, 1924), 16.
40. William Kent to Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands, telegram, 16 February 1924, Philip 
Swing Papers, 144.
41. “Using the Chamber of Commerce for Hocus Pocus Game,” Los Angeles Examiner,
editorial, 10 February 1924, Philip Swing Papers, Box 157, Scrapbook 1A, p. 20.
42. Franklin Hitchborn, “Union Men Forced to Contribute to Better American Federation” 
unlabeled news clipping, Philip Swing Papers, Box 144.  See also “Power Fights Boulder Dam Says 
Swing,” Los Angeles Herald, 18 February 1924, Philip Swing Papers, Box 157, Scrapbook 1A, 
p. 20; Franklin Hitchborn to Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands, telegram, 16 February 1924, 
Philip Swing Papers, Box 144.  One newspaper reported that Southern California Edison ordered its 
employees to send telegrams urging local offi cials and chambers of commerce to oppose the Swing-
Johnson Bill.  See “Furious Charge of the Edison Brigade of Six Hundred Agents,” unidentifi ed 
newspaper, 10 April 1924, Philip Swing Papers, Box 157, Scrapbook 1A, p.45.
43. California.  Colorado River Commission.  Colorado River and the Boulder Canyon Project,
(Sacramento: 1930), 116.
44. California.  Colorado River Commission.  Colorado River and the Boulder Canyon Project,
160.
45. California.  Colorado River Commission.  Colorado River and the Boulder Canyon Project,
159.
46. The Nation condemned state utility regulations because “all those whose purpose it is to 
defeat genuine efforts and adequate regulation” supported oversight by the states rather than the 
federal government.  According to The Nation, these interests wanted the states to regulate utilities 
“precisely because they recognize the demonstrated inability of the individual States to cope with 
the problem” of utility power.  See Guido H. Marx, “How to Control Public Utilities,” The Nation
132:3430 (1 April 1931), 348; “The Utilities as an Issue,” New Republic 62 (7 May 1930), 311-2.
47. Alfred E. Smith, “Water Power and Its Social Uses,” The Survey, 57:7 (1 Jan 1927), 424.
48. “The Utilities as an Issue,” New Republic 62 (7 May 1930), 311-2.
49. “Black Raps ‘Power Trust’ over Radio,” Washington (DC) Evening Star, 28 February 1930, 
Philip D. Swing Collection, Box 136, UCLA Special Collections
50. Gifford Pinchot, “Who Owns Our Rivers,” The Nation 126:3262 (18 January 1928), 64-6.
51. Judson King, “Uncle Sam and His Water Supply:   Some Notes on the Report of the 
President’s Water Resources Policy Commission” National Popular Government League, Bulletin,
No.  241, 27 January 1951, 5, SBM P F 164.
52. Frank B. McMillin, George B. Chandler, Ohio Chamber of Commerce, “Why Ohio is 
Interested” n.d., Swing Papers, Box 144.
53. “Utility Companies United to Oppose U.S. Projects,” transcribed from Washington News,
17 October 1927, Philip Swing Papers, Box 144.  For use of red scare rhetoric in the Muscle 
Shoals debate, see also Preston J.  Hubbard, Origins of the TVA:  The Muscle Shoals Controversy, 
1920-1932 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 288.
54. “Political Engineering,” Sierras Service Bulletin 6:1 (February 1931), 2, in Edison 
International Public Relations Offi ce Collection, Edison International, Rosemead, California.
55. “Southern Sierras Power Company Presents Its Position on Power and Canal Development 
Plans,” Brawley News 21 March 1924, Philip Swing Papers, Box 144.  Southern Sierras Power 
endorsed Southern California Edison’s proposal for federal control of Colorado development, 
combined with private construction of power facilities, if not entire dam structures.
56. “Southern Sierras Power Company Presents Its Position on Power and Canal Development 
Plans,” Brawley News 21 March 1924, Philip Swing Papers, Box 144.
57. Albert Fall to Warren G. Harding, 24 September 1921, “3rd Enclosure.  Subject: Colorado 
River Power Project and Appointment of Commissioner.” Albert Fall Papers, Box 47, Huntington 
Library.
58. “Congress advised to Leave Power Development to Private Interests,” retyped from Sunday
Dispatch, 4 December 1927, attachment to Harry A. Slattery to Philip D. Swing, 13 December 1927, 
Swing Papers, Box 134.  Slattery was careful to point out that Eaton had worked for General Electric 
and edited that company’s newsletter, The Lamp, before running for Congress.
465
59. “Congress advised to Leave Power Development to Private Interests,” retyped from Sunday
Dispatch, 4 December 1927, attachment to Harry A. Slattery to Philip D. Swing, 13 December 1927, 
Swing Papers, Box 134.
60. Elmer O. Leatherwood, “A National Legislator’s Views on Colorado River Development” 
The Tax Digest 3:6 (December 1926), 203-6, Swing Papers, Box 17.
61. E. M. Scofi eld to The Nation, 10 March 1930, Swing Papers, Box 136; untitled editorial, 
The Nation 132:342 (28 January 1931), 94.
62. “Shall We Have A Power Scandal?” The New Republic, 49 (26 January 1927), 264-65.  See 
also “Would Lease Muscle Shoals; Hint of Another Oil Scandal,” Labor News 14 May 1926, Urban 
Archives, CSU Northridge.
63. William J. Schaefl e, “The People of the United States Do Not Want Another Tea Pot Dome 
Scandal,” American Globe 25:7 (April 1928) 5-6, Philip D. Swing Collection, Box 43, UCLA 
Special Collections.
64. Judson King, “Who’s Who in the Super-Power Lobby,” National Popular Government 
League Bulletin 115:2, 15, Philip Swing Collection, Box 145, UCLA Special Collections.
65. Guido H. Marx, “How to Control Public Utilities,” The Nation 132:3430 (1 April 1931), 
348.  The utilities’ public relations campaign included the dissemination of pamphlets, books, 
and other materials to schools, “for the purpose of infl uencing public opinion in favor of private 
ownership” of power facilities, and attempts to rally other business organizations to oppose the 
Boulder Canyon Bill.  See Bruce Gustin, “Bannister Scores Power Trust for Secret Work in 
Schools,” unidentifi ed clipping, 8 June 1928, Swing Papers, Box 145; “Insurance Interests Help 
Defeat Boulder Canyon Dam Legislation,” Western Progressive, 1:3 (Mar 1927), 1-2, Swing Papers, 
Box 17.  The effort to rally business organizations apparently included a campaign in the American
Agency Bulletin, an insurance industry publication, that urged agents to “line up” with the power 
industry.  The Western Progressive carried reprints of articles from the American Agency Bulletin
provided to them by one insurance agent “who could not be bamboozled by these greedy interests.”
66. Norris Hundley, Water and the West, 273.  The Commission found that the private utility 
industry spent over $1 million per year to promote private ownership and to defeat Muscle Shoals 
and Boulder Dams, but concluded that there was no “power trust” per se.  The utility companies 
themselves cited this last point to defend themselves against the public power movement.  They 
also complained about the “organized propaganda being carried on through a great syndicate of 
newspapers and prominent radicals to make it appear that the power industry is in the tentacles of a 
powerful octopus, which will strangle the people.”  See “Power in the Public Eye” Sierras Service 
Bulletin 4:8 (September 1929) 2, in Edison International Public Relations Offi ce Collection, Edison 
International, Rosemead, California.
67. “Boulder Dam Power,” Sierras Service Bulletin, 4:7 (August 1929) 2, from Corporate 
Communications Department, Edison International.
68. Norris Hundley observed in 1975 that the “desire to tap the federal largess without 
incurring federal control” was one of the prominent themes of western development.  This applies as 
much to Boulder Dam as it did elsewhere on the Colorado River as well as the Central Valley Project 
and numerous other sites throughout the West.  As multipurpose dams built by the Army Corps of 
Engineers tended to have fewer restrictions on power development and irrigation acreage, this desire 
for federal funds without federal regulation gave the Army Corps a boost during its longstanding 
competition with the Bureau of Reclamation for budget, project authorization, and institutional 
status.  See Norris Hundley, Water in the West; Lawrence B. Lee, “California Water Politics: 
Depression Genesis of the Central Valley Project, 1933-1944,” Journal of the West 24: 4 (1985), 
63-81, discusses competition between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers 
in the context of acreage limitations.
69. See Norris Hundley, Water in the West, 271-7.  See also Elmer O. Leatherwood, “A 
National Legislator’s Views on Colorado River Development” The Tax Digest 3:6 (December 1926), 
203-6.
70. P. D. Swing to Chas. L. Childers 21 Feb 1930, Swing Papers, Box 136.
71. J. R. Haynes, 25 Mar 1930, “While it is a logical deduction from the text of the Swing-
Johnson Bill…” John R. Haynes Papers, Box 11, Special Collections, University of California, Los
Angeles.
466
467
 Boulder Dam Recreation Area:  The  Bureau of 
Reclamation, the National Park Service, and the 
Origins of the National Recreation Area Concept at 
Lake Mead, 1929-1936*
By:
Douglas W. Dodd
 The struggle to keep dams out of the  national parks that pitted 
conservationists against the West’s water and power interests has constituted a 
major recurring theme in American environmental history.  From the early fi ght 
over the fate of Yosemite’s Hetch Hetchy Valley, to the campaigns to keep dams 
out of Dinosaur National Monument and Grand Canyon National Park, historians 
have recounted the continuing effort to keep the National Park System free of 
dams.  But what would happen if things were the other way around?  What if, 
instead of trying to keep a dam out of a national park, the National Park Service 
(NPS) invented a new type of area—a national recreation area—that would have 
at its center the world’s largest dam, reservoir, and hydroelectric generating plant? 
Between 1929 and 1936 that is exactly what happened, as the U.S. Department 
of the Interior made plans for the lands that would surround  Boulder Dam and its 
reservoir, Lake Mead. 
 In October 1936 Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes approved an 
agreement between the National Park Service and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
(USBR) to create  Boulder Dam Recreation Area—America’s fi rst national 
recreation area.  The  Boulder Dam Recreation Area agreement concluded 
seven years of work begun during the Hoover administration, and it marked 
the beginning of a decades-long cooperative partnership between the NPS and 
USBR to plan for and develop outdoor recreation at federal reservoirs in the 
West.  The mutually benefi cial partnership allowed each of the two agencies to 
further its own interests.  For the National Park Service, it meant gaining new 
areas to manage while expanding its role in outdoor recreation.  For the Bureau of 
Reclamation, it meant the ability to promote recreation as a benefi t of its projects, 
while avoiding the distraction of managing recreation itself. This achievement 
was all the more remarkable in that it was accomplished without signifi cant 
opposition from private local interests or conservationists. 
 The development of the  Boulder Dam Recreation Area has not received 
full treatment in the historical literature of environmental history or the national 
parks.1  Yet it is a story that is as signifi cant as it has been obscure.  First, the 
effort to create the  Boulder Dam Recreation Area challenged the  National 
Park Service to fi nd a way to reconcile its own ideal of preservation and public 
*     This article is reprinted courtesy of the Southern California Quarterly which published a 
slightly different version in its volume 88 (Winter 2006-2007).
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enjoyment with an enormous utilitarian project, a dam belonging to another 
federal agency.  The resulting compromise established the precedent for a new 
type of National Park Service area—a national recreation area—that emphasized 
outdoor recreation while seeking to balance preservation and education with 
other uses—dams, grazing, and mining, for example—that were traditionally 
not allowed in national parks. This compromise would become the central 
principle behind the forty national recreation areas that would follow.  Second, 
the  NPS-USBR partnership produced important, if unintended, consequences.  
The increasingly cozy relationship between the two agencies that began at Lake 
Mead resulted in the National Park Service’s acquiescence to the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s later proposals to build the  Echo Park Dam in  Dinosaur National 
Monument and the  Bridge Canyon Dam in the lower Grand Canyon—setting the 
stage for two of the pivotal conservation battles of the 1950s and 1960s. 
The development of America’s fi rst national recreation area—conceived 
during the Hoover administration—was a consequence of the  Boulder Canyon 
Project Act of 1928.  In the act, Congress directed the Bureau of Reclamation to 
construct a major water-resources-development project on the lower Colorado 
River for the purposes of controlling fl oods, storing water for both irrigation 
and domestic use, and generating hydroelectric power.2   Boulder Dam would 
impound the waters of a mammoth reservoir reaching 115 miles upstream—as 
far as the little community of St. Thomas, Nevada, on the lower Virgin River, and 
Pierce’s Ferry, Arizona, in the Colorado River’s lower Grand Canyon.  Although 
recreation was not a purpose specifi ed in the Boulder Canyon Project Act, Bureau 
of Reclamation offi cials understood that public recreation would be a signifi cant 
use of the new  Boulder Dam Reservoir.  Indeed, the bureau had fi rst noticed 
the recreational potential of its reservoirs shortly after the 1906 construction of 
 Theodore Roosevelt Dam on the Salt River Project in Arizona.  Swimming and 
boating became popular at the reservoir, and a hotel to accommodate visitors 
soon followed.3  In 1914 Arizonans even tried—unsuccessfully—to have the 
area surrounding Roosevelt Reservoir designated a national park.4  By the 1920s, 
throughout the arid West, the recreational importance of its reservoirs to local 
residents and to their tourist economy was becoming clear to the bureau.  As a 
1928 Bureau of Reclamation pamphlet noted, “They are entering increasingly 
into the life of the people as pleasure resorts and playgrounds, as bird sanctuaries, 
and as excellent fi shing grounds…”5  The federal government provided little 
in the way of services or facilities at the reservoirs, however, despite their 
growing recreational appeal, other than the issuing of permits for private-sector 
developments and the stocking of fi sh by the Bureau of Fisheries.6
 But the Boulder Canyon Project’s enormous dam and reservoir would be 
the world’s largest—attractions destined to become, in the words of Reclamation 
Commissioner Elwood Mead, “a tourist mecca,” that would draw visitors, not just 
from the Southwest, but from “every part of the world.”7  Many of these tourists 
would be coming simply to gaze passively upon the dam and reservoir—much 
as tourists gaze upon Niagara Falls or the Grand Canyon—and then move on.
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But  tourism and  outdoor recreation were changing in the 1920s and 1930s, and 
a growing number of visitors would not be content with such passivity.  The 
interwar years saw a revolution in the nature of outdoor recreation.  Those tourists 
whom John Muir had once derided as “tender, pulpy people,” who traveled 
in “smooth comfort” to gaze upon scenic spectacles, were now being joined 
by legions of Americans who shared Muir’s love of a more strenuous outdoor 
experience.8  The  outdoor recreation boom was partly the result of increasing 
leisure time, particularly for middle-class Americans.  But more importantly, as 
Paul Sutter has argued, it was improved transportation—private automobiles and 
modern highways—that put outdoor recreation venues within the reach of city 
dwellers seeking a weekend outing or a week’s vacation and brought “remote 
natural areas into the recreational orbits of modern Americans.”9  As a result, 
participation in auto-camping, hunting, fi shing, and recreational boating increased 
rapidly.10
 Looking to the future of the Boulder Canyon Project, the U.S. Department 
of the Interior recognized that these new patterns in recreational demand 
would necessitate building not only roads, overlooks, and lodgings but also 
campgrounds, trails, swimming areas, and boating facilities.  Furthermore, 
visitors would require interpretive and educational services to provide them 
with “information about the dam and lake, as well as the natural glories of 
the region.”11  But the  Bureau of Reclamation, although it acknowledged the 
importance of the reservoir’s recreational potential, had no interest in assuming 
the responsibility of developing and operating recreational programs and 
facilities.  Providing high-quality  outdoor recreation opportunities, along with the 
other benefi ts associated with its projects, would undoubtedly generate public- 
relations dividends for the bureau.  But the agency possessed, its leaders readily 
conceded, “neither the necessary experience [n]or personnel to administer the 
area” for recreational use.12  The bureau saw itself strictly as an organization that 
constructed and operated water-resources- development projects, not parks, and it 
did not want to assume additional functions not directly related to its mission.
 While the  Bureau of Reclamation lacked the expertise and interest 
to develop the Boulder Canyon Reservoir for recreational purposes, the 
 National Park Service abounded in both.  Since its creation in 1916, the NPS 
had administered and promoted recreation in its national parks and national 
monuments.  It knew how to plan, design, and construct the necessary facilities 
and developments; it provided educational and interpretive services; and it had 
policies and procedures in place for managing and regulating visitor use.  The 
Park Service considered itself the nation’s foremost recreation agency and was 
proud to claim “years of experience and experimentation in handling visitors 
in such manner as to lift them from the place of mere tourist to that of the 
enthusiastic seeker after the fascinating facts of natural history.”13  Management of 
the recreational aspects of the Boulder Canyon Project would fall to the National 
Park Service.
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National Park Service involvement in developing a recreation area at 
 Boulder Dam began during the Hoover administration.  In June 1929, Secretary 
of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur made a trip to inspect the Boulder Canyon 
Project area and recognized the scenic and recreational value of the public lands 
surrounding it.  Secretary Wilbur grew up in southern California and as an 
undergraduate at Stanford University had participated in a botanical collecting 
expedition to southern Arizona, which had instilled in him, he later recalled, 
“a real love of the desert and also some understanding of its signifi cance.”14
His visit to the dam site seemed to reawaken his fascination with the desert 
landscape.  Upon his return to Washington, Wilbur ordered a report on the 
“national park possibilities in connection with the Boulder Canyon Reclamation 
Project” and directed the 
Bureau of Reclamation and 
the National Park Service to 
consult with one another about 
the future management of the 
area.15  Between 1929 and 1932 
National Park Service staff and 
consultants made a series of 
studies and investigations of the 
area surrounding the planned 
reservoir.16
 One of the fi rst proposals, 
advanced in 1929 by Ernest 
Walker Sawyer, Wilbur’s assistant 
secretary of the Interior, sought to 
preserve the area from “depredation” through the establishment of an enormous 
“national park, recreation area, or outdoor nature shrine” between the Colorado 
River and Zion National Park. Tentatively labeled the “Proposed  Virgin National 
Park,” the project would span the lower Virgin River and the Colorado River 
country upstream of the  Boulder Dam site.  The area would comprise nearly 8,000 
square miles surrounding the dam’s projected reservoir and would be accessed 
through highway entrances at  Boulder Dam, Moapa Valley, and Zion, and by 
airplane from Grand Canyon National Park.  Sawyer intended the expansive 
boundaries to include numerous outstanding features: the  Boulder Dam reservoir; 
archaeological sites such as Salt Cave, Gypsum Cave, and the “Lost City of 
Nevada” pueblo ruins; historic Mormon settlements like Fort Callville and 
Pipe Spring; and numerous scenic natural features such as the Kolob Canyons 
(near Zion), the Valley of Fire, and areas in the western Grand Canyon such as 
Toroweap, Shivwits Plateau, Lava Falls, and Vulcan’s Throne.17  The idea found a 
champion in Secretary Wilbur. 
 At Wilbur’s prompting, NPS Director Horace M. Albright reported that 
the proposed Virgin National Park region had much to recommend it:  The canyon 
of the Colorado below Grand Canyon National Park was of “great scientifi c 
19.1. During a tour of Hoover Dam construction 
on November 12, 1932, Ray Lyman Wilbur (third 
from right) accompanied President Herbert 
Hoover (between Mrs. Hoover and Mrs. Wilbur).
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importance”; the prehistoric Indian ruins along the lower Virgin were of interest 
to archaeologists; and the Kanab and Shivwits Plateaus were excellent examples 
of wild tablelands.  The region possessed, in short, “many natural features 
demanded of any area under consideration for national park status.”  But the area 
fell short of fully meeting NPS standards of suitability and feasibility.  Suitability 
was impaired in two ways.  First, although the area was highly scenic, many of 
its best features duplicated those already better represented in Grand Canyon 
National Park, and NPS policy held that duplication was to be avoided within 
the park system.  Second, and more signifi cantly, the presence of  Boulder Dam 
and its artifi cial reservoir would be “contrary to the well established policy of 
maintaining natural landscape conditions…”  With regard to feasibility, Albright 
noted the problems presented by a considerable acreage of private and state 
land intermingled with federal holdings, a longstanding pattern of extensive 
livestock grazing that would be “diffi cult to extinguish,” and the presence of 
Indian reservation and 
national forest lands 
within the boundaries 
of the area, all of which 
would “operate against the 
administration of the area 
within the principles of 
national park protection.”
As a consequence, Albright 
concluded that the area 
should not become a 
national park, although 
he recommended further 
study to identify “certain 
smaller areas” that appeared 
“worthy of preservation” as 
national monuments.18
 Despite Albright’s negative report, Wilbur remained interested in the 
scenic and recreational potential of the region.  Perhaps an expansive Virgin 
National Park was not the best way to proceed, but he still believed that some 
action should be taken to protect the area.  He told Albright:
Since it is unique in character, the land is largely public land, and 
the lake will provide a new feature both of beauty and for transportation, 
I think that we should devise some method by which it can be held in 
the public interest.  Whether it should be classifi ed as a recreation area, 
a national monument, or in some other way, I do not know.  I would like 
though to have you seriously consider not letting it leave the National 
Park Service and of originating legislation which will give us a chance to 
retain it in its original beauty.  Even if it is not of National Park standard, 
it is of suffi cient national signifi cance to warrant most careful study by us 
as to its ultimate disposition.19
19.2. In 1927 or 1928 Stephen Mather and his ranking 
staff sat for this portrait in Washington, D.C. 
From left to right: Arno B. Cammerer, Arthur E. 
Demaray, Stephen T. Mather, George A. Moskey and 
Horace M. Albright.  Photo courtesy of the National Park Service.
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Committed to his goal of protecting the scenic desert landscapes surrounding the 
 Boulder Dam reservoir, Wilbur urged President Hoover to withdraw the lands 
from entry, guaranteeing that they would remain in public ownership until the 
matter could be resolved.
 In April 1930 President Hoover signed an executive order withdrawing 
from settlement 4,212 square miles of public land upstream from the  Boulder 
Dam site, based on Wilbur’s determination that the lands would be “of 
greater public value from a scenic and scientifi c standpoint than for economic 
development” and that the new reservoir would offer “unusual recreation 
opportunities.”20  In particular, the reservoir would improve public access via 
scenic boat tours, according to the Interior Department, that would allow visitors 
to “enjoy a stupendous view of the great gorge of the Colorado River that 
hitherto could be seen only by the most hardy and experienced boatmen, and that 
even for them was fraught with serious danger.”  The reservoir at  Boulder Dam 
would open new vistas to the touring public “second in signifi cance only to that 
portion of the Grand Canyon within the Grand Canyon National Park.”21  Based 
on the recreational potential identifi ed in NPS studies, Secretary of the Interior 
Wilbur recommended that “at least part” of the area be established as a “national 
monument or some other special preserve to be developed and administered by 
the National Park Service.” 22
 Yet the question of National Park Service involvement with the Boulder 
Canyon Project would be problematic.  The National Park Service had been 
created in 1916 in the aftermath of the titanic battle to stop the city of San 
Francisco from damming the Tuolumne River in  Yosemite National Park’s scenic 
 Hetch Hetchy Valley.  The fi ght had helped to defi ne what kinds of development 
would be appropriate in a national park.  Although San Francisco won the battle, 
the dam at Hetch Hetchy would prove the exception rather than the rule.  Indeed, 
park advocates, such as the Sierra Club and the American Civic Association, 
pointed to the loss of Hetch Hetchy—and the urgent need to prevent another park 
from suffering the same fate—as a prime example of the urgent need for Congress 
to establish a national park agency with a strong preservation mandate.23  During 
the 1920s the young National Park Service fought to prevent the  Bureau of 
Reclamation and its supporters from building more dams in the national parks.  In 
particular, NPS Director Stephen T. Mather and his assistant, Horace M. Albright, 
worked to protect Yellowstone National Park and Glacier National Park from 
dam proposals that would have benefi ted irrigators in Idaho and Montana.24  But 
now Secretary Wilbur was suggesting that the NPS add to its holdings a new area 
with the world’s largest manmade dam at its center.  How could such a thing be 
reconciled with the national park idea?  As historian Richard Sellars has noted, 
“Philosophical contradictions” were bound to emerge when “the main feature was 
itself a gigantic impairment to natural conditions.”25  How the agency resolved 
this contradiction would set an important precedent.
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 Whether the Boulder Canyon Project area met the exacting criteria 
of national park quality and national signifi cance, and whether a dam could 
be allowed in an area under NPS management were questions that demanded 
answers.  The National Park Service exerted powerful infl uence over decisions 
to create new parks and monuments, and although the agency was eager to 
expand into new areas, it frequently rejected “inferior” park proposals that fell 
short of its rigorous standards.26  As a result, scrutiny of the project launched a 
round of vigorous and searching discussions within the national park leadership.
M. R. Tillotson, superintendent of Grand Canyon National Park, advocated 
for NPS management of the dam and reservoir area due to its superlative size.
As the world’s largest, Tillotson believed that it would make “an attraction of 
considerable tourist interest.”  In order to assure its proper development, he said, 
the withdrawn lands around the proposed reservoir “should become a National 
Park or Monument, either as a distinct unit or as an addition to Grand Canyon 
National Park.”27  Assistant Director Conrad Wirth was eager for the NPS to 
begin helping the  Bureau of Reclamation to administer the recreational facilities 
of the project, but he had reservations over how the area should be designated 
due to the presence of the dam.  “I do not see how this area could be considered 
for a national park, on account of its artifi cial make-up,” he wrote.  Although 
national monument status might be warranted because of the dam’s “scientifi c 
qualifi cations” as a “tremendous engineering accomplishment,” as well as the 
area’s potential for “national recreation,” he maintained that the area should be 
“placed in some other classifi cation than a national park or monument.”28  Others 
within the agency concurred with Wirth.  Wallace R. Atwood believed that the 
project area would “prove to be a very valuable recreation section,” but he was 
not convinced that it should be part of the national park system.  “Maybe we 
can look forward to a classifi cation which will include areas of this nature,” he 
wrote.29  Education and Research Director Harold C. Bryant concurred, writing 
Director Albright that he was “not convinced of the value of the Hoover Dam 
Site as a national monument.”  He regarded it as “one of those third class areas 
needing another name.”30  A consensus emerged: First, the area required further 
and more intensive study to determine its suitability.  Second, the National Park 
Service needed to devise a new category for areas that were primarily valuable 
for recreation, rather than for their superlative natural or historical signifi cance.  
Such a new category—distinct from parks or monuments—was needed in order to 
ensure that allowing a dam in a recreational area would not become precedent for 
allowing one in a national park.  In the absence of such a categorical distinction, 
the NPS could expect opposition to the plan by groups—such as the National 
Parks Association, the American Civic Association, and the Sierra Club—whose 
mission it was to safeguard the parks from despoliation.
 Establishing a primarily recreational area would be a new departure for the 
National Park Service.  To be sure, recreation was a key element of the agency’s 
mission.  The 1916 Organic Act directed it to “provide for the enjoyment” of park 
resources and make arrangements for the “accommodation of park visitors.”31  A 
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1918 letter, known as the “Lane Letter,” from Secretary of the Interior Franklin 
Lane to Stephen Mather, spelled out how the agency should implement the 
Organic Act; it specifi ed that outdoor recreation activities would be allowed in 
the parks, so long as they were consistent with the policies intended to safeguard 
the parks and preserve them unimpaired.32  Moreover, during the 1910s and 
1920s, Mather emphasized tourism and recreational development in the parks 
as a means of developing a national constituency that would provide the NPS 
with the political support it needed.  As Mather’s successor, Albright was also a 
“dedicated proponent” of outdoor recreation and tourism.33  Yet recreation was 
secondary to the purposes for which the parks had been established:  to preserve 
unimpaired for future generations the superlative and nationally signifi cant natural 
and cultural resources they contained.  What the NPS now contemplated creating 
at  Boulder Dam was something new, something that risked the appearance that it 
was compromising its mission of preservation.
 The National Park Service’s internal concern over whether the Boulder 
Canyon Project area met national park standards was not the only obstacle 
standing in the way of protecting the area.  The ranching and mining interests 
of Arizona and Nevada, wary of any further federal encroachment or regulation 
upon their activities, were hostile to the idea of a new national park or monument 
surrounding the reservoir.  Rather than calling for preservation, for example, the 
State of Nevada hoped the electrical power and roads associated with the dam 
project would accelerate the development of the area’s mineral resources, and the 
governor called for a thorough survey of the “mining potentialities in the vicinity 
of  Boulder Dam.”34  Similarly, the State of Arizona opposed the large executive 
withdrawal of public lands around the project area.35  There was strong sentiment 
in the state against “any more land being included in Federal Reservations,” one 
NPS offi cial noted.36  Even Utah entered the fray.  Because the rural ranching 
economy of southern Utah was closely tied to the “Arizona Strip” lying north 
of the Colorado River, the Utah State Legislature memorialized Congress in 
opposition to the monument withdrawal, arguing that the establishment of a 
monument would “retard the development” of the region by banning 75,000 sheep 
and 15,000 cattle from their accustomed range and by preventing homesteaders 
from acquiring property in the area.  Any move to make a park or monument 
designation could expect stiff resistance from the affected states.37
 Facing these challenges, in 1932, Secretary Wilbur assigned Louis C. 
Cramton to investigate the withdrawn lands and to make recommendations on 
how best to resolve the knotty problems of recreation and conservation that the 
Boulder Canyon Project posed.  Cramton, a former congressman from Michigan 
and a strong advocate of the national parks, had helped the NPS in the fi ght 
to prevent irrigators from tapping the waters of Yellowstone National Park.38
Following Cramton’s re-election defeat in 1930, Wilbur appointed him “Special 
Attorney to the Secretary” and entrusted him with special projects.  One of his 
fi rst tasks had been to devise a system of commercial permits for Boulder City 
to ensure orderly development rather than the “boomtown” atmosphere typically 
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associated with construction camps.39  Cramton’s commitment to the national 
park idea and his practical familiarity with the Boulder Canyon Project made 
him a good choice to lead the recreation investigation.  In May 1932 Cramton 
led a study team into the fi eld to assess the withdrawn lands, gauge their scenic 
and recreational potential, and determine how best the area could be protected 
and developed.  The study team included Roger W. Toll, superintendent of 
Yellowstone National Park, Minor R. Tillotson, superintendent of Grand Canyon 
National Park, Preston P. Patraw, superintendent of Zion National Park, and W. R. 
F. Wallace, an engineer from the Bureau of Public Roads.40
 Cramton reported that the withdrawn lands upstream of the dam site 
were recreationally valuable, highly scenic, and worth protecting.  Yet no single 
solution could be successfully applied to the entire area.  Accordingly, he divided 
the withdrawal into two separate sections and proposed different treatment for 
each.  The eastern section, encompassing the lower Grand Canyon and bordering 
Grand Canyon National Park, appeared to be of national park quality and 
deserved to be added to the National Park System.  Cramton recommended that 
the president establish a Grand Canyon National Monument to protect the area 
until Congress could enact legislation expanding the park’s boundaries to include 
it.41
 But the western section of the withdrawal, including the dam and 
reservoir, required a different approach.  The scenery here was attractive but not 
to a superlative degree.  More importantly, the presence of the dam, and other 
land uses like mining and grazing, would confl ict with the National Park Service 
mission of preserving its lands unimpaired.  In spite of these problems, however, 
the area did present outstanding recreational opportunities.  The area ought not 
to become a national park or national monument, yet it should not simply be 
returned to the public domain, undifferentiated from the millions of other acres 
of Nevada and Arizona desert.  To resolve the problem, Cramton innovated and 
proposed a new category, one fl exible and expansive enough to accommodate the 
philosophical contradictions the area posed.  He recommended that the  Boulder 
Dam area be designated a recreational area in which recreation and scenery would 
coexist with regulated utilitarian development.
 In a memo to Secretary Wilbur, Cramton attested to the national 
signifi cance of the area’s recreational potential.  The Boulder Canyon Project’s 
spectacular dam and enormous reservoir would stimulate such interest among 
tourists, Cramton wrote, that “every transcontinental traveler” would want to see 
it.  Moreover, apart from its appeal as a visual spectacle and engineering marvel, 
Cramton said, the 
recreational use of this area is an important byproduct… which 
should not be neglected.  It will meet the desires and confer direct 
benefi ts upon the many thousands of visitors who will annually 
come here from the majority of the states of the Union who 
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have no direct interest in the fl ood control, irrigation, and power 
possibilities of the project.
For these reasons, the reservoir area was of national importance and deserved 
federal protection and management.42
 Despite its recreational value, however, Cramton recommended that the 
area “ not be given a national park or national monument status.”  First, although it 
was remarkable and interesting, the area’s scenery was not “outstanding” enough 
to meet the exacting standards of national park quality.  Second, the mission of the 
National Park Service was to protect scenery, natural features, historical objects, 
and wildlife from impairment by development.  But the dam would be a “recent 
man-made work” that would be “changed as the necessities of man may from 
time to time require” and thus did not belong in a national park.  Third, allowing 
the presence of a dam and reservoir as the “central feature” in a national park or 
monument would undermine the Park Service’s efforts to keep dams out of the 
other parks.  “Conservationists have for two generations fought to protect our 
national parks from becoming incidental or subordinate to irrigation and water 
supply uses,” Cramton wrote.  “To deliberately bring into the national park chain 
and give national park status to such a dam and reservoir,” he warned, “would 
greatly strengthen the hands of those who seek to establish more or less similar 
reservoirs in existing national parks.”  Finally, livestock grazing and mining were 
important established uses of the area, and neither would be appropriate in a 
national park or monument.  Cramton concluded that the reservoir area should be 
added to the national park system, but with a name—a “recreation reservation,” 
he called it—that refl ected its primarily recreational purpose.43
 Cramton proposed the creation of a “Boulder Canyon National 
Reservation” that would place the area’s “recreational administration in the 
National Park Service while the primary jurisdiction is left with the  Bureau of 
Reclamation.”  Although the NPS internally referred to the area as a “recreation 
area,” Cramton’s decision to use the term “reservation” was deliberate.  Cramton 
argued that such a designation fi t the NPS mission, which—according to the 
National Park Service Organic Act of 1916—was to “promote and regulate the 
use of Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reservations 
hereinafter specifi ed.”  He also pointed out that Section 2 of the act referred to 
“such national parks and reservations of like character as may be hereafter created 
by Congress.”  Thus, he argued, it would be “entirely consistent with history 
and with principle, as well as with effi ciency, for the National Park Service to 
administer the recreational use of a reservation even though another organization 
might have a primary interest in such an area.”44
 The Hoover administration acted on Cramton’s recommendations.  On 
December 22, 1932, President Hoover signed a proclamation creating the 
273,000-acre  Grand Canyon National Monument, which provided protection 
for the spectacular Toroweap section of the western Grand Canyon.45  With the 
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monument established, action was now needed on the recreation area.  Cramton 
believed that the project could proceed under Secretary Wilbur’s authority without 
an immediate need for authorizing legislation.  At the secretary’s direction, the 
Park Service could advise the  Bureau of Reclamation on developing recreation 
policies and drawing up model agreements for concessionaires.  Still, Cramton 
recommended that the project be placed on a fi rmer foundation for the long 
term by seeking legislation to formally grant the NPS jurisdiction over the 
recreation area.46  To that end, Cramton provided Secretary Wilbur with a 
draft bill that defi ned the roles and responsibilities of each agency.  Within the 
nearly 1.2-million-acre proposed reservation, the  Bureau of Reclamation would 
administer the dam and its appurtenant works, while the Park Service would 
manage the recreational use of the reservoir and its surrounding lands.  The 
purposes of fl ood control, irrigation, and hydropower, defi ned in the Boulder 
Canyon Project Act, would remain the primary uses of the area under  Bureau of 
Reclamation jurisdiction.  The Secretary of the Interior would have the power 
to make necessary regulations within the reservation to protect the project’s 
utilitarian values.  While these values would be primary, the legislation would 
establish recreation and conservation as secondary uses under National Park 
Service authority.  Because they were politically important industries in Arizona 
and Nevada—and because the Interior Department did not want to unnecessarily 
provoke resistance to its plans—
livestock grazing and mining would 
be allowed to continue within the 
reservation, subject to Park Service 
regulation to make certain that such 
activities did not interfere with the 
recreational development of the 
area.  Finally, about 1.25 million 
acres of previously withdrawn land, 
not needed for recreation purposes, 
would be restored to entry under the 
public land laws, which would also 
help quiet resistance by the mining 
and livestock industries in the 
affected states.47
 In early 1933, National Park Service Director  Horace Albright and 
Reclamation Commissioner  Elwood Mead wrote to Secretary Wilbur, concurring 
with Cramton’s recommendations.48  Mead and Albright identifi ed several 
recreational activities that the new reservoir would accommodate, including 
boating, scenic boat tours, wildlife observation, and visiting special points 
of scenic, archaeological, or historical interest.  Fishing, too, would be a new 
recreational opportunity, as the reservoir would settle out the Colorado’s thick 
and murky silts, making the reservoir a suitable habitat for the trout and bass that 
sportsmen desired.49  In general, the development of the reservoir’s recreational 
potential would “increase the tourist business” in Nevada and Arizona.50  Such 
19.3.  Commissioner Elwood Mead at his desk 
in the Interior offi ce building.
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benefi ts would help build support for the project and would certainly generate 
good public relations for the NPS, USBR, and the Department of the Interior.  
Secretary  Wilbur accepted the recommendations and forwarded the draft 
legislation to Congress.  In February 1933, Representative Samuel Arentz of 
Nevada and Senator  Carl Hayden of Arizona introduced the Interior Department’s 
Boulder Canyon National Reservation bill in the House and Senate.51
 Although Secretary  Wilbur’s days in offi ce were numbered—Franklin 
Roosevelt’s inauguration was only a month away—he lobbied on behalf of the 
legislation.  “This largest artifi cial reservoir in the world,” he wrote Congress, 
“possesses great recreational and educational possibilities which should be 
conserved.”  Rather than assigning new responsibilities in the fi eld of recreation to 
the  Bureau of Reclamation, he argued that the Park Service was the proper agency 
to carry out that conservation.  The legislation would avoid the “building up of 
duplicating organizations.”  It would also make permanent the areas needed for 
“reclamation, power, and park purposes” while restoring excess withdrawn lands 
to entry.  Passage of the bills, Wilbur told the chairmen, was “urgently desirable” 
because it would “replace uncertainty with certainty” regarding NPS authority 
to manage the reservoir.52  The American Civic Association, an organization that 
considered itself a guardian of the parks, approved of the recreation plan and 
submitted a statement to Congress in support of it.53  But the legislation was cause 
for concern among other conservation groups.  Walter Huber and William Colby, 
members of the Sierra Club board of directors, wrote to Horace Albright that 
they were “a little fearful” about the area’s potential to “lower the bars” of park 
standards and “endanger the areas of strictly National Park caliber” by involving 
the NPS in “administering considerable areas devoted in part to commercial uses” 
such as mining, grazing, and water resources development.  While the Sierra Club 
would not “take any part in opposing” the bills, Huber and Colby told Albright 
that they did not “look with much favor” upon the recreation proposal.  Likewise, 
the National Parks Association expressed misgivings about the creation of what 
it called “national recreation reservations without standards,” but weakened 
by the Great Depression, the association found itself too “enfeebled” to offer 
serious opposition.54  Yet it was not these groups but the strong opposition of 
Nevada Senator Tasker Oddie—incensed that the federal government had violated 
Nevada’s sovereignty in its administration of Boulder City—that blocked action 
on the reservation bills over issues unrelated to the concerns of conservation 
groups.55  With the bills stalled in committee, the NPS still had no formal role 
at the Boulder Canyon Project, leaving the  Bureau of Reclamation to respond—
grudgingly—to the public’s recreational demands.  The issue would remain for 
the incoming Roosevelt administration to resolve.
 The second phase in the development of  NPS-USBR cooperation began 
during the New Deal era and resulted in the formalization of their recreation 
partnership through an interagency memorandum of agreement.  Taking offi ce 
in 1933, Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal administration brought renewed 
energy and purpose to the National Park Service.  Because the national parks 
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and monuments were “places for renewing national confi dence,” they became 
“focal points” for New Deal activity.56  FDR and his Secretary of the Interior, 
Harold L. Ickes, strongly supported the expansion of the National Park Service.
In 1933 Roosevelt transferred to the NPS all the national monuments previously 
administered by the Department of Agriculture and the Department of War.  The 
administration declared 1934 “A  National Park Year,” seeking to stimulate the 
tourist economy by aggressively promoting the park system.57  FDR also backed 
the creation of new national parks, including Olympic and Kings Canyon.
 The New Deal brought not only the territorial expansion of the  National 
Park Service but an expansion of its functions as well.  In particular, the 
administration responded to the national boom in outdoor recreation demand 
by supporting the expansion of the agency as the nation’s leader in outdoor 
recreation.  In 1933 Albright retired, making  Arno B. Cammerer the new director.  
Cammerer, who served from 1933 to 1940, moved the agency “further along in 
the direction set by Mather and Albright,” fully embracing the new emphasis on 
recreation and tourism.58  Under Cammerer—and  Conrad Wirth, his energetic 
assistant director—the National Park Service increasingly provided planning and 
development assistance to state and local governments.  The NPS operated a state 
parks division, which directed the work of 
several Civilian Conservation Corps camps 
in developing state and municipal parks.
The 1936 Park, Parkway,  and Recreation 
Area Study Act authorized the NPS to make 
a survey of the nation’s outdoor recreation 
needs and to partner with state and local 
governments to plan for meeting those 
needs.  The agency’s recreation mission 
also expanded through the creation of new 
types of National Park System units, which 
emphasized recreation rather than signifi cant 
natural or cultural resources.  These new 
areas included the national seashores, 
parkways, recreation demonstration areas, 
and—beginning with  Boulder Dam—
national recreation areas.59
 In 1935, the Roosevelt administration reintroduced the  Boulder Canyon 
National Reservation bill.  The new NPS Director, Arno B. Cammerer, and 
Reclamation Commissioner Mead prepared the legislation, and Secretary of the 
Interior Harold L. Ickes forwarded it to Congress.  The new bill contained the 
same division of powers and provisions as the 1933 version.  But now, going 
beyond the earlier bill, it authorized the  National Park Service and the  Bureau of 
Reclamation to cooperate in planning and managing recreation at other federal 
reservoirs associated with future reclamation projects to be built around the 
West.60
19.4.  Arno B. Cammerer, Director of 
the National Park Service.
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 Meanwhile, the USBR and its contractor, The Six Companies, Inc., made 
rapid progress on the dam.  In February 1935 the diversion tunnels closed, and 
the Colorado River—once derided as “too thick to drink and too thin to plow”—
began pooling behind the dam, forming a reservoir of sparkling, clear water that 
“for a distance of 25 miles or more” was “a dark emerald green in the canyons and 
a deep blue in more open country.”61  In September President Roosevelt visited 
 Boulder Dam and dedicated it to the American people.  In his dedication speech, 
he celebrated the area’s recreational potential, describing it as “an immense new 
park” for “the enjoyment of all the people.”62
 Completion of the dam and the fi lling of the reservoir put pressure on 
the Roosevelt administration to resolve the recreation issue.  As the number of 
tourists and recreation seekers visiting the dam continued to grow, it may have 
seemed that “all the people” were descending en masse upon their “immense 
new park.”  The  Union Pacifi c Railroad, now dubbing its route through southern 
Nevada “the  Boulder Dam Route,” promoted the dam—“the most thrilling sight 
in America”—as a weekend destination for western tourists and as a side-trip for 
cross-country passengers.63  Even airlines enticed passengers with the promise 
that their plane would circle for a close-up aerial view of the “gigantic dam and 
lake.”64  Most visitors, however, arrived by automobile.  In 1935 Commissioner 
Mead noted that tourist travel to  Boulder Dam and its reservoir was “greater now 
than ever before,” with 365,000 visitors making the trip that year.65
 Roosevelt had described the area as a “park.”  If so, it was one without 
adequate facilities or clearly defi ned administration.  The  Bureau of Reclamation 
reluctantly found itself having to grapple with managing recreation and tourism.
Much of the early tourism had simply involved watching the dam’s construction 
from cliff-side overlooks.  But with the dam completed and the reservoir rising, 
visitors now expected boat tours offering an opportunity to see the dam and 
upstream canyons from water level.  The bureau responded by issuing temporary 
permits to “several boat owners of known responsibility,” including those who 
now plied the reservoir in motorboats and sailboats, as well as commercial 
boat operators—such as the Murl Emery Company and Boulder-Grand Canyon 
Navigation Company—which were allowed to operate forty- and fi fty-passenger 
tour boats on the reservoir.66  “Scores” of swimmers also fl ocked to the shoreline 
near Boulder City and at Las Vegas Wash.  Walker Young, the bureau’s 
construction engineer in charge of the Boulder Canyon Project, reported, “the 
reservoir has become a very popular attraction for those interested in boating and 
swimming.”  “Every afternoon and evening,” he said, “the reservoir is used by a 
large number of swimmers, with a generous portion made up of children.”67
 The USBR struggled to manage the infl ux of recreation seekers.  In 
addition to managing the tour boat concessions, the agency now needed to 
provide boating facilities, including docks, marinas, and launching ramps, 
and beach and swimming facilities, such as restrooms, changing rooms, food 
vendors, and lifeguards.  The bureau fully expected the National Park Service—
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eventually—to assume 
these responsibilities, 
constructing needed 
developments,
administering necessary 
concessions, and 
regulating visitor use and 
safety on the reservoir.  
But until Congress 
authorized the Park 
Service to do so, the 
 Bureau of Reclamation 
had to manage the 
problem itself.  In the 
meantime, Secretary 
Ickes approved the 
bureau’s request for NPS 
guidance in developing 
its interim recreation policies.  Administration fell to the city manager of Boulder 
City,  Sims Ely.  Ely already had charge of issuing business permits there, and so 
the bureau simply added the responsibility for recreation-related permits at the 
reservoir to his portfolio.  Granting concessions and constructing improvements 
at the reservoir would take time, but action on safety issues could not be delayed.
“The conditions at  Boulder Dam require immediate attention or loss of life may 
result from lack of proper safeguards for boating and swimming,” Commissioner 
Mead wrote Secretary Ickes.  In August 1935 Secretary Ickes approved an 
emergency request from the bureau to hire lifeguards and patrolmen to protect 
recreationists.68
 Although it could not yet step in to manage recreation at the reservoir, 
the  National Park Service was eager to begin developing recreational facilities 
at the reservoir site.  It was able to do so by establishing Civilian Conservation 
Corps (CCC) camps through its state parks division.  NPS Assistant Director 
Conrad Wirth worked with the USBR to bring camps to the Boulder Canyon 
Project Area.69  The fi rst was State Park Camp 1 (SP-1), set up in November 1933 
at Overton, Nevada, on the Virgin River arm of the reservoir.  CCC enrollees 
from Camp SP-1 helped develop Nevada’s Valley of Fire State Park, building 
roads, trails, campsites, picnic shelters, and tourist cabins.  Enrollees helped 
archaeologists excavate the “Lost City” pueblo ruins and other archaeological 
sites that would be fl ooded when the reservoir fi lled to capacity.  They also built 
the park’s Lost City museum, which housed some of the recovered artifacts.70
 Although no state park was projected for the lower end of the reservoir, 
the NPS state parks division established two CCC camps there.  In November 
1935 and January 1936 the NPS set up Camp SP-4 and Camp SP-6 at Boulder 
City.  The mission of the two camps, known as the “Twin Camps,” was to 
19.5.  An excursion boat on Lake Mead before the lake 
rose above the upstream diversion dam.
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construct “facilities for caring for the tourist travel as well as for local residents” 
and the “eradication of scars, pits, rubbish, etc.,” that were the result of the dam’s 
construction.  The camps were needed, the NPS argued, because the USBR and 
its contractors had “done nothing in the way of accommodations for visitors.”71
Twin Camps enrollees made impressive contributions to the development at 
the reservoir.  They worked to build a swimming beach at  Hemenway Wash 
by clearing and grading the rocky shoreline and spreading truckloads of sand.
They built dressing rooms, restrooms, picnic shelters, and fl oating platforms at 
the beaches.  They built docks and launching facilities for the lake’s tour boat 
operators.  Enrollees also rebuilt and landscaped the rustic stone observation 
point overlooking the dam, and made improvements to the Boulder City Airport, 
readying it for use by Grand Canyon- Boulder Dam Tours, Inc., which operated 
sightseeing fl ights.  Finally, they cleared the lakeshore of brush and driftwood 
logs and also removed logjams and submerged logs—hazardous to boaters—from 
the reservoir itself.72
 Through the CCC, the National Park Service built recreational facilities it 
could not yet operate, while the  Bureau of Reclamation, which was responsible 
for managing them, did not want the job.  The situation demanded a resolution.  
Again, however, Congress failed to enact the needed legislation.  As recreational 
demands mounted, and as the recreation problem became more diffi cult for the 
bureau, the agencies and Secretary Ickes fi nally decided to move ahead, fi nding 
the necessary authority in existing legislation.  Citing provisions of the Economy 
Act of 1932, which authorized “interdepartmental procurement by contract,” 
as their basis for authority, the agencies began negotiating an inter-bureau 
cooperative agreement that would grant the NPS control over recreation at the 
reservoir.73
 During the summer of 1936, NPS and  USBR offi cials negotiated a 
division of administrative responsibilities at  Lake Mead—the new offi cial name 
of the Boulder Canyon Reservoir, which had been renamed in honor of the 
recently deceased commissioner of reclamation.  A special committee, consisting 
of representatives from the Interior Department Solicitor’s Offi ce, the  Bureau of 
Reclamation, and the National Park Service, met to develop a joint memorandum 
of agreement.  They recommended that the management authority at  Lake Mead 
be divided “territorially rather than functionally,” in order to avoid confl icts.  The 
bureau would retain jurisdiction over the administrative and employee community 
of Boulder City, as well as  Boulder Dam and its associated engineering works.  
The Park Service would gain control over both the remainder of the reserved 
lands within the Boulder Canyon Project Area and the surface waters of Lake 
Mead.74
 The two agencies would be territorially separate, but the  Bureau of 
Reclamation would retain certain rights within the National Park Service area.
While most roads and highways within the area were assigned to the NPS, the 
bureau would retain control of the Lower Portal road, which it needed for access 
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to construct and operate the dam’s powerhouse.  The USBR would likewise retain 
other utilitarian facilities running through the NPS area, including telephone 
lines, water lines, and the railroad line.  In the future, the USBR would have 
the authority to construct power  transmission lines through the area.  The NPS, 
for its part, would gain control of the Boulder City Airport, which would be 
“an important link in the chain of accommodations to travelers desiring to visit 
 Boulder Dam and Grand Canyon National Park.”75
 The committee also made recommendations to guide the  Bureau of 
Reclamation’s administration, particularly with regard to visitor services at 
Boulder City.  The USBR, the committee suggested, should issue permits for 
construction of additional privately owned accommodations, such as “auto court” 
cabins and a campground or “tourist camp.”  At the dam itself, the committee 
recommended that the bureau continue to allow visitors to enter the dam.
Although a private fi rm had requested a permit to operate a guide service at the 
dam, the committee believed that such applications should be denied and that 
the  bureau should operate its own tours.  The bureau, they believed, should have 
“close control” over public contact at the dam in order to coordinate visitation 
with dam operations.  A concessionaire, however, should be allowed to operate a 
souvenir shop at the dam.76
 The committee had few similarly specifi c recommendations for the 
National Park Service.  “The National Park Service for years has been engaged 
in the planning, development, and operation of recreational areas,” the report 
declared.  “For this committee to make detailed suggestions would not only 
be presumptuous, but… unwise.”  But they did propose that the National Park 
Service request a budget appropriation to purchase the surface rights to a group 
of patented mining claims located near the main highway through the recreation 
area.  They also recommended that the NPS provide fi shing and sightseeing 
access to the river and canyon below the dam.77
 The cooperative agreement also embraced the key ideas of the Cramton 
Report.  First, the agencies agreed that mining and prospecting could continue in 
the recreation area—subject to reasonable NPS regulations—“except where they 
will interfere physically and directly with a legitimate recreational development.”  
Unsurprisingly, given the economic importance of mining in Arizona and Nevada, 
the  Bureau of Reclamation had been inundated with protests from residents and 
members of Congress from both states, urging that mining not be banned from 
the area surrounding the reservoir.  The committee determined that allowing 
prospecting and  mining to continue—which, it believed, would “not result in 
injury to the recreational use of the area”— would not only help defl ect opposition 
to National Park Service management but would also “do much to create good 
will.”78  Second, livestock-grazing received similar treatment.  Although the 
National Park Service banned grazing in the parks (or sought to eliminate it where 
it existed as a prior use), the committee recommended that the agency authorize 
 grazing in the new national recreation area.  “Grazing should be permitted as a 
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gesture of good will toward the project on the part of residents of Nevada and 
Arizona,” they concluded, noting that there was not much actual risk to the area’s 
environment, since “the project area is largely arid and affords little opportunity 
for grazing of stock.”79  The Lake Mead grazing and mining policies, responses to 
local environmental and political conditions, would prove to be far-reaching and 
signifi cant, for they established a precedent of recreation-centered multiple-use 
management—rather than strict preservation—for future national recreation areas.
 On October 13, 1936, Secretary Ickes signed the memorandum of 
agreement.  Recognizing that “a large number of visitors use the lands and waters 
of the Boulder Canyon Project Area for purposes of recreation,” and further 
noting that the National Park Service had substantial experience in “administering 
areas devoted to recreational uses,” the memorandum established  Boulder Dam 
Recreation Area—the nation’s fi rst national recreation area.80
 In the newly created  Boulder Dam Recreation Area, the National Park 
Service was charged with planning and building recreational facilities, including 
scenic roads and hiking trails.  It also had responsibility for negotiating contracts 
with the concessionaires who would operate boating marinas, lodgings, visitor 
services at swimming beaches, and sightseeing tours.  The NPS would also 
regulate mining or grazing in the recreation area.81  Meanwhile, the  Bureau of 
Reclamation would operate the dam and its related facilities for the purposes 
specifi ed in the Boulder Canyon Project Act: fl ood control, water storage, and 
hydropower generation.  The bureau would continue to manage Boulder City 
and provide space for NPS administrative offi ces there.  It would also establish 
regulations governing public access to  Boulder Dam and its related works and 
provide for a “skilled guide and lecture service” at the dam.82
 With the cooperative agreement fi nally in place, both agencies set about 
promoting the new  Boulder Dam Recreation Area.  The Department of the 
Interior issued press releases promoting tourism in the region.  The  Bureau of 
Reclamation used its publication, The Reclamation Era, to spread the news as 
well.  Several articles in the magazine touted Lake Mead’s proximity to other 
national parks in the Colorado Plateau region, including Grand Canyon, Bryce 
Canyon, and Zion, as well as its suitability as a winter resort.83  The magazine also 
ran an article by NPS Director Arno Cammerer that highlighted the recreational 
improvements constructed by the Civilian Conservation Corps and described the 
various boat tours and lodging opportunities that were available.  He wrote, “The 
great  Boulder Dam…, planned originally to provide power, irrigation, and fl ood 
control, has now added recreation as a fi ne bonus for traveling America.”84
 In 1936 Congress appropriated $10,000 for the  National Park Service to 
prepare a master plan to guide development of the recreation area.  Developed 
by Assistant Director Conrad Wirth, the plan laid out proposed roads, trails, 
overlooks, overnight accommodations, and day-use recreation areas.85  To carry 
out the plan, Congress began making large appropriations to fi nance development, 
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and funding soon reached $100,000 per year.  The Civilian Conservation Corps 
carried out much of the work.86  The work of the Twin Camps—now designated 
NP-4 and NP-6—accelerated with the infl ux of money, and enrollees set about 
developing new facilities.87  They built a hiking trail from Hemenway Wash to the 
summit of Red Mountain, erected and staffed entrance stations to collect statistics 
on visitation, and converted the vacant Six Companies hospital building for use 
as the National Park Service’s  Boulder Dam Recreation Area administrative 
headquarters.  The new headquarters also included a museum featuring natural 
history and archeological exhibits.88  In 1937 the National Park Service also 
entered into an agreement with the Bureau of Biological Survey, to coordinate 
wildlife management projects (especially to protect bighorn sheep and waterfowl) 
in the recreation area, parts of which had previously been designated the Boulder 
Canyon Wildlife Refuge.89
 In developing the agreement, the National Park Service had sought 
to tailor the recreation project in such as way as to avoid or minimize local 
political opposition.  But they soon encountered a powerful challenge, despite 
their best efforts.  In 1939 U.S. Senator  Key Pittman of Nevada threatened to 
reduce the size of the  Boulder Dam Recreation Area.  Pittman represented Las 
Vegas interests that had opposed continued federal control over the reservoir.  
They disliked the NPS policy of strictly regulating the business practices—and 
numbers—of concessionaires.  The Las Vegas Evening Review-Journal, for 
example, called for a wide-open approach to development at Lake Mead, 
including allowing gambling and liquor sales within recreation area boundaries.
The paper editorialized that the government should “allow as many resorts to be 
built as there are people to build them” and denounced the recreation area plan as 
a federal “take over.”90  The paper and its allies no doubt approved when Pittman 
introduced legislation to grant 8,000 acres of federal land near Lake Mead to the 
State of Nevada for development as a state park.  Eighty percent of the land at 
issue was located within the  Boulder Dam Recreation Area boundaries, in the 
vicinity of Las Vegas Wash.  
 Secretary Ickes strongly opposed the bill.  Ickes detested Nevada’s famous 
vices and did not want to see them extended to Lake Mead.  On a 1939 trip to 
 Boulder Dam, he briefl y visited Las Vegas, which he described as “an ugly little 
town where gambling dens and saloons and prostitution run wide open day and 
night.”  “Three quarters of an hour was all we needed to get the savor of this 
rotten little town,” he wrote.  Ickes was glad to return to Boulder City, which, in 
contrast, he called, “the neatest and most attractive-looking place in Nevada,” 
owing to the federal government’s policy of prohibiting gambling, prostitution, 
and the sale of hard liquor.  Boulder City, rather than Las Vegas, was the model 
for what Ickes had in mind for development at the recreation area.  Despite 
Pittman’s assurances to the contrary, Ickes believed that the state park proposal 
was a ruse, backed by “gamblers and saloonkeepers” in order to build lakeside 
casinos that would lure  Boulder Dam and Lake Mead tourists.  When Pittman’s 
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bill passed both houses of Congress, Ickes interceded with President Roosevelt, 
who vetoed the bill on August 10, 1939.91
 In his veto message, FDR affi rmed the “national interest and value” of the 
 Boulder Dam Recreation Area.  “All of the people of the United States,” he stated, 
“have a paramount interest in  Boulder Dam and its related facilities for water 
conservation and utilization” as well as “a paramount interest in the outstanding 
recreational and scenic attractions of Lake Mead and the surrounding territory.”  
Because the area was “worthy of consideration as a possible national park or 
monument” and had “attracted thousands of visitors from all parts of the Union,” 
it therefore constituted a recreational area “truly national in character.”  Pittman’s 
bill would have opened the door “to uses which might be at variance with the 
national interest in the  Boulder Dam–Lake Mead region.”  Moreover, to transfer 
federal lands from the  Boulder Dam Recreation Area to the state would set an 
“undesirable precedent” for national parks and national forests, FDR declared.92
 Following the veto, the NPS again proved adept at public relations by 
accelerating the development of recreation facilities at Las Vegas Wash, the 
location nearest to the city of Las Vegas—and the area that Pittman had targeted.  
Although the NPS had initially planned to place priority on other areas, such as 
Hemenway Wash, Overton, and Pierce’s Ferry, it now hoped to win goodwill 
from the city by channeling funding and CCC manpower to build a swimming 
beach and campground at Las Vegas Wash.93  By 1941 the National Park Service 
had made considerable progress throughout the  Boulder Dam Recreation Area.  
The area now featured swimming beaches, campgrounds, and boating facilities 
at Las Vegas Wash and Hemenway Wash and a new administrative and visitor-
orientation center in Boulder City.  The lakeshore was cleared of debris, and trails, 
scenic roads, and overlooks were completed or under construction.
 Although World War II slowed the pace of construction at the recreation 
area, the postwar period brought the promise of both expansion and development.  
In 1947 the National Park Service renamed  Boulder Dam Recreation Area.  It 
became  Lake Mead National Recreation Area after Congress changed the name of 
the dam from Boulder to Hoover.94  Also that year, a new inter-bureau cooperative 
agreement renewed NPS management of the recreation area and extended the 
area’s boundaries southward to encompass the lands withdrawn for the new  Davis 
Dam, then under construction downstream.  Deeming it to be “in the best interests 
of the Government to provide for unifi ed administration of and jurisdiction over 
this entire area,” Secretary Ickes added the Davis Dam’s Lake Mohave reservoir 
and thousands of acres of surrounding land to Lake Mead National Recreation 
Area.95
 Building upon the success of the 1936 Lake Mead agreement, the two 
agencies coordinated recreational planning for other new reservoirs the bureau 
expected to build in the West.96  Their partnership was cemented in 1941, when 
the bureau agreed to fund a major NPS planning study, which resulted in the 
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publication of A Survey of the Recreational Resources of the Colorado River 
Basin, a key document that guided development of the National Park System in 
the region.  In return, the NPS agreed “in principle” to the future possibility of 
converting  Grand Canyon National Monument and  Dinosaur National Monument 
into “multiple-use national recreation areas”—modeled after Lake Mead—should 
the bureau decide to proceed with building its proposed Bridge Canyon Dam and 
Echo Park Dam.97  While the National Parks Association and Sierra Club had been 
wary but deferential with regard to the Lake Mead issue, both were roused into 
full-blown opposition by these plans that threatened to impair existing national 
parks and monuments.  Joined by the Wilderness Society, conservationists 
ultimately blocked both dams in two of the most bruising preservation battles 
of the 1950s and 1960s.98  Defeated in its attempt to build the  Echo Park Dam, 
Reclamation succeeded in building a dam at Glen Canyon, an area outside the 
National Park System.  But the USBR-NPS recreation partnership again proved 
useful: its reservoir— Lake Powell—became the centerpiece of the  Glen Canyon 
National Recreation Area, established by interagency agreement in 1958.99
 Between 1945 and 1965 the National Park Service and the  Bureau of 
Reclamation entered into agreements establishing nine new  national recreation 
areas:  Millerton Lake (1945) and Shasta Lake (1945) in California; Coulee Dam 
(later renamed Lake Roosevelt) in Washington (1946); Shadow Mountain Lake 
(1952) and Curecanti (1965) in Colorado; Glen Canyon in Utah and Arizona 
(1958); Flaming Gorge in Utah and Wyoming (1963); Arbuckle (later renamed 
Chickasaw) in Oklahoma (1965); and Sanford (later renamed Lake Meredith) 
in Texas (1965).100  When an area’s scenic and recreational opportunities were 
deemed to be of national signifi cance, the National Park Service retained 
management.101  In other cases, however, the NPS later agreed to transfer 
management to another agency.  For example, Millerton Lake Recreation Area, 
at the Central Valley Project’s Friant Dam, near Fresno, California, became a 
state park.  In other cases, such as Shasta Lake, Flaming Gorge, and Shadow 
Mountain Lake, national recreation area reservoirs adjacent to national forest land 
were eventually transferred to the U.S. Forest Service to promote management 
effi ciency and to avoid duplication of administration.  The NPS also cooperated 
with the  Bureau of Reclamation at smaller reservoirs that were valuable for 
outdoor recreation but that lacked suffi cient national signifi cance to warrant 
federal management.  In these cases, the NPS did not manage the recreation 
facilities but instead provided design and planning assistance to state and local 
agencies.  The National Park Service and the CCC developed Lake Guernsey, 
on the  Bureau of Reclamation’s North Platte Project, as a Wyoming state park.  
Cachuma Lake on Reclamation’s Cachuma Project in California, developed with 
NPS guidance, became a Santa Barbara County park in 1953.102
 The Kennedy administration brought about another shift in federal 
recreation policy that marked the third—and culminating—phase in the 
development of USBR-NPS cooperation at Lake Mead, which resulted in the 
permanent legislative establishment of Lake Mead National Recreation Area.  In 
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1963 President Kennedy’s Recreation Advisory Council confi rmed the success of 
the  national recreation area experiment.  Formed to help guide federal outdoor- 
recreation policy, the council proposed a “system of National Recreation Areas” 
to help solve the problem of meeting the “steeply mounting outdoor recreation 
demands of the American people.”  To shape the development of this system, the 
council issued a set of criteria.  According to the council, new national recreation 
areas were to be large areas—more than 20,000 acres—and within a day’s drive of 
major population centers.  They were to possess “natural endowments” that were 
“well above the ordinary” but still “of lesser signifi cance than the unique scenic 
and historic elements of the National Park System.”  The new policy echoed the 
1932 Cramton Report in its endorsement of multiple-use management, directing 
the federal agencies that administered national recreation areas to recognize 
outdoor recreation as the “dominant or primary resource management purpose,” 
while permitting and regulating uses such as grazing, mining, logging, water-
resources development, and hunting, so long as they were compatible with—and 
not detrimental to—recreational use.  Finally, the council called for future national 
recreation areas to be established legislatively by congressional statute rather than 
administratively through interagency cooperative agreements.103  In honor of its 
role as a model for the national recreation area concept and in recognition of its 
signifi cance as the fi rst area of the national park system set aside for primarily 
recreational purposes, on October 8, 1964, Lake Mead National Recreation Area 
became the fi rst national recreation area established by an act of Congress.104
Comprising nearly 1.5 million acres, Lake Mead National Recreation Area is 
the nation’s largest.  It is also the one of the most popular, attracting about eight 
million visitors per year—mostly from Southern California and the Southwest.105
  Lake Mead National Recreation Area, created by interagency agreement 
in 1936 as  Boulder Dam Recreation Area, plays an important if unacknowledged 
role in American environmental history.  The fi rst of its kind, it pioneered a new 
type of National Park System area.  It arose out of confl icting impulses.  The 
starkly beautiful desert country surrounding what was then the world’s tallest dam 
and largest reservoir needed resource protection, visitor education services, and 
recreational planning best provided by the National Park Service.  Yet because 
of the dam, the area could not be a national park or national monument in the 
traditional sense, where nature was to be preserved without impairment.  Instead, 
it would have to be a new type of area, one that could reconcile mass recreational 
development and preservation of outstanding natural and cultural resources 
with mining, grazing, and federal water projects—uses typically considered 
inappropriate in the National Park System.  It also represented a marriage of 
convenience, which allowed both federal agencies to serve their own bureaucratic 
interests while garnering wide public support.  For the National Park Service, 
the goal was expansion.  The agreement at Lake Mead gave the NPS additional 
territory to manage, larger development appropriations from Congress, and an 
expanded role in outdoor recreation.  For the  Bureau of Reclamation, the goal was 
to delegate recreation management to another agency so that it could focus on its 
water engineering mission without being distracted by other responsibilities that 
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fell outside its area of expertise.  Both goals depended on winning the blessings 
of private interests, conservationists, and the general public.  This marriage of 
convenience yielded offspring, too.  The fi rst was an eventual system of some 
forty national recreation areas, inspired by the compromises between recreation, 
preservation, and development embodied in the Cramton Report.  The second, 
and most signifi cant for American environmental history, was the recreation-
planning partnership between the NPS and USBR in the Colorado River Basin, 
which resulted in the Echo Park Dam and Bridge Canyon Dam proposals. The 
roots of those pivotal confl icts—which shaped the course of the environmental 
movement—are embedded in the interagency agreement that established  Boulder 
Dam Recreation Area.
Douglas W. Dodd is an assistant professor of history at California State 
University, Bakersfi eld, where he teaches courses on public history and the 
history of the American West.  He holds a Ph.D. in history from the
University of California at Santa Barbara.
Endnotes
1. The major standard works on the history of the National Park Service have given little 
attention to the emergence of the national recreation areas.  Richard Sellars’ Preserving Nature in the 
National Parks: A History (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1997) and John Ise, Our
National Park Policy:  A Critical History (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961) 
offer brief accounts of the national recreation area concept and its origins.  Alfred Runte’s National
Parks: The American Experience, 3rd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997) largely 
ignores the origins of the national recreation areas, focusing instead on the development of the urban 
national recreation areas of the 1970s.  Even briefer treatment is offered in Ronald A. Foresta’s The
National Parks and Their Keepers (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1984) and Robert 
Shankland’s Steve Mather of the National Parks, 3rd rev. ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970).  The 
issue is completely missing from the biography of Horace Albright, the National Park Service director 
most directly responsible for the national recreation area at  Boulder Dam; see Donald C. Swain, 
Wilderness Defender: Horace M. Albright and Conservation (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 
1970).  Furthermore, since these authors write from the perspective (and records) of the National Park 
Service, the equally important role of the U.S.  Bureau of Reclamation in developing the fi rst national 
recreation area has been overlooked.
2. The Boulder Canyon Project would deliver irrigation water to the Imperial and Coachella 
Valleys via the All-American Canal and the Coachella Canal and would supply Southern California’s 
Metropolitan Water District via the Colorado Aqueduct.  Southern California claimed 64 percent of 
the project’s hydroelectric power, while Nevada and Arizona each received 18 percent.  The name of 
the Boulder Canyon Project’s dam has been the source of much confusion.  Although the dam was 
actually constructed in Black Canyon, after geological studies revealed it to be a superior location, 
the project retained the  Boulder Dam name.  In 1930, Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur 
changed the name to “Hoover Dam” in honor of President Herbert Hoover.  Following the election 
of President Franklin Roosevelt, Interior Secretary Harold Ickes insisted that the government revert 
to the original name, “ Boulder Dam.”  In 1947, Congress legislatively restored the name Hoover 
Dam, fi nally putting the name controversy to rest.  Joseph E. Stevens, Hoover Dam: An American 
Adventure (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 18-9, 26-7, 32; U.S. Department of the 
Interior,  Bureau of Reclamation, The Story of Hoover Dam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Offi ce, 1971), 15.
3. Charles I. Zinser, Outdoor Recreation: United States National Parks, Forests, and Public 
Lands (New York:  John Wiley and Sons, 1995), 598.
4. John P. Orme to the Secretary of the Interior, April 3, 1914, “Proposed National Parks, 
Arizona,” File 0-32, Proposed National Parks, box 635, Entry 7, Central Classifi ed Files, 
490
1907-1932, Record Group 79, Records of the National Park Service, National Archives and Records 
Administration, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.
5. U.S.  Bureau of Reclamation, Federal Irrigation Reservoirs as Pleasure Resorts
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1928), II.
6. National Park Service, Recreational Use of Land in the United States: Part XI of the Report 
on Land Planning (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1938), http://www.cr.nps.
gov/history/online_books/recreation_use/chap3-1c.htm.
7. “Mead Portrays Dam’s Benefi ts,” Los Angeles Times, January 28 1931, 11.
8. John Muir, “The Grand Cañon of the Colorado,” in John Muir, Nature Writings:  The Story 
of My Boyhood and Youth, My First Summer in the Sierra, The Mountains of California, Stickeen, 
Selected Essays (New York: The Library of America, 1997), 790.
9. Paul S. Sutter, Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modern 
Wilderness Movement (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 19.
10. Ibid., 40.
11. [Isabelle F. Story,] “Draft of Data Re: the Hoover Dam Recreational Development Project 
for Incorporation in the Secretary’s Article for the Review-Journal,” November 12, 1931, Virgin 
National Park (Proposed) File, box 628, National Recreation Areas, Lake Mead, 1914-1932, Entry 
7, Central Classifi ed Files, 1907-1932, Record Group 79, Records of the National Park Service, 
National Archives at College Park, Md. (hereafter, NRA-LM, 1914-1932, Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, 
RG 79, NACP.)
12. Frederic A. Kirgis, Charles A. Moskey, and Mae A. Schnurr, Memorandum to Under-
Secretary West, 1 September 1936; Colorado River, File 131.24, “Cooperation with National Park 
Service, through August 1936,” box 229, Entry 7, Washington Offi ce, Project Correspondence 
File, 1930-1945; Records of the  Bureau of Reclamation, Record Group 115, National Archives and 
Records Administration—Rocky Mountain Region, Denver (hereafter Entry 7, WO-PCF, RG 115, 
NARA-RMR).
13. [Isabelle F. Story,] “Draft of Data Re: the Hoover Dam Recreational Development Project 
for Incorporation in the Secretary’s Article for the Review-Journal,” November 12, 1931; Virgin 
National Park (Proposed) File, box 628, NRA-LM, 1914-1932, Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, 
NACP.
14. Ray Lyman Wilbur, The Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur, 1875-1949, Edgar Eugene Robinson 
and Paul Carroll Edwards, eds. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960), 426.
15. J. Lee Brown, Memorandum for Mr. Alexander, “Boulder Canyon National Reservation,” 
September 1, 1934, File: 0-35, Proposed Parks:  Boulder Canyon National Reservation, Part 3, box 
2856, NRA-LM, General, Entry 7, CCF 1933-1949, RG 79, NACP.
16. Elwood Mead and Horace M. Albright, Memorandum to the Secretary, February 7, 1933, 
Colorado River, File 131.24, “Cooperation with National Park Service, through August 1936,” Entry 
7, WO-PCF, RG 115, NARA-RMR.
17. Ernest Walker Sawyer, Memorandum to Secretary Wilbur, December 7, 1929, File 0-35, 
Boulder Canyon, Special Commission on Operation of Recreational Area, Part 1, June 30, 1914, to 
July 31, 1930, box 628, NRA-LM, Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, NACP; Ernest Walker Sawyer, 
Memorandum to Secretary Wilbur, March 3, 1931, Virgin National Park (Proposed) File, box 628, 
NRA-LM, Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, NACP.
18. Horace M. Albright, “Tentative Report on the Proposed Virgin National Park.  Nevada-
Arizona-Utah,” January 6, 1930, File No. 0-35, Boulder Canyon, Part One—Boulder Canyon: Special 
Commission on Operation of Recreational Area, June 30, 1914, to July 31, 1930, box 628, NRA-LM, 
Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, NACP.
19. Ray Lyman Wilbur, Memorandum for Mr. Albright, 14 March 1930, 0-35, Boulder Canyon: 
Special Commission on Operation of Recreational Area, June 30, 1914, to July 31, 1930, box 628, 
NRA-LM, Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, NACP.
20. U.S. Department of the Interior, Memorandum for the Press, May 6, 1930, Colorado River, 
File 400.11, “Reservation of Lands, 1930-June 1940,” Entry 7, WO-PCF, RG 115, NARA-RMR; Ise, 
369.
21. “Great Lake Would Open New Scenes,” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 1930, E5.
491
22. U.S. Department of the Interior, Memorandum for the Press, May 6, 1930, Colorado River, 
File 400.11, “Reservation of Lands, 1930-June 1940,” Entry 7, WO-PCF, RG 115, NARA-RMR.
23. Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 3rd ed., (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1982), 180; Sellars, 40.
24. Runte, 108; Robert W. Righter, The Battle Over Hetch Hetchy:  America’s Most 
Controversial Dam and the Birth of Modern Environmentalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 196-8.
25. Sellars, 138.
26. H. Duane Hampton, “Opposition to National Parks,” Journal of Forest History 25 (January 
1981): 42.
27. M. R. Tillotson to the Director, December 10, 1931, Virgin National Park (Proposed) File, 
box 628, NRA-LM , Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, NACP.
28. Conrad Wirth, Memorandum for the Director, October 6, 1931, Virgin National Park 
(Proposed) File, box 628 NRA-LM, Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, NACP.
29. Wallace R. Atwood, Memorandum for Dr. Bryant, October 31, 1931, Virgin National Park 
(Proposed) File, box 628, NRA-LM, Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, NACP.
30. Harold C. Bryant to the Director, October 31, 1931; Virgin National Park (Proposed) File, 
box 628, NRA-LM, Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, NACP.
31. “An Act to Establish a National Park Service, and for Other Purposes,” August 25, 1916, 
39 Stat. 535, in Lary M. Dilsaver, ed., America’s National Park System: The Critical Documents
(Lanham, Maryland.: Rowman and Littlefi eld, 1994), 46-7.
32. Franklin K. Lane to Stephen T. Mather, May 13, 1918, in Dilsaver, 48.
33. Sellars, 94.
34. “Balzar Charts Nevada’s Path,” Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1931, 6.
35. M. R. Tillotson to the Director, December 10, 1931; Virgin National Park (Proposed) File, 
box 628, NRA-LM, Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, NACP.
36. M. R. Tillotson to Roger W. Toll, February 25, 1932, Arizona— Boulder Dam fi le, Entry 20, 
Records of Roger W. Toll, 1928-1936, RG 79, NACP.
37. Legislature of the State of Utah, H.J.M. 1, “Memorial to the Congress of the United States 
Protesting Against the Withdrawal from Entry and Against Preventing Grazing on Public Lands in 
Northwestern Arizona,” March 9, 1931, Virgin National Park (Proposed) File, box 628, NRA-LM, 
Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, NACP.
38. Horace M. Albright and Robert Cahn, The Birth of the National Park Service: The Founding 
Years, 1913-1933 (Salt Lake City, Utah: Howe Brothers, 1985), 117.  NPS Director Conrad Wirth 
described Cramton as “perhaps as much a Park Service man as he was a member of Congress.” 
Conrad Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 30. 
39. Stevens, 146.
40. Louis C. Cramton, Memorandum for the Secretary, “Park and Recreational Treatment of the 
Colorado River Area from the Grand Canyon to the Hoover Dam, including the Hoover Reservoir 
Area,” June 28, 1932, File 0-35, Proposed Parks, Boulder Canyon National Reservation, 1932, box 
628, NRA-LM, Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, NACP.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. In 1975, Congress expanded Grand Canyon National Park to incorporate the 1932 Grand 
Canyon National Monument.  National Park Service, The National Parks: Index 2005-2007
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 2005), 21; David Harmon, Francis P. 
McManamon, and Dwight T. Pitcaithley, eds., The Antiquities Act: A Century of American 
Archaeology, Historic Preservation, and Nature Conservation (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 
2006), 292.
46. Louis C. Cramton, Memorandum for the Secretary, “Park and Recreational Treatment of 
the Colorado River from the Grand Canyon National Park to Hoover Dam, including the Hoover 
Reservoir Area,” November 21, 1932, File 0-35, Proposed Parks, Boulder Canyon National 
Reservation, 1932, box 628, NRA-LM, Entry 7, CCF 1907-1932, RG 79, NACP.
492
47. Louis C. Cramton, Memorandum for the Secretary, November 21, 1932.
48. Elwood Mead and Horace M. Albright, Memorandum to the Secretary, February 7, 1933, 
Colorado River, File 131.24, “Cooperation with National Park Service, through August 1936,” box 
229, Entry 7, WO-PCF, RG 115, NARA-RMR.
49. Ibid.
50. Louis C. Cramton, Memorandum for the Secretary, December 22, 1932.  File: “H.R. 14662 
(S. 5637)  Boulder Dam, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1932,” box 628, NRA-LM, Entry 7, CCF 1907-
1932, RG 79, NACP.
51. “Vast Play Area Sought In Bills,” Los Angeles Times, February 15, 1933, 6; U.S. Congress, 
House of Representatives, 72nd Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 14662, “A Bill for the establishment, 
development, and administration of the Boulder Canyon National Reservation, and the development 
and administration of the Boulder Canyon Project Federal Reservation, and for other purposes,” 
February 14, 1933.  S. 5637 was the Senate companion bill.
52. Ray Lyman Wilbur to Gerald Nye, February 15, 1933, Colorado River, File 400.11, 
“Reservation of Lands, 1930-June 1940,” box 340, Entry 7, WO-PCF, RG 115, NARA-RMR.
53. U.S. Congress, Senate, Boulder Canyon National Reservation:  Hearing Before a 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Public Lands and Surveys on S. 5637, 72nd Cong., 2nd sess., 
February 24, 1933, 42-3.
54. Walter L. Huber to Horace M. Albright, March 8, 1933, File: 0-35, Proposed Parks:  Boulder 
Canyon National Reservation, Part 3, box 2856, NRA-LM, General, Entry 7, CCF 1933-1949, RG 
79, NACP; John C. Miles, Guardians of the Parks: A History of the National Parks and Conservation 
Association (Washington, D.C.:  Taylor and Francis in cooperation with the National Parks and 
Conservation Association, 1995), 135-6.
55. The Boulder Canyon National Reservation legislation also contained some administrative 
housekeeping language regarding the  Bureau of Reclamation’s federal reservation at Boulder 
City and the construction site.  Oddie’s opposition stemmed from an ongoing dispute between the 
Department of the Interior and the State of Nevada over the power to tax property and enforce 
state laws in the area under the bureau’s control.  He did not make any particular argument against 
the recreation reservation itself, other than to say the proposed legislation “assembles a number of 
problems, the solutions of which should be made entirely separate and the subjects of separate bills.”  
U.S. Congress, Senate, Boulder Canyon National Reservation: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Public Lands and Surveys on S. 5637, 72d Cong., 2nd sess., February 24, 1933, 13.
56. Sutter, 136.
57. Ibid.
58. Sellars, 94.
59. Harlan D. Unrau and G. Frank Williss, Administrative History: Expansion of the National 
Park Service in the 1930s (Denver: National Park Service, 1983), 129-60.
60. Elwood Mead and Arno B. Cammerer, Memorandum for the Secretary, January 16, 1935, 
Colorado River, File 400.11, “Reservation of Lands, 1930-June 1940,” box 340, Entry 7, WO-PCF, 
RG 115, NARA-RMR.
61. Wesley R. Nelson, “Boulder Canyon Reservoir,” The Reclamation Era 25 (September 
1935): 180.
62. “Important Dates in the History of  Boulder Dam,” The Reclamation Era 26 (April 1936): 
84; Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 4, The
Court Disapproves, 1935 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969), 399.
63. The UPRR offered excursion fares from Los Angeles to  Boulder Dam for $11.62.  
Passengers traveling between Los Angeles and Chicago could add a  Boulder Dam side-trip to their 
ticket for 55 cents. Los Angeles Times, November 18, 1935, 10.
64. Western Air Express-United Air Lines advertisements, Los Angeles Times, June 28, 1935, 
A14; Los Angeles Times, September 3, 1936, 12.
65. Elwood Mead to Harold L. Ickes, May 6, 1935, File 131.24, “Cooperation with National 
Park Service, through August 1936,” box 229, Entry 7, Washington Offi ce, Project Correspondence 
File, 1930-1945, Colorado River, RG 115, NARA-RMR; “Park Service to Assist at Lake Mead,” The
Reclamation Era 26 (March 1936): 65.
493
66. Ibid.;  Harold L. Ickes to Sen. Alva B. Adams, March 6, 1939, File 0-35,  Boulder Dam, 
History & Legislation, Part 1, box 2856, National Recreation Areas, Lake Mead, General, Entry 7, 
CCF 1933-1939, RG 79, NACP; Nelson, 180.
67. Nelson, 180; Construction Engineer to Chief Engineer, June 28, 1935, Colorado River, File 
131.24, “Cooperation with National Park Service, through August 1936,” box 229, Entry 7, WO-PCF, 
RG 115, NARA-RMR.  For a description of the tough-minded Ely, see Stevens, 142-58.
68. Elwood Mead to Harold L. Ickes, July 13, 1935, Colorado River, File 131.24, “Cooperation 
with National Park Service, through August 1936,” box 229, Entry 7, WO-PCF, RG 115, NARA-
RMR.
69. John C. Page to Elwood Mead, July 12, 1935, Colorado River, File 131.24, “Cooperation 
with National Park Service, through August 1936,” box 229, Entry 7, WO-PCF, RG 115, NARA-
RMR.
70. Thomas W. Miller, “Narrative Report for the Month of March, 1934,”  Boulder Dam State 
Park Camp #1, Overton, Nevada, April 1, 1934, Folder “SP2 Cathedral Gorge Camp, Nevada,” box 
94, Nebraska SP-5 to Nevada SP-4, Entry 41, Reports on CCC Projects in State and Local Parks, 
1933-37, RG 79, NACP; Thomas W. Miller, “Narrative Report for the Months of June & July 1935,” 
Folder “SP1  Boulder Dam—Overton, Nevada,” box 94, Entry 41, RG 79, NACP.
71. C. M. Bailey, “Narrative Report of CCC Accomplishments, Sixth Period,” n.d., Folder 
“SP-6 Nevada—Boulder City Camp,” box 95, Nevada SP-5 to New Jersey SP-4, Entry 41, RG 79, 
NACP.
72. Dennis McBride, Hard Work and Far From Home:  The Civilian Conservation Corps at 
Lake Mead, Nevada (Boulder City, Nevada: Boulder Images, 1995), 20, 21, 25. 
73. Unrau and Williss, 154.
74. Frederic L. Kirgis, George A. Moskey, and Mae A. Schnurr, Memorandum for Under-
Secretary West, September 1, 1936, Colorado River, File 131.24, “Cooperation with National Park 
Service, through August 1936,” box 229, Entry 7, WO-PCF, RG 115, NARA-RMR.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. “Memorandum of Agreement between the National Park Service and the  Bureau of 
Reclamation, Relating to the Development and Administration of the Boulder Canyon Project Area,” 
October 13, 1936, Colorado River, File 131.24, “Cooperation with National Park Service, through 
August 1936,” box 229, Entry 7, WO-PCF, RG 115, NARA-RMR.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. “ Boulder Dam a Tourist Mecca,” The Reclamation Era 26 (August 1936): 184-5; “Park 
Service to Assist at Lake Mead,” The Reclamation Era 26 (March 1936): 65.
84. Arno B. Cammerer, “Building a Playground at  Boulder Dam,” The Reclamation Era 28 
(November 1938): 222-4.
85. Conrad L. Wirth, “Report on the Proposed  Boulder Dam Project Area, Nevada and Arizona, 
Master Planning Principles and Objectives,” May 1, 1936, Colorado River, File 131.24, “Cooperation 
with National Park Service, through August 1936,” box 229, Entry 7, WO-PCF, RG 115, NARA-
RMR.
86. Ise, 369.
87. John C. Paige, The Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Park Service, 1933-1942:  
An Administrative History (Denver: National Park Service, 1985), Appendix C.
88. McBride, 30-3.
89. “Memorandum of Agreement between the National Park Service and the Bureau of 
Biological Survey Relating to the Development and Administration of the Boulder Canyon Wildlife 
Refuge,” March 31, 1937, box 2855  National Recreation Areas, Lake Mead, General, Entry 7, CCF 
1933-1939, RG 79, NACP.
90. “Just What is the Plan?” Las Vegas Evening Review-Journal, January 30, 1936; “Vegas 
Group on Record Against New Proposal,” Las Vegas Evening Review-Journal, April 18, 1939.
494
91. Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes.  Volume II: The Inside Struggle, 
1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 580-1, 588, 693.
92. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Veto Message of August 10, 1939,” File 120–Legislation, 
“Correspondence relating to national parks, national monuments, and national recreation areas, 
1927-1953,” box 81, Southwest Regional Offi ce Subject Files, RG 79, NARA-RMR.
93. Arthur E. Demaray to Guy D. Edwards, March 22, 1939, Colorado River, File 400.11, 
“Reservation of Lands, 1930-June 1940,” box 340, Entry 7, WO-PCF, RG 115, NARA-RMR.
94. National Park Service, The National Parks: Index 2005-2007, 61.
95. “Modifi cation of Memorandum of Agreement Between the National Park Service and the 
 Bureau of Reclamation Relating to the Development and Administration of the Boulder Canyon 
Project Area,” July 18, 1947, fi le 201-15, “Recreation Area Policy,” Lake Mead National Recreation 
Area Subject Files, 1936-1969, box 4, RG 79, NARA-Pacifi c Southwest Region, Laguna Niguel, 
California (hereafter RG 79, NARA-PSWR); National Park Service, The National Parks: Index 
2005-2007, 61.
96. John Page to Arno Cammerer, n.d., Colorado River, File 131.24, “Cooperation with National 
Park Service, through August 1936,” box 229, Entry 7, WO-PCF, RG 115, NARA-RMR.
97. U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, A Survey of the Recreational 
Resources of the Colorado River Basin (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1950); 
Susan Rhoades Neel, “Newton Drury and the Echo Park Dam Controversy,” Journal of Forest and 
Conservation History 38 (April 1994): 58.
98. For the Echo Park/Dinosaur National Monument controversy, see Susan Rhoades Neel, 
“Irreconcilable Differences: Reclamation, Preservation, and the Origins of the Echo Park Dam 
Controversy,” Ph.D. dissertation, (Los Angeles: University of California, 1990) and Mark W. T. 
Harvey, Symbol of Wilderness: Echo Park and the American Conservation Movement (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1994).  For the battle over Grand Canyon and the Bridge Canyon 
and Marble Canyon dams, see Byron E. Pearson, Still the Wild River Runs:  Congress, the Sierra 
Club, and the Fight to Save Grand Canyon (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2002).
99. National Park Service, The National Parks: Index 2005-2007, 83.
100. Based on the success of its partnership with the  Bureau of Reclamation, the National Park 
Service also entered into partnerships with other federal water resources agencies.  An agreement 
with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers created Lake Texoma Recreation Area (1946-49) on the 
Texas-Oklahoma border.  An agreement with the International Boundary and Water Commission 
created Amistad National Recreation Area (1965) on the Rio Grande, in Texas.  Barry Mackintosh, 
“Former National Park System Units: An Analysis,” 1995, http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/hisnps/
NPSHistory/formerparks.htm; National Park Service, The National Parks: Index 2005-2007, 32, 81, 
83, 90.
101. Shankland, 307.
102. Ise, 468; Barry Mackintosh, “Former National Park System Units:  An Analysis,” 1995, 
http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/hisnps/NPSHistory/formerparks.htm; U.S.  Bureau of Reclamation, 
Cultural Resources, Wyoming, Lake Guernsey, http://www.usbr.gov/cultural/wyoming.html; File 
0-41, “Agreement Re: Cachuma Reservoir,” and “Friant and Shasta Dams,” Lake Mead National 
Recreation Area Subject Files, 1936-1969, box 1, RG 79, NARA-PSWR.
103. Recreation Advisory Council, “Federal Executive Branch Policy Governing the Selection, 
Establishment, and Administration of National Recreation Areas,” Circular No. 1, March 26, 1963, in 
Dilsaver, ed., 263-7.
104. National Park Service, The National Parks: Index 2005-2007, 61.
105. Total area of Lake Mead NRA is 1,495,664 acres. The unit received 8,103,610 visitors in 
2004.  National Park Service, Statistical Abstract 2004, http://www2.nature.nps.gov/stats/abst2004.
pdf.
495
Hydroelectric Power From Eklutna:  Reclamation 
Efforts to Develop Southcentral Alaska During the 
Cold War Era
By:
John W. Heaton 
and Claus-M. Naske
 Congress charged the Bureau of Reclamation in the Newlands Act,1 of 
1902 with administering a perpetual fund designed to reclaim arid lands for 
western farmers to keep the Jeffersonian dream of an agrarian society alive in the 
twentieth century.  By all accounts, the efforts of the Bureau have been largely 
responsible for the development of much of the West’s water resources during 
the twentieth century to provide the foundation not only for agriculture in the 
region but also the infrastructure for a diversifi ed modern economy.  Historians 
have examined the role of this government agency in providing irrigation water, 
hydroelectric power, fl ood control, navigation, and recreation for the benefi t of 
the public.  More recently, scholars have emphasized either the environmental 
impact of dams or the role the Bureau played in expanding the infl uence of 
the federal government in the West over the last century.  The  Eklutna Project, 
thirty-four miles north of Anchorage, Alaska, offers an interesting case study 
in Bureau of Reclamation history because it was not implemented as part of a 
water resource management plan, and the federal government never intended 
to maintain permanent control of the facilities.  Indeed, there was never a need 
to reclaim arid Alaska lands, and reclamation laws were not extended into the 
territory.  Alaskan territorial offi cials, at the height of the Cold War, succeeded in 
convincing the federal government of the need for a cheap and dependable supply 
of electric power to facilitate the development of a remote, but strategically 
important, region of the nation.  The Bureau of Reclamation planned and funded 
this technically challenging project and eventually turned it over to local public 
utilities.
 Hydroelectric power is not new in Alaska.  In the 1930s, although the state 
was still thinly populated and little changed in some respects since the days of the 
gold rush, larger Alaskan settlements nevertheless enjoyed many of the amenities 
of modern living.  They had phone service, water systems, and electricity.  
Most communities generated power from coal or oil, but occasionally small 
hydroelectric power plants were used.  One such installation was built by private 
interests in 1929 at the mouth of Eklutna Lake, some 24 miles northeast 
of Anchorage.  The seven-mile-long and one-mile-wide Eklutna Lake, 
(elevation 868 feet) lies in a steep-sided, trough-like valley some 23 miles long. 
It is headed by a glacier and a snowfi eld. The lake overfl owed into Eklutna Creek 
below the rock dam, which had been built to provide a water supply for the small 
power plant near Eklutna Village, about 8 miles downstream from the dam.
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 The initial structure was not overly successful because when the water 
level rose four to fi ve feet above its natural barrier, the slightest leak allowed the 
water to escape.  To remedy the situation, wood pilings were driven across the 
mouth of the overfl ow channel, permitting the storage of water to a depth of three 
to four feet above the natural lake level.  In the fall of 1934 contractors built an 
earth-and rock-fi ll structure which incorporated portions of the original dam.  It 
provided a more stable water supply which ensured more dependable generation 
of electricity.  In 1943 the city of Anchorage purchased the dam from the private 
owner, but it grew increasingly clear that the project could not meet the demands 
of a growing region.2
 The crisis in the availability of electric power hampered attempts to 
develop southcentral Alaska and increased in proportion to rising populations 
beginning in the 1930s.  World War II, of course, brought an infl ux of people to 
Alaska, particularly to Fairbanks and Anchorage where military construction 
activities offered employment.  But even before the outbreak of war, the 
population of southcentral Alaska had been rising mainly due to a federal railroad 
project in the region.  Anchorage became the headquarters for these operations 
in 1914.  With completion of the railroad in the early 1920s, which included 
numerous maintenance facilities and offi ces in Anchorage, many of the workers 
chose to remain in Alaska.  In the 1930s, the widespread economic fallout of 
the Great Depression in “the states” helped to develop the agricultural potential 
of lands north of Anchorage.  A government program brought 200 families, 
displaced by drought conditions in the Midwest, to the Matanuska Valley.  With 
the outbreak of World War II, as the government increasingly recognized the 
strategic importance of Alaska, men and government resources poured into the 
territory in unprecedented amounts which helped to boost the population of 
Anchorage by 500 percent between 1939 and 1945.  Housing, never abundant, 
became extremely diffi cult to fi nd.  Moreover, services could not keep up with 
increasing demands during these years of initial growth and development.  By 
1945 the demand for power exceeded supply.3
 Anchorage Power and Light urgently searched for additional sources of 
electricity which led it to use diesel generators and even the boiler and generating 
equipment of a wrecked ship (the Sacket’s Harbor).  Alaska’s man in Washington, 
territorial delegate E. L. Bartlett, attempted to respond to calls for help from 
many Alaskan towns.4  The River and Harbor Act of March 2, 1945, had provided 
for preliminary examination and surveys of Cook Inlet to improve navigation, 
develop hydroelectric power, and provide harbor facilities.  A spokesman for 
the Corps of Engineers advised Bartlett to introduce legislation which would 
authorize the construction of a hydroelectric plant at Eklutna.5
 Representative Ben F. Jensen (R, Iowa), chairman of the House Interior 
Department Appropriation Subcommittee, became interested in Alaskan 
development and was largely responsible for making $150,000 available for 
an investigation of the territory’s power resources.  An  Alaska Investigations 
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Offi ce was established and under the able leadership of Joseph M. Morgan 
and his colleagues, an exhaustive investigation of Eklutna and other potential 
hydroelectric sites was made.  The investigation determined that, as of 1949, 
the utility system serving the Anchorage area and the Matanuska Valley had a 
production capacity of only 8,625 kilowatts—far short of actual needs.  Total 
Alaskan generating capacity from private plants amounted to 35,931 kilowatts 
and from public plants amounted to 19,440 kilowatts, for a grand territorial total 
of 55,371 kilowatts, woefully inadequate for Alaskan needs.  Delegate Bartlett 
asserted in Congress that federal policy had actively and long supported the 
development of water resources in the West, while not “a thin dime” had been 
put into Alaskan water power development.  He argued that a “start should be 
made now” because plentiful power was a prime necessity for “a self-suffi cient 
economy,” which, in turn, “was essential for national defense.”6
20.1.  Map of Eklutna Project.  Map from the 1961 Reclamation Project Data book.
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 In 1949, the House Public Lands Committee favorably reported a bill 
which called for the immediate construction of the  Eklutna project at a cost of 
$21,500,000.  The Bureau of the Budget gave its approval with the reservation 
that Federal Reclamation laws were not to be extended to the territory, nor were 
recreational facilities to be developed along with the project.7
 The proposed Eklutna facility would replace the old earthen log structure 
and consist of a low dam raising the level of the lake by two feet, a four-and-one-
half-mile tunnel leading from the lake through a mountain to the north, a penstock 
of 1,250 feet and, at the base of the mountain, a power plant of 30,000 kilowatt 
capacity.  Transmission lines would carry the electricity to the Matanuska Valley 
and to Anchorage.  Not until September 22, 1950, did the Bureau of Reclamation 
offi cially announce that initial plans and specifi cations were being expedited 
along with a $1.1 million appropriation to enable construction bids to be received 
as soon as possible.8
 By February of 1951 the drilling contractor was employing shifts of 
workers, seven days a week.  In the planning stage were 12 permanent homes 
for employees at the power plant as well as two 10-car garages, a warehouse 
and water works, roads, general utilities and a 115,000 volt transmission line 
to Palmer.  Palmer Constructor of Omaha, Nebraska, a three-fi rm organization 
including Peter Kiewit Sons, Coker Construction Co., and Morrison-Knudsen Co. 
had won the bid for building the four-mile long, nine-foot diameter, transmountain 
water diversion tunnel and other facilities at Eklutna for $17,348,865.  The bid 
called for completion of the project within 1,050 days.  It was soon apparent, 
however, that the cost of the project had been underestimated.  Bartlett was 
naturally perturbed when several House Committee members advocated 
the project’s abandonment and he pressed for money to complete Eklutna.  
Certainly, abandonment would have been an extremely effective demonstration 
of Congressional displeasure at the cost overrun, but would have meant that 
the $11,729,000 already expended would have been wasted, as Goodrich W. 
Lineweaver, Acting Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, pointed out.9
 On April 2, 1953, after a year’s delay and much political maneuvering, 
the Territories Subcommittee of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee 
debated the Bartlett bill and made a number of recommendations.  These were 
that the cost increase be limited to $30,000,000; that the annual operation and 
maintenance expenditures be restricted to $120,000; that electricity be sold at 
no less that 11.5 mills; and that the Department of the Interior negotiate with the 
city of Anchorage for the purchase of existing hydroelectric facilities and water 
rights at no more than the original costs minus a reasonable depreciation.  Until 
these stipulations were met, and the Department of the Interior had negotiated 
with Anchorage, the full House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs would 
not take up the matter.  After still more debate and the adoption of a number of 
amendments, among them a cost ceiling of $33,000,000 plus “such sums as may 
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be necessary for the operation and maintenance of the project,” the full House 
fi nally passed the Bartlett measure on July 30, 1953.10
 At the Alaskan general election of October 6, 1953, Anchorage voters 
approved an agreement between the city and the Department of the Interior that 
stated that as soon as power went on line at Eklutna, Anchorage was to transfer 
the site of its original hydroplant, together with its water rights at Eklutna, to the 
Department.  In return, Anchorage was to receive some 16,000,000 kilowatts 
of fi rm power from Eklutna with monthly credits on the city’s electric bill to 
be given until October 12, 1978, the date on which the license from the Federal 
Power Commission expired.   Eklutna power for Anchorage became a reality when 
the fi rst 15,000 kilowatt unit went on line in January 1955, and the second in 
March of the same year.  The total project had cost $30,521,183, approximately 
$2,500,000 less than the amount Congress had fi nally authorized.11
 Alaska 
offi cially entered 
the union as the 
49th state on 
January 3, 1959, 
and by then it 
had become clear 
that with the 
rapid growth of 
the Anchorage 
metropolitan
area, power 
demand again 
far outstripped 
available
generating
capacity.  Bartlett, 
now the senior 
U.S. Senator 
from Alaska, 
introduced a bill which enabled the Bureau of Reclamation to accept from 
Anchorage whatever monies were necessary to raise the dam at Eklutna to convert 
20,000,000 kWh annual dump power to fi rm power.  At hearings held in May 
1960 the small rural electric cooperative associations in southcentral Alaska 
opposed the Bartlett measure because it allowed Anchorage to purchase extra 
power at a discount rate at the expense of other consumers of Eklutna power.  The 
Bartlett bill subsequently died.12
 On March 27, 1964, at 5:36 p.m., an earthquake, registering 8.5 on the 
Richter scale, shook southcentral Alaska and devastated several communities.  
Eklutna suffered much damage to its power plant.  As soon as possible after the 
20.2.  Eklutna Powerplant.  Photo from the 1961 Reclamation
Project Data book.
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earthquake, the Bureau of Reclamation performed temporary repairs to restore 
the power plant and pressure tunnel to normal operation and ensure an adequate 
supply of water.  On September 16, 1964, Senator Bartlett submitted a measure on 
behalf of Senator Ernest Gruening (D, Alaska) and himself which provided that 
any repair money spent on Eklutna would not be reimbursable from its revenues.
The Senator reintroduced the measure in 1965, and the Department of the Interior 
reported on it favorably in April 1966.  But the Bureau of Reclamation had since 
been forced to construct a new dam—for $121,000 more than the estimated repair 
costs of the old one.  Bartlett asked that the $121,000 be reimbursable while 
the estimated repair costs be absorbed by the federal government.  His measure 
was signed into law on September 26, 1968, saving  Eklutna’s power customers 
$2,805,437.13
 The new dam, an earth and rockfi ll structure 815 feet long and 51 feet 
high constructed downstream from the damaged complex, was fi nished well 
ahead of schedule on November 15, 1965.  Beginning in 1967 the Alaska Power 
Administration (APA), a federal agency the Department of the Interior had 
created, took over operation and maintenance of the facility, a responsibility it 
maintained until 1995.14
 During these decades APA operated and marketed the power from two 
federal hydro projects in Alaska, including Eklutna and Snettisham (U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers), a project in southeast Alaska which served the Juneau 
region.  The APA was one of fi ve Power Marketing Administrations through 
which the federal government marketed power from over one hundred hydro 
projects developed by the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers throughout the United States.  The government built these structures 
for fl ood control, navigation, irrigation, and recreation.  However, the projects 
administered by the APA were different in that they were not designed originally 
as water resource management facilities, nor, according to a recent Department of 
Energy report, were they conceived as projects that the federal government would 
permanently control.  Instead, the government built Eklutna (and Snettisham) to 
“encourage and promote economic development and to foster the establishment of 
essential Industries in Alaska.”15
 By the 1980s Alaska’s congressional delegation considered this mission 
fulfi lled and raised the question of divestiture, and the DOE concurred.  The APA-
run Eklutna project by this time provided only about 5 percent—47 megawatts—
of the power for its market area.  The proposal garnered widespread support, 
and in 1997 three local public utilities, Anchorage Municipal Light and Power, 
Matanuska Electric Association, and Chugach Electric Association assumed 
ownership and control of 53%, 17%, and 30% respectively of the Eklutna 
project.  The sale of APA assets in Alaska transferred about $80 million to the 
U.S. Treasury, about 95% of the value in interest and payments the government 
would have received in lieu of the transfer.  Although, as critics of the agreement 
charged, the government could have received more in an open-market deal, it did 
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remove administrative costs of management, operation, and repair at the facilities, 
as well as responsibility for damage by potential earthquakes in the future.
Moreover, it preserved the original mission of Eklutna by preserving low rates 
to the region’s power users because consumers would have borne the costs of a 
market-based divestiture.16
 At the beginning of a new century the Eklutna Project, once held out as 
a Bureau of Reclamation effort to help power the development of an emerging 
territorial economy and key component of the nation’s strategic defense, now 
serves as a small cog in a much larger regional energy system.  With the Eklutna 
Project, the Bureau of Reclamation played a key role—one unique in the Bureau’s 
history—in providing the power for the emergence of a modern Alaska.  Once 
the local southcentral population and economy reached critical mass, it was 
able to generate funds locally to build on the foundation provided by the federal 
government and to eventually assume control of this source of power.
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The Central Valley Project:  Controversies 
Surrounding Reclamation’s Largest Project
By:
Eric A. Stene
Abstract
 The Central Valley Project differed from many Bureau of Reclamation 
projects because it began as a state project in an already agriculturally developed 
region of California.  The Central Valley Project (CVP) was a multipurpose 
project intended to provide irrigation water to farmland, electrical power for 
large populations, and fl ood control protection for the Sacramento-San Joaquin 
Delta and low-lying areas near the Sacramento River.  It was intended for the 
CVP to accomplish these tasks with a combination of dams, pumping and 
pumping-generating plants, off-stream reservoirs, and canals.  The successes of 
the CVP came at a cost of controversy about the acreage limitations declared 
in the Reclamation Act of 1902, environmental concerns, and incomplete 
structures.  This paper will look at the debates surrounding the acreage 
limitations and the environmental disasters which occurred as a result of CVP 
construction.
 The history of the Central Valley Project is the story of evolution 
from a state water project to a Reclamation project.  Politics and competition 
for the project stirred between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps 
of Engineers.  Information about the battle over acreage restrictions will be 
gathered from interviews conducted in the late 1940s, at the request of the 
Bureau of Reclamation; Reclamation’s project histories about the Central Valley 
Project; the laws enacted to confront the issue of acreage limitations; and books 
concerning the Central Valley Project.  Proponents and opponents of acreage 
limitations argued for and against the policy as Reclamation attempted to resolve 
the controversy surrounding the issue which continued for decades.
 A more recent, but often more emotional issue surrounding the 
CVP, was the project’s effect on the environment.  Environmental advocates 
frequently castigated the CVP facilities’ effect on the environment.  The 
environmentalist view confl icted with those whose views tended toward the 
improvement of agriculture, fl ood control, and electrical power for the human 
population.  As perceptions and priorities changed, so did Reclamation’s policies 
and operations as the Bureau worked to halt damage to the environment while 
continuing operation of the CVP.
 The Central Valley Project was hardly an unqualifi ed success.  
However, the CVP accomplished many of Reclamation’s goals regarding fl ood 
control and agriculture.  In the process, the natural environment was severely 
damaged, possibly irreparably so.  Politics tended to dictate Reclamation’s 
activities and responses.  This had a direct impact on Reclamation’s success or 
lack thereof in its efforts.
 The  Central Valley Project began as the crown jewel for the Bureau of 
Reclamation.  It became a complex Gargantua of technology and controversy.  
As the project grew in size and scope, the debate expanded as perspectives 
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and priorities changed.  The Central Valley Project became a complex of water 
projects as Reclamation and the state of California assumed the posture of 
campaign managers and attempted to make the project all things to all people.
The Project accomplished many of the goals set forth by Reclamation and 
California, but fell short of others as expectations exceeded abilities.  Arguments 
ranging from acreage limitations to environmental damage plagued the project 
from its beginning.  Many of those arguments still have not been resolved, and, 
depending on each person’s perspective, the project is everything from a savior 
of the arid agricultural lands of the Central Valley and a fl ood control success to 
corporate welfare and environmental Armageddon for California.
 The Central Valley Project encompasses a large section of California.  It 
is approximately 450 miles long and from forty to seventy miles wide.  The warm 
climate encourages agriculture, but runoff comes in uneven quantities.1  The 
 Sacramento River watershed receives two-thirds to three-quarters of northern 
California’s precipitation though it only has one-third to one-quarter of the 
land.  The  San Joaquin River watershed occupies two-thirds to three-quarters 
of northern California’s land, but only collects one-third to one-quarter of the 
precipitation.  The  Sacramento Valley suffers from fl oods, and fl oods and droughts 
alternately affl ict the San Joaquin Valley.2
 As early as the 1870s plans appeared to transfer excess water from the 
Sacramento River to the often parched tracts in the San Joaquin Valley, but most 
early efforts concentrated on fl ood control along the Sacramento River.  After 
years of planning and debate about the proposed project led nowhere, California 
appealed to the Federal government for assistance.  The Bureau of Reclamation 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) vied for the opportunity to 
construct the facilities on the colossal project, which came to be called the Central 
Valley Project.3
History and Construction
 California’s history encompasses several hundred years of habitation by 
various groups of Native Americans.  European settlement of the state began with 
the Spanish in the seventeenth century.  The Spanish established Roman Catholic 
missions and other settlements along the California coast, but they rarely ventured 
to the interior of the territory.  Citizens of the United States began immigrating 
into California in the 1840s.  Increasing migratory pressure by settlers on many 
north Mexican provinces and political machinations by the United States sparked 
the Mexican-American War in 1846.  The United States defeated Mexico in 
1848, and the resulting Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo gave Mexico’s northern 
states, including California, to the United States for $10 million.  The acquisition 
of California alone brought the United States riches the country did not know 
existed, and more problems to go along with them.4
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 The discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill in 1848 brought a fl ood of 
Americans into the area, and in 1850 California became a state.  The fi rst 
California Legislature in 1850, immediately enacted laws to deal with the state’s 
most precious resource, not gold, but water.  The California Legislature adopted 
English Common Law’s  riparian water rights.  According to that law, owners of 
land bordering streams or bodies of water had a right to a reasonable amount of 
that water.  Owners, whose land did not border bodies of water, had no rights to 
any of the water.5  The laws severely restricted the number of landholders who 
had access to California’s water supply.
 The 1850 California Legislature gave the State Surveyor General 
responsibility for water development.  In 1878 the California government created 
the offi ce of the State Engineer, which then became responsible for state water 
planning.   William Hamilton Hall, the fi rst State Engineer, conducted a broad 
study of California’s water problems, on a $100,000 budget.  Hall planned to 
appropriate more money and conduct a more detailed study, but for unspecifi ed 
reasons the legislature abolished the State Engineer position in 1889.6
 The California Legislature passed the  Wright Act in 1887, forming 
irrigation districts.  One Reclamation offi cial considered the Wright Act a model 
for irrigation legislation in the West.7  Others claimed it was a good idea, but 
badly implemented.  The districts encountered problems in selling their bonds, 
fi lling their reservoirs, and allocating water in 
a fair manner.  Wyoming State Engineer, and 
future Reclamation Commissioner, Elwood 
Mead declared the Wright Act, “a disgrace 
to any self-governing people.”8  California 
amended the Wright Act in 1897, stopping 
the establishment of irrigation districts until 
the formation of the Irrigation Districts Bond 
Certifi cation Commission.9
 The Federal government also became 
interested in California water during 
the nineteenth century.   Lt. Colonel 
B. S. Alexander studied the Sacramento and 
San Joaquin Rivers in 1873.  In a report 
to President Ulysses S. Grant, Alexander 
visualized a system of canals to complete 
an exchange of water from the Sacramento 
to the San Joaquin Valley.  A report on 
the “Sacramento Project” in 1904, fi rst 
connected the U.S. Reclamation Service 
to water problems in the Central Valley, 
but that connection remained limited.
California created the State Reclamation 
21.1.  B. S. Alexander, U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers. Courtesy of the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
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Board in 1911 and authorized it to spend $33 million on a fl ood control project 
in the Central Valley.  The Reclamation Service reported on the possibility of 
storing Sacramento River water at Iron Canyon near Red Bluff in the Sacramento 
Valley.  In 1920 Homer J. Gault, a Reclamation engineer, and W. F. McClure, the 
California State Engineer, wrote another report on Sacramento River storage in 
Iron Canyon, but Reclamation involvement remained nonexistent.10
 In a 1919 letter to California Governor William Stephens, Colonel  Robert 
Bradford Marshal, Chief Geographer for the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 
proposed a plan to build storage reservoirs along the Sacramento River system, 
and transfer water from the Sacramento Valley to the San Joaquin Valley via 
two large canals lying on both sides of the Sacramento River.  The plan earned 
Marshal the nickname, “The Father of the Central Valley Project.”11
 California’s government became interested in a comprehensive water 
plan for the state in 1921.  The state legislature directed the State Engineer to 
come up with such a plan.  They wanted it to accomplish conservation, fl ood 
control, storage, distribution, and uses for all California water.  The legislature 
directed the State Engineer to estimate total costs for the reservoirs, dams, and 
any other facilities needed to institute the state water plan.  The legislature then 
appropriated $200,000 to investigate this state water plan and received the report 
in 1923.  Further legislation and appropriations raised the bill to one million 
dollars.  Between 1920 and 1932, approximately fourteen more reports detailed 
water fl ow, drought conditions, fl ood control, and irrigation issues in California.  
State Engineer Edward Hyatt used the reports to create the California State Water 
Plan.12
 Salinity control, especially in the  Sacramento-San Joaquin River 
Delta, became a major concern for northern California water users, and a 
major component of the California State Water Project.  The Delta frequently 
experienced salinity intrusion, which caused problems for Antioch and Pittsburg.  
Unless water fl owed past Antioch at a minimum of 3,300 second-feet, salt water 
from San Francisco Bay moved into Suisun Bay and the Delta during high tide, 
making the water unusable for crops and industry.  Between 1919 and 1924 the 
salt water in Suisun Bay allowed suffi cient growth of teredo, a woodboring worm, 
to destroy wharves and pilings in the Bay valued at $25 million.  In 1924, the 
water reached its lowest recorded stream fl ow.  The maximum salt water content 
at Pittsburg reached 65 percent.  In 1926 Pittsburg and Antioch stopped using 
water from Suisun Bay for crops and industry.  Both communities had used the 
bay water since the middle of the nineteenth century.  In 1930 the  state water 
plan called for construction of a 420 foot dam at Kennett to maintain a regular 
fl ow to Antioch, keeping salt water out of Suisun Bay.  The California Legislature 
authorized the future Central Valley Project as a state project in 1933.  The act 
authorized the sale of “revenue” bonds not to exceed $170 million.13
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 Even with the authorized revenue bonds, California found itself unable 
to fi nance the project.  Further hampering revenue collection was the inability 
of the state to get the project approved for loans and grants under the National 
Recovery Act.  Reporting to Reclamation on the upper San Joaquin Relief Project, 
Harry W. Bashore said that the State Engineer considered  Kennett Reservoir 
the cornerstone for the entire Central Valley Project.  California applied to the 
Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works (FEA) for grants and loans, 
and created the Water Project Authority.  The Committee on Rivers and Harbors 
of the House of Representatives recommended $12 million of Federal money 
for construction of Kennett (later  Shasta) Dam because of the national benefi ts 
to navigation and fl ood control on the Sacramento River.  After reviewing the 
investigations, the California Joint Federal-State Water Resources Commission, 
the United States Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, the Bureau of 
Reclamation, and the Army Corps of Engineers approved and recommended the 
plan.14
 California amended its application to the FEA in 1934, and the Water 
Project Authority became effective.  On September 10, 1935, President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt issued an executive allocation of $20 million under the Emergency 
Relief Appropriation Act, later reduced to $4.2 million, for construction of the 
Central Valley Project.  Apparently offi cials assumed the approval was valid under 
the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, but the Supreme Court case of 
the United States vs. Arizona (295 U.S. 174) briefl y threatened that assumption.  
Before 1935 the government sometimes started irrigation projects using relief 
funds without conforming to the Reclamation Act, but the court’s decision said 
the Secretary of the Interior and the Federal Emergency Administrator of Public 
Works did not have the authority to construct Parker Dam, on the Colorado River, 
without the consent of Congress.  The Supreme court ruled that such an approach 
violated reclamation laws.15
 Technically, authorization of the Central Valley Project could not take 
place at the time because there were no executive branch fi ndings and approval 
of feasibility.  The technical problems, however, did not stop authorization of the 
project.  Active participation by 
Reclamation, in matters relating 
to the Central Valley started in 
September 1935 at meetings 
in Sacramento and Berkeley.  
Reclamation Commissioner 
Elwood Mead, Chief Engineer 
Ray Walter, Construction 
Engineer Walker R. Young, 
and State Engineer 
Edward Hyatt attended the 
meetings.  Secretary of the 
Interior Harold Ickes sent the 
21.2.  Shasta Dam, Powerplant, and Lake at the 
location originally proposed for Kennett Dam.
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feasibility report to the President on November 26, 1935.  Roosevelt approved 
the Central Valley Project, including Kennett (later Shasta), Friant, and Delta 
Divisions, on December 2, 1935.16
 The  Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937 reauthorized the  Central Valley 
Project, and authorized $12 million for construction.  The Rivers and Harbors act 
listed improvement of navigation, regulation, and fl ood control of the Sacramento 
and San Joaquin Rivers as the fi rst priorities of the Central Valley Project.  
Reclamation’s primary purpose, supplying water for irrigation and domestic use, 
followed these priorities and power generation ended up the last priority on the 
list.17
 The Central Valley Project continued largely unscathed through the late 
1940s and 1950s.  The government authorized new divisions of the project, 
with economic feasibility the only necessary criteria.  The project became a 
conglomeration of various Federal and state government agencies by the end of 
the 1960s.  The Army Corps of Engineers built several dams in California under 
the Flood Control Act of 1944, several of which became integrated into CVP.  
Meanwhile, California continued with its State Water Project.
 The Corps of Engineers (COE) completed  Folsom Dam in 1956, turning 
over operation and maintenance to the Bureau of Reclamation after completion.
Congress integrated more COE projects into CVP during the 1960s and 1970s.  
The Corps of Engineers continued to operate and maintain several dams in the 
Central Valley and the Corps often found itself holding surplus water at the dams.  
As a result, Reclamation drew up contracts for releasing the surplus water for 
irrigation because COE specialized in fl ood control, not irrigation water supply.
 The California  State Water Plan, published in 1957, proposed immediate 
construction of a project on the Feather River.  Development on the Feather River 
marked the inauguration of the California State Water Project, strongly supported 
by California Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown who realized the seriousness of 
California’s water situation.  Unlike the CVP, which only compelled repayment 
for its irrigation projects, the State Water Project required water users to pay all 
project costs for the $1.75 billion in bonds.  According to the Water Education 
Foundation, although a little more than 50 percent complete in 1994, the State 
Water Project then consisted of twenty-two dams and reservoirs and the North 
Bay, South Bay, and California Aqueducts.  Approximately 30 percent of the 
water supplied by the State Water Project irrigated the San Joaquin Valley, while 
the other 70 percent supplied water for residential, municipal, and industrial use, 
most of it in southern California.18
The Acreage Limitation Battle
 One major stumbling block for Reclamation Service involvement in a 
water project in the Central Valley was the 160 acre limitation imposed by the 
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Reclamation Act of 1902.  According to Norris Hundley, Congress intended for 
the Act to promote family farms, reclaim arid land, and prevent speculators and 
large landowners from profi ting at government expense.  Because of California’s 
history, much of the land was already held in farms the acreage of which greatly 
exceeded the 160 acre maximum.  In 1920, 60% of the land in the Central Valley 
was held in farms of 1,000 or more acres.  This increased to 70% of the land by 
1935.  Furthermore, much of the land was owned by absentee landlords.  Early 
on, the large landowners in the Valley feared imposition of the  acreage limitation, 
encouraging them to rebuff Reclamation’s assistance and look for alternative 
solutions to their irrigation woes.19  The acreage limitation controversy only 
provided the fi rst seeds of dissension, soon followed by the debate over public 
versus private power and environmental concerns.
 Construction on the Central Valley Project started in the late 1930s, and 
controversy bloomed toward the end of World War II.  The fi rst blow to the large 
landowners came in 1943, when Reclamation ceased its policy of not enforcing 
the acreage limitation.  Following the war, advocates of small farmers formed the 
 Central Valley Project Conference (CVPC) to counter the infl uence of the  Central 
Valley Project Association (CVPA).  George Sehlmeyer, Master of the California 
Grange, led the CVPC, which extolled the virtues of acreage limitations and 
public power.  The CVPA viewed the two policies as anathema.  One of the 
CVPC’s biggest victories came on September 8, 1945, as 200 delegates gathered 
to attend the Conference’s California Water Conference.20
 The California Water Conference of 1945, with Governor Earl Warren 
presiding, revealed a large amount of support for the CVP among small, working 
farmers; though the year’s Project History reported,
Paid mouthpieces of the vested interests, such as the Pacifi c Gas and 
Electric Company, the Irrigation Districts Association, the California 
Farm Bureau Association, the State Water Project Authority, and others, 
without exception, opposed the Bureau’s program of wide distribution of 
benefi ts resulting from the expenditure of public funds.21
Several issues arose at the conference, including: state vs. federal operation 
and control; public vs. private distribution of power; and COE vs. Reclamation 
construction of multipurpose projects; and controversy over the 160 acre 
limitation in the Reclamation Act of 1902.  In “Water, Power, and Politics in the 
Central Valley Project,” Charles E. Coate said, “The Army faced a decidedly 
hostile audience, and the bureau [sic] won the meeting’s endorsement”—
apparently in spite of the “paid mouthpieces.”22
 Not everyone felt the same fondness for the CVP.  Robert Franklin 
Schmeiser, elected president of the Associated Farmers of California, Inc., 
in 1947, adamantly opposed Reclamation involvement in the Central Valley.  
Mainly he opposed Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes but aimed his wrath 
at Reclamation.  Schmeiser railed against the 160 acre limitation expressed in 
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the Reclamation Act of 1902.  He supported COE construction of the Project, 
believing the Corps would supply irrigation water at a lower rate than the Bureau.  
Schmeiser did not like Reclamation’s “propaganda organization,” and argued 
against “the dictatorial powers they possess over the public.”23  Using the popular 
vernacular of the time to deal with opposition, Schmeiser called Reclamation 
offi cials “Communists” because of the acreage limitations and public power 
policy, always combustible topics in the CVP.24
 Others supported the 160 acre limitation.  Joseph Claude Lewis strongly 
supported Reclamation’s policy.  Lewis, a pro-labor member of a farmers’ 
cooperative in the 1940s, expressed his support for the acreage limitation and low 
cost public power.  He dismissed accusations that Secretary of the Interior Julius 
A. Krug and Reclamation Commissioner Michael Straus were Communists, a 
label often placed on himself.25
 During the mid-1940s, several attempts were made to exempt the CVP 
from the  acreage limitation requirements, but these failed.  Even irrigation 
water released from dams built by the Corps of Engineers became subject to the 
limitation, but the pendulum soon swung in favor of the large landholders.  The 
death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1945, was followed by the resignation 
of Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes.  Shortly thereafter Straus curtailed 
enforcement of the acreage limitation when he ran into opposition in Congress 
as farms came to be viewed as businesses.  One of the strongest opponents was 
 Sheridan Downey of California, who had been  Upton Sinclair’s running mate 
for Lieutenant Governor in 1934.  Straus remedied the situation politically by 
defending acreage limitations while creating loopholes for the large landowners—
methodologies of bypassing the limitations collectively labeled “technical 
compliance.”26
 One method open to corporate farms aimed at circumventing the acreage 
limitation was for each stockholder to obtain water for 160 acres of the land.
Often large growers deeded land to children and other relatives while continuing 
to work the acreage and profi t from it.  Large landowners also deeded land to 
employees and then leased back the acreage.  In still another scheme, wealthy 
landowners made accelerated payments.  In this process, they paid back the 
Bureau of Reclamation in a lump sum before the ten-year deadline.  This theory 
operated under the premise that Reclamation could not force the landowners to 
sell the land once the Bureau had received repayment.27
 The strategies devised to bypass the acreage limitations placed the issue 
on the back burner where it silently festered until the 1980s.  The  Reclamation 
Reform Act of 1982 recognized the large landholdings of many California 
farmers.  Even though two-thirds of California farms consisted of less than 
100 acres, 80 percent of the farmland existed in holdings of over 1,000 acres.
Furthermore, 75 percent of California’s agricultural production came from 
10 percent of the farms.  The Reform Act increased the limitation to 960 acres and 
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eliminated the residency requirement for farmers, which Reclamation never really 
enforced in the Central Valley because most contracts were with water districts, 
not individual farmers.28
 Even with Congress’ concession on the acreage limitation, those in 
possession of more than 960 acres pressed to resume circumvention of the law.  
The pressure paid off as the  Westlands Water District received a waiver from 
the Bureau of Reclamation to continue receiving a subsidized water rate until 
2007.  This meant payments of $17 per acre-foot rather than $42 per acre-foot.  
Reclamation went further in 1987, by declaring that farms in excess of 960 acres 
could continue receiving subsidized water as long as they were part of a farm 
management system.29
Environmental Crises
 The 1960s marked the end of the era of large dam building, and caught the 
CVP in a political and economic whirlpool with no apparent end.  All divisions of 
the  Central Valley Project and the features of the State Water Project supply water 
to the  Central Valley, and they all contribute to the environmental problems.  One 
high profi le problem which grew out of the CVP was the declining population of  
Chinook salmon in the   Sacramento River.  Most attention focused on the winter-
run  Chinook salmon, listed as threatened species by the Federal government and 
an endangered species by California.  The estimated population of the winter-
run Chinook in 1969, reached 117,000.  In 1991, only 191 adults returned to the 
Sacramento River to spawn.30
 The environmental movement entered the mainstream in the early 1970s.  
Soon, along with the  Endangered Species Act of 1973, signed by President 
Richard Nixon; the movement created more controversy for the Central Valley 
Project.  The Act established criteria for listing endangered species and protecting 
them from harm by federal agencies or private concerns.  The Central Valley 
Project felt the consequences of the Endangered Species Act because of project 
features’ impacts on migratory fi sh species.  The Shasta Division dams primarily 
affected  Chinook salmon and  steelhead trout.31  Shasta and  Keswick Dams 
blocked a large number of streams, tributary to the Sacramento River, that 
were formerly used for spawning by the migratory fi sh.  To solve the problems, 
managers used fi sh traps and hatcheries to move the migrating fi sh upstream 
or artifi cially breed them, but they could not keep pace with the decreasing 
populations.   Shasta Dam not only blocked migration upstream, but it blocked the 
fl ow of cool water downstream, keeping water temperature above the maximum 
fi fty-six degrees Fahrenheit necessary for the spawning  salmon.  Beginning in 
1992,  Reclamation bypassed the turbines in  Shasta Powerplant, and released 
water directly into the  Sacramento River to improve conditions for endangered, 
winter-run Chinook salmon.32
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 The population of winter-run Chinook salmon peaked in 1969, numbering 
about 118,000 at  Red Bluff Diversion Dam.  After 1969, populations of salmon 
and steelhead trout at the dam steadily declined.  By 1990 the salmon population 
dropped to less than 5 percent of their 1969 total.  The situation elicited 
outcries against the Project from environmentalists and commercial fi shermen.  
Reclamation instituted policies to alleviate the impact on the declining salmon 
population.33
 Fish ladders and subsurface openings in the dam alleviated the migration 
problem, but led to another—predatory fi sh.  Environmentalists equated salmon 
traveling through the subsurface openings, downstream through the dam, to 
putting the fi sh in a washing machine, disorienting the salmon when they get clear 
into the river.  The disoriented fi ngerling salmon became easy prey for  squawfi sh, 
which often lined up on the downstream side of  Red Bluff Dam to feast on the 
small fi sh.34
 In 1987 Reclamation began opening Red Bluff Dam’s gates yearly, from 
December 1 until April 1, for the winter-run  salmon returning to spawn at  Shasta 
Dam.  Inclusion of the winter-run Chinooks on the listing of threatened species 
by the  National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), prompted Reclamation to 
take further action.  Reclamation completed a $17 million renovation of the 
dam in March 1990.  The improvements included a temporary fi sh ladder in the 
center of the dam for passage when the gates remained closed.  Renovations 
did not immediately boost the Chinook population.  In 1991 the adult, winter-
run Chinook count reached a record low of only 191 at Red Bluff Diversion 
Dam.  The population gained in 1992 and 1993 with counts of 1,180 and 341 
respectively.  The NMFS designated the winter-run Chinook as endangered in 
December 1993.35
 Red Bluff Diversion Dam diverted irrigation water into Tehama-Colusa 
and  Corning Canals.  The diversion capacity of the fi rst sections of the two canals 
totaled 3,030 cubic feet per second.  A drum and fi sh screen structure, constructed 
in the period 1969-1971, prevented fi sh passing through the headworks from 
entering the canals.  A bypass system returned the fi sh to the river.  In accordance 
with an agreement with the  U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,  Reclamation placed 
gravel beds along the upper 3.2 miles of the  Tehama-Colusa Canal to simulate 
natural spawning beds.  The artifi cial spawning beds failed to work as planned, 
and the canal headworks still trapped young fi sh.36
  Reclamation developed several alternatives to protect salmon at  Red Bluff 
Diversion Dam.  Alternative 4A (Large Pump) would essentially end usage of the 
dam.  The plan called for utilization of a pumping plant to make water diversions, 
and leave the dam’s gates open, to make the river free fl owing again.  Alternative 
4B (Small Pump) would close the gates during the peak summer months, mid-
May to mid-July, keeping them open the rest of the year, and using a small pump 
to assist in diverting water to the canals.  Alternative 3A4 (Small Ladder) planned 
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to increase the fl ow capacity of the left and right fi sh ladders and add a permanent 
fi sh ladder to the center of the dam.  Alternative 3C4 (Large Ladder) called for 
modifi cation of the right fi sh ladder for greater fl ow capacity and addition of a 
permanent center fi sh ladder.  The plan would replace the left fi sh ladder with a 
“state-of-the-art fi sh ladder.”37  By the end of 1994, Reclamation had not decided 
on which plan to use.  Residents of  Red Bluff became concerned that some of 
the proposed alternatives for protecting the  salmon, would alter the recreation 
potential of  Lake Red Bluff, behind Red Bluff Diversion Dam, and discourage 
travelers along I-5 from stopping at the city of Red Bluff, thereby affecting the 
community’s recreational revenue.38
 The powerful pumping plants in the   Delta Division had a major, and 
often detrimental effect, on stream fl ow in the  Delta and the  San Joaquin River 
Basin.  During periods of low water fl ow and high quantities of exports, the 
Delta pumps actually reversed the fl ow of the San Joaquin River, taking it back 
upstream.  Through the Delta’s transport system, water normally traveling to the 
west, toward  San Pablo Bay, instead moves back toward the east and south.  The 
“reverse fl ows” disorient migratory fi sh, often luring them to the pumps, and draw 
salty ocean water into the  San Joaquin River and other waterways.39
 In 1944 Reclamation offi cials realized the salinity problem in the Delta 
was more pronounced than they previously thought.  Charles E.  Carey, the 
Region Two Director in 1944, believed  Shasta Dam could not entirely control the 
salinity problem, precluding use of the Delta as a reservoir as planned at one time. 
Carey announced some possible alternatives to alleviate the salinity problem: 
build a closed conduit through or around the  Delta to carry  Sacramento River 
water directly to the other side without letting it mix with Delta water; change 
the  Water Exchange Contract to make the water quality requirement less extreme 
(Carey believed this unlikely, but others claimed it was possible); control the 
Sacramento River tributaries to control salinity and assure water quality; build
Folsom Dam.40  The proposed closed conduit foreshadowed later plans for the 
 Peripheral Canal.
 In the course of Delta Division development, though not built, the  
Peripheral Canal became one of the most controversial elements of Division 
planning.   Reclamation proposed the Peripheral Canal to the  Interagency Delta 
Committee (IDC) in early 1963, as an alternative water transfer system.  By early 
1965 the proposed canal had almost universal acceptance in the Delta region.
California wanted Reclamation to design and construct the Peripheral Canal, 
then the state would assume control of the feature.  Reclamation did not want 
state control of the canal, but did not have the authority to build it.  California’s 
Department of Water Resources (DWR), on the other hand, did have the authority 
to construct the canal.41
 The IDC pointed out that much of the Peripheral Canal route would 
parallel Interstate 5, and material excavated from the canal could be used as 
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highway fi ll.  In January 1968 the California Departments of Water Resources 
and Public Works executed an agreement under which Public Works advanced 
$2 million to purchase rights of way in  San Joaquin County for the canal.  DWR 
agreed to repay the money when canal construction began, or no later than 
January 1, 1976.42
 Changing attitudes in the  United States, toward the environment and a 
myriad of other issues, soon infected perceptions of the   Peripheral Canal.   Contra 
Costa County opposed the canal because residents viewed it as another way to 
transport fresh water, out of their locale, to southern  California.  About the same 
time, questions arose about the environmental impact of the Peripheral Canal on 
fi sh populations in the Delta and the Central Valley.  Environmentalists believed 
the canal’s outlets would draw fi sh to them.  They also believed the nitrogen-rich 
water from agricultural drainage could foster algae growth, stagnating waters and 
suffocating the fi sh.43
 In a December 4, 1969, speech to the  Irrigation Districts Association, 
 William  Gianelli, Director of  DWR, responded to the environmental arguments, 
contending, “Californians must not ‘fall into the quagmire trap of Chicken Little 
emotionalists.”44  The draft environmental impact report of 1974 received such a 
negative response, DWR decided to take some extra time to prepare an acceptable 
fi nal report.  Early in 1975, with construction of the Peripheral Canal scheduled 
to commence that summer, Director of DWR John Teerink announced a one year 
delay.45
 The Department of Water Resources “proposed an amalgam of joint state-
federal programs and facilities,” including the forty-two mile Peripheral Canal, 
in 1977.46   DWR contended the canal would circumvent the Delta channels and 
carry water more effi ciently from the Sacramento River to the pumping plants 
of the CVP and the State Water Project.  The canal could release fresh water 
into the Delta at certain points along its reaches to support irrigation, to benefi t 
fi sh and wildlife, and to combat salt water intrusion.  Supporters, including the  
Metropolitan Water District of southern California and various agribusinesses, 
argued the canal would help end the reverse fl ows caused by the south Delta 
pumps.  Opponents continued arguing against on the basis of the environmental 
impact of the canal and further exports to southern California.  A referendum 
on the entire project went before California voters as Proposition 9 in 1982.
Proposition 9 failed because of cost (an estimated $3.1 billion) and environmental 
concerns.  Other alternatives surfaced after the defeat of Proposition 9, but none 
went forward.47
 Studies link several factors to the decline of the Chinook population 
including predation by two species introduced into the  Delta,   striped bass and 
 Colorado River squawfi sh; lack of water fl ow in the rivers because of upstream 
dams; and disorientation and destruction by the  Delta Division pumping plants.
The  striped bass population also experienced large declines.  Another species 
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facing declines and possible extinction was the three inch long  delta smelt.  A 
fi sh found only in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, the smelt faced destruction 
by the same forces as the Chinook salmon.  The California Fish and Game 
Commission rejected the smelt for a state listing as a threatened or endangered 
species, but in March 1993 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service listed the smelt as a 
threatened species under the Federal  Endangered Species Act.48
 Reclamation developed the Delta Division in an area ripe for controversy, 
before and after construction of the  Central Valley Project.  Special interest 
groups competed to use the Delta and its water for their own special interests.
Some groups argued for land use zoning areas strictly for municipal purposes, 
recreational development, fi sh and wildlife enhancement, or maintaining the  
Delta in its “natural” state.  Returning the Delta to its natural state seems the least 
likely, and indeed the most farfetched, idea.  The Delta’s true natural state began 
disappearing over a century ago as river diversions, hydraulic mining, industrial 
development, agricultural development, and the building of state and Federal 
water projects transformed the region.49
 The  Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992 (CVPIA) started 
the CVP in a new direction.  President George H. W. Bush signed the bill as part 
of the  Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, over the 
objections of California Governor Pete Wilson and Central Valley legislators.  
Environmentalists considered the act a victory, while California agricultural 
leaders considered it a disaster.  The CVPIA reallocated 800,000 acre-feet of CVP 
water (600,000 in dry years) from Valley farmers toward the restoration of Central 
Valley fi sheries.  CVPIA limited renewed agricultural water contracts to twenty-
fi ve years with no long-term renewals.  The Central Valley Project Improvement 
Act opened a new political pandora’s box in California.50
 In another area of the  Central Valley Project,  Friant Dam was blamed 
for the extinction of a large run of  Chinook Salmon on the San Joaquin River.  
The Bureau of Reclamation is also faulted for not exercising its responsibility 
to wildlife concerns.  In Overtapped Oasis, Marc Reisner argued that several 
amendments were passed concerning fi sh and wildlife, but Reclamation supplied 
less than 100,000 acre-feet of fresh water for state and federal refuges.51
 The most traumatic environmental consequence of the Central Valley 
Project proved to be the  Kesterson Reservoir disaster.  Reclamation began 
construction of the  San Luis Drain in 1968, to transport wastewater to the west 
Delta.  The Drain terminated at a series of twelve manmade ponds collectively 
called Kesterson Reservoir.  Kesterson was planned as a regulating reservoir to 
hold drainage from lands irrigated by San Luis Dam until the water could be 
fl ushed into the Delta during winter.52
  Kesterson was designated a national wildlife refuge, and in the early 
1980s Californians learned the price wildlife paid for using it.  Pollution 
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entering Kesterson Reservoir in drainage from the San Luis Unit via the San 
Luis Drain was discovered to have caused deaths and deformities in waterfowl 
in the refuge.  The pollutants included salts, pesticides, and trace minerals, most 
notably  selenium.  Reclamation responded by closing the refuge.  This action 
brought protests, forcing Reclamation to change its stance.  The Bureau then 
announced it would end irrigation supplies to the farmers Reclamation deemed 
most responsible for the runoff.  It was then the farmers’ turn to protest.  They 
successfully forced Reclamation to rescind its order.53
 In the mid-1980s, California offi cials warned pregnant women and 
children not to eat waterfowl from Kesterson.  By the end of the 1980s, sirens 
warned the birds away and fences kept others at bay.  Reclamation fi lled the 
reservoir in with dirt in 1988, and the ground was kept level to prevent the 
accumulation of standing water.  Later studies showed that the amount of 
selenium present still exceeded safe levels.  The pollutants’ effects were not 
limited to the wildlife at Kesterson Reservoir.  Farmers affected by the runoff 
sued Reclamation for alleged damages to fi elds that the farmers claimed resulted 
from Kesterson leakage.  After closure of the San Luis Drain, the Westlands Water 
District received 38 damage claims from farmers and landowners claiming the 
action diminished property values and resulted in lost crops.54
 The internal battle over water in California evolved with the onset of the 
environmental crises.  Early in the twentieth century, battle lines formed between 
northern California (extending north from the borders of Ventura and Los Angeles 
Counties) and southern California.  By 1990 the opposing forces realigned into 
agricultural, urban, and environmental interests.  Gaining the upper hand came 
through various alliances between the confl icting groups.55
Overview
 The  Central Valley Project is a complex operation of interrelated divisions. 
 Shasta Dam, at one time considered the key to the Central Valley Project, acts as 
a fl ood control dam for the Sacramento River.  Shasta stores water for controlled 
releases downstream.  The Trinity River Division diverts surplus water from the 
Trinity River, in the Klamath River Basin, into the Sacramento River.  Water 
from the Trinity River Division enters the Sacramento at Keswick Reservoir in 
the Shasta Division.  Downstream from Shasta Division, the Sacramento River 
Division supplies Sacramento River water to Tehama, Glenn, Colusa, and Yolo 
Counties for irrigation.  Releases from Shasta Division help control salinity in the 
Delta Division
 The American River Division provides fl ood control on the American and 
the Sacramento Rivers.  The division supplies irrigation water along the Folsom 
South Canal.  The American River Division’s Sly Park Unit, essentially operates 
independently from the rest of the Division, irrigating parts of Placer County.  
The Friant Division impounds or diverts the entire fl ow of the San Joaquin River, 
517
except for fl ood control and irrigation releases.  Friant Dam sends irrigation 
water south through the Friant-Kern Canal, and north through the Madera 
Canal.  The Army Corps of Engineers built  New Melones Dam and Powerplant 
on the Stanislaus River from 1966 to 1979.  The COE turned the dam over to 
Reclamation in 1979.  The dam primarily operates as a fl ood control and power 
facility, but Reclamation has contracts to supply water to two water districts in the 
area.
 The Delta Division is the hub around which the  Central Valley Project 
rotates.  This Division contains the facilities for transporting water from the 
Sacramento River to the San Joaquin Valley and for controlling salinity in the 
Delta Division.  The  Delta Cross Channel diverts water from the Sacramento 
River to the Tracy Pumping Plant, the Contra Costa Pumping Plants, and the 
intakes of the Contra Costa and Delta-Mendota Canals, sending the much needed 
water south into the San Joaquin Valley.
 The San Luis Unit provides storage for the Central Valley Project for dry 
seasons.  The Unit is a joint venture between Reclamation and the California 
Department of Water Resources.  The Gianelli Pumping-Generating Plant, one 
of the joint facilities, pumps surplus water from runoff and melting snow from 
the Delta-Mendota Canal and the California Aqueduct into San Luis Reservoir, 
the largest offstream storage reservoir in the United States.  When water fl ow 
through the Delta Division becomes too low, water is released from San Luis into 
the Delta Mendota Canal and the California Aqueduct.  The San Felipe Division 
diverts water from San Luis Reservoir into lands west of the Coastal Mountain 
Range, south of the San Francisco Bay.
 Congress authorized the Allen Camp Unit of the Pit River Division on 
September 28, 1976.  The Allen Camp Unit in Lassen and Modoc Counties of 
northeastern California, was to consist of Allen Camp Dam on the Pit River, 
Hillside Canal stretching 25 miles to the east, and Pilot Canal branching off 
Hillside to the southeast.  The Concluding Report of 1981 determined the Unit 
was infeasible and the project was canceled.
 The Central Valley Project plans encompassed thirty-fi ve counties in 
an area about 500 miles long and 60 to 100 miles wide, making it the largest 
Reclamation project.56  The CVP contained some of the country’s largest dams, 
Shasta and San Luis among them.  Reclamation intended Auburn Dam, on the 
American River, to be the largest on the Central Valley Project, but political 
turmoil left the dam incomplete and in limbo.
 In spite of the social, environmental, and political controversy surrounding 
the Central Valley Project, it remains an impressive accomplishment.  The Central 
Valley contains three-quarters of the irrigated land in California, and one-sixth 
of the irrigated land in the United States.  The Central Valley’s annual farm 
production exceeds the total value of all the gold mined in California since 1848.
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The Central Valley Project ranks fi rst among Reclamation projects in value of 
fl ood damage prevented between 1950 and 1991.  During that time period the 
Central Valley Project prevented more than $5 billion in fl ood damage.57
Conclusion
 The Bureau of Reclamation received a large amount of criticism over the 
Central Valley Project and indeed the application of the Reclamation Act to the 
Central Valley proved inconsistent with most other Reclamation projects.  The 
later environmental impact of the project also created a storm of controversy.  So 
much so that in recent years the Central Valley Project became a political and 
environmental bombshell, and a victim of changing times.  California politicians 
soon avoided dealing with the CVP and the State water projects, viewing both 
as machines of political suicide.  With these thoughts in mind it is important to 
understand the Bureau of Reclamation’s role and position in order to understand 
the Bureau’s actions.
 The Bureau of Reclamation is a Federal Government agency, subject 
to the whims of a parade of politicians who make their way in and out of 
government offi ce.  The Bureau depends on the good graces of these politicians 
for funding and for it’s very existence.  The Central Valley Project placed the 
Bureau in a position in which, in a highly politicized environment, it struggled to 
balance the wants of politicians with the requirements of the Reclamation Act and 
the environment.
 The initial controversy involved acreage limitations.  The Reclamation 
Act required that farms receiving water could not be larger than 160 acres.  
The Central Valley had been settled and the acreages established long before 
Reclamation entered the scene, unlike most other Reclamation projects.  The 
large landholders also held considerable political clout in northern California.  
Furthermore, the acreage limitation was viewed by many in the mid to late 1940s 
as un-American and possibly Communist, a grave label to deal with at the time.
Finally changes in the country’s leadership affected how the Interior Department’s 
leadership viewed the acreage limitation, from the time of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt to George H. W. Bush.
 The other controversy involved the impact of the CVP on the environment. 
In the early decades of the project, the environment was not an overriding concern 
in the country, so it was not a factor in the initial design and construction of the 
CVP.  The environmental movement gained momentum with the Endangered 
Species Act.  From then on, politicization of the environment impacted operation 
of the CVP and pressed the need for modifi cation of the Project’s facilities.
 Like the acreage limitation controversy, the amount of concern about the 
environment depended on the political concerns in Washington and the political 
necessities of the Interior Department and the Bureau of Reclamation.  When 
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environmental concerns became apparent and paramount, Reclamation moved 
to deal with them, although not as quickly as many would have liked.  Whether 
it was Kesterson or Chinook salmon, much of the damage had been done before 
most people became concerned.
 The Bureau of Reclamation is run in accordance with the wishes of 
Congress and the President, and much of its efforts are geared toward remaining 
a viable entity and surviving in a political arena.  These variables dictate 
Reclamation’s activities.  The Central Valley Project certainly had its drawbacks.  
There is no argument against that.  It is also important to realize that the CVP 
achieved many of the goals set for it.  Irrigation, electrical power, and fl ood 
control all serve mankind, as was important at the time construction began.
Contemporary values aside, the Project was a success in those terms.  Success of 
the Central Valley Project also exacted a terrible price.
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Bumpy Road For Glen Canyon Dam
By:
 W. L. Rusho
Basic Concept and Purpose
 Probably no dam built in America has been so controversial as  Glen 
Canyon Dam.  Built in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the dam was planned and 
designed to be a contributor in a long dream to subdue and conquer the earth, 
or as was often heard in pioneer days, “to make the desert blossom as the rose.”
Its basic purpose was to allow increased irrigation and other water development 
in the entire Upper Basin of the Colorado River, including Colorado, Utah, 
Wyoming, and New Mexico.
 My experience with the dam is intensely personal, as I had been 
employed during its construction as Public Affairs Offi cer for the Bureau of 
Reclamation (BR).  For over fi ve years I rode the monkeyslides, conducted tours 
for reporters and dignitaries, wrote articles and news releases, drafted speeches, 
conducted ceremonies, produced motion pictures, and directed the guide service 
and all photography.  In late 1963, when the dam was virtually fi nished, I was 
transferred to the Salt Lake City BR Regional Offi ce, which had jurisdiction 
over Glen Canyon Dam.  From that time on I continued to be regularly involved 
in developments at the dam, both by many personal visits and by reports from 
others.  Even after my retirement in 1988, I worked as a contractor producing 
motion pictures concerning operation of the dam.
 Considered as a lineal descendant of the many dams constructed by the 
Bureau of Reclamation, Glen Canyon Dam was not unusual.  Designed to be a 
storage dam—rather than a fl ood control structure—its purposes were to hold as 
much water as possible, release only what was necessary, and fl uctuate releases 
as drastically as required to maximize revenues from hydropower production.
After the last of eight generators came on the line in 1966, virtually the only 
restrictions on its operation derived from the 1922 Colorado River Compact, 
the 1944 Treaty with Mexico, as well as a number of related laws, all of which 
comprised what was loosely termed “The Law of the River.”
Early History of the Glen Canyon Dam Concept
Actually, lower Glen Canyon, near where the dam was built from 1956 to 
1964, had been eyed many decades earlier by hydrologists and engineers, not for 
a water storage dam, but for a fl ood control dam.
 In 1906 and 1907 a tributary fl ood on the Salt River caused the Colorado 
River to break through an irrigation gate south of Yuma, Arizona, and to fl ow 
unchecked for two years into the Salton Sink of California, thus greatly enlarging 
the  Salton Sea.  After the gap was fi nally closed by dumping huge amounts of 
rock into the breach, the river returned to its original course toward the Gulf of 
California.  But the need for a fl ood control dam and reservoir was made apparent 
to all.
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 In 1921, U.S. Geological Survey engineer  Eugene C. LaRue proposed, 
to an obsession that Glen Canyon should be the logical site for the needed fl ood 
control dam.  A reservoir there would hold a vast amount of water, and, even 
more important, its upstream location would allow all locations downstream to 
be free of fl oods, allowing river fl ows to be available for irrigation and municipal 
developments.
 While the engineers were looking at possible dam sites, politicians, water 
managers, and lawyers were scheduling meetings with representatives of all 
the states within the Colorado River Basin to divide up the obviously limited 
(except during rare fl oods), fl ows of the river.  Agreed upon and signed in 1922, 
the  Colorado River Compact substantially divided the fl ows of the river between 
what was termed the Upper and the Lower Basins of the river, to be measured 
at Lee Ferry, Arizona, (a point one mile below the river gauge at Lee’s Ferry).  
Furthermore, as a concession, the Upper Basin agreed to guarantee 75 million 
acre feet delivery to the Lower Basin in any ten year period, amounting to an 
average fl ow of 7.5 million acre feet (m.a.f.) annually.
 E. C. LaRue was frustrated in his campaign to have Glen Canyon made 
the site of the fl ood control dam.  During the 1920s, the focus for a fl ood control 
dam shifted instead, fi rst to Boulder Canyon, and then to Black Canyon, both 
within a few dozen miles of the then small town of Las Vegas, Nevada.  A dam 
at Black Canyon would be much closer to the major hydropower markets of 
southern California.  It would require less concrete for its V-shaped canyon, 
compared to Glen Canyon’s U-shape.  Also, a dam in Glen Canyon would be 
in the Upper Basin, which might be administratively diffi cult for Lower Basin 
offi cials to handle.  The  Boulder Canyon Project Act, passed in 1928, authorized 
the construction of what we now know as Hoover Dam.
 Although the Bureau of Reclamation had offi cially reserved Glen Canyon 
as a possible dam and reservoir site soon after World War I, construction of 
Hoover Dam in the early 1930s seemed to obviate the need for another main 
stem dam.  In 1936, therefore, the National Park Service, encouraged by Interior 
Secretary Harold Ickes, proposed an  Escalante National Monument, to cover 
6,968 square miles of southeastern Utah—twice the size of Yellowstone National 
Park.1  The proposed monument would have included all of Glen Canyon as well 
as considerable public land then used for grazing.
 In 1938 combined opposition from ranchers forced the Park Service to 
reduce the size of the proposed monument to 2,450 square miles, eliminating 
most of the grazing areas, but leaving Glen Canyon.  Then the State of Utah 
weighed in, undoubtedly with Bureau of Reclamation’s covert urging—favoring 
continued reservation of Glen Canyon as a possible reservoir site rather than part 
of a National Monument.  Stalemated, the Escalante National Monument proposal 
slowly died of inaction as the Nation turned its attention to World War II.
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 For many years after the 1922 Compact was signed, water use in the 
Upper Basin was so small that there was no problem delivering the required 
average of 7.5 m.a.f. yearly to the Lower Basin.  In 1944 when the United States 
agreed, by treaty, to deliver 1.5 m.a.f. of Colorado River water annually to 
Mexico, plenty of water still fl owed by Lee’s Ferry for that purpose.  But water 
demands were continually growing, not only in the rapidly expanding economy 
of California, but also in the Upper Basin, where farmers and water managers 
envisioned a number of possible projects that would consume available water.
The  Colorado River Storage Project Plan (CRSP)
 Soon after World War II, Bureau of Reclamation offi cials printed a report 
entitled The Colorado River—A Natural Menace Becomes a National Resource,2
in which a large number of potential projects were outlined for both the Upper 
and Lower Basins.  Key to enabling several water projects in the Upper Basin 
was to be large storage capacity reservoirs that would help meet the Compact 
commitments to the Lower Basin.  For this role, a large dam at Glen Canyon would 
be vitally important, as its potentially huge pool of water would insure that, in case 
of a severe drought, such as occurred in 1933 and 1934, irrigation and municipal 
projects upstream would not be denied their regular allotment of water.  Other, 
much smaller, storage reservoirs were also envisioned on tributary rivers upstream 
from Glen Canyon Dam.  In 1946, however, this “wish list” of projects was not yet 
a fully developed plan.
 Eight years later, the Bureau of Reclamation published a report, actually 
a proposal for legislation, for what was to be termed the Colorado River Storage 
Project.3  Essentially, this was a refi nement of the 1946 list of potential projects, 
all integrated into a comprehensive plan incorporating storage dams and 
reservoirs to meet downstream commitments and to produce hydroelectric power.  
“Participating Projects” would then be built to develop water for irrigation and 
for municipal and industrial uses, while revenue from the sale of hydropower 
would fully repay the costs of the storage projects.  Although it was not called a 
subsidy, the hydropower revenue would also materially assist the repayment of 
Participating Project costs.  Altogether, it appeared to be a neat package—except 
for one particular feature—the proposed  Echo Park Unit.
Congressional Authorization
 Along with the Glen Canyon Unit (dam, reservoir, and powerplant), the 
Echo Park Unit was designed as a storage unit.  Compared to Glen Canyon’s 
potential storage of 26 million acre feet of water, Echo Park would hold only 
about one-fourth as much, but Echo Park received the major portion of attention 
during Congressional hearings for one reason—the dam and reservoir were to be 
located in  Dinosaur National Monument, a segment of the National Park System.
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 Leading the campaign against Echo Park Dam was  David Brower, 
Executive Director of the Sierra Club.  By his ability to locate arithmetic errors 
in the Bureau of Reclamation’s estimate of reservoir evaporation and through 
his public interviews, speeches, writings, and advertisements, the dam fell into 
disfavor with Congressmen, and it was eliminated from the CRSP bill.  In his 
campaign, however, Brower linked Echo Park Dam with Glen Canyon Dam, 
stating that Echo Park Dam would not be necessary if the height of Glen Canyon 
Dam was built higher to allow more water storage.  In the early 1950s, therefore, 
Brower raised no objection to construction of Glen Canyon Dam.
 Many years later, during 1999 and until his death in 2000, Brower 
maintained that if, in the 1950s, he had known how beautiful Glen Canyon was, 
he could have eliminated Glen Canyon Dam from the CRSP proposal by using the 
Congressional backing that he then possessed.  Considering the political power 
in Congress then available to Upper Basin interests, fi gures such as Congressman 
Wayne Aspinall of Colorado and Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah, it is doubtful 
that Brower was correct in his half-century latter-day second-guessing.  Even 
Lower Basin legislators, such as Representative Stewart Udall and Senator Barry 
Goldwater, both of Arizona, and to their later regret, supported the CRSP.4
 Brower’s verbal association of proposed dams in Echo Park and Glen 
Canyon has led many newspaper reporters, writers, and other casual observers 
to conclude that a dam in the latter was a substitute for the former.  Actually, 
nothing could be further from the truth.  The Bureau of Reclamation had 
estimated that something over 30 million acre feet of storage would be necessary 
to meet downstream needs should a drought such as that of 1933-1934 recur.  
Since a reservoir at Echo Park would have held only 6.4 m.a.f., compared to 
Glen Canyon’s 26 m.a.f., obviously, a dam in Glen Canyon was the key to the 
feasibility of the entire CRSP plan.  Had Brower actually tried to and succeeded in 
eliminating Glen Canyon Dam, the entire CRSP would have been killed.
 Furthermore, Brower’s late-in-life contention that the defeat of Echo Park 
Dam forced the Bureau of Reclamation to raise the height of Glen Canyon Dam 
is incorrect—the 1954 Bureau design shows the dam crest at elevation 3,711 feet 
above sea level—the level of the dam as it was actually built.
 This is not to say that there was no opposition to the building of  Glen 
Canyon Dam.  Contrary to the later contention of Brower and the Sierra Club, 
Glen Canyon was not the “place no one knew.”  While it was not nationally 
famous, it had been visited often, particularly in the 1950s, by Utah Boy Scout 
groups and others who simply enjoyed boating down the calm, scenic  river.  
According to the late historian C. Gregory Crampton, Glen Canyon was the most 
accessible, and therefore the most visited—at least by boat—of all the canyons of 
the Colorado River.5  Although most people who had boated through the canyon 
were opposed to the dam, they were generally unorganized and their opposition 
was no match for the steam roller of proponents pushing for water development.
527
Construction of the Dam
 Many observers, both within and outside the Bureau of Reclamation, have 
marveled at the speed with which construction began on the CRSP.  At the time 
there was no need for any detailed economic or environmental studies.  Following 
the authorization of the CRSP (Public Law 485–84th Congress; P.L. 84-485) on 
April 11, 1956, engineers and surveyors were rushed to the site by July, and on 
October 15, of that year, the fi rst ceremonial blast was set off on the canyon wall.
 During 1956 and on 
into 1957 design engineers 
in the Denver Offi ce were 
still hard at work producing 
specifi cations for the  dam.  
One might wonder then why 
the Bureau was already doing 
site work when the design for 
the dam was not yet fi nished.  
The answer is two-fold.  Some 
work on site could be done, 
such as road building and 
planning the city of Page.
Perhaps the main reason for 
the haste, however, was a 
desire to follow a well-known, 
time honored—and usually successful—construction strategy, which states that 
when an agency starts a job that depends on appropriations from a legislative 
body, funding is much more assured if it seeks to continue, rather than start, a 
project.
 According to Glen Canyon Project Construction Engineer,  Lemuel F. 
Wylie, the principal dilemma confronting him in 1956 had nothing to do with 
the dam, but rather with the questionable location for the construction town, 
later to be named  Page.  Since the dam site was in a remote area, in a yet 
unbridged canyon, completely in Arizona, but quite near the Utah-Arizona state 
line, political interests of both states considered it desirable to have the town 
established on their side of the canyon, since economic and transportation ties 
would probably develop early with adjoining cities.  Delegations from both states 
repeatedly visited Wylie at his temporary Kanab, Utah, offi ce, all requesting 
favorable consideration.
 Years later, in 1969, former Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona publicly 
stated that Page had been so located because of his request to place it on the 
Arizona side.6  Considering that in 1956 Hayden was Chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, it was a foregone conclusion that the Bureau would 
agree.  A large spring of good water had been located on the Utah side, leading 
22.1.  Glen Canyon Dam. Photograph by the the author in 
1969.
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some engineers to recommend that location,7 and a perfunctory examination was 
made there.  But considering Senator Hayden’s expressed preference, the only 
real question was precisely where on the sandy Arizona side the town would 
be placed.  Wylie reported in an interview that he and Louie Puls, Chief of the 
Concrete Dams Section of the Chief Engineer’s Offi ce, hiked along the sandy 
Arizona side in July 1956, found nothing suitable, then decided to examine a low 
plateau about a mile to the east.  After hiking to the top, the two looked around, 
and then Puls said, “Lem.  What’s the matter with this?”  Wylie replied, “Not a 
thing—not a thing.”8
 So the town of Page was situated on the Arizona side, on Manson Mesa.  
But the selected town site had another diffi culty—it was located on the Navajo 
Indian Reservation.  To resolve this, Wylie and Department of the Interior lawyers 
met with tribal offi cials several times without conclusion, until one of the lawyers 
suggested a land trade.  This idea met with favorable response, resulting in the 
Government’s obtaining 55,000 acres of land for Page and for the Navajo side of 
the future reservoir in exchange for a like amount of land on McCracken Mesa in 
southeast Utah.9
 When asked about problems encountered while building the dam, Wylie 
could think of nothing major.  “It was mostly mechanical”, he said.  “The 
contractor knew what to do, I knew how to handle day to day problems, and I had 
a competent staff to insure quality construction.”
 A labor strike shut down construction of the dam for six months, from 
July to December 1959.  The dispute arose when the prime contractor, Merritt-
Chapman and Scott, curtailed  making extra housing payments, up till then paid to 
employees for the remote location of the job, after determining  that housing was 
available in Page and in company dormitories.  The strike was fi nally settled near 
Christmas 1959, and by January 1960 the work was again well underway.  No 
event delayed construction from that point on, and the dam and powerplant were 
fi nished on schedule.
Archaeology and History Investigations
 Today, with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 in effect, 
no project can be undertaken on Federally-owned land without preliminary and 
thorough archaeological and historical investigations (as well as many other 
studies), of the area to be impacted.  In 1956, however, no NEPA rules were 
in effect, so  Glen Canyon received no studies prior to inundation that would 
be considered as counter to authorization of the dam.  What it did receive was 
what was called simply the Glen Canyon Archaeological Salvage Project.  In 
compliance with the Historic Sites Act of 1935, the National Park Service 
obtained funding and let two contracts for the work.  The largest was awarded to 
the  University of Utah to investigate the right bank of the Colorado, the triangular 
area between the Colorado and the San Juan, and the left bank of the Colorado 
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above the confl uence with the San Juan.  The  Museum of Northern Arizona was 
authorized to examine the south side of the Colorado and the San Juan.
 Even before 1956, Glen Canyon and the San Juan River Canyon were 
known to have substantial numbers of archaeologically signifi cant sites, including 
dwelling areas, granaries, trails, petroglyphs, and pictographs.  Several private 
or institution-sponsored research expeditions had ventured into the region, 
particularly in the 1930s.  Prominent among these was the Rainbow Bridge–
Monument Valley Expedition, (RBMVE), a cooperative effort by the National 
Park Service and several universities, which operated from 1933 to 1938.10
Although the RBMVE only touched on Glen and the San Juan River Canyons, its 
crews found numerous archaeological sites, although few were excavated at that 
time.
 Initiating the Salvage Project in 1957, with the dam already under 
construction, both the University of Utah and the Museum of Northern Arizona 
sent qualifi ed crews, consisting of archaeologists, helpers, students, horse 
wranglers, boatmen, and cooks, into the canyons and onto the surrounding areas.
To obtain base data for regional comparison, they also surveyed archaeological 
sites on highland areas, such as the Kaiparowits Plateau and Cummings Mesa.
 Dr. Jesse D. Jennings, director of the University of Utah effort, devised 
special techniques to help speed the project.  For instance, he enjoined crew chiefs 
to “use the coarsest tool that will do the work” i.e., recover the data.  A shovel 
can be as useful as a trowel, a road patrol or scraper as useful as a shovel, or a 
dragline as useful as a pick, in the hands of an excavator who is free of ritual 
compulsiveness.11  Of course, there was no way to get a road patrol, scraper, or 
dragline into most of the canyons, but his philosophical approach had the merit of 
accomplishing as much as possible in the time available.
 Every form of transportation was tried as a means to get crews into the 
main and side canyons, from airplanes, to four wheel drive vehicles, to horses 
and mules.  But the areas were so rugged and remote that the rivers themselves 
became the main travel and communication lines.  Small, outboard powered 
aluminum boats were extensively used, with occasional recourse to rubber rafts.
 According to Jennings, the Survey found and recorded over 2,000 
archaeological sites, of which about 80 or 85 were fully or partially excavated.12
In confi rmation, Don Fowler, one of Jennings’ crew chiefs during the 1957-1963 
survey, estimated that due to lack of time, less than 10 percent of the sites were 
examined in any detail.  But both Jennings and Fowler agreed that the survey was 
adequate to determine the population densities at various stages of pre-historic 
cultures.  Dispelling earlier rumor, no large ruin, such as at Mesa Verde or Chaco 
Canyon, was found.  They did determine that Ancient Puebloans (Anasazi) had 
occupied the canyons during three periods, the earliest starting about 500 A.D.  
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During the last period, about 1250 A.D. the occupants were probably starving and 
fi ghting among themselves.
 Writing as a professional archaeologist, Jennings could not praise the Glen 
Canyon Salvage Project highly enough, for it fi nally provided adequate funding 
for substantive research, as opposed to the piddling, poorly-funded studies in 
previous years.  He wrote that over thirty previous explorations of Glen Canyon 
by problem oriented or pot hunting men resulted in no scientifi c account.13  He 
wrote:
I suggest that in virtually any detail, and certainly in overall results, 
emergency salvage archaeology is superior to most other work done in 
America.14
Jennings, now deceased, therefore did not lament the drowning of over 2,000 
archaeological sites.  He proudly pointed to the many volumes of useful and 
accurate scientifi c data that were recorded in monographs and books.  And besides 
the data, he and his researchers had accumulated a museum full of small artifacts 
available to future archaeologists.
 On the personal side, Jennings wrote that
… learning the Glen and working in and near it for six or seven summers 
was a rich, emotionally charged period of my life.  The vastness, the 
isolation, the stillness, the overwhelming beauty of the land, even 
(especially) the heat, the still starlit nights, the blue or brassy midday 
sky, all combined to make me constantly aware of my good fortune. . . 
. millions of vacationers each year fi sh, swim, water ski, windsurf, and 
camp in the tributaries and some spots on the lake itself see and enjoy 
much of the same natural beauty as I once did.  But the intimacy of the 
river and the side streams is gone, and all my hard won knowledge of the 
sandbars, the shoals, and the camping sites is now obsolete, but remain 
bright in memory.15
In the original Glen Canyon Salvage Project plan, no separate provision 
had been made for historical research, as it was assumed that archaeologists 
could record any rare historic site while in the course of their regular tasks.  Dr. 
C. Gregory Crampton, historian at the University of Utah took it upon himself to 
address the lack of historical research as a separate dedicated project by writing 
to the National Park Service and convincing them of the omission.  Consequently, 
Crampton himself was given $25,000, expected to be enough to do the job.  With 
such limited funds, Crampton could hire no one, but had to do all the research 
himself, using only unpaid graduate students (loosely termed ‘slaves’), as 
assistants.
 During the years 1957 to 1963 Crampton tediously fi led through old 
mining records, courthouse documents, diaries and manuscripts, and newspaper 
accounts.  Following written leads, he then made eight fl oat trips, each with one 
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or two graduate students, to stop at specifi c sites mentioned in the written records.  
With his funds nearly exhausted, Crampton, with my urging, persuaded Frank 
Clinton, Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation, to authorize and fund 
boat trips down the San Juan River in 1962 and down Cataract Canyon in 1963.
On these last two trips, I traveled along, acting as offi cial photographer, as we 
stopped and recorded numerous historic sites.
 From 1959 to 1963 Crampton wrote seven detailed monographs, 
complete with maps, photographs and documentation, each published as an 
“Anthropological Paper” by the University of Utah.  Following these works, he 
published Standing Up Country: The Canyonlands of Utah and Arizona,16 in 
which he brought Glen, Cataract, and San Juan Canyon histories into a regional 
perspective.  He followed this with Ghosts of Glen Canyon,17 a series of Glen 
Canyon historical vignettes and photographs arranged by river mile.  In these 
books he repeatedly emphasized the point that Glen Canyon, containing hundreds 
of historic sites, was the most historic of all the canyons of the Colorado.
The Rainbow Bridge Problem
 In Public Law 84-485 authorizing the Colorado River Storage Project are 
the words: “That as part of the  Glen Canyon Unit, the Secretary of the Interior 
shall take adequate protective measures to preclude impairment of the  Rainbow 
Bridge National Monument.”  These words were inserted at the insistence of 
environmental groups, including the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and the 
National Parks Association, with the intention of preserving Rainbow Bridge and 
its surrounding 160-acre enclave set aside as a National Monument in 1909, in its 
natural state.
 Congress also included the following clause:
It is the intention of Congress that no dam or reservoir constructed 
under the authorization of this Act shall be within any National Park or 
Monument.
 This clause was inserted as an affi rmation of Congressional opposition to 
a dam in Dinosaur National Monument (Echo Park), as well as a desire to keep 
Glen Canyon reservoir water out of Rainbow Bridge National Monument.
In regard to Rainbow Bridge, the Bureau of Reclamation faced a delicate 
situation, namely, how to keep reservoir water out of the monument without 
tearing up the surrounding landscape to build a barrier dam quickly enough so 
that the reservoir could be allowed to fi ll without untimely delay.
 By the terms of P.L. 84-485, the Bureau had no choice but to keep water 
from the future Glen Canyon reservoir from entering the boundary of the Rainbow 
Bridge National Monument.  Created by Executive Proclamation in 1909, the 
160-acre monument lay about 5.5 winding stream miles southeast of the Colorado 
532
River.  As the reservoir rose, it would enter the monument area at elevation 3,606 
feet above mean sea level. and at its planned maximum elevation of 3,700 feet it 
would be 45 feet deep in the channel beneath the bridge, but still 21 feet below 
the lowest abutment of the bridge itself.18  Therefore, to keep reservoir water out 
of the National Monument, as required by law, would necessitate some kind of 
downstream barrier dam.
 It was obvious to those of us who worked for the agency at the time that 
top offi cials of the Bureau would build a barrier dam only after considerable loud 
protesting.  And the most effective way to ward off building such a dam was 
to postpone specifi c Congressional appropriations for the endeavor—perhaps 
indefi nitely.  One Bureau publication stated:
Much of the earth materials required for construction of any 
possible restraining dams would have to be obtained from 
the top of the high mesa [1,200 vertical feet above the stream 
channel].  Heavy equipment to work the high mesa borrow area 
would have to be lifted to the mesa top by cableways or carried 
in by helicopters it would be impossible to build a road on to the 
high mesa.… borrow operations would necessarily leave certain 
unavoidable and irremovable construction scars.19
One might question why the Bureau would resist building a barrier dam, 
since, after all, the agency was in the business of building dams.  At least one 
author, Hank Hassell, in his book Rainbow Bridge—An Illustrated History, felt 
that it was simply pay back to the Sierra Club for having embarrassed the Bureau 
in the Echo Park Congressional hearings.
With the benefi t of hindsight it now seems clear that the motive of both 
Congress and the Bureau was simple one-upmanship.  Western states 
congressmen had been stung and stung badly by Dave Brower’s success 
in stopping Echo Park Dam.  The Bureau, too, felt that it had been 
publicly humiliated on its own turf, and now both bodies saw a way to 
strike back.20
 Three possible sites were examined for a barrier dam in the deep, narrow 
canyons leading from Rainbow Bridge down to the Colorado River.  The middle 
site, Site B, preferred by the Bureau, would have required a small dam upstream 
from the bridge and a tunnel to divert natural runoff to an adjacent canyon.
 Dam site C, further downstream, would not have required the diversion 
structures, but would have required a large dam, 365 feet high, with a crest length 
of 800 feet.  It could have been constructed by building a haul road from the 
north, with a bridge over the Colorado River, and much of the construction scars 
would have been inundated by the future reservoir, yet it was never seriously 
considered by the Bureau.  The reason was simple, 
533
it would have taken too long to build, and was at too low an elevation.
The site C dam would have had to be in place before the gates at Glen 
Canyon Dam were closed.  Such a situation would have set back the 
fi lling schedule for Lake Powell and was considered unacceptable.
 The Bureau, through the Interior Secretary, in 1960, dutifully asked for 
$3.5 million in appropriations (of the projected $25 million fi nal price), to begin 
construction of the structures to protect Rainbow Bridge.  But heavy lobbying 
by Senator Frank Moss of Utah, Congressman Wayne Aspinall of Colorado, 
and Floyd Dominy, Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, convinced the 
House Appropriations Committee to delete the line item from the budget with the 
words, “No part of the fund herein appropriated shall be available for construction 
or operation of facilities to prevent waters of Lake Powell from entering any 
National Monument.”
 In 1961 Interior Secretary Stewart L. Udall, recognizing that building a 
dam at site B would leave disastrous construction scars on the landscape, sought 
a way out by proposing a new National Park that would encompass, not only 
Rainbow Bridge, but also much of the fantastically eroded landscape—all Navajo 
land—in surrounding areas.  On April 9 he organized a mass visit to the bridge 
by environmental representatives, news reporters, and governmental offi cials 
to promote what he called  Navajo Rainbow National Park, with helicopter 
transportation furnished by the U.S. Air Force and by private air services.  
Although his concept had merit, it would have been a magnifi cent National Park, 
one key provision of his proposal was to put the boundary of such a park at the 
normal high water line of Lake Powell, thus eliminating the need for a barrier 
dam.  But Dave Brower and others would not accept it.  Also, Udall had failed to 
consult with Navajo Tribal leaders, who were miffed at the slight and also refused 
to go along, thus killing the proposal.
 During the 1960s, Congress each year expressly denied funds for a barrier 
dam, inserting the same prohibitive clause in the Appropriations Bill.  In August 
1962 the National Parks Association, the Sierra Club and other conservation 
organizations fi led suit, asking for an injunction to prevent the closing of the 
gates at  Glen Canyon Dam until protective works for Rainbow Bridge were at 
least under construction.  The judge, however, dismissed the suit, ruling that the 
organizations had no standing in law as they would not suffer harm by the fi lling 
of Lake Powell.  Upon that note, the Bureau closed most of the diversion tunnel 
gates on March 13, 1963, and Lake Powell began a rapid rise.
 As lake waters crept up the narrow canyons toward Rainbow Bridge, Dave 
Brower, now head of a new organization called Friends of the Earth, enlisted the 
Wasatch Mountain Club and Ken Sleight, owner of a river running company, to 
join him in a suit to keep Lake Powell away from the bridge.  In November 1970 
the suit was fi led, asking only that Lake Powell be limited to elevation 3,606, 
thus keeping it out of the National Monument, in accordance with Section 3 of 
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Public Law 84-485.  On February 27, 1973, Judge Willis Ritter, in Salt Lake City, 
granted the plaintiff’s motion and ordered the Bureau to lower Lake Powell to the 
3,606 level.  To the Bureau and to Upper Basin water users, this was a disastrous 
decision, for the top 94 feet, from elevation 3,606 to 3,700, contained almost half 
of the storage volume of the reservoir.  Furthermore, the lowered reservoir would 
substantially reduce the hydraulic “head” on the turbines, thereby cutting power 
production and revenue.
 Of course the government appealed and on May 1, 1973, a three-judge 
panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals voted 2 to 1 to allow Lake Powell to 
enter Rainbow Bridge National Monument while the case was reviewed.  Then, 
just three months later, the Appeals Court issued its decision.  Voting 5 to 2, the 
Court held that Congress had indeed repealed Section 3 of Public Law 84-485 by 
repeated acts of denying funds for protective works.  Chief Justice David T. Lewis 
strongly dissented, commenting that the decision “was a deep trespass upon the 
prerogatives of Congress and a clear and dangerous violation of the doctrine of 
separation of powers. … [and] an equally dangerous judicial aggression.”
 Brower and his lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court, where the 
conservation case was joined amicus curiae by Attorneys General of 16 states, 
all of which disagreed with the Appeals Court decision.  Out of four required, 
however, only three Supreme Court justices agreed to hear the case.  Therefore 
on January 21, 1974, the Court announced that it had denied the appeal and that 
it would not review the case.  Thus a new legal precedent, repeal of a law by 
implication, and denial of appropriations, had been set.  So Lake Powell would 
continue to rise.  And it rose, faster than almost anyone had predicted.
The  Spillway Crisis, 1983-1984
 Of course, the lake level fl uctuated up and down in accordance with 
seasonal runoffs, and in some years it declined more than it rose.  Generally, 
however, the level was higher each year until the lake actually fi lled, to elevation 
3,700 on June 22, 1980, an event that was marked by a public celebration on the 
crest of the dam.  As a demonstration, both spillways were slightly opened for a 
short time.  Lem Wylie, who had supervised the construction and who was invited 
as a guest for the celebration, expressed amazement at the rapid fi lling.  “I never 
expected to see this in my lifetime,” he stated.
 Yet the fi lling in 1980 was only prelude to a much more dramatic event.  
While runoff prediction is an inexact science, predictions are vital for reservoir 
regulation.  Any storage reservoir, such as Lake Powell, should be kept as full as 
possible, with accidental spills kept to a minimum.  Therefore, runoff predictions 
are necessary early each spring so that suffi cient space—but not too much—can 
be provided in the reservoir.
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 In 1983 nature dealt predictors a bad hand.  Accumulated snowfall in the 
mountains on April 1 was only a bit above average, but the snow kept falling, in 
increasing amounts.  By early May it appeared that Lake Powell had insuffi cient 
space for the runoff, so the Bureau opened the wicket gates of the powerplant so 
as to operate at full capacity, night and day.  Still the water rose steadily toward 
the full mark of elevation 3,700 feet.  The four outlet tubes, capable of a combined 
11,000 cubic feet per second release were also opened.
 Early in June one spillway radial gate (a heavy steel gate that is raised 
to admit fl ow from the bottom), was opened to allow water into the left 
spillway.  When this operation is performed, water roars into the spillway, drops 
precipitously through several hundred feet, until it reaches the elbow section, 
then fl ows through the lower end, at that point horizontal, of what had been the 
diversion tunnel.  Upon exiting, it strikes a “fl ip bucket” designed to dissipate the 
tremendous energy by throwing the water high into the air, allowing it to fall into 
the  Colorado River.  In 1983, the operation worked well—except for the insidious 
phenomenon known as cavitation.
 All civil and mechanical engineers are familiar with cavitation, a process 
where a fast moving liquid is thrown upward by some small obstruction, thus 
creating vapor cavities, or small vacuum pockets.  These cavities then collapse 
with destructive force, digging holes into the surface on which the liquid is 
fl owing.  The holes are rapidly enlarged and deepened.  After one hole is formed 
a leapfrog action is initiated, causing further cavitation holes to form on down the 
surface.  One might ask why designers specifi ed spillway tunnels that were almost 
certain to suffer cavitation damage when used.  The only answer is that a well-
managed reservoir should almost never spill, and then only for very short periods, 
after which the cavitation damage could be repaired.
 A spillway tunnel had been provided on each side of the canyon, but the 
right, or west, spillway was not used initially at  Glen Canyon so as to confi ne the 
cavitation damage to the left one.  As the infl ow into Lake Powell topped 
100,000 c.f.s., the gates were gradually opened until 32,000 c.f.s. were roaring 
through the left tunnel.  I was one of the witnesses who saw the outfl ow turn 
orange, hurling chucks of concrete and sandstone into the Colorado River.  Most 
of the engineers were somewhat worried, although they knew that most of the 
damage would be downward—not laterally into the lake.  Yet obviously an 
inspection was in order.
 With the gates temporarily closed, two intrepid engineers, clad in foul 
weather gear, rode a tugger-lowered cart into the dark left spillway.  Almost 
600 feet down the 60 degree slope they encountered massive holes cut clear 
through the three-foot thick concrete lining, and into the sandstone, with 
reinforcing bars twisted and broken.  Just beyond they could see a series of large 
holes further down. At this point they could go no further and were hoisted back 
to the daylight.
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 By the end of June, when the infl ow into the lake rose to around 
120,000 c.f.s. the gates of both spillways had to be opened.  The biggest worry 
was not that the lake would top the dam, elevation 3,715, but that the water would 
rise above elevation 3700, at which point the water would fl ow over the top of 
the gates, even if they were in closed position.  Work crews hurriedly placed 
temporary 4’x 8’ plywood panels upright across the top of the gates so as to 
increase storage.  To a non-engineer, it sounds fantastic to hold back a 186 mile 
long lake with plywood panels, but it worked.
 For a more permanent and effective fi x, heavy steel 8-foot high 
fl ashboards were fabricated and trucked to the dam.  Even as a large fl ow of water 
was roaring under the gates, workmen on top of the gates starting installing these 
fl ashboards on July 4th, working around the clock, and within two days they were 
in place.
 On July 14, the lake level reached 3,708.4, held at that elevation for almost 
a day, then began a slow, but measurable, decline.  The fl ood of 1983 was over.  
By early August all spillway fl ows were curtailed.
 But the measure of the massive job of spillway repair had yet to be 
determined.  I was one of a team who, in late July, waded into cold, standing 
water of the left tunnel and proceeded up the dark cavern toward the elbow 
section.  It was an eerie spelunking experience to be entering that awesome 
dark underground chamber, not quite sure of what we would fi nd.  Pulling a 
raft laden with battery powered fl oodlights, we scrambled and climbed around 
and over an amazing array of rock rubble, at least one piece as large as a good 
sized automobile.  In many places the concrete lining was entirely gone, with 
rebar broken off by metal fatigue. Apprehensive of the expected large hole at the 
elbow section, we stopped wading short of having to swim, but from our vantage 
point we could easily see the series of large cavitation holes just above the elbow 
section.  Having recorded the damage on fi lm and videotape, we retraced our 
route to the sunshine.
 With the powerplant operating at full tilt, and with all four outlet tubes 
shooting eight-foot wide jets into the Colorado River, emergency repairs began 
on the spillways.  Drained of water, adit tunnels were gouged into the lower 
sides of each tunnel, near the outlet portals, to allow access to heavy equipment 
and trucks.  A contractor hired hundreds of men and women to remove broken 
concrete, loose sandstone, and to prepare the tunnels for new rebar-fi lled concrete 
lining.  When the huge hole at the elbow section of the left tunnel—the most 
severely damaged—was drained, it was measured to be 32 feet deep, 40 feet wide, 
and 150 feet long.  It took twenty-fi ve hundred cubic yards of concrete to fi ll the 
hole.
 Meanwhile, in the Denver Engineering Laboratories, engineers were 
giving fi nal touches to the design for air slots to be incorporated in the upper 
portion of the  Glen Canyon spillways.  Their design called for a four-foot wide, 
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four-foot deep, circular trench to be cut and lined about 110 feet down from the 
upper portal of each spillway.  Tests had shown that when high velocity water 
crossed these air slots, a cushion of air bubbles would be introduced, on which 
the water would ride through the remainder of the spillway.   Cavitation would 
therefore be virtually eliminated.
 The general principle of using air slots on tunnel type spillways had been 
conceived by design engineers during the 1970s, had been tested, and had actually 
been retrofi tted into the spillways at Yellowtail Dam in Montana.  Whenever 
funds permitted, air slots were planned for all Bureau of Reclamation dams with 
tunnel type spillways.  Had the 1983 damage not occurred, the spillways at  Glen 
Canyon Dam would probably have been retrofi tted with air slots sometime during 
the 1980s.  But with a large contractor on site, it was logical to build in the air 
slots as part of the ongoing spillway repair.
 Also, so as to prevent surprise incidents like the 1983 runoff, it was 
apparent that runoff forecasting had to be improved.  Bureau offi cials in Salt Lake 
City, in cooperation with the National Weather Service and the Soil Conservation 
Service, devised an improved forecasting model, and ways to quickly refi ne that 
model as snowfall in the mountains accumulated.  It was not accomplished too 
soon.
 As work on the spillways progressed through the fall of 1983 and into the 
new year, large amounts of snow continued to fall in the high country, and the 
1984 forecast showed that the runoff could be even greater than in 1983.  With 
the spillways temporarily out of commission, it was obvious that releases of water 
through the dam and powerplant had to be kept at a maximum.  Through May and 
June Lake Powell inched upward until it was only a few inches from the top of the 
new fl ashboards on the spillway gates.  Then in early July the lake level began to 
recede.  The crisis point had been passed.
 On August 12, 1984, the left spillway, completely repaired and 
incorporating an air slot, was tested with a release of 50,000 c.f.s.  The event 
was astounding to watch, as huge jets of water arced gracefully from the fl ip 
buckets over 100 feet before plunging violently into the river.  Spray fi lled the 
downstream canyon, refracting rainbows from the bright summer sunlight.  After 
a few days of testing, the fl ow was curtailed and the spillway pumped dry for an 
inspection.  I was fortunate to accompany the team of engineers that went in to 
examine the concrete surface.  We could see no damage whatsoever.  The air slots 
had been a complete success in preventing cavitation.
 Altogether, the repair of the two spillways had cost around $30 million, 
but the steady full operation of the powerplant to release more water had netted 
around $34 million in extra revenue.  Furthermore, as most of the power was sold 
to energy companies in California, it enabled them to save great quantities of oil 
that would have been burned in oil-fi red generating plants.
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Glen Canyon Power and the Grand Canyon Ecosystem
 Almost simultaneous with the spillway crisis,  Glen Canyon Dam hit 
another bump in the road.  For many years, even before the dam was completed, 
biologists, geologists, archaeologists, and river runners had been concerned with 
the altered character of the Colorado River fl owing from the dam and through 
the Grand Canyon.  What enters Lake Powell as a warm, silt fi lled river emerges 
through the dam cold and clear, similar to a mountain stream.  It also fl uctuated 
high and low in accordance with power demands at the Glen Canyon Powerplant, 
sometimes very rapidly.  No studies had yet been made, but most scientists 
predicted damage to the Grand Canyon ecosystem.
 What caught the attention of the public, however, was a Bureau of 
Reclamation proposal to increase the power producing capacity by adding 
generators to the outlet tubes.  Since peaking power earns considerably more 
revenue than off-peak power, the idea had been to convert the entire powerplant 
into a peaking power operation.  Outfl ows during off peak would be practically 
curtailed, while during peak power demand, all eight generators, increased to 
twelve by addition of the four on outlet tubes, would be operated at full capacity.  
And to maintain steady fl ows through the Grand Canyon, a re-regulating dam, 
about 30 feet high, built to contain a fl uctuating reservoir, was planned for the 
canyon a few miles below the dam.  To Bureau offi cials intent on fi nding ways 
to increase revenue the plan was a good one, but it struck a very large obstacle—
public opinion.
 In 1981 during public hearings in Page, Flagstaff, and Salt Lake City, the 
proposal aroused the ire of many who simply did not want another dam, even 
a small one, built in Glen Canyon.  To them, the hated concrete dam was bad 
enough; they were not going to let the Bureau fl ood the last 15 miles of Glen 
Canyon below the dam.  Fishers, in particular, who reveled in those 15 miles 
of good fi shing, cried foul.  Even river runners, who might have been expected 
to embrace the idea of a non-fl uctuating river below Lee’s Ferry, were vocal in 
opposition.  Many of these opponents wrote newspaper articles, appeared on 
national television, and urged people to write protest letters to their Congressmen. 
 Within a few months, the Bureau surrendered, giving up the proposal, 
but opting instead to rewind each of the eight generators at the dam so as to 
increase the power output, which would not change river fl ow patterns.  The 
public protests, however, had called attention to possible damage the clear, cold, 
fl uctuating river was doing to the Grand Canyon ecosystem.  Responding to this 
pressure, Under Secretary of Interior Robert Broadbent ordered a thorough study 
of several scientifi c aspects of the riverine environment below the dam.  Although 
it was offi cially called the Glen Canyon Dam Environmental Studies, (because it 
concerned fl ow releases from the dam), the studies were to be made in the fi fteen 
miles remaining of Glen Canyon, and in the 275 miles of the Grand Canyon.
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 With the Bureau of Reclamation as prime agency, cooperation and 
assistance was needed and obtained, under contract, from the National Park 
Service, the U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
Arizona Game and Fish Department, several universities, and many Indian tribes.  
Researchers from all of these agencies and institutions spent over ten years 
investigating every possible change brought about by the fl ow regimen over the 
previous 20 years.  For two years, from 1983 to 1985, they were hampered by 
the continual high releases, and virtually no fl uctuations, required by the spillway 
crisis, thus creating an abnormal fl ow pattern.  Most substantive investigations 
therefore began after the spillways had been repaired.
 Researchers knew, even before they ventured into the Grand Canyon, 
that the clear water and fl uctuations would be having some effect; the only 
question was how much.  All of the sand, silt, and many of the minerals that used 
to fl ow though the canyon, nourishing the beaches and riverine life zones are 
now continually captured by Lake Powell.  Furthermore, clear water accelerates 
degradation of the stream bed and shorelines, causing much of the existing sand to 
disappear into the river.  High fl ows and rapid and wide fl uctuations in river fl ow 
due to changes in power demand at the Glen Canyon Powerplant add substantially 
to the degradation.
 Before 1963 the temperature of the river in Grand Canyon was 
synchronized with the seasons, warm enough to support a warm water fi shery 
that included pike minnow, formerly known as squawfi sh, razor backed suckers, 
bony tailed chub, and hump backed chub.  Researchers suspected that these four 
species, having been impacted by cold water fl ows for over two decades, and all 
now listed as endangered, would have all vanished from the canyon.
 After ten years of research, at a cost of about $100 million, almost all of 
the predicted results were confi rmed; however huge amounts of additional data 
were obtained concerning the downstream ecosystem.  Voluminous reports and 
books have been written on the fi ndings.
 Here are a few examples of what was learned.  A viable humpback chub 
population was discovered in a relatively small estuary where the warm Little 
Colorado River fl ows into the Colorado River.  But all the other endangered 
fi sh species had vanished from the canyon.  Rainbow trout, however now live 
in the cold river, in reduced numbers as the distance from the dam increases.  
Surprisingly, bald eagles have begun to frequent the canyon to fi sh in the lower 
mile of Nankoweap Creek, fl owing into the Colorado River, where trout spawning 
occurs.
  Tamarisk, tamarix, ramosissima, a water devouring phreatophyte, was 
found to have greatly spread along the river banks, largely due to the lack of 
high, sand-laden spring runoff fl ows to uproot them and wash them away.  Several 
bird species, however, such a Bell’s vireo, summer tanager, hooded oriole, and 
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great-tailed grackle, have greatly expanded their nesting range throughout the 
dense foliage of the tamarisk and other bushes that now line parts of the river.21
 So that left only the question of how the operation of the dam could be 
altered so as to minimize deleterious effects on the Grand Canyon ecosystem.  
In November 1989 the Secretary directed an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) be prepared on the operation of the dam, with Reclamation again as the lead 
agency.  Expressly ruled out was the option of removing the dam.  So also was 
drilling a prohibitively expensive tunnel to convey sediment from an upper part of 
Lake Powell around the dam to the canyon.  As for the cold water releases from 
the depths of the lake, the Bureau agreed to study ways to raise the temperature by 
modifying the intake structures.
 In early 1991 the Bureau changed the fl ow regime by raising the 
minimum fl ow, by cutting the peak off maximum fl ows, and by slowing down 
the “ramping,” speed where fl ows are altered either up or down.  The fi nal EIS, 
completed in March 1995, and the Record of Decision (October 1996) essentially 
recommended perpetual maintenance of this pattern, except in emergencies.
 Congress passed the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, requiring 
some type of continual monitoring of effects on the downstream ecosystem, 
now complied with by formation of a Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Work 
Group.
 Ironically, what began in 1981 as the Bureau’s desire to produce more 
peaking power has resulted in turning the dam and powerplant into a near steady-
state power producer, with very little peaking power, and certainly less revenue.
 In a separate, but similar incident, Regional Director David Crandall of 
the Bureau once told me that, in the early 1970s, he and his staff had tried to 
obtain agreement from the Navajo and Ute Tribes to construct another backbone 
transmission line through their reservations, parallel to the one built in the early 
1960s.  To this leaders of both tribes replied fi rmly, “Absolutely not, but we would 
like you to remove the line that is already there!”  No second line was ever built.
Changing Perceptions about Pre-dam Glen Canyon
 From the early 1950s onward, opposition to having a dam in Glen Canyon 
has been a factor to consider.  During the Congressional hearings of 1954-1956, 
opponents were vocal but unorganized, and numbered comparatively few.  River 
running at that time was not widely popular.  Boating parties venturing into 
Glen Canyon were occasional private parties and often Boy Scout groups.  And 
of those that did see the main canyon, very few ventured far into the varied and 
fantastically eroded side canyons.  As late as 1955, the private party of Katie Lee, 
Tad Nichols, and Frank Wright bestowed names on several previously unnamed 
side canyons.22
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 Glen Canyon suffered also by the attention given to the Grand Canyon.  
Whereas Grand Canyon was magnifi cently huge, astoundingly deep, and almost 
incomprehensible, “one of the great sights, which every American, if he can 
travel at all, should see . . . ,” (Theodore Roosevelt) Glen Canyon was colorful, 
intimate, and comfortable.  The Colorado River in Grand Canyon was lined with 
threatening river rapids; the same river in Glen Canyon had none.  A spur rail 
line reached the South Rim in 1901 and the fi rst automobile arrived at that point 
in 1902, but no decent road reached Glen Canyon until 1957.  Quite probably, 
had Glen Canyon not been overshadowed by the public attention given to the 
Grand Canyon, it would have been much better known when engineers and water 
managers started talking about a dam.
 How indeed is a geological curiosity transformed into a cultural icon?  
It is not a simple process of “being there.”  As author Stephen J. Pyne points 
out, Grand Canyon itself was once just a geological curiosity.  Explorer Joseph 
C. Ives, writing in 1858, called  it a “profi tless locality”—but the image of the 
canyon was gradually transformed by a cadre of scientists, writers, painters, and 
photographers, including John Wesley Powell, Clarence Dutton, William Henry 
Holmes, Thomas Moran, and publicity men and women of the Santa Fe Railroad.
 In his book How the Grand Canyon Became Grand Stephen Pyne writes:
Among the last of America’s landscapes to be formally explored, the 
Grand Canyon had become among the fi rst of its natural marvels and, 
for a nation that tended to substitute natural monuments for cultural 
ones, entered the pantheon of its sacred places.  Its valorization offered 
as much a cross section through American history as of earth history.  
The evolution of that interpretation had, with eerie symmetry, mimicked 
the evolution of the Canyon’s features.  The spasmodic tectonism of 
geographic exploration, the varied tributaries that fl owed from the 
main currents of American thought—with breathtaking brevity the two 
processes had merged, and not merely laid down a course of history 
but entrenched it so deeply the Canyon became a permanent feature of 
America’cultural lanscape.23
 Before the dam, Glen Canyon missed similar scrutiny by scientists as well 
as by lyric poets and painters.  It had been visited by perhaps hundreds of miners 
and prospectors in the 1890s and again in the 1930s.24  Yet to most of those who 
had heard the name at all, Glen Canyon was simply another in a long series of 
gorges cut by the Colorado River through the Colorado Plateau, probably a good 
place for a dam.
 All of this began to change after construction began on Glen Canyon 
Dam.  Realizing that time was running out to see the canyon, private river boating 
parties fl oated through Glen Canyon in increasing numbers from 1956 to 1963, 
when water storage was initiated in Lake Powell.
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 One of the most infl uential members of these boating groups was  David 
Brower, Executive Director of the Sierra Club.  Brower, who had not objected to 
Glen Canyon Dam so long as Echo Park Dam was eliminated from the Colorado 
River Storage Project in 1956, was astonished by the beauty and variety of 
Glen Canyon.  He soon contracted with photographer  Eliot Porter to take color 
photographs in the canyon, for eventual publication in a Sierra Club book, entitled 
The Place No One Knew—Glen Canyon of the Colorado.25  The title of the book, 
which came out in 1963, was of course, a misnomer, since Glen Canyon was 
historically the most visited by boat of all the Colorado River canyons.  What 
the title meant, rather, was that writers, painters, and photographers had never 
enshrined Glen Canyon suffi ciently to make it a cultural icon.  Understated in the 
title was the belief that had the canyon been a cultural icon, such as the Grand 
Canyon, Glen Canyon Dam would never have been authorized.
 After Lake Powell began to form, most of the publicity centered on the 
beauties of the lake and the novelties of boating into narrow side canyons barely 
wide enough for passage.  During the 1960s very little was said about the loss of 
pre-dam Glen Canyon.  Gradually, however, more voices were heard decrying 
the loss, particularly among young people.  Certainly, the loss of confi dence in 
the Federal government due to the Vietnam War and Watergate had a pronounced 
effect, for it caused many of college age to question what else the government 
had done wrong.  Also, with new equipment and money, this younger generation 
was more adventurous than those earlier.  Although it would be a mistake to 
categorize an entire generation, many of them wanted to climb mountains, hike 
trails, camp out, surf in the waves, and boat down wilderness rivers.  To them it 
was frustrating to learn through books such as Eliot Porter’s and several magazine 
articles, what Glen Canyon used to be.  At least some of them felt that older 
generations had denied to them a moving river and much of the scenery in Glen 
Canyon, as well as a great adventure—even perhaps, a soul inspiring mystical 
journey.  A slow houseboat trip on Lake Powell—or even on a speedy personal 
water craft—could hardly compensate.  By the early 1980s these discontented 
young people were ready to organize against the dam.  The vanished Glen Canyon 
was indeed becoming a cultural icon—even posthumously.
The Drain Lake Powell Movement
 A strong and infl uential voice was added in 1968, when  Edward Abbey 
burst upon the scene with his book Desert Solitaire—A Season in the Wilderness,26
a robust, well-written collection of Abbey’s stories from southeastern Utah.  New
Yorker Magazine called Abbey “a good hater.”27  In describing  Lake Powell 
Abbey wrote:
[Where Major John Wesley Powell] and his brave men once lined the 
rapids and glided through silent canyons, two thousand feet deep the 
motorboats now smoke and whine, scumming the water with cigarette 
butts, beer cans and oil, dragging the water skiers on their endless 
rounds, clockwise.28
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Abbey also quipped, “I’m a humanist: I’d rather kill a man than a snake!”
And one of his visions, supposedly written while Glen Canyon Dam was still 
under construction, was that 
some hero will carry a rucksack full of dynamite into the dam, hide it 
carefully, then attach blasting caps to the offi cial dam wiring system so 
that when the dam is dedicated by the President and Secretary of the 
Interior and Governors from the Four Corner states, a button will be 
pushed, igniting the loveliest explosion ever seen, and the new rapids 
formed will be named ‘Floyd E. Dominy Falls’ in honor of the chief of 
the Reclamation Bureau.
Desert Solitaire was an immediate best seller and has gone through several 
editions and reprinting, and is even today, four decades later, still in print.  In 
1975  Abbey followed this up with The Monkey Wrench Gang,29 a novel about 
a small band of self-righteous, do-gooder eco-terrorists who have the dream of 
destroying Glen Canyon Dam, but who, in the meantime, whet their destructive 
impulses on power lines, road building equipment, and on the train carrying coal 
from Black Mesa to the Navajo Powerplant near Page.  Again Abbey displayed 
his writing talent, as well as his iconoclastic view of economic development and 
what he called “industrial tourism”
 These two books by Abbey contributed greatly to the anti-dam movement, 
both by enhancing the status of the pre-dam Glen Canyon as a cultural icon and 
by fanning the fl ames of discontent with the dam and with Lake Powell which 
some referred to as “Lake Foul”, or, at best, “Reservoir Powell.”  This said, one 
could hardly dispute the fact that around three million people visit Lake Powell 
each year, spending millions of dollars on boats, lodging, food, and supplies.  
What it does mean rather, is that public perceptions of the lake (or reservoir), were 
becoming more polarized.  Undoubtedly the boating portion of the public loves 
the lake—it is, of course, one of the most scenic lakes in the world—while a vocal 
minority now calls for removal of the dam as soon as possible.
 On a warm spring day in 1981 Ed Abbey showed up at the dam, ostensibly 
to act as high priest for a recently organized group calling themselves Earth First!  
A few of its members climbed over a gate leading to the crest of the dam, then 
walked to the center point where they unfurled a tapered sheet of black plastic 
sheeting 300 feet down the downstream face, meant to represent a terrible crack 
in the dam.  On the bridge, 350 feet away, Abbey shouted “Earth First!  Free the 
Colorado!” and the seventy or so people that had accompanied him joined in.30
 The Earth First! Mission Statement originally boasted of engaging in 
violent tactics, such as ‘cracking’ dams with banners, blockading bulldozers, 
sitting in trees, and disabling Earth-destroying equipment (“monkeywrenching”—
as one word) was introduced to the vocabulary of the modern environmental 
movement.31
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 Soon after this 1981 incident, the Bureau tightened security at the dam.  
First workmen installed closed-circuit TV cameras at practically all access points.  
Casual visitors, could no longer roam freely on a self-guided basis down the 
elevators and onto the west end of the generator fl oor, the transformer deck and 
the governor gallery.  They would now have to fi rst obtain a ticket, have all tote 
bags inspected, and then proceed in small groups accompanied by a Bureau guide. 
Furthermore, accessible areas were reduced by cutting out the sensitive governor 
gallery.
 Near Moab, Utah, a few rebellious men and women actually tried their 
hand at eco-terrorism, monkeywrench style, by chain-sawing down a wooden 
transmission tower, thereby disrupting power service.  The loud public reaction 
against this act seemed to alert the perpetrators that it was self-destructive 
behavior, calculated to win no allies.  At least three times, studios in Hollywood 
have seriously considered turning The Monkey Wrench Gang into an action fi lled 
movie, but each time they have backed away for fear of inspiring copy-cat acts of 
destruction.
 During the 1980s until 1996, protests against the dam seemed to 
subside, perhaps because of the environmental studies and the preparation of 
an Environmental Impact Study then underway.  The National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, had, however, signifi cantly altered the equation by requiring 
extensive studies and producing an Environmental Impact Statement prior to 
authorization.  Congressman Wayne Aspinall, who had played such a pivotal role 
in the campaign for CRSP in 1956, was heard to say, in 1981, “We got the CRSP 
approved just in time. Today we could never get it authorized—particularly if it 
included Glen Canyon Dam.”
 Barry Goldwater, set to retire from the Senate in 1986, said that if he could 
recast one vote in his entire Senate career, it would have been his vote to authorize 
Glen Canyon Dam.32
 In 1996 a new group advocating removal of the dam was formed.  The 
 Glen Canyon Institute was led by two men: David Wegner, a biologist who had 
served as director of the environmental studies for the Bureau of Reclamation, and 
Richard Ingebretsen, a physician in Salt Lake City.  In the GCI mission statement 
is the following:
Although in 1996 the Bureau of Reclamation completed an EIS on 
operations of the dam, decommissioning the dam was not offered 
as an alternative to the public.  Public comments, which suggested 
decommissioning of the dam, were simply rejected as falling  outside 
the scope of that EIS process.  Glen Canyon Institute believes that 
the American public should decide whether or not the long term 
environmental costs of maintaining Glen Canyon Dam outweigh the 
short term benefi ts provided by Powell reservoir.33
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 Goal of the GCI is to produce a Citizens’ Environmental Impact Statement 
that would clearly show the benefi ts of removing, or at least decommissioning, the 
dam.  Now based in Salt Lake City, the organization has reported a membership 
of 1,400 individuals spread throughout the United States.  Richard Ingebretsen 
readily admits that draining Lake Powell is a long term objective, probably not 
achievable for at least twenty years, yet he is optimistic that their effort will meet 
with success.  While Ingebretsen and his group mention the economic costs of 
lake surface evaporation, what they are really striving for is to raise pre-dam Glen 
Canyon to the status of a cultural icon, just as David Brower had been trying to do 
since 1963.
 Brower, probably the most infl uential environmentalist in the country, 
the man who had almost single-handedly defeated Echo Park Dam, was also a 
member of GCI, and spoke at several of the GCI meetings.  On his own initiative 
in 1997 Brower convinced the National Board of the Sierra Club to unanimously 
declare its support for draining Lake Powell, thus making it national policy.  
Subsequently Brower wrote even more articles, gave more speeches, always 
advocating decommissioning of the dam, while admitting apologetically that he 
had tacitly supported the dam during the 1950s.  Brower died in 2000, but many 
of his followers in the Sierra Club and elsewhere have vowed to carry on his 
campaign.
 Congressman James Hansen of Utah responded to the movement by 
calling for a hearing before his House Interior Committee in September 1997.
His primary purpose was obviously to squash the drain Lake Powell initiative in 
the bud.  At that hearing, Sierra Club president Adam Werbach and GCI’s Dave 
Wegner reportedly “took a beating from politicians and experts who dismissed 
the plan as loony,” “impractical,” and “certifi ably nutty,”34  The hearing somewhat 
backfi red in that it only helped to publicize the concept of draining the lake by 
giving it Congressional and media attention.
 To counter the threat from the GCI and the Sierra Club, a group of Page 
residents, in July 1997, organized what they named  Friends of Lake Powell.  Its 
avowed purpose was and is to discount negative claims against the dam and 
reservoir and to promulgate the recognized benefi ts.
 Some people considered that the methods employed by the Glen Canyon 
Institute and the Sierra Club were too slow to take effect.  A new group was 
therefore organized in January 2000 with more radical tactics in mind.   Living 
Rivers, headquartered in Moab, espouses public demonstrations and media 
attention, but not eco-terrorism at the dam or anywhere else.  When Living Rivers 
announced that its fi rst rally would be held at the dam on March 14, 2000, the 
Friends of Lake Powell countered that they would hold a demonstration at the 
same time and place—the Bureau feared a possible riot.  When the day arrived 
local police were on hand to separate the groups by the width of the canyon, one 
on one side, one on the other.  Separate demonstrations and speeches were then 
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forthcoming, one group promoting draining the lake and one against it.  Visitors 
standing on the bridge separating the two demonstrations were watched closely by 
the police.  No trouble, other than loud public address systems, was reported.
 In the future we can look forward to sustained opposition to continued 
operation of Glen Canyon Dam, restricted though it has been.  And Lake Powell 
will continue to provide a Mecca for fi shers, boaters, and water oriented sports.  
Considering the economic investment in the dam and powerplant, in the city of 
Page, in recreation facilities around Lake Powell, and in the Navajo Generating 
Station, which draws clean cooling water from the lake, it is not likely that the 
drain Lake Powell movement will have success, at least not for several decades.
Emphasizing the need for continued operation of both Glen Canyon Powerplant 
and the Navajo Generating Station is the current, and probably long term, demand 
for additional electrical energy in the western United States.
Sedimentation
 Sediment, of course, continues to settle in the upper parts of the lake, 
diminishing its storage capacity and its ability to meet downstream commitments 
during times of drought.  Although never mentioned in promotional literature, 
sediment storage is a vital function of Lake Powell, since it greatly increases the 
useful life of Lake Mead, about 300 miles downstream.
 The  San Juan River arm of  Lake Powell, which receives a majority of the 
sediment input, is already heavily clogged.  The San Juan Marina on that arm had 
to be closed in 1988 due to heavy  sedimentation.  In the early 1990s a sediment 
bar built up so fi rmly on the San Juan arm that it blocked the infl ow from the 
river, forcing  the water to rise up, fl ow across a section of  nearby fl at sandstone, 
then drop by a 20-foot waterfall into Lake Powell.  Although this silt dam later 
washed out, it was an indication of things to come.
 No one knows when sediment will reach the dam, but it will not be 
soon.  Anticipating that eventual day, Bureau engineers are considering using 
the outlet tubes to fl ush some of that sediment around the powerplant.35  A 
study of sedimentation rates by the Bureau showed that it would be 700 years 
before sediment would reach the penstock level, elevation 3,490, where water 
is drawn into the turbines.  Although the powerplant could, and probably will, 
generate power up till that time, no offi cial prediction has been made as to when 
the reservoir will be too small to meet downstream commitments—or when 
Lake Powell is so diminished in size that water oriented recreation is no longer 
practical.  Perhaps by then the drain Lake Powell movement will have fi nally 
achieved success and the stored sediment will be draining around or through the 
dam, through the Grand Canyon, and fi lling up any remaining capacity in Lake 
Mead.
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Drought
 Drought is a problem not only to Colorado River water users, but also to 
the entire western U.S.  The prime stated reason for building Glen Canyon Dam 
was to sustain required fl ows to the Lower Basin and Mexico during drought 
periods.
 Yet when a severe  drought period actually occurred, as in the years 1999 
to 2005, both Lake Powell and Lake Mead were drawn down extensively.  In 
fact, releases from Glen Canyon Dam in 2004 were the fi rst in the dam’s 40-
year history in which extra Lake Powell water was released to meet Compact 
commitments.  As a Bureau spokesman stated, “ Lake Powell releases kept Lake 
Mead from going dry.”
 Several meteorologists and climatologists are now saying that drought 
should be considered usual, and that it may last for long periods.  Therefore, 
water users and Bureau of Reclamation offi cials have undertaken discussions on 
ways to tacitly circumvent the Upper Basin downstream commitment of the 1922 
Compact, and to replace it with criteria to keep Lake Powell and Lake Mead at 
equal levels, percentage wise and to equalize the shortage of water between the 
two basins.
 Because of the new criteria essentially considering Lake Powell and Lake 
Mead as one storage unit, combined with expected drought years and continuing 
increasing withdrawals from Upper Basin users, Lake Powell may never fi ll again.
Conclusions
 The bumpy road that Glen Canyon Dam history has taken in the past 
55 years represents a long encounter with scenic values, with cultural antiquity, 
with natural processes of fl ood and sedimentation, and with preservation of 
two national icons, the Grand Canyon and Rainbow Bridge.  The very rust-red 
sandstone landscape that backdrops Lake Powell, making it one of the most 
scenic bodies of water in the world, is the same scenery that causes environmental 
groups to demand that the lake be drained so that the heart of the scenery—the 
canyon fl oor and the river can be seen and accessed.  Those opposed to the dam 
will continue to promote pre-dam Glen Canyon as a national and cultural icon 
that should be returned from the depths—the sooner the better.  But they will have 
little success so long as investments in the dam and lake remain both widespread 
and profi table.  When the day arrives that maintenance of the dam no longer 
makes economic sense—no matter how far in the future that may be—Glen 
Canyon Dam will strike the biggest bump of all.  We can only guess what future 
generations will do with the dam at that time.
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W. L. (Bud) Rusho worked in public affairs for the Bureau of Reclamation 
on-site during construction of Glen Canyon Dam and then transferred to the 
regional offi ce in Salt Lake City.  He retired in 1988 and has since been actively 
freelancing as a writer, photographer, and movie maker about western topics.
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The Indian Camp Dam Controversy:  The Real 
Beanfi eld War
By:
Marilyn J. Koch
Abstract
This essay explores the controversial history of  Indian Camp Dam, a 
Bureau of Reclamation project authorized under the  Colorado River 
Storage Project and the  San Juan-Chama Diversion Project.  The dam 
was proposed, but never built, for predominantly Hispanic farmers in the 
Taos Valley of northern New Mexico.  Using interviews with participants 
in the controversy as the basis for her study, the author argues for more 
complete and complex histories of intra- and interethnic cooperation and 
resistance, histories that embrace “untidy ambiguities.”
“When [we] talk about history we don’t mean what actually happened, do we?  
The cosmic chaos of everywhere, all time?  We mean the tidying up… into books.  
History unravels; circumstances, following their natural inclination, prefer to 
remain raveled.”
Penelope Lively, Moon Tiger
 As we gather in 2002 for the centennial of the Bureau of Reclamation, 
we have set time aside for many events: for the special tour of Hoover Dam; for 
our host’s celebratory events; and to meet with friends and fellow historians.  
But most importantly, we have set time aside in the most literal meaning of that 
phrase, for we will spend most of our time in the Past, recognizing the history of 
the past 100 years of the Bureau of Reclamation.  As we gather to recognize the 
Bureau of Reclamation, we should perhaps ponder that verb: recognize—to look 
over again, literally, “to re-know.”
 To set time aside and to recognize are also most appropriate defi nitions for 
what we do as historians.  We are also, though, in the broadest sense, storytellers.  
I do not mean that historians create fi ctions nor fantasies, though some do, but that 
we place very raveled events and circumstances into a narrative framework.  We 
unravel and we tidy up.  We have to in order to satisfy the necessity for a coherent 
work.
 My contribution to this Symposium, my ‘looking over again’ a piece of the 
history of the Bureau of Reclamation, explores the controversial history of  Indian 
Camp Dam, a project that Reclamation never built.  Because it offers us insight 
into the oppositional strategies at work against the Bureau of Reclamation, this 
never-built project provides an additional dimension to our re-knowing, perhaps 
one that histories of completed projects cannot give.  Because historians tend to 
emphasize what did happen, rather than what did not, they risk overlooking or 
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missing opportunities to examine the meanings that an event had as it unfolded; 
they risk holding the past “hostage to an as yet undefi ned future.”1
 Indian Camp Dam, a relatively small dam, was to have been built 
near  Taos, New Mexico, in the valley about three miles south of Talpa, New 
Mexico, as part of the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP).  The Bureau of 
Reclamation designed Indian Camp Dam to benefi t predominantly Hispanic 
farmers and ranchers who needed an additional and reliable source of water 
for irrigating their lands, many of which were located on Spanish colonial 
land grants.  Because my essay is not the fi rst to look at the  Indian Camp Dam 
controversy, 2 and because events surrounding the controversy have also been 
satirized in the popular novel by  John Nichols, The Milagro Beanfi eld War, I am 
‘looking over again’ the story of Indian Camp Dam in a literal, revisionist, sense 
as well. Beneath any tidied up narrative of the Indian Camp Dam controversy lie 
layers of complex human interactions that comprise the very raveled and very 
untidy historical, political, and cultural past of northern New Mexico.  I do not 
presume that my history will do more than add another dimension, but I hope it 
adds a more raveled one.
 Toward that goal, I have incorporated interviews conducted with principal 
participants in the controversy, in particular  Andres Martinez and  Rudy Pacheco, 
two Hispanic water leaders who ultimately found themselves on opposite sides, 
and  John Nichols and  Paul Bloom, two Anglos who also opposed each other.  I 
have also incorporated the contemporary perspective of  Eluid Martinez (no 
relation to Andres Martinez), Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation during 
the Clinton Administration.  Eluid Martinez became involved in the Indian 
Camp Dam controversy in 1971 when he was a young hydrographic engineer 
working for the Offi ce of the New Mexico State Engineer.  As a native of northern 
New Mexico, an observer of the controversy, and as former Commissioner of 
Reclamation, Eluid Martinez commands a unique vantage point from which to 
comment upon the Indian Camp Dam project.  I believe the oral histories of these 
participants reveal that previous versions of the Indian Camp Dam history have 
omitted facts critical to a complete and fair understanding of the controversy.
23.1.  Eluid L. Martinez, Commissioner of 
Reclamation from 1995-2001, previously 
worked in the State Engineer’s offi ce in 
New Mexico, where he served as State 
Engineer at the end of his career.
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 This essay also examines the legal framework proposed for the ownership 
and maintenance of the dam, and how this project was infl uenced but ultimately 
hobbled by the tangled institutional structures, cultures, and organizational 
ideologies of the federal and state agencies involved in the controversy, including 
the Bureau of Reclamation.  Ultimately, this essay questions stereotypical 
assumptions of how ethnic boundaries were set, maintained, and crossed during 
the controversy–assumptions that have since been further distorted by the success 
of The Milagro Beanfi eld War.  This novel, and to some extent the subsequent 
movie, have garnered huge popular appeal.  To a surprising degree, the novel 
encompasses the general public’s entire awareness of northern New Mexico’s 
environmental politics.  The term “beanfi eld war” has become synonymous with 
any Anglo/Hispanic environmental dispute in New Mexico.  The book continues 
to be displayed prominently in hotel and airport gift shops, alongside the iconic 
red chili ristra lights and howling coyotes, as if to announce “This is New 
Mexico.”  But “to recognize” the history of Indian Camp Dam is to recognize that 
a stereotypical and romantic description of a cliche struggle—Anglo developers 
and reclamationists versus earth-loving Hispanic farmers, a struggle that has taken 
on the power of legend—can be not only deceptive and unfair, but can also have 
long-lasting effects on how we choose to use and conserve natural resources.
 Finally, by examining the history of this controversial and never-built 
reclamation project using the oral histories of these participants, I hope to show 
the validity of Donald Pisani’s statement in To Reclaim a Divided West, that “The 
story of the West must begin from the ground up, rather than from the top down.  
The parts must be understood before sense can be made of the whole.”3  If we are 
to use this centennial to recognize the Bureau of Reclamation, it seems fi tting to: 
“look over again” one of these parts.
  Indian Camp Dam was designed to have been built in the forested canyon 
of Rio Grande de los Ranchos, a tributary of the Rio Grande, three miles south of 
 Talpa, New Mexico.  Talpa is one of over a dozen small settlements within Taos 
valley lying along eight mountain streams, all making competing demands on the 
valley’s watershed.  In addition to the competing demands of these predominantly 
Hispanic settlements,  Taos Pueblo Indians claim Winters rights,4 prior and 
paramount rights, to the headwaters of the valley’s tributaries at Blue Lake.
 While it is beyond the scope of this essay to detail the complexities of 
Indian water rights in New Mexico, an awareness of Winters rights is important 
to a theoretical understanding of the context, and perhaps even more importantly, 
the subtext, of the Indian Camp Dam controversy.  Although Taos Pueblo was 
not involved in the controversy in an overt or active fashion, because its Winters
rights were still not fully appropriated, nor yet fully put to benefi cial use, and 
still theoretically held in trust by the United States, they remained unquantifi ed.  
In 1970, just as the Indian Camp Dam controversy intensifi ed, Taos Pueblo won 
its long battle with the U.S. government for return of Blue Lake.  Against this 
backdrop the increasing demands for the water, and at least two years of drought, 
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served to heighten awareness and competition for water throughout the Taos 
valley.  In many important ways these tensions were not new.  As John Baxter 
demonstrates in Dividing New Mexico’s Waters, 1700-1912, confl icts over water 
had tangled the web of human interaction, resistance, and compromise in the Taos 
valley for the past 300 years.5
 Indian Camp Dam was originally conceived as one of the hundreds 
of projects comprising the  Colorado River Storage Project, or CRSP.  When 
Congress fi nally passed and President Eisenhower signed the CRSP into law in 
1956, the legislation enabled the Bureau of Reclamation to build the network of 
dams necessary to divide up and store Colorado River water among the seven 
western states, including New Mexico, that claim it.  The ideological framework 
for the CRSP grew not only out of the federalism of the Reclamation Era, but also 
out of New Deal federalism and its social welfare programs.  The CRSP was not 
only a project of environmental engineering, but in social engineering as well.6
Beneath this framework lay the powerful symbolism of the Jeffersonian agrarian 
ideal of the yeoman farmer, which infi ltrated and informed everyone’s approach to 
Indian Camp Dam.
 As originally conceived, the CRSP was one of this country’s largest water 
reclamation projects.  Its scope was astounding.7  It encompassed scores of small 
and medium sized reclamation projects–the dams and reservoirs that fi ll the 
modern Western landscape.  It included large and very controversial projects, such 
as the infamous and never-built Echo Park Dam, and Glen Canyon Dam, which 
created Lake Powell and stores the equivalent of two years’ fl ow of the Colorado.  
The Bureau of Reclamation called Glen Canyon Dam its “cash register.”  
Money that Glen Canyon Dam generated from electrical power subsidized the 
construction of other CRSP projects.  The CRSP was the fi rst reclamation project 
to link the receipt of power revenues from one location to payment for irrigation 
projects in others.  This enabled politicians and reclamationists to rationalize 
the construction of irrigation projects in places where, until then, the economics 
of large scale irrigated farming had been considered impossible or, at best, 
marginal—places like Taos, New Mexico.
 The CRSP called for water to be transported from the San Juan River, 
New Mexico’s only source of Colorado River water, into the Azotea Tunnels 
underneath the Continental Divide, and fi nally into the Rio Grande Basin via 
the Chama River.  This transfer, initially a part of the CRSP, is called the  San 
Juan-Chama Diversion Project  (SJCDP).  Throughout the 1950s New Mexico’s 
Senator  Clinton B. Anderson, himself a strong advocate of reclamation and 
New Deal ideologies, fought for New Mexico’s share of Colorado River water 
and for the SJCDP.  As head of the powerful Senate Interior and Insular Affairs 
Committee, he helped direct the course of legislation required to enact the SJCDP 
pursuant to the terms of the Colorado River Compact.  Anderson and most 
reclamation advocates believed that in order for New Mexico to use Colorado 
River water most effectively, the water had to end up in the Rio Grande, where 
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it could then reach and serve the most populated and agriculturally productive 
portions of the state.  This transfer subjected the imported waters to further 
complicated political compromises and to the terms of the Rio Grande Compact.
 In 1962 Congress fi nally approved and President Kennedy signed into law 
the SJCDP and construction of the tunnels began.  Senator Anderson had seen 
to it that most of the water would go to his constituency in central and south-
central New Mexico, primarily for municipal and industrial use by the city of 
Albuquerque.8  New Mexico’s other U.S. Senator, Democrat and Hispanic  Dennis 
Chavez, supported Anderson’s long battle for the CRSP and the SJCDP.  In return, 
Chavez won Anderson’s promise that over one-fourth of the water (30,000 acre 
feet per year) would go to Chavez’s constituency, the predominantly Hispanic 
farmers and ranchers in northern New Mexico.
 Taos was too far north and east of the Chama River to receive the imported 
waters directly.  Instead, by constructing dams, Taos and three other northern New 
Mexico communities were to impound waters from their respective Rio Grande 
tributaries in the total designated amount.  This same amount would then be 
substituted with San Juan water fl owing into the Rio Grande in order to replenish 
the Rio Grande and meet the downstream requirements called for under the Rio 
Grande Compact.
 Under the terms of the  Rio Grande Compact, New Mexico had to meet 
certain downstream delivery obligations, both intrastate and interstate.  The Rio 
Grande Compact divided the New Mexico portion of the Rio Grande above the 
Elephant Butte Reservoir and designated the amounts that had to be delivered into 
the Reservoir from the upstream section of the river.  Similarly, New Mexico also 
had delivery requirements and obligations to Texas.  The most serious opposition 
to the  SJCDP had come from Texas and from the Elephant Butte Irrigation 
District (EBID) in southern New Mexico.  Texas and the EBID jointly questioned 
how their rights would be protected, especially in times of drought when they 
feared that the additional upstream projects proposed by SJCDP would consume 
too much water at the expense of those below Elephant Butte Dam.  In return for 
dropping their opposition to the diversion, EBID and Texas demanded and were 
guaranteed strict compliance with the Rio Grande Compact.
 The state of California, through the Colorado River Board of California, 
had also mounted vigorous opposition to SJCDP by attacking the feasibility of 
the New Mexico projects and questioning how they conformed to the Colorado 
River Compact and the pattern of protecting the Colorado River Basin as a whole.  
California wanted assurance that none of the Colorado River water would be 
made available for consumptive use, “whether by exchange or substitution or use 
of return fl ow, to any state not a party of the Colorado River Compact,”9 that is, 
Texas.  Thus, under the Rio Grande Compact New Mexico was left to assume 
responsibility to the EBID and Texas to limit the use of the water upstream to 
the amounts imported and simultaneously, under the provisions of the Colorado 
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River Compact, New Mexico was to keep Colorado River water out of Texas by 
consumptively using the total diverted volume.
 It is critical to an understanding of the Indian Camp Dam controversy 
to appreciate the complexity of the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers’ water 
regimes and their requirements and demands upon the state and federal regulatory 
agencies.  It is also critical to appreciate the signifi cance of the Hispanic water 
users’ role in fi ghting for northern New Mexico’s portion of Colorado River 
water.  Of the 30,000 acre feet per year allocated to northern New Mexico, almost 
half (12,000 acre feet per year) was to benefi t a few hundred farmers living on 
a few thousand acres of marginal lands high in the Sangre de Cristo mountains 
around Taos.  These farmers were not passive or unwilling recipients.  Indeed, it 
is doubtful that this water would have been allocated to Taos, sought as it was by 
so many competitors both within and outside of New Mexico, without strong and 
collective support of the Taos farmers.  Initially, they played not only an active 
role in fi ghting for the water, but in justifying its use as a way of preserving, 
perpetuating, and enhancing their pastoral lifestyles.10
 In 1954 and again in 1958 Taos water users sent their spokesperson, dairy 
farmer  Andres Martinez, to Washington to testify before Senator Anderson’s 
Interior Committee.  He spoke in favor of the CRSP and funding for the San Juan-
Chama Diversion.  Martinez delivered a lengthy statement advocating passage 
of the CRSP.11  He and the other eight signatories, six of whom were Hispanics, 
outlined the history of their county and its people.  Martinez testifi ed that 50 
percent of the heads of household in Taos left their homes and families each year 
to fi nd work “. . . in the beet fi elds and mining camps of Colorado or running the 
sheep camps of Colorado, Wyoming and Montana.  There [were] no jobs in Taos 
County.”12
 Martinez told the senators that 100 years earlier Taos had been a 
prosperous farming community, “called the granary of that part of the world,” 
with “great fl ocks of sheep and great herds of cattle.”  But that was before the Rio 
Grande Compact required them to send “many thousands of acre-feet of water per 
year to Texas.”13  It was also before the creation of the Forest Service, which the 
farmers claimed had sharply curtailed or denied grazing permits on what had been 
their ancestral and communal lands, and before the Taos Pueblo Indians had come 
to have more water rights, including the rights to the best streams in Taos.
 In her seminal essay on the history of patterns of ethnic stratifi cation in 
Taos, anthropologist and Taos native, Sylvia Rodriguez, shows that “appropriation 
of community common lands was probably the single most devastating blow 
dealt the native agro-pastoral subsistence economy,”14 and that “around the time 
of statehood [1912], Taos seems to have gone from a valley of golden promise 
to an economically stagnant backwater, awaiting touristic discovery.”15  While 
the touristic discovery of Taos is beyond the scope of this essay, its pervasive 
economic infl uence, as well as that of the luxury home real estate market (nascent 
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in Hispanic villages near the Taos Ski Valley at the time of the Indian Camp Dam 
controversy), cannot be overlooked as factors contributing to tensions in the 
valley and confl icts over land and water use.
 Andres Martinez’s 1954 Congressional statement advocated a dam to 
impound excess runoff waters.  The farmers argued that a dam would allow 
a more stable water source and prevent the injudicious over-use of the spring 
season’s waters, a practice that had grown out of the farmers’ desire to capture as 
much water as possible, when possible, from Taos’s highly ephemeral streams.  
The extra water would also make possible the irrigation of new lands and local 
market gardening would increase, increasing the saleable output from their 
farms.  In their fi nal plea, the farmers proclaimed that the San Juan River waters 
and a dam in Taos “would change an area of potential tragedy into one of great 
productivity and prosperity.”16  This plea meshed perfectly with the social goals 
of reclamation and was exactly the kind that the altruistic rationalizations of the 
CRSP were designed to address.
 After passage of the CRSP and the SJCDP, the Bureau of Reclamation 
determined that two of the four water storage projects planned for the Taos area 
could not be built due to geological obstacles.  Then, in 1969, Indian Camp Dam 
itself appeared endangered as well.  Even though Taos was eligible for the huge 
power revenues that would pay 96.6 percent of the construction costs of the dam, 
Reclamation questioned whether the dam, even with the heavy subsidies, could 
meet the government’s cost-benefi t ratios.  Because the lands to be benefi tted 
were so marginally productive, Reclamation announced that the project was not 
feasible “as a purely agricultural irrigation unit.”17  Farmers mounted a campaign 
to fi ght for the dam.  They organized a full scale “Save the Water” effort to lobby 
for the water, to endorse the dam, and to “recommend that the ground rules for 
water use or even design be changed to make [the dam] feasible.”18  By November 
1969 Hispanic ditch commissioners and mayordomos19 from thirty-fi ve ditch 
systems and other members of ditch associations from Arroyo Hondo to Llano 
Quemado united to fi ght for the dam.20
 Needing to put the water to benefi cial use and fearing political 
repercussions if three of the four projects proposed for northern New Mexico 
failed to be built, the Bureau of Reclamation did change the ground rules.  It 
added on a “recreational use” provision, which allowed the Forest Service to 
step in to maintain and operate the small lake created by the dam.  This use 
required the Forest Service to contribute signifi cantly to the costs of the dam.  But 
ironically, this plan, tacked on to help pay for the dam, later became one of the 
opponents’ most forceful arguments against it.  Hispanics long resented the Forest 
Service as the agency that held and controlled much of what had been land grant 
common lands during the Spanish and Mexican colonial periods, and they linked 
Forest Service development projects to debt and dispossession.21  The Forest 
Service had become a powerful symbol of their “stolen” homeland.22
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 Another such powerful symbol was the quiet title suit.  Such suits were 
seen as the means by which Hispanics had lost over 80 percent of their grant lands 
by the turn of the twentieth century.23  Because both the Rio Grande and Colorado 
River Compacts required stringent accounting of existing Rio Grande waters, the 
New Mexico State Engineer believed that these waters had to be measured prior 
to the addition of the imported Colorado River waters.  The only legal mechanism 
for this accounting was stream adjudication, or quieting title to the water.  In 
1969 New Mexico State Engineer  Steve Reynolds, through his Special Attorney 
General, Paul Bloom, fi led stream adjudication suits along the entire northern 
stretch of the Rio Grande, including the Taos tributaries, to determine the nature, 
amount, location, and priority of all existing water rights.24
At the initiation of the stream adjudication suits, at least two 
interpretations of the Winters reserved rights for Indians prevailed.  Water law 
historian Ira G. Clark provides a helpful discussion that serves to distill these 
two interpretations, one propounded by  William Veeder and the other by Paul 
Bloom.  These two views, both supported by the Winters decision, illustrate the 
ambiguity in the law and the confl icted position of the federal government’s 
reclamation policies vi? à vi?  Indian reserved rights.  Veeder, a veteran offi cial 
in the Department of Justice during the Nixon administration, voiced a tenacious 
defense of Indian water rights pursuant to Winters, holding that
. . . in signing treaties with the United States the Indians… retained 
everything they did not cede including their water rights… Their 
rights were therefore ‘immemorial’ in origin and prior in time to 
all counterclaims.  Development by the Bureau of Reclamation and 
other interior department agencies of “surplus” waters originating 
on or fl owing through Indian reservations was limited in time to the 
period during which Indians were unable to use them.  Nor could 
any appropriator assert rights based on state law because the federal 
government had exclusive control over Indian resources.25
Furthermore, Veeder placed Indian reservations in a position “to assert 
superior claims to all additional waters as the needs develop.”26  As Clark states, 
this interpretation imposed “drastic limitations on the power of state water control 
agencies” and threatened non-Indian water users in the vicinity of reservations, 
especially Hispanic water users in places like Taos, since their lands and acequias
usually have the oldest appropriated rights in these vicinities.  The Indians’ 
claim of prior and paramount rights could conceivably not only halt further 
development within the state, but these claims would “jeopardize the rights of 
junior appropriators who were already using the water benefi cially.”27
Clark describes  Paul Bloom as “a most vocal exponent” of the counter-
position to Veeder’s.  Bloom interpreted Winters as holding that
…the United States impliedly reserved waters for Indian use at the 
time the reservations were created, based on the constitutional power 
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of Congress to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations 
respecting property belonging to the United States.  It did not therefore, 
differ materially from the implied reservation of water at other federal 
enclaves.28
 Clark charges that of the federal agencies, the Bureau of Reclamation was 
“the worst offender” in its “purposeful ‘reclaiming’ of Indian waters for use on 
federal projects”29 since it and other federal agencies were supposed to protect 
Indian water rights rather than preempt and develop them.
 The  stream adjudication suits exposed the uncertainty of the extent of the 
Indians’ Winters claims to Taos valley’s water and thus opened a Pandora’s box 
of distrust, competition, and greed, and exacerbated centuries’ old tensions and 
ambiguities over unresolved water claims within the communities.  Although he 
believed it was New Mexico’s duty to initiate the adjudication suits, the State 
Engineer underestimated the effect the suits would have on the communities, 
and on Taos valley’s response to the dam.30  The State Engineer may have also 
miscalculated the extent to which mistrust of the state’s motives in initiating 
the suits led to a deeper apprehension and questioning of other legally required 
components of the dam.
Both New Mexico law and reclamation law required the water users 
to form an entity capable of issuing bonds to contract with the government to 
construct the  dam, but New Mexico law limited the proponents’ choices for 
such an entity to either a conservancy district or an irrigation district.31  Initially 
Andres Martinez, as head of the Taos Unit Coordinating Council’s executive 
committee, recommended the water users form a conservancy district. The 
Council argued that under irrigation district laws, irrigators would bear the full 
burden of the dam’s remaining costs, even though others in Taos would benefi t 
indirectly from the added water.  By sharing costs of the dam with non-irrigators 
under a conservancy district, the cost per farmer, in the form of ad valorem taxes, 
would be halved.32  Yet as tension and misapprehension grew, irrigators began to 
suspect that while conservancy district laws favored irrigators in this respect, in 
other, more important, respects they did not.  Under conservancy district statutes, 
members of the conservancy district’s board of commissioners, at that time a 
three-person appointed board, did not have to be farmers or irrigators.  Hispanic 
ditch commissioners and mayordomos, the leaders who oversaw operation of the 
traditional existing irrigation system, began to realize they would lose immediate 
control over water allocation and management.33  In the summer of 1971 sixteen 
mayordomos, led by Andres Martinez, very publicly resigned from the local water 
users’ association that had formed to promote the dam, basing their change of 
heart on opposition to formation of the conservancy district.34
Conservancy district case law in New Mexico refl ects that users in 
the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, New Mexico’s fi rst and largest 
conservancy district, litigated over most of the very issues that Taos users 
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feared, citing many of the same reasons.  Yet a look at the fi rst case deciding the 
constitutionality of New Mexico’s fi rst conservancy act shows that mistrust and 
antipathy toward conservancy districts were not unique to New Mexico.  In citing 
precedents for its decisions, the New Mexico Supreme Court quoted the Ohio 
court: “Rarely has a law been found which has been assailed with such frequency 
or from so many angles.”35
 Conservancy district laws in New Mexico have evolved into an odd hybrid 
that refl ect simultaneously the goals of fl ood control—the original ostensible 
purpose of the act—as well as reclamation, drainage, and irrigation.  There is no 
doubt that promoters of the original act sought protection from fl oods.  In fact, 
the original act forbade the creation of conservancy districts north of Santa Fe 
County, since that section of the River with its deep gorges was not fl ood prone.  
When the act was challenged on the grounds that it was unconstitutional by reason 
of being special or class legislation, the court ruled that the differences in natural 
conditions along the northern portion of the river justifi ed the special classifi cation 
that forbade fl ood control districts where they were not needed.36
Proponents of the fi rst act also convinced the legislature that drainage of 
the middle Rio Grande valley was imperative, as aggradation of the river had 
waterlogged the entire middle valley and the City of Albuquerque was “hemmed 
in by unhealthy marshes and swamps.”37 But in addition to fl ood control and 
drainage, boosters of a conservancy district for the middle Rio Grande valley also 
clearly wanted the economic development that reclamation promised to bring.  An 
Albuquerque editorial on June 4, 1922, proclaimed:
It is diffi cult to imagine an investment of effort that would yield such 
enormous and such certain returns.  Nor is it diffi cult to bring this 
development about.… There is not a business in Albuquerque that can 
fail of doubled volume from reclamation of the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley, because that reclamation will double the tributary population not 
once but several times over and add enormously to the fl ow of wealth to 
and through this city.… Why not get up and hustle—while the hustling is 
good?38
Most importantly, conservancy district proponents needed the ability 
to increase the tax base by bringing municipalities, principally the City of 
Albuquerque, and railroads into the district to share in the costs.  Conservancy 
district laws allowed lands to be classed and assessed according to benefi ts 
received and, unlike irrigation districts that were limited to agricultural lands, 
conservancy district laws allowed the inclusion of non-agricultural lands.
 In 1923 New Mexico modeled its fi rst conservancy act on both the 
Ohio act, passed in 1914, and the Colorado act, passed in 1922.  Those states 
designed their laws solely for purposes of fl ood control, in response to disastrous 
fl oods in Dayton and Pueblo, respectively.  In its opening remarks determining 
the constitutionality of this fi rst New Mexico conservancy act, the court In Re 
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Proposed Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District “made a careful comparison” 
of the New Mexico conservancy act with those of Ohio and Colorado and found 
that
. . . in the main the provisions of all three acts are the same.  The 
Colorado act followed the Ohio act, making such changes as seemed 
suitable for the conditions prevailing in the Western states, and the New 
Mexico act closely followed the Colorado act, occasionally including a 
provision which was in the Ohio act and omitted from Colorado law.39
 Yet the appellants questioned the title of the act, arguing that it indicated 
that the New Mexico legislature had in mind different purposes from those 
declared in the Ohio and Colorado conservancy acts, namely irrigation.  They 
argued that because the title of the New Mexico act included the subject of 
cooperation with the federal government in its reclamation policy, “the indications 
are that the purposes of our Conservancy Act look to the improvement of the 
agricultural conditions of the Rio Grande Valley, and that alone.”40  Appellants 
argued that the Ohio and Colorado acts were adopted “solely and exclusively for 
the protection of life and property, and not in any sense calculated to interfere 
with the industrial pursuits of their people.”41
 The New Mexico Supreme Court appeared oblivious to the appellants’ 
suggestion that the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District would interfere 
with agricultural pursuits or engage in reclamation.  Replying that “it did not 
appear” that the legislature, in passing the conservancy act, “had in mind alone or 
principally the reclamation of lands,” the court noted there were already statutes 
existing authorizing the formation of irrigation and drainage districts, and these 
had been approved on the same day as the conservancy act.42  In closing, the court 
noted that if “an attempt should hereafter fraudulently be made to accomplish 
a purpose not within the purview of this act, the courts would doubtless give 
protection to the complaining parties.”43
 But backers of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District appear to 
have intentionally “recast and enlarged” their proposed language for the original 
act, specifi cally to add a provision for reclamation.  Notes kept by the membership 
committee of the Middle Rio Grande Association, the booster organization formed 
to work with the legislature for passage of the conservancy district law, refl ect that 
“changing from drainage to reclamation ha[d] been more or less confusing,” but 
“when the people [were] correctly informed,… [the] committee… met with hearty 
response from people… ready and anxious for reclamation, some of whom were 
opposed to drainage.”44
In 1927, apparently anticipating that the Supreme Court would hold 
that under the original act reclamation alone was insuffi cient to warrant the 
organization of a conservancy district, the legislature amended and broadened 
the act to allow unambiguously “for irrigation of lands, though they are not 
menaced by fl oods.”45  This amendment led to another challenge to the act’s 
562
constitutionality in 1929 when plaintiffs in Gutierrez et al. v. Middle Rio Grande 
Conservancy District argued that as petitioners for the conservancy district they 
had been “moved by a desire only for fl ood control but that a corporation resulted 
with power to make irrigation its principal object.”46  The Supreme Court ruled 
that the new conservancy act did not change the character of the Middle Rio 
Grande Conservancy District as a district organized for “the main purpose of fl ood 
control with irrigation and drainage incident thereto.47  By 1940 the Supreme 
Court, again noting that New Mexico conservancy district laws closely followed 
the Colorado and Ohio statutes, acknowledged fi nally that “The provision for 
the irrigation system, included with fl ood control and reclamation, is, however, 
peculiar to the New Mexico Act.”48
More importantly though to the discussion and context of the Indian 
Camp Dam controversy, the Supreme Court in 1940 for the fi rst time examined 
the management and control of existing community acequias by the conservancy 
district.  Noting that the old community ditch laws were not repealed by the 
conservancy act, and that water rights were not affected by the act, the court 
nevertheless dodged the question of what duties, if any, remained to ditch 
commissioners who continued to be elected and operate under the old regime, 
independently of the conservancy district.  The court termed this question 
“intriguing.”49  Ultimately, the court ruled against dual control of the ditches, 
stating that “the administration of these [water] rights, so far as the impounding, 
diversion, carrying and delivering of… water for irrigation… has now been 
placed in the hands of this new and superior authority, plaintiff [conservancy] 
District.”50
 Taos water users questioned virtually all of the same provisions that 
water users in the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District did in appealing 
the constitutionality of that district, including their inability to appeal 
assessments made by the county treasurer; the appointment rather than election 
of the conservancy board; the impingement upon their power to manage and 
control their own affairs; and the lack of a requirement that a majority of the 
landowners in the district sign the petition for organization of the district.51  All 
of these provisions seemed “undemocratic” and “un-American” to opponents 
of the district in Taos.52  But most of all, the Hispanics who turned against the 
conservancy district feared “this new and superior authority.”
 Originally, the proposed conservancy district in Taos included 774 acres 
of land lying within the San Cristobal de la Serna Grant.  Granted by the King of 
Spain in 1710, the La Serna Grant was the oldest non-Indian Spanish land grant 
in Taos County (and one of the oldest in New Mexico).53  Having held onto most 
of these ancestral lands through the intervening decades of rapid Anglo land 
expropriation after New Mexico became a territory, the Hispanic residents of 
La Serna were deeply suspicious of the taxes that the conservancy district could 
impose.54  To irrigators who owned small plots it “seemed ‘wrong’ to have to start 
paying $5.75 an acre for the same water” they had been using for generations.55
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Land tenure patterns in La Serna further compounded the problem for 
the La Serna farmers.56  Because of the Hispanic tradition of dividing land 
equally among multiple heirs, each tract with access to the river, or acequia,
acreage in the La Serna Grant included many long, extremely narrow plots (in 
some cases only a few feet wide and several miles long).  Many farmers owned 
several narrow but non-contiguous plots, often with rights to different acequias.
The Bureau of Reclamation recognized that farms under ten acres were not 
considered economically feasible and recommended that owners of such narrow 
tracts consolidate their lands by forming land pools or co-ops.  The Bureau of 
Reclamation also recommended a change in cropping patterns, away from forage 
crops to more cash intensive crops.  Not only did the La Serna landowners fear 
the loss of their lands if conservancy district taxes for the dam could not be 
repaid, they also resented and resisted the pressure to change their traditional 
ownership and cropping patterns.57  In the fall of 1971 the La Serna irrigators 
petitioned for the removal of their lands from the conservancy district.
 State statute required the district court to approve the petition for the 
conservancy district, an approval now complicated by the petition for removal 
of the La Serna lands.  After months of delays (including the self-excusal of an 
Anglo judge), District Court Judge Santiago Campos ruled in October 1972 that 
the La Serna land grantees’ opposition to the conservancy district constituted an 
“insurmountable obstacle to any reasonable fi nding of benefi t from irrigation to 
all the lands within the proposed district.”58  Moreover, he ruled that the exclusion 
of La Serna left the costs of the project higher than the resulting benefi t, and thus 
the necessary statutory justifi cation for the formation of the conservancy district 
was absent.  However, Judge Campos noted the “intense and pressing interest 
in the Taos community,”59 as well as the obvious need for the water.  He warned 
that opposition to the conservancy district could well mean loss of the water that 
everyone needed and he warned the opponents of the character in Othello whose 
hand threw away a pearl richer than all his tribe.  The judge told the remaining 
proponents that he would not totally dismiss the petition if they could alter their 
plans and substitute other lands for the La Serna lands.60
 Judge Campos’s decision proved fatal for the conservancy district, 
though that was not his apparent intent.  The petitioners, not wanting to lose the 
fabled pearl, took Campos’s suggestion and redefi ned the conservancy district 
boundaries.  If anything, this move only increased the controversy, since the 
newly incorporated lands included large tracts belonging to several prominent 
Anglos, including an Anglo developer and his sister, owners of the largest land 
holdings in Taos valley.  Unlike the neighboring La Serna lands, much of the 
newly added lands had not been irrigated previously.  This fueled rumors that the 
water would not be used for irrigation, but would be converted to commercial 
uses and development purposes.61
 In April 1973 Judge Campos granted the formation of the revised 
conservancy district.  The dam’s opponents, now allied under Andres Martinez 
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as the “Tres Rios Association,” appealed Judge Campos’s decision.  On May 14, 
1975, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that Campos’s compromise decision 
to allow a reformed district was illegal.  The Supreme Court agreed that Judge 
Campos had properly excluded the La Serna lands from the district because such 
lands would not benefi t from the conservancy district.  But the higher court ruled 
that Campos had exceeded his authority in allowing the petitioners to “amend the 
petition so as to create a new and different district, since signers of the original 
petition contemplated and intended a different district from the one resulting, 
and where the ultimate tax burden upon those remaining in the district would be 
defi nitely affected.”62
 After the 1975 New Mexico Supreme Court decision nullifi ed the Rancho 
del Rio Grande Conservancy District, no one in Taos pursued the project further; 
 Indian Camp Dam never got off the drawing board.  That same year  John Nichols 
published The Milagro Beanfi eld War, and the story of the dam’s demise took on 
the aura of legend: local nativos and a few concerned, earth-loving Anglos versus 
the callous government in cahoots with land-grabbing, usually Anglo, capitalist 
developers.
 By the time he left New York for New Mexico in 1969, John Nichols 
described himself as “strung out, on edge, going down fast.”63  The son of 
privilege and wealth, a graduate of private prep schools and Hamilton College 
(the setting of his fi rst successful novel, The Sterile Cuckoo), he became active in 
the anti-war movement in New York City in the late 1960s.  But he found New 
York relentless and wanted out.  Because he found himself “looking at the world 
from a much more Marxist or even socialist perspective,” he wanted to come to 
New Mexico, which he saw as fertile ground for his political activism.64  Because 
New Mexico “approximated a colonial country,” Nichols believed it would be 
like “moving to the third world,” and that interested him.65  He also sought “an 
environment where [he] could be startled constantly by natural phenomen[a]… 
having roots in a special landscape not yet destroyed by progressive human 
endeavors.”66  Instead, what confronted Nichols in Taos valley was a community 
on the brink of building Indian Camp Dam, a project many would have proudly 
labeled a “progressive human endeavor.”
 Like other refuge seekers, Nichols saw life in northern New Mexico as 
“an antidote to modern mechanization, and land of exotic primitivism and simple 
truths.”67  In his memoir, If Mountains Die, Nichols wrote that he was “destined” 
to “wind up in northern New Mexico as the semi-Marxist-Leninist propaganda 
arm for a group of quixotic Spanish-speaking septuagenarians locked in mortal 
combat with the U. S. government over preservation of their water rights, their 
land, their culture, their very historical roots.”68
 During our interview, Nichols downplayed his own role in the controversy, 
calling it a “minor but vocal one.”69  He recalled “speaking out” at meetings 
and holding heated exchanges with Paul Bloom, the attorney from the State 
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Engineer’s offi ce.  And although Nichols wrote many articles opposing the dam in 
the local weekly independent newspaper, The New Mexico Review, he denied that 
he played a signifi cant role in changing public opinion.70  This denial is probably 
more accurate than his more romanticized written memoirs.  The articles Nichols 
wrote in 1971 in The New Mexico Review did not receive wide distribution among 
Hispanics and, having arrived in Taos only recently, he was not well known 
within the community then.
 There is also evidence to support attorney Paul Bloom’s observation that 
Nichols’ overtly politicized speeches at public meetings offended many Hispanics 
“who identifi ed him either with the Hippies or the crazy environmentalists… 
they didn’t like… being told they were barefoot, serape-wearing peasants… [who 
needed] to be protected by this political agitator who view[ed] Hispanic culture as 
being on a museum shelf for 300 years…”71
 Since the publication of Milagro Beanfi eld War it has become diffi cult for 
even the participants to unravel how much infl uence Nichols had on actual events 
at the time of the Indian Camp Dam controversy, and how much he has been 
credited with, or blamed for, because of the book.  In everyone’s attempt to give 
coherence, and perhaps meaning, to these events, Nichols’s fi ctional and satirical 
version has somehow become the standard that other versions must meet.
 Nichols described to me one heated public meeting about the conservancy 
district that he attended, saying it was “just like a fi lm set.”  He said that the 
room was “split in two,” with “100 percent Chicano farmers on one side, and 
bankers, lawyers, real estate people, Anglo business people from town and the 
developers in the valley on the other side.”72  Nichols claimed that the controversy 
“seemed to pretty much break up into what most battles around here do, between 
essentially smaller farmers, impoverished people, and the developers of the valley, 
which is a cliché struggle all over the world.”73
 But neither the historical record of Indian Camp Dam nor the recollections 
of the other interviewees reveals a simple two-sided dichotomy, nor do they 
reveal a “cliché struggle.”  Nichols’s description did seem like something off a 
movie set—indeed, it seemed to be right out of the movie version of The Milagro 
Beanfi eld War.  A far more intriguing, more ambiguous, more complicated, but 
less coherent scenario emerges not only from the legal and political web of the 
dam’s history, but from other participants’ memories.
 Born in 1898, Andres Martinez grew up poor but relatively well educated 
at a Presbyterian mission school in Taos.  He lived his entire life in Taos, except 
for the many months each year during his youth when he traveled the circuit as 
a shearer on the sheep ranching circuit throughout the West.  Martinez’s father 
had been a shepherd who never owned irrigated land, just a small vegetable plot 
and house in Ranchos de Taos.  As a child, Martinez supplemented the family’s 
income by picking onions from his mother’s garden, loading them onto burros, 
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hiking to Elizabeth Town, and selling the onions to the miners who paid him 
with little bottles of gold dust.74  Martinez’s depiction of his childhood and early 
adulthood mirrors that of the majority of Hispanics in northern New Mexican 
villages during the fi rst quarter of the twentieth century, as described by Sarah 
Deutsch in No Separate Refuge:
Faced with an increasingly intrusive conquering economy and culture, 
the Hispanics could not retreat.  They had to formulate new strategies 
in order to maintain the viability of their villages… among the options, 
seasonal labor proved the most attractive…through the strategy of 
work and migration patterns, they retained their control over their own 
enclaves, retained for themselves a homeland—both a refuge and a base 
for expansion without loss of cultural identity.… The migrants [were] 
‘living links’ to the goods, services, and cash of the Anglo economy.75
 Martinez managed to save enough money to leave the seasonal labor 
system, though it appears he never forgot the lessons of that strategy.  In 1950, 
he and his wife bought eight cows and a forty-acre dairy farm in Taos.  By 
the time he sold his dairy and retired, he was on the board of directors of the 
local savings and loan and one of its largest shareholders.  He was not an 
“impoverished farmer”; arguably, he had become a “rico.”  Rumors had it that he 
had also become a Mormon and had sought appointment to the Interstate Stream 
Commission.
 Even though he ultimately opposed construction of the  dam, Martinez 
remained, at age 92 when I interviewed him, fi ercely proud of the role he and 
other Hispanics played in getting New Mexico its share of Colorado water.  
Fighting for the water remained a core and defi ning memory.  He described 
himself as “fi ghting for twenty years to get it.”76  Martinez admitted that in the 
beginning he and the other Hispanic water users “were all for the dam.”77  That 
is, until they learned more about the conservancy district.  Martinez claimed that 
the conservancy district would have resulted in loss of lands due to its power to 
impose property liens and, if necessary, foreclose and sell the property to pay back 
taxes.78
 Perhaps because of the varied experiences of his youth as a migratory 
worker, Martinez became adept at crossing ethnic boundaries.  While 
maintaining his strong ties and identifi cation within the Hispanic community 
as a respected leader, he also negotiated and cooperated with Anglo power 
brokers when he believed it would benefi t Hispanics.  His status within the 
Hispanic community enabled him to travel out of this ethnic enclave while 
simultaneously strengthening it by establishing his own presence and identity 
within the predominantly Anglo arena of reclamation politics and interstate water 
management.
 The most ambiguously positioned participant in this controversy may 
have been  Paul Bloom, who was, in 1969, a 30-year-old Special Attorney General 
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working for State Engineer Reynolds and the Interstate Stream Commission.  In 
this position, Bloom came to be the point man and spokesperson not only for the 
state in its efforts to explain Indian Camp Dam but also for the Interstate Stream 
Commission in its efforts to promote the dam—sometimes the latter role was at 
odds with his private opinions about the dam.
 Bloom denies he ever tried to “sell” the dam, but as the state attorney who 
initiated the stream adjudication suits, he was assigned to hold town meetings to 
explain why the dam triggered the adjudication suits.  Bloom was keenly aware 
that the Interstate Stream Commission was “clearly a booster of record [for the 
dam].”79  He also understood the “complicated calculus of log-rolling,” and 
“jealous intrastate and interstate jurisdictions, communities, and political power 
bases… that had constantly traded off and fought each other to get their key 
interests taken care of…” and he realized when he was assigned to go to Taos that 
“all of these compromises were expressed in years of impatience to get [the dam] 
going.”80
 Because Bloom was the voice of government, he became heavily involved 
in the controversy and was often the focal point of the community’s re-ignited 
distrust of the government.  While this distrust was historical for the Hispanics, 
for Anglos like Nichols who opposed the dam, this distrust was contemporary, 
tied to the emerging environmental activism of the late 1960s, and perhaps even 
more signifi cantly, to anti-Viet Nam War sentiments.  John Nichols often confl ated 
his opposition to the dam with militarized rhetoric directed personally against 
Bloom.  In July 1972 Nichols described Bloom in The New Mexico Review:
Bloom… has been a pivotal fi gure in the attempt to erect Indian Camp 
Dam over the dead bodies of the poor people in Taos for whom the Dam 
is allegedly being built.… And perhaps Bloom, petulant, frowning, 
doomsayer here and culture savior there, is wondering why nobody 
believes anymore in the magic of his Indian Camp baubles, bangles, and 
bright shiny promises.
Well: maybe it’s because some grizzled old brujo was staring through 
the smoke of his pinon fi re one day, gazing up towards the soft green 
hills at the eastern edge of the Little Grande Valley, and on the crest of 
one little mountain he saw a strange fi gure from the State Engineer’s 
offi ce with his left hand thrust Napoleonically between the breast button 
in his Brooks Brothers tunic, standing proudly beside his Indian Camp 
howitzer, grandiosely proclaiming—as it has been the habit of certain 
other United States Government landscapers et al. to proclaim: “It was 
necessary to destroy the people of Little Rio Grande Valley in order to 
save them…”81
 Like others, Bloom believed that the issue of the conservancy district 
was “the kiss of death” for the dam, not because of the dangers of conservancy 
districts but because “it allowed it to be demagogued to death.”82  Bloom claimed 
he never saw “a more effective case of demagoguery, of romantic nostalgia, of 
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playing on all the nineteenth century fears and agendas.”83  Yet  Bloom maintained 
that in 1971 he privately believed the dam came 100 years too late.  He thought 
it was a “somewhat utopian… rather touching… unreal political thing to do.”84
But by the mid-twentieth century the lands the project was intended to benefi t 
had been divided up into such small tracts that land pooling would have been a 
daunting if not impossible task.  This, combined with the short growing season, 
fl ood risks, high elevation, and distance from markets, seemed to Bloom to be 
problems the Bureau of Reclamation’s optimistic forecasts could not overcome.  
But he did not see it as his place to make this judgment because, he said, the 
local water users wanted this project.  “It had been negotiated by them and for 
[them] by their elected representatives, over many years, justifi ed by their federal 
government on certain assumptions, including the benefi ts from irrigation.”85  He 
believed that “[people] couldn’t simply let comparative economics dominate 
what [they] do with natural resources or the rich and the big cities would have 
everything.”86
 Bloom also saw clearly that once Andres Martinez and his group went 
into open opposition, the dam “was doomed… at least doomed to an endlessly 
long and painful and divisive dispute.”87  Bloom warned State Engineer Reynolds 
and the Interstate Stream Commissioners that even if all the hurdles could be 
overcome, it would be done at a great price in community discord and division.
Bloom recalled that the Stream Commissioners looked at him “as if they’d heard 
Santa Claus had been shot.” 88
 In 1971 Rudy Pacheco was a 41-year old cattle rancher and school 
administrator and owner of one of the larger tracts of lands in the proposed 
conservancy district.   Pacheco wanted the conservancy district and the dam.  
After Andres Martinez’s resignation as leader of the water users’ organization, 
Pacheco led the proponents.  Pacheco never wavered in his support of the dam 
and remained bitter that it was never built, believing that its loss forced him to 
move his ranching operation to Colorado.  He believes that now, without the 
dam, it is virtually inevitable that each of the eight Taos streams’ fl ow will have 
to be commercialized and domesticated because “they killed agriculture in Taos 
County.”89
 Pacheco recalled that before the opposition to the dam became overt, 
Hispanic farmers discussed the possibility of producing grain for Coors Brewing 
Company and raising beans for the Campbell Soup Company because bean crops 
had been very cost effective in the Taos area.  Campbell’s ultimately located its 
operation in Bayfi eld, Colorado, using irrigated lands from another CRSP project.  
“Campbell’s had guaranteed a contract for 6,000 acres of beans for a twenty-year 
period.  That was a cash crop that La Serna people could have used,” Pacheco 
claimed.90  Interestingly, Pacheco blamed John Nichols, rather than Andres 
Martinez and the other Hispanics who withdrew their support, for loss of the 
water.  “Through his ignorance [Nichols] did the valley an injustice by sacrifi cing 
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that amount of water that could have been used forever in the future… and that’s 
something you lose culturally and historically and it will never come back.”91
 Perhaps because of his relative wealth, but more likely because of his 
relative youth, Pacheco was unable to maintain a coalition of water users in 
1971 with the same strength as the coalition Andres Martinez previously formed.  
Martinez and the other elder mayordomos who defected symbolized Hispanic 
tradition melded to American agrarian ideals.  Ultimately, this symbol proved too 
powerful for younger Hispanic farmers to overcome.
 In 1971 one year out of college,  Eluid Martinez joined the offi ce of the 
State Engineer as the fi rst Hispanic engineer in the history of that offi ce.  In 
conjunction with the stream adjudication suits, he began learning to conduct 
the hydrographic studies that the suits required.  While he did not witness the 
confrontations between Bloom and Nichols, Eluid Martinez did attend meetings 
of local water users as part of his duties to explain the stream adjudication 
suits.  He perceived that the attention, but not the controversy, had shifted to the 
adjudication suits.  At his fi rst such meeting at a local elementary school, he was 
told not to enter the room unless he spoke Spanish.  He did not perceive this as 
an attempt on the part of the Hispanics to keep Anglos away, but rather a concern 
that any explanations of the adjudications be given in Spanish, since many of the 
older participants did not speak English.92
Yet Eluid Martinez acknowledged that at the time of the controversy 
there was an increased animosity in Taos valley against “outsiders,” primarily the 
Hippies, who had fl ocked to the area in what Rodriguez terms “The Great Hippie 
Invasion.”93  As Rodriguez points out, this infl ux of thousands of people into Taos 
between 1968 and 1971 also placed increased pressures on the valley’s resources 
since the Hippies, although seeking the “same romantic utopia their bohemian 
predecessors had sought,” also came with dreams of “going back to the land.”94
According to Rodriguez, Hippies were:
able to buy up parcels of irrigated land rather cheaply from Hispanos, 
who needed the cash and had little inkling of the transformation about to 
occur.… within another decade the average price of an irrigated acre had 
increased by as much as forty times.95
Signifi cantly though, Eluid Martinez did not perceive that there “was 
much controversy” in Taos at the time over the matter of the stream adjudications 
themselves.  “Most of the surveys were completed and brought to closure fairly 
quickly in terms of water right offers that were signed and accepted… except for 
those lands that had been offered no water rights because of non-use.”96  Here 
again the water and land use patterns of Hispanics in northern New Mexico 
came into play and worked against them under New Mexico law.  According 
to Eluid Martinez, “in the  traditional way of managing acequias in northern 
New Mexico, the land owners would consider that their water rights would be 
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protected as long as they paid their ditch dues and ditch assessments.”97  Because 
so many Hispanics left northern New Mexico in the decades following World 
War II, primarily for economic reasons and in a continuing pattern of out-
migration similar to that described by Deutsch above, their lands went fallow 
and unirrigated although they continued to pay their ditch dues.  When the 
hydrographic surveys picked up lands as being non-irrigated, the lands were 
deemed to be without water rights.  However, by the time of Indian Camp Dam, 
New Mexico’s water rights forfeiture laws had been amended to allow for 
notice by the State Engineer and a four-year opportunity for the user to cure the 
non-use and place the lands back under irrigation.  While this change in the law 
rectifi ed the situation somewhat, it could not ultimately alleviate the problem 
many absentee Hispanic landowners confronted: how to put their lands back into 
production from afar.  Similarly, many older Hispanics who stayed on their lands 
were unable to irrigate them without the assistance from younger family members 
who no longer lived nearby.
 Upon the death of State Engineer Steve Reynolds, who had held that 
offi ce for thirty-fi ve years and become one of the most powerful men in the state’s 
history, Eluid Martinez stepped into the position in November 1990.  He went on 
to serve as Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation under President Clinton.   
With the perspective he gained throughout those years of state and federal water 
administration, Eluid Martinez now believes that opponents of Indian Camp 
Dam “might have made a mistake, in terms of water supply.”  Because of the still 
unresolved Winters claims of the Indians, “[holders of] the existing irrigated lands 
that would have been supplemented by the San Juan-Chama replacement waters 
are today fi ghting for their very existence in the adjudication that’s taking place.… 
In hindsight, if that project would have been constructed, in my opinion it would 
have provided the water supply necessary to address all these concerns.”98
Yet despite this opinion Eluid Martinez, like Bloom, also conceded that as an 
irrigation project Indian Camp “even if proposed today, would probably not be 
economically feasible,” primarily due to the obstacles of the land tenure system.99
 According to Eluid Martinez, the Bureau of Reclamation was accustomed 
to building projects for farms of 160-960 acres.  Moreover, Indian Camp Dam 
was not a project that Reclamation could build, as it usually did, from the ground 
up on lands to be newly irrigated, at least not primarily.  The project was hobbled 
by ineffective attempts, from all sides, to make it fi t into an existing and foreign 
irrigation framework.  “It was something new to them,” Eluid Martinez said, 
referring to the existing acequia irrigation system in Taos and the Bureau of 
Reclamation. 100  But this “foreign-ness” was not one-sided.  The complicated 
history of Indian Camp Dam illustrates profoundly the collisions that can occur at 
cultural intersections, where indeed, in hindsight, it can be said of the actions of 
almost all the resisting participants, “it was something new to them.”
 Other researchers tend to rely on Nichols’s nonfi ctional accounts of the 
Indian Camp Dam controversy as the basis for their fi ndings that Indian Camp 
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Dam and the related SJCDP projects exemplify “top down planning,” and they 
conclude this reveals that “Hispanic participation, at least at the grass roots level, 
was not effective.”101  These interpretations overlook or downplay the importance 
of the Hispanic water users’ very active and effective participation in obtaining 
the allocation of the SJCDP water.  In Water and Poverty in the Southwest, Brown 
and Ingram outline the complex problems facing rural Hispanics in northern New 
Mexico and examine Hispanics’ attitudes about water rights and their preferences 
for water use and economic alternatives.  But ultimately, and ironically, Brown 
and Ingram see the “lack of water storage as a continuing problem,”102 and they 
end up recommending some of the same changes that were proposed by the 
Bureau of Reclamation for the  Indian Camp Dam project, namely a change in 
cropping patterns, land pooling (in the form of cooperative grazing programs), 
reservoirs (“water storage capacity”), and permanent diversion structures.103 In 
Acequia Culture: Water, Land, and Community in the Southwest, Rivera extols 
traditional acequia culture and examines the stream adjudication suits, but he fails 
to place the suits in the context of the Hispanics’ fi ght for SJCDP, in fact he never 
mentions SJCDP.  By consistently stressing the acequias’ “traditional” culture, 
he misses the opportunity to view acequia users as dynamic agents of change 
themselves.
 Sylvia Rodriguez argues that in Taos the “ongoing process of 
expropriation [of Hispanic land and water bases] and the recent acceleration 
[of this process] has… intensifi ed Hispano resistance to further usurpation and 
displacement…”104  These resistant reactions represent, she says, “strategies of 
ethnic boundary maintenance.”105  Rodriguez believes that whereas specifi c ethnic 
cultural content can change more or less continuously, “boundary maintenance 
through time is the essential feature of ethnic persistence.”106
 While I agree with Rodriguez that boundary maintenance through time 
is an essential, if not the essential feature of ethnic persistence, I believe that 
the entire history of Indian Camp Dam controversy reveals that the boundaries 
themselves are not constant or predictable.  In northern New Mexico, I see a kind 
of ever-changing shoreline where ethnic boundaries shift with the tides of certain 
events.  Cultures selectively borrow from one another, in complex processes of 
cooperation, negotiation, accommodation, assimilation, and acceptance, even 
amidst processes of resistance and rejection.
 Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Indian Camp Dam history is the 
extent to which it exposes not only obvious inter-ethnic strategies for boundary 
maintenance and accompanying tensions and confl icts, but also the intra-ethnic 
contradictions and confl icts, such as those between Anglos John Nichols and 
Paul Bloom and between Hispanics Andres Martinez and Rudy Pacheco.  The 
controversy blurred ethnic boundaries even as it revealed and defi ned them.107
Beneath these blurred boundaries lies the deep irony that everyone involved—
from the politicians, to the Bureau of Reclamation, to Anglos John Nichols and 
Paul Bloom, to Hispanics Andres Martinez and Rudy Pacheco—everyone claimed 
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to be fi ghting to save, each in his own way, the dying Hispanic agro-pastoral 
lifestyle in Taos.
 We all struggle to defi ne ourselves in the world and to give our lives, 
our stories, meaning and emotional satisfaction.  In telling our stories and our 
histories we too often resist or omit the confusion of untidy ambiguities, even 
though experientially we fi nd them commonplace.  In an attempt to order and 
explain the past, too often we simplify it.  I would argue that our histories should 
be layered, multifaceted, and multi-voiced.  They need complexity, perhaps even 
confusion and cacophony.  They should embrace rather than shun the untidy 
ambiguities.
 The more we learn of Indian Camp Dam “from the ground up,” these 
“parts before the whole,” the more we grasp the incredible inclination of these 
events to remain untidy and raveled.  Yet we also recognize the incredible 
obligation we have to respect the right of these events to be properly represented, 
especially when the past, raveled though it may be, can give us not only 
meaningful insights into how we interact and negotiate with one another for the 
use of our natural resources, but also give us informed ways to choose our own 
local futures.
Marilyn J. Koch is an independent scholar who lives in Bernalillo, New Mexico.
A version of this paper was presented at the annual conference of the American 
Society of Environmental Historians in April 1999.  Ms. Koch is grateful for 
the comments, suggestions, and advice from Dr. Donald Pisani following that 
presentation, all of which have informed and benefi tted this essay.  She is also 
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Hydropolitics in the Far Southwest: Carl Hayden, 
Arizona, and the Fight for the Central Arizona 
Project
By:
Jack L. August, Jr.
 According to former U.S. Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt, we are 
now approaching the last phase of a productive century of federally sponsored 
reclamation in the American West.  With the development of a few remaining 
authorized dams and delivery systems, the era of the construction of the great 
reclamation projects will come to an end.  A major contributor to the process 
of water resource development in the American West was longtime senator 
 Carl Hayden of Arizona (1877-1972).  A native of Arizona’s Salt River Valley, 
Hayden, in his earliest years, experienced the often-cruel vicissitudes of fl ood and 
drought in the arid Southwest.  He saw Arizona grow from a raw territory of a few 
thousand hardy pioneers to a desert oasis of millions.  Central to his efforts in the 
service of his Arizona constituents was the development and use of the Colorado 
River, the controversial interstate stream that serves the needs of the seven 
basin states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Nevada, California, and 
Arizona).  And, while he devoted his public career to the residents of his state, the 
man who became known as the “Silent Senator” had an impact and signifi cance 
far beyond the borders of the Grand Canyon state.1
 The most striking feature of Hayden’s political career was its longevity.  
He spent sixty-seven of his ninety-four years of life in public offi ce.  Between 
1900 and 1912 he learned the art of politics by serving in a variety of local 
and county offi ces; Tempe town councilman, Maricopa County treasurer; and 
Maricopa County sheriff.  When statehood was achieved in the latter year, voters 
elected their native son to the House of Representatives, kept him there for seven 
terms, and in 1926 promoted him to the U.S. Senate where he remained until his 
retirement in 1969.  During his fi fty-seven years in the federal government, he 
served with ten presidents, beginning with William Howard Taft and ending with 
Lyndon Baines Johnson. 
 As Secretary Babbitt, a former Arizona governor, and other elected 
offi cials from the Grand Canyon State quickly learned upon the outset of their 
government service, Hayden’s lengthy tenure in offi ce benefi ted Arizona in a 
multitude of ways, and to catalogue his accomplishments would require volumes.  
In 1912, when he fi rst stepped into the House of Representatives, Arizona was one 
of the most sparsely settled states in the union.  When he retired from the Senate 
in 1969, Hayden returned to one of the fastest growing states in the country.  
Today, dams and reservoirs, thousands of acres of reclaimed farmland, power-
transmission lines, highways that helped create Arizona’s important tourist trade, 
a healthy commercial and industrial economy, Indian and veterans’ hospitals, and 
aircraft and military bases stand as testaments to the public career of Carl Hayden.
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 Fellow lawmakers who spent time with and around Hayden commented 
on his kindness, humility, and modesty.  Indeed, in what became a biennial ritual 
for senate newcomers, Hayden evinced amazement among newly elected senators 
for never sitting in the front row of the Democratic side of the Senate, as he was 
entitled.  Instead, he maintained the seat he took in March 1927, on the aisle, 
one row removed from the back. Another well-known Hayden quality that cut 
against the grain of conventional political wisdom was the Arizonan’s propensity 
for silence.  Especially in the Senate, a political body notable for its oratory, 
Hayden stood out as the soul of brevity.  His remarks in the Congressional Record 
consumed less space, perhaps, than any other senator in recent history.  Yet, as any 
careful observer of western politics knows, the absence of Hayden verbiage gave 
no hint of his power, knowledge, or effectiveness.  Upon his fi ftieth anniversary 
in Congress, the New York Times declared, “few individuals in the history of 
Congress have done so much with so little talk.”  Furthermore, when Hayden 
chose to appear before a committee with a project or a request, most members 
were certain it was justifi able.  If Hayden wanted something, it needed little 
persuasion or rhetorical advancement.  In a great political incongruity, Hayden 
fashioned silence into a form of legislative power.2
 At the same time, Senator Hayden, arguably, was one of the most powerful 
senators in U.S. history.  As Marc Reisner suggested in his critical volume, 
Cadillac Desert: The American West and its Disappearing Water, “Senator Carl 
Hayden of Arizona [was] the most powerful man in legislative government” in 
the 1960s.  Besides emerging as a ranking member of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee in the late 1920s and early 1930s and chairing this powerful 
committee from 1954 to 1969, he served as president pro tempore of the Senate 
and was third in line for the presidency.  Although he held vast political power, 
one of the Arizonan’s most useful attributes, according to President Johnson, was 
the high degree of affection in which his colleagues held him.  Moreover, Hayden 
chose most often to use his infl uence behind the doors of committee rooms or in 
persuasive conversations in the cloakrooms of Congress.  At the same time he 
did his homework with consummate care until he knew, as one of his Republican 
senate colleagues recalled, “the front, back, and middle of everything.”  Perhaps 
fellow Arizona senator Barry Goldwater said it best shortly after his return to the 
Senate after his run for the presidency: “Let me put it this simple way, whenever 
my service in the Senate is terminated I hope that my service to my country and 
my state equals a small fraction of what Carl Hayden has provided in both areas.”3
 While Hayden developed a renowned legislative expertise in the area of 
federal reclamation, he could also boast of several other areas of profi ciency that 
added to the growth and development as well as the conservation and preservation 
of the American West.  Hayden, for example, was one of the great leaders in 
federal highway legislation, coauthoring the New Deal measure, the Hayden-
Cartwright Act of 1934, which established the formula for distribution of federal 
aid for highways to the states on the basis of area rather than population.  This 
legislation helped tremendously in providing transportation links between the 
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West’s far fl ung cities.  Hayden introduced and supported measures that advanced 
mining operations throughout the country.  His efforts provided for fair prices, 
protection against unfair imports, and subsidies for strategic metals. 
 Notably, he was the sponsor, in 1919 of the Nineteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution, extending the right of suffrage, and he sponsored and managed 
the House bill to establish Grand Canyon National Park.  He worked for social 
security legislation and in 1950 fostered an amendment to that law that allowed 
American Indians to be included within its framework.  Other broad areas of 
federal legislation attracted his attention: forest conservation, national parks, 
labor, public lands, agriculture, and veterans’ affairs, to name a few. 
 Water, however, and its use and distribution, more than any other issue, 
lay at the heart of Hayden’s public career.  He became most famous as a statesman 
who helped bring water and life to a vast region of the country.  Unquestionably, 
the fortunes of his Arizona pioneer family were tied to water, or more specifi cally, 
to its diversion onto land.  As a local politician he lobbied for one of the fi rst, and 
most successful, federal reclamation projects, the  Salt River Project.  During his 
fi rst term in the House he further displayed his understanding of the importance 
of water to his home state by obtaining authorization of an engineering study that 
led to the construction of Coolidge Dam on the Gila River and the San Carlos 
Reclamation Project.  He also helped shape federal reclamation policy in its early 
years by writing and securing passage of the provision that allows local water-
user associations throughout the country to take over the care, maintenance, and 
operation of federal reclamation projects.  In nearly six decades in Congress, 
reclamation issues occupied more of his attention than any other legislative 
subject, and Colorado River development took up a signifi cant portion of that 
time.
 On February 14, 1962, the fi ftieth anniversary of statehood, Hayden, in 
an exceedingly rare instance of public self-evaluation, commented on his most 
important contribution to Arizona—bringing federal reclamation to the Grand 
Canyon State.  “The basic factor in making Arizona’s spectacular agricultural 
and industrial development was the Reclamation Act of 1902 sponsored by that 
great and energetic president, Theodore Roosevelt,” he told the Arizona Republic.
That law made possible the use of federal funds to develop water for irrigation 
and hydroelectric power, both of which were essential to the state’s prosperity.  
“Needless to say,” Hayden added, “I have helped that basic program move 
forward.”  The then-eighty-four year-old senator concluded his comments, not 
dwelling on the past but rather by urging Arizonans to look toward their future.  
“I hope to see the day when central Arizona and other important areas of the state 
have the water required to continue the pattern of growth and progress attained in 
the fi rst half-century,” he challenged his constituents.
 Hayden alluded to Arizona’s decades-old obsession, the  Central Arizona 
Project (CAP), which today channels Arizona’s hard-won share of Colorado 
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River water to the central portions of the state, including the rapidly growing 
metropolitan areas of Phoenix and Tucson.  The recently completed project not 
only will shape the nature of federal reclamation in the American Southwest in 
the twenty-fi rst century, but also will impact the delicate desert environment in 
countless ways.  Today Arizonans take for granted CAP, yet know little of its 
historical and legislative origins, many of which reach deep into the early history 
of the far Southwest.  Indeed, Hayden, who had tried unsuccessfully to fashion 
some sort of central Arizona diversion project since the 1920s, persisted in his 
efforts through years of jousting with California and the other basin states and 
won his fi nal and most gratifying legislative battle between 1963 and 1968 when 
CAP was authorized through passage of the  Colorado River Basin Project Act.  
Signifi cantly, this last, successful phase of the process began in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, where it took nearly eleven years to resolve a host of complex issues 
surrounding the use and distribution of Colorado River system water.4
 At 1:30 P.M. on August 13, 1952, Senator  Carl Hayden welcomed a small 
group of somber-faced Arizonans to his offi ce on Capitol Hill.  After a brief 
exchange of pleasantries he stuck a battered white straw hat on his bald head, 
strode to the door and beckoned, “Come on boys, let’s get this done.”  Together 
the group walked to the U.S. Supreme Court building.  Among them was 
J. H. “Hub” Moeur, chief counsel for the Arizona Interstate Stream Commission 
(AISC), who fi led a bill of complaint against California, asking for a judicial 
apportionment of the waters of the lower Colorado River basin.  After witnessing 
the fi ling the seventy-four-year-old senator issued a short statement to the 
press.  “I believe this action,” he told those gathered on the steps of the Supreme 
Court, “will make possible the settlement of a most serious controversy which is 
delaying the development of the Colorado River basin.”  “If the Californians are 
sincere in their oft-repeated demands for court action,” he added, “then they will 
welcome the opportunity to present their side of the case.”  With that, Arizona 
launched the monumental Arizona v. California Supreme Court case.5
 As several students of the case have noted, it was one of the most complex 
and fi ercely contested in the history of the Court.  Before its completion, 
340 witnesses and fi fty lawyers had produced 25,000 pages of testimony before 
a special master.  The case took nearly eleven years and cost nearly $5 million.  
And, when a sharply divided Court announced its opinion on June 3, 1963, 
followed by the decree on March 9, 1964, the river possessed a greatly modifi ed 
legal framework governing its apportionment and use among the lower basin 
states.6
 Arizona’s contentions had changed little since the late teens and early 
twenties, when the basin states focused their attentions on Colorado River 
development.  She asserted that California had made contracts for delivery of over 
5.3 million acre feet of water annually in spite of laws limiting it to 
4.4 million acre feet.  The limitation notwithstanding, Arizona’s attorneys argued 
that California had constructed reclamation works capable of diverting 8 million 
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acre feet of water annually thereby posing a threat to Arizona and other basin 
states.  According to Arizona’s attorneys, for the state to sustain its existing 
economy it required 3.8 million acre feet of Colorado system water per year.  
Furthermore Arizona relied on and asserted its rights to water under a variety 
of federal and state actions including the Colorado River Compact; the Boulder 
Canyon Project Act, the California Limitation Act of 1929, and, additionally, the 
state had entered into a water delivery contract with the federal government.7
 California registered no objection to Arizona’s motion.  Her substantial 
team of attorneys, led by the brilliant and indefatigable  Northcutt “Mike” Ely, 
agreed with the U.S. Solicitor General, who advised the Supreme Court that 
the federal government had an interest in the case and would move to intervene 
if  Arizona’s motions were granted.  On January 19, 1953, the Court granted 
Arizona’s original motion and the bill of complaint was fi led.  Hayden hoped for 
prompt action because he knew that no further progress could be made on CAP, or 
any other lower-basin project, until the Court reached its decision.8
 On May 20, 1953, California responded to Arizona’s bill of complaint.  
In nearly 500 pages of narrative and supporting documentation, California’s 
attorneys contended that it had a right to the benefi cial and consumptive use of 
5,362,000 acre feet of Colorado River system water per year under the terms of 
the Boulder Canyon Project Act and her contracts with the Secretary of Interior.  
Moreover, she claimed prior appropriative rights to the use of that amount of 
water and that these rights were senior to Arizona’s and therefore superior.  
Finally, California argued that Arizona, by failing to ratify the Colorado River 
Compact within the specifi ed six months when the other six states had done so in 
1923, as well as her subsequent attempts to have the agreement declared invalid 
and the Boulder Canyon Act declared unconstitutional, precluded her right from 
interpreting this statute.9
 For the next four years California conducted a campaign of judicial delay.  
A blizzard of motions and fi lings delayed the start of proceedings, while the 
number and complexity of issues raised prompted the Court to appoint a special 
master to hear arguments.  On January 1, 1954, George I. Haight assumed the 
position.  After ruling on several preliminary motions, Haight died suddenly 
before formal hearings began.  Judge  Simon Rifkind, a sharp-witted federal jurist 
from the southern district of New York, replaced him.  Finally, on January 14, 
1956, hearings on Arizona v. California began.10
 In the meantime, Hayden, on September 14, 1955, and nearing the end 
of his fi fth term in the Senate, announced at a Phoenix Press Club forum that he 
intended to seek reelection in 1956.  The election, however, posed new challenges 
for the seventy-eight-year-old senior solon.  Besides the election taking place 
against the backdrop of the Supreme Court case, Arizona, during the 1950s, was 
undergoing an unprecedented spurt of population growth, industrial development, 
and overall economic expansion.  Indeed Arizona boomed during the post-war 
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years, attracting people, industry, and capital.  Much of this new money fi nanced 
urban and agricultural expansion in the state’s heartland embracing fast growing 
Phoenix and Tucson.  Moreover, the distinctive technological, commercial, and 
urban dimension of this growth brought forth heightened expectations from an 
increasingly affl uent electorate.  Longtime politicians like Hayden took careful 
notice when the youthful conservative Republican upstart,  Barry Goldwater, won 
a stunning upset victory over the well-entrenched Democratic incumbent Ernest 
McFarland in the race for the U.S. Senate in 1952.  The conservative victory not 
only shattered the Democratic party’s domination of state politics-which dated 
from the territorial period-but also signaled the onset of a new era of conservative 
hegemony in Arizona.  Furthermore, Arizonans old and new expected the 
economic boom to continue and the key to sustaining this growth was the 
continued expansion of water supplies and affordable power.11
 By the mid-1950’s, however, the rivers of Arizona were fully developed 
and irrigators had turned increasingly to groundwater supplies.  In their efforts 
to keep pace with the boom, they pumped with such intensity that water tables 
dropped and aquifers were exhausted.  Thus the stakes were high in 1956, with 
Arizona v. California and the apparent pressing need for expanded water and 
power supplies.  Much like his election campaigns for the U.S. Senate in 1926, 
 Hayden’s efforts at reelection in 1956 centered on water resource development 
generally, and the use and distribution of waters of the Colorado River system 
specifi cally.12
 Hayden’s 1956 election campaign was noteworthy for other reasons as 
well.  His advancing age, questions about his health, and rumors of incipient 
senility emerged during the course of the primary campaign and carried over in 
the general election.  His Democratic primary opponent, Robert “Doc” Miller, a 
forty-eight-year-old Phoenix-area druggist, suggested that “youth must be served 
and age must be retired,” adding that Hayden, at age seventy-nine and with 
fi fty-two years on the public payroll was desperately seeking another six years 
in offi ce.  To these charges, Hayden and his staff responded to the anticipated 
criticism with resolve and innovation.  Hayden’s administrative aide, Roy Elson, 
assessed the claims: “A lot of people, particularly as he got older and his hearing 
got bad, thought he was senile. There was nothing senile about Carl Hayden. 
You’d think he was up there asleep, and then he’d ask the most penetrating 
questions.  He’d cut all the shit out and get to the heart of the matter.  He was 
superb at doing that.  I mean people would marvel.”l3
 After careful deliberation, Hayden agreed to make his fi rst television fi lm 
for use in a political campaign.  His appearance on “Personalities in Government” 
featured the veteran senator’s views of various presidents and congressional 
leaders with whom he had served during his forty-four years in Congress.  The 
show, and subsequent radio and television appearances, not only helped Hayden 
dispel rumors about his poor health and failing mental abilities, but also raised 
public awareness of his considerable accomplishments.  Moreover, during the 
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course of the campaign Hayden convinced voters that McCarthy-era Vice-
President Richard Nixon’s charges that he was a dangerous left-leaning ideologue 
out of touch with modern American values were ridiculous and unfounded.  
Additionally, the new technology reached the growing numbers of new Arizona 
voters who were made aware that Hayden, in December 1955, had advanced to 
head the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee thereby giving the Grand 
Canyon State unprecedented infl uence in federal affairs.14
 Hayden’s infl uence and stature in Congress were emphasized in the 
1956 campaign as well as in his fi nal campaign for the U.S. Senate in 1962.  An 
especially fl attering portrayal by former U.S. Senator and Assistant Secretary of 
State William Benton, published in the New York Times Magazine on July 24, 
1955, was adapted and utilized by Hayden campaign strategists in a variety of 
ways.  Benton sought to praise the unsung or unappreciated heroes on Capitol 
Hill who rarely received “a stick of news type for their pains.”  Chief among 
them were those senators and representatives who were committee specialists.
They mastered the detailed and complex problems of legislation, worked long 
hours in solitary study, and attended faithfully often-tedious committee sessions 
that lay behind the construction of appropriation bills, tax measures, and major 
substantive legislation in all fi elds.  This was the non-glamorous drudgery, 
which was the heart of effective work in Congress and without injustice to 
anyone, Benton, ventured, Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona was the person who 
symbolized those in Congress who had “performed magnifi cent services for years 
on end while remaining virtually unknown to the general public.”l5
 Benton continued that, although Hayden spoke seldom and never with a 
tinge of rhetoric or passion, his infl uence within the Senate was enormous.  He 
marveled also that his advice was sought and heeded by members of both parties 
and was trusted by everyone.  Indeed Hayden’s handlers used this and other 
laudatory pieces to full advantage, effectively countering political attacks from 
the right and questions about Hayden’s age and mental acuity.  On election night, 
November 6, 1956, Hayden, as usual, won every county in the state, defeating his 
Republican opponent, Ross F. Jones, 170,816 to 107,447.16
 The central issue of  Hayden’s fi nal election campaign-the election of 
1962-remained CAP and the Colorado River.  Despite the senator’s age, state 
leaders convinced him to run for a seventh term.  A Phoenix Gazette editorial 
of September 21, 1962, put Hayden’s reelection in perspective for its readers: 
“The U.S. Supreme Court’s impending decision on a master’s report favorable 
to Arizona in the Colorado River controversy puts CAP just around the corner.  
Every ounce of California’s political clout will be brought into play.  It will take a 
unique combination of power to beat the project’s enemies.  Such a combination 
rests in the hands of Carl Hayden.”  On the same day, the Arizona Republic
elaborated upon these themes: “Arizona’s congressional delegation is vastly 
outnumbered by California which wants the Colorado River for itself.  Only 
the parliamentary skill of Senator Hayden supported by the universal esteem 
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in which he is held in Congress will secure passage of CAP.… Senator Hayden 
stands above party politics. He should be reelected by overwhelming non-partisan 
support.… Senator Hayden deserves the vote of every citizen who wants Arizona 
to prosper.”  Clearly, Arizonans saw their hopes tied to Hayden and his seniority 
in the Senate.17
 In spite of his distinguished record, his acknowledged leadership in 
Arizona’s water struggle, and support from newspaper editors throughout the 
state—including conservative publishing mogul Eugene Pulliam—Hayden 
faced several serious challenges in his 1962 campaign for reelection.  His bright, 
aggressive, thirty-two-year-old assistant Roy Elson, who managed the campaign, 
acknowledged that the Arizona electorate had grown and changed since 1956, 
adding that “there must have been a fi fty percent increase in voting population” 
during the six-year period.  Moreover, Hayden’s aide later recalled that in 1962 
“forty percent of the people in Arizona didn’t even know who Carl Hayden 
was because he didn’t put out press releases.”  Elson, described by Capitol 
Hill colleagues and newspapermen as Hayden’s “Rasputin or Machiavelli,” 
knew that most of these newcomers had never heard of Hayden and still others 
questioned the wisdom of voting for an eighty-four-year-old man.  Moreover, 
in the fall of 1961 his wife of fi fty-three years, Nan, passed away, leaving many 
wondering whether the elderly senator would not have the strength, emotionally 
or physically, to conduct his public responsibilities effectively.  Meanwhile, 
the Republican Party continued its unremitting growth in the state, building a 
powerful and well-fi nanced organization.  Indeed, Hayden’s staff knew the senator 
was politically vulnerable in 1962.18
 Elson took decisive action in early 1961, preparing a fi fteen-page 
confi dential memorandum for Hayden that detailed the diffi culty ahead if the 
senator chose to run for reelection.  As the administrative aide put it, “I wrote 
to the senator on what we had to do if he was going to win, because this whole 
change in the demographics of the population.… We couldn’t rely anymore on his 
old organization, we had to do more press, get things into the can, do television 
spots.”  Throughout the year Elson, who for the fi rst time in Hayden’s electoral 
career hired a press secretary, executed a well-organized and effective campaign 
strategy.19
 He convinced the new Democratic administration to visit Arizona to 
honor Carl Hayden.  Indeed, one of the highlights of the campaign occurred on 
November 17, 1961, when President John Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon 
Johnson attended a $100-per-plate fundraising dinner in Phoenix.  Billed as a 
bipartisan tribute to the aging senator, it garnered intensive media coverage.  
Newspaper, radio, and television reporters competed aggressively for the best 
photo or an interview with visiting political luminaries.  President Kennedy told 
the dinner audience at the Hotel Westward Ho, “Every federal program which 
has contributed to the development of the West, irrigation, power, reclamation, 
bears his mark.  And the great federal highway program which binds this country 
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together, which permits this state to be competitive east and west, north and south, 
this in large measure is his creation.  In one well-orchestrated stroke of political 
handiwork, Elson had accomplished his goal of reintroducing and redefi ning 
Senator Hayden, under the most favorable of circumstances, to a rapidly growing 
electorate.20
 In addition to the November gala, during the fall of that year the Hayden 
campaign traveled throughout Arizona shooting newsreel footage of the senator at 
Glen Canyon Dam and at various military bases—fi lm that proved crucial to the 
success of the campaign.21
 Beginning in early 1962, however, Hayden experienced a series of 
nagging bouts with fl u, and infections which threatened to derail the reelection 
effort.  First the senator contracted a stubborn fl u, and then a urinary tract 
infection struck.  Elson recalled that Hayden convalesced in his apartment at the 
Methodist building across from the capital, and “for a long time we had some 
people sitting in our offi ce, some John Birchers, demanding to see the senator.”  
As a result of these pesky ailments, during the fall of 1962 rumor spread that the 
senator had actually died; prompting a somewhat feeble Hayden to assert publicly 
that news of his death was simply not true.22
 It was during this critical period that Elson’s earlier campaign strategy 
came into play.  The newsreel footage shot the previous year, along with help 
from local television station executives willing to air the footage, aided the 
faltering campaign.  Also on the Saturday before the 1962 general election, Elson 
orchestrated a media event that put to rest rumors surrounding Hayden’s mortality. 
Vice-President Lyndon Johnson and Senator Richard Russell of Georgia arrived 
at Bethesda Naval Hospital—where Hayden spent the fi nal thirteen days of 
the campaign—to brief the ailing senator on the Cuban Missile Crisis.  While 
photographers shot pictures, Hayden got out of his bed and three veteran 
Democrats held a press conference.  The newsmen quickly drafted stories that 
although Hayden was not well, he was nevertheless alive and alert.23
 On the night of the election, Hayden, still at Bethesda, asked Elson 
what he thought was going to happen.  The senator expressed concern that the 
Republicans nominated the mercurial and oddly charismatic Glendale car dealer 
and prominent conservative, Evan Mecham, to run against him.  Elson told his 
mentor that although the future governor of Arizona had run a vigorous campaign, 
“I think you’re going to win by twenty-six or twenty-seven thousand votes.”
Elson’s prediction was on the mark as Hayden won the election by a count of 
199,217 to 163,388—a small margin for him.  Then that night, before the polls 
closed, Hayden phoned all his key campaign workers in Arizona and personally 
thanked them for their help.  Many were in tears over the emotional victory as 
Hayden had been elected for an unprecedented seventh term to the U.S. Senate.24
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 Senator Hayden took little time to celebrate as he quickly refocused 
his energies on the Supreme Court decision in  Arizona v. California.  When 
the opinion was fi nally announced on June 3, 1963, Hayden considered it a 
tremendous victory for Arizona while local newspapers considered it “a personal 
triumph for Carl Hayden.”  The Court, Hayden was pleased to note, centered 
its opinion on the Boulder Canyon Project Act rather than the Colorado River 
Compact.  Moreover Congress, the justices reasoned, in passing the legislation 
“intended to and did create its own comprehensive scheme for… apportionment.”  
In addition Congress had authorized the Secretary of Interior to utilize his contract 
power to implement a lower-basin agreement.  Importantly for Arizona, each state 
retained exclusive rights to its tributaries, which meant exclusive rights to the 
Gila.  Concerning mainstream apportionment, the Court gave Arizona what it and 
Hayden had argued for since the 1922 negotiations over the compact: “4,400,000 
acre feet to California, 2,800,000 acre feet to Arizona, and 300,000 to Nevada.”  
“That formula,” wrote Ben Cole of the Arizona Republic’s Washington Bureau, 
was “a personal triumph for Carl Hayden because the decision referred back 
twenty-fi ve years to the December 12, 1928, debate in which Hayden pointed out 
that the Boulder Canyon bill and its allocation formula settled the dispute over 
lower basin waters.”  After reading the ninety-fi ve pages of opinion and dissent, 
Hayden informed newsman Cole, 
naturally I am pleased that the Supreme Court has in general followed 
the Special Master’s recommendations with reference to the division of 
the waters of the Colorado River.  This is especially gratifying because it 
makes possible at last for us to put our rightful share of our waters to use 
in the Colorado River Basin.25
 Underlying the decision favorable to Arizona was a deeply divided 
Supreme Court. The fi ve justices upholding the recommendation of Special 
Master Simon Rifkind were Hugo Black, author of the opinion, Byron R. White, 
Arthur J. Goldberg, Tom C. Clark, and William Brennan, Jr., Justice William 0. 
Douglas wrote a tart dissent, and Justice John Harlan drafted a separate dissent 
which had the concurrence of Justice Potter Stewart.  Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
who was governor of California at the time the suit was fi led, did not participate 
in the decision.  Douglas, whose dissent was extremely sharp, wrote in part: 
Much is written these days about judicial lawmaking, and every 
scholar knows that judges who construe statutes must of necessity 
legislate interstitially… the present case is different.  It will, I think, be 
marked as the baldest attempt by judges in modern times to spin their 
own philosophy into the fabric of law in derogation to the will of the 
legislature.  The present decision, as Mr. Justice Harlan shows, grants 
the federal bureaucracy a power and command over water rights in the 
seventeen western states that it has never had, that it always wanted, that 
it could never persuade Congress to grant, and that this court up to now 
has consistently refused to recognize.26
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 Understandably, Californians reacted with anger and apprehension to the 
decision.  They charged the Court with misreading the intent of Congress, eroding 
the rights of the states, and argued that the ruling represented the fi rst time that the 
Court had interpreted an act of Congress as apportioning water rights to interstate 
streams.  Previously, rights had been determined only by interstate compact or 
by the Supreme Court itself.  Thus this untoward judicial innovation threatened 
California, and  Hayden and his senate staff quickly concluded that Golden State 
leaders would try to regain in the political arena what they had lost in the judicial 
decision.  Elson described the situation on the heels of the ruling, “We knew 
that California and Northcutt Ely would try some way to stop this through the 
legislative process, even though they had lost… What they couldn’t accomplish in 
court they would try to do in the fi eld of politics.”27
 Other aspects of the decision refl ected a departure from previous judicial 
renderings.  The Secretary of the Interior would allocate future surpluses and 
shortages among and within states.  The later feature marked, as one expert on 
the Colorado has written, “an especially sharp break with tradition.”  Moreover, 
the Court ruled that Congress could invoke the navigation clause of the U.S. 
Constitution as well as the “general welfare” clause to divide the waters of 
non-navigable and navigable streams.  This dimension of the ruling, as Justice 
Douglas wrote in his scathing dissent, increased drastically federal control over 
the nation’s rivers.  For Hayden and Arizona, nevertheless, the ruling appeared to 
clear the way for legislative action on CAP.28
 Besides the positive implications for CAP,  Arizona v. California proved 
a victory for American Indians as well.  As noted earlier, when Arizona fi led 
suit in 1952, the federal government intervened not only to protect its interests 
on the river, but also to defend the rights of the Native Americans living on the 
twenty-fi ve reservations within the lower basin.  U.S. attorneys petitioned for 
adequate water for all irrigable lands on Indian reservations as well as national 
parks, forests, recreation areas, and other federal lands.  In their decision the 
justices ruled in favor of the government although limiting their decision to fi ve 
reservations abutting the mainstream of the river—Fort Mohave, Chemehuevi, 
Cocopah, Yuma, and Colorado River.  Basing its reasoning on  Winters v. United 
States (1908) the Court held that the fi ve reservations were limited not just to 
their land but their rights also extended to water.  The justices concluded that 
“It is impossible to believe that when Congress created the… Colorado Indian 
Reservation and the Executive Department of this Nation created the other 
reservations they were unaware that most of the lands were desert… and that 
water from the river would be essential to the life of the Indian people.”29
 Especially noteworthy was the fact that in determining the amount of 
water the Indians were to receive, the Court adopted the government’s position.  
Thus the Indians were awarded water based upon irrigable acreage.  And in a 
supplemental decree, the Court added that the Indians were not restricted in 
the uses to which they could put their water.  As one scholar wryly observed, 
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“Reason, rather than agriculture, seemed to emerge as the ultimate test.”  
Although he agreed in principle with the Court’s ruling pertaining to the affected 
tribes, Hayden expressed concern that Indian uses were to be charged against the 
state in which the reservation was located.  Arizona, where most of the Indian 
land under the ruling was located, therefore, bore the majority of the burden of 
this “Indian water.”  Moreover, the justices ruled that these rights dated from 
the establishment of the reservation and were superior to later non-Indian rights, 
including those rights based on uses initiated before the Indians had begun 
diverting water from the Colorado or its tributaries.  The Court thus reaffi rmed 
Winters asserting that American Indian rights existed whether or not they were 
actually using the water and continued unimpaired even if they should cease their 
uses.  Some of the lands along the lower reaches of the Colorado had been set 
aside as early as 1865 and none later than 1917.  Clearly, Arizona v. California
left the tribes in a much stronger legal position than they previously maintained.30
 Upon the announcement of the Supreme Court decision Hayden phoned 
Don Smith, a reporter for U.S. News and World Report, to issue a rare public 
statement. “The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on the division of Colorado 
River water,” he told Smith, “is the most signifi cant federal action in history 
affecting the state of  Arizona.  This adjudication must now be followed by the 
construction of the long-awaited  CAP.”  During his recent reelection effort, 
Hayden made authorization of CAP the centerpiece of his campaign, promising 
to work for the project’s prompt authorization after the Supreme Court’s decision.  
Toward this end, the aging dean of the Senate sought and won a seat on the Senate 
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee as a very “junior” member.  In addition to 
this parliamentary positioning, Hayden, in April 1963, prepared and sent a draft 
bill and strategy memo to the Arizona delegation in order to foster unity in the 
state’s approach to Congress.  He wrote: “I feel that our bill should be as simple 
as possible, and as similar as practicable to the bill considered by Congress in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s and twice passed by the Senate.”  And on June 4, 1963, 
one day after the Court’s ruling, Arizona senators Hayden and Goldwater and the 
three House members of Arizona’s delegation introduced legislation 
(S. 1658; H.R. 6796, H.R. 6797, and H.R. 6798) to authorize CAP, one of the 
largest water project proposals ever to come before Congress.31
 Hayden’s bill authorized a diversion of 1.2 million acre feet of water 
annually out of the Colorado River to provide supplemental irrigation and 
municipal water to central and southern Arizona.  To do this, it provided for the 
construction of fi ve dams and reservoirs, two power plants, and transmission and 
distribution facilities on the Colorado and its tributaries in Arizona and western 
New Mexico.  A key feature of this fi rst bill was a 740-foot-high-dam at Bridge 
Canyon on the Colorado River at the headwaters of Lake Mead.  If built,  Bridge 
Canyon Dam promised to be the highest dam in the western hemisphere.  The 
Bridge Canyon power plant would have an installed capacity of 1.5 million 
kilowatts, and one-third of its capacity would be transmitted south to pump water 
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over a canal and aqueduct system from the existing Parker Dam on the Colorado 
219 miles to the Phoenix area and 341 miles to Tucson.32
 Shortly before introduction of S. 1658, the Bureau of Reclamation 
completed a supplemental feasibility report on CAP in January 1962.  It estimated 
that CAP would provide additional water to irrigate 880,000 acres of land in 
Arizona and would provide 303,000 acre feet of municipal and industrial use 
water for 1.1 million people, primarily in the Phoenix-Tucson areas.  In the 
fi fteen-year period that elapsed between the two bureau reports on CAP, Arizona’s 
population had grown from 700,000 to approximately 1.4 million, and lands under 
irrigation in central Arizona from 566,000 to about 1 million acres.  In addition, 
U.S. Geological Survey data indicated that Arizona had “mined its groundwater 
basins in the state at an alarming rate.  According to the survey, the groundwater 
level was dropping at a rate of ten feet per year in the Phoenix area and twenty 
feet per year in Pinal County, south of Phoenix.  In some areas wells were going 
dry or saline water was seeping into them, making them unusable, and the ground 
was subsiding from over-pumping.  C. A. Pugh, area engineer for the Bureau of 
Reclamation at Phoenix, estimated that the overdraft of groundwater basins in the 
state totaled 2.2 million acre feet annually.  The net delivery of water from CAP 
would amount to only 1,070,000 per year, so it could not possibly replenish more 
than half the water defi cit in the state at that rate of use.  If these statistics were 
accurate, Hayden reasoned that Arizona appeared to be heading into a water crisis 
that could be only partly addressed by CAP.33
 Hayden knew well that in spite of Arizona’s obvious need for additional 
water, Congress historically delayed fi nal action on reclamation projects until 
leaders and all sections of the state and region were unifi ed or had arrived at a 
general consensus.  Thus looking for the broad support necessary for his bill 
he made known past support for several big packages of upper-basin projects 
including the  Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956, which led to the 
construction of Glen Canyon Dam.  He also played a prominent role in backing 
numerous individual state proposals such as New Mexico’s San Juan-Chama 
Project, which passed Congress in 1962.  In light of these and other previous 
efforts in support of regional water resource development, Senator Hayden 
believed he deserved the same kind of consideration for CAP within his state 
and throughout the region.  Beyond these arguments, the extent of Arizona’s 
legislative effort for CAP was commensurate with the perceptions within the state 
of the benefi ts to be gained from the proposed project.  This was based partly on 
the felt need for additional water in some parts of Arizona, but in large part, the 
belief in CAP was, as political scientist Helen Ingram aptly put it, “emotional and 
symbolic.”34
 Yet between 1960 and 1963 the anticipation of a Supreme Court decision 
favorable to Arizona prompted federal administrators and representatives in the 
basin states to begin formulating a regional plan acceptable to the entire basin—
not just Arizona.  In January 1962, for example, Secretary of the Interior Stewart 
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Udall, an Arizonan and former congressman, encouraged Congressman Wayne 
Aspinall (D -Colorado), Chairman of the infl uential House Interior and Insular 
affairs committee, to request the Interior Department to conduct a comprehensive 
study on water development in the Colorado River in preparation for the expected 
pressure for authorization of individual state projects—including CAP—as soon 
as the decision in Arizona v. California was handed down.35
 Indeed several studies were already underway and in November 1962 
Aspinall asked Udall for an outline of the Interior Department’s plans for a 
regional approach to water development in the basin.  In an effort to practice 
“constructive water statesmanship,” Secretary Udall, and his undersecretary 
James Carr of California, adopted this regional approach and by January 1963 
he revealed a huge $8 billion plan which included projects in fi ve western 
states.  In announcing his regional program—the Pacifi c Southwest Water Plan
(PSWP)—Udall hoped to “erase the outmoded concept limited by state lines, 
and concentrate on meeting the total water needs of a region.”  In addition to this 
lofty goal, he also sought to reconcile diverse interests and several multiple use 
water projects into one harmonious and comprehensive plan.  In August 1963, 
after Hayden had introduced his CAP bill, the PSWP was sent to the seven basin 
states and to fi ve federal departments for review and comment.  No state with 
water entitlements below Lee’s Ferry was left out of the scheme and seven of 
the proposed seventeen projects benefi ted Arizona, California, Nevada, New 
Mexico, and Utah.  PSWP, moreover, sought to unify the interests of Arizona and 
southern California, with several programs aimed at easing California’s concern 
over mainstream withdrawals by CAP.  Water transfer from northern to southern 
California, water salvage projects, and several new reclamation programs were 
included in the plan to mitigate other California concerns.  Beyond this, Udall 
tried to exploit common interests in PSWP by proposing two huge hydroelectric 
dams,  Bridge Canyon and  Marble Canyon, to be located near the Grand Canyon 
National Park.  Revenues derived from these cash register dams would underwrite 
the cost of the entire plan, and guarantee the future growth and development of 
the Southwest.36
 To Hayden PSWP and the comparatively simple CAP bill were competing 
legislative initiatives, and the senator and Arizona’s political leadership were 
particularly incensed with the Kennedy administration in general and Secretary 
Udall in particular.  During 1963 and 1964, in several exchanges of letters and 
memos between Hayden’s offi ce and Interior, an agitated Hayden let it be known 
in vivid and uncompromising language that he considered the overdrawn PSWP a 
method for delaying consideration of CAP that played into the hands of California 
and upper basin opponents of CAP, particularly Colorado.  Then-governor of 
Arizona Paul Fannin added that he considered PSWP “a plot against Arizona 
born in California and formalized in the Interior Department by California’s 
undersecretary.”  Fannin advocated the Senator’s approach: “We must and will 
go it alone with the CAP as proposed by Hayden in S. 1658.”  In numerous 
correspondences through the next two years, Udall suggested to Hayden and other 
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state leaders that the CAP fi t into his broader regional program.  To one of these 
missives, dated December 19, 1963, in which Udall alerted the senator that he 
could not fi le a favorable report on a separate CAP bill, Hayden shot back, 
24.1.  August 1963 Pacifi c Southwest Water Plan Report cover.
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I vigorously protest your failure to keep your commitment to me and 
to other offi cials of this state.  I insist that language be included in the 
PSWP which will be a clear endorsement of the CAP as embodied in 
S. 1658 and/or as a separate fi rst segment in any regional program. 
According to Elson, “it irritated the hell out of Carl Hayden because there was 
nothing incompatible with a simple CAP to any regional plan.”37
 Several CAP supporters offered other, more politically-sinister 
explanations, for the legislative standoff in 1963-1964.  Although not discussed 
openly, several Capitol Hill insiders suspected that an understanding had been 
struck with President John F. Kennedy and Secretary Udall.  As Hayden aide 
Elson described the unwritten agreement: “Let’s not rock the boat with anything 
that’s going to cause a big problem with California, particularly southern 
California, at least until after the 1964 elections.”  The Yuma Daily Sun of June 
16, 1963, seconded Elson’s musings concerning the politics of PSWP.  “There 
is also the task of getting the approval of the Kennedy administration.  Which 
will be ardently courting California’s 40 electoral votes in 1964, an election 
year.”  California was now the largest state in the nation; it counted thirty-seven 
more electoral votes than increasingly Republican Arizona and was doubtlessly 
a prize in the 1964 presidential sweepstakes.  Many CAP proponents realized 
that Kennedy, as leader of the entire nation—and a practical and politically savvy 
person as well—would not simply brush aside the arguments of Democratic 
Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown or the forty-member congressional delegation. 
Whether valid or not, the notion that Kennedy did not want Udall appearing to 
take sides with his state of Arizona and its small electoral vote as opposed to 
California and its substantial electoral vote was a topic of discussion during the 
early phase of CAP’s legislative journey.38
 Not surprisingly,  Stewart Udall took a great deal of editorial abuse within 
Arizona over his “federalized regional project” that “placed all water and power 
of the Colorado under control of his department.”  One highly charged and 
exaggerated editorial in the Arizona Republic of August 18, 1963, asked “Udall, 
Where Are You?” suggesting that the grandiose plan (PSWP) meant that he 
had written off Arizona for his political future and that he had come under the 
infl uence of the California water lobby headed by Undersecretary of the Interior 
James Carr. Younger brother and Arizona congressman  Morris Udall was the 
focus of similar harsh and unfair criticism.  Observers questioned whether he 
supported CAP or the “empire-building plan” unveiled by his brother.  As the 
infl uential Arizona Republic editorialized, 
Voters know where Stewart Udall stands-he’s against the Central Arizona 
Project.… Will Morris Udall align himself with the rest of the Arizona 
delegation, which unanimously supports the project?  Or, will he, in 
deference to his brother, sit on the sidelines and refuse to help Arizona?39
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 To an unsympathetic Hayden, Secretary Udall confi ded that “he had taken 
his daily horsewhipping from the Phoenix newspapers,” but he resented what he 
termed a personal attack by Senator Goldwater and the unwarranted attacks on his 
younger brother by powerful publisher Eugene Pulliam.  He explained: 
From this point on I intend to give Goldwater and Pulliam blow for blow 
if that is what they want.  I may be 1000% wrong but on the basis of my 
knowledge of the art of the possible in the House and my conversations 
with Chairman Aspinall and others, it has been my best judgment that 
some kind of regional approach will be absolutely essential if a Central 
Arizona Project is to pass in the House.
Furthermore, the Secretary told Hayden,
Governor Fannin and the Arizona water people have made a grievous 
mistake in failing to have any consultation whatsoever with the members 
of the House concerning basic strategy.  The Pulliam-Goldwater tactics 
of attempting to bludgeon my brother and Representative [George] 
Senner (D-Arizona) into line with their strategy is outrageous and 
indefensible.
 Clearly, the administration’s preference for a regional approach to 
Colorado River development in the form of PSWP posed unforeseen challenges to 
Hayden and his staff.  In spite of the uncharacteristically harsh rhetoric between 
the two distinguished Arizonans and among state interests, Hayden agreed with 
Udall’s notion that “It is largely up to the two of us to hold the whole thing 
together.”  As a result of the need to make progress on CAP both camps made a 
frosty pledge to confer at any time on strategy matters.40
 Nevertheless, as Arizona’s quest for CAP shifted to Congress, and as 
several proposals and counterproposals made their way through the maze of 
subcommittee and committee hearings, Hayden knew that his accumulated power 
and infl uence in the Senate bode well for the legislation.  In 1966, moreover, an 
Arizona “Task Force” arrived in Washington to lend support to the legislative 
effort, drawing staff and expertise from the state’s water establishment: Arizona 
Interstate Stream Commission, Arizona Public Service, the Central Arizona 
Project Association, and the Salt River Project.  Additionally, Hayden chaired the 
Senate Appropriations Committee, and he could, if he wanted, hold up every other 
water project in the country.41
 As usual he appeared before a variety of congressional committees adding 
to his already considerable record of testimony in behalf of the project.  Typical 
of his statements between 1963 and 1968 was his testimony in support of his 
bill, S. 1658, before the Senate Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of 
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on August 27, 1963.  “Arizona’s 
efforts to obtain her full share of Colorado River water have been frustrated by 
the deliberate delaying tactics of California,” he told the subcommittee, and “after 
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fi fteen years of separate consideration by Congress, the effort is being made to 
absorb the simple and readily understood Central Arizona Project into one of the 
most controversial, complex, and confusing water resource development plans 
ever presented to Congress.”  Hayden told this and other groups of legislators 
in subsequent testimony that he believed in a regional concept of water resource 
development, that he could support any features of a regional plan which were 
sound, but that he was opposed to anything that would complicate and delay 
authorization of CAP.  The senator expressed serious concern for Secretary 
Udall’s PSWP because if the plan was never constructed, the benefi ts to California 
would be greater than if the plan were constructed.  Hayden posited that in the 
end it would be cheaper for California to use Arizona’s water than it would be to 
participate in any comprehensive plan.42
 The Arizona senator did not want the urgently needed and completely 
feasible CAP to be stalled because of controversy over a master plan.  Nor did 
he want other worthy projects, like Utah’s Dixie Project or California’s Auburn-
Folsom South Project, hindered because they would have to be included in the 
collection of separate projects, which Secretary Udall called PSWP.  Hayden 
correctly predicted that senators and representatives would hear testimony that 
there would be insuffi cient water in the Colorado River to sustain CAP.  In 
anticipating these arguments he pointed to previous statements by Commissioner 
of the Bureau of Reclamation Floyd Dominy, who stated that despite rumors to 
the contrary “there is certainly enough water in the river for the CAP of 
1.2 million acre feet” under the Arizona v. California ruling. 
 Hayden also criticized the portion of the PSWP proposal to import 
1.2 million acre feet of water from northern California to southern California at a 
cost of billions of dollars while ignoring an equal amount of water that could be 
developed at a minimum cost through adequate conservation practices within the 
area.  “This committee,” he inveighed, “is being requested to provide funds for 
the import of water from northern California at a great cost to protect the right of 
southern California to waste water.”
 What especially irked Hayden about PSWP or other “regional” initiatives 
that emerged over the four-and-one-half years of legislative wrangling in 
what became the  Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, was the obvious 
efforts of certain interests within California to delay CAP or nullify Arizona v. 
California.  Later he recalled that “it appeared a lifetime of labor was approaching 
fruition.”  The Court decision, combined with solemn assurances of California’s 
former governor Earl Warren who in 1948 told Hayden, “whenever it is fi nally 
determined that water belongs to Arizona, it should be permitted to use that water 
in any manner or by any method considered best by Arizona,” seemed to clear 
the way for authorization of CAP.  Moreover, shortly after the opinion, Governor 
Edmund G. “Pat” Brown announced that California, having lost the Supreme 
Court case, would not try to accomplish by obstructionism what she had failed 
to accomplish by litigation.  As Hayden stated on August 4, 1963, and reiterated 
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on several occasions thereafter: “For forty years I have witnessed the thwarting 
of Arizona’s effort to put to use its share of Colorado River water. At every turn 
Arizona has encountered the deliberate delaying tactics of California and there 
is every reason to believe that his plan of obstructionism will continue.”  To his 
dismay, he found that “a small group of Californians, notwithstanding previous 
commitments, continued to nullify, by delay, the Supreme Court’s decision.”  
Although California employed the politics of delay throughout the process of 
legislative consideration of the bill, Hayden fi rmly believed that the concept of 
equity would prevail in the end.  Indeed, California had its water, Nevada had its 
water, the upper basin was developing its water, and Arizona had nothing.  Thus 
as he told lawmakers at the outset of legislative consideration of CAP, “I think all 
of you know that I have always attempted to help in any way possible with every 
project of our western resources—even when I was being fought on my own 
project—but quite frankly my patience has been exhausted.”43
 In spite of California’s continued opposition, Hayden had powerful 
allies in the Senate.  His close and respected friend, Senator  Henry Jackson 
(D-Washington), chaired the Senate Interior Committee.  Jackson, whose state 
owed much of its post-war prosperity to Hayden-supported federal reclamation 
programs, monitored carefully natural resource development and federal 
reclamation.  Moreover, Jackson’s valued relationship with Senator Hayden 
and fi rm alliance with President Kennedy served Arizona well throughout 
CAP’S various journeys through the Senate between 1963 and 1968.  During 
the course of arriving at a measure suitable to all contending and confl icting 
interests, however, California and the upper basin looked to the Northwest and 
the Columbia River system to import and augment Colorado River water supplies 
in an effort to avoid water shortages made worse by CAP.  At one point during 
the process, several senators and congressmen contemplated the importation 
of 8 million acre feet of water per year from the Columbia River Basin and 
even as far north as Canada.  Naturally, Jackson saw fi t to protect the interests 
of his region and took actions to eliminate transbasin transfers of water during 
fi nal consideration of the CAP bill.  In its fi nal form the legislation contained a 
provision that provided for a ten-year ban on interbasin feasibility studies.44
 Hayden also counted on support from Senator  Clinton Anderson (D-New 
Mexico) who served as chairman of the Power and Reclamation Subcommittee of 
the Interior Committee.  Anderson held considerable stature in the Senate as well 
as with groups concerned with water resource development and, besides, he had a 
stake in the bill as it pertained to protecting and extending water entitlements for 
his state.  Moreover, his especially close relationship with Senator Jackson made 
Anderson an important ally in the CAP fi ght.  Indeed, throughout his last term in 
offi ce, Hayden relied on these two powerful senators to counter the opposition 
arguments of California’s two senators, Thomas Kuchel (R-California), the 
ranking Republican member of the Senate Interior Committee, and Claire Engle 
(R-California), who helped engineer the 1951 defeat of CAP in the House of 
Representatives.45
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 Thankful for the support he maintained in the Senate, Hayden and his 
staff nevertheless knew the real fi ght for passage remained in the House of 
Representatives.  Between 1963 and 1968 Arizona, fortunately, had capable 
and bipartisan representation in the House.  John Rhodes, a Republican, was 
a respected and infl uential leader among House Republicans who served on 
the House appropriations subcommittee which would ultimately provide 
money to build the project.  George Senner, a northern Arizona Democrat from 
Arizona’s then-newly created third district, was untested and soon lost his seat 
to the inimitable Sam Steiger of Prescott, a Republican.  And Morris Udall, a 
member of the key Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, maintained special 
responsibilities over the bill.  Importantly for Arizona, her three-man team in the 
House worked well together during the fi nal four and one-half year legislative 
history of the bill.
 Although Arizona’s House delegation introduced CAP bills identical to 
Hayden’s the day after the Supreme Court’s decision, passage was another issue.  
Indeed nine out of ten bills introduced and referred to committee never saw a 
fl oor vote.  The power of congressional committees in the House, moreover, 
could not be overstated and of special importance were the committee chairmen.
Bills opposed by the chairman rarely emerged from committee for a fl oor vote.  
The chairman controlled the schedule of hearings on legislation, and undecided 
members often followed the chairman’s lead.  Since the principal obstacle to 
passage of  CAP was in the House, the House Interior Committee-and its Irrigation 
and Reclamation Subcommittee where the CAP bill was referred-held vital 
importance for CAP proponents.46
 For Hayden this meant CAP passing through the gauntlet of the House 
Interior Committee, chaired by  Wayne N. Aspinall.  According to most observers 
of Colorado River Basin affairs, Aspinall, the former schoolteacher with a testy 
disposition who had climbed from a small western Colorado town to chairman of 
this all-important committee, distrusted expansionist California and felt similarly 
about Arizona.  In fact, the river ran under the window of his home on Aspinall 
Drive in Palisade, Colorado, and he sought to conserve every acre foot of water 
before the lower basin states would take it and never give it back.  Mo Udall 
considered the sixty-seven-year-old chairman who had served in Congress since 
1948 “a superb legislative tactician.”  Of utmost concern to Aspinall was the 
obvious fact that although entitled to 2.8 million acre feet of water, Arizona’s use 
of this amount through CAP might cut sharply into water destined for upper-basin 
use but not yet developed.  During one crucial phase of CAP’s consideration in 
the House Interior Committee in 1967, Hayden, in an uncharacteristic display 
of power, threatened to eliminate funding for construction of the Frying Pan-
Arkansas Project in Colorado and allowed that he would hold up other projects 
important to the House Interior chairman if Aspinall did not move the bill 
forward.  Therefore, as Hayden knew from the outset of legislative consideration 
of his bill, if CAP was going to get past Aspinall and his committee, Colorado 
must be satisfi ed.47
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 In addition to Aspinall,  John Saylor of Pennsylvania, ranking Republican 
on the House Interior Committee, continued to frustrate Arizona as he had in the 
1950s.  Described by one colleague as a “dynamic, hard- hitting protagonist,” 
who had earned respect in the House, Saylor was an ardent conservationist who 
supported the growth and expansion of the National Park system and advocated 
programs for outdoor recreation.  Saylor, moreover, backed a strong wilderness 
bill, the “integrity of the national parks,” and complained vigorously about the 
Bridge Canyon Dam provision of CAP because it threatened to back water into 
Grand Canyon National Park.  While not opposed to sound reclamation projects 
he opposed increasing public power development and spotty fi nancing and poor 
planning in “marginal reclamation projects.”  He voted against the upper Colorado 
project in 1956 thereby gaining recognition and support among environmentalists 
for his efforts.48
 Indeed in 1966 and 1967 environmentalists’ opposition to the construction 
of dams in and around Grand Canyon brought nationwide attention to CAP 
and threatened to derail the entire project.  Environmentalists waged a spirited 
campaign against the dams reminiscent of the great battle over Echo Park.  By 
1966 virtually everyone involved in the legislation—through hearings, meetings, 
and “confi dential” parlays—knew that the river was over-allocated and most 
wanted to see augmentation from the Northwest, so they generally favored the 
Grand Canyon dams.  As expressed in his fi rst Supreme Court CAP bill, Hayden 
still advocated construction of  Bridge Canyon Dam, as he had since 1947, and 
indicated that he also supported  Marble Gorge Dam if indeed revenues were 
needed to fi nance augmentation and other development.  Yet the previously 
fragmented environmentalist movement, representing diverse interests and a 
wide array of organizations, brought signifi cant pressure to bear on Congress and 
the Johnson administration.  They contended that the dams would fl ood scenic 
areas and inundate portions of Grand Canyon National Park and Grand Canyon 
National Monument.  A few groups, including the Sierra Club, the National Parks 
Association, and the Arboretum, saw a great deal to lose with the inclusion of 
hydroelectric power dams in the bill.
 The California-based  Sierra Club, with a national membership of about 
40,000 at the time of the battle, was the most prominent and well organized 
of the anti-dam environmental groups.  Led by its energetic and controversial 
director, David Brower, the Sierra Club spearheaded a broadly gauged effort to 
fi ght construction of dams in the vicinity of the Grand Canyon.  An impressive 
letter writing campaign and an effective public-relations program, underscored 
by the strong emotional and symbolic appeal of “saving” the Grand Canyon from 
profi t-mongering developers, accomplished much for their cause.  Brower wrote 
President Johnson, Secretary Udall, and other members of the administration 
directly, protesting the dams.  Soon Johnson administration offi cials, members 
of congress, and Arizona’s leaders began receiving thousands of letters daily 
from individuals and groups as diverse as the social science faculty at Dartmouth 
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College in Hanover, New Hampshire, to fi rst grade public school classes in 
Sandusky, Ohio.49
 In the course of the advocacy campaign, a series of highly publicized well-
attended addresses brought further attention to the issue.  In Denver, for example, 
Brower, speaking before an anti-Grand Canyon dams audience, quipped that he 
did not oppose dams in the Grand Canyon as long as the Bureau of Reclamation 
built a comparable canyon somewhere else.  As one chronicler put it, “Never 
before had conservationists challenged the collective will of seven states.”50
 By early 1966 the public was suitably convinced that the most 
controversial aspect of the legislation involved the two proposed dams. And in 
the spring of that year, after Reader’s Digest, Life, and even My Weekly Reader
ran stories attacking the Grand Canyon dams,  Hayden realized they posed 
insurmountable political obstacles.  By early 1967 Hayden, as he met with 
senate leaders in efforts to further revise CAP, knew that an alternative source of 
energy would be required to pump CAP water to central Arizona.  In a July 1967 
memorandum to President Johnson advising him that the Senate Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs had overwhelmingly recommended passage of 
S. 1004, the CAP bill-for the fourth time-he added that this legislation contained 
“no new Colorado River dams.”  As Elson interpreted the outcome of the anti-
dam fi ght: “Most people in the East and other places were for CAP, but they were 
against the dams because they had been informed by Brower and his operatives 
that within the region there existed adequate amounts of alternative energy 
sources, notably low-grade coal.”  As a result Hayden and Arizona were forced 
to accept an alternative to hydroelectric power.  Yet, as historian Donald Worster 
explained in his analysis of this environmentalist victory, they lost something as 
well.  In exchange for Grand Canyon dams, energy required for CAP was derived 
instead from coal strip-mined on Hopi lands at Black Mesa and burned in the 
 Navajo Generating Station near Page “polluting crystalline desert air with ash and 
poison gas.”  As one Reclamation offi cial explained the paradox, “it didn’t solve a 
damn thing except it gave us power to pump water to central Arizona.”51
 If acquiescing on the dam issue, incorporating aspects of Secretary Udall’s 
regional plan, and jousting with Congressman Aspinall’s upper basin demands in 
the House proved diffi cult but tolerable, Hayden had great diffi culty with another 
necessary compromise.  From the start of congressional negotiations California’s 
senators made it clear that its central demand for dropping opposition to CAP 
would be a fi rst priority of 4.4 million acre feet awarded it in the  CAP legislative 
battle, Roy Elson recalled: “For California...it all became an argument about what 
to do about the shortages in the river… we got into these early diffi culties mainly 
over that issue.”  Hayden knew immediately the implications of the demand; 
California wanted Arizona to regulate their mainstream diversions so that 
California would never receive less than 4.4 million acre feet out of the 
7.5 million acre feet lower-basin allocation.  At fi rst an intransigent Hayden 
refused to negotiate the issue with California senator Kuchel.  By 1965, however, 
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as time seemed to get shorter and the issue more complex, the bill in the Eighty-
eighth and Eighty-ninth congresses carried provisions for twenty-fi ve-and twenty-
seven- year guarantees for California’s 4.4 priority.  In the fi nal version of the bill, 
however, Arizona promised California that CAP diversions “shall be so limited as 
to assure the availability” of 4.4 million acre feet annually in perpetuity.52
 As Hayden neared the last year of his fi nal term in offi ce and CAP 
remained stalled in the House Interior Committee in spite of the numerous 
concessions already made, a frustrated and impatient state leadership triggered 
another minor complication for the senator.  Rumor of an Arizona “Go-It-Alone” 
CAP, promoted by the state conservatives and elements within the Arizona Power 
Authority (APA) fi rst surfaced in 1963.  A prominent feature of the state-fi nanced 
and operated plan included the successful application of the Arizona Power 
Authority to the Federal Power Commission to fi nance, construct, and manage a 
hydroelectric power dam on the Colorado River.  Hayden quickly thwarted this 
untimely effort by shepherding through Congress a bill (S. 502) that preserved 
the jurisdiction of Congress over the construction of hydroelectric power works 
below Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River.  With the passage of S. 502 on 
June 23, 1964, those Arizonans calling for a state-owned and operated CAP were 
effectively prohibited from taking action though they lobbied the senator and 
threatened continuously to take action as late as 1967.  While the state “Go-It-
Alone” plan refl ected the lack of consensus within Arizona over CAP strategy, it 
was more accurately an illustration of the high degree of frustration over repeated 
legislative delays in the CAP bi1l.53
 By the end of 1967, after seemingly endless negotiations among and 
within states, implementing selected provisions from over thirty Department 
of Interior studies and discarding others, crafting suitable and appropriate legal 
language, and including the time-honored pork barrel benefi ts for those politicians 
who needed to “bring home the bacon,”  CAP was fi nally ready to move.  Key 
in breaking the political logjam in California was newly-elected Republican 
governor Ronald Reagan, who began direct and productive negotiations 
with Arizona’s Republican governor Jack Williams.  Reagan informed his 
administrators that he had “become increasingly concerned over the serious 
impasse… relative to the Colorado River legislation and with the adverse impact 
this stalemate is having on other programs in California and on reclamation 
throughout the West.”  Another crucial element in prompting fi nal action was 
Hayden’s pressure on House Interior chairman Aspinall, who in the fall returned 
from a “vacation” in Colorado and was virtually forced to hold fi nal hearings 
on the bill and report it out of committee.  The legislation, depending on one’s 
perspective, was either light enough or heavy enough to move.  During the spring 
of 1968, as Hayden and his staff participated in fashioning the fi nal compromises 
and details in conference committee, most of the key players who participated in 
creating the measure that emerged from Congress—even opponents of CAP like 
California’s Thomas Kuchel—could not disguise their profound pleasure that 
Senator Hayden came away from the momentous struggle with one last political 
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victory.  On September 12, 1968, when the Senate agreed to the House version 
of the  Colorado River Basin Project Act, the ninety year-old Hayden received 
glowing tributes for his persistent efforts.  The senator quietly acknowledged the 
accolades with nods of appreciation.  On September 30, 1968, President Johnson, 
at a ceremony attended by Senator Hayden and other Arizona dignitaries, signed 
CAP into law.54
 Besides CAP, the legislation included authorization of several other 
controversial reclamation projects as well, including Hooker Dam in New 
Mexico, an aqueduct from Lake Mead to Las Vegas, the  Dixie Project in Utah, 
and the Uintah Unit of the  Central Utah Project.  The Act also authorized the 
 San Miguel,  Dallas Creek,  West Divide,  Dolores, and  Animas La-Plata projects 
in Aspinall’s state of Colorado.  Additionally, it authorized the establishment of 
a Lower Colorado River Development Fund to build a still-yet-to-be-defi ned 
augmentation project.  Finally, the bill made delivery of Mexico’s 1.5 million acre 
feet of water a national, not regional, responsibility.  This legislation, signed into 
law two days before Hayden’s ninety-fi rst birthday, was—at the time—the most 
expensive single congressional authorization in history, containing $1.3 billion for 
implementation of the program.55
 On May 6, 1968, shortly before the fi nal touches were being completed 
on CAP, Hayden was led into the Appropriations Committee chamber jammed 
with senators, friends from Arizona, and a few representatives from the media.  
President Johnson arrived bearing a pair of walnut bookends and issued a short, 
grandiloquent tribute.  Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, Hayden’s best friend 
24.2.  President Lyndon Baines Johnson hands the pen with which he signed the 
Colorado River Basin Projects Act on September 30, 1968, to Senator Carl Hayden.
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in the Senate, then chaired a brief ceremony and introduced Hayden.  The Arizona 
senator walked slowly to the dais and announced, 
Among other things that fi fty-six years in Congress have taught me 
is that contemporary events need contemporary men. Time actually 
makes specialists of us all.  When a house is built there is a moment 
for the foundation, another for the roof, the walls, and so on.  Arizona’s 
foundation includes fast highways, adequate electric power, and 
abundant water, and these foundations have been laid.  It is time for a 
new building crew to report, so I have decided to retire from offi ce at the 
close of my term this year.
  Then, as cameras clicked, Hayden burst into tears, as did nearly everyone else in 
the crowded room.  With the typically brief announcement, Hayden signaled the 
end of his congressional service.56
 Most accounts of the political and legal history of CAP dutifully 
acknowledge Hayden’s preeminent role in bringing water to central Arizona.  Yet 
the veteran senator’s infl uence has been obscured by the length of the process, the 
legendary Arizona v California Supreme Court case, and the thousands of pages 
of mind-numbing technical and fi scal testimony in the Congressional Record.  
Hayden, more than any other CAP proponent, fashioned the legislative strategies 
that shaped CAP’s confi guration in the public mind.  His actions and statements 
before innumerable congressional committees not only provide an important 
perspective for assessing CAP’s broader economic, social, and environmental 
signifi cance, but also reveal Arizona’s profound role in fashioning solutions to 
vexing regional and national issues.  Indeed, the hundreds of miles of canals, 
pumping stations, and water-delivery systems that today wind their way through 
miles of desert stand as a testament, for better or worse, to Hayden’s towering 
public career.57
 The realization of Carl Hayden’s dream—the CAP—at the end of the 
twentieth century raises some fundamental questions.  Will the desert bloom in the 
twenty-fi rst century with renewed agricultural activity and urban expansion?  Or, 
is this water-based civilization in a fragile ecosystem doomed to fl ourish briefl y—
then disappear?  Will Las Vegas and southern California, both pressing against 
their environmental limits and desperately seeking a greater share of lower-basin 
water, succeed in forcing Arizona back to the federal bargaining table?  Certainly 
Hayden foresaw these questions and sensed their implications even as he fought 
mightily for the benefi cial implementation of federal reclamation in the arid West.
 Put another way, Hayden focused much of his considerable energy on 
the single, most important factor confronting his arid constituents—the search 
for large quantities of fresh water.  Throughout his congressional career he 
represented the “heart of the West,” which was to historian Walter Prescott Webb 
“a desert unqualifi ed and absolute… a gigantic fi re” that defi ed human settlement 
and economic development, yet vividly defi ned the region as a unique place on 
604
the American landscape.  From Hayden’s perspective, Arizona and the Southwest 
were defi cient in comparison with other parts of the country, and the most notable 
defi ciency was water.  Much of his public career, as exemplifi ed in the legislative 
fi ght for CAP, was devoted to rectifying that defi ciency. 
 Underlying the mad scramble for Colorado River water was the peculiarly 
western obsession with economic growth and development.  This almost myopic 
quest in the environmentally sensitive central Arizona desert has come under close 
scrutiny in recent years.  Scholars from a variety of disciplines have revisited the 
era of the western water wars and orgy of dam building, and have come away with 
profound questions regarding the long-term effects of environmental manipulation 
and the ultimate fate of the Colorado River, which one interpreter describes as “A 
River No More.”  As scholars and politicians reassess and revise their economic 
and environmental interpretations of federal reclamation, Carl Hayden will stand 
out as one public fi gure that in many ways symbolized this critical movement 
in the American West.  Without question water has been among the region’s 
most critical concerns in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. No doubt the 
environment will continue to infl uence the direction of public policy in the region 
in the twenty-fi rst century as well.58
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Federal Reclamation in the Twentieth Century:
A Centennial Retrospective
By:
Donald J. Pisani
Abstract
 The Reclamation Act of 1902 dedicated proceeds from the sale 
of public lands in the western half of the United States to the construction 
of irrigation works.  Proponents of the legislation promised on the fl oor of 
Congress, that “worthless” lives trapped in the tenements of eastern cities could 
be reclaimed along with “worthless” desert land in the West.  Congress required 
the farmers who benefi ted to repay the cost of irrigation works over ten years, 
so the program was expected to be self-supporting.  By the time Theodore 
Roosevelt left offi ce in 1909, two dozen projects had been launched, at least 
one in every state and territory, but none had been completed.  With notable 
exceptions, those projects did not live up to expectations.  Federal reclamation 
never became self-supporting, and some projects came to resemble rural slums.
Not until the 1930s, when the “High Dam Era” gave the bureau responsibilities 
for providing water and power to cities as well as farms, did it become the most 
important federal agency in the West.  From 1930 to 1970 the water and power 
provided by the bureau transformed the region, but since 1970 the bureau has 
been but a shadow of the robust agency that once dammed the West.
 This paper focuses mainly on two periods of bureau history, its fi rst 
decade and the quarter-century from the end of World War II to about 1970.  I 
make three basic arguments: fi rst, that in 1902 the Reclamation Bureau and its 
leaders were motivated more by nineteenth than by twentieth-century values; 
second, that the Reclamation Bureau did as much to decentralize power over 
water as to consolidate it in Washington; and, third, that federal reclamation died 
as much because it failed to sustain its original ideals as because it ran out of 
places to build dams, suffered from the constraints of economic retrenchment, or 
fell prey to the environmental movement.
 When Congress adopted the  Reclamation Act in June 1902 it launched 
potentially the biggest public works program in American history.  Harper’s 
Weekly proclaimed that 
the bill aims at substantial and enduring effects upon the broader 
economic development of the nation.  There was and still is in some 
quarters an ill-judged disposition to regard it as of merely sectional 
interest: but in the true analysis its signifi cance is national not local. … A 
hundred million [irrigated] acres will give homes for a million families, 
and afford sustenance for many times that number.
New York City’s Christian Work applauded the new national program as 
one of the stupendous tasks of the opening century.… The fi rst year of 
the Roosevelt administration has been rendered not more notable by the 
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determination to build the Isthmian Canal than by the passage of the bill 
to water the dry lands of the great American West.  
 Philadelphia’s Inquirer lamented that “the only ultimate regret will be 
that so benefi cent a work was not sooner undertaken,” and the New York Times
applauded the bold new legislation as the last phase in the conquest of a continent: 
The irrigation plan is but adding to the general resources of the nation 
in furtherance of the impulse which has carried our vigorous race from 
the little fringe along the Atlantic to the shores of the Pacifi c and far into 
Asian waters. 1
 To be sure, the opponents of the legislation quickly reined in the bureau’s 
grand ambitions.  Eastern and Midwestern farm organizations feared that the rapid 
expansion of irrigated land in the West would return the nation to the agricultural 
depression of the 1890s.  Inevitably, they argued, adding 100,000,000 acres to the 
nation’s farmland—an area roughly the size of California—would depress crop 
and land values.  Why not reclaim abandoned land in the East, they asked, land 
closer to the nation=s major cities?  Why should prospective farm families have 
to pay the cost of moving two or three thousand miles to deserts far removed 
from agricultural markets?  Farm organizations such as the National Grange 
found a strong ally in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which consistently 
opposed the national reclamation program.  And many easterners within Congress 
feared that even though the  Reclamation Act promised that reclamation would 
be paid for from sales of public land, and from reimbursement of the cost of the 
hydraulic works by the farmers who benefi ted, the day would come when the 
West demanded money from the general treasury, following the precedent of 
nineteenth century river and harbor bills.  Another concern was that the program 
would benefi t established farmers and private landowners in the West more 
than those who settled on “virgin land.”  Few large tracts of arable public land 
remained, even within the deserts of the West, so the bureau would have to make 
accommodations with private landowners.  In short, even in 1902 support for 
federal reclamation was thin and brittle.2
 The misconceptions of the bureau itself compounded the lack of 
widespread support for the new program.  At fi rst,  Reclamation Service engineers 
assumed that all desert land was fertile, given enough water.  So strong was 
this conviction that on many projects the soil was not tested until years after the 
project had opened.  Much of that soil—20 or 30 percent on some projects—had 
to be abandoned, at great cost to individual farmers as well as to the nation.  Then, 
too, Reclamation Service offi cials assumed that most desert land would require 
only one acre-foot of water a year—a supply of water suffi cient to cover the land 
irrigated a foot deep—while most land required three to fi ve times that amount.  
On many projects, farmers complained that the government could not deliver the 
water they needed.  Another misconception was that the appetite for land within 
government projects would remain strong for decades to come.  After all, the 
nation had absorbed over 400,000,000 acres of new farm land in the decades after 
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the Civil War as the Great Plains were opened to agriculture.  The Reclamation 
Service could not anticipate changes in technology, agriculture, and the sheer cost 
of  farming that would make virgin land far less attractive in the twentieth century 
than it had been in the nineteenth.  Nor could it foresee how the standard of living 
of those who lived in America=s large cities would increase.  Federal reclamation 
had been launched with the expectation that it would provide a subsistence to 
small farmers.  But by the 1920s, the new consumer economy had redefi ned the 
“good life” in the United States, and farm families began to emulate the living 
standards of urbanites.
 Let me begin by challenging the idea that, as part of the Progressive Era’s 
conservation movement, the Reclamation Act represented the ethics of “science,” 
or helped to create the “modern” American state.  These are important arguments, 
foundation blocks of the “organizational synthesis” popularized by historians 
such as Samuel Hays and Robert Wiebe in the 1960s, and an interpretation that 
still has considerable appeal to historians of the United States.  “The modern 
American conservation movement grew out of the fi rsthand experience of 
federal administrators and political leaders with problems of Western economic 
growth,” Hays wrote in Conservation and the Gospel of Effi ciency, “and more 
precisely with Western water development.”3  Like silviculture, hydrology was a 
new science that promised the rational, orderly use of natural resources.  It also 
promised to promote bureaucratic planning by experts and reorder a constellation 
of political institutions around the executive branch of government.
 Yet this interpretation fails to recognize the strong links between the 
 Reclamation Act and nineteenth century laws and values, particularly the 
Homestead Act (1862).  In 1800, Congress had permitted settlers and speculators 
to purchase public land on credit, with up to four years to pay.  That law proved 
to be a disaster.  Those who purchased the land quickly fell in arrears on their 
payments.  Congress granted many extensions before it excused their debt 
completely.  A century later, in the four years that preceded adoption of the 
Reclamation Act, most westerners favored using river and harbor appropriations, 
or proceeds from the sale of grazing permits or timber on the public lands, to pay 
for the construction of dams and canals.  Using proceeds from public lands, and 
requiring farmers to repay construction costs, was a compromise.  In a 1914 letter 
to Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, George H. Maxwell, the publicist 
most responsible for pushing the Reclamation Act through Congress, admitted: 
“We accepted… repayment from the land because it enabled us to get our bill 
through.  Those who understood political conditions never believed the money 
would be paid back.”  From the beginning, federal reclamation was regarded 
by many westerners as what we would today call an “entitlement program.”
Government farmers, and the many private landowners who owned land within 
government projects, resisted repaying their debt to the government long before 
the hard times of the 1920s and 1930s hit the West.4
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 Federal reclamation looked to the 
past in many other ways as well.  The 
most fateful early decision made by the 
 Reclamation Service was to launch too 
many projects too soon.  This typifi ed 
distributional politics:  no public works 
program could be launched that did not 
distribute benefi ts as widely as possible.  
The Reclamation Act required that 
51 percent of the proceeds of public land 
sales be spent within the state or territory 
in which that land had been sold.  Yet 
the Reclamation Act did not require that 
so many projects be launched so soon.
That was a political decision made by 
President Theodore Roosevelt.  Late 
in 1901 or early in 1902, Roosevelt 
warned against undertaking too many 
government projects at once: 
It would be unwise to begin by doing too much, for a great deal will 
doubtless be learned, both as to what can and what can not be safely 
attempted, by the early efforts, which must of necessity be partly 
experimental in character.  At the very beginning the Government should 
make clear, beyond [any] shadow of doubt, its intention to pursue this 
policy on lines of the broadest public interest.  No reservoir or canal 
should ever be built to satisfy selfi sh personal or local interests.5
Yet Roosevelt soon changed his mind.  When the Reclamation Act passed 
Congress in June, 1902, Democrats as well as Republicans took credit for the 
legislation.  Indeed, it was Francis G. Newlands, a maverick Congressman 
from Nevada but nominally a Democrat, who sponsored the bill in the House 
of Representatives.  The Republican Party was dominant in most parts of the 
West, but Roosevelt expected that Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma would 
soon join the union, and he wanted to maintain the West as a stronghold of his 
party.  Therefore, two weeks after passage of the Reclamation Act, TR advised 
the Secretary of the Interior that “instead of starting on a few large [model] 
enterprises, I should think it would be best to divide up the work among the 
different States as fairly [that is, widely] as possible.”  Smaller projects could be 
completed more rapidly, insuring that the benefi ts of federal reclamation would 
be felt before TR left the White House.  The greatest public works program 
undertaken in the history of the United States would be indelibly associated with 
Theodore Roosevelt and his party.6
 Perhaps the strongest link to the past was in the attitudes Reclamation 
Service offi cials exhibited toward the farmers they served.  The fi rst director 
of the Reclamation Service,  Frederick Haynes Newell, had never designed an 
25.1.  Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. 
Lane.
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irrigation system when he assumed that 
job.  The ethics of science and effi ciency 
did not dominate Newell’s thinking, 
and he regarded federal reclamation 
as an experiment in social Darwinism.
Some had to fail so that others could 
succeed.  Newell’s chief rival to head 
the reclamation program,  Elwood Mead, 
deeply believed in social planning, 
but Newell did not.  Few of the fi rst 
settlers on government projects lasted 
a decade, but Newell denied that 
the Reclamation Bureau had any 
responsibility for their failure and 
lack of success.  The fault lay with 
the settlers.  “The characteristics of 
present settlers are in many respects 
entirely different from those of the 
older pioneer communities,” he 
complained in 1912.  “[T]here is 
not the spirit of cooperation which 
ruled the early pioneers.”  In his 1916 
textbook on irrigation, written just after he left the Reclamation Service, Newell 
noted that more than 75 percent of the fi rst settlers on federal irrigation projects 
had fl ed the land within a few years of entry.  He concluded:
The irrigators as a body are not only inexperienced, but many of them 
are disappointed in that they have expected easier things.  Thus they do 
not always appreciate the efforts made in their behalf.  There has been 
attracted to the locality [the arid West] a considerable number of men 
who have never made a success elsewhere; these attribute their failure 
to make good under the new conditions not to their own inability, but 
largely to the faults of the country or system.… He is attracted usually 
by glowing accounts of the relative ease of acquiring wealth in the West, 
and with erroneous ideas concerning the conditions to be met… There 
has thus arisen a class which has been called the “professional pioneer,” 
always seeking for something a little better or for conditions where life 
will be easier; staying in any locality only a few months and then again 
seeking El Dorado.
25.2.  President Theodore Roosevelt.
25.3.  Francis G. Newlands while senator 
representing Nevada.
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And in 1922 Newell proclaimed that “The reasons for success or failure lie not 
so much in climate, soil, or markets, but rather in the character of the landowner, 
his experience, strength, health, and especially the ‘will to win,’ or possession 
of qualities which distinguish the pioneer.”  The biggest problem with federal 
reclamation, in Newell=s mind, was that the virile rural population had gone 
soft.  Newell’s ideas—and they were shared by many of his lieutenants—were 
anachronistic in an age when the cost of setting up a new farm had soared and 
when city life looked increasingly attractive to the nation=s rural residents.7
 Another part of the organizational synthesis is the argument that 
conservation and federal reclamation helped to centralize power in Washington.  
In 1906, the publication Forestry and Irrigation, which largely spoke for the 
bureau, editorialized that “There is probably no law on the statute books which 
puts in the hands of a single offi cial of government such unlimited powers of 
expenditure as the [Reclamation Act.]”8  The Reclamation Act gave the secretary 
of the interior power to select projects, determine the size of farms, withdraw 
from entry the public lands needed for farms or towns, purchase or condemn 
existing dams and canals, approve construction contracts, and set the amount 
each farmer owed the government as well as operation and maintenance charges.  
During the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, however, most important 
decisions were made by the president or in the offi ces of the Reclamation Service.  
Neither the secretary of the interior nor the director of the U.S. Geological Survey, 
of which the service was a part until 1907, ever vetoed a project proposed by the 
Reclamation Service.
 Most historians look at confl icts between Congress, the secretaries of 
the interior, and settlers on government projects as dominant themes in the 
Reclamation Bureau’s history over the fi rst three decades of this century.  The 
bureau’s relationship with the states has been largely ignored, in part because 
that relationship does not square with the pervasive view that the bureau simply 
imposed its will on the West.  Yet after 1910 or 1911 the  Reclamation Service’s 
chronic lack of funds persuaded it to seek assistance from the states, and more 
often than not resistance to cooperation came from the states rather than from 
offi cials within the Reclamation Service.  One of the most important amendments 
to the original Reclamation Act, the  Warren Act of 1911, allowed the Reclamation 
Service to sell surplus water to owners of land outside the government projects, 
blurring the lines between federal and private water projects.  Proponents of the 
legislation argued that the West=s major rivers contained few ideal reservoir sites 
and that the Reclamation Service could often build a dam that would serve twice 
as much land as could be irrigated within a government project for little more 
money.  Therefore, the Warren Act permitted the Reclamation Service to contract 
with private companies, water user associations, or irrigation districts to pay 
either for part of the dam, or part of the water stored behind the dam.  In either 
case, since the money would be paid into the reclamation fund, providing water 
to private irrigation projects would produce another source of income.  This law 
proved enormously important to the Reclamation Bureau, and by the 1950s the 
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federal government watered nearly as much land outside its projects as within.
In the Snake River Valley, for example, the Jackson Lake Dam at the head of the 
river provided water to privately irrigated land as far west as Twin Falls, as well 
as to the government’s Minidoka Project near Rupert.9
 As early as 1904  William Ellsworth Smythe, Francis G. Newlands, 
and other friends of federal reclamation proposed using irrigation districts to 
supplement the funds available to the Reclamation Service, particularly in states 
like California, which offered few opportunities to construct government projects 
on the public domain.  Irrigation districts, which were institutions created by the 
state with the power to tax the land within their boundaries and issue bonds to 
pay for hydraulic works, would turn the Reclamation Service into a construction 
agency responsible for reducing the cost of construction and ensuring the quality 
of dams and canals—or so Smythe hoped.  However, the Reclamation Act of 
1902 gave the Interior Department no authority to build such hybrid projects, and 
within Congress easterners and midwesterners balked at expanding the scope of 
the law.  Moreover, many westerners feared that federal reclamation meant federal 
control over their surplus water.10
 In 1915 a Reclamation Service offi cial drafted a plan to create a second 
reclamation fund exclusively to construct dams and canals within private
irrigation projects, but nothing came of it.11  World War I offered the best 
opportunity for cooperation.  At the end of the war, in anticipation of post-war 
unemployment, Secretary of the Interior Lane proposed a massive program to 
put 50,000 returning veterans to work clearing stumps, leveling land, laying out 
townsites, and building houses, barns, and roads.  His bill proposed a partnership 
between the states and central government.  The states could donate unimproved 
land to the federal government, leaving reclamation and settlement to the 
Reclamation Bureau, or they could pay at least one-fourth of the entire cost, 
from purchasing the land to building houses, barns and roads.  The legislation 
required the states to create soldier settlement boards to screen applicants and 
to administer the completed projects.  The states would also provide returning 
soldiers with agricultural training, sharing that cost with the federal government.
Particularly after crop and land prices began to fall in 1919, the Lane legislation 
fell victim to the post-war economic slump and the absence of grassroots support 
for reclamation or planned settlements.12
 Throughout the 1920s, the Reclamation Bureau encouraged the western 
states to play a larger role in federal reclamation, but the states refused.  State 
politicians argued that providing irrigated land was a national responsibility, that 
there was no demand for more irrigated land, that hybrid projects would threaten 
state control over water rights, and that constitutional debt limitations prevented 
the states from buying land, preparing it for cultivation, or constructing irrigation 
and drainage works.  Oddly enough, hybrid projects had the greatest appeal in the 
state’s rights South, not the West.  Since the early years of federal reclamation, 
the Reclamation Bureau had wanted to extend its operations to include swamp 
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and cutover, as well as arid lands.  In 1918 Secretary of the Interior Franklin 
K. Lane, with the encouragement of the Reclamation Service, persuaded 
Congress to appropriate $100,000 to study the reclamation of wastelands in 
the South.  President Woodrow Wilson heartily endorsed the plan.  Additional 
expenditures followed in 1926, 1927, and 1928.  In 1926 a committee consisting 
of representatives from the federal and state governments, along with private 
interests, selected four potential project sites.  Congress, however, balked at 
opening new farmland during a time of agricultural depression.13
 Congressional appropriations for public works increased dramatically 
during the 1930s, and as the bureau’s budget soared its appeals for state aid 
all but disappeared.  Power did increase in Washington as a result of the high 
dam projects undertaken in the 1930s, but state and local institutions of water 
management also proliferated.  Boulder Dam is a case in point.  The  Metropolitan 
Water District (MWD), formed to carry water and power to Los Angeles from 
the Colorado River, used the irrigation district—a state and local institution—as 
a model.  Even though the Reclamation Bureau operated Parker Dam—the origin 
of the aqueduct from the Colorado River to Los Angeles—it used funds provided 
by the MWD.  The MWD was also a bridge between the federal government and 
private utility companies.  Apparently, the bureau got the idea of using power 
revenue to fi nance Boulder Dam from William Mulholland and E. F. Scattergood, 
the latter of whom had designed and supervised the water and power systems of 
Los Angeles.  Homer Hamlin, who served as Los Angeles City Engineer during 
the 1920s, was one of the fi rst to conceive of a multiple-purpose dam in Boulder 
or Black Canyon, and in 1929  F. E. Weymouth, who had been chief engineer 
of the Reclamation Bureau under A. P. Davis, was chosen to head the MWD.  
Weymouth hired many former employees of the Reclamation Bureau who had left 
government service during the Harding scandals of the 1920s.  Here again, the 
line between federal, state, and private institutions is very blurry.14
 Thus far I’ve focused on federal reclamation in the fi rst few decades of 
the twentieth century.  The conventional wisdom among professional historians 
is that Boulder Dam and the other great dam projects conceived during the 
1930s, including Grand Coulee and Shasta, resurrected the bureau’s reputation 
at the expense of the family farm and the rural West.  During the 1930s, this 
interpretation runs, the bureau turned its attention to western cities, and World 
War II increased the importance of the urban West.  But that interpretation is at 
best misleading.  The bureau did much more than build high dams during the 
1930s.  By 1941 there were forty-six Bureau of Reclamation irrigation projects 
in the West and another twenty-seven under construction.  That was more 
than double the number of projects in 1920, and preliminary surveys had been 
completed on an additional forty-eight projects.  There was a surprising growth in 
irrigated land after 1935.  From 1920 to 1935 the amount of land irrigated by the 
bureau increased only modestly—from 1.2 million acres to 1.6 million.  By the 
end of World War II, however, the bureau irrigated twice as much land within the 
government projects as in 1920.15
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 The Reclamation Bureau had good reason to publicize the glamorous 
high dams more than its irrigation projects because the chronic and intractable 
problems it had encountered during the Progressive Era remained.  Farmers 
everywhere suffered from the depression of the 1930s, but nowhere were times 
harder than on most of the government projects.  There were big differences 
between such successful projects as the Yakima and Salt River and those in 
Montana.  But a 1940 survey of the projects settled between 1931 and 1940 
revealed desperate poverty.  Sixty percent of the original settlers on the Vale-
Owyhee Project in eastern Oregon had left their farms, or leased their land to 
others.  Seventy-fi ve percent of the homes on that project cost less than $350, and 
half had two rooms or less—even though the average-size farm family numbered 
fi ve.  Forty percent of those Oregon families could not afford to dig a well, so 
they carried their drinking water fi ve miles or more, and many common diseases, 
including typhoid fever, went untreated because the settlers were too poor to hire 
a doctor.  On the other hand, many conditions remained beyond the Reclamation 
 Bureau’s control.  A 1936 study of 136 farmers who had settled on the Klamath 
Project along the California-Oregon border in 1927 revealed that most who left 
their farms had homesteaded for speculative reasons, fully expecting to sell out, or 
they were lured away by the city, or pushed away by old age, illness, or divorce.  
Not all farmers who abandoned government projects did so because they had 
“failed,” or because they lacked experience or capital.16
 Nevertheless, for all its problems, the dream of the family farm remained 
strong in the years following World War II.  Most historians who have written 
about the bureau after the war have failed to recognize the idealism that animated 
its leaders, at least from 1945 to 1953.  In those years, the Interior Department 
was fi lled with New Dealers who wanted to build a better world, including Harold 
Ickes, Abe Fortas, Oscar Chapman, Michael Straus, Arthur Goldschmidt, and 
Stephen Rauschenbush.  Many smaller irrigation projects were designed as much 
to provide supplemental water outside government projects—to farmers who 
irrigated but suffered from inadequate water supplies—as to open new land to 
cultivation.  However, the Interior Department hoped to settle 45,000 returning 
veterans and their families on the government projects—the biggest of which 
would irrigate one million acres of Avirgin land@ within the Columbia Basin—
opening nearly as many new farms as had been settled from 1902 to 1945.17
 But the bureau’s objectives were not always consistent, and jobs, power, 
and water for cities often worked at cross purposes with the homestead ideal.
At the end of the war, as during the 1930s, the paramount concern was jobs.  
Offi cials in the Interior Department concluded that a permanent increase in public 
works spending would not just prevent the United States from lapsing back 
into the depression as the nation converted to a peacetime economy, but would 
provide sustained economic growth and serve as an antidote to the boom and bust 
cycles inherent in capitalism.  Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes predicted 
that 14,500,000 would lose their jobs at the end of the war.  Such agencies as the 
Reclamation Bureau, Corps of Engineers, Forest Service, and Soil Conservation 
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Service had plans for plenty of worthy projects that they could begin within 
three months of the war’s end.  In April 1945 the bureau proposed to Congress 
415 irrigation and multiple-purpose water projects in seventeen western states.
State-by-state the number varied, from a modest fi ve projects in Washington to 
ninety-six in Montana, and from 101,000 acres in Utah to 2.2 million acres in 
California.  These projects were expected to add 11,000,000 acres of new land to 
cultivation and provide supplemental water to nearly as many acres of old land.
That was twice the amount of land irrigated in 1945.  Secretary of the Interior 
Harold Ickes—who had headed the Public Works Administration during the New 
Deal—estimated that the post-war work would provide one year’s employment 
for at least 1.5 million returning veterans.18  The bureau’s budget went from 50 
million in 1946, to 120 million in 
1947, to 200 million in 1948, to over 
300 million in 1950.  Gone was the 
idea that dams and canals should be 
built using the proceeds from land 
sales or oil leases.  Reclamation had 
become a symbol of national economic 
growth, and a method to avoid future 
depressions.19
 But federal reclamation 
meant much more than jobs.  Interior 
Department offi cials argued that 
federal reclamation could help win the 
Cold War, just as the power it produced 
had helped to win World War II.  
Nevertheless, Secretary of the Interior 
Oscar Chapman feared, in his words, 
that the United States ran 
a grave danger of saddling ourselves with a straight military economy.  
If that happens we shall fi nd that the old economic freedoms which give 
American life so much of its richness have disappeared.  We shall be 
supporting an enormous budget, with a huge proportion for defense, and 
yet fi nd ourselves poor as church mice where our great basic programs 
are involved.  Yet those programs—irrigation and land development 
projects, proper care for our national park system, intelligent 
development of our river systems, and so on—are the things which make 
the difference between the rich cultural society we are used to and a 
pinched, Spartan existence which is inevitable under a straight military 
economy.  For instance, we are nearing the ceiling on the growth and 
stability that can be achieved by our Western States without increased, 
broad-scale irrigation and related water resources development.20
 Since 1920 a dramatic demographic change had occurred within the West.  
Parts of the region lost population during the 1930s, but overall the eleven states 
25.4.  Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. 
Chapman.
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of the Far West gained 60 percent as compared to a 24 percent increase in the 
entire population of the United States.  During World War II, the difference was 
even more pronounced.  The population of the Far West increased by nearly 
18 percent while that of the nation as a whole increased less than 1 percent.  Much 
of that increase occurred within California, Oregon, and Washington, and those 
states continued to grow at a rapid rate after the war.  From 1940 to 1950, their 
population increased at a rate three times faster than the nation as a whole.21
 The West’s population boom promised to prevent the Reclamation 
Bureau from returning to the dark years of the 1920s.  But most of the region’s 
population growth during World War II was due to war industries, and offi cials 
within Interior feared that as those industries disappeared the West would return 
to an extractive economy, one that attracted raw material producing companies 
that could profi t the cheap power no longer used in such defense industries 
as ship or plane building.  Arthur Goldschmidt, who headed the Interior 
Department’s Division of Power at the end of the war, thought that the region 
held a disproportionate number of “rural, low income groups.”  People who 
lived at or near the subsistence level, in his judgment, “do not contribute to the 
national welfare or to a healthy economy in any region.”  He wanted to use cheap 
hydroelectric power to decentralize industry in the United States so that every 
part of the nation, in his words, contained a “balanced economy, a combination 
of agriculture and industry based upon the natural resources of the region itself....
Colonies are out-of-date as mere sources of raw materials and as markets.  They 
are economic anachronisms.”  During World War II, many British economists 
and sociologists traveled to the United States to inspect the Tennessee Valley 
Authority.  One visitor, Julian Huxley, likened the American South and West to 
the colonial problem of the British in Nigeria.22
 Arthur Goldschmidt called for large-scale planning in the West.  At the end 
of the war, however, powerful opposition surfaced within the West to expanding 
the “TVA-idea” or river basin planning.  While the Reclamation Bureau often sold 
large water projects as part of the defense effort during the Cold War, they also 
deepened suspicions about planning and “big government.”  The 1948 Republican 
platform called for sharp reductions in foreign and domestic spending, and it 
opposed the creation of “all-powerful Federal socialistic valley authorities.”   By 
1952 the New Deal had become “creeping Socialism” to conservatives within 
the Republican Party, and planning had become associated with Communism.  
In September 1950 on the fl oor of the United States Senate, Senator William 
Knowland of California charged that Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman, 
Commissioner of Reclamation Michael Straus, and Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior William Warne, “have a scarlet left-of-left record that extends back many 
years, even to the early years of the New Deal.”  As early as 1938 Knowland 
charged, Chapman belonged to the American League Against War and Fascism.  
“This outfi t,” the senator proclaimed, “has been offi cially branded as a simon-pure 
and unchallenged transmission belt of the Communist Party in America.”  Another 
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employee of the Interior Department, H. Stephen Rauschenbush, was, according 
to Knowland, “probably the chief prophet of modern American Marxism.”23
 Senator Knowland notwithstanding, no federal bureau had greater 
prominence in the West during the 1950s than the  Reclamation Bureau, and it 
is interesting to consider why such a powerful agency faded from the limelight 
so rapidly during the last few decades.  Several explanations have been offered, 
each of which has merit.  The environmental movement certainly played a part.  
In the post-war years, many members of the Sierra Club, Audubon, and other 
environmental groups considered themselves conservationists.  Their battle was 
over where dams should be located, not the construction of dams per se.  Dams 
should not fl ood land in national parks or national monuments, nor should they 
imperil the West’s scenic wonders.  Some historians think that the battle against 
dams in Echo Park, the Grand Canyon, Glen Canyon and other parts of the West 
played a large part in creating the modern environmental movement.24
 Later, in the 1960s and after, environmentalists began to oppose all
dams.  On some rivers, particularly the Columbia and Snake, massive numbers 
of fi sh perished because dams depleted oxygen, reduced water temperatures 
upstream in reservoirs, increased temperatures in the sluggish water downstream, 
and limited the ability of rivers to dilute sewage and other contaminants in the 
water.  At the least, dams contributed to the prolifi c growth of algae, at the most 
to eutrophication.  Water projects also had a profound effect on the habitat of 
terrestrial animals, contributed to the buildup of alkali, salts and other dangerous 
elements in the soil (including selenium) and to groundwater depletion.  Yet 
the environmental movement did not kill dam-building in the West.  More 
signifi cant than opposition to water projects from groups outside government was 
opposition to new dams and canals from federal agencies concerned with water 
quality and wildlife habitat.  In the 1970s, R. L. Coughlin of the Federal Water 
Quality Administration publicly charged that the  Bureau of Reclamation was the 
prime source of water pollution in the Far West.  While the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture and the Corps of Engineers had been strong critics of the Reclamation 
Bureau during the early decades of the twentieth century, by the 1970s many 
other agencies opposed the bureau, notably the Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  In the battle over the Garrison Diversion Unit 
in North Dakota, they were joined by the President’s Council on Environmental 
Quality, the State Department, the Offi ce of Management and Budget, and the 
General Accounting Offi ce.25
 Marc Reisner has provided another answer to the question of what 
happened to federal reclamation.  To Reisner, the collapse of the  Teton Dam 
in 1976, built on a tributary of the Snake River in 1975 despite warnings from 
U.S. Geological Survey engineers of unstable rock and earthquake hazards 
in the region, symbolized the end of the dam-building era.  When sections of 
that structure dissolved and washed away, eleven people died, 15,000 were left 
homeless, 13,000 cattle drowned, the fl ood stripped topsoil from 100,000 acres 
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of prime farmland, and property damages reached one billion dollars.  The 
Reclamation Bureau had built 240 earth fi ll dams west of the Mississippi, and 
this one was the fi rst to fail.  A commission of nine engineers spent six months 
investigating the causes of the disaster and concluded that the bureau had been 
at fault for using a highly erodible soil for the dam’s core and for failing to 
seal the structure to the rock at either end properly.  The wisdom and justice of 
building dams had been questioned many times before 1976, but seldom had 
the engineering skills and judgment of the Reclamation Bureau been called into 
question.26
 The Teton Dam rested on an earthquake fault, which meant that bedrock 
was far below the surface debris and sediment.   Dam safety was a serious matter 
because many streams had been plugged so many times that the collapse of one 
dam would take out a series of structures, producing massive fl oods, extensive 
damage, and thousands of deaths.  The entire Columbia River had been dammed, 
except for a fi fty-mile stretch near the Hanford nuclear power plant, and in 
California every major stream save one had been dammed at least once.  If Glen 
Canyon Dam gave way, for example, the resulting fl ood would destroy Boulder 
and Davis dams as well—with devastating results to southern California.  To be 
sure, the Teton Dam collapse did not persuade Congress to reexamine wasteful 
expenditures on public works.  If it had, President Jimmy Carter would not have 
compiled his famous “hit list” of water projects in 1977.  Yet this episode did 
demonstrate a fundamental hydrologic truth: since the deep canyons of the West 
had all been dammed, new projects had to be constructed at far less desirable 
sites.  And safety was not the only issue.  Once the deep canyons were gone, new 
dams threatened to fl ood as much farmland as they irrigated.  Reisner concluded:
As Fontenelle [on the Green River in southwestern Wyoming] was an 
inferior site compared with Flaming Gorge, as Glen Canyon was inferior 
to Hoover, as Auburn was vastly inferior to Shasta (but six times more 
expensive, even allowing for infl ation) the Bureau was now being 
forced to build on sites it had rejected forty, fi fty, or sixty years earlier.  
It was building on them because while the ideal damsites had rapidly 
disappeared, the demand for new projects had not.
The Teton Dam failure raised questions and doubts about many of the projects 
the Bureau had on the drawing boards, particularly Auburn Dam, which had been 
authorized for the North and Middle forks of the American River thirty miles 
north of Sacramento.  Less than a year before the collapse of Teton Dam, a 
5.9 earthquake hit near Oroville on a seismic fault thought to be dormant.  Bureau 
of Reclamation studies required by the State of California estimated that complete 
failure of a dam at the Auburn site would fl ood 750,000 people, inundate the state 
capital, and close fi ve military bases.  Even though more than 200 million dollars 
had been spent on the project, work was stopped and President Carter added the 
Auburn Dam to his list of rejected projects.27
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 It is wrong to suggest that all, or even many, of the dams built by the 
Bureau of Reclamation in the 1960s and 1970s were unsafe.  It is not wrong, 
however, to suggest that the cost of those dams greatly exceeded their economic 
benefi ts and that bureau personnel consciously doctored the fi gures to make each 
dam look as attractive as possible.  The Teton Dam was not just built in a bad 
place.  Its cost far outweighed its benefi ts, and like many projects built during the 
1960s and 1970s, it benefi ted relatively few water users.  When the bureau fi rst 
proposed the project, it used an interest rate of 3¼ percent in calculating benefi ts 
even though the rate that prevailed when work began was 5? percent.  Yet even at 
the lower rate, the benefi t to cost ratio was less than one—meaning that taxpayers 
spent more money building the project than it could return to water users.28
 The Reclamation Bureau manipulated fi gures in many ways, as did 
the Corps of Engineers.  Not surprisingly, most projects cost far more than 
original estimates.  To reduce construction costs on paper, the bureau used 
prices that had prevailed fi ve or ten years earlier.  It also added “write off” 
benefi ts not recognized during the pre-World War II years, such as recreation, 
habitat improvement, or pollution abatement.  Then, too, the bureau often stated 
power revenue from dams as constant, even though revenue from that source 
generally declined over the life of the dam.  In 1964 Senator William Proxmire 
of Wisconsin examined 380 pending water projects in the United States, some 
of them Corps of Engineers projects.  He found that more than half had benefi t 
to cost ratios of less than two, and he noted that “I have consistently found that 
projects with an alleged benefi t-cost ratio of less than 2 to 1 provide returns less 
than their cost.  Costs of public works are invariably much greater than originally 
estimated because of poor estimates and infl ationary pressures.”29
 The most common method of padding benefi ts, however, was to use an 
artifi cially low interest rate.  For most of the 1960s the bureau used 3? percent, 
which Congress had set as a benchmark in 1962.  However, the actual rate at 
which the government borrowed money in the middle to late 1960s was closer 
to fi ve percent than three, and the difference between the two fi gures became 
enormous when a project was amortized over fi fty or sixty years.  As Richard 
Berkman and Kip Viscusi noted in the infl uential Ralph Nader study of the 
bureau, by 1969 the cost of all the projects constructed by the bureau ran nearly 
three times the original estimates.30  Nevertheless, despite creative accounting 
techniques, by the 1960s many large projects still had a cost to benefi t ratio of 
less than one.  The Garrison Diversion Project in North Dakota and the Central 
Arizona Project were glaring examples.31
 One reason that damage to the environment did not play a larger role in 
bringing the high dam age to an end was that environmental groups attracted more 
public support by attacking waste and subsidies than by trying to protect nature.
The economist Paul Taylor estimated that within the Central Valley Project the 
federal subsidy amounted to $92,320 for a farm 160 acres in size, and in parts 
of the San Joaquin Valley many farms were 2,000 to 3,000 acres in size. The 
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Westlands Water District was formed in 1952.  The San Luis Dam, part of the 
Central Valley Project, was authorized by Congress in 1960 and completed in 
1968, but the Westlands project served almost exclusively corporate landowners, 
including the Southern Pacifi c Railroad and Standard Oil Company.  According to 
Marc Reisner, district farmers paid only one tenth of the actual cost of the water 
they used, and 70 percent of the profi t they received from crops came from federal 
water subsidies.32
 Federal subsidies to land served by the Bureau of Reclamation increased 
dramatically from 1902 to 1968, tipping the scale of benefi ts from national water 
projects away from the East and upper Midwest.  Federal reclamation had been 
sold to Congress partly as compensation to the West for river and harbor bills that 
mainly benefi ted states around the Great Lakes and along the eastern seaboard.  
But the historian Tim Palmer estimates that from 1950 to 1976, the Northeast 
received only six percent of the money spent on water projects by the Corps of 
Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation while the South received 28 percent and 
the West about half.  In effect, residents of the East and Midwest subsidized the 
growth of cities in the West at the expense of those in the northeast, as crops 
grown in California and Arizona received greater per acre subsidies than crops 
raised in other parts of the nation.33
 Yet the waste of bureau projects, the cost overruns, the environmental 
damage, the disproportionate benefi ts to the West and South, and the bureau’s 
arrogance in responding to criticism do not alone explain why the era of dam-
building came to an end in the 1970s.  To some extent, of course, the Reclamation 
Bureau suffered from the deep public cynicism produced by the Vietnam War and 
Watergate.  Few institutions of government escaped the crisis in moral authority.  
Still, the bureau’s fall from grace was more signifi cant because it had been built 
on such high ideals.  The Corps of Engineers had never promised to transform 
society, but the Reclamation Bureau had inspired grand dreams—not just the 
dream of conquering forbidding deserts but of building a new society there.  Often 
lost in the day-by-day operations of the bureau, these ideals remained the soul of 
federal reclamation.
 Homemaking was the bureau=s only mission that appealed to citizens 
outside the West.  As long as the bureau paid homage to the family farm ideal, 
many of its blunders and failures were forgiven.  In many parts of the West, farm 
size had increased dramatically during the agricultural depression that extended 
from 1920 to 1940.  In Montana the average leaped from 480 acres to 821 acres, 
and in Wyoming from 749 to 1,866 acres.  Tenancy also increased.  In 1946, 
Commissioner of Reclamation Michael Straus promised that within fi ve years 
the bureau would have opened more than 45,000 family-sized farms on 
4,000,000 acres.34  The bureau’s magazine, Reclamation Era, promised that the 
bureau would provide as many homes to returning veterans and their families as it 
had created on all its projects during the four decades prior to World War II.  The 
fi rst farms would be on the Klamath, Yakima, Minidoka, and Shoshone projects, 
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but the single largest project would be in the Columbia River Basin, where the 
bureau hoped to have at least 400,000 acres ready for settlement by 1950 or 1951.  
“The ultimate objective of the Bureau of Reclamation and its staff,” Reclamation
Era reported, “is to develop the West through the creation of permanent family 
farms on Federal Reclamation projects.”35
 By the end of the 1950s, however, it was clear that the  Columbia Basin 
Project would not resurrect the bureau’s mission to create rural homes in the 
West.  At the end of World War II, the Reclamation Bureau had hoped to create 
10,000 to 20,000 new farms in the Columbia Basin, but only 2,300 had been 
opened by 1958.  Nor was that land settled by young men looking for a fresh 
start; the median age of those who took up farms in the Columbia Basin Project 
was 40.  Nor did it provide homes for those who had abandoned farms on the 
Great Plains; most settlers came from Washington or Utah.  These were not rural 
poor.  Over half had family assets of $20,000 or more, and one-third did not live 
on their farms.  In 1968 the Reclamation Bureau turned the project over to three 
irrigation districts.  According to the historian Paul Pitzer, had the bureau fi nished 
the project, the results would have been even worse.  “It would be a collection 
of family farms ranging from forty to eighty acres, none of them capable of 
supplying their owners with a satisfactory living.  The area would be a rural slum.  
It is for the best that this aspect of the project failed.”36
 It was not just that the bureau failed to create new family farms; it also 
failed to enforce older restrictions on farm size.  By the 1970s the hallowed 
160- acre limitation on the cheap water each farmer could secure from the bureau 
became a mockery.  From the beginning of its life, the Reclamation Bureau 
had little choice but to accommodate to large private landowners within the 
boundaries of its projects.  Those landowners consistently opposed bureau efforts 
to control the sale of their surplus or “excess” land, and the bureau lacked both the 
staff and the inclination to monitor the sale or title transfers to private lands within 
projects.  The Interior Department gave private landowners plenty of warning 
before it acted, and sometimes it did not act at all.  A married couple could acquire 
water for 320 acres, and by signing a contract with the Secretary of the Interior 
to dispose of surplus land, any person who owned more than 160 acres was given 
cheap water to irrigate all the land for a decade or more before he was required to 
sell it.  Moreover, if landowners paid all the construction charges imposed on the 
excess lands in advance, the Interior Department usually permitted them to sell 
that land at any price they wished.37
 The 160-acre limitation had never been enforced, but before the 1930s the 
vast majority of farms within the reclamation projects—well over 90 percent—
were that size or smaller.  Nevertheless, new projects undertaken by the bureau 
in the 1930s and after catered more and more to large landowners, particularly 
in California, and they were the projects that captured the public imagination.
During the 1930s the bureau, with congressional approval, waived the 160-acre 
restriction on several large projects, including the Central Valley Project (CVP), 
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Imperial Valley Project, and the Colorado-Big Thompson Project.  The CVP was 
the biggest battleground, in part because the Corps of Engineers was ready to 
build some of the reservoirs within that project as fl ood control structures that 
did not require repayment, and that was an attractive option to large farmers.  In 
the south San Joaquin Valley, 700,000 acres were divided into 600 farms and 
800,000 acres were divided into 12,300 small holdings.  But that pattern of land 
distribution changed dramatically after World War II.  By the time Congress raised 
the 160-acre limitation to 960 acres in  1982, and waived many other restrictions 
on large landowners, the family farm seemed more and more of an anachronism.  
Even more of an anachronism was the notion that federal reclamation should 
attempt to reform American society and distribute wealth as widely as possible.  
As Donald Worster has noted, the 1982 law tacitly acknowledged that the 
economic marketplace should decide the size of farms and the distribution of 
wealth, not government.38
 Although the Reclamation Bureau continued to serve many small farms, 
particularly outside California, the 1982 law convinced many critics of the 
bureau that it had abandoned its original mission and sold out to agribusiness.
Even more serious, by the 1980s the Reclamation Bureau had lost its reputation 
as the exemplar of new technology.  During the 1930s Boulder Dam stood as 
a monument to human ingenuity, and the dams the bureau built were seen as 
thoroughly modern—the latest in the technology of managing nature.  Boulder 
Dam was more than a piece of concrete.  Among other things it symbolized a 
powerful idea that had been around since the Progressive Era, the concept of 
“multiple use.”  The biggest dams built by the bureau, including Boulder, Shasta, 
and Grand Coulee all provided fl ood control and power, as well as irrigation and 
water for towns and cities.  But those were exceptional, not typical dams.  The 
West contained few places to build such dams, which is why small dams were 
so much more common than large ones.  Not only were the sites for large dams 
limited, but most dams were constructed to serve a particular purpose.  It was 
not easy to use a dam designed mainly to generate power for fl ood control or 
irrigation as well.
 During the 1930s part of the appeal of high dams was that they would last 
as long as the pyramids.  But after World War II that very “permanence” became 
a liability.  One of the strongest arguments against building dams had always been 
that it made more sense to move people to water than water to people.  Far more 
water was lost in transit, through seepage and evaporation, than was delivered 
at the end of the pipeline or ditch.  The Cold War raised new concerns.  Dams 
contributed to the concentration of people in large cities, making those cities more 
attractive targets, and while high dams were very strong, they could not resist 
a direct hit from a thermonuclear bomb.  Many of the West’s cities could be as 
easily paralyzed by disrupting their water and power systems, or by the fl oods that 
would result from bringing down one of these dams, as from the detonation of a 
thermonuclear bomb within the city itself.   Even more important was the promise 
of nuclear power.  As a writer in the Sierra Club Bulletin observed in 1948,
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we may live to see the regulated use of atomic power a few years from 
now.  If we learn to use it properly… we won’t need to harness all the 
rivers of the land.… At least we might wait a little while and see what 
happens before we drown our greatest canyons and destroy forever so 
much natural beauty.
 David Brower suggested that  atomic energy might make high dams 
obsolete long before they fi lled with silt.  “Is it not time to reverse the trend of 
centralization—of concentrating tremendously remunerative strategic targets: of 
building larger projects to enable more people to live in less space[?]”39  Silt was 
not just something that clogged dams; it was a symptom of bad land management.  
“[T]he real management of rivers begins in the headwaters and on the hilltops...
through good land management,” a writer observed in 1950 in the Sierra Club 
Bulletin.  Yet neither the Corps of Engineers nor the Bureau of Reclamation 
cooperated with the Soil Conservation Service or the Forest Service in their 
attempts to fi ght soil erosion.  In the middle of the 1960s, during debate over the 
proposed Rampart Dam in Alaska, a Corps of Engineers structure that would have 
created a reservoir larger than Lake Erie, a writer in Living Wilderness pointed out 
that any one of fi ve atomic generators produced by the General Electric Company 
could produce as much power as the proposed hydroelectric plants at Rampart 
Dam at half the installation cost.  And, she estimated, the price of the power to 
consumers would be no higher.40
 But most important was that hydroelectric power no longer seemed as 
attractive after World War II as it had during the 1920s or 1930s.  California was a 
prime example.  In 1910 falling water produced most of the electricity used in the 
state.  Steam power was used mainly to meet peak demands.  But the increasing 
effi ciency of steam generators, the falling prices of petroleum and natural gas, and 
the fact that such plants could be located near large cities, made steam turbines 
increasingly attractive.  In 1920 hydroelectric power constituted 37 percent of the 
power generated within the United States.  That fi gure fell to 33 percent in 1940, 
and despite the large hydroelectric plants opened during World War II, only 
36 percent of the nation’s power came from falling water in 1945.41
 New technology also reduced the need to expand the supply of water for 
irrigation.  Insecticides, pesticides, and sophisticated farm machinery permitted 
farmers to raise much more food and fi ber on the same land, irrigated or not.  
Leveling land with lasers, lining canals with concrete, delivering water directly to 
the roots of plants through underground pipes, utilizing computers to determine 
exactly the amount of water needed when it was needed in different soils, 
and raising plants that required less water were just a few of the changes that 
permitted farmers to stretch their water supplies.  Conservation promised to free 
up a large part of the West=s water.  And as the cost of irrigating land rose, it made 
little sense to build new dams and canals.42
 In retrospect, President Jimmy Carter=s famous  “hit list” of water projects 
seems far less signifi cant than it did at the time.  Dams had been under fi re 
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throughout the 1970s, and many critics of western water policy argued that there 
was no need to open any additional land to irrigation.  On February 21, 1977, 
Carter released a revised version of the 1977-1978 budget prepared by Gerald 
Ford’s staff.  At a time of growing budget defi cits and infl ation, Carter wanted to 
balance the budget, and eliminating wasteful spending would help.  He deleted 
nineteen water projects that he deemed improvident, unnecessary, or damaging to 
the environment.  He also launched a review of 320 projects already authorized 
by Congress.  Even such staunch environmentalists as representatives Moe 
Udall of Arizona and Gary Hart of Colorado came out against the cuts.  Initially, 
environmental organizations strongly supported the president in the hope that 
Carter would abandon such projects as the Auburn Dam in California and the 
Garrison Diversion Project in North Dakota, but that support dissipated when—
under strong pressure from Congress—Carter compromised so that only nine 
projects were eliminated.  His support for raising the 160-acre limitation to 
1,260 acres and for continuing the subsidies to the Westlands Irrigation District 
also dismayed environmental groups.43
 The cuts in spending on water projects were more apparent than real.  In 
1980 Carter approved four billion dollars for water projects, though relatively 
few of those projects were located within the West.  On the advice of his chief 
economic adviser, David Stockman, and with the support of such disparate 
groups as the American Tax Reduction Movement, the National Taxpayers 
Union, Common Cause, the Americans for Democratic Action, and the League 
of Women Voters, President Ronald Reagan went considerably beyond Carter.  
Reagan reduced spending on water projects and signed the fi rst bill in American 
history to “deauthorize” water projects—eight projects that would have cost 
2.5 billion dollars.  Even more important, Reagan added the requirement that 
those who benefi ted from new water projects share in paying for them.  Since 
few water users were willing to use their own money to help pay for water 
projects, this—and the Astagfl ation@ and defi cits that characterized the Carter and 
Reagan years—did more to end the dam-building era than anything else.  No 
new major Bureau of Reclamation projects were authorized during the 1980s 
or 1990s.  In the 1970s and after, the greatest expansion of irrigation was on the 
Great Plains, where farmers mined underground water far faster than it could be 
returned by nature to the aquifers.  Nebraska irrigated less than one million acres 
in 1959, but seven million acres in 1980.44
 By way of conclusion, what has the experiment in reclamation meant 
to the West and the nation?  Most professional historians have regarded 
federal reclamation as a disaster, and there is plenty of evidence to support 
that conclusion.  During its fi rst few decades of life, the Reclamation Bureau 
did not succeed in placing “surplus” human beings on surplus land, it did not 
succeed in reforming rural institutions in the West, it did not succeed in curbing 
land speculation, and it did not succeed in producing a more virtuous society.  
By the 1930s only two or three million acres had been irrigated by the federal 
government, a far cry from the 30 to 100 million acres promised by various 
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proponents of federal reclamation in 1902.  The bureau became a much more 
popular institution within the West after World War II, but by the 1960s it would 
be blamed for encouraging rampant urban growth, for squandering tax dollars, for 
deceiving the public, and for being the region’s biggest polluter.
 That said, the contribution of the bureau to the West depends on one’s 
perspective.  Until the last two decades, most appraisals of federal reclamation 
focused on economic benefi ts.  In 1919, encouraged by the agricultural boom 
of World War I, Arthur Powell Davis, then director of the Reclamation Bureau, 
stated fl atly that “national reclamation has amply justifi ed all [that] its exponents 
declared for it [in 1902].”  He estimated that the 122 million dollars spent on 
federal reclamation had generated 550 million in new wealth.  Within the federal 
projects land that had sold for fi ve or ten dollars an acre in 1902 fetched as much 
as $200 an acre, and 600,000 westerners lived on or near a government project.
In fi scal year 1920 the crops raised on the Salt River Project returned more than 
twice the cost of constructing that project.  To be sure, the poorest states in the 
West, such as Nevada and Arizona, benefi ted more than the wealthiest.  For 
example, the population of Phoenix increased more than 400 percent from 1905 to 
1917, and much of that growth derived from the Salt River Project.  In 1920 as in 
1980, the farms and cities of the West were much more closely related than most 
historians have recognized.45
 Historians have rarely considered what federal reclamation can teach us 
about government.46  Yet there are powerful lessons in the bureau’s story.  First, 
the bureau suffered from a split personality from the beginning of its life.  It 
could not reconcile the dream of the autonomous family farm with the goal 
of promoting regional economic development, as Boulder Dam demonstrates.
Repeatedly, it was forced to choose between the two and in the end it did far more 
to shore up the status quo than to reform western society.  Second, as a recent 
study by the political scientist Daniel Carpenter reminds us, the personalities and 
vision—or lack of vision—of bureau chiefs matters for as much or more than 
“bureaucratic culture.”47  The fi rst head of the Reclamation Service, Frederick 
Haynes Newell, may have been a fi ne engineer, but he was also blinded by a 
nineteenth century vision of agriculture that was anachronistic by 1902.  Elwood 
Mead, Newell’s chief rival to head the new program, had blind spots of his own, 
but there is little doubt that from 1902 to 1924 the bureau would have pushed a 
very different agenda in Congress had Mead been responsible for the program.  
Third, federal reclamation exemplifi es federalism more than the expanding 
power of the central government.  In the United States, power can fl ow two 
ways simultaneously.  The powers of state and local institutions often increase 
as federal agencies become more powerful in Washington.  As one political 
scientist has put it, our system of government is more a marble cake than a layer 
cake.  It has to be considered in its entirely.  From the beginning of its life, the 
Reclamation Bureau was forced to accommodate itself to local interests and 
local institutions.  We need to pay as much attention to how the bureau deferred 
and cooperated with state and local institutions of government, and attempted 
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to fashion new institutions of government, as with how it tried to compete and 
dominate.  Finally, federal reclamation demonstrates the power of sectionalism—
within the West as well as the United States.  The leaders of the Reclamation 
Bureau attempted to avoid the pitfalls of public works in the nineteenth century, 
but Americans have always expected the benefi ts of government to be spread as 
widely as possible.  In 1902 that meant that 51 percent of the proceeds from the 
sale of public lands should remain within the state or territory where that land was 
located, and that decision had dire consequences for federal reclamation.  And 
it is interesting to note that when Jimmy Carter issued his “hit list,” he received 
the strongest opposition from Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, and Arizona, whose 
political representatives thought that California had received far more than its fair 
share of federal water appropriations.  Whether the water projects they voted for 
were wasteful or ineffi cient was beside the point.  They wanted to catch up with 
California by capturing a share of the Colorado River for upstream interests.
 It is important to note that the Bureau of Reclamation is still a very 
important federal agency.  The masthead of its website announces that the 
bureau=s mission is “Managing Water in the American West,” not constructing 
water projects.  The brief history tells us that the bureau has created “more than 
600 dams and reservoirs including Hoover Dam on the Colorado River and Grand 
Coulee on the Columbia River.”  Today the bureau supervises or oversees the 
distribution of water to more than 31,000,000 urban and rural residents in the 
West, including one-fi fth of the region=s irrigation farmers, and, we are told, that 
land produces 60 percent of the nation=s vegetables.  It is the “Largest wholesaler 
of water in the country,” and the second largest producer of hydroelectric power 
in the West, after the Corps of Engineers.  How times have changed is refl ected in 
the concluding paragraph in the “What We Do” section of the website:
Today, Reclamation is a contemporary water management agency with a 
Strategic Plan outlining numerous programs, initiatives and activities that 
will help the Western States, Native American Tribes and others meet 
new water needs and balance the multitude of competing uses of water 
in the West.  Our mission is to assist in meeting the increasing water 
demands of the West while protecting the environment and the public’s 
investment in these structures.  We place great emphasis on fulfi lling 
our water delivery obligations, water conservation, water recycling and 
reuse, and developing partnerships with our customers, states, and Indian 
Tribes, and in fi nding ways to bring together the variety of interests to 
address the competing needs for our limited water resources.
The historian can only smile at those words, both because the mission of the 
bureau has changed so dramatically over the last few decades, and because the 
bureau has come back from its deathbed before, particularly during the 1930s.
If an agency that generated so much confl ict over water in the past is now the 
region=s negotiator and peacemaker, this surely is a brave new world.48
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A Tale of Two Commissioners:  Frederick Newell 
and Floyd Dominy
By:
Donald J. Pisani
 Tonight1 I’d like to survey some highlights of the history of the Bureau of 
Reclamation by looking at the lives and times of two of the agency’s most notable 
directors,  Frederick Newell and  Floyd Dominy.  A principal architect of the 
Reclamation Act of 1902, Newell directed the federal reclamation program from 
1902 to 1914, supervising the construction of 28 irrigation projects—one or more 
in every state and territory within the American West.  Dominy was commissioner 
of the Reclamation Bureau from 1959 to 1969, during what Marc Reisner has 
called “the Go-Go years.”  By that time the high dam symbolized the bureau more 
than the family farm, and it paid as much attention to the urban as to the rural 
West.  In any one year of the 1960s, the bureau’s construction budget exceeded 
all the expenditures by the Bureau of Reclamation from 1902 to 1933.  Yet for all 
its wealth, I would argue that by the 1960s time had passed the bureau by: it was 
an agency without a rudder.  For reasons largely beyond its control, it had lost the 
ideals that sustained it through the fi rst six decades of the twentieth century.  By 
the 1970s two fundamental changes had occurred in the West: the family farm had 
declined dramatically in importance, and the region could no longer claim to be 
an economically backward province of the East.  It could no longer contend that it 
had a special right to federal aid, a right that transcended the claims of other parts 
of the nation.
Frederick H. Newell
  Frederick Haynes Newell was born on March 5, 1862, in Bradford, 
Pennsylvania, a small lumber and mining town in the northwest part of the state, 
just south of the New York border—a town far-removed from major cities, the 
closest of which was Erie, 100 miles to the West.  “The people [in Bradford] were 
what might be called typical mountaineers and laborers in the lumber camps, 
rough, illiterate and with many queer old country habits and superstitions,” 
Newell recalled in his unpublished memoirs, written in 1927.  Newell’s mother 
died in childbirth the year after he was born, and so did the child she carried.
So young Frederick grew up without siblings, and for most of his youth lived 
with relatives.  As he put it, “I attended many public schools in different 
parts of the country not staying very long at any one as I moved from place 
to place.”  Nevertheless, Newell was a good student, and after attending high 
school in Newton, Massachusetts, where he lived with an uncle, he entered the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1880, in part so that he could live at his 
grandfather’s house in Brookline, Massachusetts.
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 Not surprisingly, Frederick Newell 
would exhibit a curious distance and 
detachment when he wrote about his 
father, who at various times tried the feed 
and grain business in Chicago—and got 
“skinned,” as Frederick put it—then sold 
boilers, machinery, and safes in Detroit; 
then made furniture; until in mid-life he 
returned to Bradford, where he found oil 
and fi nancial success after many failures.  
Frederick described his father as “always 
sanguine, full of entrancing schemes.… 
He was surveyor, engineer and general 
all around man.…  He bought and sold 
coal and timber lands and went into 
various ventures, characteristic of the time 
and place.”  In short, his father was an 
American type: wanderer, dreamer and 
speculator—the kind you fi nd in so many 
American novels, including Mark Twain 
and Charles Dudley Warner’s The Gilded Age.  The life of Frederick’s father 
drove home to the boy a Darwinian lesson he would carry with him through life: 
for many success did not come easily.  It comes only to those who are persistent 
and tenacious, and how people bear hardship is as important as whether or not 
they achieved success.
 In addition, Newell’s upbringing produced in the young man a versatility, 
resourcefulness, and a strong sense of independence.  On vacations from high 
school, Newell became deeply involved in his father’s business ventures, and after 
graduation he returned to Bradford from Massachusetts and plunged
again into a wide variety of occupations including surveying, printing, 
bookkeeping… generally for my father.  The experience I now appreciate 
was valuable as it was necessary for me to take the initiative and use 
my own judgment continually as my father was never a man who 
would bother with details but who wanted results immediately and 
economically.  There was nothing that I would not undertake… whether 
laying gas lines, plumbing, designing houses or straightening out the 
books of some company and discovering blunders or worse on the part of 
people with whom he [that is, his father] was doing business.
Newell fi rst went west during the summer of 1881, after his father and a few other 
residents of Bradford invested in mineral land in southern Colorado.  Frederick 
helped organize the Columbia Gold Mining Company, and he became secretary 
and treasurer—a formidable job for a boy just out of high school. 
26.1.  Frederick H. Newell while Director 
of Reclamation.
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 After  Newell graduated from MIT in 1885, with a B.A. in mining 
engineering, he fi rst returned to Bradford and worked for his father—who hadn’t 
wanted him to go to college in the fi rst place—then caught on with the Ohio 
Geological Survey studying oil-bearing rocks.  At the time geology was in its 
infancy, and those who knew the most about the subject were more likely to work 
for the federal or state governments than teach at a university.  So Newell’s big 
break came in 1888 when he met John Wesley Powell, the head of the United 
States Geological Survey in Boston, and later in that year, in Washington, he 
met two other prominent fi gures in the USGS, G. K. Gilbert and Henry Gannett.  
At the time, Powell was organizing the Irrigation Survey within the USGS to 
investigate and map potential dams and canals in the West, and Powell asked 
Newell to take charge of a crew of 14 recent engineering graduates from Harvard, 
Yale, and Troy to study the characteristics and volume of streams in the West.  
This was far-removed from petroleum geology, but Newell jumped at the chance.
 The training camp at remote and isolated  Embudo, New Mexico, on the 
Rio Grande, changed Newell’s life.  However, Congress cancelled the Irrigation 
Survey in 1890, and it cut the USGS appropriation by half in 1892.  Powell 
resigned as director of the Survey in 1894, and Newell learned another valuable 
lesson: western politicians cared little about science but everything about 
economic development.  It was a lesson he would long remember.
 Frederick Newell was not a hydraulic engineer, and he never designed an 
irrigation project—either before or after 1902.  He knew a lot about the nature 
of rivers, and he also prepared the census of irrigation for the United States in 
1890 and 1900, but he had little experience with desert agriculture.  More than his 
adaptability, and more than his raw intelligence, what Newell had was the right 
political and scientifi c connections.  In 1890 he joined the Cosmos Club, which 
until he found a house in Washington, served, he recalled in his memoirs, as his 
“main refuge.”  Within a year he became a regular member of the “Great Basin 
Lunch Mess,” which included G. K. Gilbert, Henry Gannett, W. J. McGee, and 
Gifford Pinchot.  The group met over lunch to discuss the critical natural resource 
issues facing the nation in the 1890s.  In the next few years he became active in 
the National Geographic Society, the American Geographical Society, and the 
American Forestry Association, and he gave frequent lectures before scientifi c 
and engineering societies—more often on forestry than hydrology.  Newell and 
Gifford Pinchot frequently discussed the need to improve the administration of the 
national forests, in part to protect the fl ow of the many streams that originated on 
the public domain.  Through Pinchot, Newell met the then governor of New York 
in 1900, Theodore Roosevelt.  Newell and Pinchot became Roosevelt’s closest 
advisors on natural resources, and it was only natural that when the  Reclamation 
Act passed Congress in 1902, the United States Geological Survey would 
administer the new program and Frederick Haynes Newell would take charge.
 Federal reclamation was such a bold program that it was almost inevitable 
that those who designed and administered it would make mistakes.  In 1800 the 
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Harrison Land Act had sold land on credit.  Farmers quickly fell into arrears on 
their payments—and fi nally, after attempting to use the United States Army to 
evict those who refused to pay, Congress excused those payments entirely.  Those 
who settled the land thought that they were entitled to it for nothing.  It was they 
who gave the land value, they reasoned, not the federal government.  As you 
know, the same thing happened to federal reclamation.  By the 1920s, and in some 
parts of the West long before that, farmers considered the program an entitlement, 
and so did many of its sponsors.  After all, easterners got river and harbor 
improvements for nothing, why shouldn’t farmers who had the courage to try to 
settle the desert wilderness get their land and water free?  Equally important was 
the massive depression of the 1890s.  Congress passed the  Reclamation Act with 
the expectation of jump-starting the western economy.  Federal reclamation, it was 
hoped, would encourage private capital to invest in the region— which it had not 
done since the early 1890s.  Then, too, in 1902, there were three states expected to 
join the Union before Theodore Roosevelt stepped down as President: Oklahoma, 
Arizona, and New Mexico.  TR wanted to maintain the Republican support he 
already enjoyed in states like Wyoming and Montana.  Therefore, in consultation 
with Charles D. Walcott, the director of the USGS and the Reclamation Service, 
and Chief Engineer Newell, Roosevelt made a fateful decision: the Reclamation 
Service would not build one or two model irrigation projects so that it could 
learn from experience.  Nor would it build the large projects beyond the means of 
private enterprise that A. P. Davis, J. D. Lippincott and others had favored for the 
Colorado and Sacramento rivers.  Instead, within a few years of 1902 it launched 
smaller irrigation projects in every western state and territory to spread the wealth 
of the reclamation fund as evenly as possible. To be sure, Congress required in 
the  Reclamation Act that 51 percent of the money raised from public land sales be 
spent on reclamation within the state or territory in which that land was located.
But that did not mean that the Reclamation Service had to launch 28 projects 
within a few years.  So fast did the Service undertake these dams and canals that 
it could not profi t from mistakes and misconceptions.  And by 1915, when Newell 
left the Reclamation Service, the mistakes were all too obvious: the soils—which 
had not been tested prior to opening the original projects—were uneven and often 
of poor quality, inadequate attention had been paid to fi nding transportation and 
markets for the crops raised, and those crops were likely to be low value alfalfa 
rather than the high value citrus fruits or vegetables that promoters of government 
irrigation had hoped would be raised on the projects in 1902.
 By 1909 the Reclamation Service was bombarded with complaints from 
the projects and from Congress, and Newell had become defensive and evasive.
He tried to hide the seriousness of the problems on the projects from the president, 
from the secretaries of the interior, and from Congress.  A. P. Davis remembered 
a meeting in 1914 with Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane and the so-
called “father of the Reclamation Act,” Francis G. Newlands, then a United 
States senator from Nevada.  Newlands had long been a friend and supporter of 
Newell, but at this meeting, according to Davis, even Newlands lost his patience.
Davis was a team player and he had gone out of his way to defend Newell.  But 
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Newlands—who was generally mild-mannered—asked “almost savagely,” or so 
Davis later remembered, what Newell’s faults were.
I told the Senator that Mr. Newell’s principle weakness was his inability 
to say “No,” and that his principal mistake was in taking up too much 
work which was the result of his yielding to pressure in various regions, 
for the sake of avoiding antagonism and criticism, but that it had had 
the reverse effect.  I told him I had often protested against taking up 
so many projects beyond the capacity of funds to properly push, and 
that I could prevent this when in the Washington offi ce, but when I was 
absent in the fi eld… commitments were made to new work which had 
tied up the funds and made it necessary to ask Congress for additional 
appropriations.  It had also led to delay of the work on all of the projects, 
so that settlers were exposed to great hardships in waiting for water.…
 Newell accomplished a great deal.  By 1906 twenty-eight government 
projects had been selected.  When completed, they were expected to irrigate as 
few as 8,000 acres on the Garden City project in Kansas to as many as 200,000 
acres on the Salt River Project in Arizona and the Truckee-Carson Project 
in Nevada.  In all, more than 3,000,000 acres would be reclaimed from the 
desert and 62,000 farms created.  As head of the Reclamation Service, Newell 
supervised the construction of 100 dams, twenty-fi ve miles of tunnels and some 
1,300 miles of canals and ditches that supplied water to 20,000 farmers.  At 328 
feet, the Shoshone Dam in northeastern Wyoming, completed in 1910, was the 
highest dam in the world, and Roosevelt Dam, built on the Salt River between 
1906 and 1911, was the largest masonry dam in the world.  By 1916 Arrowrock 
Dam, which was 385 feet high, had eclipsed the Shoshone Dam.
 Nevertheless, Newell had many blind spots, and for a partial explanation 
we can go back to his childhood and the decades he was growing up.  Newell 
shared the same faith in Social Darwinism that many Progressives held, and the 
experience of his father must have suggested to him that the natural order of 
human existence included failure and uncertainty.  What most hampered Newell’s 
judgment is that he refused to recognize how vastly different agriculture was in 
the United States in 1900 or 1910 than in 1860 or 1880.  In one of his annual 
reports, when he was under heavy fi re from Congress,  Newell acknowledged 
some of the “fallacies” that had retarded federal reclamation.  The most important, 
he said, was that “it was not anticipated how diffi cult it would be to secure the 
right kind of farmers to handle the reclaimed land, and utilize it to advantage.”
 Newell was right.  Many penniless and inexperienced farmers fl ooded 
onto the government projects before water was available, and they were doomed 
to fail.  Nevertheless, those settlers had been encouraged to take up land on 
the projects by the Reclamation Bureau, and one wonders whether Newell’s 
own versatility—remember that he was neither a hydraulic engineer nor a soil 
scientist—played some part in the decision to open the projects to all comers.  Of 
course, when those settlers proved less resourceful than he had hoped, Newell 
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quickly lost faith in them.  In 1912 he suggested that the problems on the federal 
reclamation projects were due mainly to character faults in those who settled the 
government projects, not in the administration of the Reclamation Service or even 
in limitations imposed by Congress.  “The characteristics of present settlers are 
in many respects entirely different from those of the older pioneer communities,” 
he wrote.  “[T]here is not the spirit of cooperation which ruled the early pioneers; 
the class of people now attracted to the lands are not as capable of adapting 
themselves to existing conditions and initiating the building of distributing 
works.”  Disgruntled farmers, Newell believed, had blamed the Reclamation 
Service for their own weaknesses.  If anything, the Reclamation service had done 
too much.  In a 1913 letter to Gifford Pinchot, Newell observed that the more the 
federal government did, the more dependent on government assistance farmers 
became.  “On the whole,” he concluded, “we have done too much in taking the 
initiative and in trying to expedite development.”  Newell drew a sharp distinction 
between the self-reliant pioneer farmer of the nineteenth century and the twentieth 
century farmer who refused to work as hard.
He [the would-be twentieth century farmer] is attracted usually by 
glowing accounts of the relative ease of acquiring wealth in the West, 
and with erroneous ideas concerning the conditions to be met.… There 
has thus arisen a class which has been called the “professional pioneer,” 
always seeking for something a little better or for conditions where life 
will be easier; staying in any locality only a few months and then again 
seeking El Dorado.
Newell admitted that more than 75 percent of those who fi rst settled an irrigation 
project were gone within three or four years.  “This is naturally to be expected,” 
he observed, “as the fi rst-comers were usually the more restless members of a 
community, men who were always on the lookout for something new and when 
they discovered it were anxious to dispose of their acquisitions and move on to 
a still better opportunity.”  In a 1919 address Newell called for a return to the 
old values: “Let us try to get back to more of the real spirit of democracy, of 
Americanism, of self reliance, of doing those things for ourselves and for the 
public which we can best do, not waiting for some governmental bureau, which in 
turn waits on Congress.…”
  Newell was forced to resign from the Reclamation Bureau in 1915 by 
Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, and soon thereafter he became head of 
the Civil Engineering Department at the University of Illinois.  He remained very 
active in national engineering societies, but in the years that followed showed 
little interest in science or conservation, and he was not in demand as a consultant. 
He enjoyed academic life but riding herd over nine academic engineers provided 
little challenge.  As he wrote after he left the University of Illinois in 1920: 
“everything seemed too easy in the sense that there was not enough stimulus to 
keep an active man from becoming a typical college professor emersed [sic] in 
petty routine.”  In 1918 the American Geographical Society, of which Newell had 
been a prominent member, awarded him its Cullum Gold Medal.  One side of the 
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medallion bore the inscription: “He carried water from a mountain wilderness 
to turn the waste places of the desert into homes for freemen.”  Yet, ironically,  
 Newell died in 1931 convinced that federal reclamation had been unnecessary 
and unwise.  Congress, Newell argued at the end of his life, had paid too much 
attention to the arid West; the farms of the humid United States were more than 
adequate to feed the entire nation.  The crops produced on government projects 
represented less than 1 percent of the value of all farm products raised in the 
United States and only 6 percent of the value of the arid region’s output.  There 
was no demand for new homes and—given farm mechanization, the labor-saving 
value of electricity, and the continuing migration to cities—the family farm had 
no future in the West.  Newell died an embittered man.
Floyd Dominy
 Floyd Dominy has gotten a bad rap from historians.  Those of you 
who have read  Marc Reisner’s Cadillac Desert: The American West and its 
Disappearing Water (1986) know what I mean.  In that book, Reisner likened 
Dominy to “a Mafi a shakedown artist running a recalcitrant store owner out of the 
neighborhood,”
“A terrorist” who “ended his term [as commissioner] as a zealot, blind 
to injustice, locked in a mad-dog campaign against the environmental 
movement and the whole country over a pair of Grand Canyon dams 
[Bridge and Marble Canyon].”
Dominy spent many hours talking with Reisner, and one would expect that 
Reisner would have developed some respect for the former commissioner’s 
honesty and accessibility, if not his policies and values.  But Cadillac Desert
is fi lled with asides like the following: “At eleven o’clock one morning in the 
spring of 1980, Dominy, fl oating on three gin and juices and powered by two 
cigars, was in a mood to talk.…”  Historians are no less given to the love of 
salacious details than the public at large—perhaps because we are so immersed in 
the “petty details” that Newell found distasteful as chair of the civil engineering 
department at the University of Illinois.  In any case, Reisner knew that sex sells 
and that Floyd Dominy had huge sexual appetites.  And, in fairness to Reisner, he 
thought that Dominy’s sexual exploits had a bearing on the policies he followed 
as commissioner.  “In the end, it wasn’t any of this that did Dominy in,” Reisner 
wrote.
It was his innate self-destructiveness, which manifested itself most 
blatantly in an undisguised preoccupation with lust.  His sexual exploits 
were legendary.  They were also true.  Whenever and wherever he 
traveled, he wanted a woman for the night.  He had no shame about 
propositioning anyone.  He would tell a Bureau employee with a bad 
marriage that his wife was a hell of a good lay, and the employee 
wouldn’t know whether he was joking or not.
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 Well, my purpose is not to deny these charges, only to say that while 
historians have the obligation to look at the seamy side of people, they also have 
the obligation to look at them whole.  Tempting as it is to turn people into cartoon 
fi gures, and history into a series of simple morality plays, the past is much more 
complicated than that.  So let me show you another side of Floyd Dominy, a 
part of his life that infl uenced the decisions he made just as much as Frederick 
Newell’s childhood turned him into a man who couldn’t say no and led him to 
treat farmers on government irrigation projects with disdain and contempt. 
 Unlike Newell, Dominy was born on a farm near Hastings, Nebraska.  In 
1958 in hearings before Congress on the 160-acre limitation, Dominy talked about 
what it was like to grow up on such a farm.
I want you to know that… it took [my grandfather] from 1876 to 1919 
to pay off the $2,000 that he borrowed to make the trek to [Nebraska 
from Illinois] to provide his home on a public land homestead.… [W]hen 
my own father reached maturity he took a homestead in the same area, 
160 acres.  On that farm 6 of us children were born and 6 of us reached 
maturity on the subsistence of that 160-acre homestead.  We had outside 
plumbing.  We did not have deep freezers, automobiles, [or] school 
buses coming by the door.  We walked to school in the mud.  We had… 
one decent set of clothes to wear to town on Saturday.  Otherwise we 
wore overalls.  We didn’t have the modern things that a farm today must 
provide.
26.2.  Floyd E. Dominy at Hoover Dam in 1963 during his term as Commissioner of 
Reclamation.
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 Dominy attended the University of Wyoming, but unlike Newell he 
majored in agricultural economics, not engineering.  He graduated in 1933, not a 
good year to begin a career, and after a brief stint at teaching school he became 
a county agricultural extension agent in Campbell County, Wyoming, which was 
grazing country.
I saw there the [bitter] fruits of the 640-acre Homestead Act.…I want 
everyone in this room and I want this committee to know that most 
of those 640 acres could not sustain a family under any reasonable 
economic conditions that have prevailed then or now.
In short, by the time he became commissioner, Dominy’s experience growing up 
in Hastings, Nebraska, and his later experience in Wyoming suggested that the 
small farm was a thing of the past, given the standard of living of most Americans 
in the 1950s and 1960s.  (Ironically, he ran a family farm himself in Virginia, 
twenty miles from the capitol, after he came to Washington in 1938.  He started 
with 32 acres and eventually secured 380 acres, but thought that even that was 
inadequate to make a living.)  Soon before he left offi ce in 1969, he observed in a 
speech that
The general trend now is… the abandonment of family-sized farms and 
the deterioration of small communities into ghost towns.  In our modern 
mechanized and high-speed civilization, I see no major changes likely in 
this trend.
 Floyd Dominy was the fi rst commissioner to make this admission, at least 
publicly.  Contrary to what some historians have suggested, the Reclamation 
Bureau did not abandon the family farm in the 1930s and 1940s.  To be sure, the 
agricultural depression of the 1930s, the growth of cities like Los Angeles, and 
World War II contributed to the decline of the rural West.  But the bureau built 
many small water projects during the 1930s and 1940s, and at the end of World 
War II the twin goals of federal reclamation—promoting the family farm and 
encouraging economic growth—remained intact.
 In 1946 Commissioner of Reclamation Michael Straus predicted that 
within fi ve years the bureau would open more than 45,000 family-sized farms on 
4,000,000 acres.  This was no small undertaking.  The bureau promised to provide 
as many homes to returning veterans and their families as it had created on all 
its projects during the four decades prior to World War II.  The fi rst farms would 
be on the Klamath, Yakima, Minidoka, and Shoshone projects, but the single 
largest project would be in the Columbia River Basin, where the bureau hoped to 
have at least 400,000 acres ready for settlement by 1950 or 1951.  “The ultimate 
objective of the  Bureau of Reclamation and its staff,” Reclamation Era reported, 
“is to develop the West through the creation of permanent family farms on Federal 
Reclamation projects.”
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 The  Columbia Basin Project had many objectives, perhaps too many.  It 
was designed both to provide new land for farmers driven off the Great Plains by 
the dust storms of the 1930s and to prevent a post-war drain of population away 
from the Pacifi c Northwest during the reconversion to a peacetime economy.  
Not only would the construction of dams and canals in central Washington state 
provide jobs, but the farms might provide homes to displaced workers.  By the 
end of the 1950s, however, it was clear that the Columbia Basin Project would 
not resurrect the bureau’s mission to create small farms in the West.  At the end 
of World War II, the Reclamation Bureau had hoped to create 10,000 to 20,000 
new homesteads in the Columbia Basin, but only 2,300 had been opened by 1958.  
Nor was that land settled by young men looking for a fresh start;  the median 
age of those who took up farms in the Columbia Basin Project was 40.  Nor did 
it provide homes for those who had abandoned farms on the Great Plains;  most 
settlers came from Washington or Utah.  And these were not poor people.  Over 
half had family assets of $20,000 or more, and one-third did not live on their 
farms.  In 1968, the Reclamation Bureau washed its hands of the project, turning 
it over to three irrigation districts.  According to the historian Paul Pitzer, had the 
bureau fi nished the project, the results would have been even worse.  “It would 
be a collection of family farms ranging from forty to eighty acres, none of them 
capable of supplying their owners with a satisfactory living.  The area would be a 
rural slum.  It is for the best that this aspect of the project failed.”
 Little wonder, given his background, that  Floyd Dominy showed scant 
interest either in the family farm or in maintaining the 160-acre limitation on 
cheap water.  When federal reclamation began in 1902, Dominy recognized, it 
was a subsistence program, but by the 1960s, the rural standard of living had 
changed dramatically.  “[In 1902] Those guys didn’t think a farmer should have 
indoor plumbing or electric lights, for heavens sakes,” Dominy observed in his 
oral history.  “They didn’t think their kids should go to college or to the dentist.  
They were subsistence farmers.  That’s all a farmer was supposed to do in 1902 
was live, exist.  Not prosper, but exist.  That’s the origin of the 160-acre limit and 
all that crap.”
 There were, of course, other forces working to end the era of dam-building 
besides the decline or erosion of the traditional family farm ideal.  Those who 
have studied Dominy’s reign as commissioner of the  Bureau of Reclamation have 
focused on the debate over the construction of Glen Canyon, Bridge, and Marble 
dams and the Pacifi c Southwest Water Plan.  They have regarded the Reclamation 
Bureau as far more powerful, and certainly far more autonomous, than it really 
was.  Like all institutions of government, the bureau was subject to historical 
trends over which it had little or no control.
 To begin with, big dams looked far less attractive to Americans—and 
even to many Americans living in the West—by the 1960s.  Traditionally, one of 
the strongest arguments against such dams had been that it made more sense to 
move people to water than water to people.  Far more water was lost in transit, 
647
through seepage and evaporation, than was delivered at the end of the pipeline 
or ditch.  Now many critics of dams began to question whether they represented 
conservation at all.  The Sierra Club regarded silt as more than something that 
clogged dams; it was also a symptom of the Reclamation Bureau’s refusal 
to cooperate with those agencies that tried to protect the land.  “[T]he real 
management of rivers begins in the headwaters and on the hilltops…through good 
land management,” a writer observed in 1950 in the Sierra Club Bulletin.  For 
example, both the Corps of Engineers and the  Bureau of Reclamation refused to 
cooperate with the efforts of the Soil Conservation Service and the Forest Service 
to fi ght soil erosion.
 In the 1950s and 1960s, environmental organizations did not simply argue 
that dams were bad for the environment, they also argued that dams represented 
an outmoded, expensive technology.  In the 1930s, part of the appeal of high 
dams was that they would last as long as the pyramids.  But that changed during 
the Cold War, when the very dams that provided the power to run many of the 
nation’s defense industries became potential targets for Russian missiles and 
bombs.  Many of the West’s cities could be as easily paralyzed by disrupting their 
water and power systems, or by the fl oods that would result from bringing down 
one of these gigantic structures, as from the detonation of a bomb over the city 
itself.  And even more important than the danger from the destruction of dams was 
the promise of nuclear power.  As a writer in the Sierra Club Bulletin observed in 
1948,
we may live to see the regulated use of atomic power a few years from 
now.  If we learn to use it properly… we won’t need to harness all the 
rivers of the land.…At least we might wait a little while and see what 
happens before we drown our greatest canyons and destroy forever so 
much natural beauty.
  David Brower suggested that atomic energy might make high dams 
obsolete long before they fi lled with silt.  He asked, “Is it not time to reverse the 
trend of centralization—of concentrating tremendously remunerative strategic 
targets: of building larger projects to enable more people to live in less space[?]”  
In the middle of the 1960s, during debate over the proposed  Rampart Dam in 
Alaska, a Corps of Engineers structure that would have created a reservoir larger 
than Lake Erie, a writer in Living Wilderness pointed out that any one of fi ve 
atomic generators produced by the General Electric Company could produce 
as much power as the proposed hydroelectric plants at Rampart at half the 
installation cost.  And, she estimated, the price of the power to consumers would 
be just as cheap. 
 By the 1960s and 1970s, hydroelectric power no longer seemed as 
attractive as it did during the 1920s or 1930s.  California was a prime example.
In 1910 falling water produced most of the electricity used in the state.  Steam 
power was used mainly to meet peak demands.  But the increasing effi ciency of 
steam generators, the falling prices of petroleum and natural gas, and the fact that 
648
such plants could be located near large cities, made steam turbines increasingly 
attractive.  In 1920 hydroelectric power constituted 37 percent of the power 
generated within the United States.  That fi gure fell to 33 percent in 1940, and 
despite the large hydroelectric plants opened during World War II, even in 1945 
only 36 percent of the nation’s power came from hydroelectric plants.
 Neither waste nor the growing cost of water projects explain the end of 
the dam-building era any more than the declining number of good dam sites.
After all, water projects had always been wasteful, and nineteenth century river 
and harbor improvements had been a method to distribute surplus federal money 
as much as a way to improve transportation.  Nor did this change.  Many of the 
water projects undertaken during the 1930s were “wasteful” by nature because 
their primary purpose was to provide jobs.  Nor were agricultural subsidies new.  
But after World War II the West and South benefi tted more from water projects 
than other parts of the country.  In 1902 federal reclamation had been sold to 
Congress partly as compensation to the West for river and harbor bills that mainly 
benefi tted states around the Great Lakes and along the eastern seaboard.  But the 
historian Tim Palmer estimates that from 1950 to 1976, the Northeast received 
only 6 percent of the money spent on water projects by the Corps of Engineers 
and  Bureau of Reclamation, while the South received 28 percent and the West 
about half.  In effect, residents of the East and Midwest subsidized the growth 
of cities in the West at the expense of those in the northeast, as crops grown in 
California and Arizona received greater per acre subsidies than crops raised in 
other parts of the nation.
  By the late 1960s, it was very diffi cult to argue that the West 
needed or deserved more federal aid than other parts of the country.  The region’s 
economy may not have been as diversifi ed as that of the East, but the importance 
of grazing, mining, lumbering and other extractive industries had declined as the 
West urbanized.  Moreover, the Vietnam War cut into the budgets of virtually all 
domestic programs, and the lessening of tensions between the United States and 
Soviet Union reduced the appeal of building dams to power the defense industries 
of the West.
 During the 1960s Dominy 
was extremely effective in squeezing 
money out of Congress.  But he was 
successful not just because western 
politicians were effective at winning 
the pork, but also because Dominy 
used a wide variety of effective 
arguments when he testifi ed before 
Congressional committees.  Federal 
reclamation projects, Dominy argued, 
produced many of the nation’s 
vegetables, particularly during 26.3.  Loading cantaloupes in a fi eld on the Yuma Project in 1958.
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the winter months when crops could be grown only in the warm and sunny 
Southwest.  In 1965 he pointed out that 95 percent of the lettuce, 70 percent of the 
cantaloupes, 52 percent of the sweet corn, 50 percent of the carrots, and 
44 percent of the caulifl ower came from land watered by the Reclamation Bureau. 
After the war, nutritionists argued that Americans should diversify their diet, 
and by providing fruits and vegetables grown in the winter, federal reclamation 
improved the health of all Americans.  Moreover, in testimony before Congress 
 Dominy repeatedly pointed out that reclamation ministered to the health of the 
soul as well as the body.  The ten most-visited bureau reservoirs attracted more 
vacationers per year than the ten most heavily used national parks and thus took 
much of the pressure off the parks.  In 1967 he observed that in the previous 
year more than four million “visitor days” had been spent on Lake Mead and 
only two and one-half million at the most heavily visited National Park, Grand 
Teton.  Dominy also claimed that irrigating land drove up its value, along with 
crop values.  Increasing wealth expanded the tax base of communities and the 
quality of their schools and other public services.  “[T]he income tax increases 
as a result of our project growth is greater each year than the total investment in 
reclamation,” he noted.
 Above all, Dominy warned that the nation had to prepare to feed a 
much larger population.  The nation’s population increased by 15 percent in 
the 1940s and another 20 percent in the 1950s, and the number of people in the 
West increased even faster than that.  Meanwhile, millions of acres of marginal 
farmland in the South and Midwest were retired from production after World War 
II, and Dominy estimated that half the nation’s farms were “marginal.”  In any 
case, at the end of his term as commissioner Dominy predicted that
by 1980, the Bureau of Reclamation will be able to go it alone, 
continuing the program solely out of income.  But as in any business 
venture, it is necessary to spend money to make money.  And to get 
back on schedule, it will be important… to step up the program as the 
committee has indicated just as soon as the present budget emergency is 
over.
 From 1903 to 1950 the  Bureau of Reclamation spent two billion dollars 
on its projects.  It spent another two billion from 1951 to 1961, and the bureau’s 
construction appropriations peaked at $300 million in 1964.  In fi scal year 1965, 
the budget began to shrink and when Dominy stepped down as commissioner 
in 1969 he observed that “water development is being slighted.… I think our 
national priorities are not being assessed properly, and that we are spending far 
too much on space and other elements.  If we need to cut back, we should not cut 
back on the one thing that keeps America strong, its development of resources.”
 The last major project authorization came in 1968, a year before Dominy 
left offi ce.  That was for the  Central Arizona Project, the aqueduct that stretches 
from the Colorado River to Tucson, via Phoenix.  For a man who grew up on 
the plains of Nebraska, a man who knew rural poverty fi rst-hand, the American 
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West of 1969 was a  far better place to live because of the Bureau of Reclamation.  
Dominy genuinely believed that the dams and canals built by the bureau had 
improved the living standards of the region’s rural and urban residents.  Many of 
us would argue that that economic growth came at a high, even an intolerable, 
price to the environment, Native Americans, and to other groups that did not 
share in the wealth produced by the projects.  But that story has been well-told.
What I’ve tried to suggest is that while the personalities and values of individual 
commissioners certainly helped shape the policies they followed, neither Newell 
nor Dominy had the power or autonomy attributed to them by many historians.
Sometimes the bureau responded effectively to change, as it did in building the 
high dams in the 1930s and 1940s, but much was beyond its control, from the 
emergence of a consumer economy and increasing living standards in the 1920s 
to the Vietnam War and the stagnant American economy of the 1970s.  Just as 
Newell and Dominy were men of a particular time and place, so was the dam-
building impulse that drove the bureau during the fi rst seven decades of its life.
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One Hundred Years of the Bureau of Reclamation:
Looking from the Outside In
By:
Patricia Nelson Limerick
 The  Bureau of Reclamation is a federal agency very much identifi ed with 
the American West, thanks to its focus on water management in arid lands.  This 
situation offers wonderful opportunities to historians.  A review of the agency’s 
annual reports over the last century offers its own fi ne microcosm of changes in 
Western life, economy, and ideology.  The offi cials who have written the Bureau’s 
offi cial reports have been something close to seismic monitors for changes in the 
settlement patterns of the West, as well as in American attitudes toward the West.  
As many others have observed, the rise of urban and suburban populations in the 
West registers clearly in the changing mandate of the Bureau, as hydroelectric 
power and municipal and industrial water supply have steadily pushed irrigation 
to the side.  Similarly, shifts in popular attitudes toward nature are expertly 
mirrored in the Bureau’s reports, even if they are not always as well refl ected in 
the Bureau’s practice.
 If we look at the most recent report, for the year 2000, the words “water 
conservation” are used repeatedly.  Quite a number of passages discuss the 
Bureau’s efforts to aid wildlife and preserve or restore its habitat.  The Bureau 
reaffi rms its commitment to act in support of the goal of “no net loss of wetlands” 
(though this might be considered by some to be a textbook case of closing 
the barn door after departure of the horses).  It declares an enthusiasm for the 
“watershed approach,” incorporating “the ecology and interests of an entire basin 
rather than using a piecemeal approach.”  The phrase “environmentally and 
economically sound” is also a popular one.1
 I suppose one could say that we could and should see the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s rhetorical streak of born-again environmentalism as proof that 
“even the Devil can quote Scripture” (a proposition that hardly needed any more 
proof).  Still, I would rephrase the proposition slightly, to refl ect the constraints 
under which federal agencies have operated and still operate: “The Devil had 
better quote Scripture, and quote it often, if He doesn’t want any more litigation, 
or any more trouble with Congress, the electorate, and environmental groups than 
He already has.”
 And yet the change in the Bureau’s operations has been as enormous 
as the change in its offi cial rhetoric.  As the 1979 Report said, “the Service’s 
[the Bureau had been briefl y renamed the Water and Power Resources Service] 
mission has evolved from a single-purpose irrigation function to a multipurpose 
water resource development program.”  The 1989 Report declared that “emphasis 
is now shifting to activities that respond to the West’s current water needs—
such as environmental protection, water quality and salinity control, wetlands 
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management, water conservation, groundwater management, drought relief, 
system optimization, and related research work.”  As the 1997 Report said, the 
Bureau’s mission has “moved from development to management” of water.  All 
of these remarks can be read as coded ways of saying, “We don’t build big dams 
anymore, though we still have responsibility for quite a few of them.”  Bureau 
employees have taken up the use of the term “mission creep,” a phrase that 
could produce many amusing guesses as to its meaning among those who do not 
frequent agency circles (images of Father Serra on a stealth approach might come 
to mind), to summarize the proliferation and spread of their activities: the dam-
building and irrigation-water-supplying agency has “evolved” into furnishing 
cities and suburbs with water, providing hydroelectric power, managing recreation 
sites, designing techniques to restore water quality, trying to accommodate the 
needs of wildlife, and monitoring and shoring up old dams.  In fact, rather than 
the creeping approach of new missions, the bigger story of change for Bureau 
staff has involved the mission that crept away from them: the building of big 
dams.2
 The shift from construction to maintenance is, itself, one of the most 
poignant dimensions of the Bureau’s “change over time” (and yes, I do think that 
federal agencies have poignant dimensions—plenty of them).  Offi cial discussion 
of dam safety accelerated after the 1976 collapse of the Teton Dam, and the 
passage of the 1978 Dam Safety Act.  In many recent reports, this observation 
has appeared: “More than half of Reclamation’s facilities are now more than 50 
years old.”  As the 2000 Report summed this up, “Reclamation has 457 dams and 
dikes.  Of these 358 would endanger lives if a failure occurred.”  In the agency’s 
early years, Reclamation Service offi cials liked to use the adjective “permanent” 
and the adverb “permanently.”  “The works to be built by the Government,” the 
Third Annual Report declared, “should be permanent in character,” and thus “in 
striking contrast with those built by private enterprise, since the latter are largely 
temporary in character.”  But earth shifts; concrete wears away; silt accumulates; 
ditches and canals leak and seep; hydroelectric production facilities become 
obsolete.  The fact that reclamation structures come with such constrained life 
spans makes one wonder exactly what meaning the word “permanence” held for 
Reclamation engineers a century ago.  But the fact that the structures that Newell 
and his immediate successors built now need regular examination and restoration 
is its own poignant testimony that, even if the founders of the  Bureau of 
Reclamation did not do much to reckon with the passage of time, the passage of 
time has been pretty merciless in its reckoning with them.  (One striking historical 
irony involves some dams that are now in need of repair and reconfi guration, but, 
since they are now on the Historic Registry, they can only be rehabilitated in ways 
that visually match their appearance at the time of construction.)3
 When it comes to a reckoning with time, centennials, sesquicentennials, 
quincentenaries, and all the other “metric moments,” to use Greg Dening’s 
phrase, do provide a distinctive opportunity.  Given the ways in which the history 
of the  Bureau of Reclamation echoes and mirrors the history of the American 
653
West, this particular centennial offers a particularly rich opportunity for metric 
refl ection.  Richard White’s famous phrase, describing the American West as “the 
kindergarten of the state” (the place where historians can watch the process as 
the federal government invented and deployed its domestic powers) provides a 
useful framework for considering the origins of this particular agency.  While I 
have a few reservations about the use of the human life cycle as a metaphor for 
federal agencies, its value and applicability are also unmistakable.  The phase we 
call “adolescence,” for instance, is as wild a ride for federal agencies and their 
associates as it is for young people and their associates.  And even people who are 
not fond of metaphors and analogies would have to admit that the Reclamation 
Service had something that seems well-characterized as a “rough childhood.”
 For the last decade or so, I have watched federal resource management 
agencies the way other people watch sports teams.  Watching a federal institution 
maneuver through time and changing contexts has a fascination that may escape 
others, but it still captivates and enchants those who are susceptible to it.  On a 
number of occasions, I have had the opportunity to speak to employees of federal 
agencies, refl ecting on the relationship between their organization’s history and 
their own, poignant contemporary dilemmas.  To prepare for these occasions, I 
have read offi cial newsletters and reports, and thus I have come to believe that 
you can learn a lot about an organization by reading, with critical intensity, its 
offi cial publications.  What to others may seem boilerplate often provides a very 
useful and revealing orientation for a speaker or presenter who wants to invite an 
audience into an exploration of the connections between an organization’s past 
and present.  At the least, offi cial publications display what the agency’s offi cials 
were willing to put on public record.  While there is always some chance that 
this material will consist of fl uff and self-promotion, there is also the fact that 
federal agencies are in the business of courting public approval, and thus these 
texts reveal the leadership’s assessment of public mood and preference.  So, at the 
very least, these offi cial publications tell us about the organization’s perception 
of changing constituent or electorate tastes; when, for instance, mantras of 
environmental sensitivity move into publications of the Bureau of Reclamation, 
you know that an offi cial bow toward preserving the earth and its resources has 
become very mainstream indeed.
 Now it is also true that I rarely have other historians in the room when I 
am engaged in these exercises in the “applied humanities,” and so the occasion 
today is a somewhat unnerving one.  And yet it is also a valuable occasion; as 
Don Pisani and I anticipate the Reclamation Centennial Conference in Las Vegas 
this June, this OAH session offers itself as a useful strategy session, or maybe a 
dress rehearsal or trial run.  Most important for me, it provides an occasion for 
appraising the “social utility” of looking at the past, in this case at an agency’s 
origins, as a foundation for thinking productively and freshly about our current 
dilemmas in Western resource use.  At the core of what I have been trying to 
do, when speaking to professionals in various federal resource management 
agencies, is to try to come up with a “better quality of hindsight,” to see if there is 
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a way to bring the past to bear on the present in a way that suggests possibilities 
and encourages fl exibility.  Our discussion today should provide me with an 
illuminating consideration of the question of whether this idea of “a better quality 
of hindsight” is more (or less) than a pipedream.
 Reading annual reports from the Bureau of Reclamation may not strike 
everyone as the most promising way to explore possibilities or encourage 
fl exibility, but I found the experience often engaging, and sometimes hypnotizing 
and entrancing.  It is true that people’s literary tastes can change over time; I 
used to read a lot more novels, or at least want to read a lot more novels, until I 
had to face up to the fact that what we call “nonfi ction” is entirely oversupplied 
with improbable characters and wild plot twists.  Is there any reason why I would 
need to rely on a novelist’s efforts at creativity and originality, when I can simply 
compare and contrast the “change over time” represented, for instance, in the 
Bureau of Reclamation’s late twentieth century desires to increase “diversity” in 
its work force in contrast to its Mongolian–excluding origins?4
 The success of the Reclamation Service, its founding Chief Engineer 
Frederick Newell said, required men—specifi cally, “an excellent class of well-
educated, effi cient, and energetic young men,” and the word “white” was the 
understood and implicit additional adjective in that phrase.  While it is true that 
one would not welcome the assignment of explaining to Newell or any other time 
traveler what a turn-of-this-century federal agency really means by its desire for 
“diversity,” nonetheless, early twentieth century Reclamation records are their 
own exemplary case studies in “white maleness” as the unmarked category, the 
category entirely conceived of as the norm.  The 1902 Act banned the use of 
“Mongolian labor”; three Reclamation projects were suffi ciently short of settlers 
that they were made into Japanese American relocation camps during World War 
Two; and Indian tribal resources sometimes fi gured in Reclamation projects, but 
otherwise race and ethnicity did not register in the reports, because the category of 
“human beings of signifi cance to Reclamation’s mission” so clearly came with an 
exclusive racial defi nition.5
 Review the reports of the early Reclamation Service, and no reason 
presents itself to doubt the racial exclusivity of the newly founded agency and its 
intended benefi ciaries.  But the reports do lead one to question an equally well-
established assumption: the assumption that the agency’s founders were men of 
arrogance, over-confi dence, and swaggering self-congratulation.
 “The engineers who staffed the Reclamation Service tended to view 
themselves as a godlike class performing hydrologic miracles for grateful 
simpletons who were content to sit in the desert and raise fruit”: that is Marc 
Reisner’s characterization of the agency in his famed 1986 book, Cadillac Desert.
Here is Donald Worster’s portrait in 1985 of the Bureau’s powers: “In its fi rst few 
embryonic [a word that offers an interesting variation on the life-style metaphor] 
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years, when thanks to Congressman Newlands’ efforts it was free to use the 
money from western land sales as it saw fi t, the Service was a power unto itself.”6
 To read these characterizations and then to turn to the fi rst reports of 
the Service is to engage in an episode of general puzzlement. “Godlike class 
performing hydrologic miracles”?  OK, maybe this was a very, very clever 
godlike class, cleverer than most of the sort, who made a strategic choice to write 
offi cial reports that would throw readers, past and present, off their trail.  Too 
much swaggering and boasting might confi rm hostile judgments and unmask 
excesses of power; would not an intelligent and foresighted godlike class choose, 
instead, to put on a show of manifestly unfelt modesty and humility?  Well, 
maybe, but the tone, style, and content of the 
fi rst decade or two of Annual Reports simply 
do not bring the words “godlike” or “power 
unto itself” to mind.
 Anyone who has ever founded an 
organization, and tried to report positively on 
its beginnings, must surrender to empathy on 
the very fi rst page of the First Annual Report.
The Newlands Act passed on June 17, 1902; a 
few days later, some men who worked for the 
Hydrographic Branch of the U.S. Geological 
Survey became the Reclamation Service; a 
few months passed, and it was time to report 
to Congress.  Here is what Secretary of the 
Interior E. A. Hitchcock said in his letter of 
transmittal for the report:
In view of the short time that has elapsed since the passage of said 
act, it is impossible to show in this report “the quantity and location 
of the lands which can be irrigated” from the various projects under 
consideration, or “the cost of works in process of construction, as well as 
those which have been completed,” for the reason that no works are now 
in process of construction or have been completed.
 I like this passage for a couple of reasons: it is honest; no one could call 
it arrogant; it has the kind of Lewis Carroll quality that sometimes characterizes 
federal communications (“we are writing to report that we have nothing to 
report”); and anyone, with responsibility for an institution or organization, who 
has received a grant and almost immediately received instructions to report on the 
outcomes and results of the grant, simply has to know how Secretary Hitchcock 
and Chief Engineer Newell felt.  Under these circumstances, “hitting the ground 
running” can easily feel like the equivalent of “hitting the ground tottering.”7
 And so the report for 1902 is fi lled with descriptions of fi eld work 
undertaken, surveys under way, and investigations of prospective projects, as well 
27.1.  Offi cial Portrait of Secretrary 
of the Interior Ethan Allen Hitchcock.
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as apologetic statements on the order of this one: “The fact that it is impossible to 
state in advance the plans which ultimately may be recommended for reclamation 
will result in great disappointment to many persons.”  When it came to the 
selection of sites for projects, the Reclamation Service and land-and-profi t-
oriented members of the western public were engaged in a great competitive 
guessing game, with the one certain outcome that a lot of people were going to 
be angry at the agency.  There was, for example, the problem of people who were 
trying to anticipate rising land values from reclamation:
The fact that lands have been temporarily set aside is, in the eyes 
of many, an indication that these lands will be reclaimed; and 
although every attempt has been made to warn individuals of the 
futility of fi ling upon these lands under the homestead law, yet they 
persist in taking up the land on the bare possibility that the surveys 
and examinations will show their lands to be reclaimable…It is 
an unfortunate condition which apparently cannot be corrected at 
present.
What this passage, along with many others in the First Report, makes clear is that 
from the time of its creation, from before the time of its creation, the  Reclamation 
Service was ensnarled and entangled in history, tied up in the consequences 
of actions that preceded any effort on its part to take control of western water 
development.8
 The Service began as a unit within the  U.S. Geological Survey, which had 
already had twenty years of complicated institutional life itself, and its fi rst Chief 
Engineer, Frederick Newell, had been a career employee of the USGS himself.  
As Newell put it, 
The operations were greatly facilitated by the fact that the work 
was not new to the men in charge, and that they were able to 
follow the methods and precedents established by the Geological 
Survey during twenty years of fi eld work.
“The plan,” Newell said further, was “to gradually enlarge and increase the 
number of parties in the fi eld without otherwise disturbing the current operations.” 
[“To gradually enlarge” is totally par for the course; it is a plain and simple 
historical fact that the Reclamation Service has, throughout its century of 
existence, led in the national campaign to eliminate active verbs and to fearlessly 
and shamelessly split infi nitives, though I do not believe that this mission was 
spelled out in its enabling act.]9
 Maybe I romanticize the charms of the true “fresh start” or “blank slate,” 
but the Reclamation Service never had such a thing.  If the Reclamation Service 
was an “infant” bureaucracy, its cradle was another bureaucracy.  From the 
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beginning it was living with its in-laws, operating within existing protocols, never 
having a clear moment of launching itself into the stream of time.
 In a similar way, the Reclamation Service was going to inherit a burden 
from history in the form of a tangle of land and water claims already imposed 
on the West’s resources.  As Newell said in the fi rst report, many western lands 
had “passed, in whole or in part, into the hands of private owners.”  Grants to 
railroads, as well as Spanish land grants, divided up the land; “homesteads and 
other entries” had been made “along banks of rivers or around springs or other 
sources of water supply.”  “The problem of reclamation,” as Newell summed it 
up, “is therefore not simply one of dealing with public land, but is complicated by 
private ownership.”  “Complicated” puts it mildly.10
 Here we get to the territory of greatest interest in this First Report, 
and perhaps in the whole history of Reclamation.  The results of irrigation, as 
conducted by private enterprise, Newell said, were “not wholly satisfactory, as far 
as the larger interests of the country are concerned”; “the larger public interests 
have not been guarded, and the making of homes has not been carried on to the 
extent which the wisest statesmanship requires.”  Here is the very interesting 
dynamic present from the start: at the foundation of federal reclamation was a 
stern critique of private enterprise, and especially of the speculative element of 
American capitalistic practice.  And yet federal reclamation was itself supposed 
to run like a business (the repayment provision was the keystone of that idea), 
and it was, moreover, supposed to serve the mission of creating and sustaining 
entrepreneurial family farms.  If you took the leash off and let Newell’s line of 
thought proceed, he was on his way to a very forceful statement that private 
enterprise had made a mess of land and water development in the West.  
Reclamation would, in the words of the Report, have to “accommodate earlier 
private developments,” but in the muddle these developments had created, even 
such seemingly simple matters as distinguishing, in order to allocate water rights, 
“between bona fi de and fi ctitious landowners” was “extremely diffi cult.”11
 So take the restraints off Frederick Newell, and you’d have a recruit for 
socialism, or at the least, for Henry George’s Single Tax campaign against the 
“unearned increment”?  Maybe.  But there is no question that the fi rst Chief 
Engineer of the Reclamation Service had good reason for ambivalence about the 
workings of American private enterprise.  And yet his agency and its staff would 
be judged by the success with which they served, supported, and won the approval 
of practitioners of the very economic system that had created the problems they 
were trying to rectify.  This was a tension that would persist through the agency’s 
history; during the Clinton years, for instance, the reports are well-supplied with 
declarations that the Bureau must be more “business-like” in its operations, and 
provide “customer” satisfaction to the American people, and the big question, 
of the trustworthiness and effi ciency of private enterprise in water usage and 
management, remained securely stored under the carpet.
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The crypto-critique of private enterprise in the early reports catches the 
attention, but what strikes the reader most intensely is how poorly Newell’s stance 
in his ten years of reporting fi ts the word arrogant or even the word confi dent.  Of 
course, six months after the passage of the Reclamation Act, having to report that 
there was nothing yet to report would hardly provide the occasion for a display of 
pride and institutional self-congratulations.  Still, over the next ten years, the annual 
reports retained a quality of modesty and even humility, culminating in the Eleventh
Annual Report summing up the Reclamation Service’s fi rst decade and setting some 
sort of record for frank admission of mistakes and misconceptions in a governmental 
statement.
 In the Second Report, Newell described, with considerable frankness, 
the very big difference between passing a law and creating an agency: “In an 
undertaking of this kind there must be encountered many unforeseen contingencies 
and complications when the general law is applied to actual conditions.”  In the 
Third Report, Newell took his admission of these diffi culties a step further: “Nearly 
all the projects under consideration here are relatively large and involve engineering 
diffi culties or have complications arising from private or vested interests.  Nowhere 
is it possible to go forward untrammeled.”  It is possible to read this as merely  a 
statement of frustration, rather than one of modesty and honest admission of 
limitation, and it is also possible to read it as the quintessential bureaucratic defense: 
“Don’t blame us; we’re trying hard; we may not have accomplished much; but 
our circumstances have been very diffi cult.”  Still, it would be hard to describe the 
statement as arrogant, over-confi dent, self-congratulatory, or “godlike.”12
 In the Third Report, a substantial list of decisions made by the Secretary of 
the Interior involving the interpretation of the 1902 law indicated that, just three 
years into the agency’s operations, the complexity of managing human beings was 
entering into the picture as the equivalent in challenge to managing rivers.  Within 
another year or two, the annual report had added a section called “Litigation,” listing 
all the lawsuits fi led against the  Reclamation Service, giving another indication that 
the complications of dealing with human beings were adding signifi cantly to the 
challenge of dealing with rivers.  “The engineering side,” Newell acknowledged 
in the Third Report, “does not offer usually as great causes of delay as the legal or 
human element.  There are almost everywhere land titles to be adjusted, rights of way 
to be secured, and claims to water to be considered.”13
 By the time of the Eleventh Annual Report, summarizing the fi rst ten years of 
the Service’s experience, perplexity over how best to deal with “the human element” 
produced a remarkably frank report, cataloguing the misapprehensions that had 
characterized the beginnings of Reclamation.  “The most diffi cult of the problems are 
not those of engineering nor of construction,” the opening of the report said clearly, 
“but those having to do with the human side—namely, the attracting or securing of 
the type of farmer who can and will make a success by intensive agriculture.”  As 
many others have noted, Newell was mad at the project settlers, and indeed held them 
responsible for most of his agency’s problems.14
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 But not solely responsible—here, again, the frankness of a section of 
the Report called “Fallacies Entertained” gives one a new respect for the under-
utilized possibilities of federal reporting.  “The fi rst, and perhaps the most 
striking” fallacy embraced by the Service at its founding, Newell reported, was 
the under-estimating of the cost of  reclamation, basing estimates on low-budget 
and unreliable pioneer enterprises.  “Another of the fallacies,” he said, “was in 
the assumption that as soon as water was provided this [would be the] end of 
necessary expenditures.”  On the contrary, once the water was available, there 
was still “the large cost of leveling, subduing, and cultivating the soil.”  “It was 
assumed,” moreover, “that the soil was necessarily fertile, not appreciating the 
fact that it frequently lacks the essential elements common in humid regions.”
And “another oversight…was the neglect of full consideration of drainage and 
the importance of providing this to prevent much of the more valuable land from 
being destroyed by swamping or alkali.”  And then there was a complex of under-
recognized factors involving the production and marketing of crops: 
It was not appreciated also that markets could not be had immediately 
for the crops raised and that much time must be required in developing 
good markets and in discovering those crops or varieties which are 
most profi table under the existing conditions of soil, climate, and 
transportation facilities.
Altogether, the Eleventh Report offers quite a prolonged and searching admission 
of error, and I do not think it has many counterparts in federal reports.  In a 
number of ways, it anticipates the critical appraisals offered by historians like 
Donald Worster and Mark Fiege.15
 The admitting of error does shift, at the end, to Newell’s anger at the 
“human element.”  “Perhaps most important of all, it was not anticipated how 
diffi cult it would be to secure the right kind of farmers to handle this reclaimed 
land, and to utilize it to advantage.”  It was not simply a problem of recruiting, 
though it was certainly that, too.  “When the act was discussed in 1901 and 
1902, it was generally assumed that the principal operations would be those of 
constructing the larger reservoirs and main-line canals, leaving to the farmers the 
business of building the distribution system. . . .”  Well, no such luck, and Newell 
resorted to pioneer nostalgia to explain what had gone wrong.  Earlier pioneers 
had been capable of making their own arrangements to get the water to their 
fi elds, but 
the characteristics of present settlers are in many respects entirely 
different from those of the older pioneer communities; there is not the 
cooperation which ruled the early pioneers; the class of people now 
attracted to the lands are not as capable of adapting themselves to the 
existing conditions and initiating the building of distribution works.
Submitting to this post-frontier failure of vigor and enterprise, the Bureau had 
to “dig canals and laterals aggregating thousands of miles in length,” and to 
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face the fact that “a great number of structures must be provided which were not 
anticipated—for example, bridges and road crossings.”16
 Like many others, Frederick Newell had learned that the agrarian dream 
was tough on its believers.  In many ways, his complaints anticipated the question 
Richard Hofstader would raise: why would we think of American farmers as 
people driven by the intrinsic moral virtue of laboring in the earth, when so 
much of their actual behavior revealed them to be a variety of petty bourgeoisie, 
considerably more committed to market values and “unearned increments” in land 
values, than to moral virtue?
 In his peevishness over the project settlers’ default on pioneer virtue, 
Newell offered his own version of a lament that would become a familiar one 
for many engineers in the twentieth century, whose training had left them ill-
prepared to deal with the human dimensions of the systems they designed.  “The 
problem is largely one of human nature,” Newell said in an archetypal version of 
the Engineer’s Lament.  “The problem, as now presented, is not so much one of 
engineering, or of soil or climate, as it is of purely human elements.”17
 One could say that the Eleventh Annual Report was its own exercise 
in justifying and rationalizing the expenditure of public resources to produce 
underwhelming results.  But the Eleventh Annual Report is still a remarkable 
document for an agency to reckon with in its heritage.  In this report, 
Reclamation’s leadership acknowledged and admitted a lot of problems, and 
thereby got the jump on their latter-day critics.  Cost over-runs, problems of 
drainage, market uncertainties, diffi culties in crop selection, wasteful applications 
of water, tensions with settlers: all these matters got their “public record” 
exposure barely ten years after the agency’s creation.  If you return to the “roots” 
of the Bureau of Reclamation, you fi nd quite an unusual offi cial act of admission 
of error and misconception.  The tone of the Eleventh Report was so entirely the 
opposite of bluff and bravado that one almost wishes it could be made available 
as a kind of example, template, or role model for organizations today, both 
governmental agencies and non-profi ts.  Rather than a demonstration of excesses 
of confi dence, the Eleventh Report recorded an awareness, not of problems 
foreseen, but problems already manifested and acknowledged.
 “Better quality hindsight” could remind both Reclamation’s employees 
and its critics of this component of the agency’s heritage.  The swaggering 
and boasting came later—beginning with the Hoover and Grand Coulee 
dams, and continuing through Floyd Dominy’s time as commissioner.  By a 
certain interpretation of chronology, the era of arrogance was the anomaly—
though, heaven knows, an enormously consequential anomaly for the Western 
environment.  By that interpretation, when the Bureau shifted in the last decade 
and a half to a more modest agenda, making a degree of peace with the end of 
the era of big dam building, it actually returned to its roots, repossessed its 
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pre-imperial heritage, and recaptured an older willingness to face up to its 
limitations.
 Of course, this was not the preference of many of its career employees.  
These changes have been matters of political expediency, responses to changing 
moods among voters and members of Congress.  In fact, the hundred years of 
the Bureau of Reclamation offer their own focused case study in the American 
West’s awkward relationship with the engineering profession.  Engineers—mining 
engineers, dam engineers, electrical engineers, highway engineers, construction 
engineers, civil engineers, automotive engineers, chemical engineers, foresters 
(for some reason not called “forest engineers”)—have played an enormously 
important role in setting up the material circumstances of our comfortable and 
complacent lives.  From the point of the view of the engineers themselves, the last 
century of history could be summed up in these terms: for several decades, society 
said to the engineering profession, “Create an infrastructure that will supply us 
abundantly with food, water, electricity, fossil fuels, and roads,” and, when that 
product was delivered, a growing segment of society declared, not its appreciation 
and gratitude, but its disgust with the injuries done to ecosystems, landscapes, 
and environments.  Engineers, with their minds on technical matters, have been 
understandably “challenged” when it comes to fi guring out society’s mandate.  
It is easy to understand their frustration with the stance of many of the West’s 
contemporary water and power users, a stance that seems to add up to “Make it 
possible for us to live in comfort, but keep any ugly impacts out of our sight.”
The terms of an honest and fruitful relationship between a democratic society 
and the engineering profession remain, in 2002, very much on the drawing board.  
Lessons drawn from the fi rst hundred years of the Bureau of Reclamation should 
surely play a part in the redesign of that relationship.
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From the Colorado River to the Nile and Beyond:
A Century of Reclamation’s International Activities
By:
Richard H. Ives
and Robert M. Bochar
 Since the earliest days of the  Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), 
there has been an  international component to what essentially has been a 
domestic program.  The development and management of the water resources 
in the western states have been the primary mission of Reclamation since 1902, 
although we have routinely ventured outside our borders to learn from and assist 
other countries. 
 Just as the map of the world has changed dramatically over the course 
of Reclamation’s lifetime, so has the nature of Reclamation’s international 
involvement.  Reclamation employees have worked in more than eighty countries, 
either on short-term temporary assignments or as part of longer-term resident 
teams.
 Most of Reclamation’s international activity has been in the semi-arid 
or arid regions of the world, primarily in developing countries.  Reclamation’s 
overseas presence has also mirrored America’s  international experience, with 
the bulk of the activities occurring since World War II (War).  Following the 
War, many large-scale foreign assistance programs emerged for both post-War 
reconstruction and Cold War efforts to combat the spread of communism. 
 Like the domestic program, Reclamation’s international activities have 
evolved to meet changing economic, environmental, and political realities.
Sometimes dramatic or day-to-day changes have occurred in the International 
Program due to sudden shifts in U.S. foreign policy, the vagaries of funding, 
and rapidly changed political conditions in host countries.  While we refer to an 
International Program (Program), this may conjure up an image of an orderly 
package of interrelated international activities, however, for the most part, that 
is not the case.  The Program comprises an ever-changing array of unrelated 
international activities and projects which are quite diverse in their nature and 
objectives.
 This paper is not intended to be a comprehensive list of Reclamation’s 
international activities; rather, its focus is to highlight some of the important 
trends, key initiatives or projects, and a few of the noteworthy people who have 
been involved with the Program.  Although Reclamation has been involved in 
many hundreds of international activities, a list of some of the larger ones is 
available at http://www.usbr.gov/international.  Finally, Reclamation’s activities 
related to the international rivers shared with Canada and Mexico are largely 
components of the domestic program and will not be included here.
664
International Water Resources—Why and How Reclamation is 
Involved
 The primary goal of Reclamation’s current Program is designed to provide 
reimbursable technical assistance and training to assist other nations to better 
manage their water resources, while supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives, 
help in the acquisition of new or improved technologies from other countries, and 
assist American private sector fi rms in competing  internationally.
 The Program consists of three main parts: technical assistance, technical 
cooperation and exchange, and training and visitor programs.
• Technical assistance activities are designed to address specifi c needs 
 that have been identifi ed by the requesting country.  Funds for these 
 activities are generally provided by either the U.S. Agency for 
 International Development (USAID), the World Bank, or the requesting 
 country.  Reclamation’s technical assistance activities have comprised the 
 largest share of the Program, but they almost always include an important 
 training component which has been designed to upgrade the technical 
 skills of foreign counterparts.
• Through technical cooperation and technology exchange, Reclamation 
seeks to improve its own capabilities through the exchange of technical 
staff and joint cooperative projects with international counterparts.  
Technology exchange activities benefi t both partners and each side 
normally pays for its share of the activities.
• Reclamation also assists water resource agencies from other countries by 
providing training and visitor programs for their staff.  Training programs 
are tailored to fi t specifi c needs, and all costs are fully reimbursable to 
Reclamation.  Additionally, Reclamation facilities are visited by more than 
800 international water resource counterparts on an annual basis, and there 
is no charge for these short term visitor programs.
 Individual activities comprising the current Program cover a wide range of 
topics, including dam safety, desalination, river basin management, construction 
supervision (for irrigation projects), water conservation, sedimentation, 
transboundary water resources cooperation, and integrated water resources 
management.
The Early Years
 A movement to secure Federal funding for the development of irrigated 
lands in the West emerged at the close of the nineteenth century.  It was 
recognized that some countries were signifi cantly farther along in this arena, and 
efforts were made to learn from their experience.  An engineer named 
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 Herbert M. Wilson from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), traveled to Egypt 
and India in 1889 to inspect large-scale irrigation development and to obtain basic 
information that would be useful for establishment of an irrigation service in the 
U.S.  This appears to be the fi rst recorded international activity associated with the 
Reclamation program.  Wilson, who had considerable experience conducting land 
surveys in the West, assessed the vast and sophisticated Indian irrigation works, 
with some 25 million acres (10 million hectares) of irrigated lands.  He recorded 
the construction, operation, and maintenance costs for these projects, and noted 
the increased agricultural returns and opportunities for settlement provided by 
these vast projects.  He also studied problems of drainage, salinity, silt, as well as 
transboundary water resources issues.  With the passage of the Reclamation Act 
of 1902, Congress created the Reclamation Service which the Secretary of the 
Interior placed within the USGS, virtually assuring that Wilson’s fi ndings would 
be incorporated into the Reclamation program in the West. 
 In the fi rst few years of the Reclamation Service, some twenty-fi ve water 
projects were authorized for construction.  Consumed by its own ambitious 
domestic program agenda, and lacking authority to venture into the international 
arena, Reclamation was involved in minimal international activity during its 
fi rst few decades.  As a side note, however, most of Reclamation’s earliest 
Commissioners were extremely active internationally, before, during, and after, 
their tenures as Commissioner.  However, absent legal authority, Reclamation 
employees were required to secure a leave of absence to undertake foreign 
consulting work.
  Frederick Newell, who directed Reclamation from 1907 to 1914, traveled 
to the Isthmus of Panama in 1908 to assist in the engineering details of the 
Panama Canal.  The large earthfi ll dams being planned by the Isthmian Canal 
Commission were very similar to those being constructed by Reclamation.  His 
deputy,  Arthur Powell Davis, who later became Commissioner of Reclamation 
(1914–23), had been involved in the Panama Canal investigations prior to his 
arrival at Reclamation in 1902, and he continued to serve on a board reviewing 
the feasibility of building the canal.  In 1911, at the request of the Russian 
Government, Davis took a leave of absence to inspect a proposed irrigation 
project on the Amudarya River in Turkestan.   Elwood Mead, Reclamation’s 
Commissioner from 1923-36, spent eight years in Australia (1908-15) where he 
inaugurated a comprehensive water conservation and reclamation plan.  During 
Mead’s tenure as Commissioner, he took several extensive leaves of absence in 
order to provide assistance to other countries (i.e., Haiti, Cuba, and Palestine) on 
irrigation-related matters.
 Several other Reclamation employees, including Chief Design Engineer 
John L. Savage, who became world renowned and highly sought, would also 
take leaves of absence to travel overseas to consult with foreign governments on 
various water projects.
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 While Reclamation was only minimally involved in providing direct 
assistance to others, the early exploits of Reclamation did not go unnoticed.
A stream of  foreign visitors came to the West to see Reclamation projects.  
Reclamation’s 1911 Annual Report indicated:
There have been an almost continual series of investigations of the work 
and its results by men both from this country and abroad.  Nearly every 
foreign country having large areas of arid lands has been represented by 
visitors who have studied the works on the ground, and particularly the 
methods and analyses of cost.  Offi cial and unoffi cial representatives 
from Great Britain and its colonial possessions…from various portions 
of the German Empire, from Austria, Russia, Spain, and other European 
countries, and from Mexico and South America.  These men have been 
interested not only in irrigation but in the control and conservation of 
fl ood waters.
And from Reclamation’s 1920 Annual Report:
Irrigation development of hitherto largely unused lands is becoming 
more and more prominent in Australia, South Africa, Canada, Brazil, 
Argentine [sic.], Russia, and other countries, and the works of the 
Reclamation Service have for many years attracted engineers and 
economists from all over the world.  There can be no doubt that much of 
the stimulus for extended reclamation development of the arid regions of 
the world has been the direct result of fi rst-hand study of the irrigation 
problem in the United States, and particularly that as exemplifi ed by the 
work of the Federal Government.
 The construction of Boulder (Hoover) Dam gave impetus to increased 
worldwide recognition for the skill and resourcefulness of Reclamation engineers.  
The year 1930 saw the fi rst signifi cant indication that engineering experts were 
looking to the United States for leadership in matters pertaining to water resource 
development.  Some Reclamation engineers published technical articles that were 
picked up by newspapers abroad and Reclamation was overwhelmed by requests 
for additional information.  Many who wrote were not content with simply 
reading about our dams and requested the opportunity to see these structures for 
themselves.  This resulted in a steady stream of visitors who came to marvel at 
 Hoover Dam and other Reclamation facilities.  Between 1935 and 1941, more 
than 500 foreign engineers visited Reclamation projects.  Visitors from India, 
England, France, Egypt, Germany, The Philippines, Thailand, and South Africa, 
came for varying lengths of time to learn Reclamation practices and procedures.
 Reclamation’s domestic program was continually evolving through 
the advancement of large dam design and construction, as well as establishing 
sustainable rural economies based upon irrigation.  Its string of accomplishments 
in water resources development had encouraged others to want to follow in its 
footsteps, but the War would intervene and plans would be delayed.
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World War II—A Catalyst for Change
 The War resulted in restrictions on travel and strict security regulations, 
effectively curtailing virtually all of Reclamation’s international activities.  
Reclamation’s wartime effort focused on work conducted at the Denver 
laboratories where scientists, engineers, and technicians, who were ordinarily 
engaged in work on dams and canals, were called upon to design new ordinance 
and equipment, expedite production and delivery of war materials, and uncover 
evidence of sabotage in support of the U.S. war effort.
 World War II, however, would also serve as a milestone for Reclamation 
in several important ways.  It had diverted attention and funding away from 
Reclamation’s water development activities in the West.  The War had also left 
much of Europe, as well as other parts of the world, in need of reconstruction.
The U.S. was moving forward to assume a leadership role in the international 
arena, a dramatically different position from its pre-War days of isolationism.
 In another part of the world, Reclamation’s  international work began 
with assistance to China on the  Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River.  Long 
discussed by the Chinese, Reclamation agreed to assist the Chinese Government 
with the project, and sent  John Savage to China in early 1944.  During his 
six-month stay in China, Savage studied the hydroelectric and fl ood control 
possibilities for the Yangtze River and its tributaries.  At the end of the War, a 
large number of Chinese engineers traveled to Denver to begin working with 
Reclamation staff on the design of the Three Gorges Dam.  However, as a result 
of the ongoing Chinese civil war, the engineers were required to return to China in 
1947, and work by Reclamation personnel on the Three Gorges Dam stopped.
Post-War Emergence of International Activities
 The movement of Reclamation into the international arena was largely 
facilitated by broad changes in America’s thinking about its international role.  To 
a great extent, the changes were driven in the late 1940s by the  Truman Doctrine 
and the  Marshall Plan, which outlined America’s strategy to fi ght the spread 
of communism and a plan for the reconstruction of Europe, respectively.  Of 
particular importance was the  U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 
1948 (Smith-Mundt Act), which authorized reimbursable technical assistance and 
training.
 President Truman articulated his Doctrine in the  Point IV Program, as 
an affi rmative assistance program to help under-developed countries develop 
their natural resources as a means to resist threats to their freedom.  Point IV, 
implemented in June 1950 by P.L. 535, was largely the beginning of today’s 
foreign technical assistance program.  P.L. 535 required Federal agencies to 
establish offi ces for the purposes of directing international activities.  It also 
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marked the establishment of the administering agency, a predecessor agency to 
USAID.
 These instruments not only provided the legal authority for Reclamation 
to assist others, but provided goals and funding as well.  Given this new mandate, 
it was apparent that guidelines would be needed for increasing Reclamation’s 
international involvement.  Thus, several key decisions were made, including the 
creation of a  Division of Foreign Activities in March 1951, which would shape 
the Program in a form that has endured to this day. 
 Reclamation’s domestic program would always have priority over 
international activities, unless the 
State Department (State) had indicated 
that a particular international activity 
would be in the national interest as 
part of the U.S. foreign policy.  If 
that were the case, then consideration 
would be given to engaging in such 
activity, even though an adverse effect 
on the domestic program might occur.  
Reclamation continues to acknowledge 
the importance of meeting U.S. foreign 
policy objectives.
 Reclamation was required to receive reimbursement for costs associated 
with undertaking  international technical assistance and training since, lacking 
authorization, no funds could be sought from Congress.
 While Reclamation strongly supported the notion of assistance to other 
countries, it determined that it would be inappropriate to initiate such activities, 
largely because it would raise concerns about private sector competition.  In 
addition to requests for assistance from foreign governments, Reclamation has 
the wherewithal to respond affi rmatively to requests from the Department of 
State (State), USAID, the United Nations, or an international fi nancial institution 
such as the World Bank.  (Note: In the late 1980s passage of various laws to 
permit technology transfer between United States Government (USG) agencies 
and the private sector authorized Reclamation to assist U.S. fi rms in competing 
for international work.  However, in spite of numerous partnership attempts with 
American fi rms, Reclamation has seen only limited success here.)
The Flood Gates Opened—Dramatic Post-War Expansion
 In the years immediately after the War, State received dozens of requests 
from other countries for assistance in irrigation and water resources development.  
While State would typically turn to Reclamation for assistance, it retained the 
lead role.  Thus, Reclamation employees served as members of State-led teams 
28.1.  John L. Savage on the Yangtze River.
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addressing irrigation and power-related needs.  By the late 1940s, a handful of 
Reclamation personnel were on long-term assignments in Afghanistan, Ceylon 
(Sri Lanka), Venezuela, Costa Rica, and El Salvador.
 A full-fl edged Reclamation-wide Program, with a budget of nearly $2 
million (roughly equivalent to $13.5 million in today’s dollars) emerged in 1952, 
after substantial amounts of Point IV funding had materialized.  For the next few 
decades, Reclamation, with its characteristic zeal, contributed to the cause of 
providing for more food security for the free world.  Commissioner  Michael W. 
Straus (1945-53) stated, “wherever it can, Reclamation will continue to cooperate 
and contribute knowledge to the free world’s warfare against want.” 
(See Reclamation’s Golden Jubilee in the bibliography at the end of the paper.)
 By 1952 Reclamation was working on planning studies involving projects 
in twenty-one countries, covering some seventeen million acres (6.8 million 
hectares) of irrigated land, and hydropower of more than 4,200 megawatts of 
installed capacity.  The growth of the Program was so dramatic that the quantity 
of Reclamation’s international work in 1952 exceeded the sum total of all that had 
occurred in the past.  (Reclamation’s Golden Jubilee)
 Reclamation’s early Post-War international work was characterized 
by some of the same basic features that are present in today’s program.  
Reclamation’s international activities always responded to the needs that were 
refl ected in the incoming requests for assistance.  The work covered a wide range 
of topics related to water resources development and management, including 
project planning, design and construction; irrigation management; drainage 
and land classifi cation; sedimentation; and other topics.  In addition, there was 
a tremendous difference in the level of effort between the individual projects 
involved, ranging from a temporary assignment of one employee for several 
days to Reclamation teams assigned overseas for a year or more.  In some cases 
Reclamation would provide advisory assistance and merely assist counterparts in 
executing an activity, while, at other times, Reclamation personnel would perform 
specifi c tasks such as preparing a project appraisal report.
 For the next two decades much of the focus of the Program was on 
planning studies in numerous countries, for entire river basins as well as 
individual water projects.  Some of the larger or better known planning efforts 
focused on the  Litani River Basin in Lebanon (1954-1958),  Blue Nile River Basin 
in Ethiopia (1958-1964),  Helmand Valley in Afghanistan (1960-1971),  Han River 
Basin in Korea (1966-1971),  Sao Francisco River Basin in Brazil (1964-1973), 
and the  Mekong River Basin and the  Pa Mong Project in Thailand and Laos 
(1964-1974).  In Australia, Reclamation participated in the planning, design 
and construction of the  Snowy Mountains Scheme (1951-1961).  Each of these 
activities entailed the assignment of teams of Reclamation technical specialists 
overseas for several years. 
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 Reclamation’s involvement with the  Nile River goes back to the early 
learning years when we sought information on Egyptian irrigation systems.  In the 
intervening century, Reclamation has provided technical assistance and training 
at varying times in the Nile River Basin to Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Sudan.
Reclamation’s Nile River experiences exemplify the nature of our international 
work, in that we have expended enormous effort over many years in assisting 
others, but we have had little control over the outcome.  Ethiopia and the Sudan 
both experienced devastating civil wars and enormous political change after we 
had completed our technical assistance and training programs, thereby largely 
negating our efforts.
 Reclamation has 
contributed to a wide array of 
project planning studies, however, 
many countries have undertaken 
only a limited amount of water 
infrastructure development due, 
in part, to the lack of funding, 
political changes, and changing 
environmental values.  In addition, 
the inability of many countries 
to secure agreement with their 
neighbors on the use of water 
in shared international river 
basins has also greatly hindered 
development.
Winds of Change—Foreign Policy Shifts and New Paradigm
 By the mid-1970s the focus on broad-scale river basin planning efforts 
and large projects had waned in the Program.  USAID’s movement away from 
infrastructure development in the 1970s was probably the major cause of this 
shift in Reclamation’s international activities, since USAID had been a major 
source of funding.  Emphasis on water project development was being replaced 
28.2.  Report covers from Resident Team Programs.
28.3.  Ethiopia land classifi cation work in Blue 
Nile.  (Old Ways Meet the New)
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by greater diversity in the types of 
international projects and activities 
undertaken by Reclamation.
 U.S. foreign policy shifts 
have also had direct impacts on 
the Program.  The oil embargo of 
1973 led to the establishment of a 
joint economic commission with 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 
1974, with multiple USG agencies 
participating.  Reclamation was 
soon engaged in a substantial 
technical assistance effort there 
with a resident team in the Kingdom.  The focus was initially upon irrigation but 
it ultimately moved into the fi eld of seawater desalination.
 With the signing of the  Camp David Peace Accord in 1979, foreign policy 
emphasis shifted to the Middle East, and Reclamation was soon engaged in 
several substantial efforts in Egypt.  The massive American foreign aid program 
in Egypt resulted in a return to infrastructure development projects.  Reclamation 
was asked to spearhead a twelve-year, $140 million effort funded by USAID to 
replace the Soviet-built turbines and electrical equipment at the power station of 
the  Aswan High Dam on the Nile.
 Following resumption 
of normal relations and 
scientifi c protocols between 
China and the U.S. in the late 
1970s, the Chinese would 
again request assistance from 
Reclamation with the design of 
the  Three Gorges Dam.  Due 
to changes in the U.S. policy, 
Reclamation in 1984 agreed to 
provide only limited reviews of 
some project studies and designs.  Work continued off and on until late 1993 when 
other changes in domestic policies and priorities (i.e., environmental concerns) 
resulted in Reclamation deciding to cease its assistance to China on the Three 
Gorges Dam.
Imparting Knowledge—International Training Activities
 Reclamation’s international training has likely had the most lasting impact 
upon those who have received our assistance.  Training began in 1920, when 
Reclamation opened its doors for formal training opportunities.  The fi rst offi cial 
28.5.  Aswan High Dam in Egypt.
28.4.  Reclamation advisors assist Pakistani 
counterparts in drainage work.
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trainee was a South African engineer who spent one year with Reclamation before 
returning to a senior position in his irrigation department.  When Mexico was 
embarking upon an extensive program of water development in the mid-1920s, it 
turned to Reclamation for technical assistance and training.  One of the Mexican 
trainees would become head of the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources in 1946 
and send many trainees to Reclamation after the War (Pratt, p. 3).  Similarly, a 
young engineer from Afghanistan, M. K. Ludin, was a trainee for one year with 
Reclamation in the late 1930s.  When he returned home and created the Afghani 
Bureau of Reclamation, he adopted many of Reclamation’s policies with regard 
to repayment, acreage limitation, and multipurpose projects.  He later became the 
Minister of Public Works and was instrumental in securing Reclamation’s Post-
War involvement in Afghanistan.
 The phenomenon of young engineers who trained with Reclamation and 
later rose to senior positions back home was to become commonplace.  This 
greatly contributed to the forging of close long-term relationships between 
Reclamation and other water agencies.  While it is not always readily discernible, 
there are tangible foreign policy benefi ts to these relationships.  The State 
Department, particularly during the Cold War, strongly endorsed the building of 
these bridges between nations and, even today, State continues to fund modest 
technical exchange programs for foreign visitors.
 Reclamation’s early involvement with Turkey was notable largely because 
a young trainee, Suleyman Demirel, who came to Denver in the late 1940s, 
was destined for greater things.  He returned to become head of the Turkish 
Directorate for Hydraulic Works in the early 1950s, and he was soon instrumental 
in securing a resident team from Reclamation that assisted him in moving forward 
with an ambitious water development program.  However, Demirel did not stop 
there, and later became Prime Minister on seven occasions, starting in 1965, 
and later he became President of Turkey (1993).  Undoubtedly our most famous 
trainee, a Reclamation delegation in 1996 visited Turkey at his behest to witness 
his country’s water-related accomplishment.
     Our formal training programs, 
which focus upon on-the-job 
instruction, have played a critical role 
in imparting Reclamation experience 
to others.  Training programs have 
also been changing in recent years 
due to the high costs associated with 
providing long-term training.  Thus, 
Reclamation has been transitioning 
to technical seminars and workshops, 
which have proven to be a cost-
effective means of providing programs 
to a large number of trainees.  
28.6.  Suleyman Demirel (middle row–
center) with Reclamation Resident Team 
(kneeling in front).
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Reclamation has been offering international workshops and seminars related 
to specifi c technical topics, including dam safety operations, integrated water 
resources management, and canal automation techniques.
Technical Cooperation and Exchange
 While assisting others has largely held the spotlight in the Program, 
especially through long-term technical assistance and training programs, 
Reclamation has also sought to broaden its own horizons through contact with 
others since Wilson traveled in 1889.  There are numerous documented instances 
where Reclamation has acquired improved technical capabilities for application 
in the domestic program through international cooperation.  For example, several 
Reclamation engineers recently traveled to Sweden to review new power-related 
technologies and to South Africa to observe Israeli-made evaporative devices for 
potential application in the Salton Sea Restoration Project.
 While Reclamation has been involved in several formal technical 
cooperation and technology exchange programs (e.g., Israel and Spain), in most 
cases these activities are carried on informally.  Formal programs usually entail 
an agreement between Reclamation and a counterpart water agency setting 
forth mutually-agreed-upon activities and goals.  Even in the arena of technical 
cooperation, where Reclamation usually seeks partners on an equal technical 
footing, foreign policy objectives can play a dominant role.  Reclamation’s 
involvement was solicited by State some years back in technical exchange 
programs involving the former Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.  
These programs were designed by State in order to keep lines of communication 
open and facilitate cooperation between the participants.
 The U.S.-South African Binational Commission (BNC) is another, more 
recent example of a technical cooperation program with strong foreign policy 
overtones.  The BNC was initiated in 1995 by State to bolster the fl edgling 
South African Post-Apartheid Government.  Water quickly emerged as an area 
of interest for the South Africans, and Reclamation was tapped to coordinate 
the USG effort.  There have been a series of exchanges between Reclamation 
and the Ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry focusing upon a variety of water 
management topics, many of which have been funded by State.
A New Game Plan—Water as a Means to Promote Cooperation
 At the fi rst meeting of the Working Group on Water Resources (WGWR) 
in the Middle East Peace Process in April 1992, State and its USG water agency 
partners, including Reclamation, became involved in an interesting and uncharted 
odyssey that is now almost a decade old.  From the outset, State chaired the 
WGWR and requested Reclamation’s assistance to help move technical activities 
forward.  The well-established relationships between Reclamation and water 
agencies in other key countries involved in the WGWR, and Reclamation’s 
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credibility, were useful to State.  Reclamation was tasked by State, in 1995, with 
taking the lead to support an Arab (Omani) WGWR initiative in desalination.  For 
several years, Reclamation technical experts played a pivotal role in virtually 
every phase of the establishment of the Middle East Desalination Research Center 
(MEDRC).
 The success of water-related activities in the Middle East Peace 
Process led State to the conclusion that water can be an effective catalyst to 
promote cooperation between nations.  State recently embarked on a program 
to reduce potential international transboundary confl icts in selected river 
basins.  Reclamation was asked to take the lead in three State-funded initiatives, 
including ones focused on: the Okavango River Basin in Southern Africa; the 
Senegal and Niger River Basins in West Africa; and Lake Malawi in East Africa.  
Reclamation has also been requested to assist in several other activities relating to 
international water resources-related cooperation involving several countries.  In 
each case Reclamation will offer short-term programs designed to demonstrate 
the principles of water-related cooperation and integrated water resources 
management.
The Future—New Challenges
 Will there be a need for Reclamation in the international arena in the 
future?  The data regarding water, that is, water scarcity, water for population 
growth and food security needs, water quality degradation, and others, are bleak.
Water is a resource that is in extremely short supply in many regions of the 
world.  Readily available and affordable new water supplies are simply absent.  
Reclamation continues to be a world leader in a variety of areas related to water 
resources development and management, and we have a broad array of skills and 
experience to share that could help make a difference.
 So what will the future Reclamation International Program look like?  It 
is likely to look both similar to and nothing like the past!  It will be similar to the 
past in that there will be wide variety of ever-changing external inputs impacting 
the nature and size of the program.  Foreign policy shifts are likely to continue 
whereby foes can become friends and vice versa.  A few years ago we were 
prohibited from cooperating with the Government of South Africa.  Thus, it is 
diffi cult to predict the Program’s future landscape because dramatic geopolitical 
changes occur overnight and with these changes, new needs and opportunities 
emerge.  As an example, drought-stricken Afghanistan, where Reclamation had a 
resident team (1960-1974), is in desperate need of reconstruction and water issues 
are of major concern.  With our broad range of expertise and previous experience 
there, Reclamation would be well-suited to assist, if funds were to become 
available.
 Certainly Reclamation will continue to provide technical assistance and 
training to those in need, and to cooperate with others to address our needs.
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We can say with certainty that we will fulfi ll the obligations set forth in our 
current agreements and commitments with our international counterparts, and 
we will move forward with activities already planned.  We will need to continue 
to develop programs that are responsive to the needs of our international 
counterparts and consistent with the requirements and direction of Reclamation’s 
domestic program and U.S. foreign policy.
 While the horrifi c events of September 11, 2001, have caused considerable 
disruption in the Program, it is likely that it is only a temporary situation.  Clearly, 
we must now address new topics such as security and heightened travel concerns 
that had not previously been considered, along with the continuing need for 
funding.  History shows that we have adjusted and adapted to new ways of doing 
business that did not compromise the Program.  We will need to be innovative, 
alert to the winds of change, and responsive to help meet some of the world’s 
water resources challenges in the future.
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Farms for Veterans:  Reclamation Settlement 
Policies and Results Following the World Wars
By:
Brian Q. Cannon
Abstract
 Between 1946 and 1964 the Bureau of Reclamation opened over 
2,800 farms on federal reclamation projects in Wyoming, Idaho, Washington, 
Oregon, California, and Arizona.  In 1944 Congress had granted  veterans a 
90-day preference right in applying for homesteads on reclamation projects.
Thus, most who fi led on these lands had served in the armed forces.  In an effort 
to maximize the veterans’ prospects for success as homesteaders, the Bureau 
drew upon over four decades of experience in creating irrigated homesteads in 
the West.  Particularly the lessons learned by the Bureau in offering farms to 
veterans following World War I provided a springboard for the Bureau’s post-
World War II efforts.
 Barely sixty percent of the 1,311 settlers who homesteaded on 
reclamation projects following World War I obtained title to their farms.  Of 
those who did prove up, 75 percent (or about 45 percent of all 1,311 original 
claimants) retained their farms until 1944—an impressive rate considering the 
economic volatility of the 1920s and 1930s.  However, nearly half (46 percent) 
of those who had gained title to their homesteads no longer farmed the land 
themselves in 1944.  Persistence rates were greater on the highly productive 
Klamath Project, where 65 percent of the homesteaders who had proved up 
continued to farm their land in 1944, than on the North Platte Project in western 
Nebraska and eastern Wyoming, where only 19 percent still farmed their land.
 Bureau employees identifi ed a lack of capital, defects in the farms 
themselves, inexperience or lack of commitment on the part of the homesteaders 
and poor health as key reasons for the high attrition rates among post-World 
War I homesteaders.  In an attempt to surmount these obstacles Congress in 
1924 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to screen applicants for homesteads 
on the basis of industry, experience, character, and capital.  It also required 
the Bureau to conduct more careful surveys of the land itself before projects 
were approved.  Both in the 1920s and the 1940s Congress rejected proposals 
from the Bureau for greater technical assistance and monetary assistance to 
homesteaders.
 Working within the limitations imposed by Congress, the Bureau 
endeavored to improve economic opportunities and increase residential stability 
on lands that it opened to homesteading following World War II.  In many cases, 
local examining boards undercut the effectiveness of the screening process for 
prospective settlers, opting to award homesteads to veterans who possessed 
very little capital.  The screening process did insure that most homesteaders 
possessed some agricultural experience.  Thanks to more careful preliminary 
studies, veterans generally enjoyed superior farming opportunities on the 
Bureau’s projects in the 1940s and 1950s than their counterparts had received in 
the 1920s.
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 Notwithstanding the Bureau’s more careful preliminary investigations, 
enough poor units were included in the post-1945 projects that Congress enacted 
Public Law 258 in 1953, providing for exchange of submarginal homesteads on 
reclamation projects.  The law was largely inspired by the Bureau’s most glaring 
postwar failure, extensions of the Riverton Project, where seepage and alkaline 
soils made it impossible for over one-third of the postwar settlers to support 
themselves.
 Despite the Bureau’s intent to award farms to individuals who planned 
to spend their lives on the farm, many who obtained land actually regarded it as 
a speculative investment.  Others who may have intended to reside permanently 
on the farm became discouraged by the rigors of homesteading or were enticed 
to leave by the prospect of higher wages or a higher standard of living off the 
farm.  For a variety of reasons, then, many post-World War II homesteaders 
quickly moved away from their farms.
 The percentage of homesteaders who retained their lands roughly two 
decades after they had been homesteaded was actually higher for the post-World 
War I cohort on the Klamath and North Platte projects than for the post-World 
War II group on the Minidoka, Klamath, or Yuma projects.  Absentee ownership, 
however, was less common among the post-1945 cohort than among the 1920s 
homesteaders.  Whereas only 15 percent of all the veteran homesteaders at 
North Platte and 37 percent of the veterans who homesteaded in the 1920s on 
the Klamath Project continued to occupy their lands 20 years later, 44 percent 
of the post-1945 homesteaders on the Klamath Project and 30 percent of the 
post-1945 homesteaders on the Yuma Project still resided on their farms 20 years 
after they had fi led upon their lands.  In this sense at least, the Bureau’s efforts to 
reduce speculation and tenancy by screening settlers and improving the quality 
of opportunities on its projects had succeeded.
 Shortly after World War II ended, 1,305 veterans applied for 86 irrigated 
homesteads on a federal reclamation project in northern California.  One 
applicant, a Japanese American who had sustained 105 shrapnel wounds on the 
battlefi eld in Italy, aptly articulated the allure of a homestead for many veterans.  
“My entire life up to this moment has been spent on a ranch and it is my wish 
to keep on being a bona fi de farmer,” he wrote.  “Farming is all that I know.…
With a ranch of my own I would have complete freedom of doing as I please…I 
have much to work for, and the will to succeed is urging me ahead.  Obtaining a 
homestead site will greatly reduce the strain on me.  Let me assure you that my 
utmost desire is to make this project a success and to be one of the many who are 
planning to make this home community one to be proud of.”1
 This young veteran hoped to win the opportunity to participate in a 
belated, little-known fl urry of homesteading; between 1946 and 1964, an era 
when homesteading was generally no longer permitted, the Bureau of 
Reclamation opened over 2,800 farms on federal reclamation projects to veterans 
in Wyoming, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona.  In an effort to 
maximize the veterans’ prospects for success as homesteaders, the Bureau drew 
upon over four decades of experience in creating irrigated homesteads in the 
West.  Particularly the lessons learned by the Bureau in offering farms to veterans 
following World War I provided a springboard for the Bureau’s post-World 
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War II efforts.  This paper examines the Bureau’s efforts to improve its 
homesteading program from the 1920s to the 1940s and to counteract or surmount 
obstacles that had plagued veterans homesteading on its projects following the 
First World War.  It surveys key differences between the Bureau’s post-World War 
I homesteading program and its counterpart following the Second World War and 
traces some of the reasons for those differences.
 Following  World War I the Department of the Interior received 
196,000 inquiries regarding settlement opportunities on western reclamation 
projects.  In February 1920, responding belatedly to the demand for farms, 
Congress through Public Resolution 29 granted a 60-day preference right 
to veterans in applying for homesteads on public lands, including federal 
reclamation projects.  The preference period was later increased to 90 days.  
Although most veterans who had written to the Department of the Interior were 
no longer interested by the time that Congress belatedly acted, 10,875 would-
be homesteaders applied for 1,311 farms that were opened to settlement on 
reclamation projects over the next 20 years.  Particularly from 1920 to 1922 lands 
opened to entry were awarded almost exclusively to veterans.  Most of these 
new farms were located on the  Klamath Project in California and Oregon and the 
 Shoshone and  North Platte projects in Wyoming.  The farms were awarded by 
lottery.2
 The post-World War I homesteading frontier had its share of impressive 
success stories.  Take the case of Frank Vancluira, one of eighty  veterans who 
took up homesteads on the North Platte Project’s Fort Laramie Division early 
in 1920.  A Bohemian immigrant who had moved to the United States in 1911, 
Vancluira farmed in New York and Nevada and worked in a sausage factory 
before joining the Army in 1917.  One of his legs was severely injured during the 
war.  With $2,000 in capital and a monthly pension from the Veterans Bureau as a 
result of his wartime injury, Vancluira managed to develop his farm and construct 
a home without having to borrow money.  His knowledge of irrigation as a result 
of his previous farm work in Nevada, combined with his industriousness and good 
fortune in receiving an exceptionally fertile homestead, allowed him to prosper.  
Within four years his farm was valued at $10,000—far beyond the amount of 
money he had invested in the place.3
 Despite the success stories, barely sixty percent of the 1,311 homesteaders 
on reclamation projects during the inter-war years obtained title to their farms.  
Of those who did prove up, 75 percent (or about 45 percent of all 1,311 original 
claimants) retained their farms until 1944—an impressive rate considering the 
economic volatility of the 1920s and 1930s.  However, nearly half (46 percent) 
of those who had gained title to their homesteads no longer farmed the land 
themselves in 1944.  Persistence rates were greater on the highly productive 
Klamath Project, where 65 percent of the homesteaders who had proved up 
continued to farm their land in 1944, than on the North Platte Project, where only 
19 percent still cultivated their land.4
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 The high percentage of homesteaders who departed without proving up, 
coupled with the failure of many veterans to farm the land after they gained title 
to it, concerned the Bureau of Reclamation.  Andrew Weiss, superintendent of the 
North Platte Project, was assigned by Commissioner Elwood Mead to investigate 
the reasons for the homesteaders’ diffi culties, focusing upon the Shoshone and 
North Platte projects.  Weiss found that most  veterans had arrived on the projects 
with insuffi cient funds.  For instance, Sam Monaco, an industrious immigrant 
and World War I veteran, had come to the North Platte Project in 1920 with 
practically no capital.  Monaco “made a very courageous trial for three years, 
being obliged to undergo every privation to get along.”  Unable to afford lumber 
for a pig pen or a hen house, he had sheltered the hens in his own shack and had 
dug a clay pit for the hogs.  Despite his pluck, Monaco was eventually “forced 
to quit.”  No amount of ingenuity or hard work could compensate for his penury.  
Many homesteaders had rented out their farms after proving up, Weiss reported, 
because they needed more money than their farms could furnish.  For instance, 
E. G. Phelps, a homesteader in southeastern Wyoming, who was described by 
the project manager as “a very fi ne type farmer” and a “splendid type of man” 
who was “intelligent and anxious to learn” had tried to farm and work part-time 
elsewhere but he had found he “could not make it” fi nancially.  Finally he opted to 
rent his farm and work full time as a power house operator in order to support his 
family.  Weiss estimated that over half (53 percent) of the veterans, like Monaco 
and Phelps, who homesteaded on the Fort Laramie division in 1920 were poorly 
prepared fi nancially for homesteading.  Only about one in four had arrived with 
suffi cient money for “the necessary fi xed improvements” and the “necessary farm 
equipment and livestock.”5
 On the Frannie Division of the Shoshone Project in northern Wyoming, 
Weiss discovered that in 1924 only fi ve of the 57 veterans who had taken up lands 
there in 1920 remained.  Even on better farms that had been opened to settlement 
the following year, only one in fi ve homesteaders remained.  Weiss identifi ed their 
principal impediment as “the lack of capital.”6
 In addition to insuffi cient capital, defects in the land itself such as poor 
soil, drainage problems, or unrealistically small farms handicapped some  veterans. 
Hundreds of veterans took up lands in the Goshen Irrigation District in southern 
Wyoming between 1921 and 1927, and roughly one-fi fth “had very little chance 
of success” because of “poor or submarginal” farms, project superintendent Frank 
Roush estimated in hindsight.  Farming conditions were worst on the Frannie 
Division of the Shoshone Project, where 95 farms were opened in 1920 and 1921.  
In 1924 the president of the local water users’ association reported that nearly 
two-thirds of the lands on the division were “practically valueless” because of 
seepage, alkaline soil and other problems.  Draining the lands adequately would 
cost an estimated $30 per acre, but the land itself was valued at not more than 
$25 per acre.  A commission appointed by the Secretary of the Interior to study 
reclamation concluded in 1924 that “the lands on the Frannie Division are of 
such low agricultural value as to make it impossible for them to pay the cost 
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of operation and maintenance of the irrigation works much less to return the 
construction costs.”7
 Weiss reported that inexperience, coupled with underestimation of the 
rigors of farm life, had driven others from their farms.  Roughly one in three 
 veterans who homesteaded on the North Platte Project in 1920 had never lived or 
worked on a farm.  “Too few of us knew much about irrigated farming when we 
started here,” observed homesteader George “Doc” Haas, one of only nineteen 
remaining homesteaders in 1947 out of 130 who had come to the Goshen 
Irrigation District in 1921.  “We had every kind of ex-soldier, from piano tuners to 
paper hangers.…We did not realize that there was no let-up in work, season after 
season.”8
 Other  veterans quickly sold or rented out their farms after proving up 
because they had always regarded their homesteads as speculative property.  
Weiss’s report showed that 35 percent of those who homesteaded on the Fort 
Laramie Division of the North Platte Project in 1920 had no interest in farming, 
preferred some other occupation, or disliked the country and therefore never 
intended to remain there.  For instance, Paul J. Hall, a 30 year old veteran, was 
characterized by the project superintendent as “not hav[ing] much energy.”  He 
lacked capital, farming experience and had “no desire to farm.”  Moreover, his 
wife disliked farm life.  Willard Wertman, a 35 year old homesteader who had 
grown up on a farm in Milford, Nebraska, only farmed his unit for one season.
He “always seemed to dislike the country and was dissatisfi ed with nearly every 
thing in connection with his farm, the community and the government.”  F. W. 
Bosse, had been raised on a farm and was a “good worker” but by disposition 
“not a farmer.”  Similarly, T. J. Burchell, a railroad engineer and a druggist, “had 
no desire or qualifi cations as [a] farmer.”  Some had homesteaded largely for 
speculative reasons.  A. R. Baker, who had constructed a 10x12 shack on his 
homestead, had come from a wealthy family but invested little if any capital on 
the place and engaged only in “poor and nondescript farming.”  A graduate of 
the Washington School of Finance, he worked as a fi nancial expert and had only 
resided on the land long enough to acquire title.  He had retained the land, though, 
“with hopes of higher values and oil boom.”9
 Poor health dogged other homesteaders like L. C. Anstine, a veteran with 
a fair education, farming experience, and a “good personality,” who suffered from 
a wartime injury.  The project manager gauged his prospects for success in 1924 
as “poor” because of his “physical handicap” although he noted that Anstine had 
“made a creditable effort.”  Likewise, Bruce Morton, a 40-year-old veteran with 
farming experience, had made only “fair” progress as a farmer although he knew 
how to farm, was “industrious,” and possessed a “good personality.”  Having 
been “gassed” while fi ghting in the trenches, he labored under a “severe physical 
handicap.”  The project manager believed Morton would “no doubt make a 
success if he were able-bodied and had suffi cient capital.”10
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 In Weiss’s view, then, insuffi cient capital, defects in the land itself, 
inexperience, lack of commitment, and poor health largely explained the lackluster 
performance of most veterans who homesteaded following World War I.  Twenty 
years after Weiss fi led his report, his successor as project manager, Fred Roush, 
identifi ed fi ve reasons postwar homesteaders had abandoned their units on the 
North Platte Project.  Roush believed the most important factor to be “poor and 
submarginal units,” followed by “lack of fi nancial aid” to the homesteaders during 
the farm development phase, the agricultural depression of the 1920s and 1930s, 
lack of managerial ability or ambition on the part of the veterans, and insuffi cient 
instruction of the settlers in irrigation and farming techniques by county agents or 
other qualifi ed personnel.11
 Shortly before Weiss completed his investigations of veteran homesteading 
and two decades before Roush offered his evaluation, the  Fact Finders’, a blue 
ribbon commission appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, had identifi ed many 
of the same problems with homesteading in general on reclamation projects.  In 
their report they had recommended that “new projects or extensions of existing 
projects should be authorized only after full information has been secured 
concerning the water supply, engineering features, soil, climate, transportation, 
markets, land prices, probable cost of development and other factors upon which 
the success of the project must depend.”  They had also advocated screening 
applicants for homesteads on the basis of their “industry, experience, character, 
and possession of a part of the capital needed in improving their farms.”
Additionally, they had recommended that the government provide agricultural 
and economic advisors and short-term, low-interest loans to settlers for livestock, 
equipment, and farm development.12
 A conservative Congress in 1924 rejected the Fact Finders’ calls for loans 
and agricultural advisors for settlers.  In what became known as the Fact Finders’ 
Act, Congress did stipulate that “no new project or new division of a project 
shall be approved for construction…until information in detail shall be secured…
concerning the water supply, the engineering features, the cost of construction, 
land prices, and the probable cost of development.”  After gathering the requisite 
data, Congress instructed, the Secretary of the Interior must “ma[k]e a fi nding 
in writing that it is feasible, that it is adaptable for actual settlement and farm 
homes, and that it will probably return the cost thereof to the United States” 
before construction could proceed.  Congress also authorized the Secretary of the 
Interior to appoint examining boards to review the qualifi cations of prospective 
homesteaders and to establish minimum qualifi cations for homesteaders on 
reclamation projects in terms of “industry, experience, character, and capital.”  
After touring reclamation projects the following year, the Secretary, Hubert Work, 
concluded that “settlers should have enough capital to enable them to improve and 
equip their farms.”13
 Following passage of the  Fact Finders’ Act, the veterans’ preference law 
remained in force through 1940, but the Fact Finders’ Act now required all 
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would-be homesteaders, including veterans, to meet minimum standards 
regarding industry, farming experience, character and capital.  Examining boards 
consisting initially of the superintendent of the project, the county extension 
agent, and a prominent farmer or businessman residing in the area were appointed 
by the Bureau to review each applicant’s qualifi cations.  The Bureau required 
applicants to have at least two years of farming experience and to possess $2,000 
in capital or assets such as livestock or farming equipment that would be as useful 
as cash on a farm.  Examining boards were required to rate each applicant on the 
basis of character and industry, and the boards could require applicants to submit 
medical evidence of good health.14
 From 1925 to 1937 the four variables—industry, character, farm 
experience, and capital—were weighted equally.  After 1937, though, farm 
experience was weighted most heavily, followed by capital and then industry 
and character.  While veterans continued to enjoy preference rights in all land 
openings, as veterans of the World War grew older and became better established, 
they no longer applied for all available lands.  Extensive homesteading almost 
exclusively by veterans would not again occur until after another World War.15
 Soon after the veterans preference legislation expired in 1940, western 
Congressmen including James Scrugham of Nevada and John R. Murdock of 
Arizona discussed the possibility of extending these benefi ts for veterans over 
another two decades.  In 1944, with national interest in the returning veterans 
crescendoing rapidly, Murdock believed the time had come to publicize the 
desirability of reclamation for veterans.  As the House Committee on World War 
Veterans’ Legislation held hearings in the Spring of 1944 on Senate bill 1767, the 
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act ( G.I. Bill of Rights), Murdock capitalized upon 
Congress’s interest in the future of America’s soldiers and scheduled a meeting 
with the committee.  He reminded them that “after every war our veterans have 
been taken care of in the public domain, lying in the West.”  Murdock proposed 
an amendment to the GI Bill which would entitle veterans to preference over all 
other applicants for homesteads on reclamation projects.  The amendment also 
sought to enhance the veterans’ chances for success by waiving over half of each 
homesteader’s share of the Bureau’s cost of constructing the irrigation system.  
After discussing Murdock’s amendment to the GI Bill, the committee discarded 
it.  Some felt that Murdock’s amendment had merit but should be considered as a 
separate bill because it dealt only with the West; others believed the proposal was 
“too generous.”16
 Three months after Murdock’s abortive attempt to amend the GI Bill, J. 
Hardin Peterson, a representative from Florida who chaired the House Committee 
on Public Lands, introduced H.R. 5025 in June of 1944, granting preference to 
veterans in applying for public lands “under the homestead or desert land laws” or 
under a 1938 law which permitted citizens to fi le on 5-acre parcels of land.  Partly 
because it made no mention of either the Bureau of Reclamation or the West 
but applied, in theory at least, to any public lands across the nation that might 
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be opened to settlement, the measure attracted little attention or controversy.  
One day after H.R. 5025 had been referred to the Committee on Public Lands, 
Murdock as a member of that committee referred the bill without amendment 
to the House, recommending its passage and noting that a representative from 
the Department of the Interior had appeared before the committee to endorse it.
Four days later the House approved the bill and submitted it to the Senate.  Later 
that summer the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys recommended 
passage of the bill and on August 13 the Senate acquiesced.  On September 27 
President Roosevelt signed the bill into law.17
 With veterans preference for homesteading on public lands in place, the 
Bureau of Reclamation and its friends in Congress pushed for more.  From their 
perspective based upon the experiences of post-World War I homesteaders, the 
veterans’ preference law was defective.  One defect was that it failed to provide 
for fi nancial or technical assistance for the  veterans.  Warned one representative 
from the Bureau, “We feel that a man should be assisted suffi ciently to increase 
to the optimum point his chances of success on the land.…I think we have had 
some failures on our projects that could have been avoided if we had given a little 
additional attention to getting the farm into production quickly and seeing that the 
farmer was properly coached in the methods of using his water.”
 In tandem with John Murdock, offi cials in the Bureau worked to draft 
H.R. 520.  Murdock introduced the bill in the Spring of 1945.  Among other 
things, the bill authorized the Bureau to extend technical assistance to farmers 
on reclamation projects, permitted the Bureau to contract with settlers or with 
29.1.  Alfred Fincher and his family arrived on their veteran’s homestead on the Vale 
Project nine days before this picture was taken in September 1936.
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water users’ associations for clearing and leveling land to prepare it for irrigation, 
and authorized “necessary” appropriations for these activities.  The bill proposed 
other mechanisms for assisting the veterans fi nancially: it permitted governmental 
agencies “authorized to make provision for the reestablishment of veterans 
in civil life” to become involved “to the fullest extent” that was legally and 
administratively feasible in extending “fi nancial assistance” to the veterans “for 
the acquisition or erection of housing, farm buildings and adjuncts, improvements, 
equipment, chattels, and operating capital, and for transportation to the project.”18
 Referred to the House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, with 
Murdock as the chair, the bill was made the committee’s fi rst item of business.  
Through the committee’s hearings, stretching from April 12 to May 22, Congress 
probed the relationship of veterans to federal reclamation.
 Ultimately representatives of the  Department of Agriculture expressed the 
most infl uential opposition to the bill.  Praising the idea of veterans’ preference, 
Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard sharply criticized the second section of 
the bill.  That section authorized the Secretary of the Interior to purchase and sell 
lands within or near projects, to predevelop project lands including clearing and 
leveling them, and to provide technical and agricultural guidance and advice to 
settlers.  Such provisions, warned Wickard, would “duplicate machinery already 
set up for the whole of agriculture in the Department of Agriculture” and would 
therefore be a “wasteful” use of governmental resources.  As Representative J. 
Will Robinson put it, section 2 appeared to be “setting up some super-agency to 
take care of the veterans.”19
 As a result of these objections, the committee, in concert with 
representatives from the Bureau, altered the bill somewhat.  The amended bill 
differed from the original in the sense that it extended veterans preference to 
those who had served during the First as well as the Second World War and 
specifi ed the Veterans Administration as the government agency authorized to 
loan funds to the homesteaders.  In response to concerns from the Department of 
Agriculture, the amended bill authorized the Secretary of the Interior to “obtain 
through or in cooperation with the State colleges and appropriate agencies of 
the Government guidance and advice for settlers on lands within the projects 
in matters of irrigation farming; and to disseminate information by appropriate 
means and methods,” whereas the original bill had authorized the Secretary “to 
extend guidance and advice to settlers…and to disseminate information,” without 
any reference to cooperation with other government agencies.20
 Three months after receiving the committee’s report, the House turned its 
attention to H.R. 520.  President Truman had urged Congress to approve the bill 
in order to give “outstanding opportunities for returning veterans.”  As had been 
the case in the committee hearings, no one voiced opposition to the concept of 
veterans’ preference.  For instance, John W. Flannagan of Virginia, chair of the 
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House Committee on Agriculture, claimed, “We are all in accord that the veterans 
should be given preference in the purchase of this reclaimed land.”21
 Although rewarding the veterans seemed to be desirable to all, 
representatives voiced several arguments against other features of the bill.  The 
foremost argument was that the bill, even as amended, authorized the Secretary 
of the Interior to become involved in agricultural training and technical assistance 
although the Department of Agriculture already had similar programs in place.  
The House Committee on Agriculture, which had met to review the bill that 
morning, had drafted an amendment eliminating all key provisions of the bill 
aside from the granting of preferential rights to veterans and the provision of 
information and fi nancial assistance by the Veterans Administration.  Irrigation 
and Reclamation Committee member Robert Rockwell noted that the committee 
had not even consulted with the new secretary of Agriculture, Clinton Anderson, 
who had opposed the bill in writing on the same grounds as his predecessor.  
Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois charged the bill unduly broadened the activities 
of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Department of the Interior, duplicating 
services which were already being furnished by the Department of Agriculture.  
Similarly, Clarence Cannon of Missouri opposed the duplication of services of 
two bureaus.22
 Others objected to the bill’s focus upon western lands, arguing that few 
genuine opportunities awaited the veterans on reclamation projects in the rural 
West.  The bill would play “a dirty trick on the veterans,” claimed Jessie Sumner 
of Illinois, forcing them into unwinnable pioneering situations rather than 
loaning them funds so that they could buy improved farms.  Chester Gross of 
Pennsylvania questioned the wisdom of veterans’ homesteading in the West.
It induces them now to go out into the West on new lands, where 
rattlesnakes might bite their children and coyotes and wolves endanger 
the lives of their wives, and where their greatest asset is sunshine, which 
never pays mortgages or educates their children and where foxes will kill 
their chickens and crows pick the eyes out of any livestock that is born 
outside,
he claimed, concluding, “It is just not right.”  Rising to the challenge William 
Lemke of North Dakota retorted that “in many places east of the Mississippi River 
nothing worthwhile grows even if they have water.”23
 Committee members who favored the bill attempted to refute the 
criticism of their colleagues.  The new Secretary of Agriculture clearly had 
not taken occasion to compare the former bill with the newly amended one, 
some insisted; he had merely repeated the objections of the former secretary, 
which had been addressed and resolved by the committee in redrafting the bill.
Strenuously opposing the proposed amendment which would excise most of 
the bill, committee members argued that it would reduce veterans’ preference 
to a meaningless gesture.  Antonio Fernandez of New Mexico maintained 
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that a veterans’ preference law which contained no provisions for fi nancial or 
educational assistance to homesteaders would be “nothing but an empty shell,” 
similar to the  preference right that veterans received after the First World War.  
John Murdock called the amended bill “a mockery” and Will Robinson of Utah 
warned that those who wanted to strike most of the bill and claimed to be “so 
strong for the veterans” were actually “leav[ing] a hollow shell for the veterans,…
helping them with one hand but…taking everything away [with the other] that 
was given them by a committee that studied this bill for 3 or 4 weeks.”  Murdock 
agreed that “the powers of the Bureau of Reclamation are somewhat extended 
by the terms of this bill,” but he maintained that this was necessary because 
the projects to be developed were “more diffi cult” ones with more “diffi cult 
engineering problems” than the fi rst projects that had been developed.24
 At length, opponents of the bill carried the day, although the vote was 
close.  The House voted 76 to 68 to approve the fi rst section of the bill, with its 
provision for veterans preference, but to jettison most of the other provisions, 
including any expansion of the Interior Department’s jurisdiction.  The amended 
bill was sent to the Senate where it was referred to the Committee on Irrigation 
and Reclamation, but the amended bill had no strong supporters in the House; 
after all the lip service that had been paid to the veterans, no one, it seemed, 
was very interested in this watered down bill’s fate in the Senate.  Certainly 
Murdock and his associates on the Irrigation Committee, along with the Bureau 
of Reclamation, saw no charm in such a limited bill.  Perhaps their disinterest 
stemmed from their belief that the amended bill offered nothing substantial to 
veterans, although it still did confer preference rights and instructed the Veterans 
Administration to assist the homesteaders fi nancially.  Certainly the bill did 
nothing for the Bureau or for development of western lands.  Preoccupied with 
other matters, the Senate committee never held hearings on the bill and never 
referred it back to the full Senate, and so the bill died.25
 Despite the fate of H.R. 520, the principle of veterans preference still 
applied to public lands being opened for homesteading, including reclamation 
projects, due to H.R. 5025, the measure that had been approved without debate 
in the preceding year.  Although Congress had refused to furnish the types of 
economic and educational assistance advocated by Murdock and the Bureau in the 
1940s and the Fact Finders’ Commission in the 1920s, strides had been made in 
terms of screening applicants for homesteads and requiring more rigorous reviews 
of the agricultural potential of proposed projects.  Would these factors improve 
the quality of economic opportunities for World War II veterans on reclamation 
projects?  Would a higher percentage of homesteaders gain title to their lands and 
personally cultivate them than had been the case following World War I?
 The demand for farms following the Second World War was not as great 
as pundits during the war had forecast it would be.  Nevertheless, the demand for 
farms, as refl ected in applications, remained far greater than the Bureau could 
satisfy.  Despite the fact that the general trend in American society involved 
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leaving the farm behind, farm life, even on raw lands with the risks that it 
entailed, remained attractive to many  veterans.  On all projects excluding the 
mammoth Columbia Basin Project where most of the lands were offered for sale 
rather than as homesteads, the Bureau received a total of 66,296 applications 
(many veterans applied for a farm on several projects) for 1,422 farms between 
1946 when the fi rst postwar drawing was held and 1957 when 145 farms were 
awarded on the Northside Pumping Division of the Minidoka Project in Idaho.
The ratio of farms to applicants in these drawings was nearly 47 to 1.  The ratio 
of applicants to farms ranged from 8.5 applicants per farm in a drawing on the 
Riverton Project in Wyoming in 1947 to a high of nearly 309 applicants per farm 
on a block of land with 11 farms in the Columbia Basin in 1952.  Desire for lands 
actually increased with the passage of time.  Whereas the ratio of applicants to 
farms never topped 100 in the immediate postwar era, beginning in 1951 ratios of 
over 150 applicants to each farm were commonplace.26
 With such high numbers of applicants, the Bureau seemingly possessed 
an ideal opportunity to weed out candidates who possessed insuffi cient capital 
or insuffi cient farming experience.  Shortly after the war ended, however, local 
examining boards were given greater leeway in determining the amount of capital 
and degree of farming experience that would be required for those applying 
for homesteads on individual projects.  Inasmuch as letters of recommendation 
submitted by the applicants regarding their character and industry were 
“invariably… favorable in tone” and “overworked such words and phrases as 
honest, reliable, morally above reproach, etc.” capital and farm experience were 
the most objective and reliable criteria for determining the fi tness of applicants 
for homesteading.  While the policy of allowing local boards to adjust minimum 
requirements made the process more decentralized and democratic, it also 
imperiled the original purpose of the somewhat elitist and exclusionary standards: 
selecting homesteaders with the suffi cient capital and experience to virtually 
insure their success.27
  On the Klamath Project, site of the fi rst land opening following World 
War II, representatives of local civic, veterans’, and agricultural organizations met 
with Bureau offi cials to determine the prerequisites for would-be homesteaders.   
Under a system implemented by the Bureau in 1936, applicants for homesteads 
were rated on a scale of 100 points.  Those with more than $2,000 in assets could 
receive as many as 10 points more than those who possessed only the minimum 
amount.  Representing the interests of young, predominantly poor, land-hungry 
veterans the members of a nearby American Legion post protested, “The whole 
deal stinks, especially the ten thousand dollar clause.”  F. D. Rockbice, a World 
War I veteran who had homesteaded on the Klamath Project in the 1920s, 
expressed the prevailing sentiment.  Rockbice argued that the capital requirements 
were “not…fair.”  “Because a man has 10 or 50 thousand does not make him a 
better farmer, a better man, or a better citizen than the little fellow who wants 
a home for himself and family and a chance to better himself,” he maintained.
Rockbice conceded that someone with lots of money would have “very little 
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chance” of “fail[ing] to make good.”  But he believed the government should 
be more concerned with preserving the homestead law’s intent, which was “to 
give the man that did not have a home a chance to make one.”  Ultimately those 
responsible for fi xing standards for the 1946 applicants on the Klamath Project 
voted to scrap the fl exible points system for capital requirements, although they 
decided by a margin of only one vote that it was “not only fair but necessary 
in order to assure the success to the entrymen” to require at least $2,000.  By 
refusing to boost capital requirements beyond the level that had prevailed for two 
decades, though, the examining board increased the likelihood that homesteaders 
would fail; $2,000 in 1946 would buy far less than it could have bought ten years 
earlier.  In 1948 on the Klamath Project, the examining board went even further, 
voting by a margin of 26 to 3 that applicants be permitted to substitute a credit 
rating for capital.28
 The examining board on the Klamath Project nearly decided to scrap 
the farm experience requirement as well as the requirement for capital.  At a 
meeting prior to a 1948 land opening on the project, a group of veterans who had 
constituted a local Veterans’ Independent Action Committee opposed any attempt 
to exclude applicants on the basis of farm experience.  Those with appropriate 
“intention, willingness and ability to learn” should not be penalized for their lack 
of actual farming experience, their spokesman maintained.  Others attending the 
meeting agreed in principle but wondered how one could gauge intent accurately.  
One member of the examining board, Nelson Reed, believed that someone who 
had previously farmed and applied for a homestead would be more likely to 
“stick on the homestead,” knowing in advance what they were getting into.  “If 
he farmed before” and chose to apply for a homestead it was a good sign that he 
29.2.  In December 1946 Frederick Lehman congratulated Mr. and Mrs. Robert Metz on 
winning a drawing for a homestead on the Klamath Project.
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“ha[d] intentions of remaining on the farm.”  On the other hand, “if he ha[d] no 
previous farming experience,” he would not be able to anticipate the rigors of 
farm life.  How could the board “tell if he [was] sincere” enough to persist in the 
face of adversity?  In “tough years,” those without experience might not even 
“be able to stick it out” without the requisite agricultural skills, a representative 
from a local chapter of the  Veterans of Foreign Wars suggested.  At length, those 
attending the meeting chose by a slim majority to retain the requirement of at least 
two years of farming experience.29
 Examining boards on other projects followed similar procedures in 
establishing minimum qualifi cations for applicants.  The result was that the capital 
requirements varied considerably.  On the Yuma Project, the examining board 
insisted upon $1,000 in cash and $1,000 in operating capital or assets.  Applicants 
for farms on the Shoshone Project were only required to possess $1,000 in cash or 
assets and two years of farming experience, but those who possessed more capital 
(up to $2,500) or more experience (up to fi ve years) were given priority over 
others.  The examining board for the Boise Project required applicants to possess 
$3,500 in cash or assets that could readily be converted into cash, and stipulated 
that an applicant’s automobiles and household goods could count for no more than 
$1,000 of that amount.  Applicants for lands in the Columbia Basin near Pasco 
were required to have a net worth of at least $3,700.30
 Although Congress had rejected calls for the Bureau of Reclamation 
to provide technical assistance to homesteaders, the Bureau did furnish some 
assistance and coordinated other assistance with other local, state, and federal 
agencies through its project land use or settlement specialists.  The Bureau 
cooperated with Washington State College in producing a Farmer’s Handbook
for settlers in the Columbia Basin.  The booklet contained information on a 
variety of topics including farm life, housing, climate, erosion, irrigation, weed 
control, and pest control.  On the Shoshone Project, the Bureau arranged for 
settlers to use its machines, hand tools, and concrete forms free of charge in a 
laboratory to pour their concrete drops for irrigation ditches, with supervision 
from Bureau employees.  Under development contracts, the Bureau also furnished 
prefabricated irrigation structures.  Settlers could also borrow equipment such as 
portable sprayers from the Bureau for tasks such as eradicating weeds.  In 1948 
Bureau personnel on the project assisted forty-eight homesteaders on their farms 
with irrigating, surveyed and staked farm ditches on sixty farms, contracted with 
sixty-eight farmers for farm development work such as land leveling and land 
clearing, located fence lines on thirteen farms and worked up farm development 
plans for all 111 farms.  Most settlers felt the technical assistance they received 
was suffi cient.  In a systematic sampling of 208 settlers on the Columbia Basin 
late in 1954, only 4 percent identifi ed lack of advice or incorrect advice from 
public agencies as a major problem they had encountered, and only 6 percent 
perceived inexperience or uncertainty regarding the proper course to pursue as a 
major handicap.31
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 Whereas the Bureau succeeded in furnishing technical assistance and 
disseminating information it was unable to proffer settlers on its projects the 
capital they desired, although many settlers did obtain loans from the  Farmers 
Home Administration.  The level of capital needed by farmers had never been 
higher.  On the Northside Division of the Minidoka Project the cost of clearing 
land, leveling it, constructing farm ditches, drops and other irrigation works and 
applying fertilizer averaged $57 per acre.  Additionally the government estimated 
the cost of a modern home; farm buildings; machinery such as tractors, disks, 
grain drills, checkers, hay mowers and rakes; and domestic water supply at 
$17,500.32
 With the exception of settlers on the unusually productive  Klamath 
Project, most  veterans found it diffi cult to secure fi nancing from local banks.  In 
a survey of farmers in the Columbia Basin, over one-fi fth cited inadequate credit 
or capital as a key problem.  The experiences of individual veterans illustrate their 
problems with insuffi cient capital.  In their fi rst year of farming in the Coachella 
Valley, Pearl and Wayne Mayfi eld “needed fertilizer bad[ly]” but could not obtain 
a loan for it because they “didn’t own the land” and therefore could not use their 
farm as collateral.  A banker in Moses Lake, Washington, told one veteran that he 
expected “the fi rst three farmers on these farm units were gonna go broke before 
one made it…so they weren’t gonna have anything to do with [the] farmers at 
all.”  The fact that many homesteaders were young and had no credit rating also 
made bankers suspicious of them.  When Jake Colvin applied for a loan from a 
bank in Yuma, the banker inquired about his credit rating.  “I said, ‘Best in the 
world; I’ve paid cash for everything I ever bought in my life.’  ‘Well that’s not 
credit.  You’ve got no credit,’ they said.  ‘We just can’t loan money to somebody 
that doesn’t have a credit rating.’”  To establish a credit rating Elliott Waits 
borrowed a small amount from one bank in Yuma, deposited it in another, drew 
some interest, paid the remaining interest on the loan and then repaid the bank in 
six months.33
 Alongside settler selection and provision of credit and technical assistance, 
critics of the Bureau’s post-World War I homesteading program had pointed to the 
need for more rigorous evaluation of actual farming opportunities on the projects 
including water supply, soil quality, climate, and accessibility to markets.  As 
evidence of the Bureau’s more careful preparatory work, settlers in the 1940s 
and 1950s received contour maps for their farm units showing optimal locations 
for irrigation structures and detailed classifi cations of their soils.  Reclamation 
Commissioner Michael W. Straus boasted in 1949 that “almost 100 percent of the 
new settlers make good.”  Straus was exaggerating, but veterans did generally 
enjoy superior farming opportunities on the Bureau’s projects in the 1940s and 
1950s than their counterparts had received in the 1920s.34
 Notwithstanding the Bureau’s more careful preliminary investigations, 
enough poor units were included in the post-1945 projects that Congress enacted 
 Public Law 258 in 1953, providing for exchange of submarginal homesteads on 
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reclamation projects. The law was largely inspired by the Bureau’s most glaring 
postwar failure, extensions of the  Riverton Project where seepage and alkaline 
soils made it impossible for over one-third of the postwar homesteaders to 
support themselves.  Assistant Commissioner H. F. McPhail admitted in 1953, 
“The facts clearly show that large amounts of money have been expended for 
construction of irrigation facilities on the newer portions of the project without 
reasonable certainty that the soils were irrigable.”  Reporter Morton Margolin 
quoted an anonymous Bureau employee as saying that offi cials in the Bureau 
had disregarded warning signs and rushed ahead because “Congress and the 
Administration were alike in their desire to provide new farm lands as soon 
as possible” following the Second World War.  “Political pressures dictated an 
expediting of construction, which prevented as thorough an investigation as the 
Bureau usually makes.”35
 Despite the desire of the Bureau and of local examining boards to award 
farms to those who intended to spend their lives on the farm, many homesteaders 
actually regarded their homestead as a speculative investment.  Others who may 
have originally planned to make the farm their home became discouraged by 
the hardships of homesteading or were enticed by the prospect of higher wages 
or a higher standard of living off the farm.  Turnover rates were lowest on the 
Klamath Project where the soil was richest.  Ninety percent of the homesteaders 
there remained on their farms at the end of the fi rst four years, and 43.5 percent 
remained in 1968, 20-22 years after the homesteaders had arrived.  On other 
projects fewer settlers stayed.  On the Minidoka Project by the end of 1960, seven 
years after the fi rst settlers had arrived on the project, 72 percent of a cluster 
sample of 83  veterans who had acquired a farm prior to 1959 retained their land.  
Within 20-22 years of the veterans’ arrival, 31 percent still owned the land.  At 
Yuma Mesa, where the summertime heat was nearly unbearable, 75 percent of the 
fi rst group of 54 homesteaders remained on their farms after two years.  Ten years 
after the fi rst settlers had arrived, 44 percent of them were still there, and after 
twenty years one-third of them remained.36
 Looking back upon outcomes of homesteading by veterans following the 
First and Second World Wars, how do they compare?  Of all the areas opened to 
homesteading following 1945, only the Riverton Project witnessed an extensive 
exodus of homesteaders during the fi rst decade of settlement comparable to 
veterans’ abandonment of the Shoshone Project in the 1920s.  However, the 
percentage of homesteaders who retained their lands roughly two decades 
after they had been homesteaded was actually higher for the post-World War I 
cohort on the Klamath and North Platte projects than for the post-World War 
II group on the Minidoka, Klamath, or Yuma projects.  Absentee ownership, 
however, was less common among the post-1945 cohort than among the 1920s 
homesteaders.  Whereas only 15 percent of all the veteran homesteaders at 
North Platte and 37 percent of the veterans who homesteaded in the 1920s on 
the Klamath Project continued to occupy their lands 20 years later, 44 percent 
of the post-1945 homesteaders on the Klamath Project and 30 percent of the 
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post-1945 homesteaders on the Yuma Project still resided on their farms 20 years 
after they had fi led upon their lands.  In this sense at least, the Bureau’s efforts to 
reduce speculation and tenancy by screening settlers and improving the quality of 
opportunities on its projects had apparently succeeded.
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From Water to Water and Power:  The Changing 
Charge of the Bureau of Reclamation
By:
Jay Brigham
 The United States Congress did two signifi cant things in 1902, which at 
the time must have seemed completely isolated from one another.  After great 
debate, Congress passed landmark legislation that established what we now know 
as the  Bureau of Reclamation.  Much less fanfare accompanied congressional 
authorization that instructed the United States Census Bureau to conduct the fi rst, 
rudimentary,  electrical census of the United States.  It seems unlikely that many of 
those in Congress in 1902 who voted on these two authorizations foresaw the day 
when the Bureau of Reclamation (BR) and electrical generation would become 
closely intertwined.
Undoubtedly, establishment of the  Bureau of Reclamation was the more 
important of these two congressional acts.  For the next 100 years the Bureau 
brought water to many parts of the otherwise arid West.  When the formation 
of the BR and the 1902 electrical census are considered together, however, they 
present an interesting interplay.  Arguably, in 1902 irrigation and reclamation 
represented the nation’s pastoral ideal and the Jeffersonian notion of the yeoman 
farmer.  Irrigation would open new farmland for Americans to own and cultivate 
thus giving them a stake in society.  Electricity, on the other hand, to many people 
represented modernity, if not urbanization, at the dawn of the twentieth century.  
Although some believed that electrical energy would result in decentralization, 
most people clearly associated electricity with cities and towns and such images 
as streetcars and great white ways.  Electricity generated from water power 
became the source of much hope and debate in the fi rst decades of the twentieth 
century leading to passage of the  Federal Water Power Act in 1920 after years of 
intense political debate.  The growing dichotomy between urban and rural after 
the beginning of the twentieth century resulted, in part, because of the growing 
use of electricity and the images associated with such use.  This fi rst occurred 
in public places with developments such as electric streetcars and street lighting 
systems and then in private settings through household lighting, heating, and 
appliance usage.
30.1.  Grand Coulee, Hoover, and Glen Canyon Dams and their powerhouses.
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 The 1902 electrical census revealed that the total generating capacity of 
commercially- and municipally-owned central electrical stations hardly exceeded 
1.2 million kilowatts for the entire United States.  Five years later, the same 
generation capacity had increased nearly 125 percent to more than 2.7 million 
kilowatts.1  By comparison, in the year 2000 the total capacity of BR dams in the 
seventeen western states that the Bureau serves surpassed 14.7 million kilowatts.
That generation capacity included electricity from the federal government’s 
largest hydroelectric dam,  Grand Coulee (6.8 million kilowatts), from perhaps the 
most famous federal dam,  Hoover Dam (2.1 million kilowatts), and from one of 
the most controversial federal dams  Glen Canyon (almost 1.3 million kilowatts).  
Not all BR dams have such tremendous output.  The power plant in the Bureau’s 
project at  Lewiston, Idaho, has a listed capacity of 350 kilowatts.2
 Originally charged with watering the arid West, the Bureau of Reclamation 
has become one of the country’s largest generators of electricity.  While water 
certainly remains the BR’s primary objective, electrical generation provides 
considerable revenue.  Examining the fi rst three decades of the Bureau’s history, 
from its formation through the passage of the  Boulder Dam Act reveals how the 
Bureau’s mission changed from water to water and power.  The Bureau’s concern 
with generation resulted not only from the need to have electricity to pump water, 
but also out of the emerging belief that the public should retain control of at least 
some of the nation’s hydroelectric development.  It also soon became apparent 
to Bureau offi cials that electrical generation could result in signifi cant revenue.  
The Bureau’s role in the construction of Hoover and later Grand Coulee Dams 
also fi t well with the emerging view that the federal government should infl uence 
the development of the nation’s development of electrical resources through the 
ownership of at least some large federal projects.  Federal infl uence in this regard 
was exerted in other parts of the country through the Tennessee Valley Authority 
and later the hydroelectric development of the Saint Lawrence River.  Only 
in the West, however, did reclamation and hydroelectricity become so closely 
intertwined.
 Viewing the early history of BR electrical generation as fi ve concentric 
circles drawn around a project provides an analytical model for understanding 
the growing role that electricity played in Bureau projects.  Each new circle 
incorporates the existing circles, plus signifi cant new functions.  The innermost 
circle represents power projects built to facilitate dam construction.  In those 
instances, electricity might have been used to power shovels, drills, and cement 
mixers.  Such generation might have been water or steam power.  The next circle 
represents electricity used for pumping water.  Using electrically powered pumps 
resulted in a signifi cant increase in the distance that the Bureau could move water.  
Electrical pumps meant that the Bureau was no longer dependent on gravity 
to irrigate land.  The next circle, the third, represents electrical sales to parties 
that lived close to the dams.  Although many of these sales involved relatively 
small amounts of electricity, they are important because the Bureau was selling 
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surplus electricity.  Dams were generating more power than projects required for 
operation.
 By the fi rst decade of the twentieth century, electrical engineers had 
solved the impediments to the  long distance transmission of  electricity by using 
transformers and alternating current.  Such breakthroughs were especially 
signifi cant in the West where great distances often separated hydroelectric sites 
from population centers.  These technological advances gave the Bureau the 
capability to transmit power beyond the immediate vicinity of dams.  The ability 
to transmit power more than several miles, often over rugged terrain, resulted in 
the sale of Bureau power to municipalities and private power companies.  Such 
sales represent the fourth concentric circle.  By the mid-1910s, the Bureau’s 
power sales had surpassed $500,000 per year.  The fi fth circle represents power 
generation and sales to larger cities with electrical generation being nearly 
as much of a factor in the political debates regarding project authorization as 
irrigation.  Hoover Dam best represents the fi fth concentric circle.  Although 
an irrigation and fl ood control project, signifi cant and divisive political debate 
concerning electrical generation, transmission, and distribution preceded 
Congressional authorization of the project.  It is noteworthy that Pelton water 
wheels generate electricity for use at Hoover Dam, while the Bureau transmits 
electricity generated from the banks of turbines on each side of the river to distant 
cities.  Although it is beyond the scope of this work to examine the Bureau’s 
activities during World War II, during the war Bureau of Reclamation power 
developed a sixth circle, the interconnection of Bureau generated power into the 
developing western power grid.3
 Congress passed legislation creating what became the Bureau of 
Reclamation on June 17, 1902.4  The provisions of the law are well known and 
hardly need repeating.  In ten relatively brief sections, Congress laid out the basis 
to provide water to the arid west.  The act gave the Secretary of the Interior broad 
power to withdraw land and to authorize projects.  The reclamation fund would 
fi nance projects.  Landownership could not exceed 160 acres, and residency 
was required.  Issues associated with electrical generation, transmission, and 
distribution do not appear in the law.  The word electricity does not even appear in 
the statute.  That all began to change within a few years.
 The  Salt River Project in Arizona was among the fi rst reclamation projects 
that the Secretary of the Interior authorized on March 14, 1903.5  The First Annual 
Report of the Reclamation Service, which covered the period from passage of the 
law to December 1, 1902, recognized the nascent power potential of the proposed 
project.  The report stated, “[i]n the construction of a great dam one of the most 
important elements is power.”  Further discussion followed that included a brief 
description of the proposed power plant.  This represents the fi rst concentric 
circle.  The writer reported that the power house would have a generating capacity 
of 1,200 horsepower with a fourth of that amount devoted to the cement mill.
Bureau offi cials estimated the total cost of the power house at $215,260.6
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 The following year electricity appeared even more prominently in the 
Bureau’s annual report.  In discussing the  Minidoka Project, another of the 
Bureau’s original endeavors, on the upper Snake River in Idaho the report stated 
that the site presented an “unusually favorable” location for power development.
The Bureau was considering three different plans for the project.  The fi rst had an 
estimated generation capacity of 9,545 horsepower, the second plan’s estimated 
capacity was 11,820 horsepower, and the third plan could generate up to 
17,500 horsepower (more than 13,000 kilowatts).  The report stated that the 
Bureau could use electricity to pump water “above the gravity line” south of 
the river.  If the Bureau did not electrically pump water, offi cials thought that 
a gravity system could only irrigate about 66,000 acres.  Electricity greatly 
increased that potential.  The Bureau estimated that under the fi rst plan, it could 
irrigate 116,000 acres, while under the second plan an additional 10,000 acres 
could be irrigated.  Finally, under the third, 17,500 horsepower plan, upwards of 
172,200 acres would receive river water.7
 The Bureau’s second annual report also contained a section describing the 
proposed  Shoshone Project on the North Fork of the Shoshone River in northwest 
Wyoming.  Jeremiah Ahern, who conducted the project investigation, estimated 
that at two sites 9,000 horsepower might be generated.8  The next several Bureau 
of Reclamation Annual Reports continued to discuss hydroelectric potential.  The 
third and fourth annual reports reviewed the power potential on the following 
projects: Salt River, Klamath, Minidoka, Crow Reservation, Sun River, and Priest 
Rapids.9
 During these early years of the Bureau of Reclamation some prominent 
national fi gures began to express concern over what they considered a waterpower 
monopoly.  Gifford Pinchot, James Garfi eld, Franklin Lane, and others believed 
that the nation’s waterways should be publicly developed to serve the greatest 
good.  These individuals, usually considered as part of the growing progressive-
conservationist movement, expressed alarm over what they thought was the 
30.2.  Theodore Roosevelt Dam and 
Powerhouse. 30.3.  A 1911 view of the Minidoka 
Powerplant.
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purchasing and holding of  water power sites for speculative purposes.  In 1904 the 
Bureau of Reclamation addressed the problem in this statement:
One of the diffi culties encountered in putting the reclamation law into 
effect is the fact that speculative interests have fi led upon, or are seeking 
to fi le upon, all possible sites for developing power.… The fact that 
the persons who fi le upon these water power sites are not compelled 
to utilize them or expend any considerable amount of money in their 
development enables a monopoly of this kind to be created at a small 
expense.10
At issue for the Bureau was the possibility that private power interests would 
monopolize the best dam sites, thereby securing water rights and effectively 
preventing new reclamation projects.
The same report contained a section titled “Power Development and 
Pumping,” that discussed both hydropower and steam generated electricity for 
pumping purposes.  An electrical engineer in Denver was responsible for making 
the studies of power possibilities of each project.  The report then gave a state-
by-state breakdown of the pumping and power possibilities thus far investigated, 
which included projects in Arizona (Salt River); California (Owens Valley, Yuma, 
and King River); Colorado (Uncompahgre Valley); Idaho (Minidoka); Nebraska 
(North Platte); Nevada (Truckee-Carson); New Mexico (Rio Grande); North 
Dakota (steam generated power); South Dakota (Belle Fourche); Utah (Utah Lake 
and Bear Lake); Washington (Priest Rapids); and Wyoming (Shoshone).11
 These early annual reports indicate that a new reality was setting in at 
the Bureau of Reclamation that recognized  electricity as an integral part of any 
proposed project.  A circular letter dated February 2, 1904, discussed the changing 
situation.  The letter stated that 
[t]he feasibility of a project may depend upon the possibilities regarding 
power development and use, and as much time should be allowed for 
studying this phase of the undertaking as for the investigation of other 
engineering questions.
The letter instructed consulting engineers to state in their reports if power 
development was possible, and if so, how much and for what uses.  By issuing 
these engineering instructions, the Bureau had put electricity on the same 
engineering level as irrigation and fl ood control.  A circular letter in May of 1904 
addressed the concern about speculative withdraws of water power sites.  The 
letter gave the Bureau’s approval for withdrawal of potential hydroelectric dam 
sites if any “reasonable prospect” existed that the Bureau may use the site.12
Effectively, the Bureau decided to make preemptive claims to protect potential 
project sites from speculative claims.
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  Numerous factors caused 
the Bureau of Reclamation to 
reassess the importance of electricity. 
Independent of the Bureau, electricity 
was becoming a political, social, and 
technological issue in America.  As 
increasing numbers of people used 
electricity, the need for additional 
generation became paramount.
This, in part, led to the speculative 
purchases of potential water power 
locations.  Water power itself seemed 
to represent an energy panacea since 
it did not require the transportation 
of fuel and once a dam was built supply seemed unlimited.  Internally, the Bureau 
realized that  electricity would allow it to irrigate more land then envisioned only a 
few years earlier.  Technology would thus help promote the Jeffersonian yeoman 
farmer ideal.  Bureau projects, especially Salt River and Minidoka, would soon 
generate electricity in excess of the requirements for pumping water.  Surplus 
electricity meant dollars for the Bureau of Reclamation.  Congress addressed 
the changing circumstances when it amended the reclamation law in April 1906.  
Section fi ve of the  1906 law gave the Secretary of the Interior the right to lease 
surplus power for not more than ten years with a preference given to leases for 
municipal purposes.  The government would place revenue from such leases 
in the reclamation fund and credit the money to the project that generated the 
electricity.  Irrigation remained paramount, however, as a power lease could not 
“impair the effi ciency of the irrigation project.”13  Fourteen years later, when 
Congress passed the Federal Water Power Act, it also contained a clause giving 
preference to municipal power systems.14
 For the remainder of the fi rst decade of the twentieth century electricity 
continued to increase in importance at Bureau projects.  During these years, the 
Bureau also authorized construction of steam generating plants for pumping 
purposes at several projects.  In May 1906, for example, the Bureau started 
receiving bids for construction of two steam turbines with a total capacity of 600 
horsepower to pump water at the ably named  Garden City Project in western 
Kansas.15  Steam-driven generators later pumped water on the  Williston Project in 
North Dakota.
 Electrical power proved indispensable in the construction of another 
early project that featured a hydroelectric dam.  After several years of study, the 
Secretary of the Interior authorized the  Strawberry Valley Project in December 
1905.  Located southeast of Salt Lake City, the Strawberry Valley Project evolved 
out of the agitation of people in the area for irrigation water.  Besides water, 
the project eventually supplied power to several small Utah towns.  The project 
diverted water from the Colorado River watershed into the Great Basin through an 
30.4.  Bell type 116” turbine runner (Unit 1)
at the Siphon Drop Powerplant on the Yuma 
Project in 1926.
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18,500-foot tunnel that carried 
water from the Strawberry 
River to the Spanish Fork 
River.16
The project involved 
two dams: a retention dam on 
the Strawberry River with a 
capacity of 250,000 acre feet 
and then a diversion dam on 
the Spanish Fork River.  The 
Spanish Fork River dam 
diverted water into a three-
mile long power canal before 
the water fi nally entered the 
irrigation works.  Electrical energy proved crucial in construction of the tunnel.  
Initially workers used electric drills powered by gasoline burning generators to 
tunnel through the limestone rock.  After workers had excavated 1,565 feet of the 
tunnel, work stopped to await installation of a more sophisticated electrical plant.  
Work resumed in December 1908 and workers used compressed air drills driven 
by electrically powered air compressors.  Electricity lit the tunnel and helped with 
ventilation.  The project’s machine shop was equipped with electrically powered 
tools and equipment, and an electrically powered locomotive helped clear debris.
A power line transmitted excess power to the town of Spanish Forks, which used 
it for electric lighting.  The Bureau planned to move another transmission line 
built during the construction phase into the valley upon completion of the project 
and to use the line to carry power to pumping stations.  The electrical system went 
online in January 1909 with a capacity of 3,000 horsepower.17
 The year 1909 also was eventful in an electrical sense on other Bureau 
projects.  During construction of the Roosevelt Dam on the Salt River Project, the 
Bureau had installed a temporary power plant that could generate 
1,300 horsepower of electricity. Even before the temporary generator began 
generating electricity, engineers had made plans to install six 900-kilowatt 
generators in the permanent power house.  The fi rst three units began generating 
electricity in 1909 (unit one in June, units two and three in August).  Although 
designed to power pumps, municipal and industrial customers bought Roosevelt 
Dam power most notably the privately owned Pacifi c Gas and Electric 
Company.18
 While the permanent generators began producing power at  Strawberry 
Valley and on the  Salt River Project, the  Minidoka Project on the Upper Snake 
River in Idaho also began generating electricity in 1909.  Power possibilities were 
among the considerations when the Bureau conducted initial project studies in 
1903.  The Bureau later sold excess power for lighting, commercial, and industrial 
uses.  In 1909 the Bureau had developed 6,000 horsepower of electricity on 
30.5.  In 1906 Reclamation had the exciters in place 
and ready for operation in the powerhouse on the 
Strawberry Valley Project.
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the Minidoka Project with another 4,000 horsepower under consideration.  The 
power plant began operation in May 1909, generating power for the project’s fi rst 
pumping station.  Water from electrically powered pumps irrigated 3,600 acres on 
the project in 1909.19
 The Salt River, Strawberry Valley, and the Minidoka Projects all reveal 
the changing charge of the Bureau of Reclamation within the fi rst ten years of its 
existence.  Although on all three projects irrigation remained supreme, electricity 
has assumed an important position.  The Bureau and Congress recognized this 
through new regulation and statute.  On all three projects electricity allowed for 
the pumping of water in greater amounts and over greater distances.  Electricity 
was especially crucial in the construction of the Strawberry Valley Project and 
to a slightly lesser degree the Salt River Project.  In subsequent years, the sale 
of electricity, especially on the Salt River Project, would result in substantial 
revenue.  In varying degrees, the fi rst three concentric circles had developed 
around these projects: electricity for construction, electricity for pumping, and 
electrical sales to individuals and small municipalities.  The foundation for the 
fourth circle, sale to municipalities had clearly been laid with installation of the 
permanent generating facilities at Salt River, Minidoka, and Strawberry Valley.
 As the Bureau entered its second decade of existence, it continued 
to expand as it constructed more projects, some of which could generate 
hydroelectricity.  The thirteenth annual report, which covered fi scal year 
1913-1914, refl ected a degree of contradiction in how the Bureau viewed 
power development.  The report noted that projects on large rivers often had 
hydroelectric capability.  Pumping underground water or surface water above 
the gravity line remained the Bureau’s primary reason for power development.  
Beyond pumping water, the Bureau’s interests in electricity, in order of 
importance, were dam construction, transportation of construction material, and 
then commercial sales of power.  Having stated the Bureau’s interest, the report 
then discussed the rates charged for commercial sales from the Minidoka Project, 
which were less per kilowatt hour than the rates charged for Niagara Falls power.  
This statement is of interest because, during the long debate over ownership of 
electrical systems, public power advocates often used rates at the government-
owned plant at Niagara Falls as a yardstick to measure the rates of privately 
owned utilities in the United States.  The report contained the Minidoka Project’s 
rate schedule and noted the Bureau usually sold power nearly at cost.20
 Data contained in the Sixteenth Annual Report shows the extent of the 
Bureau’s electrical development.  The Bureau operated thirteen power plants on 
nine projects.  As shown in Table 30.1, those plants generated in excess of 
100 million kilowatt hours of electricity.  Power sold to customers approached 
80 million kilowatt hours and resulted in revenue exceeding $623,000.
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Table 30.1.  Bureau of Reclamation  Power Plants Operated during fi scal year 1916-1917.
Project Plant Capacity KilowattHours Kilowatt Power Sales Kilowatt
Kilowatts Generated Hours Sold Revenue Hour Cost.
Salt River Roosevelt 10,000 48,112,800
“ Cross Cut 5,000 9,612,000
“ SouthConsolidated 2,000 6,148,400 60,964,565 $495,049.56 $0.01
Boise Boise 1,875 4,228,720
Minidoka Minidoka 7,000 40,762,730
“ Arizona Falls 1,000 2,745,660 17,009,555 $41,529.57 $0.00
Truckee-Carson Lahontan 1,875 4,758,320 1,023 $16,331.86 $15.96
Rio Grande Power plant 150 59,100 1,200 $52.21 $0.04
Strawberry Valley Spanish Fork 850 1,043,661 939,365 $9,756.10 $0.01
Okanogan Power Plant No. 1 187 6,870 6,870 $140.00 $0.02
“ Power Plant No. 2 187 11,310 11,310 $440.00 $0.04
Yakima-Sunnyside Rocky Ford 187
North Dakota 
Pumping Williston 1,150 1,222,310 943,050 $60,561.00 $0.06
Total 31,461 118,711,881 79,876,938 $623,860.30 $0.01
Source:  Bureau of Reclamation, Thirteenth Annual Report, 1916-1917 (Government
Printing Offi ce, 1917), 23.
Notes:  For Salt River and Minidoka generation totals and revenue are project wide.
Salt River units one, two, and three were not in service during fi scal year 1916-1917 
according to the report.  All plants were hydroelectric except Williston, which was steam.
Although the size of many of the plants listed in Table 30.1 is small by 
contemporary standards, many towns had similar size plants during the 
1910s.  The Bureau continued to look for additional sources of electricity.  The 
information in Table 30.2 is also drawn from the Sixteenth Annual Report.
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Table 30.2.  Undeveloped power on Bureau Projects during fi scal year 1916-1917.
State(s) Project Kilowatts Kilowatt
Minimum Maximum
Arizona-
California Yuma Drop in CA Canal 895 895
Araz 6,714 6,714
Laguna 2,984 2,984
California Iron Canyon Iron Canyon 26,110 26,110
Orland Drop, highline to South Canal 506 506
“ Hat Creek 6,714 8,952
“ Fall River 5,222 29,840
“ Big Bend 111,900 111,900
Colorado Grand Valley* Main Canal 2,238 2,238
Uncompahgre* Various Sites 29,840 29,840
Idaho Boise Arrowrock Dam 7,460 14,920
“* Various Sites 1,417 1,417
Minidoka Minidoka Dam 7,460 7,460
“ Head of Walcott Lake 22,380 22,380
Montana Flathead No. 1 Newell Tunnel 96,980 96,980
“ No. 2 Buffalo Dam 28,348 28,348
“ No. 3 14,174 14,174
“ No. 4 52,220 52,220
“ No. 5 11,190 11,190
Huntley Second Drop, Main Canal 205 205
Montana-North
Dakota Lower Yellowstone* Lateral K.K. drop 234 234
Nebraska North Platte* Pathfi nder Dam 12,682 44,760
Nevada Truckee-Carson Lahontan 3,730 3,730
“ 26-foot drop 2,163 2,163
New Mexico-
Texas Elephant Butte Elephant Butte Dam 8,952 8,952
Oregon Columbia River Celilo Falls 373,000 596,800
Deschutes 4 sites 67,140 74,600
Silver Lake Silver Creek 2,163 2,163
Umatilla Drainage Outfall 108 108
Warner Valley Deep Creek 1,492 1,492
Willamette Valley Santiam River and Marion Lake 10,444 10,444
“ McKenzie River, 2 plants 22,753 22,753
707
“ Middle Fork Willamette and   
Waldo Lake Storage 48,490 48,490
Oregon-
California Klamath Various Sites 7,460 7,460
Utah Strawberry Valley Spanish Fork 1,119 1,119
Washington Columbia River Priest Rapids 149,200 149,200
Okanogan Salmon Creek No. 1 1,492 1,492
“ Salmon Creek No. 2 1,902 1,902
Yakima-Sunnyside Mabton 98 98
“ Main Canal 206 206
Yakima-Tieton Lateral E 2,544 2,544
Yakima-Wapato Drop 0 2,186 2,186
“ Drop 1 3,046 3,046
“ Drop 2 1,822 1,822
“ Drop 3 1,110 1,110
Wyoming Shoshone Shoshone 29,840 29,840
Total 1,190,335 1,487,989
Source:  Bureau of Reclamation, Thirteenth Annual Report, 1916-1917 (Government
Printing Offi ce, 1917), 28.  Notes:  Asterisk indicates generation from irrigation fl ow only.
 Several things are notable about the data in Table 30.2.  Perhaps most 
signifi cantly is the number of projects, twenty-eight, and the number of possible 
power plants, at least forty-six.  The maximum capacity the Bureau thought 
these plants could generate (1,487,989 kilowatts) dwarfed the capacity of those 
plants already generating electricity (Table 30.1: 31,461 kilowatts).  The Bureau 
was certainly thinking big, and that thinking was nowhere more evident then on 
the Columbia River.  Estimates of a dam at Celilo Falls ranged from 1,190,335 
to 1,487,989 kilowatts and the estimate for Priest Rapids was almost 150,000 
kilowatt hours.  The Bureau never did build dams at either of those Columbia 
River sites.  The Grand County, Washington Public Utility District, with fi nancial 
backing from public and private utilities, built a dam at Priest Rapids in the 1950s. 
The Army Corps of Engineers built The Dallas Dam fl ooding Celilo Falls, also 
in the 1950s.  The Bonneville Power Administration transmits power from both 
projects on its lines.21  A notable omission from the Bureau’s list of potential 
waterpower sites was the lower Colorado River near Black and Boulder Canyons.  
That would soon change, leading to ever further expansion of the Bureau’s 
hydroelectric capacity.
 Calls for a dam on the lower Colorado River began shortly after the turn 
of the century from residents of California’s Imperial Valley.  People in the valley, 
who wanted a dam for irrigation and to help control the Colorado’s devastating 
fl oods, began calling for a dam.  In time, their demands coincided with the Bureau 
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of Reclamation’s plan to establish a comprehensive development program for the 
Colorado River Basin.  Initial discussions usually centered on fl ood protection 
and irrigation as the primary reasons for such an undertaking.22  Yet, many people 
were beginning to focus more attention on the river’s hydroelectric potential.
 In 1916 the Department of the Interior through the United States 
Geological Survey released Water-Supply Paper 395 titled, “ Colorado River 
and Its Utilization.”  The report was a comprehensive study of the entire river 
and its watershed.  The report contained extensive discussions concerning water 
supply, irrigation, river control, and water power.  Overall, the river’s short fall 
on many parts made much of it unfavorable for generating cheap energy.  In some 
canyons, however, the river fell as much as fi fteen feet per mile making those 
areas suitable for hydroelectric production.  The report’s author estimated that 
dams could generate nearly 1.5 million kilowatts of electricity without interfering 
with irrigation.  An elevation profi le of the Grand, Green, and Colorado Rivers 
in the study included a notation that read “Boulder Canyon power site.”23  Within 
a few years, interest in the river’s power potential had spread beyond the federal 
government.
 City offi cials in  Los Angeles announced in 1921 their intention to secure 
future water and power supplies from the Colorado River, even if it the city had 
to build a dam on the river.   Southern California Edison (SCE) and  Southern 
Sierra Power joined the battle when they agreed that SCE would sell power to 
Southern Sierra from proposed SCE dams.  Southern California Edison fi led four 
applications with federal and state offi cials to build dams on the river.24  E. F. 
Scattergood, the chief electrical engineer of the Los Angeles Bureau of Power and 
Light, later wrote public power stalwart Senator George Norris that a dam was 
“necessary to the continued growth of the southwest.”25
 In the early 1920s the Bureau of Reclamation again entered the picture.  
Congress had directed the Bureau to examine “possible irrigation development of 
the Imperial Valley in California.”26  The Bureau had done previous investigative 
work over the years regarding the Colorado River and Bureau Director Arthur 
Powell Davis used that material in writing his report.  A map that followed Davis’ 
transmittal letter to the Secretary of the Interior listed thirteen undeveloped power 
sites on the river, including the Boulder Canyon site.  Also listed were twenty-fi ve 
dams already built in the Colorado’s watershed.  In his proposed development 
program, Davis called for a high dam to generate electricity in addition to fl ood 
control and irrigation.  Davis thought that the federal government should build the 
dam and then sell power for compensation.  If that proved unfeasible, he thought 
the government should solicit public or private groups about constructing the 
dam.  Davis’ call for a high dam was important since irrigation and fl ood control 
did not require a high dam, such as the dam ultimately built.27
 The river’s  hydroelectric potential received nationwide attention 
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throughout the 1920s.  William Randolph Hearst, for example, repeatedly used 
his nationwide newspaper chain to blame private power companies for blocking 
passage of Colorado River legislation.  In 1924, during congressional debate 
over the second Swing-Johnson bill, the Hearst press claimed that a dam in 
Boulder Canyon could generate 600,000 horsepower of electricity.28  The Hearst 
newspaper chain, with papers in eighteen major cities, recognized fl ood control 
and irrigation as the principal reasons for building the dam, but said that electrical 
production remained the major point of contention.29  In 1928, when Congress 
fi nally passed the fourth Swing-Johnson legislation, the Hearst press called 
Boulder Dam the “billion dollar dam site”–and one of the biggest congressional 
prizes since Congress allocated railroad land tracts in the nineteenth century.  If 
private power companies had won the prize, the Hearst papers said, they would 
have dictated the industrial development of the entire southwest.30
 The discussions regarding potential Colorado River electricity must have 
been especially pleasing to businessmen in Los Angeles.  By the 1920s electricity 
had become a focal point of the city’s business community.  Beginning in 1922 
the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce began publishing Southern California 
Business.  Throughout the decade, magazine articles associated the continued 
growth of Los Angeles and the entire Southwest to the construction of a Colorado 
River dam.  Commenting on the  Colorado River Compact signed in 1922, one 
article said “few of us hoped for agreement between these seven great states 
whose future growth and expansion are intimately connected with and totally 
dependent upon the development of the Colorado river, both in hydro-electric 
power and waters for irrigation.”  An accompanying map showed nine potential 
power markets in Nevada, Arizona, and California.31
 In the fall of 1925, Southern California Business featured articles that 
discussed the proposed dam site.  “The truly important fact is this…Boulder 
Dam will guarantee adequate water and cheap power to the cites of Los Angeles, 
Pasadena, Glendale, and Riverside-and to the entire Colorado River Basin.”32  The 
Chamber of Commerce’s president issued a statement presenting the Chamber’s 
views on the proposed dam.  The organization favored a high dam to prevent 
fl ooding, provide water, and to “make available a large volume of hydroelectric 
energy, an important necessity for agricultural, industrial and community 
development in the Southwest.”33
 During the years preceding authorization of Hoover Dam, the Bureau 
continued to develop  hydroelectricity on other projects.  In 1925 the Bureau 
operated twenty-two power houses on thirteen projects, as compared to thirteen 
power houses on nine projects in 1917.  In addition to those projects and plants 
listed in Table 30.1, the Bureau operated the Lingle Plant on the North Platte 
Project, the Pilot Butte Plant on the Riverton Project, the Shoshone Plant on 
the Shoshone Project, and the Tieton Number One Plant on the Yakima Storage 
Project.  These plants had a combined capacity of 4,020 kilowatts.34  For 
the remainder of the decade only one more project, Yuma, began generating 
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electricity.  The Bureau did build several more plants on projects with existing 
hydropower generation that included the Guernsey Plant on the North Platte 
Project and the Mormon Flats, Horse Mesa, and Stewart Mountain Plants, all on 
the Salt River Project.35
 Power sales remained profi table for the Bureau in the 1920s.  In 1926 
the Bureau placed the total amount spent on reclamation power development at 
$46,077,649.  Gross earning in 1925 equaled $1,067,135 and net earning were 
$442,619.  The Bureau said that the real benefi t, however, was not fi nancial, but 
the advantages that resulted from electrically driven pumps and draglines that 
improved irrigation.  Home use of cheap Bureau power was another benefi t to the 
projects.36  The larger projects provided considerable income.  On the Minidoka 
Project in 1928 revenue from electrical sales surpassed $150,000.  For the same 
year, electrical sales on the North Platte Project exceeded $220,000.37
 The Bureau’s 1925 annual report listed the “principal” power contracts as 
of June 25, 1925.  On some projects, power went to a single customer such as the 
Boise Project, which sold power to the Idaho Power Company, and the Newlands 
Project, which sold electricity to the Canyon Power Company.  Power from the 
Minidoka Project, however, went to at least seventy-three customers that included 
the cities of Burley and Rupert, and the villages of Albion, Declo, Heyburn, and 
Minidoka.  Minidoka power also went to several power companies and fi fty-
nine “small contracts” with revenue less than $1,000 a year.  The Utah towns of 
Spanish Fork, Payson, Salem, and Springville bought electricity from another of 
the Bureau’s original power projects, Strawberry Valley.38
 Returning to the analytical idea of concentric circles focuses attention on 
the degree of electrical development on Bureau of Reclamation projects by the 
mid to late 1920s.  Electricity was an integral part of dam construction and used 
for pumping water throughout the West; the fi rst and second circles.  The third 
and fourth circles, electrical sales to parties close to dams and to towns and cities 
some distance from power plants also had occurred.  These sales provided the 
Bureau with substantial revenue by the mid 1920s.
 People fought over issues that the fi fth circle represents, sales to large 
cities with electricity a major part of dam authorization and construction, through 
much of the 1920s.  The United States Geological Survey report in 1916 and 
the Bureau’s report in 1921 both identifi ed enormous hydroelectric potential in 
the areas around Black and Boulder Canyons on the lower Colorado River.  The 
transmission of large amounts of Hoover Dam electricity to Southern California 
upon completion of the project clearly represents the fi fth concentric circle.  The 
change in the  Bureau of Reclamation’s mission from water to water and power 
is evident in the fourth Swing-Johnson legislation that became law in December 
1928.
 Whereas “electricity” did not appear in the 1902 law establishing the 
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forerunner to the Bureau of Reclamation, “electricity” was prominent in the 
“Boulder Canyon Project Act” as it is offi cially titled.39  The fi rst sentence of the 
act read, in part, “and for the generation of electrical energy as a means of making 
the project herein authorized a self-supporting and solvent undertaking . . .”
Another part of the fi rst section required construction of a power plant at or near 
the dam “suitable for the fullest economic development of electrical energy from 
the water discharged from said reservoir . . .”  Electricity was clearly an important 
aspect of the entire project.  Electrical generation was not only a legally mandated 
part of the project, it was the means to pay for the project.  This represented a 
dramatic departure from the Bureau’s organic law and from the 1906 amendment 
allowing electrical sales and contracts.  Instead of revenues from land sales 
fi nancing project construction, electricity was the fi nancial agent for the dam’s 
construction and completion.  Section 5(d) of the act refl ected the realization that 
the power plant would generate great amounts of electricity for transmission to 
distant cities.  In part, the subsection gave any agency with a contract for 
25,000 “fi rm horsepower” or less the legal right to use the transmission lines 
of any agency with a minimum contract of 100,000 “fi rm horsepower,” the 
equivalent of 74,600 kilowatts.40  Essentially, the law said that smaller power 
users could use the transmission lines of the larger power users.  This avoided 
duplicate power lines and saved money.  More revealing is the anticipated size 
of the contracts, more than 74,000 kilowatts.  By comparison, the Bureau’s four 
original hydroelectric plants on the Salt River Project had a rated capacity of 
18,000 kilowatts.41
 In the years following congressional authorization of Hoover Dam the 
Bureau has built numerous other projects with tremendous hydroelectric capacity, 
most notably Grand Coulee and Glen Canyon Dams.  Those are just a few, today 
the Bureau operates fi fty-eight power plants in eleven states making it the second 
largest generator of electricity in the United States, second only to the Army 
Corps of Engineers.  Those numbers do not include dams on projects such as 
Salt River that the Bureau no longer operates.  Authorization and construction 
of Hoover Dam represented the completion of the Bureau’s transformation 
from water to water and power.  The intellectual and legal foundations of that 
change date back to the very fi rst years of the Bureau’s existence.  By 1909 those 
foundations were well in place when the Salt River, Minidoka, and Strawberry 
Valley Projects all began to generate electricity in excess of what was needed for 
pumping purposes.  While irrigation will always remain the central feature of the 
Bureau of Reclamation’s fi rst 100 years, electricity has been a part of that history 
for nearly as long.
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Just Add Water:  Reclamation Projects and 
Development Fantasies in the Upper Basin of the 
Colorado River
Stephen C. Sturgeon  
Abstract
The history of the development of the American West is full of countless 
examples of promoters seeking to encourage outside investors to buy land, invest 
in mines, and build railroads.  The history of water projects in the region is no 
different.  Residents of communities such as Grand Junction, Colorado, recognized 
early on the two-fold dilemma that they faced: irrigation and reclamation projects 
would be critical to the economic growth of the area, and the funding for these 
projects would have to be obtained from sources outside the region.  The promoters 
of such projects relied upon booster literature in order to entice investors with 
alluring (and often false) descriptions of the potential wealth to be had in these 
“irrigated Edens.”
 While some parts of the American West quickly developed into large-
scale irrigation areas, other regions, such as the Upper Basin of the Colorado River, 
languished.  The small population, remote location, and marginal land in this 
area sharply limited its political and economic clout.  These limitations, however, 
became less problematic following passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902, when 
the federal government became the funding source of last (or increasingly fi rst) 
resort for water projects in the American West.  Since the federal government had 
access to larger fi nancial and construction resources than other entities, and federal 
projects merely had to break even rather than turn a profi t, it was now much easier 
for Upper Basin projects to secure funding.
 The advent of federal funding, however, did not eliminate the role of local 
promoters and booster literature.  In fact, their role became even more important 
because now instead of simply trying to impress a single investor, or even a 
handful of investors, it was necessary to convince a whole federal bureaucracy 
as well as Congress about the merits that a particular water project had to offer.  
Gradually, over time, the scale and nature of these projects began to change.  
Instead of simple stand-alone irrigation projects, local and regional boosters, with 
the active support of the Bureau of Reclamation, began to promote massive, multi-
phased projects that covered entire river basins.
 This essay will examine the booster literature that was used to promote 
the largest such plan—the  Colorado River Storage Project.  This six state project 
received congressional approval in 1956, and the arguments made on its behalf 
by supporters indicate how much the scope and nature of reclamation projects 
changed over time.  Rather than simply serving irrigation needs, the Colorado 
River Storage Project was intended to promote rapid and massive industrial 
development in the Upper Basin region.  Instead of touting the benefi ts this project 
would have for agriculture, which would have been the norm for promoters in the 
past, the booster literature also touted the potential for industry, as well as other 
diverse goals such as increased recreational opportunities and even improved 
national defense.
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 Just as promoters in the past often over-hyped the projects they were 
supporting, the booster literature for the  Colorado River Storage Project also raised 
unrealistically high expectations.  Instead of becoming the new industrial heartland 
of America, the Upper Basin today still remains a rural, agricultural region.  In 
some instances, such as oil shale, industrial development actually backfi red, 
leading to an economic setback for the region.  Thus large-scale water development 
in the Upper Basin did not ultimately turn out to be the total panacea that local 
residents had desired.
 In the northwest corner of the state of Colorado, straddling the border with 
Utah, is a 325 square mile federal preserve called Dinosaur National Monument.
Although the monument encompasses the scenic canyons of the Green and Yampa 
Rivers, most tourists visit Dinosaur to see the preserved remains of the prehistoric 
creatures that give the area its name.  The main dinosaur exhibit is located at the 
visitors’ center on the Utah side of the monument, where a modern glass and steel 
building encloses the uplifted remnant of a prehistoric riverbed that contains the 
fossils of various ancient reptiles.
 Most tourists never journey past the visitor center, but the road does continue 
on for several more miles.  After crossing over the Green River, drivers reach the 
end of the asphalt pavement and continue on a narrower dirt track.  Just to the left of 
the road are carved petroglyphs, which serve as reminders of the fi rst settlers in this 
area.  Around the next bend in the road is a site that preserves the memory of a more 
recent one.
 A woman by the name of Josie Morris settled here about 1914.  Like 
many things about Morris (her exact age, how many husbands she had—legal or 
otherwise) this date is open to question.  Park historians do know that she lived here 
until her death in 1964, most of the time on her own, leading a fairly self-suffi cient 
life which she occasionally subsidized through poaching or producing moonshine.
The site that Morris chose to homestead was a particularly good one because a 
natural spring bubbled up out of the ground near her cabin, which provided plenty of 
water for her own use as well as for irrigating her orchard and garden.  She also used 
nearby Cub Creek for watering her livestock.
 Not long after Morris settled at this site a neighbor challenged her use 
of the water in Cub Creek.  He did so, not in the stereotypical Western way of a 
gunfi ght, but by taking her to court.  Under the legal doctrine of  prior appropriation, 
the downstream neighbor claimed he had fi rst rights to use any water in the 
creek.  Citing this doctrine the judge ruled that Morris could not continue to draw 
water from Cub Creek.  However he then went a step further by ruling that if any 
water from the spring on her property drained into the creek, the spring could be 
considered a tributary of Cub Creek; and therefore the neighbor would be entitled 
to claim that water as well.  In order to comply with the court’s decision and still 
preserve her option to use the spring, Morris built several small ponds to catch the 
water and even fl ooded some of her own pastures to prevent any spring water from 
washing into the creek.  Only by impounding the water (and in the case of her fi elds, 
wasting it) was she able to preserve her right to use it.1
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 Morris’s struggle to maintain control of her water supply offers an example 
in microcosm of the larger struggle over the control and development of water in the 
American West.  In a region that is in large part defi ned by the absence of high levels 
of precipitation, this struggle is not just limited to feuds between neighbors but also 
involves confl ict between cities, states, and whole river basins.  The effort to control 
water has typically focused on two issues: determining who has the legal right to use 
the water, and determining how best to put that water to use.  It was this second goal 
that led to the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902—legislation which allowed 
the federal government to assist (as well as subsidize) directly in the development of 
water resources in the West.
 As the title of the legislation might suggest, the primary focus of early 
federal reclamation projects was on irrigating new crop land.  Over time, however, 
the scope of these federal  projects grew and shifted away from being primarily 
agricultural.  Instead they began to include such diverse elements as hydroelectricity, 
mining, recreation, industrial development, and regional planning.  This shift away 
from agriculture to industry was particularly noticeable in the Upper Basin of the 
Colorado River over the course of the twentieth century.  The Upper Basin also 
provides a clear example of how this shift, made with the best of intentions, could 
end up having unintended (or even disastrous) consequences.
31.1.  Federal and state representatives at a meeting of the  Colorado River Compact 
Commission, north of Santa Fe, New Mexico, at Bishop’s Lodge.  Left to right: W. S. 
Norviel, Commissioner for Arizona; Arthur P. Davis, Director, Reclamation Service; 
Ottamar Hamele, Chief Counsel, Reclamation Service; Herbert Hoover, Secretary of 
Commerce and Chairman of Commission; Clarence C. Stetson, Executive Secretary of 
Commission; L. Ward Bannister, Attorney, of Colorado; Richard E. Sloan, Attorney, of 
Arizona; Edward Clarke, Commissioner for Nevada;  C. P. Squires, Commissioner for 
Nevada; James R. Scrugham, Commissioner for Nevada; William F. Mills, former Mayor 
of Denver; R. E. Caldwell, Commissioner for Utah; W. F. McClure, Commissioner for 
California; R. F. McKisick, Deputy Attorney General of California; Delph E. Carpenter, 
Commissioner for Colorado; R. J. Meeker, Assistant State Engineer of Colorado; Stephen 
B. Davis, Jr., Commissioner for New Mexico; J. S. Nickerson, President, Imperial 
Irrigation District of California; Frank C. Emerson, Commissioner for Wyoming; Charles 
May, State Engineer of New Mexico; Merritt C. Mechem, Governor of New Mexico; T. C. 
Yeager, Attorney for Coachella Valley Irrigation District of California.  November 24, 1922.
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 Like many facets of western water law, the Upper Basin of the  Colorado 
River is a legal fi ction.  Created during negotiations over the  Colorado River 
Compact of 1922, the basin is defi ned as that portion of the drainage area for the 
Colorado River which is located upstream from Lee Ferry.2  The basin includes 
portions of fi ve states: Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona.  The 
legal concept of the Upper Basin and Lower Basin was created in part to help divide 
the fl ow of water in the river between the various competing states, and especially to 
give the other river basin states protection from California’s steadily growing water 
consumption and political power.  Despite assurances and visions that the Lower 
and Upper Basins would be developed at the same pace, the Lower Basin quickly 
absorbed the majority of federal reclamation spending.  As a result, it would be more 
than thirty years after the compact was signed before the Upper Basin would see the 
construction of larger-scale federal reclamation projects.
 Reclamation development in the Upper Basin, both public and private, 
has long suffered from a series of limitations: limited arable land, limited funding 
sources, and limited local skill and equipment.  What the region did not suffer from 
was a limited desire for reclamation.  An examination of the history of reclamation 
development in the area around Grand Junction, Colorado, shows that almost as 
soon as the fi rst outside settlers arrived, they identifi ed reclamation development as 
crucial to the economic potential of the area.  The stages of reclamation development 
in Grand Junction followed a pattern similar to what took place in other parts of the 
West: small, locally-controlled projects gave way to larger-scale efforts that required 
outside funding.  In the early 1880s farmers near Grand Junction began developing 
a series of irrigation projects on the banks of the Colorado River (then known as the 
 Grand River).  These projects soon proved to be unviable on their own and were 
consolidated into a larger valley-wide canal project (known as the  Grand Valley 
Canal) designed not only to irrigate land on the banks of the river, but also further 
away.  This more ambitious project exceeded the fi nancial resources available in the 
Grand Junction area, so a series of outside investors ended up funding construction 
of the canal.  The process eventually culminated in the canal company being owned 
in 1885 by the Travelers Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut.3
 Even outside, private-sector fi nancial resources, however, were not enough 
to construct and maintain a viable canal project, and in 1894, following a series of 
reorganizations, foreclosure auctions, and court challenges, the Grand Valley Canal 
switched from being a for-profi t corporation to a not-for-profi t mutual company.  
This, of course, left project supporters with the same problem as before: how to 
secure fi nancing for further irrigation development in the valley when such projects 
appeared unlikely to turn a quick profi t.  At this point the federal government and the 
Reclamation Act of 1902 played a key role in changing the direction of development 
in the West.  By merely requiring that projects eventually had to repay their costs 
(with a liberal defi nition of repayment), rather than generate immediate profi ts, the 
Reclamation Act transformed hundreds of previously uneconomic projects into 
potentially viable ones.4
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 In the fi rst two decades 
of the twentieth century, the 
federal Reclamation Service 
undertook to build a series of 
projects in the region around 
Grand Junction.  The most 
ambitious of these was the 
 Gunnison Tunnel (1909), 
which diverted water from 
the Gunnison River through 
a six-mile tunnel into the 
 Uncompahgre Valley.  While 
federal involvement did allow 
for the construction of larger-
scale projects, it did not always 
improve the fi nancial success of these ventures.  The  Grand Valley Project (not to 
be confused with the Grand Valley Canal), located on the Colorado River upstream 
from Grand Junction, was approved by the federal government in 1911 with a 
projected three-year repayment period once the project was fi nished.  Although 
it was completed in 1917, repayment did not start until 1928, and only after the 
government changed the repayment period to 40 years, wrote off $812,000 in 
construction costs, and instituted a reduced payment plan for the fi rst fi ve years.  
Similarly, the  Uncompahgre Project (of which the Gunnison Tunnel was part) 
originally had a repayment period of 10 years, which the government then extended 
to 20 and later 40 years.  Despite the extensions, however, local farmers proved 
unable to meet the revised repayment schedules, so in the early 1950s Congress 
approved an extension for the project that spread the repayment period out over 106 
years, and wrote off $1 million of the original $10 million cost.5
 While these federal projects were much larger in scope than the previous 
private-sector ones, they remained much smaller than the development occurring in 
the Lower Basin of the Colorado River.  Early projects there included  Laguna Dam, 
 Roosevelt Dam, and  Coolidge Dam.  Additional projects, such as the  All–American 
Canal and  Imperial Dam, followed the completion of the Colorado River Compact in 
1922.  Despite the seeming success of the Bureau of Reclamation, the federal agency 
actually had severe fi nancial diffi culties during its fi rst thirty years of existence, 
owing in large part to the chronic cost overruns on projects and the inability of 
farmers to pay back construction costs in a timely manner.  The turning point for the 
Bureau was  Hoover Dam.6
 Standing 726 feet high, Hoover Dam at the time of its construction in 
1935 was the largest reclamation project in the world.  The dam, however, not 
only represented a physically larger project for the Bureau of Reclamation, it also 
represented a new kind of project.  Whereas past efforts had typically focused on 
irrigation and fl ood control benefi ts for the immediate surrounding area, Hoover 
Dam offered little to the sparse populations of southern Nevada and northern 
31.2.  The east portal of the Gunnison Tunnel during 
construction.
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Arizona.  Instead the bulk of the benefi ts literally fl owed down the river to Southern 
California in the form of improved fl ood control for the Imperial Valley, and, more 
importantly, hydroelectricity for Los Angeles.7
 The advent of  hydroelectricity had a two-fold impact on the Bureau: one, 
it transformed the agency from a fi nancially-troubled program into an economic 
powerhouse; and two, it encouraged the Bureau to start planning more, and larger, 
integrated regional projects rather than continuing to concentrate on traditional, 
stand-alone initiatives.  In particular, the fi nancial boom from hydroelectricity led 
Reclamation offi cials to start planning for so-called “cash register” dams, which 
sometimes had no merit other than generating electricity.  The profi ts from these 
dams were used to offset the losses typically incurred by irrigation projects.8
 Hoover Dam was the beginning of the so-called “golden age of reclamation,” 
which lasted for the next forty years.  The  Boulder Canyon Act of 1928, which 
authorized construction of Hoover Dam, ushered in this era by also authorizing the 
Bureau of Reclamation to investigate feasible projects in the Upper Basin of the 
Colorado.  In 1946 the Bureau issued its preliminary plan for the region, a wish 
list of over one hundred proposed dams—one for virtually every river in the Upper 
Basin.  There were so many proposed projects in the plan that to build all of them 
would have required more water than existed in the basin.  The Bureau demonstrated 
the high level of political power it now had by announcing that it would not consider 
any projects in the Upper Basin until the states in the area had reached a formal 
agreement on dividing the Colorado River’s water among themselves.  The states 
quickly complied, and the  Upper Basin Compact was formally signed in 1948.9
 Following ratifi cation of the compact by Congress a year later, the Bureau 
of Reclamation released a revised plan in 1950 entitled the  Colorado River Storage 
Project (CRSP).  The CRSP called for the construction of ten major dams and 
reservoirs on the Colorado and its tributaries.  These reservoirs, however, would not 
serve any irrigation or fl ood control purpose.  Instead they would regulate the fl ow 
of the river in order to help maximize the production of hydroelectricity.  In turn, the 
profi ts from the sale of this electricity would help offset the cost of building a dozen 
smaller regional irrigation projects.10
 While the stated core goals of the Colorado River Storage Project may 
have been water and light, the Bureau and its boosters actually had a much larger 
agenda in mind: to transform the Upper Basin of the Colorado River from a desert 
wasteland into a new industrial and recreational center for the United States.  Clearly 
infl uenced by the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority, which during the New 
Deal had helped to promote the development of one of the most impoverished 
regions of the South, the promotional literature supporting the CRSP stressed the 
broad cornucopia of benefi ts that would fl ow from the project—not only for the 
Upper Basin but the entire nation.11
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 Perhaps not surprisingly, one of the major potential benefi ts the promotional 
literature touted about the Colorado River Storage Project was that it would unleash 
the vast untapped wealth of natural resources in the Upper Basin.  Pamphlets 
31.3.  Signed into law in 1956, the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) authorized a 
broad range of projects in the Upper Colorado River Basin.
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featuring maps of the region speckled with various resource symbols described 
the region as the “treasure chest of the nation.”  Others called it a “yawning 
giant.”  Estimates varied about how many valuable minerals were located in the 
area (ranging between 42 and 200), but among those mentioned were lead, copper, 
iron, zinc, phosphates, gold, silver, oil, natural gas, gilsonite, gypsum, tungsten, 
molybdenum, and vanadium.  Promoters were quick to emphasize that the Upper 
Basin was the chief domestic source for such strategic minerals as uranium, and 
contained the world’s largest reserves of oil shale.  All that was needed to unleash 
these potential riches was power and water.  Failing to do so, warned a pamphlet 
produced by the mining industry, “can hurt our entire national economy and our 
national defense program.”12
 Another benefi t that the literature promoted was the potential for industrial 
development from the CRSP.  This industrial growth was directly linked to the 
expanded use of natural resources.  Regional boosters expressed frustration over the 
fact that while mining took place in the Upper Basin, the extracted raw materials 
were shipped elsewhere for processing and manufacturing.  With power and water 
from the Colorado River Storage Project, plants could potentially be built within 
the area to use these materials instead.  This in turn would help to diversify the local 
economy.  These same boosters, however, stressed that industrial growth would 
require “fabulous amounts of water,” not just for the manufacturing process but also 
for the workers who would relocate to the area seeking employment.13
 Boosters did not just expect 
growth in rural areas; they also 
anticipated that there would be 
growth in the cities of the Upper 
Basin as well.  Arguments in support 
of the need for more urban water 
took two contradictory forms.  Much 
of the promotion literature claimed 
that due to “the continued shift of 
population from East to West,” 
western cities such as Salt Lake 
City and Albuquerque had reached 
the limits of their growth owing 
to a lack of new water supplies.
Denver in particular was held 
up as a dire warning because it 
had instituted water rationing.
(This, however, was a somewhat 
31.4.  Glen Canyon Dam and 
Powerhouse.
31.5.  The scroll case in unit 5 of the Glen Canyon 
Powerhouse during installation in 1963.
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misleading example since the rationing was due to a severe, multi-year drought 
which hit Colorado in the early 1950s—a fact that the literature did not mention.)
In contrast to the literature that claimed more water was needed to catch up with 
existing growth, others argued that the water was needed to spur on additional 
growth.  These promoters freely admitted that their population growth estimates 
were “based on the assumption that additional water can be secured,” and that “if 
no additional water is to be obtained only a relative small increase in population can 
logically be expected.”14
 When examined together these two arguments reveal a clear fl aw: if urban 
growth in the region had reached a limit due to the lack of additional water, then the 
Colorado River Storage Project, which would introduce a larger but ultimately fi nite 
amount of water, could at best only delay this problem but not solve it.  The day of 
reckoning would be merely deferred, not eliminated.  The promotional literature also 
ignored the fact that the CRSP was not designed to serve urban water needs.  The 
cities cited as examples, in fact, are located outside the Upper Basin watershed.  The 
only way for the CRSP to serve these cities was to provide new sources of water 
for agriculture so that existing water supplies could be diverted out of the basin.
The literature also never addressed the question of whether additional growth was 
necessary or even desirable.  (Such a question would undoubtedly have struck the 
promoters as completely irrational.)  Instead promoters argued that the CRSP was 
necessary so the West “can keep pace with the rest of the nation.”15
 Supporters of the Colorado River Storage Project were quick to point to how 
the economic benefi ts of all this anticipated growth would ripple through the region, 
particularly in the form of increased tax revenue.  One promotional publication 
argued, “[t]he claiming of arable land areas out of desert wastes would add millions 
to taxable land values in Utah and the Upper Basin.  And the adding of supplemental 
water in areas restricted to early maturing crops would further expand the tax base.”  
Senator  Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, a strong proponent of the CRSP, stressed 
how the project would lead to the development of new industry and “the money that 
those industries pour into our State in tax revenues will help to support our schools. 
. . .”  These rosy tax scenarios, however, failed to mention the fact that the infl ux 
of a larger population to provide the work force for these new industries would 
necessarily lead to increased public expenditures for more roads and schools, thus 
raising the question of whether or not the increased revenue would even be suffi cient 
to cover the new expenses.  As if to defl ect this question, one promoter argued that if 
the CRSP was not approved “the property values adjacent to the Colorado River in 
the Upper Basin will diminish in value and waste down the river with the water.”16
 While many of the potential benefi ts predicted for the Colorado River 
Storage Project, such as an enhanced agricultural infrastructure and an improved 
tax base, were similar to those that nineteenth century reclamation boosters had 
touted, some of the benefi ts were distinctly new.  One such new potential benefi t 
was increased recreational opportunities.  Promoters were quick to point out the 
fact that the bulk of the proposed reclamation projects would be located between 
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“two transcontinental 
highways and much nearer 
to the eastern populations 
desiring” recreational 
opportunities.  The CRSP, it 
was promised, will “greatly 
expand the nation’s existing 
facilities for fi shing, 
boating, camping, water-
skiing, swimming and other 
recreational activities.  It 
will open up new scenic 
areas, now inaccessible.
Colorful natural bridges, 
spectacular canyons and historic sites will be made available to the people of the 
nation.”17
 However, promoters were also quick to stress that the full recreational 
potential of this region would only be realized if all the proposed projects in the 
CRSP were built, because it was these individual projects that would allow for 
access to recreational areas.  The construction of  Glen Canyon Dam would create 
Lake Powell, which in turn would allow people to reach Rainbow Bridge National 
Monument
by means of a scenic short boat trip.  In its current isolated status, Rainbow 
Bridge is accessible only by an arduous pack trip by horseback or by a long 
river trip and a 10-mile hike.  As a result, comparatively few people have 
seen this wonder of the world.
Flaming Gorge Dam promised to “make accessible the awesome scenery of the 
deep gorge of the Green River….”  The  Echo Park Dam promised to open the 
Lodore Canyon, which currently is “dangerous for boat trips, even with experienced 
guides,” “to people who love true beauty.”  Additionally promoters claimed that 
these projects even had scientifi c value because they would enable “[s]cientists and 
naturalists [to] have new access to the primitive area.”18
Clearly much of this rhetoric was aimed at countering the attacks being made 
on the  Colorado River Storage Project by environmentalists (or as they were called 
then, conservationists).  Promoters of the project sought to combat these attacks 
in a variety of ways, one of which was by labeling environmentalists as elitists.
The rhetoric proponents used suggested that reclamation projects had the potential 
to make nature more democratic.  A few examples are enlightening.  “Without 
the projects, there will be no development, and only a few men with means and 
with physical stamina and courage to endure dangers will ever be able to see and 
appreciate the grandeur of these Rocky Mountain canyons.”  “[T]he Colorado River 
Storage Project will provide full enjoyment of areas that are now open only to a 
few––the people who can afford expensive river trips and the people who care to 
31.6.  Flaming Gorge Dam and Powerplant in 1984.
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risk these trips.”  “It will make available this area to the people instead of restricting 
it to a few.”19
Another angle of attack was to claim that development would make nature 
more family friendly.  “The projects will open new vistas for conservationists, 
tourists, fi shermen, nature lovers and the American family.”  “With development of 
the dams, many of these areas will be accessible.  A few roaring rapids will be turned 
into placid lakes where a man can take his family for a boating or fi shing outing.”  
However, lest promoters be accused of taming too much of the wilderness they were 
quick to add, “[a]nd there are still a hundred miles of river rapids in the same general 
area, for those who like this sport.”20
Promoters even went so far as to claim that the Colorado River Storage 
Project had the potential to improve nature.  CRSP reservoirs promised to “provide 
numerous havens for ducks and other migratory birds.”  These havens were “not 
now present but vitally needed.”  Additionally, 
the project will turn silt-laden rivers into clear streams.  The Green and 
Yampa rivers now are muddy most of the time because of heavy deposits 
of silt.  Dams to be constructed will hold this silt in check, turning brown 
rivers into clear and sparkling streams.
“ Navajo Dam will turn the muddy, sluggish San Juan River into a clear reservoir.”  
These clear streams in turn would offer new recreational opportunities.  “Flaming 
Gorge Dam will make a clear water fi sherman’s stream out of the lower Green River 
now too clouded with mineral deposits to be a game stream.”  What promoters did 
not know was that the process by which these rivers became clear would destroy the 
local river ecology and drive out the native fi sh.  The new fi shing holes would be 
world famous and strictly artifi cial.21
 Another group for whom the Colorado River Storage Project would offer a 
mixed legacy was the  Navajo.  Promoters, however, promised that the CRSP would 
be a supreme blessing for the tribe.  In order to make this promise, promoters had 
to take the unusual gambit of attacking the past actions of the federal government 
and the white settlers in the region.  Pro-CRSP literature argued that the Navajo 
“often go hungry because they have been shunted aside onto marginal lands with 
inadequate water supplies.  They also lack clothing and shelter.”  The newspaper in 
Farmington, New Mexico, which published a special supplement in support of the 
CRSP featuring the plight of the Navajo on the cover, claimed that the reason “30 
per cent of the tribe” lived at subsistence levels was because “we Americans have 
broken so many solemn treaties.”22
 In contrast to this history of past abuse, supporters of the Colorado River 
Storage Project maintained that reclamation was the key to helping the Navajo.
One source of help would be the construction of  Navajo Dam on the San Juan River 
in New Mexico, which promoters claimed would lead to industrial development 
in the area and therefore provide jobs to tribal members.  The second source of 
help was the proposed  Navajo Indian Irrigation Project, which aimed to irrigate 
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up to 125,000 acres of land on the reservation.  A third source of help, though one 
with no obvious link to the CRSP, was the promise that “this project will help 
provide educational opportunities for the children of the Tribe,” by leading to the 
construction of schools for sixteen thousand Navajo.  More broadly, promoters 
stressed that the CRSP would help in the “rehabilitation of this long-neglected 
segment of the original American society,” and offer “partial fulfi llment of promises 
made to the Navajo people in the treaty of 1868 and never lived up to.”  Project 
supporters also offered a more tangible reason than honor for non-Navajos to 
support these initiatives.
This project will help the Indians help themselves.  In the long run, it 
will save the government money because it helps the Navajos to become 
self-supporting, instead of having to be supported by government 
expenditures.23
Promoters, however, seemed to have set a low threshold for success.  One 
document claimed that the construction of Navajo Dam “would give a decent 
standard of living to one–fi fth of [the tribe]. . . .”  Unfortunately these lowered 
expectations proved correct.  The Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (NIIP) ultimately 
turned into a political boondoggle.  Unlike other component projects of the Colorado 
River Storage Project, which were developed and administered by the Bureau of 
Reclamation, the NIIP was quickly turned over to the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
where it became a fi nancial black hole, “which yielded few benefi ts to the tribe 
and provided far less employment of tribal members than originally negotiated.”
Perhaps it was this unproductive experience that led the Navajo to oppose further 
federal reclamation projects on the Colorado River when they were proposed in the 
1960s.24
Just as the promoters of the Colorado River Storage Project pointed out the 
ways that the Navajo had suffered injustice, project supporters also pointed out the 
ways that they perceived themselves to have also been treated unfairly.  Ironically, 
even though promoters argued that the CRSP would create new recreational 
opportunities and help Indians, they also complained that these two factors had 
hindered development in the region.
In the four Upper Basin states, and particularly in Utah, there are expansive 
areas taken up by Monuments, Parks, Forest Service, Grazing Service, 
Indian Reservations, and other reserves of various kinds, all tax free.  And 
now some would deprive the common people of this area of one of the few 
resources which is available for development and use.
Senator  Arthur Watkins of Utah expressed jealousy about the economic growth 
occurring in other parts of the country.  “Our Detroits and our Pittsburghs seem 
to grow ever larger, while the industrial have-not areas content themselves with a 
few industrial handouts.”  He later expanded his complaint to include foreign aid 
projects.
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We have spent 300 millions to help Italians build reclamation projects, yet 
the Italians are under no obligation whatsoever to repay any of the costs of 
those projects.  We are willing to repay in dollars and cents for the capital 
on irrigation, and dollars and cents, with interest, for municipal uses and for 
power.
Senator  Frank Barrett of Wyoming took a different tack, borrowing from 
the states-rights rhetoric of southern politicians.  “Overpowering and vital 
interest [sic]of these Western States are involved, and after all, people of 
the West ought to have the major right to make the decisions affecting their 
welfare.”25
 While some promoters argued that “justice” required that the 
Colorado River Storage Project be built, others warned of the regional 
devastation that would ensue if the CRSP did not receive congressional 
approval.   George Clyde, the Commissioner of Interstate Streams for Utah, 
offered a legal doomsday scenario.  “If the project is not authorized, the 
rights of the Upper Basin states to their share of the Colorado River will 
be effectively destroyed.”  He continued, “Failure of Congress to authorize 
this project will be the equivalent of their confi scating these rights in the 
Colorado and making them available to the Lower Basin and Mexico.”
Others warned that this was the “last watering hole” for the Interior West.  
“The Colorado River is the last water resource available in many parts of 
the area to supply additional water for municipal and industrial purposes.”
“Testimony given . . . left no doubt that the future of [these] states is 
dependent upon the plan.”  Congressman  Wayne Aspinall of Colorado 
offered an even direr scenario.
[S]tand on a canal bank as it winds its way over the land.  On the uphill 
side, you have virtually a barren desert with but scrub growth and little 
green.  On the downhill side you have green and growing crops, houses, 
cities and life.  That is the choice in the West, irrigation or desolation; 
abundance or scarcity.
Sometimes the apocalyptic predictions promoters used would end up undermining 
the very argument they were trying to make.  “When [the Colorado River’s] waters 
have been used, there is no other substantial supply on tap.  The future of the 
Southwest will have dropped back with its past.”  Thus, it seems, whether or not the 
CRSP was built the West was doomed to economic collapse.26
An unusual variation on this doomsday theme was the plea by promoters 
to build the Colorado River Storage Project not for their sake but for the sake of 
“our best crop, our children.”  Senator Arthur Watkins in a letter to Secretary of 
the Interior  Oscar Chapman complained, “For many years the young people of 
my state have been migrating in large numbers to other states where there would 
be opportunities for homes and livelihoods.  The limiting factor in Utah has been 
lack of water and power.”  Utah’s other Senator,  Wallace Bennett, echoed these 
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sentiments but conjured up images of the old orphan trains when he predicted, “We 
shall have to continue to export our children to other states because opportunity for 
them is lacking.”  George Clyde complained, “Utah has long been a feeder state.  Its 
raw materials have been shipped to other centers for processing.  Its children have 
had to seek employment elsewhere.”  One promoter cited the plight of the children 
in his attack on efforts by environmentalists to block the CRSP.
Natural scenery is a beautiful thing, but economic security can also be very 
attractive.  Approximately 30% of the native born population of Utah must 
seek employment outside the state, after the state has educated and trained 
them in the art of making a living.  Power and water for irrigation would 
unlock many of Utah’s natural resources and enable more [of] the people of 
the state to remain home.
The Republican Party of Utah endorsed this focus on the future when it passed a 
resolution supporting the Colorado River Storage Project and claiming that among 
its many benefi ts the project “will provide new homes and opportunities for our 
children and their children. . . .”  As another promoter put it, with the CRSP “[o]ur 
young men and women can build their destiny here.”27
While much of the promotional rhetoric surrounding the debate over the 
Colorado River Storage Project focused on local concerns, supporters also were 
quick to claim that the nation as a whole would benefi t in a variety of ways.  One 
area of emphasis was how the national economy would grow as a result of the 
CRSP.  Promoters claimed that the industrial development of the Upper Basin 
would lead to a higher standard of living in the region.  As a result of this, “[t]he 
people of this reclamation area…will want and need new products—cars, tractors, 
stoves, refrigerators, household items and equipment.  Thus new markets will be 
created for products manufactured in other parts of the country.”  Even during the 
construction phase for the CRSP the country as a whole would benefi t “because an 
estimated 81 per cent of the construction costs will be spent in markets outside the 
Upper Colorado River Basin.”  The project was even touted as a fi nancial boon for 
the federal government due to the increased income tax that would be generated in 
the newly prosperous region, not to mention the revenue the government would gain 
from the sale of hydroelectricity generated by the CRSP dams.28
While many of the supposed benefi ts that promoters claimed would 
come from the  Colorado River Storage Project seemed fairly straightforward and 
conventional, there was one set of benefi ts that was quite different.  Supporters 
claimed that in addition to all the various economic rewards from the CRSP, this 
project was vitally necessary in order to increase the security of the United States 
from the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union.  Some promoters emphasized the 
untapped reserves of strategic minerals, such as uranium, oil shale, gilsonite, and 
bentonite, among others, located in the region—minerals that could only be fully 
developed with water and power from the CRSP.  Others claimed that the country 
needed to develop all of its potentially irrigable land.  Senator Wallace Bennett 
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warned that recent history had shown that the United States could not rely on foreign 
supplies during wartime, and that we must develop domestic sources.29
Supporters of the Colorado River Storage Project also argued that the 
project would strengthen the nation’s industrial capacity in the event of an atomic 
war.  There were two aspects of this argument that promoters set forth.  One was 
that the CRSP would allow for industrial dispersion into the interior of the United 
States.  Senator Bennett warned how “[t]he overwhelming bulk of our productive 
capacity could be obliterated by a few well–placed bombs or missiles, for our 
key industries are concentrated in just a few areas.”  A group lobbying on behalf 
of the CRSP produced an entire brochure quoting the testimony of national Civil 
Defense Administrator Val Peterson on why the project was necessary for national 
security.  In it, he expressed concern about the “[t]he potentially fatal vulnerability 
of concentrations of industry . . . .”  Peterson went on to call “attention to the work 
that Russia is reported to have done in developing a second line of industry behind 
the Ural Mountains.”  Senator Arthur Watkins took this idea a step further when 
he suggested that “the United States, too, should build its own industrial defense 
bastion behind the protective peaks of our own ‘Urals,’ the great Rocky Mountain 
Range.”  Local promoters in Utah further suggested that not only was Utah “made 
up of many valleys, each protected by high and rugged mountains on all sides giving 
industries the best form of strategic protection,” but also that “Utah’s geographical 
position is such that it is a distributing point and has excellent transportation 
facilities to all the West Coast’s harbors, the nation’s railroad systems, and/or air 
bases.”  Promoters, however, were careful to not present themselves as a threat to 
the industrial welfare of other parts of the country by clarifying that “[n]o one is 
advocating that our industries be relocated,” rather that they simply be duplicated in 
the interior.30
The second argument concerning industrial security that supporters of the 
Colorado River Storage Project made was that the Upper Basin not only offered 
geographic security, but geologic security as well.  In comments that seemed to 
foreshadow the dialogue from Dr. Strangelove concerning “a mine shaft gap,” Civil 
Defense Administrator Peterson warned that “the balance of victory between two 
military powers may well rest with the nation whose civilian population can best 
minimize the effect of an atomic attack and get up off the ground organized and 
ready.”  To help facilitate this, Peterson pointed to the examples of “underground 
defense plants and military installations in Scandinavia,” which he said were cheaper 
to build “under the rock” than on the surface.  Project supporters, seizing on these 
comments, were quick to point out that “[d]eep gorges abound in the project area.  
Power plants and industrial plants could be tunneled into the sheer rock walls at 
canyon fl oor level, providing protection from atomic blast.”  Senator Watkins went a 
step further, envisioning a whole network of underground installations.
[T]he Mountain West has thousands of feet of solid rock in mountain 
and canyon walls which can be utilized to protect vital industries and 
government installations from atomic attack.  These natural bomb shelters 
can be located in the ribs of the aptly named Rocky Mountains.  Tunnels 
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and caves could be developed in these mountains at widely separated 
locations to give this nation an impregnable industrial bastion that would 
be secure even against the awesome weapons of the atomic and hydrogen 
bombs.
All of this could be possible, CRSP promoters promised, just by developing water 
and power in the region.31
Supporters of the Colorado River Storage Project did not simply worry about 
the impact of an atomic war upon American industry; they also stressed how the 
project would benefi t civilian evacuations.  Senator Bennett pointed out that “[i]f we 
don’t have water for our present needs in some areas, it will obviously restrict our 
ability to meet our civil defense responsibilities. . . .”  Civil Defense Administrator 
Peterson warned what those responsibilities might be.  “In this nuclear age, if 
an attack is made . . ., it will be necessary, fi rst, to get our people away from our 
critical target areas, . . . and if a city is hit by a hydrogen bomb, we will not be able 
to re-enter for some time, and possibly never.…”  “It would be fortunate if we had 
areas with water and power facilities far removed from our vulnerable and heavily 
populated urban centers to which these people could go.”  “The Upper Colorado 
Development, by providing water and power, would pave the way for taking care of 
those who by necessity may be forced to evacuate our West Coast cities.”  The chief 
thrust of all these various defense arguments was that an opponent of the CRSP was 
an opponent of national security.32
Despite the “un-American” taint, opponents of the Colorado River Storage 
Project did manage to get some aspects of the project changed.  Chief among 
them was deletion of the proposed  Echo Park Dam that was scheduled to be built 
inside  Dinosaur National Monument.  When Congress agreed to drop the dam, 
environmentalists agreed to drop their opposition to the overall project.  (A decision 
that many of them later came to regret when Glen Canyon was subsequently fl ooded 
as part of the project.)  As a result of this compromise, the Colorado River Storage 
Project fi nally received congressional approval in 1956.  Passage of the project, 
however, did not mean that booster efforts in support of the CRSP came to a halt.  
Although Congress had agreed to the project in principle, federal reclamation 
offi cials still had to obtain annual fi nancial appropriations from Congress in order 
for the project to continue.
To help secure this on-going funding, project promoters continued their 
publicity campaign on behalf of the  Colorado River Storage Project.  Just as 
the promotional literature in the 1950s had tried to demonstrate how the CRSP 
addressed various local and national concerns, the new literature evolved over time 
to refl ect changes in those national concerns.  By the 1970s the communist threat 
had been replaced by the energy crisis.  Instead of talking about strategic minerals, 
promoters now focused on the potential fuel sources located in the Upper Basin.
Developing these sources would help the United States to meet “our national goal 
of freedom from reliance on foreign oil.”  Among the resources waiting to be fully 
developed in the area were coal and oil shale.  As in the past, however, promoters 
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stressed that water was the key component to developing this material.  Now, 
however, they went even further with their water pitch by announcing that 
“[s]ince the natural supply of the Colorado River will someday be inadequate, 
ways of augmenting the fl ow of the river are being investigated.”  Thus promoters 
continued to dream about even bigger and more grandiose reclamation projects for 
the Upper Basin.33
When examining the literature that promoters used in support of the 
Colorado River Storage Project it is clear that the size, scope, and ambition of 
the CRSP exceeded anything ever envisioned by local boosters in the nineteenth 
century.  One question that comes to mind, however, is whether the boosters in the 
1950s were any more accurate in their predictions than the boosters had been in the 
1880s?  Did the development they foresaw come to fruition with the construction of 
the CRSP?  The quick answer would be “no,” but a more complete answer would 
suggest that the outcome of the CRSP stands as a model for the law of unintended 
consequences.
Charles Wilkinson, in his book Fire on the Plateau, discusses the “Big 
Buildup” on the Colorado Plateau (a region that substantially overlaps with the 
Upper Basin) between 1955 and 1975.  While there is no doubt that massive 
development took place in the region during this time period, it was not the type 
of development that Colorado River Storage Project supporters had envisioned.
Instead of extracting and processing natural resources on-site, companies continued 
the practice of hauling materials away to be processed elsewhere.  Virtually no 
large-scale industrial development took place in the region—even after the CRSP 
was completed—nor did substantial urban growth occur in the area either.  While 
cities such as Salt Lake City, Phoenix, and Denver, located outside the Upper Basin, 
have grown exponentially, there continues to be no major urban presence within the 
region.  The Upper Basin instead remains a “plundered province” providing raw 
materials to other parts of the country.34
Ironically, the economically most promising natural resource in the area 
proved to be the most fi nancially devastating one.  Oil shale had long been touted as 
an energy source that would potentially make the Upper Basin one of the wealthiest 
regions of the country.  The process required to extract the oil from the rock, 
however, is an expensive and ineffi cient one, which requires large amounts of water 
and produces large amounts of spent shale.  Promoters of the CRSP proclaimed that 
the reclamation project was vital to ensure that suffi cient water would be available 
to allow the oil shale industry to grow.  When the sharp rise in oil prices took place 
in the 1970s it appeared that these predictions would, indeed, come true.  Major oil 
companies began buying up property in the area around Grand Junction, Colorado, 
in anticipation of this new boom.  Instead, things suddenly went bust.  In May 
1982 Exxon, the dominant company in the  oil shale business, suddenly shut down 
its operation, triggering a regional economic depression that lasted for nearly a 
decade.35
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The demise of the oil shale industry should not, however, be taken as an 
indication that the  Colorado River Storage Project failed all the objectives that 
promoters proclaimed for it.  The CRSP did result in the Bureau of Reclamation 
becoming a major hydroelectric producer in the region (although the chief 
benefi ciary has been the Lower Basin rather than the Upper).  Perhaps the one 
area where the CRSP has had the greatest success, however, has been in creating 
a massive recreation industry in the Upper Basin.  The tourist revenue generated 
in 1997 at Lake Powell alone was $455 million, derived from approximately 2.5 
million visitors.  While environmentalists have never forgiven the building of 
Glen Canyon Dam, it is obvious that its construction has had a sizable, long-term 
economic impact on the region.  This is clearly another instance of unintended 
consequence because, while the promoters did talk about the recreational 
enhancements that the CRSP would produce, recreation was clearly not the primary 
benefi t they were looking for from the project.  Promoters, however, are nothing if 
not ingenious when it comes to reinventing themselves and their claims.  A recent 
tourist slogan for the man-made Lake Powell is a prime example of this, “Lake 
Powell: America’s Natural Playground.”36
Stephen C.  Sturgeon, Ph.D., is Manuscript Curator and associate librarian in 
Special Collections & Archives at Utah State University, as well as an adjunct 
associate professor of history.  He is the author of The Politics of Western Water: 
The Congressional Career of Wayne Aspinall (Tucson: University of Arizona Press 
2002).
Endnotes
1. Information on Josie Morris from a park brochure entitled “Josie Bassett Morris.”  Information 
about her water struggle comes from a plaque at the Josie Morris Cabin site.  Copies of this information 
were obtained from David Whitman, Chief Interpreter, Dinosaur National Monument, 4545 East 
Highway 40, Dinosaur, Colorado 81610–9724.
2. “Lee Ferry” is not a typographic error.  This is a different location than, and downstream 
from, historic Lee’s Ferry, Arizona, and is defi ned in Article II.e. of the Colorado River Compact as 
“a point in the main stream of the Colorado River one mile below the mouth of the Paria River.”
3. While I am not trying to claim that the Upper Basin is simply Grand Junction writ large, 
I am initially focusing on this particular area for three reasons: Grand Junction became the largest 
commercial/industrial hub within the Upper Basin, the development patterns in Grand Junction mirror 
those that took place throughout the basin, and a larger body of historical literature and analysis is 
available for this area than other parts of the Upper Basin.  See William Wyckoff, Creating Colorado: 
The Making of a Western American Landscape, 1860-1940 (New Haven, 1999), 226, 231; Lawrence 
J. MacDonnell, From Reclamation to Sustainability: Water, Agriculture, and the Environment in the 
American West (Niwot, Colorado, 1999), 93–95; and Brad F. Raley, “Private Irrigation in Colorado’s 
Grand Valley,” Chapter 9 in Fluid Arguments: Five Centuries of Western Water Confl ict, ed. Char 
Miller (Tucson, 2000).
4. MacDonnell, From Reclamation to Sustainability, 95.
5. Wyckoff, Creating Colorado, 233; MacDonnell, From Reclamation to Sustainability, 98-99, 
316; Wayne Aspinall, Speech, “Irrigation and Federal Participation in Colorado,” July 18, 1977, 8–9, 
Folder 19, Box 39, Wayne Aspinall Papers (University of Colorado Archives, Boulder, Colorado).
6. Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and its Disappearing Water (New York, 
1986), 118-124; Donald Worster, Under Western Skies: Nature and History in the American West (New 
York, 1992), 72.
7. Worster, Under Western Skies, 66; Richard Lowitt, The New Deal and the West (Norman, 
Oklahoma), 82.
733
8. Reisner, Cadillac Desert, 140–2.
9. The formal name of this report, nicknamed the “Blue Book,” was The Colorado River: A 
Comprehensive Report on the Development of Water Resources.  The government citation for this 
report is House Doc. 419, 80th Cong., 1st sess.; Russell Martin, A Story that Stands Like a Dam: Glen 
Canyon and the Struggle for the Soul of the West (New York, 1989), 48.
10. George Sibley, “A Tale of Two Rivers: The Desert Empire and the Mountain,” in Water in the 
West, ed. Char Miller (Corvallis, Oregon, 2000) 134-5.
11. Mark W. T. Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness: Echo Park and the American Conservation 
Movement (Albuquerque, 1994) 43, 73.
12. Utah Committee for the Development of the Colorado River, Colorado River News Report,
booklet, January 1958, item 36, Book Collection 38 (Special Collections & Archives, Utah State 
University, Logan); B. H. Stringham, “The Echo Park Dam Problem,” radio editorial script, June 
1954, p. 9, folder 5, box 14, B. H. Stringham Papers (Special Collections & Archives, Utah State 
University, Logan); Upper Colorado River Commission, The Colorado River Storage Project, booklet, 
[1956?], folder 1, Book Collection 38; Rocky Mountain mining industry, Water and Power needed 
for development of Nation’s Rich Treasure Chest of Minerals and Metals, pamphlet, [1952?], item 28, 
Book Collection 38.
13. Arthur V. Watkins, “The Upper Colorado River and National Defense,” typescript, 1954, p. 5, 
folder 7, box 13, B. H. Stringham Papers; Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., Impact: An outline 
of the many benefi ts to be derived from the Colorado River Storage Project, pamphlet, [1954?], folder 
1, Book Collection 38; Utah Colorado River Development Committee of Twenty–One Counties, Letter 
to Oscar L. Chapman, 1950, folder 6, box 14, B. H. Stringham Papers; “The Colorado River Story,” 
typescript, [1954?], p. 14, folder 5, box 13, B. H. Stringham Papers. 
14. Trade Promotion Committee of the Vernal Junior Chamber of Commerce, “Principal Statistics 
Re: Echo Park Dam,” typescript, [1952?], folder 5, box 14, B. H. Stringham Papers; Farmington
Daily Times, “The Colorado River Story: The Factual Background,” booklet, [1954?], folder 1, Book 
Collection 38; “The Colorado River Story,” typescript, [1954?], folder 5, box 13, B. H. Stringham 
Papers; Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., Impact: An outline of the many benefi ts to be derived 
from the Colorado River Storage Project, pamphlet, [1954?], folder 1, Book Collection 38; I. Dale 
Despain, “In the matter of the authorization of the Split Mountain and Echo Park dams, in connection 
with the Upper Colorado River Storage project,” typescript, 1950, folder 6, box 14, B. H. Stringham 
Papers.
15. Utah Committee for the Development of the Colorado River, The Colorado River Project: 
Here’s What It Means, pamphlet, [1955?], folder 1, Book Collection 38.
16. Utah Committee for the Development of the Colorado River, Colorado River News Report,
booklet, January 1958, item 36, Book Collection 38; Transcript of radio broadcast by Senator Clinton 
Anderson, May 22, 1955, p. 6, folder 7, box 13, B. H. Stringham Papers; Memo of telephone conversation 
between Lee and Beauregard, March 1, 1950, folder 7, box 14, B. H. Stringham Papers.
17. Utah Colorado River Development Committee of Twenty–One Counties, Letter to Oscar 
Chapman, 1950, p. 2, folder 6, box 14, B. H. Stringham Papers; Upper Colorado River Commission, 
The Colorado River Storage Project, booklet, [1956?], folder 1, Book Collection 38.
18. Upper Colorado River Commission, The Colorado River Storage Project, booklet, [1956?], 
folder 1, Book Collection 38; Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., Impact: An outline of the many 
benefi ts to be derived from the Colorado River Storage Project, pamphlet,  [1954?], folder 1, Book 
Collection 38; Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., The Colorado River Storage Project: A project 
to benefi t ALL Americans!, pamphlet, [1954?], folder 1, Book Collection 38.
19. “To Mr. President [Truman?],” letter, July, 1951, p. 9, folder 3, box 14, B. H. Stringham 
Papers; Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., Impact: An outline of the many benefi ts to be derived 
from the Colorado River Storage Project, pamphlet,  [1954?], folder 1, Book Collection 38 (emphasis 
in the original).
20. Upper Colorado River Commission, The Colorado River Storage Project, booklet, [1956?], 
folder 1, Book Collection 38; Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., The Colorado River Storage 
Project: A project to benefi t ALL Americans!, pamphlet, [1954?], folder 1, Book Collection 38.
21. Upper Colorado River Commission, The Colorado River Storage Project, booklet, [1956?], 
folder 1, Book Collection 38; Utah Colorado River Development Committee of Twenty–One Counties, 
734
Letter to Oscar Chapman, 1950, p. 2, folder 6, box 14, B. H. Stringham Papers; Upper Colorado 
River Grass Roots Inc., Impact: An outline of the many benefi ts to be derived from the Colorado River 
Storage Project, pamphlet, [1954?], folder 1, Book Collection 38; The Colorado River Storage Project,
booklet; Utah Committee for the Development of the Colorado River, Colorado River News Report,
booklet, January 1958, item 36, Book Collection 38; Charles Wilkinson, Fire on the Plateau: Confl ict 
and Endurance in the American Southwest (Washington, D.C., 1999) 188, 203.
22. Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., Impact: An outline of the many benefi ts to be derived 
from the Colorado River Storage Project, pamphlet, [1954?], folder 1, Book Collection 38; Farmington
Daily Times, “The Colorado River Story: The Factual Background,” booklet, [1954?], folder 1, Book 
Collection 38.
23. Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., The Colorado River Storage Project: A project 
to benefi t ALL Americans!, pamphlet, [1954?], folder 1, Book Collection 38; Upper Colorado River 
Commission, The Colorado River Storage Project, booklet, [1956?], folder 1, Book Collection 38; 
Farmington Daily Times, “The Colorado River Story: The Factual Background,” booklet, [1954?], folder 
1, Book Collection 38; The Colorado River Storage Project: A project to benefi t ALL Americans!
24. “The Colorado River Story,” typescript, [1954?], p. 14, folder 5, box 13, B. H. Stringham 
Papers (emphasis added); Charles Wilkinson, Fire on the Plateau: Confl ict and Endurance in the 
American Southwest (Washington, D.C., 1999), 202-3.
25. B. H. Stringham, “The Echo Park Dam Problem,” radio editorial script, June 1954, p. 9, 
folder 5, box 14, B. H. Stringham Papers; Arthur V. Watkins, “The Upper Colorado River and National 
Defense,” typescript, 1954, p. 2, folder 7, box 13, B. H. Stringham Papers; Upper Colorado River 
Grass Roots Inc., The Colorado River Storage Project: A project to benefi t ALL Americans!, pamphlet, 
[1954?], folder 1, Book Collection 38.
26. George D. Clyde, “The Case of the Upper Colorado River Storage Project and its Participating 
Projects,” typescript, September 1954, item 41, Book Collection 38; Upper Colorado River Grass 
Roots Inc., Summary of H.R. 3383, pamphlet, 1955, folder 1, box 13, B. H. Stringham Papers; Wayne 
Aspinall, Letter to John Dingell, June 6, 1955, “Echo Park Project–1955,” Box 69, Wayne N. Aspinall 
Papers, University of Denver Special Collections; “Story of the Colorado River Storage Project,” 
[1955?], folder 5, box 13,  B. H. Stringham Papers.
27. B. H. Stringham, “The Echo Park Dam Problem,” radio editorial script, June 1954, folder 5, box 
14, B. H. Stringham Papers; Arthur Watkins, Letter to Oscar Chapman, January 26, 1950, p. 3, folder 6, 
box 14, B. H. Stringham Papers; Wallace F. Bennett, “Statement on the Upper Colorado River Project 
before the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee,” typescript, March 1, 1955, p. 3, folder 7, 
box 13, B. H. Stringham Papers; George D. Clyde, “Statement presented at the Congressional Hearings 
on H.R. 4449 in support of the Colorado River Storage Project and participating projects,” January 
1954, Exhibit “B” p. 1, item 41w, Book Collection 38; G. E. Untermann, “Factual Data,” typescript, 
[1954?], p. 3, folder 5, box 14, B. H. Stringham Papers; “Resolution by Utah State Republican Party,” 
typescript, [1954?], folder 5, box 13, B. H. Stringham Papers; Utah Committee for the Development of 
the Colorado River, The Colorado River Project: Here’s What It Means, pamphlet, [1954?], folder 1, 
Book Collection 38.
28. Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., Impact: An outline of the many benefi ts to be derived 
from the Colorado River Storage Project, pamphlet, [1954?], folder 1, Book Collection 38; Upper 
Colorado River Commission, The Colorado River Storage Project, booklet, [1956?], folder 1, Book 
Collection 38; Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., The Colorado River Storage Project: A project 
to benefi t ALL Americans!, pamphlet, [1954?], folder 1, Book Collection 38.
29. Utah Colorado River Development Committee of Twenty–One Counties, Letter to Oscar L. 
Chapman, 1950, folder 6, box 14, B. H. Stringham Papers; Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., 
Our National Defense Demands the Upper Colorado River Storage Project, pamphlet, 1955, item 33, 
Book Collection 38; Wallace F. Bennett, “Statement on the Upper Colorado River Project before the 
Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee,” typescript, March 1, 1955, p. 3, folder 7, box 13, B. H. 
Stringham Papers.
30. Wallace F. Bennett, “Statement on the Upper Colorado River Project before the Senate Interior 
and Insular Affairs Committee,” typescript, March 1, 1955, p. 3, folder 7, box 13, B. H. Stringham 
Papers; Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., Our National Defense Demands the Upper Colorado 
River Storage Project, pamphlet, 1955, item 33, Book Collection 38; Arthur V. Watkins, “The Upper 
735
Colorado River and National Defense,” typescript, 1954, p. 4, folder 7, box 13, B. H. Stringham 
Papers; Directors of Greater Utah Valley, Inc., “Petition to the Joint Congress of the United States of 
America,” typescript, January 7, 1954, p. 1, folder 2, box 13,  B. H. Stringham Papers; Upper Colorado 
River Grass Roots Inc., Impact: An outline of the many benefi ts to be derived from the Colorado River 
Storage Project, pamphlet, [1954?], folder 1, Book Collection 38.
31. Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., Our National Defense Demands the Upper Colorado 
River Storage Project, pamphlet, 1955, item 33, Book Collection 38; Upper Colorado River Grass 
Roots Inc., Impact: An outline of the many benefi ts to be derived from the Colorado River Storage 
Project, pamphlet, [1954?], folder 1, Book Collection 38; Arthur V. Watkins, “The Upper Colorado 
River and National Defense,” typescript, 1954, p. 4, folder 7, box 13, B. H. Stringham Papers.
32. Wallace F. Bennett, “Statement on the Upper Colorado River Project before the Senate Interior 
and Insular Affairs Committee,” typescript, March 1, 1955, p. 3, folder 7, box 13, B. H. Stringham 
Papers; Upper Colorado River Grass Roots Inc., Our National Defense Demands the Upper Colorado 
River Storage Project, pamphlet, 1955, item 33, Book Collection 38 (emphasis in the original).
33. Colorado River Water Users Association, The Role of the Colorado River, pamphlet, 1976, 
item 22, Book Collection 38.
34. Charles Wilkinson, Fire on the Plateau: Confl ict and Endurance in the American Southwest
(Washington, D.C., 1999), 182-5. 
35. Andrew Gulliford, Boomtown Blues, Colorado Oil Shale, 1885-1985 (Niwot, Colorado, 
1989), 151-7.
36. Jared Farmer, Glen Canyon Dammed: Inventing Lake Powell and the Canyon Country
(Tucson, 1999), 185–7; American Automobile Association, Tour Book: Arizona & New Mexico, 2001 
Edition (Heathrow, Florida, 2001), 51.
736
737
The Bureau of Reclamation and the Civilian 
Conservation Corps:  A Legacy Revealed
By:
Christine Pfaff
Abstract
 Between 1934 and 1942 the  Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) played 
a vital role within the Bureau of Reclamation.  From one initial CCC camp 
assigned to Reclamation in 1934, the program expanded to a peak of forty-six 
camps at the height of the CCC program during the summer of 1935.  From then 
on the number of Reclamation camps operating fl uctuated between thirty-four 
and forty-four up until May 1941.  Thereafter camps were closed in response 
to national defense needs.  By June 30, 1942, only seven camps remained on 
Reclamation projects, and they were discontinued shortly thereafter.
 The contributions of the CCC to Reclamation are not well known.  
Though the number of CCC camps operating on Reclamation projects was 
small in comparison to other agencies, the program had a signifi cant impact 
and assisted in furthering the goals of Reclamation during the devastating years 
of the Great Depression.  At a time when fi nancially stricken farmers were 
unable to adequately maintain older Reclamation irrigation facilities, CCC 
enrollees were instrumental in rehabilitating them.  The enrollees also provided 
the necessary labor to develop supplemental water supplies and construct new 
irrigation projects.  Lastly, CCC assistance afforded Reclamation the opportunity 
to expand on its primary mission of irrigation to develop recreational amenities 
at a number of its reservoirs.
 This paper explores the contributions and role of the CCC within 
Reclamation and within the larger context of the national CCC program.  
Origins of Reclamation’s camps, the project work accomplished, the public 
perception of the camps, the impact on enrollees, and the success of the program 
are addressed.
Introduction1
 As dry winds and dust storms blew across the western High Plains in 
the early 1930s leaving devastated farms in their wake, newly elected President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was formulating sweeping plans in the nation’s capital 
for emergency disaster relief.  The entire country was in the grips of the Great 
Depression and jobless men everywhere struggled to earn enough money to 
buy food for their families.  For the country’s youth, the situation was equally 
desperate.  Hundreds of thousands of young men from economically stricken 
households were unable to fi nd work.  Against this backdrop, Roosevelt outlined 
his concept for a Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) during his inaugural address 
on March 4, 1933.  He proposed creating a new program aimed at conserving the 
nation’s depleted natural resources and putting unemployed youth to work.  The 
president told the American people: 
Our greatest primary task is to put people to work.  This is no unsolvable 
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problem if we face it wisely and courageously.  It can be accomplished 
in part by direct recruiting by the Government itself, treating the task as 
we would treat the emergency of war, but at the same time, through this 
employment, accomplishing greatly needed projects to stimulate and 
reorganize the use of our natural resources.2
 Within a short time, CCC camps had been established across the country 
and young men were recruited to work on a myriad of conservation projects 
overseen by various federal agencies including the Bureau of Reclamation 
(Reclamation).  At the height of CCC enrollment in the summer of 1935, 
over a half-million men were scattered in 2,652 camps.  Of all the New Deal 
programs instituted by Roosevelt to combat the economic hardships of the Great 
Depression, probably none was as popular and successful as the CCC.
 Those familiar with the accomplishments of the CCC inevitably think 
of handsomely crafted rustic stone and log structures, walls, picnic shelters 
and other facilities within National Forests or National Parks.  Indeed roughly 
75 percent of all CCC camp enrollees worked on projects administered by the 
Department of Agriculture, the majority of them being on U.S. Forest Service 
lands.   Almost all of the remaining camps were allotted to the Department of the 
Interior with the National Park Service (NPS) being the greatest benefi ciary. 
 The association between the CCC and Reclamation, also within Interior, 
is far less well known. As the Federal agency responsible for designing and 
building large-scale irrigation projects in the western United States, Reclamation 
was vitally involved in the allocation and use of two natural resources, namely 
water and soils.  Even though the number of Reclamation CCC camps was much 
smaller than that of other agencies, the program had a signifi cant impact and 
assisted in furthering the goals of the agency during the devastating drought 
years of the 1930s.  CCC assistance also afforded Reclamation the opportunity to 
expand on its primary mission of irrigation to develop recreational amenities at a 
number of its reservoirs. 
Creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps
 By the close of Roosevelt’s fi rst month in offi ce, Congress had acted upon 
the President’s ambitious jobs-creation proposal and passed “An Act for the relief 
of unemployment through the performance of useful public works and other 
purposes.”  On March 31, 1933, the President signed the bill into law (Public 
No. 5, 73rd Congress) thus creating the CCC (initially called the  Emergency 
Conservation Works or ECW).
 With legislation in place, Roosevelt wasted no time in transposing his 
vision into action.  In April 1933 he appointed Robert Fechner director of the 
CCC and established an advisory council comprised of representatives from 
the Departments of Labor, War, Interior and Agriculture.  The purpose of the 
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council was to coordinate oversight 
of the program and create a forum 
for discussing policy issues. The 
Department of Labor was assigned 
responsibility for recruiting youths 
and the War Department (Army) was 
in charge of enrollee administration, 
transportation, housing, food, clothing, 
supplies, medical care, education, 
discipline, and physical conditioning.
The Departments of Agriculture 
and Interior had the task of locating 
the conservation work camps and 
supervising the actual work.
 At the president’s urging, the CCC enrolled its fi rst 25,000 young men by 
April 6, 1933.  The initial camp, appropriately called Roosevelt, was established 
on April 17 on George Washington National Forest near Luray, Virginia.  
Less than three months after the program=s inauguration, about 300,000 men 
from throughout the country were settled in almost 1,500 camps.  Each CCC 
installation typically housed about 200 men.  According to Fechner, Ait was the 
most rapid large scale mobilization of men the country had ever witnessed.3
Initial enrollment in the CCC was limited to unemployed single men between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-fi ve who were U.S. citizens.  For the most part these 
were discouraged men, unsuccessful in securing jobs because they had no work 
experience.  They were described as “a weaponless army whose recruits came 
from broken homes, highway trails and relief shelters … ”4  American Indians 
were at fi rst not eligible but this restriction was soon lifted because of the dire 
conditions on many of the reservations.
 Enrollment was also expanded to include “local experienced men” who 
served as technical foremen on work projects, and a limited number of World War 
I veterans.  The latter were selected by the Veterans Administration and assigned 
to special camps operated less stringently than regular ones.  Although racial 
discrimination was offi cially forbidden in accordance with the CCC legislation, 
blacks and other minorities did not escape prejudice within the program.5  The 
number of blacks enrolled was limited, and they were for the most part restricted 
to segregated camps.
Reclamation’s  CCC Program
 Due to its role in planning and constructing irrigation projects throughout 
the arid and semi-arid West, Reclamation was vitally concerned with farmers’ 
welfare during the Depression. Beginning in 1902 the Federal government had 
invested heavily in construction of dams and water conveyance facilities to 
32.1.  ECW winter camp at Belle Fourche 
Dam in 1934.
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provide farmers with essential water.  Irrigators who benefi tted from Reclamation 
facilities were required to repay their construction costs over a period of years.
Operation and maintenance of irrigation systems were also supported by fees paid 
by the water users.  By the mid-1930s, Reclamation had constructed a network of 
some fi fty small and large projects across the West. 
 The combined effect of drought and poor agricultural practices exacted 
a terrible toll on Western farmers during the Depression.  Crop prices were 
low, water supplies had dwindled, and valuable topsoil was swept off of fi elds 
in blinding dust storms.  The fi nancial hardships faced by farmers meant that 
irrigation systems were not adequately maintained.  Many aging water control 
structures had deteriorated beyond repair; canals were silted and clogged with 
vegetation; weeds and gophers infested canal banks; and crop yields dropped 
drastically with the decrease in water supplies.  By 1934 it had become critical for 
the Federal government to address the plight of western farmers and to safeguard 
its hefty investment in irrigation projects.  The CCC program provided a perfect 
mechanism for doing both while meeting its objectives of protecting natural 
resources and aiding unemployment. 
 The fi rst CCC camp to open on a Reclamation project was established in 
May 1934 at Lake Guernsey, a reservoir of the North Platte Project, in Wyoming.  
Designated originally as RS-1 (Reclamation Service No. 1), the camp became 
known as BR-9.   It was obtained under a cooperative agreement with the NPS 
and along with BR-10, established in July 1934, was responsible for transforming 
the reservoir shores into a showplace of recreational development.  Sturdy log and 
stone picnic shelters, trails, and a handsome rustic-style museum complete with 
interpretive displays were built by CCC enrollees.  The outstanding signifi cance 
of their contributions at Lake Guernsey resulted in the designation of Lake 
Guernsey State Park as a National Historic Landmark on September 25, 1997. 
 In early September 1934 a second camp was established on a cooperative 
basis with the NPS at Elephant Butte Reservoir on the Rio Grande Project in 
New Mexico.  Designated BR-8, the camp enrollees, along with those from 
BR-54 occupied in August 1935, greatly improved the recreational facilities at the 
reservoir.  They also transformed the landscape by building a variety of structures, 
terracing the hillsides, and planting hundreds of trees.  The CCC component is a 
major feature of the Elephant Butte National Register Historic District, listed in 
the National Register of Historic Places in February 1997.
 In July 1934 six drought-relief camps were also assigned to Reclamation. 
These were essentially the same as regular  CCC camps but were restricted to 
states suffering severely under the drought and were authorized for one year, 
rather than the normal six months.  Additionally, they were fi nanced under 
different appropriations.6  Assigned numbers beginning with DBR (Drought 
Relief Bureau of Reclamation), the six camps were DBR-1 at Lake Minatare, 
Nebraska, on the North Platte Project; DBR-2 at Fruitdale, South Dakota, on the 
741
Belle Fourche Project; DBR-3 at Carlsbad, New Mexico, on the Carlsbad Project; 
DBR-4 at Ysleta, Texas, on the Rio Grande Project; DBR-5 at Heber, Utah, on 
the Strawberry Valley Project; and DBR-6 at Ephraim, Utah, on the Sanpete 
Project.  The improvements completed on Reclamation irrigation projects by the 
drought-relief camps were of tremendous value in combating the acute water 
shortages plaguing farmers.  The camp at Lake Minatare can also be credited with 
construction of a unique Reclamation CCC edifi ce that still exists: on a point of 
land extending into the lake, the enrollees built a fi fty-fi ve-foot-high native rock 
Alighthouse@ containing a circular staircase.  From the observation deck at the top 
can be seen Scotts Bluff and Chimney Rock, both landmarks of the Oregon Trail.  
 Initially, work accomplished at Reclamation CCC camps focused on 
rehabilitating the storage, distribution, and drainage systems of older projects that 
had been seriously affected by the combination of drought and depressed farm 
prices.  Efforts consisted of returning weed- and silt-fi lled canals and laterals to 
a proper cross section; replacing decaying wood structures with concrete; adding 
new water control structures; building bridges over canals; eradicating weeds 
and rodents; reconditioning operating roads; placing riprap on canal and lateral 
banks, and sealing porous canals with earth or concrete linings.  Much of the work 
accomplished was of a seemingly mundane and unspectacular nature but it had 
far-reaching benefi ts.
 As Reclamation’s CCC program expanded from its small beginnings in 
1934, the types of project work undertaken by the enrollees grew more varied and 
broadened to include developing supplemental water supplies and constructing 
new irrigation projects.  The acute water defi ciencies experienced during the 
Depression indicated that a few of the project storage facilities, though adequate 
under ordinary conditions, were insuffi cient during drought periods.  To remedy 
this situation, CCC forces were used to build supplemental storage facilities.
Examples are Midview Dam and dike on the Moon Lake Project in Utah (BR-11) 
and Anita Dam on the Huntley Project in Montana (BR-57). Clearing reservoir 
areas of timber and debris in preparation for new dam construction was another 
labor intensive task assigned to the enrollees at various camps.  The physically 
demanding work involved felling trees, piling, and then burning them.  Utilizing 
heavy equipment such as tractors and bulldozers provided the enrollees an 
opportunity to learn new skills.  The most prominent of this type of work was 
accomplished at the Shasta Dam site on the Central Valley Project in California.  
Enrollees of BR-84 and BR-85 cleared 2,597 acres in the reservoir area during 
the camps’ existence.  Similar work was undertaken at Wickiup Reservoir on 
the Deschutes Project (BR-75, -76, and -77), Deer Creek Reservoir on the Provo 
River Project (BR-91), Pine View Reservoir on the Ogden River Project (BR-12), 
Island Park Reservoir on the Upper Snake River Project (BR-28) and Parker Dam 
Reservoir on the Parker Dam Project (BR-17 and BR-18).
 Building new feeder canals to bring additional water to existing reservoirs 
was another effort to increase water supplies.  Examples include the Duchesne 
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Feeder Canal on the Moon Lake Project (BR-11) and the Strawberry Reservoir 
Feeder Canal on the Strawberry Valley Project (BR-5).  Enrollees cleared the 
canal right-of-ways, excavated the trenches, trimmed the canal slopes, and, in 
some cases, poured concrete linings.  The  CCC also completed improvements to 
numerous existing storage facilities such as Orman Dam on the Belle Fourche 
Project (BR-2), Clear Lake Dam on the Klamath Project (BR-41), Moon Lake 
Dam on the Moon Lake Project 
(BR-11), and the South Diversion 
Dam on the Orland Project 
(BR-78).
 Another type of work 
undertaken by the CCC was 
fl ood control.  Many areas of the 
West under Reclamation projects 
were subject to intense localized 
rainfalls of short duration that had 
caused severe damage to irrigation 
systems.  The CCC built a number 
of fl ood control structures such as 
Apache and Box Canyon Dams on 
the Rio Grande Project (BR-39).
 As noted earlier, among the most visible contributions of the CCC 
enrollees assigned to Reclamation projects were the recreational improvements 
completed.  Several of the projects had lands adjacent to rivers, reservoirs, or 
lakes, which were ideally suited for use as parks, campgrounds, or picnic areas.
Some of these lands were developed by the CCC through construction of tables, 
benches, stoves, fi replaces, water systems, latrines, sewage disposal plants, and 
landscaping.  Swimming, boating, and fi shing facilities, and hiking trails built by 
the CCC provided park visitors 
with additional amenities.  The 
improvements greatly enhanced 
public appreciation for the 
CCC and made Reclamation 
projects more accessible.  The 
prime examples of recreational 
development occurred at 
Elephant Butte Dam on the 
Rio Grande Project (BR-8 and 
BR-54), at Guernsey Lake on the 
North Platte Project (BR-9 and 
BR-10), and at Lake Walcott on 
the Minidoka Project (BR-27).
32.2.  CCC crew placing and fi nishing concrete 
at a new Kingman check on the Owyhee Project 
in 1940.
32.3.  CCC forces lined small community ditches 
in Las Cruces, New Mexico, on the Rio Grande 
Project in 1937.
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 Auxiliary to these main classes of work, the CCC enrollees were engaged 
in improvements to wildlife refuges at reservoirs, rodent control operations, 
weed eradication experiments, and emergency work.  In cooperation with the 
Bureau of Biological Survey (now the Fish and Wildlife Service), Reclamation’s 
CCC enrollees developed wildlife refuges at the Deer Flat Reservoir in western 
Idaho (BR-24), Tulelake Wildlife Refuge in northern California (BR-20), at Lake 
Walcott, in southern Idaho (BR-27), and at the Pishkun Reservoir in Montana 
(BR-33).  At Elephant Butte Reservoir, CCC forces constructed a 12-pond fi sh 
hatchery (BR-8 and BR-54).
 The elimination of troublesome rodents along canal banks and in 
farm fi elds was an ongoing endeavor at many camps and was viewed as an 
“undertaking of major importance to many Reclamation projects.”7  Damage 
caused by rodents was twofold: in canal banks their burrowing resulted in canal 
collapses and in fi elds their activities resulted in substantial crop loss.  Pocket 
gophers and ground squirrels were the primary targets and, in cooperation 
with the Biological Survey, eradication was accomplished either by trapping 
or poisoning or both.  The work was well suited to the  CCC program because 
it was labor intensive.  Small crews performed the task as an adjunct to larger 
construction projects.  By June 1941 CCC enrollees treated 2,510,100 acres for 
rodent control.
 Weed eradication was another activity performed at many Reclamation 
CCC camps.  The presence of noxious weeds, such as Canada thistle, bindweed, 
and Johnson grass, was increasing on Reclamation projects, and the available 
labor of CCC recruits was applied towards eliminating this menace.  Canals 
provided easy transportation routes for seeds to all parts of the irrigated lands, 
and controlling and eradicating weeds was a complex problem.  Enrollees did not 
enter on private property to conduct weed control, but the farmers were shown, 
by demonstration on government tracts, the methods of attacking various kinds of 
invasive plants.  Sample demonstrations were also performed on the Government 
canals and laterals for the benefi t of the operating personnel.  Experiments with 
different types of grasses that could crowd out weeds on canal banks and that 
might be useful as a pasture crop were undertaken.8   On the Belle Fourche Project 
(BR-2), CCC enrollees demonstrated to farmers the use and methods of growing 
strawberry clover and brome grass as valuable pasture.  Experiments to eradicate 
noxious weeds using blades and chemicals were carried on at test plots.  On the 
Rio Grande Project (BR-4), considerable effort was expended on that objective.  
Different methods tried for the control of bindweed included chopping plants out 
by hand, spraying them with oil, and then burning them.
 While the CCC program received a lot of attention for its role in fi ghting 
forest fi res and assisting in fl ood disasters, emergency work conducted by CCC 
enrollees on Reclamation projects attracted little recognition in spite of its great 
value.  The most common emergencies were canal breaks usually resulting from 
the tunneling activities of rodents.  Such breaks, if not repaired promptly, had 
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the potential to cause serious 
damage by fl ooding some 
fi elds and drying up others.  A 
1937 Reclamation Era article 
described various emergencies 
that had been attended to by 
 CCC enrollees.  On the Klamath 
Project in California and Oregon 
(BR-20 and BR-41), ten recent 
breaks in canal banks had been 
repaired.  On the Salt River 
Project in Arizona (BR-14 and 
BR-19), a serious break in the 
South Canal occurred in April 
1937 and was tended to by enrollees.  Early in May 1937 CCC men from the 
Deaver Camp on the Shoshone Project (BR-7) were called out to help reconstruct 
300 feet of the inclined drop below the Ralston Reservoir.
 The hazards of winter created numerous emergencies where the help of the 
CCC was invaluable.  The snow season of 1936-1937 was particularly severe in 
parts of Utah and Nevada, and the CCC youths effectively carried out emergency 
work to save human lives and livestock.  In January 1937 about 50,000 head of 
sheep were marooned by heavy snows in Pleasant Valley in the Uintah Basin of 
eastern Utah.  A CCC tractor, with a bulldozer attachment, was loaned to the Utah 
State Road Commission to open a 26-mile road on which to lead the animals out.
CCC enrollees from BR-11 on the Moon Lake Project accompanied the tractor to 
perform any unexpected repairs.  Mining and farming districts in western Nevada 
were particularly hard hit by snowstorms in early February 1937.  CCC men and 
equipment were made available for rescue work.  In cooperation with the county, 
they cleared 380 miles of road, dug out ten towns and outlying ranchers and 
miners, and permitted feed to be hauled to many isolated cattle herds. 
 All CCC men at Carlsbad, New Mexico, (BR-3) were called out in early 
June 1937 to perform emergency fl ood protection work at McMillan Dam brought 
about by extreme fl ood conditions of the Pecos River.  A leak caused by the high 
waters was discovered at the dam on May 31, and for the next six days CCC 
crews placed sandbags on the reservoir face of the dam to hold back water from 
any leaks that might occur.  The superb efforts of the CCC enrollees were praised.  
When a small  dam failed on June 13, 1937, near  Austin, Colorado, and partially 
fl ooded the town, CCC forces from the camp in Montrose (BR-23) were brought 
in to help restore sanitation facilities and repair damaged irrigation ditches.
 At the height of the  CCC program in the summer of 1935, there were 
forty-six camps operating on Reclamation projects throughout the West.  In 
addition to and in association with the main camps, side camps also known 
as spike camps, were sometimes established.  These were usually smaller and 
32.4.  CCC forces placing steel reinforcement on 
the Stinkingwater Siphon, Belle Fourche Project, 
in 1938.
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made up of tents that could easily be 
dismantled.  Typically, camp structures 
were standard plan, simple frame 
buildings.  Side camps were created 
when a job was at such a distance 
from the main camp that it made 
sense to station a work force in closer 
proximity.  Examples of side camps on 
Reclamation  CCC projects were the 
ones at Alamagordo Dam (BR-3, main 
camp) where enrollees constructed 
improvements for recreational use of 
the reservoir; on the Hyrum Project 
(BR-12, main camp) where enrollees constructed a diversion dam on the Little 
Bear River and built a parapet and curb walls on the Hyrum Dam; and at the river 
portal to the Gunnison Tunnel (BR-23, main camp) where enrollees worked on 
widening and reconstructing the old road leading from the top of the canyon down 
to the East Portal. 
 Some CCC camps established on Reclamation projects were seasonal for 
climatic reasons.  Those at high elevations, such as BR-5 on the Strawberry Valley 
Project, were summer camps and enrollees were relocated to lower elevations in 
the winter (BR-11).  BR-50 on the Yakima Project was only occupied during the 
summer because of heavy winter snows and severe weather.  Due to the intense 
summer heat in Yuma, Arizona, enrollees of BR-13 and BR-74 did not occupy 
the camps during that season for the fi rst few years.  The two Salt River Project 
camps in the Phoenix area, BR-14 and BR-19, operated similarly.
Job Training in Reclamation CCC Camps
 When CCC camps were assigned to Reclamation, the agency assumed 
responsibility for supervising and training the enrollees while they were engaged 
in project work.  The latter was scheduled for fi ve days a week, eight hours a 
day except in the event of emergencies.  Oversight of work activities was carried 
out by Reclamation fi eld engineers and by project superintendents in charge of 
the Reclamation projects on which the camps were located.  The fi eld engineers 
directed surveys, inspections, and other fi eld engineering work.  They also 
supervised and approved the construction of the various physical features.  The 
CCC project superintendents, also designated by Reclamation as CCC Regional 
Directors, had immediate charge of the work activities and directed the CCC 
supervisory, facilitating, and enrolled personnel in carrying out the work.
 During the lifespan of the CCC, Reclamation dedicated an increasing 
amount of attention to the job-training aspects of the CCC program.  Even before 
a national requirement for ten hours of weekly general education or vocational 
training was instituted in June 1937 by CCC headquarters in Washington, D.C., 
32.5.  CCC men working on McMillan 
Spillway No. 2, Carlsbad Project, New 
Mexico, in 1938.
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Reclamation recognized the valuable 
skills that enrollees were developing 
on the job.  Constructing canals, roads, 
dams, and water control features as 
well as building recreational facilities 
afforded enrollees a perfect opportunity 
to gain practical experience.  Building 
concrete structures involved teaching 
the young men the fundamentals 
of earth excavation, form building, 
reinforcement, concrete mixing, concrete 
fi nishing, and curing concrete.  Other 
training included working with rock, 
both in quarrying and the construction 
of masonry walls; the use of burners and chemicals for weed control; and the 
shaping of lumber for timber structures.  Enrollees became expert at operating all 
types of heavy equipment such as tractors, trucks, and draglines.  In addition to 
acquiring construction skills, enrollees at Reclamation camps participated in the 
cooking and clerical operations of the camps.9
 The opportunity to attend classes in the evening was another component 
of the educational experience offered at CCC camps.  Some of the young men 
enrolled in nearby schools to further their knowledge.  With the increased 
emphasis on education, starting in June 1937 Reclamation expanded its own 
classroom programs.  During the day, foremen were assigned to supervise and 
explain to enrollees the proper method to do their assigned tasks.  One or two 
evenings a week, the foremen held classes in camp to supplement the practical 
work with related training.  For example, an enrollee whose duty it was to refuel 
tractors with diesel fuel might learn the essential difference between diesel fuel 
and gasoline.  A standard CCC truck driver’s course taught truck drivers how to 
reduce the cost of vehicle maintenance, to be more effi cient operators, and to be 
safety conscious.  Visual aids such as miniature models and motion pictures were 
often used to enhance the classroom instruction.  Foremen attended leadership 
courses to learn effective teaching methods.  Regular Reclamation employees 
assisted by teaching technical subjects and clerical skills such as property 
accountability and cost-keeping.  Courses mentioned in some of the camp reports 
include spelling, blueprint reading, bee culture, warehousing, and shorthand.10
 All sorts of training materials were also available through the CCC 
education offi ce in Washington.  Handbooks containing lists of available fi lms 
and manuals were sent out to the camps.  Manuals ranged in subject from “Brick 
and Stone Work” to “Common Range Plants” to “Signs and Markers” to “Job 
Training is a Business Proposition.”  All camps had libraries supplied with 
textbooks, reference works, and a selection of daily newspapers.  Books useful for 
on-the-job training as well as for advancing personal skills were available.  Titles 
32.6.  Yuma Project.  CCC enrollee off-
the-job-training class in blacksmithing on 
the Yuma Project in 1939.
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ran the gamut from “Accountancy as a Career” to “Electricity in the Home and on 
the Farm” to “Elements of Forestry” to “Amateur Machinist.”
 Towards the end of the CCC program, Reclamation directed all of 
its camps to furnish new enrollees with a series of publications intended to 
familiarize them with the agency and its role in conserving resources.  The list 
included Reclamation Home Creating—Wealth Producing—Self Sustaining,
Grand Coulee Dam, Boulder Dam, and the Central Valley Project.  Reclamation 
had plans to prepare its own pamphlet on the agency’s CCC program, but it is 
unknown whether this ever occurred.
 The training and education paid off for Reclamation’s CCC enrollees.   In 
February 1937 it was reported that CCC men from Reclamation camps had been 
successful in securing a range of jobs upon leaving the Corps.  These included 
farmer, farm hand, ranch hand, miner, railroad worker, skilled labor helper, 
lumberjack, highway worker, factory worker, and painter among others.  Much of 
the success of the enrollees was attributed to the experience gained while in the 
CCC camps.  Records indicated that enrollees who served at least a year or longer 
in the CCC ended up with higher paying jobs than those who served for just six 
months.  Enrollees who were offered positions while in the Corps were honorably 
discharged to start their employment.  It was found that the young men leaving 
the CCC to accept jobs usually returned to their home state or region.  Eastern 
boys assigned to western camps nearly all returned to the East and western youths 
preferred to stay in the West.  Even before leaving the CCC, individuals who 
performed outstanding work had opportunities for advancement.  They could be 
promoted to responsible positions as foremen on the technical supervisory staff at  
camps when vacancies occurred.
 From information included in Reclamation’s CCC regular camp reports 
and in journal articles, it appears that the training offered to enrollees was well-
received by them.  In fact, with few exceptions the morale of the enrollees was 
noted as good.  For example, at BR-5 on the Strawberry Valley Project, the 
“enrollees exhibited a fi ne cooperative spirit and high morale” despite the remote 
locality of the camp.  At BR-20 on the Klamath Project, the enrollees were praised 
for their hard work in the camp’s fi rst annual report: 
The manner in which the men in both camps (BR-41 as well) 
applied their efforts was truly remarkable, and it was not long before the 
camps became well established and the work program began to show 
signs of progress … The men wanted to work, to prove their worth and 
better themselves, when given the opportunity.  Moreover, they proved 
this when offered the facilities of the buildings and teaching personnel at 
the Merrill and Tulelake high schools for evenings.
 In addition to the emphasis on developing “strong minds,”  CCC camps 
also promoted building “strong, healthy bodies.”  Physical conditioning, 
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in addition to educational training, was considered important for character 
improvement and for maintaining good camp morale.  Planned athletic and 
recreational activities were part of all camp schedules.  Enrollees participated in 
sports such as baseball, basketball, swimming, ping pong, or tennis.  Many camps 
also offered regular recreational outings to nearby towns and attractions.
 A number of the camps produced their own newsletters in which 
upcoming activities were announced or the results of sports competitions were 
reported.  The newsletters provide a more personal view of daily life at the camps. 
A column in the October 1937 “Stanfi eld Echo” (BR-44) advised new enrollees 
on proper behavior.  Among the twenty items listed were the following: “Be 
careful of the type of language you use around camp and in public;” “Do not 
smoke or fl ip cigarettes, or talk after the lights are out;” “The wasting of food is 
considered serious misconduct and will be punished accordingly;” and “Watch 
your actions while you are in town, you will be judged accordingly.”
 Although Reclamation’s  CCC program was not without its critics, overall 
it appears to have been viewed as very benefi cial by the public.  Their initial 
concerns about having unemployed youths living nearby dissipated over time.
Annual open houses at the camps gave outsiders a perfect opportunity to learn 
of the accomplishments of the enrollees and to better understand the program.
Camps participated in numerous local events such as parades and county fairs.
Reclamation even produced a fi lm in 1937 entitled  Reclamation and the CCC
which showed enrollees engaged at work on a number of projects.  Unfortunately, 
no copy of the fi lm has been located. 
 Strong community support is evidenced in newspaper articles published 
in early 1938 when President Roosevelt contemplated closing all Reclamation 
camps in response to the criticism that they benefi tted private irrigators rather than 
the interests of the public.  In Wyoming, the Powell Tribune wrote:
As to the CCC in reclamation work, we have regarded the camp at 
Deaver as of great benefi t to the general farming community there … We 
need more CCC camps and fewer jails; we need more CCC camps and 
less unemployment; we need more CCC camps for the improvement in 
mind, morals and body of the boys themselves—that is more important 
and more of value to us all than the work they do.11
In February 1938, to counter the accusations lodged against it, Reclamation 
restricted CCC activities to Federally owned lands, and the government had to 
have a direct fi nancial interest in all work performed, or it had to be developing 
recreational facilities for public benefi t.
Termination of Reclamation CCC Camps
 The outbreak of World War II brought an end to the  CCC.  As the United 
States geared up the production of arms and ammunition, the unemployment 
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problem dissolved.  The number of CCC camps nationwide dwindled from a peak 
of 2,652 in the summer of 1935 to 1,500 by April 1939.
 With the attack on Pearl Harbor, the country’s attention was riveted on a 
new front.  Some six weeks after the bombing, on January 27, 1942, CCC director 
James L. McEntee announced the immediate reorganization of the CCC on a war 
basis.  He directed the termination of all CCC camps as quickly as possible unless 
they were involved in war-related construction activities or in the protection of 
war-related natural resources.
 Reclamation justifi ed its continued need for CCC camps during the war on 
the basis of the urgent need for a reliable and adequate food supply.  The effect of 
the war on Reclamation=s CCC program was thus described: 
 The defense program and later the all-out war program 
emphasized the responsibility of the Nation’s food growers, and a 
portion of that responsibility was thus imparted to the camps helping 
in this work.  Meeting the needs of the armed services and industry, 
the bureau’s camps provided one of the sources of supply for trained 
construction equipment operators.  All phases of the training program 
were emphasized and especially those skills which could augment the 
supply of needed trained workers.12
 During the last full fi scal year of the CCC program, 1942, there was a 
reduction in the number of camps assigned to Reclamation from forty-three 
camps on July 1, 1941, to seven camps on June 30, 1942.  In general, the CCC 
work activities previously initiated were continued through fi scal year 1942, 
with impetus added by the war.  In planning for the annual CCC “open house” 
celebrations in 1941, a memo was sent out from Reclamation Commissioner John 
Page to all CCC fi eld offi ces urging them to highlight activities contributing the 
most to the national defense program.  Page quoted from a letter that the Director 
of the CCC had sent out: 
It should be emphasized that the entire pattern of camp life—the daily 
routine, the training and educational programs, the work projects—all 
contribute to national security by developing in youth character, 
discipline, good work habits, health, love of country and the ability to 
achieve economic independence.13
Eight new camps were assigned to Reclamation at the beginning of Fiscal 
Year 1942.  They were established for the purpose of constructing small water 
conservation and utilization projects (BR-93, -94, -95, -96, -97, -99, -101, -102).
Sometimes referred to as  Wheeler-Case Projects, they were confi ned to the Great 
Plains and other western areas subject to drought and water shortages.  As one of 
several agencies participating in the program, Reclamation’s role was to construct 
irrigation facilities to help meet local water needs.  By the end of the year, 
considerable progress had been made. 
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 Although President Roosevelt urged continuation of the CCC as a 
means of accomplishing critical defense work, Congress sealed the fate of the 
program on June 30, 1942, when it voted to liquidate the CCC and allocated 
$8 million to help cover closing costs.  Steps were immediately taken to 
release the remaining 60,000 enrollees and to discontinue all work programs.
Reclamation’s remaining camps were shut down the following month.  Some 
of Reclamation’s terminated camps were transferred to the Army or Navy for 
military use.  In a number of cases, closed CCC camps were used to house 
conscientious objectors (BR-75, -76, -77, -93, -95, -97, -99), war prisoners 
(BR-39) or Japanese evacuees (BR-42).  Where no future uses could be 
contemplated, camp structures were relocated or demolished.
Conclusion
 During the life of the CCC program, Reclamation operated camps at 
eighty-three separate locations on forty-fi ve Reclamation projects in fi fteen 
western states.  Even though the agency was but a minor recipient of CCC 
benefi ts (in April 1937 Reclamation was assigned thrity-four camps which 
represented only 1.7 percent of the total number), Reclamation continually touted 
the positive results attained by the enrollees.  The assignment of CCC camps to 
Reclamation occurred at a time when western agriculture was in critical straits.
Work completed by the enrollees helped revitalize an array of existing irrigation 
projects and brought new water to other areas.
 A few fi gures illustrate the impressive volume of accomplishments of 
 CCC forces on Reclamation facilities: over 60,000,000 square yards of canals and 
drainage ditches were cleaned or cleared; 1,800,000 square yards of canal were 
lined with impervious material and 2,800,000 square yards were riprapped for 
protection against erosion; 3,000 miles of operating roads had been constructed 
along canal banks; 39,000 acres of reservoir sites were cleared of brush and trees; 
and 15,800 water control structures had been built.  The contributions of the CCC 
were summarized in Reclamation’s fi nal report on the program as follows: 
 The fi ne work of the Civilian Conservation Corps by 1942 had 
brought the Federal irrigation projects back to a high standard of physical 
excellence.  The irrigation systems are now in generally good condition, 
able to deliver required amounts of water and by the permanency of their 
rehabilitation they are insured against interruptions of consequence.14
 For the enrollees at Reclamation camps, the experience provided 
invaluable skills, training, and opened new doors for a more promising future.
The CCC offered an opportunity “To learn in the great outdoorsChow to work, 
how to live, and how to get ahead.”15
Christine Pfaff is a Bureau of Reclamation historian who formerly 
worked in Reclamation’s Technical Service Center and has since moved 
to the historic preservation program of Reclamation where she uses her 
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skills as an architectural historian.  She has published several articles on 
the history of Reclamation, a book on Reclamation’s historic buildings, 
and a book on the CCC at Reclamation.
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Lee’s Ferry, the Colorado River, and the 
Development of the Bureau of Reclamation
By:
Douglas E. Kupel
Abstract
The 100-year anniversary of the Newlands Act, which created the U.S. 
Reclamation Service, now known as the Bureau of Reclamation, will be 
celebrated in the year 2002.  This occasion marks an appropriate time to refl ect 
on the development of the Bureau over time.  As the prime focus of Federal 
activities on the Colorado River, events at Lee’s Ferry have made a decided 
impact on the direction of the Bureau.  This paper examines the role of Lee’s 
Ferry as a concrete location and spiritual center for the reclamation movement in 
a paper prepared for the Bureau’s Centennial Symposium.
Established as a refuge from Federal authorities for exile John D. Lee, Lee’s 
Ferry is now the physical and spiritual center of the Federal contribution to 
Western water history.  As scholars look back on the centennial of the Bureau 
of Reclamation, an examination of the history of Lee’s Ferry and the turf battle 
between the Bureau and the USGS over the future development of the Colorado 
River provides needed insight.  It adds a valuable perspective for westerners 
concerned with the next hundred years of water history.  Known today primarily 
as the departure point for thousands of white-water rafting thrill-seekers and 
world-class trout anglers, the future of Lee’s Ferry will be every bit as signifi cant 
as its past.
Introduction
 Lee’s Ferry is both the physical and spiritual heart of water history in the 
arid West.  As a physical place, Lee’s Ferry is the crucial dividing point between 
the Upper and Lower Basin states as defi ned by the Colorado River Compact of 
1922.  Measurements taken at Lee’s Ferry govern the amount of water credited to 
each of the basins, as well as allocations between states within each basin.
 As a symbol, Lee’s Ferry represents the pivotal position of  the Colorado 
River in the development of the Bureau of Reclamation.  First settled as a 
remote place of exile for fugitive Mormon leader John D. Lee as he sought to 
escape Federal authorities, Lee’s Ferry is now the true “ground zero” for Federal 
infl uence on the West.  As the focus of Federal activities on the Colorado River, 
events at Lee’s Ferry have made a decided impact on the direction of the Bureau.
 Despite its key role in history, the history of Lee’s Ferry itself had been 
left relatively unexamined.  Recent work by historian P. T. Reilly and others have 
only now added new chapters to the complex saga of Lee’s Ferry.  This new 
research provides support for the contention that Lee’s Ferry is one of the most 
signifi cant locales in the landscape of Federal water policy.1
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 Lee’s Ferry is located between the two largest dams on the Colorado 
River.  Just upstream of Lee’s Ferry is the massive Glen Canyon Dam, which 
creates Lake Powell.  Downstream from Lee’s Ferry and on the west side of the 
Grand Canyon is Hoover Dam, which backs up the waters of the Colorado to form 
Lake Mead.  Glen Canyon was constructed in the 1950-1960s and represents the 
last of the giant concrete dams completed by the Bureau of Reclamation.  Hoover 
Dam, completed in the depression decade of the 1930s, represented the beginning 
of a new era for Reclamation.
 What few people realize today is that there was considerable debate about 
the relative merits of the two dam locations in the twenties.  This vigorous debate 
pitted representatives of two Federal agencies against each other: the venerable 
U.S. Geological Survey, tracing its heritage back to the nineteenth century ideals 
of John Wesley Powell, and the upstart U.S. Reclamation Service, representing a 
twentieth century conception of water use.  Reclamation Service offi cials lobbied 
hard for construction of a dam on the lower Colorado to provide needed fl ood 
control for Southern California and Arizona while producing hydroelectric power 
for ready customers in Los Angeles.  USGS offi cials, notably hydrologist E. C. 
LaRue, argued for the construction of a dam at Glen Canyon to regulate the fl ow 
of water between the Upper and Lower basins.
 The Bureau won this skirmish between the two agencies, and construction 
of Hoover Dam sent Reclamation on a path of growth and achievement 
unparalleled in modern history.  Eventually, the Bureau would return to the site 
of its earlier triumph.  Construction of Glen Canyon Dam capped a long era of 
achievements.
 The location of Lee’s Ferry carries with it a touch of irony.  John D. 
Lee was sent there by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon 
Church) as an exile to build and operate a ferry.  He built the Lonely Dell Ranch 
for Emma Lee, his seventeenth wife, a few miles below Glen Canyon Dam.  By 
1873 Lee had built a ferryboat named the Colorado and established the fi rst ferry 
service across the river.  Lee was captured by Federal authorities and executed in 
1877 for his part in the Mountain Meadows Massacre.  The ferry ran continuously 
until 1928.  It was replaced by Navajo Bridge, which was completed across 
Marble Canyon in 1929.
Geology
 The spectacular landscape dominating the canyon country of Northern 
Arizona is the product of eons of geologic activity: shifting of continents, 
global rising and falling of sea levels, and creation of highlands now worn and 
redeposited.  At times, deserts dominated the landscape; sometimes freshwater or 
saltwater seas invaded, leaving rivers to erode the most recently deposited layers.  
Prevailing winds abetted the process.  Periods of erosion account for missing rock 
strata, layers appearing elsewhere in sequence.  Two geologic processes are most 
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responsible for the canyon of the Colorado Plateau: 1) an uplift of the ground 
itself, and 2) erosion of the rock by many years of constant water fl ow.
 The last uplift of the Colorado Plateau began about sixty million years 
ago.  Uplift made the land rise.  The meandering streams of the Colorado River 
ran faster and faster.  As the land rose, the constant erosion of the water cut the 
canyons that today dominate the Colorado River.  This erosion sliced through 
many geologic layers, which are now visible.  Navajo sandstone, the dominant 
formation, is made of sand dunes hardened by pressure from deposits above 
them. The deposits eventually wore away and exposed today’s sandstone.  Other 
layers contain sea- deposited sediments; still others hold fossils of land or marine 
organisms that lived millions of years ago.  Petrifi ed wood and fossils of dinosaur 
bones, seashells, and small sea creatures are found in several rock strata in this 
area.
 The deep canyons left by uplift of the Colorado Plateau and the downward 
force of erosion made access across the vast chasm of the Colorado River very 
diffi cult.  Only at a few locations from its confl uence with the Green River in 
Central Utah to the lower valley near Topock, California, does the Colorado open 
its banks to easy access.  For hundreds of miles the canyon of the Colorado is an 
insurmountable barrier, isolating the lands of the Arizona strip north of the river 
and placing them with easier access to Utah than to the state capitol at Phoenix.
 One of the few places along the canyon where the Colorado River can 
be reached with relative ease is at its confl uence with the Paria River.  Here, 
between the depths of Glen Canyon on the upstream side and Marble Canyon on 
the downstream side, is a break in the canyon walls for a stretch of two miles that 
allows a diffi cult and dangerous crossing of the river.  Now Anglicized, the word 
Paria derives from the Indian name Pahreah, meaning a stream of water having 
willows growing along its banks.2
European Discovery
 Early Spanish explorers traveled the northern frontier of New Spain 
(today’s Mexico) looking for an overland route to California.  Some of these 
explorers left us detailed accounts of their expeditions.  In 1776 two Spanish 
priests began an expedition that provided the fi rst written record of Lee’s Ferry.  
Father Francisco Atanasio Dominguez and Father Silvestre Velez de Escalante 
set out from Santa Fe in July to pioneer an overland route from New Mexico 
to Monterey on the California coast.  After three months, the party reached the 
vicinity of today’s Cedar City in Utah, where they encountered an early snow.  
The inclement weather infl uenced a decision to turn back to Santa Fe before the 
full onset of winter.  Following the advice of Paiute Indians, Dominguez and 
Escalante searched for a shallow ford of the Colorado.
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 Inadvertently turning too far south, the two priests reached what is today 
known as Lee’s Ferry.  On October 26 the party reached the Colorado River 
at the mouth of the Paria River.  Here, the river proved too deep to ford on 
horseback, and too swift to swim across.  The men christened their camp Sal si 
Puedes (get out while you can) and they did just that by moving upstream along 
the Paria River canyon until they reached the Colorado Plateau. The explorers 
climbed out of the river bottom and made camp near what is today’s Wahweap 
Marina on Lake Powell.  They spent four more days searching for a way across 
the river. Finally, on November 7, they chopped steps in the sandstone wall at a 
location now called Padre Creek and safely led their pack stock to the banks of 
the Colorado.  Here the crossing was wide but shallow. The site known as the 
“Crossing of the Fathers” today lies beneath the waters of Padre Bay in Lake 
Powell.3
Mormon Crossing Era
 The early development of Lee’s Ferry is closely associated with the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormons or LDS).  The river 
crossing is named for Mormon pioneer John Doyle Lee.  The crossing was a key 
location on the major transportation route for Mormon immigrants to Arizona and, 
after 1877, for travelers returning to Utah along the “Honeymoon Trail” to the 
LDS Temple at Saint George to solemnize their unions.
 The establishment of the Mormon Church dates to an event in American 
history known as the “Second Great Awakening,” a period of religious revival and 
evangelicalism in the late 1820s and early 1830s.  This revival was national in 
scope, but had two centers: in the south and in western New York state.  In 1830 
Joseph Smith received a revelation and a new type of Christian church began.
Because of some unusual tenets of the religion, its practitioners were subject 
to opposition and distrust from more traditional, established religions.  One of 
these early tenets of the LDS Church was polygamy, the practice of men taking 
more than one wife.  From its original location in New York, members of the 
LDS church moved to Ohio, then to Illinois, and fi nally on the long trek to the 
Great Salt Lake in what would become the Territory and later the State of Utah.  
Members arrived at the present-day location of Salt Lake City on July 24, 1847.
John D. and Emma Lee, 1871-1879
 John D. Lee was born in Kaskasia, Illinois, on September 12, 1812, 
and converted to Mormonism at the age of twenty-six.  Lee joined Joseph 
Smith in western Missouri in 1838, then moved with other church members to 
Nauvoo, Illinois, after violence forced them to relocate.  Lee was a leader in the 
community and constructed a substantial house in Nauvoo.  After further violence, 
including the murder of Joseph Smith, Lee and the rest of the Mormon faithful 
began a westward trek.  During the move Lee was a leader and able assistant to 
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Brigham Young on the trip to Utah.  After establishing a home in Salt Lake City, 
Lee heeded his church’s call to settle in the southern portion of Utah.  Lee and his 
wives settled and built houses at Parowan, Harmony, and Panguitch in southern 
Utah.4
 While living near Harmony, Lee participated in a massacre of immigrants 
en route to the Pacifi c Coast.  In the summer of 1857 a wagon train under the 
command of Captain Charles Fancher set up camp at Mountain Meadows, a 
popular resting spot on the trip west.  At the time, leaders of the LDS Church were 
in a bitter struggle with the Federal government over control of the Utah Territory 
and were anticipating armed intervention at any moment.  The immigrants, 
many of them from Missouri, taunted the Mormon settlers with tales of how 
Smith’s followers had been driven from the state.  On September 11, 1857, local 
Mormon leaders and Ute Indians joined forces in an attack on the wagon train.
Viewed ostensibly as a military campaign against a hostile force, the attack was 
a massacre from which only seventeen children escaped death.  While in many 
ways a payback for tremendous mistreatment over the years, the Mountain 
Meadows Massacre of 1857 forever marked its antagonists with the taint of 
bloodshed and violence.5
 The massacre opened southern Utah to additional Mormon settlement.  
Called Utah’s “Dixie,” because of its comparatively warm climate and southern 
location, this portion of the territory included the communities of Saint George, 
Harmony, Panguitch, and Cedar City.  This process of colonization was an integral 
part of church expansion.  In addition to southern Utah, church leaders began to 
look southward into Arizona.  Of particular interest for Mormon proselytizers 
were the sedentary and urban Hopi Indians.
 In 1858, 1859, and 1860, Mormon leaders sent expeditions to the Hopi.  
Led by pioneer Jacob Hamblin, the missionary parties crossed at what would 
later become Lee’s Ferry.  These early efforts toward converting the Hopi to the 
Mormon religion proved disappointing.  In time, Mormon leaders directed their 
attention to the neighboring Navajo.  In contrast to the Hopi, who received the 
Mormon missionaries with indifference, the Navajo were openly hostile to those 
they considered intruders in their land.  By 1860 the Navajo were in a state of 
open confl ict with the U.S. Government, a situation which ended only with the 
Navajo’s defeat at the hands of Kit Carson.  While many Navajo lost their lives 
during the confl ict, many more died during the infamous “long walk” to the 
Bosque Redondo reservation in New Mexico.
 The relationship between the Mormons, the Navajo, and the Hopi took on 
the form of an uneasy truce after 1865.  Mormon missionaries remained anxious 
to convert additional souls, but they also coveted the few well-watered locations 
in Arizona for settlements.  Resident American Indians looked to protect their 
lands.
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 As one of the few locations where the Colorado could be crossed, the 
Paria River confl uence served an important military purpose to the Mormons.  
Control of the crossing prevented incursions by Native Americans north of the 
river while providing a base of operations for Mormon colonizing to the south.  In 
October of 1869 Hamblin posted guards at the river crossing to control access at 
this strategic point.  Hamblin christened the post “Fort Meeks” in honor of camp 
leader William Meeks.  By 1870 Hamblin had cleared a patch of land along the 
Paria and planted wheat.  As historian A. Gary Anderson has noted, “this crossing 
on the Colorado River was not unknown when John D. Lee arrived, nor was the 
idea of a ferry new.”6
 Although U.S. President James Buchanan had issued a general pardon 
for acts of rebellion arising from the Utah War in 1858, for John D. Lee and 
other Mormon leaders associated with the Mountain Meadows Massacre the 
passage of time could not wash the stain clean.  In 1870 LDS church offi cials 
excommunicated Lee and others for their participation in the event.  While 
church offi cials were outwardly preparing to fi x the entire blame for the 
affair on Lee, inwardly they still considered Lee as one of their own.  Despite 
the excommunication, for Lee, a faithful member of the fl ock since 1838, 
relinquishment of his loyalty to the church would come slowly if at all.
 To Lee and the Mormon leadership, the confl uence of Paria Creek with the 
Colorado River served two important purposes.  For Lee, it provided a remote and 
isolated area free from the watchful eyes of Federal authorities.  For the church, it 
was an important link in the Mormon colonization of Arizona.
 Lee and two of his families set out for the remote location, arriving shortly 
before Christmas in 1871.  Mormon historian Juanita Brooks credits Emma 
Lee with naming the locale “Lonely Dell” based on the pioneer wife’s initial 
observations.  Wives Emma and Rachel took up residence, one in a dugout and 
one in a rock structure.  In May of 1872 Rachel moved to a location today known 
as “Jacob’s Pools,” leaving Emma Batchelder Lee as the woman in charge of 
Lee’s Ferry.  Emma was indeed the driving force behind the ferry and the Lonely 
Dell Ranch, as Lee himself was often absent.7
 The arrival of Lee created two centers of activity at the confl uence of 
the Paria and Colorado Rivers.  The ferry across the Colorado operated from the 
water’s edge, downstream from the juncture of the two rivers.  The residential 
area, starting with some rough cabins and corrals, was upstream along the Paria.
This sheltered location back from the Colorado gave the residents some protection 
from storms that frequently passed through the canyon.
 During December of 1871 Lee constructed crude shelters for his two 
wives and their children.  Based on accounts from Lee’s diaries, Mormon 
historian Juanita Brooks described these early structures:
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By January 12 they had fi nished building two small rooms.  One was a 
dugout with its back and two sides set into the hillside.  It had a fl agstone 
fl oor, and a willow and sod roof.  Later, this would be a cellar, and a 
place where the children could sleep during the scorching midday hours.
The larger room was of rock laid up with mud and lime mortar, and had a 
dirt fl oor and roof, but two small windows and a solid door.8
 These fi rst dwellings were mere shelters from the elements.  As time went 
on, Lee constructed a more presentable cabin of driftwood for Emma.  He had the 
assistance of Tommy Smith who arrived in 1872 with lumber for a new ferryboat 
and considerable carpentry skills.  Professor Harvey C. DeMotte, a member of 
John Wesley Powell’s 1871-72 expedition down the Colorado, left us with a 
description of the building as it appeared in 1872:
The house of logs and innocent of fl oor, whose foundations were not laid 
with square and compass, stood with gable pointing toward the south of 
east; along one side a shade, composed of leafy boughs, served well the 
purpose of verandah, from the outer edge of which suspended blankets 
hid the sun’s rays from the evening meal.9
 John Wesley Powell’s trips down the Colorado have received well-justifi ed 
attention by historians through the years.  While Powell and his men achieved 
a signifi cant accomplishment by being the fi rst to travel downstream on the 
Colorado River through the Grand Canyon, the records of Powell’s exploits also 
give us some insight into conditions at Lee’s Ferry.  Powell took two trips through 
the Colorado, one in 1869 and a second in 1871 and 1872.  The second trip was 
actually undertaken in two parts, with a break at Lee’s Ferry.10
 Powell fi rst visited Lee’s Ferry on August 4, 1869.  His crew spent the 
night there, noting the remains of Indian and Mormon campfi res.  Powell returned 
on September 30, 1870, during a reconnaissance trip in preparation for his second 
voyage.  Accompanied by Jacob Hamblin, Powell and his men constructed a fl at 
boat called the Cañon Maid to use as a ferryboat to cross the river.  Recognizing 
that Lee’s Ferry was an important access point on the river, Powell used it as a 
location to split his second trip down the Colorado.  In 1871 the party left Green 
River, Wyoming in May and arrived at Lee’s Ferry in October.  The men cached 
one boat on each side of the river and disembarked.  The Powell party returned to 
33.1.  This 1871 image of John 
Wesley Powell’s second expedition 
down the Colorado River was captured 
at the jumping off point in Green River, 
Wyoming.
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Lee’s Ferry in the summer of 1872 to resume their trip.11
 The main difference between the two trips was that John Doyle Lee 
had arrived at the mouth of the Paria to establish his residence.  Frederick S. 
Dellenbaugh, a member of Powell’s party, noted that in addition to constructing 
a cabin, “Lee had worked hard since his arrival early in the year and now had his 
farm in fairly good order with crops growing, well irrigated by the water he took 
out of the Paria.  He called the place Lonely Dell, and it was not a misnomer.”12
 With a good knowledge of Lee’s predicament, members of the Powell 
expedition were not above having some fun with Lee.  Dellenbaugh describes one 
incident:
Our camp was across the Paria down by the Colorado, and when Brother 
Lee came back the following Sunday he called to give us a lengthy 
dissertation on the faith of the Latter-Day Saints (Mormons), while 
Andy, always up to mischief, in his quiet way, delighted to get behind 
him and cock a rifl e.  At the sound of the ominous click Lee would wheel 
like a fl ash to see what was up.  We had no intention of capturing him, 
of course, but it amused Andy to act in a way that kept Lee on the qui 
vive.13
 In addition to constructing lodging, Lee quickly turned his attention to the 
establishment of a garden patch.  One of his fi rst tasks was to complete a dam on 
the Paria River to impound water for irrigation.  Thus began a continual battle 
to maintain the dam in the face of frequent fl oods and to keep the crops watered 
during times of drought.14
 In 1872 church authorities desired to open Arizona to colonization and 
assigned Lee to operate a ferry.  A boat was completed by January of 1873.  In 
April of 1873 church offi cials sent Joseph W. Young, James Jackson, and twenty-
fi ve others to improve roads to and from the ferry site.  Jackson assisted Mrs. Lee 
during the frequent absences of John D. Lee from the site.
 In 1874 confl ict between Mormons and the Navajo led church offi cials to 
fund construction of a “Fort” on the banks of the Colorado River.  In January of 
1874 three Navajo men were killed by settlers in Grass Valley, Utah.  Although 
the protagonists were not Mormons, the incident escalated tensions between 
Mormon settlers and the Navajo.  In May of 1874 Jacob Hamblin suggested that 
the Mormons construct a Fort at Lee’s Ferry to protect the river crossing.
 Marshall William Stokes captured Lee in Panguitch on November 7, 1874. 
It took two trials for Federal authorities to convict Lee of participation in the 
Mountain Meadows Massacre.  Lee was executed at the site of the massacre on 
March 23, 1877.
 Following Lee’s capture and execution, his wife Emma operated the ferry.  
Warren M. Johnson took over operation of the Ferry from Emma on November 
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30, 1879.  Johnson operated the ferry for sixteen years, until 1896.  James S. 
Emett then took over.  One of Emett’s improvements was the introduction of a 
cable-ferry in 1899 and the construction of a new access road.  Emett continued to 
operate the ferry until it was purchased by Coconino County in 1910.  Custodians 
for Coconino County ran the ferry until the construction of Navajo Bridge made it 
obsolete.  The last ferry run was in 1928.  Navajo Bridge opened in 1929.
Lee’s Ferry and Charles H. Spencer, 1909-1912
 These three  years were ones of rapid change at Lee’s Ferry.  The Grand 
Canyon Cattle Company purchased the Lonely Dell Ranch from James S. 
Emett in 1909, and Coconino County owned the ferry location after 1910.  But 
the greatest change originated from former teamster, bullwhacker, and expert 
yarn-spinner Charles H. Spencer.  Spencer had convinced himself, and soon 
proved very adept at convincing others, that small amounts of very fi ne gold 
could be found in the depths of the geologic strata uncovered by centuries of the 
Colorado’s relentless erosion.  The only problem, for Spencer and others, was 
how to recover it.  The Spencer mining operation endured for only a short time, 
until February of 1912, but it left a lasting mark on Lee’s Ferry.15
 Spencer arrived at Lee’s Ferry in May of 1909.  He listened carefully as 
Jerry Johnson, Warren Johnson’s son, related the exploits of Robert B. Stanton’s 
early attempts at gold mining along the Colorado.  Spencer developed enthusiasm 
for his project and sent a member of his party to Flagstaff to record several mining 
claims.  He lured fi nancial backers in Chicago to join the operation, incorporated 
as the Black Sand Gold Recovery Company.  By June Spencer and his crew 
had established a camp on the left bank of the Colorado, near the location of the 
original ferry and across the river from the Fort.
 After several unsuccessful attempts to recover gold from the sands 
along the left bank of the river in August and early September of 1910, Spencer 
decided to move his operations to the more developed and spacious right bank.
On September 10 and 11, 1910, Spencer and his crew moved to the right bank, 
making over the old Fort as a mess hall and erecting two tents nearby to serve as 
the cook’s commissary.16
 After establishing his foothold on the right bank, Charlie Spencer re-
grouped to obtain more capital from his Chicago backers.  He returned at the 
fi rst of the year in 1911 and embarked on a massive building program that would 
change the appearance of Lee’s Ferry dramatically.  He formed a new company, 
called the American Placer Corporation, to serve as a holding company for the 
operation.
 Buildings erected by Spencer in 1911 included: an offi ce building to the 
west of the Fort (American Placer Corporation Offi ce); an addition on the west 
end of the old Fort; a new mess hall and cook’s house; three bunkhouses (west, 
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center, and east); a blacksmith shop; and a laboratory (assay offi ce).  Other 
Spencer contributions included smaller features such as root cellars, chicken 
coops, outhouses, and a powder storage magazine.  The powder magazine, a large 
dugout excavated out of the right bank, was located up the Colorado River past 
all other improvements.  The most unusual Spencer addition was the construction 
of a steamboat, christened the Charles H. Spencer, that lowered its anchor in the 
Colorado.17
 Despite the ability of Charles Spencer to convince others that there was 
gold in the deposits at Lee’s Ferry, he was unable to actually locate any mineral 
wealth.  His talents lay in the area of promotion, not production.  The fi nal blow 
came when his steamboat could not buck the forceful current of the Colorado.
It had been constructed to transport coal for the boilers of the gold operation.
Without a fuel source, not withstanding the lack of gold, the operation was 
doomed to failure.18
 After the Charles H. Spencer failed in its maiden voyage in December 
of 1911, the workers began to drift away.  When the investors cut off the money 
supply, even Spencer himself abandoned his project.  Although Spencer would 
continue to return to Lee’s Ferry many times over the next forty years, he never 
matched his construction efforts of 1910-1911.
USGS/Reclamation Controversy over Dam Construction (1921-1933)
 The next scheme of big dreamers that concerned Lee’s Ferry centered on 
a resource that appeared to be plentiful: water.  Since the great fl ood that created 
the Salton Sea in 1905, plans had been circulated for a dam on the Colorado to 
provide fl ood control, generate hydroelectric power, and impound water for use 
in California and Arizona.  Engineers, politicians, and developers in California 
and Arizona vied to be the fi rst to lay claim to the vast water resources of the 
Colorado.19
 Eugene Clyde LaRue of the U.S. Geological Survey played a key role 
in the development of dams on the Colorado.  Although LaRue’s ideas were 
discredited by the politicians of the day, his observations about the fl ow of the 
Colorado proved prescient.  LaRue began a comprehensive study of the Colorado 
in 1912.  His ultimate conclusion, published in 1916, was that the fl ow of the 
Colorado was not suffi cient to irrigate all of the lands available for agriculture.  To 
conserve water, LaRue advocated construction of a series of comparatively small 
dams.  This would reduce the total water surface exposed to evaporation, thus 
conserving stored water for irrigation in both California and Arizona.20
 Offi cials at the U.S. Reclamation Service, once a part of the USGS, 
pursued a different vision for the Colorado.  The Reclamation Service conducted 
its own studies, relying on the work of J. B. Lippincott.  The California-
based engineer advocated construction of a large dam on the lower Colorado.  
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Lippincott explained that the advantage of the lower Colorado River dam is that it 
would be closer to power and water use in California.  This idea did not set well 
with Arizonans who hoped to divert water from the Colorado for use in the desert 
state.21
 As it turned out, the Californians were better prepared and fi nanced.  They 
struck fi rst, in 1921.  The Southern California Edison Company entered into a 
cooperative agreement with the United States Geological Survey to conduct a 
survey of the Colorado River with a view toward determining potential dam 
sites.  Like other travelers before and after, the Edison men selected Lee’s Ferry 
as the base of their operations because of its easy access to the river and land 
transportation.22
 In addition to surveying the river for possible dam sites, the Edison and 
USGS party erected a stream gaging station at Lee’s Ferry.  Placed in operation 
in 1921, the stream gage represented the fi rst fi rm Federal foothold at the ferry, 
an ironic addition to a location selected by John D. Lee to hide from U.S. 
government authority.  The Federal presence at Lee’s Ferry had begun.23
 Another irony in the Edison program was that the USGS hydrographer 
E. C. LaRue worked closely with the California company.  Because of his prior 
experience, LaRue was a logical choice to head the survey of potential dam 
locations upstream and downstream from Lee’s Ferry.  Both the USGS and 
the Edison Company provided funds for the project.  Although LaRue would 
later come to a conclusion regarding dam locations that was at odds with the 
electric company, this association was used by his enemies to discredit LaRue’s 
objectivity.24
 The Edison Company leased land from the Navajo Nation on the left 
bank of the Colorado for their headquarters.  In 1922 the Edison men erected a 
boathouse there that served as the base of their operations.  This work coincided 
with meetings of the Colorado River Commission conducted by Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover.  These discussions in Santa Fe led to agreement 
on a compact that divided the waters of the Colorado between the upper and 
lower basin states.  However, Arizona refused to ratify this Compact of 1922.  
The Compact had the effect of splitting the Colorado River drainage into two 
basins, the upper and lower.  The location of the division between the basins was 
specifi ed in Article V of the Compact as a hypothetical point one mile below the 
mouth of the Paria River.25
 Separate Reclamation Service investigations of the Colorado culminated 
in 1922 with the publication of the Fall-Davis Report, named for Secretary of the 
Interior Albert Fall and Reclamation Service chief A. P. Davis.  The Fall-Davis 
report recommended construction of a high dam at Boulder Canyon that would 
serve several purposes: fl ood control, generation of hydroelectric power, river 
regulation, and storage of water for agriculture.  The report essentially followed 
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the earlier Lippincott plan.26
 Despite the assistance of the Edison Company, LaRue and the USGS 
pursued a vision of Colorado River development that differed from the 
Reclamation Service.  LaRue compared the two plans in his second report on the 
Colorado, published in 1925.  LaRue stated that the USGS plans “are based on the 
theory that major regulation of fl ow by storage can be developed by dams at or 
above Lees Ferry.”  With a large dam at Lee’s Ferry as its centerpiece, LaRue then 
called for a series of smaller dams and reservoirs downstream.  These would allow 
for the generation of hydroelectric power while conserving water for agriculture.
The smaller dams would reduce water loss from evaporation.  According to 
LaRue, building a dam at Lee’s Ferry would regulate the fl ow of the river and 
allow for a comprehensive development of the Colorado’s resources.27
 The Bureau of Reclamation pursued a different vision.  Davis and other 
Reclamation offi cials preferred the recommendations of the Fall-Davis report 
which called for the construction of a large dam in Boulder Canyon on the lower 
Colorado.  Accompanying the large dam was a second dam, downstream, that 
would recapture power releases and allow for agricultural diversions.  The large 
dam was eventually named Hoover Dam, and the smaller was christened Davis 
Dam.
 The Davis plan had the strong backing of the California congressional 
delegation.  The basic elements of the plan were introduced as the Swing-Johnson 
bill in Congress, named for Representative Philip Swing of San Diego and 
cosponsored by Senator Hiram Johnson.  The bill eventually became law as the 
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928.  Construction of Boulder Dam (later Hoover 
Dam) began in 1930 and was completed in 1936.
 Despite the rejection of LaRue’s idea for an upstream dam, the USGS 
soon developed Lee’s Ferry into a signifi cant scientifi c outpost.  With the arrival 
of stream gagers at the ferry, the old Spencer era mining buildings began to see 
new use.  Edison gager Irving Cockcroft and his wife Margery moved into the old 
Fort on August 20, 1921.28
 The Cockcrofts established a post offi ce in the American Placer 
Corporation Offi ce building.  The place opened for business on August 12, 1922, 
and Irving Cockcroft erected a sign stating that the building was the “Lee’s Ferry 
Post Offi ce.”  Since that time, the building has frequently been referred to as the 
“Post Offi ce.”  Another change was the conversion of the east Spencer Bunkhouse 
into a school.  This was done in 1921 under the impetus of Jerry Johnson, but it 
benefi tted the children of the river gagers working for Southern California Edison 
as well as children of the Mormon residents of Lonely Dell Ranch.  The building 
served as a school for about four years. 29
 The United States Geological Survey assumed complete control for the 
stream gaging operation at Lee’s Ferry on November 1, 1923.  On that day Edison 
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gager Irving Cockroft turned over the equipment to USGS employee Jim Klohr.  
The new man brought his family and the small group soon settled into the old 
Fort, using the Spencer addition as a bedroom.30
 Another result of the USGS activity on the Colorado was the designation 
of the spring at Lee’s Ferry, located in the bluff behind the cable ferry, as a public 
water reserve.  The experience of the Edison crew and the USGS men showed 
the importance of this water supply.  By order of the Secretary of the Interior, 
numerous springs in Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, 
Wyoming, and New Mexico were designated as “public water reserves” in order 
to protect the water supply in isolated and arid locations for the public use.  Public 
Water Reserve No. 107, issued on April 17, 1926, included:
All land within a quarter of a mile of a spring on the north bank of 
Colorado River near the old site of Lees Ferry east of the mouth of 
Paria River, and located approximately in what probably will be, when 
surveyed, Sec. 13.31
 Charlie Spencer resumed operations at Lee’s Ferry early in 1931, sending 
several laborers to begin sluicing operations on the Chinle Formation.  Spencer’s 
men treated the buildings and grounds as if they were their own, resulting in 
confl ict with USGS hydrologist Charlie McDonald.  The two groups, USGS 
gagers and Spencer miners, eventually agreed on exclusive use of separate 
buildings.  While this solved the problem for the moment, it soured the USGS 
on any further dealings with Spencer.  Offi cials in Washington, D.C., began to 
contemplate how they might prevent any further trespass by Spencer on the 
stream gaging operation.  After Spencer’s backers ran out of money in April of 
1931, the brief mining boom came to an end.32
USGS Outpost at Lee’s Ferry, 1933-1945
 The United States Geological Survey consolidated its control over the 
old ferry site in 1933.  On January 18, 1933, President Herbert Hoover issued 
an executive order setting aside lands near the existing gaging stations on the 
Colorado and Paria Rivers as an administrative site.  President Hoover declared 
that Section 13 and lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Township 40 North, Range 7 East and an 
unsurveyed portion of what, when surveyed, would be Section 18 in Township 40 
North, Range 8 East, were reserved “for occupation and use by representatives of 
the Geological Survey.”33
 The USGS soon undertook an improvement campaign on the property.  
It erected a fence to the east of the Fort, west of the westernmost Spencer 
Bunkhouse (demolished 1943) to demarcate its administrative zone.  The Survey 
also considered demolishing several of the Spencer buildings at this time.  These 
included the old schoolhouse (east Spencer bunkhouse), the chicken house (center 
bunkhouse, a.k.a. feed and storage room; demolished 1967), and the saddle barn 
(west bunkhouse, demolished 1943), and the Spencer addition to the Fort.34
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 After 1933 the center of USGS residential activity shifted from the Fort to 
Spencer’s old mess hall (demolished 1967).  The USGS converted the mess hall 
into a residence for its stream gagers.  This building became known as the “stream 
gager’s residence.”35
 The depression decade led itinerant hydrographer Frank Dodge to become 
more of a permanent resident at the ferry site.  A fairly frequent visitor to the 
ferry since 1919, Dodge secured part-time work with the USGS as an assistant 
hydrologist in 1932.  The decision to hire Dodge was justifi ed on the basis that 
a second person was needed to make readings during periods of high water.  
Dodge upgraded Spencer’s old laboratory (assay offi ce) building (converted into 
sediment lab 1947; demolished 1967) into a makeshift residence.  Over the years, 
this building became known as “Dodge’s Cabin.”36
 A reunion of Mormon pioneers held at Lee’s Ferry in 1935 gave the USGS 
an incentive to clean up its buildings and grounds.  The event took place over 
three days in October.  The reunion marked a turning point for Lee’s Ferry.  A 
sense of the passage of time and the growth of historical perspective gave rise to a 
sense of history about the old place.37
 However, recollections of the past did not always prove accurate.  In 1936 
historian Frank Kelly visited the area with former resident Robert B. Hildebrand 
who reminisced about his boyhood at Lee’s Ferry.  Hildebrand posed for 
photographs in front of several buildings, one of which he called the original Lee 
cabin.  Other visitors, struck by the apparent age of the Samantha Johnson Cabin, 
incorrectly began to associate the old building with John D. Lee.  Kelly gave these 
memories a stamp of approval when he described Lee’s Ferry in a 1943 article:
Although some of the old buildings have been destroyed, Lee’s original 
one-room log cabin fortunately has been preserved.  Behind it stands 
his old blacksmith shop, where horses were shod and emigrant wagons 
repaired, with giant leather bellows still in working order.38
 As the years passed, and as additional visitors arrived at Lee’s Ferry, the 
story of the Lee cabin and blacksmith shop took on all the elements of truth from 
constant retelling.  With the departure of Jerry Johnson from the property in 1934, 
no one remained on site that had direct knowledge of the earlier period.  Lee’s 
Ferry had now entered the realm of history, but that history took on aspects of 
myth.  As tales were told and retold, some of the stories were embellished.39
 As part of the USGS operations in the thirties, Government Land Offi ce 
(GLO) surveyors returned to the Lee’s Ferry area in 1937 to survey Township 40 
North, Range 8 East.  The GLO surveyors noted eight stone buildings and one 
mine shaft at the old Ferry site.  The surveyors described the area in their notes as 
follows:
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In section 18 there is a strip of land on the north side of the river about 
one-fourth mile wide and one-half mile long, whereon there are a group 
of stone cabins, a part of the settlement known as Lee’s Ferry.  This 
strip of land is covered by proclamation to the jurisdiction of the U.S. 
Geological Survey, and a representative of this government bureau 
occupies one of the cabins.  The remainder of the cabins were not 
occupied at the time of the survey… There is an old mine shaft in section 
18 near the group of stone buildings near the base of the canyon wall, 
but no operations are being carried on at the present time and there is no 
evidence of valuable mineral deposits.40
 The land survey coincided with an improvement to the grounds by the 
USGS late in 1937.  The Survey built a water tank and pipeline to convey water 
from a well to the stream gager’s residence (demolished 1967).  The engineers 
added a septic tank, to complement a six-foot by nine-foot bathroom they 
attached to the building.  The arrival of indoor plumbing at Lee’s Ferry was not 
the most dramatic event which ever took place at the site, but it was a signifi cant 
improvement.41
 In 1942 the USGS undertook another clean-up of the property.  Many of 
the remaining metal objects from the Spencer mining era were collected as part 
of a war-effort scrap drive.  The only items that remained after the operation were 
those that were too large to move, such as the boilers Spencer had freighted to the 
site in 1910.  In 1943 the west Spencer Bunkhouse, closest to the ravine and in the 
worst shape, was razed for stone used to refurbish other buildings.42
Change of Tide: World War Two
 A number of factors came together during World War Two which brought 
an end to Arizona’s opposition to the Colorado River Compact of 1922 and started 
its battle for authorization of the Central Arizona Project.  The fi rst was the war 
itself.  World War Two generated a tremendous demand for food and fi ber raised 
in Arizona, resulting in an increase in agricultural production and a corresponding 
rise in water use.  Combined with the arrival of defense industries and workers 
into the state, Arizona experienced an increased demand for water.  The need for 
improved relations with Mexico, spurred by the war, started treaty negotiations 
in 1941 that resulted in an agreement on water use from the Colorado in 1944.
The election of Governor Sidney P. Osborn (who started the fi rst of his four 
consecutive terms in January of 1941) brought a mature political leader to the 
executive chair, one who understood that Arizona must change its tactics in order 
to move forward.43
 As one of his fi rst legislative efforts, Governor Osborn requested approval 
of a combined “Water and Power Authority” that could take charge of the state’s 
efforts to develop its resources.  In 1941 and again in 1943, during the 15th and 
16th Legislatures, Osborn asked for approval of this initiative but was refused 
768
each time.  In 1943 he received permission from the Legislature to create a State 
Land Department that would meet some of his goals for more centralized resource 
planning.44
 Also in 1943 Osborn persuaded the Legislature to give permission for 
a committee to negotiate a contract with the Secretary of the Interior for water 
from the Colorado River.  As a condition, the Legislature reserved its prerogative 
to approve the actions of the committee.  This fi rst step opened the door to a 
fi nal solution in 1944.  Governor Osborn convened a special session of the 16th 
Legislature on February 15, 1944, to consider the ratifi cation of the Compact 
and the authorization of a contract with the Secretary of the Interior for the 
use of Arizona’s 2.8 maf (million acre feet) designated in the Boulder Canyon 
Project Act.  The legislators responded, and by the end of the special session 
on February 24, 1944, had passed both measures.  In addition, the Sixteenth 
Legislature allocated $200,000 for use in a cooperative study with the Bureau of 
Reclamation to devise plans for bringing the water to Central Arizona.  Governor 
Osborn signed the measures ratifying the Compact and authorizing the contract 
on February 24, and “ended the most controversial issue in the state’s history, and 
marked the beginning of Arizona’s fi ght to put the waters of the Colorado River to 
benefi cial use.”45
Reclamation Service Arrives at Lee’s Ferry, 1946-1962
 The postwar period saw a renewed level of activity at the USGS 
compound.  In 1946 a survey crew from the Bureau of Reclamation arrived to 
investigate possible dam sites and rights-of-way associated with the proposed 
Central Arizona Project.  In 1947 the USGS turned Frank Dodge’s old 
residence—Spencer’s assay offi ce—into a new sediment laboratory.  That same 
year the Survey constructed a new hydrographer’s residence, measuring 18 by 30 
feet (demolished 1967).  The Survey followed this by constructing a new building 
for guest housing (USGS Residence) in May of 1950.  Many of the stones for the 
new buildings were salvaged from old Spencer buildings, contributing further to 
the deterioration of the mining legacy at the ferry.46
 The contract between the State of Arizona and the Bureau of Reclamation 
facilitated studies of potential routes to bring Colorado River water to Central 
Arizona.  The Bureau of Reclamation, spurred by the contribution of $200,000 
from Arizona into its study fund, turned its attention to examining plans for 
the project.  During the summer of 1944, U.S. Senator from Arizona Ernest 
McFarland chaired hearings on the Colorado.  On June 6, 1944, the Bureau issued 
a report which discussed the possibility of diverting water to Central Arizona.  
The Bureau continued to study the matter, trying to resolve a controversy over the 
route the water would take.47
 John T. Sanders made the fi rst Reclamation mark on Lee’s Ferry.  He 
arrived on March 21, 1946, and began to take stream fl ow measurements in 
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anticipation of constructing Glen Canyon Dam upstream from Lee’s Ferry.  On 
October 25, a large party of Bureau of Reclamation employees from the Salt Lake 
City offi ce arrived at Lee’s Ferry.  Their fi rst order of business was to improve 
the road from State Highway 89 to Lee’s Ferry.  Most of this work had been 
accomplished by November 7.48
 More Reclamation employees arrived in December of 1946.  They brought 
boats and barges to facilitate their work on Glen Canyon Dam.  Reclamation 
workers established a base camp at Lee’s Ferry.  Surveyors fanned out from Lee’s 
Ferry to begin the preliminary survey work for the new dam.  Workers drilled a 
well in January of 1947, and by the end of March the operation resembled a small 
city.49
 The studies convinced Reclamation offi cials that E. C. LaRue’s old plan 
of a large regulating dam at Glen Canyon was still a solid one.  It took additional 
work to convince politicians in Washington, D.C., and the West that it was a 
good idea.  The plan eventually reached fruition as the Colorado River Storage 
Project Act.  The measure passed Congress on March 28, 1956.  President Dwight 
Eisenhower signed it into law on April 11.
 President Eisenhower touched off the fi rst blasts signaling the start 
of construction of Glen Canyon Dam by telegraph from the Oval Offi ce on 
October 15, 1956.  The long-deferred dream of USGS Hydrographer E. C. LaRue 
was about to become reality under the auspices of the Bureau of Reclamation.
Construction of the dam, completed in 1966, resulted in the creation of Lake 
Powell, a water recreation wonderland.  Glen Canyon Dam also tamed the 
Colorado through the Grand Canyon, allowing for the development of a white 
water rafting industry headquartered at Lee’s Ferry.  The cold water released 
from the bottom of the dam turned out to be perfect for trout, resulting in the 
development of a stretch of world-class trout fi shing river at Lee’s Ferry.50
 In 1959 USGS personnel apparently burned at least one of the two 
cabins at the cable ferry site, and possibly both.  The burned cabin was the Frank 
Johnson Cabin, used by Johnson as a residence while he tended the ferry.  A 
second cabin, christened the “Louse House” by travelers who picked up some 
unwanted companions there, had already lost its wooden upper walls and roof by 
1959.  According to Crampton and Rusho in their 1965 report, “The cabins were 
burned by the U.S. Geological Survey for the alleged reason that the agency had 
neither the men nor the funds to police the buildings against an increasing number 
of careless tourists.”  C. Gregory Crampton photographed both structures on 
September 20, 1959, and reported that the Frank Johnson “Cabin had been burned 
and was still smoldering when visited.”51
 The Glen Canyon Dam construction project resulted in a number of 
scientifi c studies of the history and archaeology of the Glen Canyon region.  In 
June of 1960 C. Gregory Crampton of the University of Utah published his study 
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of historical sites in Glen Canyon from the mouth of the San Juan River to Lee’s 
Ferry.  These studies represented some of the fi rst professional historical work 
at Lee’s Ferry.  Unfortunately, due to the pressure of completing the studies in 
a short amount of time, errors crept into the text of these early reports that have 
confused the history of Lee’s Ferry to this day.52
The Consortium at Lonely Dell, 1964-1974
 In 1964 a group of investors decided to purchase the Lonely Dell Ranch 
property, the location of Lee’s original cabins on the Paria.  Known casually as 
“the consortium,” the group shared a vision of turning the place into a destination 
resort for vacationers.  Heading the group was Phoenix architect Denver “Dee” 
Evans and his wife Jean.  Evans, son of noted architect Robert F. Evans who 
had developed the Jokake Inn and the Paradise Inn in the Phoenix area, hoped 
to duplicate his father’s success with the construction of a resort at Lee’s Ferry.  
Included in the investment group was E. Reesman Fryer, descendant of Mormon 
immigrants who had crossed at the Ferry in the nineteenth century.  Fryer and his 
wife Ione had a different vision for the Lonely Dell Ranch, one of preservation of 
its rich heritage.53
 Five other individuals or married couples formed the consortium: Allen 
Luhrs and Alma Luhrs, John and Alta Luhrs (both couples doing business as 
Luhrs & Luhrs, a partnership), Robert L. and Charlotte Brown, Joseph Louis 
33.2.  Eugene C. LaRue’s dream of a Glen Canyon dam was fi nally realized in the 1960s.
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Refsnes, and Jack and Edythe Whiteman.  All were wealthy Phoenix residents.  
John and Alta Luhrs later sold their share to the partnership, which then created 
six undivided interests.
 According to historian H. Lee Scamehorn, the group acquired the property 
“to produce unadulterated seed.  The site was suffi ciently isolated that plants 
grown there would not be contaminated by vegetation from other agricultural 
lands.”  While this explanation seems plausible, it is more likely—given the 
interest of Evans and Fryer in history—that the property was acquired primarily 
for its historic attractions.  In 1987 Fryer described his labor of love:  “I replanted 
orchards and rebuilt ditches…I think I worked every bit as hard as John D. Lee 
and Warren Johnson ever did.”54
 The consortium made a large change in the landscape of the property.  On 
June 9, 1965, the new owners began construction of two large holding ponds 
into which Paria River water could be diverted and impounded.  These irrigation 
facilities served a large orchard of fruit trees that the owners planted south of 
ranch buildings.55
 According to historian Scamehorn, the consortium had a large amount of 
work to do.  Years of neglect and deferred maintenance left the Lonely Dell Ranch 
in poor condition.  Scamehorn observed:
Lee’s Ranch showed obvious signs in 1964 of advanced deterioration 
caused by prolonged neglect…The condition of the property demanded 
a heavy expenditure for what the partners called “salvage” operations…
The ranch buildings also needed extensive repairs.  The stone house 
[Weaver Ranch House] was described by the partners as “primitive.”  It 
had to be rebuilt, expanded, and modernized to make it habitable.  The 
so-called Lee cabin and other buildings required refurbishing.  Hand-split 
shingles were put on the cabins, and in other ways they were restored to 
the appearance they might have had in the 1880s.56
 The ambitious “salvage” program of the partners was cooled a bit in 
1967 when the National Park Service expressed an interest in acquiring the 
property.  The two sides, Park Service and partners, began extended discussion 
about acquiring the Lonely Dell Ranch property.  The main sticking point in the 
discussions was price.  Events reached a climax in 1971 when the Park Service 
fi led suit to condemn the property.  This lawsuit was dismissed on a technicality in 
1973, opening the way for renewed negotiations.57
National Park Service at the Ferry Site, 1962-1974
 In 1962 the National Park Service took over administrative control of 
the Lee’s Ferry property from the USGS.  However, USGS stream gaging work 
continued.  The NPS presence began with periodic ranger patrols to the site 
approximately once per week.  Permanent duty began on May 19, 1963, with 
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the appointment of Ed Mazzer as the Sub-District ranger.  Improvements which 
accompanied permanent status were the installation of two trailers, one of which 
served as the Ranger’s residence and the second as the Ranger’s Offi ce.  That 
same year the Park Service constructed a new bridge across the Paria River, 
ensuring better access to the Lee’s Ferry site.58
 The acquisition of the old ferry site by the Park Service led to increased 
development for recreational use.  It also led to additional historical investigations 
and the fi rst steps toward preservation of the historical buildings at the site.  On 
October 6, 1964, NPS Ranger Phil Martin and historian P. T. Reilly conducted a 
survey of the stone buildings at Lee’s Ferry.59
 The Park Service then issued a contract to historians C. Gregory Crampton 
and W. L. Rusho to examine the historic buildings at Lee’s Ferry.  The two men 
undertook a fi eld visit to the site on December 10 and 11, 1964.  The two scholars 
completed the report in January of 1965, noting:
It should be stressed that this paper has been put together quickly to meet 
an early deadline and it is therefore not complete in factual detail nor 
is it a work of thorough-going scholarship which would have required 
a longer time to produce.  Indeed, the history of Lee’s Ferry is amply 
signifi cant to justify a complete and scholarly study.60
 In October of 1965 the Park Service sponsored additional research at Lee’s 
Ferry.  Architect Walter A. Gathman and draftsman Donald A. Krueger, working 
for the Park Service’s Division of History Studies, surveyed the 1874 Fort at Lee’s 
Ferry.  On the basis of the Crampton and Rusho report, Park Service offi cials felt 
that the Fort was the most signifi cant building in the old Ferry area.61
 In March of 1966 the Park Service took action on the studies.  After NPS 
regional historian Bill Brown examined the Fort in person, the Park Service 
undertook a stabilization treatment.  Under the direction of HABS architect 
Charles Pope, workers sprayed the interior wooden features of the Fort with an 
epoxy preservative.62
 Differences between the Park Service and the USGS over the future of the 
property led to an unfortunate incident in 1967.  On February 7 and 8, 1967, the 
USGS demolished nearly all of the remaining Spencer buildings at the Ferry site.
Both the Park Service and the USGS failed to provide an adequate explanation 
for the destruction.  As best as can be surmised, the Park Service and the USGS 
felt that the Spencer buildings lacked historical signifi cance.  However, William 
E. Brown, NPS Regional Historian for the Southwest Region based in Santa Fe, 
admitted that:
Review of the record on the Spencer Buildings indicates that it 
would be less than candid to avoid a conclusion that a mistake 
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may have been made.  If so—let it be noted—it was one of 
omission, not of commission.63
 In the fall of 1967 the Park Service returned to address the remaining 
historic buildings at Lee’s Ferry in a more positive manner.  The condition of the 
north wall of the American Placer Corporation Offi ce had deteriorated to such a 
point that immediate stabilization work was needed.  Roland Richert of the NPS 
Ruins Stabilization Unit examined the building on August 30, 1967.  Richert 
returned to Lee’s Ferry and between September 18 and 22, worked with skilled 
mason Willie Yazzie.64
 NPS personnel returned to Lee’s Ferry in 1969 to complete the job of 
historic building documentation begun in 1965.  During the intervening years, 
many of the Spencer Buildings had been demolished by the 1967 action, leaving 
representatives of the Division of Historic Architecture, part of the Offi ce of 
Archaeology and Historic Preservation, to document the remaining buildings.
These included the American Placer Corporation Offi ce, the Chicken Coop, the 
Lee’s Ferry Fort Root Cellar, and the Spencer Bunkhouse.65
 While history continued to be a big draw for tourists at Lee’s Ferry, 
the introduction of trout into the now-frigid waters of the Colorado River that 
emerged from the depths of Glen Canyon Dam began to lure increasing numbers 
of tourists starting in the sixties.  Many fi shed from the banks at the river’s edge, 
while others ventured forth in boats.  Still others eschewed fi shing entirely.  Lee’s 
Ferry developed into the prime point of embarkation for raft trips through the 
Grand Canyon.  By 1969, more than 3,000 people were making the river run 
through the Grand Canyon each year.  The change even captured the attention 
of a writer for the New York Times, who described the bustling scene in 1969 as 
follows:
A lively, year-round outdoor recreation center has sprung up at this 
scenic and history-saturated spot in the shadow of the Vermillion Cliffs.  
The development, situated along the Colorado River at the northern 
end of the newly created Marble Canyon National Monument, consists 
of a motel, a store, a service station and a marina alongside the river 
and a 28-unit public campground on a bluff nearby.  The campground 
is operated by the National Park Service, and is complete with roofed 
shelters, tables, fi repits, trailer turnouts and toilet facilities.66
National Park Service at Lee’s Ferry and Lonely Dell Ranch, 
1974-present
 The National Park Service consolidated its ownership of Lee’s Ferry and 
the Lonely Dell Ranch in 1974 when it acquired the interest of the consortium in 
the ranch property.  This acquisition resulted in full Federal control of the area.  It 
is also signifi cant as the fi rst time since 1909 that both properties had been in the 
same ownership.67
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 In 1976, in conjunction with the Nation’s bicentennial and in preparation 
for rehabilitation work at the property, the Park Service undertook several 
examinations of the property.  This included an environmental assessment of 
improvements to the roads, boat ramps, parking lots, and proposed raft boarding 
jetty.  The Park Service issued the assessment in January of 1976.  In March the 
Park Service forwarded a completed National Register nomination of the Lee’s 
Ferry portion of the property to offi cials in Washington, D.C.  The National 
Register accepted the nomination on May 15, 1976.68
 Later in the year, the Park Service contracted with University of Colorado 
historian H. Lee Scamehorn to prepare a historic structure report for the combined 
property.  Scamehorn completed his report in August of 1976.  The Scamehorn 
report is valuable for its detailed analysis of events leading to the purchase of the 
property from the consortium.  However, the report’s description of buildings at 
the Lonely Dell Ranch portion of the property contained several errors.  These 
errors were repeated in later works.  Scamehorn noted that questions have been 
raised about the authenticity of the claims that buildings on the ranch were 
constructed by Lee, but he did not offer a defi nitive conclusion.69
 The historic structure report paved the way for Park Service improvements 
to the property in 1976-1977.  Additional rehabilitation work took place in 1983 
and 1984.  In 1986 the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit of the National Park 
Service began investigations of the Spencer mining era historic features at Lee’s 
Ferry.70
 The project resulted in a report published in 1987 that documented both 
the vessel and the mining remains.  While the report is an excellent and detailed 
account of the Spencer operation, the authors noted that “much of the physical 
evidence of an important chapter in regional history was removed with the 
structures” during the 1967 destruction of the Spencer buildings by the USGS.71
 The historical evaluation program of the 1990s ended with the completion 
of a revised National Register of Historic Places nomination in July of 1997.
Prepared under the direction of Ann Hubber of Historical Research Associates in 
Missoula, Montana, the 1997 nomination was an attempt to reorganize and correct 
the two previous National Register nominations, completed in 1976 for Lee’s 
Ferry and in 1978 for the Lonely Dell Ranch.72
 Today, visitors to Lee’s Ferry are struck with the isolation and desolation 
of the area.  While a thin veneer of civilization has been applied in the form of 
improved roads and tourist facilities, even those who arrive in modern motor 
homes and automobiles recognize the sacrifi ce made by the pioneers who arrived 
in wagons to cross the mighty Colorado.  The buildings that remain at Lee’s 
Ferry and the Lonely Dell Ranch offer mute testimony to that earlier era, an era 
in which pioneers and settlers clung closely to life at this crucial transportation 
outpost.  Above all, visitors are reminded that it is the Colorado River that 
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made Lee’s Ferry such a needed link in the development of Arizona.  The river 
today still retains some degree of its menacing quality, captured in the words of 
historian Sharlot Hall during her 1911 visit:
This wild river takes its toll every few months; the very waves as they 
pass look fi erce and tameless and hungry…It was this same wild current 
that Father Escalante feared to cross in 1776; he turned back after 
coming down and riding into the river twice.  I don’t blame him.  Death 
sits mighty close to the bank here.73
 Established as a refuge from Federal authorities for exile John D. Lee, 
Lee’s Ferry is now the physical and spiritual center of the Federal contribution 
to western water history.  As scholars look back on the centennial of the Bureau 
of Reclamation, an examination of the history of Lee’s Ferry and the turf battle 
between the Bureau and the USGS over the future development of the Colorado 
River gives us a better understanding of the mission of the two agencies.  The past 
activity at Lee’s Ferry provides a valuable perspective for westerners concerned 
with the next hundred years of water history.
Dr. Douglas E. Kupel works for the City of Phoenix Law Department where 
he does research in support of water rights and environmental litigation.  He 
is the author of Fuel for Growth: Water and Arizona’s Urban Environment
(Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2003.), and he is active in the history 
community as a speaker and program participant.
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Memoirs of a Bureau Curmudgeon:  Unabridged 
Version—Politically Incorrect
By:
 Thomas J. Aiken
 A book has been written and Hollywood has made a movie about a 
family’s history where central to the story is the reverence a father and his sons 
have for fl y fi shing in a western river.  It is titled, A River Runs Through It.  I grew 
up during the fi fties and my father and I held the same reverence for fl y fi shing on 
the Gunnison River in Western Colorado.  Our personal paradise extended from 
the western edge of the Gunnison River Canyon near the mouth of Steuben Creek 
to the bridge that led to Iola, which I think was a remnant of a coaling station for 
the old narrow gauge railroad long since abandoned.  The River was lined with 
tall willow and cottonwood trees as it meandered through a vast hay meadow.  
Riffl es were full of rainbow trout and slow deep holes were full of lunker German 
browns just waiting for the perfect presentation of a white winged royal coachman 
or ginger quill dry fl y.   The rolling river and the willow brush and grasses on the 
bank created an aroma that was intoxicating, I could not imagine anything more 
wondrous or beautiful, there was no place else on earth I would rather be. 
 Then something terrible happened.   This paradise began to fall to the 
woodman’s axe in 1960 as a government agency cleared the area for a large 
reservoir.  Reservoir?  What kind of no account fi shing would that be?   Flat 
water—oh, puleeze!  I was to learn that this diabolical agency’s name was the 
Bureau of Reclamation.  What did that mean?  Reclamation of what?  It was 
destroying paradise, not reclaiming it!  It was an outrage!  I vowed that some how, 
some way, some day, I would even the score.
 As a business major at Colorado State University (CSU) a few years 
later, I was in need of another economics class.  Without any conscious thought 
I found myself in “Water Resource Economics E-201.”  At the bookstore I recall 
thumbing through the book recommended for the course and there before my very 
eyes was that despicable name once again “Bureau of Reclamation.”  What have 
I done?  Now I have to spend three months reading about the “Bureau of Wreck 
the Nation”!  But wait just a minute, on second thought, this might be good.
Better to know something about the despoiler than remain ignorant of it and its 
evil ways.  While I did gain some knowledge of the importance of this agency to 
the economic growth and well being of the Western United States, not to mention 
how to calculate a benefi t cost ratio, I could not begin to forgive it nor think kind 
thoughts about it.
 After college and a stint in the Army, I was back home in Colorado 
Springs working as an accountant for the City Utilities, but looking for a better 
job, one offering more challenge and excitement (okay one offering more pay and 
earlier retirement).  I took the old Federal Service Entrance Exam one cold spring 
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day and later found my scores were high enough to qualify me for employment at 
the GS-5 and GS-7 levels.  I sat back waiting for the job offers to roll in.  I waited 
and waited and waited, fi nally giving up, concluding a Federal job was not in 
my future (believe it or not, in those days a Federal job was a coveted prize and 
people respected Federal employees).  Then one late summer day (a dog day of 
August as it were), three job offers arrived in the mail.  How exciting!  Ripping 
into the envelopes, the fi rst offer was for a GS-5 in the Army Material Command, 
Texarkana, Texas (yeah right!—Army—Texarkana???), the next was for a GS-5 
with the National Park Service in the Grand Canyon (Hmm …), the last was, oh 
no!…a thousand times no! … the enemy, despoiler of paradise, the disgusting 
Bureau of Reclamation.  But wait, what is this? … a GS-7? … in Denver? … a 
few miles north …Hmm …  My practical intuitions were kicking in.  It was more 
money and since in those days the government did not pay for your fi rst move, it 
would cost less to move to Denver than say the Grand Canyon (where do you live 
at anyway in Grand Canyon? … a lodge miles from anywhere? … a rickety cabin 
on the edge of the canyon?).
 The interview took place in 
an offi ce on the fourteenth fl oor of 
a brand new fourteen story gray 
concrete building west of Denver, 
the one that still sticks out like a 
sore thumb.  Bill Schlichting and 
Dale Raitt, the two Branch Chiefs 
in the Program Coordination 
Division, conducted the interview.  
Expecting heinous ogres I was 
on my best defenses, but hey, 
these were regular, normal guys!  
(Well, Raitt was an engineer …).  
Anyway, the job was for a budget 
analyst reporting to Schlichting.
It seemed like something I could 
handle.  Besides, I reasoned 
that once inside I could seek my 
revenge.  I really, really wanted 
that job now!
 The call from Schlichting came early in September.  The job was mine and 
Bill’s question to me was when could I report?  I quickly thought—two weeks 
notice to the City Utilities and, most importantly, a week for my dad and I to 
make our annual fall trip to the mighty Gunnison.  Yes, paradise was lost, but we 
had found another location upstream at a collection of rustic cabins called Sleepy 
Hollow.  It wasn’t the same, but it wasn’t bad, and the fi shing was good.  We 
could not bear nor force ourselves to even drive down to see paradise lost, now 
lying under a body of fl at water called Blue Mesa Reservoir.
30.1.  Building 67 on the Denver Federal 
Center was completed about the same time that 
 Tom Aiken reported to work at the Bureau of 
Reclamation.
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 On October 2, 1967, I embarked on a career that I didn’t comprehend for 
one minute would span more than one third of Reclamation’s fi rst one hundred 
years of history.  Throughout those many years (that moved far too quickly), I’ve 
been excited, bored, frustrated, angry, happy, satisfi ed, dissatisfi ed, but most of all, 
continually mesmerized by the day to day happenings of the United States Bureau 
of Reclamation.  The following is an account of the names, places and events as 
I recollect and interpret them to be.  Whether history agrees or not doesn’t really 
matter to me, this is how I saw it and lived it.  I use “Reclamation” and “The 
Bureau” interchangeably because I always have and at my advanced age, I feel 
I’m entitled.
 If I could have scripted my career, I could not have arranged for a greater 
start or fi rst boss than  Bill Schlichting.  He was one of the most honorable and 
forthright people I have ever met, and he had a genuine interest in getting me 
off on the right path in Reclamation.  He remained a very good friend until 
his untimely death.  I was the new kid on the block in an offi ce of fi ve budget 
analysts.  In addition to Bill, there was Rudy Mezner, Bob Cope and Tom 
Bumgartner.  The rest of the Program Coordination Division, located on the other 
side of Division Chief George Powell’s offi ce, were the program analysts; Dale 
Raitt, Bill Hilmes, J. R. Smith, Harry Menzel, John Childress, Jim Moomaw, 
Denby Peeples, and Bill Wiley to name a few.  As I mentioned, the offi ces were 
in the top fl oor of the new building, the fl oors were shiny tile, carpeting was 
only allowed on “Mahogany Row” (top management), the desks were gray 
steel and only the big cheeses had offi ces, the rest of us were in an open bullpen 
arrangement–probably accounting for my total lack of sympathy for those later in 
my career who bemoaned the onset of systems furniture and cubicles as opposed 
to walled offi ces.  As an interesting aside, Congress authorized and appropriated 
$6 million to The Bureau to construct this new building.  After moving in, 
someone (no doubt a Harvard grad) decided Reclamation should turn it over to 
the  General Services Administration (GSA) to manage.  GSA promptly began to 
charge The Bureau $2 million annual rent.  This may explain why Harvard has 
more prestige than CSU because I haven’t yet fi gured out why this was good 
for the taxpayers or the farmers and power customers who repay most of what 
Reclamation spends.
 Mezner, Cope, Bumgartner, and particularly Wiley were the fi rst bonafi de 
curmudgeons I met in The Bureau (a curmudgeon is an irascible cantankerous 
old goat who has tremendous knowledge about the organization, who gets very 
irritated at those who only think they know everything and who will be damned 
if they will share this knowledge unless you pay proper homage and appreciate 
that knowledge).  In all of my experience, I have never seen a more concentrated 
collection of curmudgeons and reprobates in one location.  But they were just 
as critical to my early education as was the formal and “on the job” training 
Schlichting was providing.
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 I didn’t, of course, recognize it then, but it was the last of the “glory years” 
of Reclamation.  We were truly the shining knights on the white horses.  We 
walked with a swagger that would make John Wayne proud (stone-cold Steve 
Austin for those too young to remember John Wayne).  Our constituency, the 
water and power users, loved us as we kept providing them with bigger and better 
facilities.  We kept spreading the cost of these facilities over more and more years. 
Water and power were cheap and plentiful.  All was right with the world.  A new 
kid on the block could not be in a more central and advantageous place for an 
education than in the budget shop, wedged in “Mahogany Row” on the fourteenth 
fl oor of the most respected engineering organization in the world, bar none. 
 As I embarked on this government career, my only source of knowledge 
about government was the tidbit that stuck in my pea brain from Mr. Heidtsmith’s 
9th grade Civics class at good ol’ North Junior High School in Colorado 
Springs.  I remembered there were three branches of government, the executive, 
legislative, and judicial.  Further, there were two Senators from each State and 
a bunch of Congressmen and they made up the legislative branch who made up 
the laws.  The President was the executive and he had a bunch of people helping 
him called the Cabinet and they carried out the laws and ran the government.
Finally, there was a bunch of judges called the Supreme Court who interpreted 
the Constitution and laws.  Pretty good, huh!  Well, soon enough I learned that 
things aren’t exactly as they are laid out by academia.  There is a dynamic called 
politics that tends to shape, warp, and distort.  This is something that has been and 
will continue to be a tremendous infl uential force on the policy and day to day 
activities of Reclamation.  In those days The Bureau seemed to me to be more 
of an agency of the Legislative Branch than of the Executive Branch.  I learned 
the names of the powerful water bloc in Congress—Senators Carl Hayden and 
Alan Bible and Congressmen Wayne Aspinall, “Bizz” Johnson, Berne Sisk, 
and John Moss, long before I knew 
who the Secretary of the Interior was.
Commissioner Floyd Dominy seemed 
way more dialed into the powerful 
Congressional water bloc than he 
was anyone in the Executive Branch, 
particularly Interior Secretary Stuart Udall.  
The fi rst Secretary I actually met was 
 Rogers Morton.  One day, unannounced, he 
walked into our offi ce and shook my hand.  
I was stunned.  First of all that it happened 
to a lowly new kid on the block (my desk 
being nearest the door might have had 
something to do with it) and secondly by 
the size of his hand, it engulfed mine and 
made all two hundred and twenty pounds of 
me feel downright dainty, it was one huge 
hand!  I have since met and shook hands 
30.2.  Offi cial Portrait of Secretary of 
the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton.
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with every Interior Secretary until Bruce Babbitt, who ironically has held the 
offi ce longest.  Our paths just never crossed.
 Those were heady days, days of bigger than life people conceiving 
bigger than life projects—the world’s largest double curved thin arch dam, the 
California undersea aqueduct (taking fresh water entering San Francisco Bay and 
piping it undersea to Los Angeles) controlling the very weather itself, Project 
Skywater—to name just a few.  Floyd Dominy was the Commissioner and was, 
in fact, a legend in his own time.  Enough has been written about his prowess 
and importance to The Bureau on the political front.  Equally important and 
in some sense more important was the person overseeing the technical front, 
Chief Engineer  Barney Bellport.  One day very soon after I started my career, 
happenstance found me getting on the elevator after lunch—followed by (gulp!) 
“Mahogany Row.”  I watched Bellport, his deputy  Harold Arthur,  Jack Hilf, 
overseer of design and construction, and Hank Halliday the business manager 
step in behind me.  My instinct was to bolt out and catch another elevator—too 
late the door had closed.  By the time we reached the fourteenth fl oor, there was 
absolutely no doubt in my mind as to who was in charge.  Bellport was mightily 
displeased with those present and spent the entire ride climbing up one side and 
down the other of their collective frame.  I wanted to disappear into thin air, turn 
into a bug and crawl out, become invisible, be anywhere but there.  In reality, 
my presence was probably only noticed by me.  Participative management and 
employee input were concepts whose time had not yet come.
 In simplest of  terms, the function, budget and organization of The Bureau 
followed a very logical process in those days.  Projects were conceived, triggering 
a planning process that took the idea through a reconnaissance investigation, 
appraisal study and, in the early days, a basin survey.  This early work was 
done by planning offi ces that were funded through the General Investigation 
appropriation.  Generally, the next step would be to provide this information 
to the Congress, and if they authorized the project, a Feasibility and Defi nite-
plan Report were prepared and construction was started with the funding of the 
Construction and Rehabilitation appropriation.  At completion of construction, 
the project was brought on line and an operation and maintenance offi ce was set 
up.  All future funding would then be through the Operation and Maintenance 
appropriation.  It was interesting that funds for the General Investigation and 
Construction and Rehabilitation appropriations were much easier to come by 
than for the Operation and Maintenance appropriation.  Why?  Politics.  The local 
Congressman could brag to his/her constituency about this new project he/she is 
delivering to them.  There isn’t much glamour or glitz in maintaining something 
that already exists.  Ho hum.
 Working in the budget shop in the Chief Engineer’s offi ce allowed me 
to see and learn about virtually every thing that was going on in The Bureau, 
something that paid off in later years as I left new kid status and gained rising 
star status moving up the food chain to bigger and better jobs.  One issue that 
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became more and more apparent to me was that the Chief Engineer’s offi ce was 
over staffed even considering the large workload.  This was, of course, no secret 
to most, but it certainly wasn’t discussed by the curmudgeons gathered at the 
coffee urn every morning as they whined about their condition in life and longed 
for the good old days.  Being the outspoken and inquiring minded person I’ve 
always been (smart aleck), I once asked my curmudgeon educators, “If you are 
so miserable, why don’t you retire?”   Ashen silent faces, the new kid had uttered 
the forbidden “R” word.  That part of my education soon enough dried up.  What 
was happening, however, was The Bureau was starting to feel a pinch brought on 
by a once incredibly large staff resulting from the post World War II repatriation 
program (provide jobs for the returning GIs) and a more scrutinized budget, 
ironically because of the ongoing Vietnam War.  Thus, the stage was set for a 
defi ning moment in my career and the decade that changed Reclamation forever.
 By the early 1970s things were becoming more and more clear to me.  In 
spite of the tremendous knowledge about The Bureau working on the budget 
afforded me, it was becoming routine and boring.  Every year same old thing 
just different numbers.  The bread and butter part of my duties was to put out a 
monthly  budget summary report to the Commissioner’s offi ce and to put together 
another quarter inch thick budget report for all the big and medium cheeses in 
the Denver offi ce.  Once, while on a detail to the Commissioner’s offi ce (getting 
all of $8 a day per diem), I looked into what happened to the report I sent back 
there each and every month.  What I found didn’t surprise me.  The budget 
secretary received it and fi led it, nobody used or even looked at it.  I related this to 
Schlichting and asked if I could prepare it but not send it for a couple of months 
to see if anyone noticed.  He agreed.  We never heard a word, not even from the 
secretary.  I quit preparing it.  A unique survey method came to my mind for the 
other report.  I would occasionally selectively slip an interesting  article from the 
pages of Playboy into one or two of the reports sent to the medium cheeses whom 
I suspected might discretely enjoy reading.  I never heard a single comment and, 
believe me, some of the articles were really interesting, not to mention really 
big.  My conclusion was that this report got limited review.  I never related this to 
Schlichting and continued to crank out the report.  Now, I would not recommend 
this survey method today, but if someone is so inspired, I would strongly suggest 
articles from Field and Stream magazine.  Many things were swirling in my 
head, the curmudgeons who were eligible to retire had no intention to do so, 
thus slowing any advancement possibilities, the most important aspect of my job 
was of little interest to anyone, and intuition told me that those denizens I saw 
scuttling to and fro in the hallways carrying stacks and stacks of computer punch 
cards would soon enough fi gure out how to replace me, my one hundred key 
Marchant calculator (WWII surplus), and ten key adding machine (Korean War 
surplus).  Where did Personnel keep the vacancy announcements?
 Before moving on, it would be fi tting to show the character of some of 
the aforementioned curmudgeons.  I’ll start with  Rudy Mezner.  Rudy was one 
of those people who was a lot older than they look.  He had worked for The 
785
Bureau since long before WWII and his defi ning characteristic was his dapper 
look.  Rudy was about 5’ 5” and always dressed in various tailored pin striped 
suits with monogrammed shirts and a fedora, something on the order of a James 
Cagney gangster.  In those days everyone wore coat and tie, but most came 
out of the Sears catalog or the rack at J. C. Penney’s—government pay being 
what it was (is?).   Bob Cope and  Tom Bumgartner were WWII vets with stories 
to tell.  Bob was on a mine sweeper that sank outside San Francisco Bay, and 
Tom was a bombardier on a B-17 stationed in England.   Bill Wiley was a gruff 
old codger with a black patch over one eye, I pretty much steered clear of him.
 Denby Peeples was one of the more interesting of the bunch.  He was probably 
at or near seventy years old and as one of the senior analysts, he had a coveted, 
newfangled, mechanical Friden calculator.  Somehow, Denby had fi gured out the 
right combination of numbers and the right formula that when he triggered the 
calculation, the Friden churned out a tune one could dance to.  John Childress was 
a pipe smoker who started more than one fi re in waste baskets with his discarded 
match.   Bill Hilmes kept the fi re extinguisher between their desks.  Bizarre folks 
were all around the building.  The curmudgeons used to talk about one of the 
engineers who dyed his hair with shoe polish or lamp black.  I was later to bear 
witness to this fact when one rainy day I was on a crowded elevator standing 
directly behind this person, watching inky black rivulets fl owing off the back of 
his head and down his erstwhile white collar.  There was another gent who wore 
fuzzy earmuffs because he didn’t like sound when he worked.  I ought to write a 
book about the characters I’ve run across in The Bureau.
  Ed Hawk, perhaps the most notorious and mysterious of all the 
curmudgeons deserves his own paragraph.  Even though I never met Ed, it was 
obvious that he carried considerable weight, because I saw his name in several 
letters as head of various committees—the Ed Hawk Committee.  I was later to 
learn that Ed was a fi gment created by that now piece of Americana called the 
Steno-Pool.  In those days most of the correspondence was dictated on recording 
machines and sent to the pool for typing.  Ed’s real name was “ad hoc.”  In 
retrospect, it was amazing how many letters were surnamed and signed without 
being read.  Another piece of correspondence that was signed and sent out made 
reference to “the source of the scriptures.”  What the author intended to say was 
“thesaurus of descriptors.”  The letter made for some interesting reading.
 One more side track and I promise to move on.  Earlier I alluded to the 
$8  daily per diem, let me explain.  In those days the bureaucracy was incredibly 
miserly.  The per diem rates were on a sliding scale that reduced the amount 
allowed the longer you were in detail status.  I don’t remember exactly what 
the rates were when I started that particular detail in Washington, probably 
around $20, but I do remember the $8 I was paid during the last couple of weeks 
of this training detail in the Commissioner’s Offi ce.  I stayed in the old Park 
Central Hotel, it was closest to the Interior building and, for D.C., the rates were 
reasonable (something in the range of $20).  Old timers reading this may recall 
the Park Central.  After the fi rst couple weeks you were on fi rst name basis with 
786
the mice and roaches that shared your room.  There was no air conditioning, but 
the window did open.  Mine had a nice view of a dirty brick wall about ten feet 
away.  The risk you ran opening the window was letting the rats in with the cooler 
air.  My mice and roach friends did not appreciate sharing the room with rats, so I 
left the window closed most of the time.  Another point to be made on the miserly 
scale had to do with vehicles.  In those days government vehicles were strictly no 
frills; no radio, no air conditioning.  A motor, four wheels and a steering wheel 
was about it.  It wasn’t until the ‘70s that radios and air conditioning started to 
show up on vehicles.
 In 1972 a GS-12 Administrative Offi cer position in the  Durango Planning 
Offi ce was advertised.  Max Stodolski, a friend of mine, had just recently 
transferred there and a quick call to him convinced me to apply.  When I went 
for the interview with Project Manager Ed Wiscombe, I was armed with budget 
knowledge of the projects they were studying: San Miguel, Dolores, Paradox 
Valley, and Animas-La Plata.  It must have helped because Ed offered me the job.  
I reported to Durango, Colorado, in September.  My star was on the rise.  As a 
footnote, I should mention my Denver job was abolished after I left (keep track 
of this).  While I was still back in Denver, I was vaguely aware of a law that had 
recently been passed called the  National Environmental Policy Act which meant 
little to me at the time, but in Durango it was brought up in conversations in staff 
meeting on a regular basis.  It didn’t appear to me, or many others at the time, that 
it was that big a deal.  A few more papers to prepare and fi le.  Other events that 
didn’t seem terribly signifi cant at the time were also occurring.   Ellis Armstrong 
became Commissioner, and according to the curmudgeons, there was bad blood 
between him and Bellport.   Bellport retired, moved to California and hung out 
his consultant’s shingle.  The Chief Engineer’s offi ce became the  Engineering 
and Research Center (ERC) and  Harold Arthur assumed the helm.  Soon after, 
Arthur named  Donald Duck as his deputy.  I kid you not.  Donald was married to 
Dolores and, to my knowledge, they did not have nephews named Huey, Dewey 
or Louie.  Shortly after my arrival in Durango, the ERC was in the middle of a 
reorganization that saw the fi rst postwar brain drain as its numbers were reduced.  
Many of the curmudgeons could no longer not think about nor not utter the “R” 
word.  Many reluctantly embraced it.  On another front, the members of the 
water bloc in Congress began to retire or lose elections and our legislative power 
base began to erode.  In 1973 another law was passed that caused the planners 
to scratch their heads, it was called the  Endangered Species Act.  What did it 
mean?  How does it relate to that other law?  What does it mean consult with the 
Secretary?  Sounds like more paperwork—job security for the planners. 
 At this point I have to digress to tell you about one man’s hog heaven.  
The Animas River fl ows right through Durango, it looks to be a clone of the 
Gunnison AND the then State record German brown trout had been caught under 
the Main Street bridge.  With nostrils fl ared and fl y rod in hand I began to fi sh and 
catch fi sh—all the while eyeing the prime stretch south of town.  I was aware I 
was looking at the Southern Ute Indian Reservation lands, and since I never saw 
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anyone fi shing there, I assumed it was not allowed.  Imagine my elation when I 
found out that for fi ve bucks you could get an annual reservation pass, imagine 
further my pure bliss that, for reasons I never fi gured out, nobody did.  I was truly 
in hog heaven for the two years I lived in Durango.  For all intents and purposes 
I had a private fi shing preserve for a measly fi ve bucks!  The fi shing was the best 
I have ever experienced and I never saw another living being, except my dad 
and a few deer, the whole time I fi shed there.  Hog heaven was to last only two 
years, however.  In the fall of 1974 a decision was reached to consolidate the 
Durango and Grand Junction offi ces.  My position was to be abolished and I was 
to be transferred to Grand Junction as the Budget Offi cer—Enos Stone was the 
Administrative Offi cer there and he had about thirty years seniority on me.
 Where did we keep the vacancy announcements?
 One more story, if it survives the editors cut.  While in Durango, I was 
driving a senior Reclamation manager for a visit to Navajo Dam to investigate a 
pesky leak that had developed in the abutment.  He was a rotund and stoic man of 
little humor and few words.  As we started to leave for the drive back, he shouted 
“STOP!”  Startled to hear his voice, I slammed on the brakes and watched him 
slide forward to become tightly wedged between the seat and the dash.  As he 
dropped off the seat, he … ah … broke wind with a sonic resonance that would 
make an Arabian stallion proud.  I ran around, opened his door and tugged on his 
shoulders until he popped out and landed on the berm of the road.  With all the 
dignity he could muster, he stood up, picked up his sunglasses from the fl oor (the 
reason he wanted me to stop in the fi rst place) and got back in the car.  I had my 
upper lip clenched tightly between my teeth to maintain composure on the long 
drive back.
 Timing and, in the case of rising stars, contacts and mentors are 
everything.  A GS-13 Administrative Offi cer position was open in  Auburn, 
California, at the construction offi ce for what was to be the world’s largest double 
curvature thin arch dam.  I called two people I knew from Denver who were now 
in the Sacramento Mid-Pacifi c regional offi ce, Paul Olbert and Hank Masterson.  
Paul was the Assistant Regional Director for Administration and Hank was a 
branch chief in Personnel; they both suggested I apply.  The interview took 
place with Project Construction Engineer  Don Alexander and, still armed with 
the  knowledge about Auburn Dam I had gained in the budget offi ce, I was able 
to convince him that I was the man for the job—I suspect with some help from 
Olbert and Masterson.  I reported for duty the week between Christmas and New 
Years in 1974.  What a contrast with the genteel and studious ways of a planning 
offi ce.  I was now in the world of clod kicking, hard hat wearing he-men smoking 
cigars the size of which would downright impress a Presidential Intern.   Gaylord 
Hay was the soft-spoken Offi ce Engineer,  Rod Somerday was the outspoken Field 
Engineer, and  Lou Frei was the ranting Project Geologist.  One of the interesting 
things to observe was the jockeying for position between Lou and Rod to be the 
“daddy rabbit” for construction operations.  Many Auburn employees went on to 
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hold important jobs in The Bureau, mainly in Denver and on the Central Arizona 
Project.
  Auburn Dam’s Environmental Impact Statement was one of the fi rst 
prepared and the fi rst challenged for adequacy.  After a rewrite, a judge declared 
it adequate and, in 1974, work on the massive foundation began.  In August 1975 
an earthquake occurred some forty or fi fty miles north of Auburn that brought into 
question the seismic safety of the dam being built.  A massive seismic/geological 
investigation began.  Then, less than one year later, the defi ning moment for The 
Bureau occurred in Idaho at about 7:45 A.M. June 5, 1976, when a survey party 
noticed a small leak near the right abutment of a newly constructed dam on the 
Teton River.  By noon the crest had collapsed and the embankment was breached.  
Reclamation’s swagger turned into a stagger, and we started to second guess 
ourselves on everything, including Auburn Dam.  Our confi dence was rocked.  
To compound the Auburn situation, President Carter, soon after coming to offi ce, 
listed Auburn on his “Hit List” of water projects he felt were unneeded.  Further 
construction contracts were put on hold.  Hit lists, seismic investigations, no new 
contracts—where are the vacancy announcements?
 I should mention that the 1976 Carter/Ford presidential campaign was 
the fi rst in my memory (and the fi rst of many to come) where the candidates 
openly attacked the bureaucracy, in many instances placing blame for the woes 
of the world on the Federal employee’s back and painting us as underworked 
and overpaid slow moving sloths.  We unfairly lost prestige that we have never 
recovered.  The Carter Administration was the fi rst in my experience to place 
a pure political appointee with no prior Reclamation experience in the role of 
Commissioner, the former State Engineer in Idaho, Keith Higginson.  Although 
it only lasted the length of his Administration, Carter also gave us a new name, 
“ Water and Power Resources Service” which to me made eminent sense then and 
now as being a more contemporary, descriptive name for Reclamation–unless 
anyone wants to argue that we are reclaiming the environment from the family 
farm (is that a snicker I hear?).  One other thing Carter did that has had a role in 
reshaping The Bureau was to form the Department of Energy (DOE) and transfer 
the power distribution and marketing function from Reclamation to the newly 
formed  Western Area Power Administration.  What were regional divisions 
under Reclamation became virtual dynasties with fi efdoms spread far and wide 
under DOE.  Many in Congress continue to question the wisdom of that action.
Commissioner Higginson began the shift in Reclamation’s public policy by 
placing more emphasis on environmental protection, economic justifi cation and 
dam safety.  Auburn survived the “Hit List,” but Carter did not survive his bid for 
reelection.  Some say his attempt to eliminate or curtail the Congressional pork 
barrel system (Hit List) undermined the effectiveness of his Presidency.  At any 
rate, as the Carter Administration left offi ce they declared that a safe dam could 
be built at Auburn, but no new construction contracts were to be let until new fl ow 
standards on the lower American River were addressed.
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 The  Mid-Pacifi c Region GS-14 Program Coordination Division Chief’s 
vacancy announcement hit the streets in the fall of 1978.  The position reported 
to Paul Olbert and I was concerned that all the times I called him a blithering 
idiot when we argued over administrative matters would haunt me.  He must 
have agreed that he was a blithering idiot or he appreciated someone who stood 
his ground in an argument because I began my new duties right after Christmas.  
My old job at Auburn was abolished (you’re probably catching onto this).  In this 
new job, I was once removed from a Bureau legend that had held the Program 
Coordination job for many years prior.  Remember the story of meeting Rogers 
Morton when I was a new kid?  At about the same time another individual walked 
into the old budget shop.  He was wearing a fedora and a trench coat and my 
reaction wasn“Wow, the Godfather!”.  I nearly fell out of my chair when he shook 
my hand and said “Hi!  I’m  Mike Catino from Sacramento.”  Mike went on to be 
the Regional Director in Sacramento and a lot of us affectionately referred to him 
as the Godfather.
 In those days the Program Coordination Chiefs had status in Reclamation 
and held one of the most powerful positions in their Regions.  We met formally 
as a group at least four times a year, twice with the Commissioner and all the 
Regional Directors.  We also had a close camaraderie that served The Bureau 
well.  Managing the budget was handled on the phone.  If we had surplus funds, 
I would call Gordon Wendler in Denver or Que Quigley in Boise and move the 
money around.  Conversely, if we had a short fall, a quick call to Dwayne Wynia 
in Amarillo or Darrel Hogg in Salt Lake City would usually bear fruit.  When all 
else failed, a call to Chuck Lewis  in Boulder City would always save the day, 
simply because he had the Central Arizona Project construction budget under 
his purview (big bucks).  Of course once Mid-Pacifi c Region’s own  San Felipe 
Project got underway,  Bill Klostermeyer, The Bureau’s Program and Budget guru 
in the Commissioner’s Offi ce, referred to me as the “CEO of the First National 
Bank of San Felipe.”  We seemed to always have surplus money thanks to the 
local benefi ciaries continually getting Congressional write-ins added to the 
budget, even when we didn’t need it.  This “green eyeshade” team received many 
kudos from the Department of the Interior and the Offi ce of Management and 
Budget (OMB) for budget presentation and performance over the years.
  Billy Martin was the Regional Director at the time I went to the Region 
and he was perhaps the most pragmatic Regional Director I have worked for.  
To illustrate, Billy assigned me to represent the Region before the  California 
Water Commission whenever he was invited to one of their meetings.  Those 
were the days of Governor Jerry “Moonbeam” Brown, and to get a clue as to the 
makeup of the Commission, I refer you to pages 350 and 351 of the September 
1977, edition of the National Geographic.  The lady living in the tree house on 
a redwood stump was a member of the Commission.  I’m dead serious and if 
you cannot fi nd the issue, I do have a copy.  Needless to say, defending water 
projects to this group was a character builder.  Many who attended the public 
meetings of the Commission had an aura of burnt rope and rancid bacon grease 
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about them.  As this group railed against dams and canals and subsidized water 
to farmers, I wondered if it occurred to them where bacon came from or, for 
that matter, what they could personally do with a little water?  I feel that, to a 
large degree, subsidized water for farms occurred because the early estimates 
on farmers’ ability to repay were overly optimistic and later it helped preserve 
the small family farmer suffering in the Great Depression on their 160 acres.  
But, it is important to remember that affordable water for family farmers was a 
public value of the time.  In later years corporate (albeit sometimes disguised) 
farms were becoming the rule.  The  Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 was passed 
ostensibly to recognize their existence and to begin to address the subsidized 
water issue through higher prices for water on excess acreage (something the Act 
also increased was the acreage that could receive water from 160 acres to 
960 acres).  Existing long terms (40 years) contracts were a shield around most 
of the subsidy. However, as these contracts reached their term, new contracts 
were written to address subsidies.
 Throughout this era, The Bureau fought the good fi ght to keep  Auburn 
Dam on track.  The benefi ciaries of the project were behind us all the way 
shouting words of encouragement.  Those of us in The Bureau were encouraged 
when the Carter administration declared a safe dam could be built at Auburn, 
and we had every confi dence in the world when the Reagan administration took 
offi ce that we would complete the project.  Reagan gave Auburn a tentative 
green light, but insisted on up front cost sharing by the benefi ciaries.  Not a 
problem, we thought, until we turned around to fi nd that our supporters knees 
had turned to jelly in the face of this new bully.  Auburn Dam is still in a state 
of suspended animation and water supply contracts written in anticipation of the 
yield from Auburn have compounded Reclamation’s inability to meet obligations 
for water throughout the CVP.  There are more and more Reclamation projects 
where enhanced cost sharing has been negotiated; parts of the Central Arizona 
Project, the Buffalo Bill Modifi cation Project and the Shasta Temperature Control 
Device come to mind.  Also, power users have begun to fund more power related 
maintenance items on Reclamation powerplants.
 The Reagan Administration gave The Bureau its fi rst pharmacist as 
Commissioner—  Robert (Bob) Broadbent.  In actuality he was a respected 
politician from Las Vegas who soon gave the Mid-Pacifi c Region its fi rst 
politically oriented and youngest regional director,  David Houston.  Dave was 
unquestionably one of the brightest individuals I have ever met.  I can remember 
more than once briefi ng him on an issue totally new to him while walking down 
the hall to a meeting, and as the meeting took place he knew more about the topic 
than I did.  In 1984, my friend and mentor, Paul Olbert retired, leaving open the 
 Assistant Regional Director for Administration job.  I applied for the position and 
Dave picked me.  You are probably way ahead of me on this by now, but a few 
years after I left the Program Coordination position, it was abolished.
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 The decade of the ‘80s saw two major realignments of The Bureau.  
 Regions were consolidated from the original seven, which incidentally were 
referred to by number when I fi rst started, to fi ve.  In 1985 the Lower Missouri 
Region (Region 7 to curmudgeons) was consolidated with the Upper Missouri 
Region (Region 6).  Later, in 1988, most of the Southwest Region (Region 5) was 
folded into the aforementioned region to create the vast Great Plains Region.  A 
small piece of the Southwest Region was added to the Upper Colorado Region 
(Region 4).  Rumors persisted for some time that Mid-Pacifi c Region (Region 
2) and the Pacifi c Northwest Region (Region 1) would be combined and that 
the Lower Colorado Region (Region 3) would join the Upper Colorado Region.
Neither rumor has panned out—at least not yet.  Now, having said all of that, the 
change from numbers to names, I suppose, was because names were more lyrical 
and prettier sounding than numbers.  Curiously, bureaucrats being bureaucrats, 
we’re not satisfi ed until we’ve assigned everything an acronym, we now refer to 
the regions by letters; GP, MP, UC, LC, PN.  Alas . . .
 With notable exceptions like the massive Central Arizona Project, and a 
few smaller projects like Dolores, Paradox Valley and Dallas Creek in Colorado, 
and San Felipe in California, Reclamation’s construction program was starting to 
wane.  One by one, The Bureau construction stiffs began to snuff out the cigars 
and hang up their hardhats.  The exodus in the MP Region was accentuated with 
the retirement of Bill Hart who managed construction of the San Felipe Project.
Bill, a genuine curmudgeon, used to show his disdain for things not specifi c 
to construction by wearing bright red Mickey Mouse socks to Regional Offi ce 
management meetings.  Even I picked up on the social comment.  Looking back, 
I think the only overarching authorizing legislation we have had since the ‘60s 
involving construction was the “Reclamation Safety of Dams Act of 1978.”  We 
have had a few specifi c authorizations like the temperature control device at 
Shasta Dam, but the construction heartbeat has become a mere murmur of its 
former self.  In addition to Auburn, other construction projects were stopped 
midway.  Construction on the  San Luis Drain in California was halted because 
of environmental concerns with having the outfall in the Delta.  In the interim, 
drain water was spread in an area designated as the  Kesterson Wildlife Refuge.  
An environmental alarm was sounded when three eyed, four legged birds were 
found in the refuge, a result of selenium build up from farm drainage.  The decade 
could be defi ned as a paper decade as volumes of reports on the environment were 
written and, in the second half, a time of self examination for Reclamation.
 The transition between the Reagan and Bush administrations, even though 
both were Republican, brought on a whole new cast of characters in the  politically 
appointed positions (which seems to be ever expanding).  Let me take a moment 
to illustrate what I have observed during these times.
 As the loyal campaigners (or donors) are rewarded with appointments 
to high-level government jobs, it seems like they all will have stopped at the 
nearest shopping mall bookstore and bought the latest management technique du
792
jour book—Management by Objectives, Zero-based Budgeting, Total Quality 
Management, ad nauseam—as they charge in to show the careerist how they 
are going to improve our productivity.  Swell.  Fittingly, they have unwavering 
loyalty to the administration they helped elect, but they often assume (or demand) 
the careerist do likewise.  It is my experience that except for the chameleon 
careerist, most careerists fi rst loyalty is with the United States and the agency they 
work for, otherwise why be a civil servant?  Careerists have their own political 
preferences and occasionally have developed good working relationships with 
Congressional members and their staffs.  I wonder if it occurs to the political 
appointee just where some of the occasional really dicey questions they are asked 
at congressional hearings come from?  Loyalty is a personal thing.
 Most political appointees are decent folks with our Nation’s interest at 
heart and after a few months in offi ce realize that the careerists do actually know 
a thing or two about what they are doing and a mutual respect begins to develop.
However, with every Administration there are the political peacocks who never 
show respect for the civil servant because, in their minds, they alone hold all 
of the answers and the careerists are lower caste drones there simply to do their 
bidding.  I have noticed with some level of alarm that in recent years more and 
more career managers are becoming more and more concerned with “politically 
correct” than they are with following the letter of the law and accomplishing good 
public policy.  I read once, and believe it to be true, that the career civil servant, 
the “bureaucracy” if you will, has served as the ballast in the “Ship of State” 
that keeps it from swinging too far to the right or to the left every time there is a 
change in the Administration. As more and more politically appointed positions 
are established further and further down in the hierarchy of an agency the more 
wildly the “Ship of State” will veer.  I truly believe that the Congress should put 
fi rm limitations on the number of political appointees to one or two per agency 
and eliminate the “burrowing in” efforts of political appointees during changes in 
Administrations.  One saving grace is that the strutting and crowing of any given 
political peacock usually lasts less than twenty-four months and there is always 
the chance that they will be replaced by an appointee that can develop a mutual 
respect with the careerist.
 Now that I’ve wound myself up real tight on politics, I’m going to digress 
to tell you about an interesting near miss I had with politics.  During my tenure 
at the Auburn project, I was befriended by a gentleman by the name of  Wendell 
Robie.  Among other things, Wendell was the driving force behind the Winter 
Olympics at Squaw Valley, owned a bank with branches throughout Northern 
California, owned a lot of Northern California and was the most powerful 
man in the Republican party in Northern California.  We became friends while 
I was a member of the Lions Club he chartered in the 1930s when I was the 
Administrative Offi cer at Auburn Dam where I worked closely with Wendell on 
relocating the Western States Trail, another one of his interests.  (Allow me an 
interesting sidebar in this digression)—Wendell once took me for a ride in his 
car to check out possible trail sites along the canyon of the Middle Fork of the 
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American River.  We wound our way down the canyon wall on a poor excuse 
of a single lane mining road at a place called Ruck-a-Chucky.  We got to the 
bottom of the canyon and stopped at the edge of the water.  While I was nervously 
pondering how we were going to back all of the way out of this predicament, 
Wendell gunned the engine and we plunged into the river!  Somehow I stifl ed 
the scream of terror in my throat, drawing courage from Wendell’s nonchalant 
demeanor as water began fl owing through the fl oorboards of his family sedan.  We 
bounced and drifted and fi nally bounded up on the remains of the mining road on 
the other side whereupon Wendell opened his door and suggested I do the same 
to drain out the part of the river that we had captured during the crossing.  When 
the color returned to my face, I thought “That was weird.”  I was later to learn that 
we were just ahead of the pulse fl ow released daily for power production from the 
upstream dams.  Apparently Wendell did this frequently and somehow I fi gured it 
was pointless to ask him why he didn’t own a jeep.
  To get me back on the real point of this digression, it was during one of 
my many encounters with Wendell that he asked if I wanted a career in  politics.  
He stated that “they” would get me on the Placer County Board of Supervisors 
and then look to the State Assembly and, in time, national politics.  This was not 
to be taken lightly, because Wendell controlled the GOP in that part of California.  
I asked him why Bizz Johnson, a Democrat, held the Fourth Congressional seat.
Wendell smiled and responded that they had an “understanding” and that when the 
time was right, he would put his man in.  His man was Gene Chappie, a colorful 
member of the State Assembly that I had met and came to know.  The time was 
right very soon after that, and Gene became the next Congressman to represent 
the Fourth District.  I thought about Wendell’s offer, but ultimately thanked him 
and said no.
 In 1987 Commissioner 
 Dale Duvall asked Reclamation 
to examine the direction of its 
programs. That examination, 
“Assessment ‘87,’” pointed out 
the need for water conservation, 
improved management of 
projects, and the need to address 
environmental values.  The hiring 
of people with biological science 
degrees was almost reaching a par 
with hiring engineers launching 
yet another metamorphosis of 
The Bureau.  The last decade 
of the twentieth century was 
kicked off with an initiative of 
Commissioner  Dennis Underwood 
entitled, “The Strategic Plan.”  It 
30.3.  C. Dale Duvall while Commissioner of 
Reclamation.
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used “Assessment 87” as a base and laid out a new long term “A big picture” for 
Reclamation with specifi c goals and action plans.  The Bureau was beginning to 
turn greener and greener as the world was presented with the “Strategic Plan” in 
1992.  That year also saw the passage of one of the most signifi cant laws to affect 
and change the course of Reclamation, the “Reclamation Projects Authorization 
and Adjustment Act of 1992”.  It was a far-reaching law with forty titles 
impacting almost all of Reclamation, but nowhere so dramatically as California’s 
Central Valley Project with Title XXIV, the  Central Valley Project Improvement 
Act (CVPIA).  The CVPIA assigned environmental protection and restoration a 
priority equal to that of water and power deliveries.  Implementation of the law 
has been a diffi cult process because it so radically changed a paradigm that had 
existed for over a half a century.
 In 1993 Regional Director Roger Patterson suggested that I take the 
vacant  Project Superintendent’s job at Folsom Dam.  I at fi rst resisted because 
it was yet another job at my same grade level (my mentors had long since left 
The Bureau and my rising star had long since stalled—I guess the other potential 
mentors I had called blithering idiots had taken the words personally), besides, 
the only thing I knew about electricity was that it could shock you (I was later 
to learn that a turbine runner was not an Olympian from India).  I was aware of, 
and Patterson pointed out, that we had some real personnel and administrative 
issues at Folsom that needed attention.  Additionally, he indicated he was going 
to assign more responsibility and consolidate fi eld offi ces into Area Offi ces (ours 
became the Central California Area Offi ce [CCAO]).  Silly me, I thought under 
those circumstances there would be a grade raise someday.  Alas.  Twenty four 
34.4.  Folsom Dam spillway in 1998.  The dam is a composite structure with a concrete 
spillway and earth wing dams on the American River above Sacramento, California.  The 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built the dam between 1948 and 1956, but Reclamation 
manages the dam in cooperation with the Corps.
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years as a GS-14 must be a record.  Am I starting to sound like the coffee urn 
curmudgeons of so long ago?  Oh well, it was a much better commute; half the 
distance, no freeway, dodge deer and count road kill.  You probably guessed, but 
Patterson abolished the Assistant Regional Director-Administration position.  For 
those of you who have not kept score, every Bureau job I have held has been 
abolished after I’ve left it (I’m sure that is a record).  A record that I might share 
with a handful of others is that I have worked under ten Commissioners, seven 
acting Commissioners and eight Presidents.
 Another event occurred in 1993 that impacted all of Federal Government.  
It was a vice-presidential initiative to change the way the government works 
called the  National Performance Review (NPR).  “More with less” became the 
battle cry to “cut red tape, put customers fi rst, empower employees to get results, 
and get back to basics” (if you are tempted to say “yada, yada, yada” at this 
point, feel free).  Commissioner Dan Beard outlined his plan for the Bureau that 
fl attened management, implemented the Area Offi ce concept and to “ … 
focus on: operating our projects with greater environmental sensitivity …”
Impacts on staff were felt throughout the organization, but nowhere as severe as 
the Denver offi ce, which I think by this time was being called the Reclamation 
Service Center—I admit I’ve lost track.  Its direction was to de-emphasize design 
and construction and to provide support to all Reclamation offi ces at the lowest 
possible cost.  The Denver workforce was reduced and realigned accordingly.
 A challenge to Denver’s new direction occurred a little after 8:00 A.M.
Monday morning, July 17, 1995.  I was at my offi ce at  Folsom Dam loading my 
briefcase for a trip to the Regional Offi ce for a round of meetings when Dennis 
McComb, our O&M Chief, stuck his head in my offi ce and dead panned, “Gate 3 
just failed.”  My reaction was—“what the hell is he talking about?”  He repeated 
and still unbelieving, we jumped in a car and headed for the dam.  The sight 
that unfolded as we came around the bend was 
incredible.  Water was spewing a hundred feet 
in all directions from the center of the dam—I 
hope to shout “the gate had failed!”  We quickly 
assembled a team consisting of experts from 
our Denver Offi ce, the Corps of Engineers, 
McClellen Air Force Base, and California 
Department of Transportation, among others to 
immediately go to work on fi guring out how to 
plug the hole and design a long term fi x.  The 
bell had been tolled that Reclamation’s  aging 
infrastructure is in need of attention.  Still, 
suffi cient budgets to address these problems 
have been hard coming.  You can see why Area 
Managers sometimes feel like Quasimodo trying 
to get Esmeralda’s attention ringing and ringing 
the bells of Notre Dame. 
34.5.  Gate 3 at Folsom Dam 
after failure  July 17, 1995
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 The ‘90s saw a renewed effort toward bringing about a more  diverse 
workforce.  In retrospect we have come a far way during my career, albeit 
not far enough in the eyes of many.  If I could take you back to 1968 and the 
curmudgeons at the coffee urn and had I told them then that at that very moment 
there was a grammar school girl on Long Island, New York, named  Maryanne 
Bach who will go on to get an advanced degree in ecology and will become a 
Regional Director, or that  Felix Cook, the black engineer toiling in the catacombs 
of their building, will go on to head the technical side of Reclamation, they would 
have looked at me funny and thought to themselves “This poor kid must have 
suffered a head wound when he was in Vietnam. … what the hell is ecology?”  
I take personal pride in the small level of career help I’ve been able to provide 
to some of the women I’ve had the privilege of working with over the years.
 Donna Darr was a supply clerk in the Auburn Offi ce when we fi rst met.  She 
went on to become Mid-Pacifi c Region’s most successful liaison offi cer in the 
Commissioner’s Offi ce.  Dee Winn was my secretary and  Marcy Turner was a 
budget clerk when I became the Program Coordination Chief.  By the time I left 
the position, both were professional graded budget analysts and Marcy went on to 
be a Branch Chief.    Susan Hoffman’s career has proceeded from soil scientist to 
Mid-Pacifi c Region’s Planning Offi cer.  On the other hand, try as I might, I was 
not able to get the grade the CCAO Administrative Offi cer,  Joni Ward, deserved.  
It is locked in at GS-12.  It is particularly a concern because I was a GS-13 
Administrative Offi cer at Auburn and my duties were no greater than Joni’s were 
when she had the job.  Does a glass ceiling exist?  Do we have a way to go?
 At the turn of the millennium those of us with a part of the CVP were 
wrapped up in renewing the long term contracts our users had held for forty years. 
The changes brought on by the  CVPIA made the process a contentious one.  First 
of all, the contracts could only be renewed for twenty-fi ve years.  A situation 
that made it more diffi cult for farmers to get long term loans for farm operations.  
Additionally, less water was available to the users as more was committed to 
environmental restoration.  And, of course, the water that would be available 
would have a much higher price.  It was a blow felt most severely by smaller 
family farms and those with marginal lands.  The values of the fi rst part of the 
century, symbolized by the famous picture of the H. J. Mersdorf “Desert-Ranch” 
with the sign stating “HAVE FAITH IN GOD AND U.S. RECLAMATION,” 
had been reversed by the end of the century.  Because of delays in fi nalizing the 
environmental documentation, interim contracts were negotiated to bridge the 
expired contracts and the new long term contracts.  The whole process took over 
a decade to complete.  In the early part of the contract negotiations, I had the 
privilege of working with The Bureau’s quintessential curmudgeon,  Cliff Quinton. 
Cliff was a repayment specialist and the Central California Area Offi ce’s chief 
negotiator who had a scowl and demeanor that would make a middle linebacker 
weak in the knees.  He was extremely knowledgeable and was never tripped up in 
negotiations.  For years after his retirement, I was able to keep contractors in line 
with the mere threat of bringing Cliff out of retirement.
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 By and large, John Q. Citizen takes water for granted and why shouldn’t 
he?  Isn’t it always there when he turns on his tap?  Isn’t there abundant food in 
the grocery store?  Doesn’t the air conditioner kick on when the temperature gets 
above 78 degrees?  Aren’t all of his favorite golf courses a verdant green?   Few 
people outside of the industry have a clue as to how complex the water world 
is.  As the twentieth century rolled into the new millennium, those who read 
newspapers and watch the news should have been getting the message that they 
better start paying more attention to the many faceted water issue.  For example, 
story after story has been in the news about the plight of the West Coast salmon.  
The fi shermen blame the farmers and the dams that supply them, the farmers 
say the fi shermen are over-harvesting the sea, the environmentalists blame the 
loggers, fi shermen, and farmers, and they all blame the sea lions.  Who is right?  
Who is wrong?  Is the answer to stop fi shing?  Put farms out of production?  Stop 
logging?  No, of course not, people still value plentiful food and good homes!
When I fi rst started my career, nearly one third of John Q’s disposable income 
went for food, today it is more like one tenth.  John Q. has grown up without 
being hungry or doing without.  He is focused on “me” and “now.”  More and 
more of his dollars are spent on entertainment and “toys.”  He apparently isn’t 
taking time to think about the long term as his parents and grandparents did.  By 
his parents ‘and grandparents’ standards, his decisions probably seem downright 
goofy.  Thus, as Reclamation’s second hundred years begin, the stage is set for 
water related decisions that would confound the decisionmakers of one hundred 
years ago.  One would hope that John Q. will become aware of the water world 
and let the elected offi cials know what his values are.  As it stands now, John Q. 
is complacent to let the special interest or advocacy groups dictate his values for 
him while he remains in blissful ignorance.  I wonder if John Q. understands that 
as we put more and more farms out of production for environmental values, we 
become less adaptable to droughts that occur across the nation, and we become 
more dependent on  foreign food.  I wonder further if he understands that our 
30.6.  This image showcasing the Mersdorfs’ hopes is an iconic image to Reclamation.
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growing dependency on foreign foods, in many cases, is leading to massive 
environmental destruction as more and more rainforests are leveled to make 
farmland.  Whether it is triggered by drought, the West Coast salmon, or the 
Sandhill Crane in Nebraska, or rolling brownouts throughout the Reclamation 
West, the issues with water are basically the same; there are more and more 
diverse demands for water, and not everyone’s demands can be met without 
impacting someone or something else.
 Reclamation attempts to inform John Q, but it wasn=t always so.  Prior 
to the Teton collapse, The Bureau had a high and mighty self image and public 
relations was not much more than simply setting up tours for various facilities.
The public image of Reclamation continued to erode throughout the late ‘70s and 
early ‘80s.  The late ‘80s and ‘90s saw Reclamation make concerted efforts to at 
least respond to negative press and in more and more instances, get ahead of the 
media on issues through improved media relationships.  Press releases are issued 
on all major issues and events and Reclamation managers are being trained in how 
to deal with the media.   Jeff McCracken, Mid-Pacifi c Region’s Public Information 
Offi cer came to Reclamation with an extensive background in the news industry.  
He fostered good relationships with the various editors, reporters, and news 
directors by keeping them informed on issues and being forthcoming when they 
had questions.  Because of this, he was able to successfully guide the Mid-Pacifi c 
Region through some potential public relation disasters.  With the public outreach 
throughout Reclamation now in place, John Q. has no one to blame but himself 
for not being informed on water issues.
 As Reclamation steps boldly into it’s second century we have a new 
President, a new Secretary of the Interior and a new Commissioner who is one 
of us, a person who came up through the ranks,  John Keys, former Regional 
Director of Pacifi c Northwest Region and a pretty good college football referee.  
For all the curmudgeons, this is a welcome sign; for those who have not worked 
for a Commissioner with a Bureau background, they will appreciate the depth of 
understanding of their issues from the start.
 A few months after this screed 
was submitted as part of the Reclamation 
History Symposium, our nation was 
attacked by terrorists.  Here and elsewhere 
I have amended my original manuscript.
Uncertainty has become the norm as 
Reclamation struggles to protect the very 
facilities that the western United States relies 
upon for water, food production, power and 
fl ood protection.  Much has changed and 
more will change in our employees’ daily 
lives and how business is conducted.  Already 
armed guards patrol critical infrastructure 
30.7.  John W. Keys III as 
Commissioner of Reclamation.
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and other security measures have been brought to bear.   Security is a new factor 
to be budgeted for and executed.  Secrecy has entered Reclamation’s world.  Yet 
politics are still part of the picture.  Two events occurred in 1995 that prompted 
me to start the ball rolling to get a bridge authorized that would take the public 
traffi c (over eighteen thousand cars a day) off the top of  Folsom Dam.  They 
were the Oklahoma City bombing and the failure of the spillway gate which 
made obvious the vulnerability of Sacramento to a man made fl ood.  At least 
six separate security reviews before and after 9/11 indicated that public access 
to the top of the dam presents a serious security risk.  Duh!  At Congressman 
Doolittle’s request for data, I had an appraisal level study completed so that he 
might use the data to draft a bill to get a bridge authorized.  With the events of 
9/11, I thought getting the bridge authorized would be a slam dunk—it was such 
obvious good public policy.  To my great surprise, however, the Department of 
the Interior came out in total opposition to the proposed legislation, stating that 
it was a local transportation issue.  Never mind that Reclamation over the years 
allowed the road to become a major artery for two of the fastest growing counties 
in the United States.  Never mind the many vulnerabilities and danger to the 
lives of hundreds of thousands of people immediately downstream that the dam 
poses by allowing clear access to the top of all eight spillway gates.  How the 
political people could keep a straight face and say it is a local transportation issue 
is really beyond me.  I had arranged for non-Federal cost sharing, but the bill was 
written for full Federal funding, which apparently had stuck in somebody in the 
Department’s craw.  Congress controls the Federal purse strings and if they say 
fully Federal, then so be it.  The important thing is the safety and security of the 
structure and the many people who live in immediate harm’s way; it is simply 
good public policy.
 To summarize the last third of The Bureau’s history, I would make 
reference once again to the shining knight on the white horse.  He was still 
charging hard in the late ‘60s, but the noble steed was starting to get winded.  The 
‘70s turned out to be an unexpected low hanging branch that knocked him head 
over heels; squarely to the ground.  The ‘80s found him staggering in search of 
his steed, but a storm of paperwork and environmental problems buried him and 
allowed his now dented armor to tarnish and rust.  As he laid there, he began to 
ponder his place in the world.  In the ‘90s, he was propped up and told that the 
Water Kingdom has changed, the throne was being shared by many rival kings in 
an uneasy truce.  The image of the damsel in distress and the fi re breathing dragon 
was becoming blurred in his eye, “which was which?,” he asked.  Where does he 
go from here?   The answer most likely is to become gatekeeper and arbiter, like 
other aging knights of old, to resolve differences and attempt to equitably divide 
the waters of the Water Kingdom.
 On a personal note, I don’t know precisely when I became a curmudgeon, 
but it happened.  I suppose it was inevitable.  I didn’t recognize it until more 
and more people started to ask me when I was going to retire, and it was driven 
home when Betsy Rieke, a fellow Area Manager, made that particular reference 
800
to both herself and me during one of our manager’s meetings.  Have I exacted my 
revenge on The Bureau?  Well, I don’t know—some probably think so.  I do know 
that I’ve made The Bureau pay, though, something in the order of $2 million 
to do something I=ve had some fun doing.  And, I wrangled a GS-15 out of the 
powers to be.  Although it wasn’t my intention, I’ve made a couple of Regional 
Directors uncomfortable with actions I’ve taken in the interest of good public 
policy albeit politically incorrect at the time.  I know there will be a sigh of relief 
in some quarters when I soon announce my retirement.  Do I still fi sh?  I can=t say 
I do.  The days on the Southern Ute Reservation spoiled me.  That coupled with 
the large crowds and small trout in California lessened the enjoyment.  Besides, 
I rediscovered another passion from my frivolous youth, building hot rods.  I get 
great enjoyment buzzing around town in my ‘34 Ford with its chopped top and 
327 engine, leaving every Harry Highschool, who thinks his Honda is hot stuff, in 
the dust when the light turns green. Like it or not, things change, people change, 
values change.  As The Bureau proceeds through the next one hundred years, 
these things are certain; the values we hold today will change, public policy will 
continue to change, and Reclamation=s mission will continue to change.  As the 
Beatles once sang, “O bla dee, O bla dah, life goes on.”
 Heraclitus was right, you know, you can’t step into the same river twice.
Thomas J. Aiken, at the time of the history symposium, was the area manager of 
the Central California Area Offi ce in Folsom.  He has since retired.
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The World Commission on Dams:  A Case Study on 
 Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia River Basin 
Project:  Process and Lessons Learned
By:
Paul C. Pitzer
 Except for the Great Wall of China, dams are the largest man-made 
objects on this planet.  The  World Commission on Dams (WCD) states that there 
are around eight hundred thousand of them scattered across six of the seven 
continents.  Most are comparatively small in volume, but an estimated forty-
fi ve thousand are higher than a fi ve story building, and a few are monumental 
exceeding ten or more million cubic yards of material.1  These dams are 
responsible for about 30–40 percent of the irrigated land worldwide and dams 
generate 19% of the world’s electricity.2
 Various studies have looked at individual dams—their histories, their 
politics, their technological achievements, their environmental and cultural 
impacts.3  From these it is clear that dams can and have dramatically altered 
their surroundings.  Those changes have brought both positive and negative 
results and spirited debate continues about which might outweigh the other.  
Specifi cally, government bodies, civil society organizations, private contractors, 
and fi nancial institutions have debated the costs and benefi ts of dams, large and 
small.  Large dams have come under especially close scrutiny.  Proponents point 
to power production, fl ood control, irrigation, domestic water supply, navigation, 
and recreation as worthy enhancements resulting from their construction—this 
refl ecting the nature of many dams as multipurpose projects.  Opponents decry 
adverse environmental, social, and economic impacts that generally follow in 
the wake of dam construction—with some of those impacts being unanticipated.
There is apparently no exact way to determine if the benefi ts of a dam outweigh 
the costs, and the heated debate over this has accelerated and continued without 
resolution.  People on both sides of the issue agree that the polarization of 
opponents and proponents has resulted in a virtual breakdown of constructive 
dialogue.4
 One aspect of the argument is the degree to which large dams collectively 
have successfully accomplished the goals initially projected for them.  There 
have been few comprehensive studies of all large dams on a worldwide basis.  
“Cooked” fi gures often cloud the ability to weigh the value of benefi ts against 
those of costs.  The estimated values of those costs and benefi ts are generally 
based on subjective judgments complicated by rapidly changing social priorities.
While large dam building in the Industrialized World peaked in the twentieth 
century and now has more or less stopped, Third World Countries continue to 
project and build large dams; for example, the Three Gorges Dam on the 
Yangtze River in China currently nearly completed.  The question is whether or 
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not this is wise, and if so, under what conditions and guidelines future large dams 
should be built to maximize their benefi ts while minimizing their costs and their 
detrimental impacts, and guaranteeing achievement of the goals projected for each 
structure.
 In Third World countries many dams have been and are fi nanced by 
the World Bank.5 In April 1997 the World Bank, together with the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN), held a meeting in Gland, Switzerland, to discuss a 
recently completed World Bank study of fi fty Bank-funded dams.6  Participants7
agreed that an independent commission should review the “performance of 
large dams and set guidelines for the future.”8  After subsequent meetings, the 
result was the recommendation that the World Bank and World Conservation 
Union create, by November 1997, a World Commission on Dams (WCD) which 
would work (following a fi ve month preparation period) for two years.9  It would 
function under two “overarching goals.”  First “to review the development 
effectiveness of dams and assess alternatives for water resources and energy 
development,” and second “to develop internationally-accepted standards, 
guidelines and criteria for decision making in the planning, design, construction, 
monitoring, operation, and decommissioning of dams.”10  These goals were 
elaborated in six objectives:
To assess the experience with existing, new and proposed large 1.
dam projects so as to improve (existing) practices and social 
and environmental conditions.
To develop decisionmaking criteria and policy and regulatory 2.
frameworks for assessing alternatives for energy and water 
resources development.
To evaluate the development effectiveness of large dams.3.
To develop and promote internationally acceptable standards 4.
for planning, assessment, design, construction, operation, and 
monitoring of large dam projects and, if the dams are built, 
ensure affected peoples are better off.
To identify the implications for institutional, policy and 5.
fi nancial arrangements so that benefi ts, costs and risks are 
equitably shared at the global, national and local levels.
To recommend interim modifi cations—where necessary—of 6.
existing policies and guidelines, and promote “best practices.”11
 The planners and stakeholders immediately recognized a few signifi cant 
problems.  First, they needed to insure objectivity and second, they needed to 
involve representatives of all “stakeholders” in each aspect of the work.12
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To that end, they recommended an independent commission composed of a 
chair and eleven commissioners with a “secretariat” appointed by the chair.  In 
addition to the goals and objectives, the fi nal report of the WCD was to include 
“recommendations on policies, standards, guidelines, best practices and codes 
of conduct” as well as an “understanding of the accuracy of predictions of costs 
and benefi ts used in the dam planning process and of their overall development 
effectiveness and the need for restoration and reparation where necessary.”13
A third problem was the fact that every dam, regardless of size, is unique in 
its technical confi guration, its effects, and its economic and social/cultural 
surroundings.  The planners recognized that drawing meaningful conclusions 
from many different and distinct sources and studies would be a formidable task.
 Finally, there was the problem of paying for the study.  The World Bank 
agreed to arrange funding in the amount of just under ten million dollars.  By 
June 2000 fi fty-one contributors had pledged more than seventy-fi ve percent of 
that amount.14  Signifi cant contributions came from the governments of Germany, 
Norway, Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, South 
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
 Guidelines for selection of the commissioners included the need 
for eminent persons with appropriate expertise and experience, objectivity, 
and integrity, and independence with the ability to represent the diversity 
of stakeholders and their points of view including various affected regions, 
communities, and both public and private sectors.15  Selected as Chair of the 
WCD was Professor Kader Asmal of South Africa (Minister of Water Affairs and 
Forestry).16  Vice-Chair was Lakshmi Chand Jain of India (High Commissioner 
to South Africa).  The remaining commissioners were Donald J. Blackmore of 
Australia (Chief Executive, Murray-Darling Basin Commission), Joji Cariño of 
the Philippines (Executive Secretary, International Alliance of Indigenous-Tribal 
People of the Tropical Forest based in London), José Goldemberg of Brazil 
(Professor and Director of the Institute for Electro-technical Energy, University 
of São Paulo), Judy Henderson of Australia (Chair, Oxfam International), Gran 
Lindahl of Sweden (President and CEO, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd.—a 
global engineering fi rm), Deborah Moore of the United States (Senior Scientist, 
Environmental Defense Fund), Medha Patkar of India (Founder, Struggle to Save 
the Narmda River), Thayer Scudder of the United States (Professor, California 
Institute of Technology), Jan Veltrop of Norway (Harza Engineering Company 
and Chairman of the United States Committee on Large Dams), Shen Guoyi of the 
People’s Republic of China (Director General of the Department of International 
Cooperation in the Ministry of Water Resources), and Achim Steiner as Secretary-
General and ex-offi cio Commissioner.17
 On 16 February 1998 in Cape Town, South Africa, Professor Asmal 
offi cially launched the World Commission on Dams with an address to 
its commissioners, members of the press, and other interested parties.  He 
emphasized the diversity of the commissioners and the unanimity fi nally achieved 
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by the stakeholders in their selection—this apparently after some diffi culty and 
disagreements.  He emphasized the overarching goals for the WCD and added, 
At a time when dam building is increasing in some countries, in 
others, dams are already reaching the end of their useful lives.  Clearly 
consideration may have to be given to the mechanisms, both with 
existing dams and those being contemplated, for the effective and 
effi cient decommissioning of dams.  Indeed this reality now confronts the 
owners of a number of large dams in the United States.18
 The WCD hosted the fi rst of its many public meetings on 21 and 22 
September 1998 in Bhopal, India.  That meeting focused on “Large Dams and 
Development in South Asia: Experiences and Lessons Learned.”19  Seemingly 
having had a successful beginning, the Commission went on to a variety of large 
and smaller meetings during which announcements identifi ed the representative 
large dams that it would study in depth.  Specifi cally, the Commissioners 
identifi ed seven individual large dams and river basins for detailed case studies.  
These were the Tucurui Dam and Amazon/Tocantins River in Brazil, the Glomma 
Dam and Lagen River Basin in Norway, the Tarbela Dam and Indus River Basin 
in Pakistan, the Pak Mun Dam and Mekong/Mun River Basins in Thailand, the 
Aslantas Dam and Ceyhan River Basin in Turkey, the Kariba Dam and Zambezi 
River Basin in Zambia/Zimbabwe, and the Grand Coulee Dam (GCD) and 
Columbia Basin Project (CBP) and the Columbia River Basin in the United 
States.  In addition, the WCD would complete country reviews of China and 
India.  A pilot study would fi rst be done on the Gariep/Van der Kloof Dams and 
Orange River in South Africa.20
 For each individual case study, the following questions were to be 
addressed:
What were the projected versus actual benefi ts, costs, and 1.
impacts of the dam?
What were the unexpected benefi ts, costs, and impacts?2.
What was the distribution of costs and benefi ts—who gained 3.
and who lost?
How were decisions made?4.
Did the project comply with the criteria and guidelines of the 5.
day?
What were the lessons learned?6.
Questions three and six were of greatest signifi cance.
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 In addition to the seven in-depth studies, the WCD announced that it 
would also do a limited analysis of an additional 150 dams using existing data 
from as many sources as possible.  The WCD urged interested parties to make 
contact with specifi c study groups to contribute information and views.
 For the following two year period, the WCD established subgroups that 
began the indicated studies.  Commissioners and designated group leaders held 
extensive meetings and workshops to that end, adhering as much as possible 
to its “multistakeholder process”—that is, involving representatives of every 
identifi able aspect connected with that specifi c project.21  It is not the purpose of 
this paper to explore all of those studies but rather to focus specifi cally on the 
Grand Coulee Dam study and its fi ndings.  Some attention, however, will be given 
to the fi nal report since the Grand Coulee study contributed to it.
 The WCD announced that selection of Grand Coulee Dam for study was 
based on the dam’s size and because of the ongoing debate about its positive and 
negative impacts.  The WCD added that Grand Coulee Dam was also of vital 
interest since it is a mature dam in a mature democracy where debates about re-
licensing, decommissioning, protection of endangered species, and recreational 
demands on water resources are more advanced than elsewhere in the world.22
 WCD senior advisors Sanjeev Khangram and Jamie Skinner traveled to 
Seattle, Washington, in February 1999 to begin work on the Grand Coulee study.  
To guide and complete the study, the advisors selected Dr. Leonard Ortolano of 
the Civil and Environmental Engineering Department at Stanford University.  
Assisting Ortolano was Dr. Katherine Kao Cushing from the University of 
California at Berkeley.23
 On 20 May 1999 fi fty-six stakeholders met with Ortolano, Cushing, 
Commissioner Jan Veltrop, and WCD Senior Advisor Sanjeev Khagram (an 
assistant professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government 
at Harvard University) at Cavanaugh’s Inn at the Park in Spokane, Washington.  
The stakeholders represented government agencies, farmers, industry, and Native 
Americans.  Most of those attending were from the United States but there was 
some representation from Canada.  The meeting was at times contentious as 
various stakeholders had strongly held views and agendas.  Some feared that 
the whole thing was an attempt by environmentalists to remove more dams—
specifi cally Grand Coulee Dam.  In fact, a column in the Davenport Times of 
Spokane had called the Commission an “upstart group of pseudo scientists” 
who would “come down on the side of removing, abandoning or breaching 
the mighty Grand Coulee Dam.”24  Columbia Basin Project farmers wanted to 
redress decades-old grievances concerning cost of the water delivered to them 
and their desire to expand the project.  Native Americans were anxious to discuss 
their cultural losses resulting from dam construction.  Regional politicians were 
disturbed at the prospect of somehow losing local control.  Some questioned the 
origins of funding for the WCD, wondering who was behind the study and to what 
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end?  Bureau of Reclamation Public Affairs Offi cer Craig Sprankle reported later 
that after listening to Professor Ortolano and looking at and commenting on the 
issues and questions to be studied, there was less suspicion.25
 Antagonisms between project farmers and others involved with irrigation 
projects is an on-going saga.  Farmers, who often pressured the government 
to build dams and irrigation facilities, later complained bitterly about the cost 
of the water.  Such had been the case on the Columbia Basin Project.  Early 
on in the project’s history, many farmers balked at land ownership restrictions 
and withdrew from the project.  In the late 1950s and early 1960s farmers and 
the Bureau of Reclamation carried on an especially acrimonious debate about 
renegotiation of costs.  The need to raise charges stemmed to some degree from 
high unanticipated costs needed to install drainage facilities.26  Easing of land 
ownership restrictions during the Reagan years has led farmers to want project 
expansion, but they balked at the anticipated cost which in the 1990s was 
estimated at about two billion dollars.
 In the 1990s the Bureau of Reclamation conducted two environmental 
impact studies concerning project expansion and concluded that it was not 
practical at that time.27  Area farmers dispute the fi ndings and challenge fi gures—
especially the allocation of moneys collected from the sale of power generated 
at the dam.28  Many of the “old-timers” remember promises made in the 1920s 
and 1930s that the water would actually be free, and that power sales would pay 
all of the costs.29  All of the deeply held opinions among the participants made it 
diffi cult for participants to achieve consensus.
 The purpose of the Spokane meeting was to draft a scoping paper 
delineating the issues to be addressed within the framework of the case study 
procedure.  Eventually the stakeholders divided into breakout groups and 
addressed the task.  Under the headings of Irrigation, Hydropower, Flood Control, 
Project-Affected People, Ecosystems/Anadromous Fish, Recreation, Distribution 
of Benefi ts and Costs, and Basin-Wide Issues, the participants identifi ed 114 
issues.  These were later arranged into three categories:
Issues to be addressed in the study•
Interesting background information, and •
Issues of less direct relevance•
Forty-three issues were listed as primary for the study, fi fty-eight were 
background information, and eleven were of less direct relevance.30
 The WCD Grand Coulee team also held a meeting on 4 October 1999 
in Castlegar, British Columbia, Canada, to gather additional input.  Seventeen 
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stakeholders attended representing BC Hydro, Canadian First Nations, and others.  
They discussed and added to the results of the Spokane meeting.
 In the area of irrigation, the stakeholders directed Ortolano to concentrate 
on technological changes since the start of the project—specifi cally increased 
effi ciency, altered attitudes concerning the environment (with emphasis on fi sh, 
waterfowl, and groundwater quality), and factors obstructing expansion of the 
project.  Concerning hydropower, the stakeholders urged focus on distribution 
of low-cost benefi ts (specifi cally, the stakeholders pointed out that availability of 
low-cost power in the region had drawn new industry creating a growing market 
for power which was resulting in increased costs to all including farmers).  There 
were no concerns aimed at fl ood control.  In the category of project-affected 
people, stakeholders directed the WCD team to detail the “displacement” of 
Native Americans, reparations for such displacements, disruption to their cultural 
lives, and destruction of such culturally signifi cant items as burial sites.  With 
ecosystems and anadromous fi sh, there was a range of opinions.  In general, the 
stakeholders urged consideration of impacts of Grand Coulee Dam on native 
species as well as those introduced to mitigate anticipated damage.  Concerning 
recreation, confl ict between the need for occasional drawdowns of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Lake and the desires of locals for consistent lake levels drew attention.  
Distribution of benefi ts and costs led the stakeholders to urge reexamination of 
the “relationship between hydropower revenues and cost of providing irrigation 
works and water.”  In addition, stakeholders pointed to the Columbia Basin Treaty 
between the United States and Canada, and wondered, “Who pays for what? 
Who benefi ts and who loses?”  Finally, under basinwide issues, the Canadian 
stakeholders felt that “. . . basin-wide management system, in some instances, led 
to a transfer of benefi ts from Canada to the U.S. (For example, there used to be 
orchards upstream, now there are none.  But there are orchards downstream).”  In 
short, the stakeholders urged the WCD committee to explore fully the Columbia 
Basin Treaty.31
 It is signifi cant to speculate, at this point, that the comments of the 
stakeholders and the degree to which at least some of them pursued their 
individual agendas rested on a measure of misunderstanding on their part about 
the nature and authority of the World Commission on Dams.  Although none of 
the stakeholders said as much at the Spokane meeting, or at any other meeting, 
there was in their comments an implication that they felt the WCD had the 
power and authority to redress their grievances.  Lost was full appreciation of the 
WCD’s charge to examine the dams in question only with the hope of presenting 
information about past experiences and develop guidelines for future large dam 
development elsewhere.  At no time did the WCD studies intend to infl uence 
existing conditions nor did it have the authority to correct problems and injustices 
however lamentable.32
 Based on their study so far and the results of the Spokane meeting, in June 
1999, Ortolano and Cushing issued their scoping report for the 
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Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project case study.33  It presented a précis 
that would act as the guide for the eventual fi nal report.  Divided into eight major 
sections, that fi nal report would contain an introduction explaining the study and 
naming the participants, an overview of the nature of the Columbia Basin Project, 
historical analysis of the project’s development, discussion of costs and benefi ts 
including unexpected impacts, a look at distribution of those costs and benefi ts, 
analysis of consistency with planning criteria and norms, basinwide linkages, 
and fi nally, an assessment of development effectiveness and lessons learned.  The 
lessons learned would be the heart of the fi ndings and the most signifi cant section 
that would move on into the WCD’s overall fi nal report.
 Over the next six months, Ortolano and his team gathered information, 
conducted interviews, drew together detailed background and historical studies 
and essays, and began to formulate their fi nal report.  Early in December 1999, 
the team released a circulation draft of the proposed fi nal report.34  At over four 
hundred pages, the draft report contained detailed histories, charts, maps, and 
other fi ndings including analysis of interviews and conclusions based on the data.  
Copies of the draft circulated among the stakeholders who were then invited to a 
fi nal meeting.  
 That all-day meeting was held at the Benson Hotel in Portland, Oregon, 
on 13 January 2000.  Thirty-four persons attended—somewhat fewer than 
anticipated.35  Twenty-six were stakeholders; two of the others were WCD 
Commissioners Jan Veltrop and Deborah Moore, two observers came from 
the World Resources Institute and Harvard University (both of which were 
conducting independent investigations of the WCD process), representing the 
WCD was Senior Advisor Jamie Skinner, and the others were in some way part of 
the Grand Coulee study team.36
 After introductions and statements by Commissioners Veltrop and Moore, 
Professor Ortolano presented the study’s main fi ndings.  He recited a brief 
history of the project and detailed its benefi ciaries and major cost-bearers.  To no 
one’s surprise, he listed the benefi ciaries, in order of signifi cance, as Columbia 
Basin Project farmers or irrigators, Bonneville Power Administration ratepayers, 
downstream residents and businesses, recreators and recreation-related commerce, 
and United States residents in the Northwestern states, and Canada.37  Major 
cost-bearers were, in order of signifi cance, Native American and First Nations 
Tribes, environmentalists and environmental non-governmental organizations, 
commercial fi shermen, sport fi shermen, non-Native Americans forced to resettle, 
United States taxpayers, Bonneville Power Administration ratepayers, some 
United States farmers outside the project area, and Canada.38
 At fi rst glance, it appears odd that Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) 
ratepayers appeared on both lists.  Grand Coulee Dam is a key component of the 
Federal Columbia River Power System which supplies seventy-fi ve percent of 
the power in the region at costs well below the national average.  Direct Service 
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Industries and large industrial customers benefi t from even more generous rates.  
On the other hand, the rates could be lower.  BPA ratepayers also underwrite 
irrigation, fi sh mitigation programs, and programs to enhance and recover 
endangered anadromous fi sh populations.  In the area of irrigation, ratepayers 
cover eighty-seven percent of the irrigators’ construction costs—a sizable 
subsidy which accounts, in large part, for irrigation being the fi rst item among the 
benefi ciaries.  In fact, there was nearly unanimous agreement among interviewed 
stakeholders that the irrigating farmers were the prime benefi ciaries of the project. 
BPA ratepayers would pay even less if they did not subsidize irrigation and fi sh 
protection.  Hence they both benefi t and at the same time, bear some of the costs 
of the project.
 Despite the extensive benefi ts received by farmers, following in the 
tradition of their physiocrat predecessors, representatives of the irrigation districts 
felt the study should refl ect what the farmers pay rather than what they do not pay. 
For example, they pay for Operation and Management and equipment 
replacement.  The subsidy irrigators receive is only for construction.  
Irrigation district representatives felt there was no power subsidy because 
they pay for primary and secondary pumping costs “at cost.”  Professor 
Ortolano responded by saying that what the farmers pay does not refl ect 
the value of power in the open market.  The irrigators voiced their 
objection to the use of the term subsidy.39
At no time did anyone point out that without the government underwriting 
the project and the income from the sale of electricity, the cost to farmers 
to compensate for the water they receive would be both astronomical and 
prohibitive.
 Native American representatives felt that modern tribal economies 
and the project’s effects on them were not adequately covered in the report.  
Representatives of the Colville Confederated Tribes agreed to supply Ortolano 
with additional information detailing specifi c losses resulting from construction of 
the dam, the reservoir, and the irrigation project.
 Stakeholders were then each asked to fi ll out a form dealing with the eight 
“lessons learned,” that appeared in section eight of the draft study.  Each could 
indicate strong agreement (sa), agreement (a), no view (nv), disagreement (d), or 
strong disagreement (sd).
 Briefl y stated, the eight lessons and the feedback on them were as follows:
1. An open planning process facilitates identifying and resolving 
confl icts among stakeholders; a closed process serves the opposite 
purpose.
 sa: 7  a: 6  nv: 0  d: 2  sd: 3
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2.  Periodic, planned re-evaluations of project operations provide a 
mechanism for incorporating temporal changes in social values into 
project operations.
 sa: 6  a: 4  nv: 1  d: 2  sd: 5
3.  Periodic, planned re-evaluations of project operations provide a 
mechanism for incorporating changes in science and technology into 
project operations.
 sa: 6  a: 5  nv: 0  d: 2  sd: 5
4.  While subsidies for water project outputs can accomplish useful social 
policy objectives, they can lead to situations where resources are not used 
in an economically effi cient manner.
 sa: 2  a: 9  nv: 0  d: 4  sd: 3
5.  There are limits to government planning in a market-driven, capitalistic 
system.
 sa: 2  a: 9  nv: 2  d: 1  sd: 4
6.  In a decentralized resource management decision-making context 
such as the one existing in the Columbia basin, failure of stakeholders to 
coordinate can lead to major institutional failures.
 sa: 1  a: 9  nv: 2  d: 2  sd: 3
7.  Decisions that introduce signifi cant irreversible effects should only be 
taken after very careful study.
 sa: 4  a: 7  nv: 1  d: 2  sd: 3
8.  Tools for cumulative impact assessment need to be applied to avoid 
resource management problems.
 sa: 6  a: 6  nv: 0  d: 2  sd: 3
 While the minutes of the meeting refl ected the analysis that stakeholders 
mostly agreed with item number one and items fi ve through eight and were split 
on items two through four, it is clear that there was no consensus or general 
agreement and that respondents were ‘all over the board.’ Not all stakeholders 
responded to each lesson, and one stated later that he had disagreed with all 
statements simply because he disagreed with the report in general.
 Discussion of the lessons learned took considerably longer than 
anticipated and consequently, participants did not complete the full agenda.  
Comments included suggestions for an increased list of benefi ciaries.40  Three 
additional lessons learned were suggested:
1. Once you build a project, there will continue to be debate about 
how a project is operated, and a plan should be in place for a process to 
manage these debates about operations.
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2. In large projects, most of which are multi-purpose, it is possible 
for the various purposes to be in opposition, and even mutually exclusive 
(e.g., foregone power revenues due to irrigation withdrawals).
3. Mechanisms need to be created to address claims by peoples 
adversely affected by projects.
 With all of this in hand, Ortolano and his team prepared the fi nal report 
which they issued in March 2000.  It contained eleven lessons learned; three 
(number one, number seven—which became number ten, and number eight—
which became number eleven) remained the same or nearly the same as in the 
preliminary study.  Altered were numbers two, three, and fi ve and added were fi ve 
entirely new items.  The altered and new items are listed below:
1. Same as #1 above
2. In a multipurpose water project, it is common for project 
purposes (e.g. fl ood control and recreation) to confl ict.  Because 
confl icts among various purposes are practically inevitable, a 
process for managing stakeholder contributions to debates on 
project operations should be institutionalized on future projects.
3. (which was changed from #2 above) For future projects, 
periodic, planned re-evaluations can provide a mechanism for 
incorporating temporal changes in social values into project 
operations.  To meet social policy objectives, it might be necessary 
to reduce uncertainties for stakeholders whose decisions would be 
infl uenced by results of re-evaluations.
4. (which was changed from #3 above) For future projects, 
periodic, planned re-evaluations provide a mechanism for 
incorporating changes in science and technology into project 
operations.  To meet social policy objectives, it might be necessary 
to reduce uncertainties for stakeholders whose decisions would be 
infl uenced by results of re-evaluations.
5. Substantial infl ation-corrected cost overruns in GCD and 
CBP refl ect the uncertainties that surround large construction 
projects.  These uncertainties underscore the need for wide-ranging 
sensitivity analyses to ensure that project goals and objectives are 
robust and can be met with available resources.  Implicit or indirect 
subsidies need to be evaluated under alternative market conditions 
to ensure that the subsidies are in line with the project’s social 
objectives.
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6. Stakeholders and planners involved in an open planning 
process need to work with a common conceptual framework and 
vocabulary in making formal project appraisals.  Of particular 
importance is the distinction between private and social (economy-
wide) perspectives.  Failure to develop a shared conceptual 
framework and vocabulary can lead to unnecessary acrimony.
7. In large water resources projects, those who bear the 
costs may not receive many benefi ts.  Therefore, mechanisms 
for ensuring just compensation are important.  In a project that 
has impacts that cross international borders, the usual forums for 
allowing parties to make compensation claims—for example, 
the judicial system in the U.S.—may not be satisfactory, and 
alternative forums should be considered.  Alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms may also be able to speed up the 
settlements of claims normally brought using the court system.
8. (Which was changed from #5 above) Limits exist on the 
extent to which government plans can be implemented effectively 
in a market-driven capitalistic economy.
9. In designing institutions for river basin management, 
centralization, and decentralization each have their advantages and 
disadvantages.
10. Same as #7 above.
11. Same as #8 above.41
 The report altered a bit the list of benefi ciaries and cost bearers and 
concluded that the major benefi ciaries of the Columbia Basin Project (CBP) 
were/are, in descending order, the local irrigators and agribusiness people, 
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) rate payers (including public utility 
districts [PUD]), downstream residents, people using the area for recreation, the 
general economy of the Northwestern United States, and British Columbia Hydro 
ratepayers.  On the distaff side, the cost bearers in descending order were/are 
United States and Canadian native peoples, persons concerned with maintaining 
ecosystem integrity, commercial fi shing interests in the United States and Canada, 
sports fi shing interests, non-Native peoples who were forced to relocate, United 
States taxpayers, some United States farmers outside of the CBP area, and some 
upstream residents and businesses.42
 No project in American history had been as completely and thoroughly 
studied prior to its construction as was the Columbia Basin Project.  Through 
the 1920s numerous investigations looked into the various plans to irrigate the 
Columbia Basin with the defi nitive report completed by the Army Corps of 
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Engineers in 1932; the so-called 
Butler Report or 308 Report.43
That report established the 
“grand plan” for development 
of the Columbia River, a 
blueprint largely followed 
through subsequent decades.  It 
fi nally established the physical, 
if not the economic viability 
of Grand Coulee Dam and the 
Columbia Basin Project.  In the 
1940s, Harlan Barrows of the 
University of Chicago investigated 
twenty-eight potential problems that 
would guide the development of 
irrigation using water from behind 
Grand Coulee Dam.  Barrows, who 
had been instrumental in planning for 
the Tennessee Valley Authority, took 
four years and used over three hundred 
people to scrutinize every aspect of the project then imaginable with the hope 
of yielding a planned and orderly development free from signifi cant diffi culties.  
The resulting Columbia Basin Joint Investigations (CBJI) fi lled many books and 
acted as the guide for building not only the irrigation works, but also planned 
communities, industry, and laid out the whole economic and physical strategy for 
the area.44  The overarching ideal was to create a “planned promised land” where 
the economy and the environment were controlled eliminating both fi nancial 
depression and drought.  A holdover from the New Deal, the concept of planning 
would have been applied as fully as possible.45
 Repeatedly, the fi ndings of the WCD report indicate the failures of 
particularly the Joint Investigations.46  For example, farmers were scheduled to 
repay fi fty percent of the cost of irrigation but they actually pay only about ten 
to fi fteen percent.  The CBJI dramatically underestimated productivity per acre 
on the project.  Crop production in 1998 was $637 million, over twice what had 
been predicted, even with dollar values adjusted for infl ation.  The investigations 
projected 80,000 families living in created towns and on something in excess of 
10,000 farms of about 160 acres each.  The average farm size now of about fi ve 
hundred acres is much greater than the planners recommended as prodigious 
changes in farm technology have thwarted the goal that would have fostered the 
35.1.  Grand Coulee Dam construction in 
1936.
35.2.  Grand Coulee Dam in 1948 after 
construction.
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growth of small family farms and rural communities.47  None of the anticipated 
planned communities/cities have materialized.  Farmers tended to locate in 
already existing towns rather than in new communities or on their farms.
 The CBJI did not envision a third powerhouse at Grand Coulee Dam or 
any of the large upstream dams that now regulate the fl ow of the Columbia River.  
When dollar values are adjusted for infl ation, the cost of the original and the 
newer power generating facilities at the dam have run about thirty percent higher 
than estimated.48  On the positive side, among other things, the CBJI in no way 
anticipated the atmospheric pollutants avoided through the use of hydroelectric 
power rather than fossil fuel alternatives, a benefi t which has a high value but one 
diffi cult to calculate.
 The WCD report concluded that it would be impossible to assess the 
success or failure of the Grand Coulee Fish Management Project (GCFMP) which 
set a target rate of 36,500 salmon passing up the river to spawn annually.  In the 
1930s, over 70,000 fi sh were caught annually by commercial fi sheries alone.  
Nobody knows the total number of fi sh that utilized the river in those days.  Today 
there is no viable commercial fi shery as little or no commercial fi shing is allowed.  
This change in conditions renders meaningless any attempts at evaluation.49
 If nothing else, the case of Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia Basin 
Irrigation Project demonstrates the diffi culties encountered in trying to plan a 
large project with multiple and varied impacts existing in a dynamic and rapidly 
changing society.  Anticipating the future with its shifting values and goals is 
impossible.  This author clearly remembers one of his teachers in the early 1950s 
telling our elementary school class that the large dams on the Columbia River 
were “conservation projects.”  Few knowledgeable teachers would make that 
statement today.
 “At the time GCD was planned, assessing ecological effects of proposed 
federal projects was neither a requirement nor a priority.”50 “The state of 
knowledge of ecosystems at the time was such that virtually no consideration 
was given to the maintenance of genetic biodiversity.”51  In addition to the most 
obvious damage to the salmon (anadromous fi sh), the project caused dramatic 
changes in the plant and animal populations of the project area while at the same 
time creating new wetlands and habitat areas.  Little of this was anticipated, and 
only minimal care is taken now of the new wildlife areas.
 In the 1930s and 1940s there was no process for including input from the 
Colville and Spokane tribes in any aspect of the decision making process.  This 
matter was not addressed for decades and was only somewhat remedied in the 
mid-1990s when the government fi nally reached a settlement with the affected 
peoples.52
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 Trade-offs also exist between regional development and objectives related 
to equity and the environment.  This is clearly shown by the way GCD affected 
indigenous peoples in the upper Columbia River Basin.  In the view of many 
Native Americans and members of First Nations in Canada, GCD was nothing 
short of catastrophic.  For them, the project had a disastrous effect on their 
culture.53
 The WCD report stresses the need to have all stakeholders involved in 
decision making from the outset, and this is refl ected in the lessons learned listed 
above; especially lesson number one.
 The WCD report gave considerable attention to the economic viability 
of Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia Basin Project.  Because an economic 
effi ciency objective (the condition that economic benefi ts exceed costs) for water 
resources projects developed by Reclamation and the Corps did not come about 
until the late 1930s and early 1940s, this objective had little formal infl uence on 
the planning of GCD and CBP.  However, concerns about what would now be 
termed economic effi ciency were raised in the context of GCD and CBP.  For 
example, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers both used economic effi ciency arguments to support their opposition 
to the project.54
 The WCD report concludes that due to the need for projects to increase 
employment during the economic depression of the 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt’s 
promise to honor campaign commitments in the Northwest, and the strength 
and effectiveness of local project supporters, concerns about whether or not 
the undertaking would be economically viable were ignored or overridden.
Furthermore, at the time, there was minimal concern, if any, for the feelings 
of and cultural stability of the Native Americans involved.  The WCD report 
continues,
...the consensus of the 12 individuals we interviewed representing 
irrigators, PUDs, and local governments in the CBP area was that the 
net positive impacts of GCD and CBP for the region far outweighed the 
costs to Native Americans [sic.].  Such regional development arguments 
frequently ignore the subtleties involved in making arguments related to 
economic effi ciency.  Indeed, some of those who trumpet the economic 
signifi cance of the project do not recognize either the failure to pay 
interest on the capital cost of irrigation or the lost power revenues 
associated with providing below-market price energy to pump irrigation 
water as signs of economic ineffi ciency.55
 If judged in terms of only regional development goals, the CBP must 
be considered a success.  Indeed, the WCD report admits that the hydroelectric 
facilities have had an overwhelmingly positive benefi t-cost ratio.56 However, there 
have been considerable power cost subsidies to local users such as Public Utility 
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Districts (PUDs).  In other words, had the market price been charged to all, the 
benefi ts would have been even greater. 
 The report’s executive summary concludes,
The regional development objectives of GCD and CBP have, to a 
considerable extent, been achieved.  But they have come at a substantial 
cost to the rest of the economy, both in terms of direct construction 
subsidies and in revenues foregone from indirect subsidies in the form of 
below-market energy prices.57
As for the cultural impact of the project, the WCD report states,
There is no calculation procedure that allows a balancing of these 
negative social impacts and cultural losses against the substantial 
regional development benefi ts that the US Northwest has enjoyed as a 
result of GCD and CBP.58
 The report also commented on the irreversible elimination of anadromous 
fi sh runs in the hundreds of miles of habitat upstream from Grand Coulee Dam, 
and the damage done to wild stocks of salmon and steelhead in the mid-Columbia 
River tributaries with the introduction of hatchery and transplanted fi sh. 
 Today, U.S. citizens rely on an open planning process tied to NEPA 
(National Environmental Protection Act) to help decision-makers become aware 
of trade-offs: how much of one objective, such as the quality of the environment, 
must be sacrifi ced when attempting to augment another, such as regional 
development.  However, nothing equivalent to NEPA existed in the time that 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his administrators decided to proceed 
with construction of GCD.  Moreover, even the open planning prescribed by 
NEPA has limitations.  For example the NEPA process does not necessarily 
address the consequences of unequal power among stakeholders, a problem that 
still plagues the anadromous fi sh recovery and recreational jurisdiction issues 
associated with GCD and CBP.59
 Finally, the WCD report summary concludes:
After nearly 60 years of project operations, those who have benefi ted 
from GCD and CBP have, quite naturally, become focused on maintaining 
the advantages they have enjoyed as a result of the project—mainly 
low-cost irrigation water, low-cost electricity, and benefi ts from fl ood 
control and recreation.  At the same time, groups that were disadvantaged 
by the project (i.e., Native Americans and First Nations) are continuing 
their struggles to obtain compensation for what they perceive as broken 
promises and grave injustices of the past.  It is possible that individuals 
who gain or lose from future water resources projects will be just as 
tenacious in defending their gains or seeking compensation for their 
losses many years after basic project decisions have been made.60
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 The overriding objective of the WCD was to provide guidance for future 
large dam projects.  The preceding quote was aimed toward that end, and it 
provides a convenient segue into comments about the completed fi nal overall 
report of the WCD which would assess and meld the fi ndings of all of the regional 
studies including the GCD and CBP study.
 With some fanfare, Nelson Mandela and the WCD Commissioners 
unveiled the fi nal report at a luncheon held in London on 16 November 2000.  
Over three hundred invited dignitaries attended including World Bank President 
James D. Wolfensohn and World Conservation Union Director General, Maritta 
von Bieberstein Koch-Weser.61 That report incorporated fi ndings of the worldwide 
studies of large dams including those from Grand Coulee Dam.62
 The Final Report found that worldwide sixty to eighty million people 
have been displaced by dams while sixty percent of the world’s rivers have been 
affected by dams and diversions.63  The study found the use of water worldwide to 
be more than twice what it was fi fty years ago.  The report listed eight signifi cant 
conclusions:
Large dams display a high degree of variability in delivering 1.
predicted water and electricity services—and related social 
benefi ts—with a considerable portion falling short of physical 
and economic targets, while others continue generating benefi ts 
after 30 to 40 years.
Large dams have demonstrated a marked tendency towards 2.
schedule delays and signifi cant cost overruns.
Large dams designed to deliver irrigation services have 3.
typically fallen short of physical targets, did not recover their 
cost and have been less profi table in economic terms than 
expected.
Large hydropower dams tend to perform closer to, but 4.
still below, targets for power generation, generally meet 
their fi nancial targets but demonstrate variable economic 
performance relative to targets, with a number of notable 
under- and over-performers.
Large dams generally have a range of extensive impacts on 5.
rivers, watersheds and aquatic ecosystems—these impacts are 
more negative than positive and, in many cases, have led to 
irreversible loss of species and ecosystems.
Efforts to date to counter the ecosystem impacts of large dams 6.
have met with limited success owing to the lack of attention 
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to anticipating and avoiding impacts, the poor quality and 
uncertainty of predictions, the diffi culty of coping with all 
impacts, and the only partial implementation and success of 
mitigation measures.
Pervasive and systematic failure to assess the range of 7.
potential negative impacts and implement adequate mitigation, 
resettlement and development programmes for the displaced, 
and the failure to account for the consequences of large dams 
for downstream livelihoods have led to the impoverishment 
and suffering of millions, giving rise to growing opposition to 
dams by affected communities worldwide.
Since the environment and social costs of large dams have been 8.
poorly accounted for in economic terms, the true profi tability 
of these schemes remains elusive.64
 The report continued, 
…the WCD Global Review documents a frequent failure to recognize 
affected people and empower them to participate in the process.  As the 
Global Review of dams makes clear, improving development outcomes 
in the future requires a substantially expanded basis for deciding on 
proposed water and energy development projects.65
 The report made recommendations and commented,
Social, environmental, governance and compliance aspects have 
been undervalued in decision-making in the past.  It is here that the 
Commission has developed criteria and guidelines to innovate and 
improve on the body of knowledge on good practices and add value to 
guidelines already in common use.  Seen in conjunction with existing 
decision-support instruments, the Commission’s criteria and guidelines 
provide a new direction for appropriate and sustainable development.
Bringing about this change will require:
planners to identify stakeholders through a process that •
recognizes rights and assesses risks;
States to invest more at an earlier stage to screen out •
inappropriate projects and facilitate integration across sectors 
within the context of the river basin; 
consultants and agencies to ensure outcomes from feasibility •
studies are socially and environmentally acceptable;
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the promotion of open and meaningful participation at all •
stages of planning and implementation, leading to negotiated 
outcomes;
developers to accept accountability through contractual •
commitments for effectively mitigating social and 
environmental impacts;
improving compliance through independent review; and,•
dam owners to apply lessons learned from past experiences •
through regular monitoring and adapting to changing needs and 
contexts.66
 The WCD congratulated itself by pointing out that it had conducted 
“the fi rst comprehensive global and independent review of the performance 
of essential aspects of dams and their contribution to development.”67  But the 
recommendations, while commendable, are somewhat utopian.  It is clear that 
consideration of all “stakeholders” in the decisions affecting any given large dam 
would have meant that few, if any, would ever have been built.  Identifi cation of 
stakeholders itself presents a problem.  In the 1930s, at the time of Grand Coulee 
Dam construction, for example, who could have predicted the advances in power 
transmission that would make the entire trans-Rockies West a market for the 
dam’s electricity?  And if that had been anticipated, would (or should) power 
interests in California or Nevada have been allowed the same input as those in 
Oregon and Washington?  This is a question of particular signifi cance at this 
writing (March 2001) as power shortages and brown-outs plague California.
 When a government agency implements its act of “taking” through 
eminent domain, not many feel adequately compensated, and changes in lifestyle 
or culture are beyond replacement or adjustment.  All large dams have involved 
tradeoffs, and in most cases, the power of government and/or industry have 
overshadowed the desires of those adversely affected.  There is little reason 
to believe that this will not continue, and in fact, it continues today with the 
formidable Three Gorges Project on the Yangtze River in China where over 
a million people have been displaced.  Where the environment is concerned, 
when and where push comes to shove, the demand for power, for example, will 
undoubtedly overshadow environmental damage.  Few Americans are willing to 
keep their homes cooler in winter, do without air conditioning in summer, and 
eliminate use of other electrical conveniences.
 The studies by the World Commission on Dams were a prodigious and 
laudable undertaking.  Their main contribution may be amassing and assembling 
information about dams, their histories, and their problems all in one place.
Few, if any, of the fi ndings are new or startling.  The report, like the fi nal report 
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on Grand Coulee Dam, while acknowledging past goals and how they have 
changed, clearly refl ects and emphasizes the values and concerns of the late 1990s 
industrialized countries and not those of the times when the various dams were 
built or the conditions under which they were built. The recommendations are 
praiseworthy, but only time will tell if they have any signifi cant impact.
Paul C. Pitzer has published several articles and Grand Coulee: 
Harnessing a Dream (Pullman:  Washington State University Press, 
1994).  He has recently retired from teaching American history in the 
Portland, Oregon, area, and he served as a consultant to the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD).  Dr. Pitzer contributed four annexes, 
or appendices, to: World Commission on Dams, WCD Case Studies: 
Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project, USA, circulation draft, 
December 1999 found at http://www.dams.org and in hard copy in the 
Bureau of Reclamation’s library at the Denver Federal Center. 
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this opportunity to challenge the operations of various dams.  At the same time, dam owners and 
government agencies are seeking to expedite and simplify the process in order to complete it more 
quickly.
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The State of Nature and the Nature of the State:
Imperialism Challenged at Glen Canyon
By:
Kevin Wehr
Abstract
This paper investigates the ways in which the American government has 
built an infrastructure on the landscape of the American West, especially through 
the discursive construction of a particular nature-society relationship.  This 
relationship is neither static nor uncontested—as it changes over time, different 
social groups are more and less able to effectively challenge the human domination 
of nature.  I wish to situate this paper in relation to both discourses about nature 
(“the state of nature”) and to processes of state building in the American West (“the 
nature of the state”).  I examine briefl y the social and historical context of the high 
dams in the West, specifi cally Boulder and Grand Coulee Dams, both built in the 
1930s.  I then discuss in more detail the rise of an effective oppositional discourse 
in the late 1950s, centered on the proposal of the Echo Park and  Glen Canyon 
Dams.  I argue that this period marked the end of the “golden years” of dam 
building, and that this episode represents a signifi cant change in the relationship 
between society and nature.  This change is marked by the rise of contestation 
around Glen Canyon Dam, but its emphasis is more on advocating a shift from a 
nature-society relationship based primarily on domination and economic-resource 
maximization to one based in part upon aesthetic and other forms of appreciation.
This opposition at Glen Canyon was, I argue, a challenge and an opportunity for 
the Bureau of Reclamation.  In the last 40 years the Bureau has neglected to take 
up this opportunity to improve its relations with nature and environmentalists, as 
shown in the rhetoric surrounding the Centennial celebration at Hoover Dam, in 
June of 2002.
Introduction
 Most of the dams in the West were built during the Progressive Era and 
the New Deal, and consequently refl ect an ideology of rational planning and state 
building based in a faith in scientifi c progress.  State-sponsored infrastructure had 
myriad environmental and political effects, but the natural formations1 that the 
state worked to overcome also had a profound infl uence on how society developed.  
Through an examination of the ways that nature, society, and the state have 
interacted with and mutually constructed one another, this paper will attempt an 
integration of political and environmental sociology.
 The theoretical impetus for this paper is to illuminate the relationship 
between society and nature.  The larger theoretical concerns are twofold.  First, 
political and environmental sociology have contributed important insights towards 
understanding the ways that culture and politics are linked and the way that society 
and nature are linked, but rarely are these areas integrated.  Through an examination 
of dams in the American West, this work makes sense of the ways that a central 
concern of political sociology—state-building—infl uences and is infl uenced by the 
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nature-society relationship, which is a central concern of  environmental sociology.  
Second, there were specifi c social and environmental effects of this state building 
that contributed to a nature-society relationship that dialectically changes over time.  
Since the natural environment is not simply a passive object that the state builds 
upon, historical discourse analysis can help integrate political and environmental 
sociology by contributing to the understanding of the ways that natural conditions 
helped and/or hindered state-building.  This paper thus asks the specifi c question: 
what  discursive methods were used to justify or contest the building of an economic 
and political infrastructure in response to the perceived water scarcity of the 
American West?
 To address this question, this paper examines the discourse around three 
dams of the American West— Boulder,  Grand Coulee, and Glen Canyon: how they 
were presented to the public by the state and how the public received them.  The 
physical existence of the dams has no inherent meaning; rather, different social 
groups assign meaning to the dams.  The ideology that gives support to the nature-
society relationship that is based in domination is one that I, following James Scott, 
call high modernism.  Scott’s work, Seeing Like a State, argues that high modernism 
is a world-view in which the “strong version of the beliefs in scientifi c and technical 
progress that were associated with industrialization in Western Europe and in North 
America from roughly 1830 until World War I” was transcendent.  Scott defi nes 
high modernism as a “supreme self-confi dence about continued linear progress, the 
development of scientifi c and technical knowledge, the expansion of production, 
the rational design of social order, the growing satisfaction of human needs, and, 
not least, an increasing control over nature (including human nature) commensurate 
with scientifi c understanding of natural laws.”  (Scott, 1998: 89)  In this paper I 
argue that the dams of the American West represent an important case study of high 
modernism.  This high modernism that was so well-characterized by the proposal 
and construction of Boulder and Grand Coulee Dams, began to crumble in the 
1950s.  The rise of an environmentalist discourse allowed a successful contestation 
of the Echo Park and Split Mountain Dams in Dinosaur National Monument in Utah.
The Social and Historical Context: Boulder and Grand Coulee Dams
 Intense battles marked the beginnings of the debates, actual construction, and 
even the dedication of Boulder Dam.  First proposed by Mark Rose and the Imperial 
Irrigation District in 1911, the dam was fought over by western states, debated by 
farmers, power companies, media moguls, Congress, and Bureau of Reclamation 
engineers.  Finally approved in 1928, and constructed from 1931-1935, Boulder 
Dam established the foundation for state-building discourses that were infused with 
the rhetoric of dominating nature and subordinating it to human ends.  The  Colorado 
River was variously described as a “tyrant,” a “raging river,” and a “natural 
menace.”  In order to overcome nature-imposed barriers, the Bureau of Reclamation, 
Congress, and several Presidents of the U.S. acted (sometimes in concert sometimes 
at cross-purposes) to convert the river to a “natural resource.”
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 This conversion occurred as much through discursive deconstruction and 
reconstruction as it did through the actual building of the dam in the river.  The 
discursive construction of the  Colorado River as a natural resource contained 
elements of appreciation for nature as a productive force as well as a deprecation 
of nature as “red in tooth and claw.”  The discursive construction of the river also 
included strong elements of state-building rhetoric that characterized the river as 
a potentially useful resource, a key element in the building of an empire in the 
American West.  Various social groups fought over how this empire was to be 
built—and who would benefi t from the resources.  Private capital battled for control 
of the electricity, local farmers and their Congressional delegates fought for water 
rights, and the many Depression Era jobless jockeyed for employment while union 
activists struggled to organize them.  At  Boulder Dam, the fi rst of the high dams 
in the West, it was the state-sponsored plan that won out at Boulder:2 the federal 
government would put forward the money and the design, private capital would 
contract to build the dam, power would be leased to private utility companies for 
distribution, and through several strikes and work actions the job site would remain 
non-unionized.
 Boulder Dam inaugurated a golden age of dam building in the United States, 
dated loosely from 1930 through 1960.  In his journalistic style, Marc Reisner called 
this time “the Go-Go years” (Reisner 1986), while the more academic Lawrence 
Lee calls it the “Second Phase of Reclamation” (Lee 1980).  Boulder Dam started 
this period as the fi rst high dam proposed and built explicitly for multiple purposes.  
The legal and technical groundwork established with Boulder Dam determined 
the course of the other large dams; similarly, the social and political maneuvering 
required to construct Boulder Dam informed the discourses around Grand Coulee 
and Glen Canyon.
 High dams in the West were also an outgrowth of the changing socio-
political landscape.  Beyond the geographical and physical variation (Grand Coulee 
in the Pacifi c Northwest versus Boulder and Glen Canyon in the southwestern 
desert), the dams differ in important respects in the discourse pertaining to their 
proposal and construction due to this differing social and political context.  Different 
groups boosted or contested each project for different reasons.  The discursive 
legitimation of the dams required different techniques in each area.  Similarly, the 
solution to political problems of Boulder Dam would set a path for how later dams 
were negotiated.
 Within the discourse around the proposal and construction of  Grand Coulee 
Dam, we can hear the echoes of debates over Boulder.  Begun just after Boulder 
Dam (1931-36), Grand Coulee (1933-41) benefi ted from popular confi dence in such 
projects, a positive governmental climate towards public works, and technological 
achievements invented at Boulder.  Built on the successful legal foundations of 
the Colorado River Compact and other enabling decisions, Grand Coulee was also 
completed by some of the same construction companies and many of the same 
workers who built Boulder.  The continuities are certainly strong, but the contrasts 
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are also important: local boosters, absent at Boulder, were key to the success of 
Grand Coulee Dam.
 The discourses at 
Grand Coulee are both 
competing and overlapping, 
but all were built on 
particular constructions of a 
nature-society relationship 
that enabled human 
domination of the Columbia 
River, exemplifi ed in Woody 
Guthrie’s lyrics “that wild 
and wasted stream.”  These 
discourses about nature were 
based in an ideology that 
helped construct the river as 
something to be dominated by humans.  The river was seen as a wild entity—but one 
that could nonetheless be harnessed by human endeavor.  High modernist discourses 
characterized much of these rhetorical styles used at Grand Coulee.  The dam was 
part of an imperialist vision and was to be built by the federal government as part 
of a plan to settle and build up the West.  These typical state building goals were, 
under a period of high modernism, implemented using the scientifi c and rational 
engineering techniques that would carry the region, and therefore the nation, along 
the linear path of progress.
 The discourses around Grand Coulee Dam are important in two respects.  
First, as with Boulder, the lack of an oppositional discourse precluded the possibility 
that the dam would not be built.  Second, the discourses also expose a set of 
constructions of nature and the nature-society relationship.
 I call the discourses at Grand Coulee 
“imperialistic,” following the terms used 
by the boosters themselves.3  Imperialistic 
discourses justifi ed the dam in terms of 
building an empire, extending civilization, 
and made special use of ideas such as 
manifest destiny.  Different groups used 
this category differently: the national-level 
discussions were centered around a fairly 
pure imperialistic high-modernist discourse, 
while the local proponents fought over 
specifi c proposals for the dam using differing 
styles of imperialistic high modernist 
rhetoric and individualistic capitalist 
rhetoric.  While the elite groups used an 
36.1.  These U.S. Postage 
stamps of Boulder Dam (1935) 
and Grand Coulee Dam (1952) 
demonstrate the strong interest 
of the government in presenting these iconic structures 
to the American Public, among whom interest was high at 
the time.
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individualistic capitalist discourse that was suffused with the values of unfettered 
competition and a strong opposition to federal intervention, the local boosters 
argued from a high modernist perspective that valued the interventions of the state in 
building large-scale water systems that could not be achieved by local capital alone.  
It is worth noting that all of these discourses were in favor of some form of the dam, 
none were opposed to building the dam.
 The discourses of the two main adversarial groups precluded any discussion 
of not building a dam.  The competition between discourses was instead over 
who would build the dam and what it would look like.  Not only did the state-
sponsored, high-modernist plan win approval, but those who were opposed to a 
state-sponsored plan eventually backed it in order to get their part of the benefi ts.  
Even those one might imagine would protest the dam supported it.  Local Indian 
tribes, whose land was inundated by the dam’s reservoir, supported the dam due to 
the promise of water and hydropower benefi ts.  Farmers, who faced competition 
if new lands were brought into production, supported the dam due to its cheap 
hydropower.  Labor unions, a group that often opposed non-unionized public works, 
supported the project because of the need for jobs.  Woody Guthrie, erstwhile 
opponent of government, church, and 
capitalism, supported the dam because 
of jobs, power, and irrigation.  Like all 
hegemonic ideologies, high modernism 
was largely successful because it could 
absorb resistance and suppress dissent, but 
rhetorical techniques are not the only ways 
of co-opting dissent of course.  Detractors 
were curbed in part by practical and 
political considerations.
 As well as exposing the ability 
of high modernism to absorb resistance, 
the imperialistic discourses also expose a 
particular construction of a nature-society 
relationship.  The rhetorical strategies 
employed at Grand Coulee by  Rufus 
Woods,  James O’Sullivan, and so many 
others portray nature in complex ways, 
but ways that always reveal an attitude of 
domination on the part of humans.
 Woods, for example, declared that 
“Nature” was on the side of the pumping 
plan developers.  Nature had provided 
the perfect location, and had even built a 
canal seemingly just for the purposes of 
the human inhabitants of the area.  This 
36.2.  Rufus Woods was a tireless 
promoter of Grand Coulee Dam and the 
Columbia Basin Project.
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characterization of nature points to the complexity of the nature-society relationship 
as understood by many of the proponents of Grand Coulee Dam.  The dam was at 
once intended by nature, and yet the Columbia River was seen as a mighty force 
that was nearly impossible to subdue.  Humans could harness the river, but it would 
take an awesome effort.  Nature was clearly an active force in his plan: nature was 
capable of building canals, carving out a reservoir, and providing an ideal dam 
site.  This characterization of nature points to the complexity of the nature-society 
relationship as understood by many of the proponents of Grand Coulee Dam.  The 
dam was at once intended by nature and yet the Columbia River was seen as a 
mighty force that was nearly impossible to subdue. The gendered character of this 
relationship of domination is inescapable: it is almost as if nature is inviting humans 
(men) to subdue it (her).
 Yet nature was also seen as wild, powerful, and a formidable opponent.  
Much of the imperialistic rhetoric was obsessed with describing the wild power of 
the river, albeit in terms of its potential.  The river was characterized as the “wildest 
big stream in the civilized world,” and the attempt to harness it would be nearly 
impossible, “a waste of time an’ money.”  Thus nature was also an active force 
as well as one that invited humans to dominate it.  What are we to make of this 
complexity and near contradiction?  In part, it stems from the contradictory character 
of the discourses used: imperialism implies domination—both of nature and of 
other humans—while locals also tended to see their land as blessed by God, and the 
inhabitants (or immigrants) as a chosen people.  Thus nature is simultaneously a 
resistant force that must be overcome as well as a benefi cial force that helps humans 
toward their glory and destiny.
 If the boosters of the dam manipulated interpretations of empirical facts 
regarding nature to make the dam seem blessed (or at least easy to build), then what 
does it matter whether nature is a positive or a negative force, whether imperialistic 
and Hebraic discourses are contradictory?  This is to say, in the end the dams were 
built and most of the competing social groups came out ahead.  If so, why did the 
competing discourses matter?  These competing discourses were all self-interested.  
The imperialistic and Hebraic discourses were both heavily disposed towards a 
society-centered philosophy.  In fact, there were no oppositional discourses that 
were not self-interested until the rise of the environmentalist discourse during the 
Glen Canyon debate.  Until this powerful environmentalist discourse emerged, there 
was no apparent opposition, or at least no discursive grounds to root opposition in.
Lacking this powerful discursive grounding, the ideology of high modernism was 
transcendent
Harnessing the Colorado: The Bureau’s Grand Plan
 In the late 1940s and early 1950s the Bureau of Reclamation built dams at 
an incredible pace throughout the West.  Rivers by the hundreds were dammed for 
single and multiple purposes as the Bureau rode a wave of public and governmental 
approval.  This golden age of dam building was overseen by Commissioners of 
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Reclamation Michael Strauss and Floyd Dominy, who pursued further construction 
with great zeal.  One major aim of the Bureau was the total development of the 
upper and lower Colorado.
 In 1946 the Bureau of Reclamation published its plans for this total 
development of the Colorado River.  The ponderous title of the document conveys 
the enormity of its contents: The  Colorado River: A Comprehensive Report on the 
Development of the Water Resources of the Colorado River Basin for Irrigation, 
Power Production, and Other Benefi cial Uses in Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.  (Bureau of Reclamation 1946)  This 
report reuses the label given to the Colorado 25 years before when Boulder Dam 
was proposed, the epigram printed on the cover of the report reads: “A natural 
menace becomes a national resource.”  This continuity in discourse is important.  
The Bureau, with its comprehensive report, was attempting to continue its successful 
development of the Colorado and the West through what had become standard 
rhetorical techniques.  The discourses used at Boulder and Grand Coulee were 
unquestioningly reused to boost the  Glen Canyon and  Echo Park dams in the upper 
Colorado Basin project.4
 The report outlined a total of 134 projects (including dams, canals, 
diversions, and pumping systems) in the upper and lower Colorado Basin, totaling 
$2,185,442,000.  Included in these were proposals for dams at Echo Park, Split 
Mountain, and Glen Canyon.  In the report, the Bureau outlines the justifi cations for 
such a massive series of projects:
Future development of the water resources of the Colorado River Basin 
is needed to relieve economic distress in local areas, to stabilize highly 
developed agricultural areas, and to create opportunities for agricultural 
and industrial growth and expansion throughout the Colorado River Basin.
(Bureau of Reclamation 1946: 21)
The Bureau used a typical rhetoric of economic progress to justify its proposals.
It emphasized the industrial and agricultural growth that will be spurred by the 
projects, as well as the relief of local economic distress.  Such arguments had 
become, by the late 1940’s, standard techniques for legitimation.  The Bureau’s new 
projects, however, would be both bigger and, it argued, more benefi cial.
 For example, in their 1946 proposal, the Bureau claimed that the cost to 
benefi t ratio was higher than 1.0.  “These benefi ts indicate that a basin-wide plan for 
full development of the water resources could return to the Nation $1.30 for each 
dollar required to construct, maintain, and operate the projects” (ibid. 1946: 18).
 And yet, the Bureau did identify some cause for hesitation.  Through a 
careful reading of the document it is clear that the Bureau admits “there is not 
enough water available in the Colorado River system for full expansion of existing 
and authorized projects and for all potential projects outlined in the report” (ibid 
1946: 21).  So why did the Bureau propose them if there was not enough water?
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 The answer may be that the Bureau saw the Colorado River as teetering on 
the brink.  With just a small ($2 billion) nudge, the Bureau could knock the Colorado 
into the realm of completely harnessed.  The Bureau argued that:
Yesterday the Colorado River was a natural menace.  Unharnessed it tore 
through deserts, fl ooded fi elds, and ravaged villages.  It drained the water 
from the mountains and plains, rushed it through sun-baked thirsty lands, 
and dumped it into the Pacifi c Ocean—a treasure lost forever.  Man was 
on the defensive.  He sat helplessly by to watch the Colorado River waste 
itself, or attempted in vain to halt its destruction (ibid. 1946: 25).
The Bureau here was engaged in the discursive construction of the river.  The 
river was simultaneously a powerful actor (“a natural menace”) and also an entity 
that was treasured as a potential economic resource.  The justifi cation based on an 
imperial modernist ideology of expansion and development by the federal state for 
the utilitarian benefi t of all society was founded in such a rhetorical construction.  It 
is no mistake that only “villages” populate the area through which this unharnessed 
resource travels.  The state was interested in building up civilization in these areas—
never mind that Los Angeles, San Diego, and Phoenix were already sprawling 
metropolises at the time.
 Man was portrayed as defensive against the active river, but through 
courageous action, the river can be tamed:
Today this mighty river is recognized as a national resource.  It is a life-
giver, a power producer, a great constructive force.  Although only partly 
harnessed by Boulder Dam and other ingenious structures, the Colorado 
River is doing a gigantic job.  Its water is providing opportunities for 
many new homes and for the growing of new crops that help to feed this 
nation and the world.  Its power is lighting homes and cities and turning 
the wheels of industry.  Its destructive fl oods are being reduced.  Its muddy 
waters are being cleared for irrigation and other uses (ibid. 1946: 25).
The river had been tamed and transformed through the benefi cent hand of the state.  
The Colorado now gave life rather than taking it.  It had been put to work, had built 
new homes, gardens, and fi elds, contributing to national prosperity.  The proper role 
of the river had been achieved, with a little help from humankind.  And yet the job 
was not done, according to the Bureau.
 The river was only partially harnessed.  Given the terrifi c benefi ts gained 
already, what a shining future the river had before it:
Tomorrow the Colorado River will be utilized to the very last drop.  Its 
water will convert thousands of additional acres of sagebrush desert to 
fl ourishing farms and beautiful homes for servicemen, industrial workers, 
and native farmers who seek to build permanently in the West.  Its 
terrifying energy will be harnessed completely to do an even bigger job in 
building bulwarks for peace.  Here is a job so great in its possibilities that 
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only a nation of free people have the vision to know that it can be done and 
that it must be done.  The Colorado River is their heritage (ibid. 1946: 25).
In this amazing nationalistic passage, the Bureau claimed legitimacy for its 
state-building proposals through the great prosperity to be gained from further 
development.  The 134 dams and canals in its proposal were labeled as the heritage 
of past Americans, those free frontiersmen who worked so hard to build upon the 
vision of manifest destiny.  The Colorado River remained a “part of America’s 
frontier” (ibid. 1946: 71), the inheritance of all Americans, whom the Bureau 
glowingly called “empire builders” (ibid. 1946: 45).
 The Bureau’s grand plan had many supporters; most prominent was the State 
of  Arizona.  Offi cials from Arizona used the same discourse of imperial modernism 
to boost Glen Canyon Dam.  Arguing that although the dam was long overdue, it 
was required to bring development to their state.  In April 1957, for example, Desert
Magazine described the benefi ts to arise from Glen Canyon Dam, using similar 
rhetoric as the Bureau (Murbarger 1957):
When man erects a mighty dam across the Colorado River at Glen Canyon 
. . . a new era will dawn. . . . A city will rise from the desert fl oor; new 
factories will turn their wheels with power from the impounded water.
The building of the dam was hailed as the start of a new era, one fi lled with 
prosperity for the population and industry.  The article further boosted the dam 
with discussions of the benefi ts of recreation on the reservoir and the huge areas of 
shoreline that would be created by the lake for tourists to explore.
 The Phoenix periodical Action published an article in its October 1957 issue 
boosting the dam, arguing that the long range benefi ts for Arizona were clear:
No doubt about it, northern Arizona, particularly Flagstaff, will benefi t 
from the building of the Glen Canyon Dam.  Phoenix, because of its 
strategic position in the state’s economic pie, will also benefi t.
Arizona boosters focused on the economic benefi ts that the dam would produce, 
combined in part with fl ood control.  The discourse they used to do so was strikingly 
similar to that of the imperial modernist discourse used at Boulder and Grand 
Coulee.  Echoing the Bureau of Reclamation’s recycling of a successful discourse, 
the Arizona supporters discursively constructed the river as an economic resource 
that was fi nally being developed so as to bring Arizona what was due.
 In what appears to be an attempt to counter protests about the building of the 
dam, some periodicals engaged in discourse that constructed the area as a wasteland. 
In February of 1957 the magazine Western Construction argued that:
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The entire area is a vast expanse of wasteland, uninhabited except for a few 
ranchers on the northwest side of the river and scattered Indian families on 
a reservation to the southeast (McClellan 1957: 29).
In fact, the Navajo Nation Reservation (the largest in the U.S.) had thousands of 
inhabitants and one of the most developed rangeland economies of any reservation.
The construction of the area as one that could easily be sacrifi ced can be seen as a 
response to the environmentalist discourse highlighted in the next section.
 The Bureau of Reclamation and its allies in civil society recycled many of 
the rhetorical strategies that were successful in the 1920s and 1930s for boosters 
of the Boulder and Grand Coulee Dams.  This state-building discourse combines 
legitimation through the interpretation of history (frontiersmen of vision who built 
a foundation for the future) with the rational application of science and technology 
to benefi t all society (reduction of a fl ood menace, improvement of an economic 
resource).  This combination allowed the discursive reconstruction of the Colorado 
River into a natural economic resource.  The river was tamed and harnessed and put 
to work for society.
 The only problem with this discourse was its overuse; the Bureau could 
have had no idea that this was reducing the effi cacy of the discourse, for it had been 
so successful in the past.  A new way of thinking about nature was growing in the 
American West, however, and its rise eclipsed the Bureau’s dominance in western 
development.
Chanting down Echo Park
 The environmentalist discourse used to oppose Echo Park and Split 
Mountain Dams in the 1950s was not actually new.  It was a derivation of the 
nature-as-aesthetic-resource argument that John Muir unsuccessfully used from 1907 
to 1913 in fi ghting the  Hetch Hetchy Dam in California.  In fact, elements of its 
expression can be seen in works that date back at least 120 years (Nash 1967/1982).
John Muir was one of the fi rst advocates of wilderness preservation in the Sierra 
Nevada Mountains of California and Nevada.  His founding of the Sierra Club in 
1892 was partially in response to the conversion of Yosemite State Park into the 
second National Park.  As stated in a 1911 bulletin, the Club’s goals were primarily 
to “take the lead in all matters involving the preservation of the wonderful natural 
scenery which California is so fortunate as to possess, and in calling the attention of 
the world to these wonders” (Sierra Club 1911).5
 In 1908 these goals were threatened by the proposal of a dam in Hetch 
Hetchy Valley, adjacent to Yosemite Valley and partially within the Park boundaries.  
Muir led the battle to save Hetch Hetchy Valley, arguing in a 1908 letter to Sierra 
Club members that Yosemite and Hetch Hetchy held an “unrivalled aggregation 
of scenic features” and that it should be “preserved in pure wilderness for all time 
for the benefi t of the entire nation” (Muir 1908).  Muir argued that the government 
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should respect the boundaries of Yosemite National Park, or else all such boundaries 
would be meaningless.  In the end, Muir’s battle was lost, and San Francisco built 
a dam for its municipal water supply in Hetch Hetchy Valley.  But this oppositional 
discourse was resurrected forty years later by very group that Muir had founded—a 
discourse that placed inherent aesthetic value in nature.
 The 1946 proposal by the Bureau of Reclamation to build a set of dams 
at Echo Park and  Split Mountain, as part of the grand plan to develop the Upper 
Colorado River Basin, would back water into  Dinosaur National Monument.  
 Bernard DeVoto broke this story of a latter-day Hetch Hetchy in the 22 July 1950 
issue of the Saturday Evening Post.  From his regular Harper’s column “The Easy 
Chair,” DeVoto had denounced cattle barons and Bureau of Land Management 
grazing leases (Thomas 2000).  DeVoto’s article “Shall We Let Them Ruin Our 
National Parks?” was a similarly incendiary piece, full of fi ghting energy and 
infl ammatory rhetoric.  Under the large-font title, the piece opens with a mid-sized-
font sentence in offset text asking, “Do you want these wild splendors kept intact 
for your kids to see?  Then watch out for the Army Engineers and the Bureau of 
Reclamation—because right where the scenery is, that’s where they want to build 
dams” (DeVoto 1950:17).
 DeVoto challenges the democracy under which we ostensibly live:
No one has asked the American people whether they want their sovereign 
rights, and those of their descendants, in their own publicly reserved beauty 
spots wiped out (ibid. 1950:17).
 DeVoto’s warning cry to Americans not to let the engineers of the Bureau 
perpetrate this crime against “unspoiled natural beauty” continued with an 
admonition: “No one can doubt that the public, if told all the facts and allowed to 
express its will, would vote to preserve the parks from any alteration now or in the 
future” (ibid. 1950:17).
 DeVoto’s muckraking article argues quite clearly that Americans 
would never choose to let this go forward, if only they knew.  The piece is a bit 
disingenuous, for the Bureau engineers were not trying to pull the wool over 
anyone’s eyes.  They were in communication with the Park Service throughout 
the planning stages, and fully believed that the reservoirs represented a benefi cial 
recreational opportunity for Americans.  DeVoto, however, disagreed with this 
assessment.  To DeVoto, the area was perfect as it was, and should not be altered in 
any way.  If given all the facts, DeVoto argued, Americans would not support the 
project.
 Amidst half-page photographs of Dinosaur National Monument, DeVoto 
goes on to describe the scenic quality of the area as well as the ruin that it will 
become.  Though he never explicitly compares the Dinosaur case to Hetch Hetchy, 
DeVoto’s article proved quite signifi cant to groups like the Sierra Club.  The 
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Reader’s Digest reprinted the article later in 1950, and Martin Litton, reporter for the 
Los Angeles Times, wrote several articles exploring the case in more depth.  It was 
this series of articles outlining the imposition on a wilderness area that caught the 
attention of  David Brower, Executive Director of the Sierra Club (Litton 1992).
 Brower took the lead in opposing the dam in Echo Park, seeing in the 
fi ght the possibility of redeeming Muir’s loss at Hetch Hetchy nearly forty years 
before.  Brower assembled a coalition of individuals and groups committed to 
keeping national parks and monuments free from development.  He led the fi ght 
by coordinating a massive letter-writing campaign and helping to publish many 
pamphlets and several books.  Among the many notable fi gures involved in the fi ght 
were wilderness photographers Eliot Porter and Ansel Adams, novelist Wallace 
Stegner, and publisher Alfred A. Knopf.
 Brower was very concerned about the encroachment of a reservoir into a 
national monument, and he recruited Wallace Stegner to edit a book on the Dinosaur 
situation, in an attempt to bring national attention to the cause, to be published by 
Alfred K. Knopf (Thomas 2000: 164). This Is Dinosaur: Echo Park Country and 
Its Magic Rivers combined the writing talents of Stegner, Knopf, and several others 
with thirty-six striking photographs of the region, six of which took advantage of the 
new, and expensive, full-color printing technology.  The book’s aim was to introduce 
people to this little-visited area, and to convince them that it was worth saving.
  Wallace Stegner’s contribution discussed the history of the national 
monument, an “almost ‘unspoiled’” wilderness area.  With his deep understanding 
of the intertwining of human history and natural environment, Stegner notes that 
Dinosaur National Monument is a “palimpsest of human history, speculation, rumor, 
fantasy, ambition, science, controversy, and confl icting plans for use, and these 
human records so condition our responses to the place that they contain a good part 
of Dinosaur’s meaning” (ibid. 1955: 3).
 In describing the area, Stegner talks lovingly of “cliffs and sculptured forms 
[that] are sometimes smooth, sometimes fantastically craggy, always massive” that 
“have a peculiar capacity to excite the imagination; the effect on the human spirit is 
neither numbing or awesome, but warm and infi nitely peaceful” (ibid. 1955: 4).
 Stegner’s call for wilderness protection came at a time when he was still 
relatively unknown as a writer.  In 1955 his important early work The Big Rock 
Candy Mountain was ten years old, and he had just fi nished his nonfi ction novel 
on John Wesley Powell’s adventurous exploration of the Colorado, Beyond the 
Hundredth Meridian.  His Pulitzer Prize winning novel Angle of Repose would not 
be written until fi fteen years later.  Stegner was taking a chance by being politically 
outspoken.  He was, as Thomas argues, in some ways attempting to fi ll the role 
left empty by the death of his friend Bernard DeVoto in 1955 (Thomas 2000: 166). 
 Alfred A. Knopf was, in many ways, taking a bigger chance.
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 Knopf published This Is Dinosaur and presumably put forward much of the 
capital needed for the expensive camera work.  His chapter, entitled “The National 
Park Idea,” argues forcefully for preservation of wilderness areas for both people 
and wildlife.  The national park “is not a resort, though there will always be those 
who try to make it so.  And the very special purposes of recreation, education, 
refreshment, and inspiration for which Parks and Monuments have been set aside 
prohibit many economic uses which are thoroughly legitimate elsewhere” 
(ibid. 1955: 85).  Knopf argued that there were many other places where such 
economic purposes could be pursued, but that National Parks and Monuments had to 
be defended categorically and on general principle, or else all such areas would be 
threatened in the future.
 After arguing philosophically for the preservation of Dinosaur National 
Monument, Knopf argued from logic.  Such a threat is not just temporary, but 
permanent:
If you fl ood a canyon, as it is proposed to fl ood the Dinosaur canyons with 
dams at Echo Park and Split Mountain, that canyon is gone forever, buried 
fi rst under water and eventually under silt (ibid. 1955: 86-87).
 Much of the piece is spent arguing against perceptions of the American 
public about the southwestern lands (exemplifi ed in articles such as the one 
previously quoted from Western Construction).  Knopf is at pains to point out that
Dinosaur is not expendable wasteland, not a profi tless desert, but a scenic 
resource of incalculable value that has been preserved this long precisely 
because of its inaccessibility. . . . Dinosaur deserves to be more visited. 
. . . That is all it would take, that democratic groundswell, to insure that 
Dinosaur and the other superlative places will be passed on, unimpaired, to 
our grandchildren’s grandchildren (ibid. 1955: 93).
Knopf ends by calling on the legitimacy of history and the myth of democratic 
America.  Americans are wise people, and can see value when it is shown to them.  
They deserve their heritage, and so do their grandchildren.  This treasure can be 
saved through the use of our democratic powers to stop the tyrannical exercise of 
authority by a faceless bureaucratic agency.
 Knopf and Stegner’s book enjoyed quite a good reception.  It is styled as 
a coffee-table book, and was sold all over the country through Knopf’s powerful 
distribution channels.  In combination with the massive letter-writing campaign that 
Brower organized through the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and the Isaac 
Walton League, the fi ght for Dinosaur ranged from American’s living rooms to 
Capitol Hill.
 Brower initiated a storm of protest over the proposed dam at Echo Park, 
a key element of which was the fl ooding of the Department of Interior and 
Congressional Representatives with letters of outrage.  Letters were addressed 
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to President Eisenhower, Secretary of Interior Douglas McKay, and individual 
Senators and Representatives.  Most letters were forwarded to the Secretary of 
Interior, who cataloged many of them, now collected at the National Archives and 
Records Administration.  The catalog for 1954 contained a listing of 2,875 letters 
that the department received that year.  The letters are signed by individuals writing 
as rangers, lawyers, citizens, or members of conservation groups.  All of these 
letters exhibit some form of an environmentalist discourse, often combined with an 
economic argument, such as evaporation problems, cost-benefi t arguments, and even 
the perception that hydropower was obsolete due to the expansion of atomic energy 
(perhaps a very un-environmental argument).
 The environmentalist discourse that the proposed dam at  Echo Park brought 
out was focused on the quality of the place in and of itself.  The construction of 
the river canyon as an economic resource was resisted vociferously.  Instead, the 
river, the canyon, and the entire area were discursively constructed as a natural 
and aesthetic resource that was of such value for recreation and inspiration that to 
destroy it for economic purposes would be a great evil.6  Letter writers sounded this 
tone over and over, in many creative ways.
 This environmentalist discourse was straightforwardly exemplifi ed by 
Edward Thatcher of Eugene, Oregon (8 March 1954), who cited the “magnifi cent 
natural beauty” of Dinosaur National Monument.  Thatcher argued that the 
proposed Echo Park Dam would inundate the “canyon scenery and rock formations 
incomparable in their value to citizens of this country.”7
 Russell D. Butcher of Millbrook, New York, spent a bit more time 
explicating his position.  On 15 January 1955 Mr. Butcher wrote to the President, 
saying that he was “greatly disturbed” and that 
it is my belief that this country should protect its great parks from 
commercial and private developments. . . . I do not consider any one 
of these plans to be of great enough importance, or without perfectly 
good alternatives, to warrant a breaking away from park principles—of 
keeping them “intact and in their entirety for the enjoyment, education, 
and inspiration of all the people for all time.”  Also, because these park 
service areas comprise only about one-half of one per cent of the entire 
U.S., I truly believe that we should preserve them as a last remnant of the 
once vast primeval America. . . . It is merely opening the way for further 
encroachment upon other areas.  It is very easy to visualize a slow eating 
away of the park system, as one by one they are opened up to commercial 
interests.  I believe therefore, that we should start thinking about this 
problem now before we suddenly fi nd ourselves without any of these fi ne 
parks; that we should pass them on to the next generations, unspoiled.
 Vera Moran, of Santa Rosa, California, was not nearly as congenial and 
circumspect as many writers.  Ms. Moran wrote to Secretary McKay saying:
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Those who want to benefi t themselves by stealing public resources—
whether forests, parks, national monuments-or however derogated—are 
Public Enemies
Of the United States
When they get through with it, America the Beautiful will no longer be 
beautiful—it will be stripped and stark.
. . . protect the public and public interests by saying to these predators and 
public enemies:
Keep Out!!
 Such arguments about the splendid beauty of Dinosaur were clearly 
heart-felt.  Many writers went even further in their claims about the uniqueness 
of the area.  A. Weston Niemela, of the Chemketan Conservation Committee, a 
conservation group within the Oregon Indian tribe, wrote on 5 March 1955 that 
“Many of us in the Chemeketans have been to the Monument and can testify to 
its unique beauty; as an area of recreational and spiritual value it could never be 
replaced.”  In the nuanced version of the Chemeketans discourse, the uniqueness of 
this area in terms of its beauty and recreational qualities is combined with a spiritual 
element.  The spiritual aspect of their discourse makes a larger set of claims that 
evokes John Muir’s idea of nature as a cathedral for worship: inundation equals 
desecration.
 On 28 April 1955 Eleanor Roosevelt Elkott, of Birmingham, Michigan, 
wrote to the President, saying 
The United States is a big country.  The citizens derive spiritual and moral 
strength from their land—touring, camping, fi shing, golfi ng.  It is not fair 
for citizens who believe in freedom and democracy to be overuled [sic] 
by men sitting in offi ces who want to make money. . . . We must not build 
Echo Park Dam.
Her association of golfi ng with spirituality not withstanding, Ms. Elkott makes a 
case that was echoed by many writers.
 The preservationist argument tended to be a popular environmentalist 
discourse that cited the spiritual, recreational, and inspirational qualities of 
wilderness in general and the American Southwest in particular.  The letter writers 
intensely resisted the construction of the Monument as a wasteland or as an 
economic resource.  Instead, they saw the canyons and the rivers as an incomparable 
aesthetic resource that should not be squandered in the name of progress and 
economic development.
 In the face of nearly 3,000 letters, Secretary McKay could respond only 
with a formula letter, citing the complexity of the situation.  He acknowledged the 
“vexing situation” and its complex of contested views and interests.  His position, 
though, in the face of this fi rst wave of letters remained steadfast.  It would take a 
larger coordination of national groups to sway him.  In combination with published 
books and letter-writing campaigns, the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and 
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the National Park Association, continually published updates and excoriations of 
the Department of the Interior, the President, and the Bureau of Reclamation in 
their house organs: Sierra Club Bulletin, Living Wilderness, and National Parks 
Magazine.
 Starting in 1954 and continuing without abatement for a full year, in its 
Bulletin the Sierra Club published articles, editorials, and photographs of Dinosaur 
National Monument.  The Sierra Club argued unrelentingly against the dam at Echo 
Park, discursively constructing the river as a natural aesthetic resource worth saving.
 The Sierra Club called members to action with direct textual requests and by 
the presentation of images.  The cover of the February 1954 issue of the Sierra Club 
Bulletin carried an image of the Yampa River as it fl owed through an area called 
Rainbow Recess in Dinosaur National Monument.  Underneath was the headline in 
large font “Trouble in Dinosaur” and some short text describing the
primitive paradise unequalled anywhere . . . a unique gem of the 
National Park System . . . are needlessly threatened.  You can prevent the 
destruction.  Men of vision saved this place for us.  Now it’s turnabout.
Underneath this text reads a large, underlined font “URGENT: Please read this issue 
now—and lend a hand.”
 The Wilderness Society, in a coordinated effort, sent the February 1954 
issue of the Sierra Club Bulletin to their members with an additional message on 
the cover:  “The Wilderness Society sends you this issue to stress the urgent need to 
act promptly.”  The lead article in this issue is entitled “Two Wasteful Dams—Or a 
Great National Park?” and argued forcefully against the need for them, contrasting 
this with the great inherent value of the place itself.  Highlighting the aesthetic value 
of the area, the article quoted the National Park Service in saying that “the effects 
upon ‘irreplaceable … values of national signifi cance would be deplorable’” 
(Sierra Club 1954: 3).  The article continued by arguing that there were alternative 
sites, that the Secretary of Agriculture is currently worried about surpluses, and 
most importantly, that the “proposed Echo Park and Split Mountain dams would 
destroy the park value of Dinosaur; the unique would give way to the commonplace 
and would imperil the entire Park System” (ibid. 1954: 4).  To the argument that 
the reservoirs would make the area more accessible to tourists, the author responded 
by pointing out that this would be true: “you can look at part of the setting 
[the highest 100 feet of exposed canyon]—after we’ve lost the priceless gem” 
(ibid. 1954: 4).  The discourse used to defend Echo Park and Dinosaur National 
Monument continually reverted to a defense of the “priceless” aesthetic quality of 
the place.  Nature, the Sierra Club argued, was irreplaceable, while the reservoirs 
had plausible alternatives.
 The National Park Service, in an extraordinary confl ict within the 
Department of Interior, fought strenuously against the Bureau of Reclamation plans 
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for Dinosaur National Monument, dovetailing its arguments with the Sierra Club 
and the Wilderness Society.  Though much of this confl ict remained hidden from 
public view, some of it was apparent, and the results of the confl ict can be seen in 
the subsequent restructuring of the National Park Service after the decision to drop 
the  Echo Park and  Split Mountain Dams.
 Early in the process of developing the grand plan of the Bureau of 
Reclamation, the  National Park Service appears not to have been concerned with 
the encroachment on the Monument that would occur due to the building of the two 
dams in Utah.  In fact, a “memorandum of understanding” between the Bureau of 
Reclamation and the National Park Service, dated 4 November 1941, indicated that 
the “The Dinosaur National Monument region and its water control possibilities” 
is a most vital area for study.8  Furthermore, “concerning the Dinosaur National 
Monument region, it seems not improbable that a policy similar to that already 
agreed to in principle for the Grand Canyon National Monument situation could be 
applied.  Although legislation would be required in both cases to effect this policy, 
i.e., change the status of the areas from monument to recreational areas, the National 
Park Service does not believe such legislation would be diffi cult to secure.”  This 
change in status would allow development; a recreational area is a lesser category 
that does not limit usage the way that a National Park or Monument does.
 Even through January of 1954, just before the Sierra Club issued its call 
to action, the Park Service was still interested in budgetary allocations from the 
Department of Interior so as to improve the section where the reservoirs would 
be located.  In an internal memorandum, the Park Service estimated a cost of 
$21,000,000 needed to improve the recreational facilities, including boating and 
swimming.
 The Park Service was interested, no doubt, in making the best of a situation.  
At this point, the Secretary of Interior and the President were both set on moving 
forward with the Bureau’s plans.  In the face of this apparent juggernaut, the Park 
Service could at least capitalize on these plans by making the area accessible and 
developing it for maximum tourism.
 Between 1949 and 1954, however, factions within the Park Service became 
more and more concerned about the precedent set at Dinosaur.  Other Reclamation 
projects were being designed in or near National Parks or Monuments in Kings 
Canyon (California), Glacier Park (Montana), and the Grand Canyon (Arizona).
Some Park Service offi cials feared a continuing loss of power vis-à-vis the Bureau 
of Reclamation.  Reclamation already had a budget of more than fi ve times the Park 
Service, and some Park offi cials worried that increasing their budget to develop 
recreational opportunities would not be worth the trade off of the precedent of 
inundating part of the Monument (Stratton and Sorotkin 1955).
 As early as 1949 the confl ict within the Park Service was apparent in some 
memorandums circulated inside the Service and even forwarded to the Secretary 
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of Interior.  One such memo stated outright that the Monument’s “preservation in 
its natural state represents its highest use” (Stratton and Sorotkin 1955: 70).  The 
Bureau and the Park Service continued attempts to balance their confl icting interests, 
and contradictory memos such as the 1949 and 1954 examples above must be seen 
in this light: they represent negotiations between several interest groups within the 
Department of Interior.
 Just how much rancor existed between the Bureau and the Service is 
apparent in the accusations that the Park Service was behind the publication of 
Bernard De Voto’s July 1950 article in the Saturday Evening Post.  Michael Straus, 
then Commissioner of Reclamation, wrote to Newton Drury, Director of the Park 
Service, asking where DeVoto had gotten the photos for his article, as they were 
attributed to the Park Service.
 These internal confrontations and accusations destabilized the Department 
of Interior and to some extent allowed Park Service personnel to coordinate with 
outside groups such as the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society.  For example, 
Park Service Director Drury wrote to a conservationist organization, regarding the 
Park Service’s correspondence with the Bureau of Reclamation.  This continued 
information exchange between the two agencies would, Drury hoped, “enable us 
to alert the conservationists of the Nation and more effectively with respect to 
remaining threats to national park areas from dam building” (Stratton and Sorotkin 
1955: 76).
 In 1953, just before the public controversy exploded, some members of 
the Park Service also took a long-term view of this controversy.  Commenting 
in a private correspondence that the confl ict could actually improve the state of 
conservation movement in the United States, one offi cial wrote “I’m beginning to 
think the dam controversy will prove a good thing in the long run.”  The recipient 
replied: “I believe it has done more to bring the various conservation groups together 
than anything I can remember” (Stratton and Sorotkin 1955: 75).  This assessment 
of the national situation was indeed accurate, perhaps even more so than the 
writer imagined.  For in the next two years the public outcry took the shape of an 
oppositional discourse, in part defi ned by the National Park Service’s defense of its 
preserved lands.
 The National Park Service had a public sphere group that advocated for 
protection and expansion of the Park System: the  National Parks Association.  
In their quarterly periodical National Parks Magazine, rangers and offi cials 
of the National Park Service joined citizens and activists in writing about the 
“incomparable” loss that the Park System would suffer from the dam project, 
making them “useless for monument purposes” (National Parks Association 1954: 
3).
 The National Parks Magazine used the same environmental discourse as 
the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society, with the additional legitimacy provided 
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by the liberal inclusion of national and state park offi cials’ statements, as well as 
pro-development voices, such as the Manager of Winter Park, Colorado, Stephen 
J. Bradley.  Bradley wrote of his visit to Dinosaur National Monument in the April 
1954 issue of National Parks Magazine, that “we were in a scenic area, the like of 
which for sheer dramatic beauty—of color, form, movement and sound—I had never 
experienced anywhere, and I have visited one-third of our National Parks.”  The 
discursive construction of the river canyons as an aesthetic treasure worth preserving 
was thus propounded from many sides, public and private.
 In addition to their monthly publications and organizing efforts, the  Sierra 
Club also internally distributed several policy manuals, guides for political action, 
and a “Public Relations Primer,” with “how-to” procedures for contacting the press, 
making speeches, etc. (Sierra Club 1957).
 One section of this primer, entitled “misconceptions frequently encountered” 
lists a specifi c suggestion for responding to challenges such as “The Sierra Club 
opposes progress; it is always opposing dams and roads.”  Readers were directed to 
respond with 
The Sierra Club does not blindly oppose progress, it opposes blind 
progress.  It opposes dams when it is proposed to build them in, or where 
they will affect, dedicated scenic wilderness and wildlife areas, especially 
when alternatives exist” (Sierra Club 1957: 9).
Such clear training of its members helped the Sierra Club effectively oppose the 
dams at  Echo Park and  Split Mountain.
 Unity of message, along with the 
many variants offered by members and 
affi liates in their letters to government 
offi cials, helped convince Secretary of the 
Interior  Douglas McKay to drop the dams 
that would fl ood portions of Dinosaur 
National Monument.  In late November 
of 1955 McKay announced his decision 
not to build the dams.
 Regarding the victory,  David 
Brower noted in his diaries on 1 
December 1955: “Recent events prove 
that people really believe in preserving 
portions of America’s original beauty—
and that the strength of their belief shapes 
policy.”  The victory, for David Brower, 
was sweet.  It certainly confi rmed that 
Americans could exercise some form 
36.3.  Douglas McKay, Secretary of the 
Interior during the term of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower.
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of direct democracy, and that enough of them believed strongly in preservation 
to sway the government.  In short, he was witnessing the birth of a powerful new 
discourse—one that would electrify the environmental movements in the United 
States.  It would, however, turn out to be a hollow victory for the Sierra Club 
and environmental organizations in general, and even a personal defeat of great 
signifi cance to Brower.  In order to remove the dams at Dinosaur, the Sierra Club 
was essentially locked into not protesting the great storage dam at  Glen Canyon.  
Though the oppositional discourse at Echo Park focused on keeping Dinosaur as a 
Monument in order to preserve the wilderness area, the victory was won in part by 
showing how other aspects of the upper Colorado Basin development plan could 
substitute for the Echo Park and Split Mountain projects.  In a letter to Secretary 
McKay on 20 May 1955, David Brower asked about increasing Glen Canyon 
Dam by 35 feet, pointing out that this could offset the loss of  Echo Park and Split 
Mountain: “Would it be physically possible to substitute for some of this storage? 
…by adding 35 feet to the present 700-foot height planned for the Glen Canyon 
Dam.”
 Through this strategy, Brower and the Sierra Club effectively shut 
themselves out of protesting  Glen Canyon Dam.  Many accounts at the time describe 
this as an agreement or a trade off, but there is little evidence of any formal pact.  
Instead, the  Sierra Club had made a political mistake in granting the legitimacy 
of the Glen Canyon site and the upper Colorado project as a whole by suggesting 
raising the Glen Canyon Dam’s crest height to offset the loss of Echo Park and Split 
Mountain.  As  Luna Leopold commented to Stegner and Brower: “if the Sierra Club 
gets into the problem of suggesting alternatives for Echo Park and Split Mountain 
Dam you are going to let yourself wide open” (Thomas 2000: 174).  By granting this 
legitimacy the Sierra Club could hardly fi ght Glen Canyon Dam.
The Glen Canyon Compromise: The Place No One Knew
 The victory at Echo Park was based on Brower’s own presentation to 
Congress, where he made the explicit comparison to Hetch Hetchy, and told the 
Representatives not to make the same mistake twice.  He also went on to show how 
Bureau engineers had failed in their math.  Brower pointed out that the  Glen Canyon 
Dam could be raised in height to increase capacity and thereby make up the loss of 
storage at Echo Park.  The Bureau could thus back down on Echo Park while saving 
its upper Colorado development plan.  It was a Faustian bargain for the Sierra Club 
though, as Brower soon understood, for Glen Canyon was an astoundingly beautiful 
place that few people knew about.
 Glen Canyon was so remote from Anglo society—there were several rough 
roads to it in the Navajo Reservation to the south, but none leading to the river from 
the north—that it was virtually unknown even halfway into the twentieth century.
 It was in this “place that no one knew” that Glen Canyon Dam was built, 
begun in 1956 and fi nished in 1964.  The Sierra Club mourned the loss with several 
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publications, most notable the coffee-table book of  Eliot Porter photographs 
published by the organization and edited by  David Brower, The Place No One 
Knew (Porter 1963).  In the Foreword to the book, Brower helped to entrench the 
environmentalist discourse that constructed the river and its immediate environs as a 
remarkable natural aesthetic resource:
Glen Canyon died in 1963 and I was partly responsible for its needless 
death.  So were you.  Neither you nor I, nor anyone else, knew it well 
enough to insist that at all costs it should endure.  When we began to fi nd 
out it was too late (ibid. 1963: 7).
The building of a dam is equated with river death, and Brower admits culpability.  
After Secretary McKay’s decision was made to remove Echo Park from 
development in favor of increasing Glen Canyon Dam’s height, Brower went on 
several trips down that stretch of the Colorado, and described the area as some of the 
most magnifi cent scenery he had ever seen.  Porter’s camera recorded the beauty for 
other Americans to see.
 Eliot Porter wrote much of the text that accompanied his photographs.  
When combined with the images, his words repudiate the discursive construction of 
the river as a “menace” by the Bureau.  The river is characterized as “serene” and 
“overwhelming:”
The eye is numbed by the vastness and magnifi cence, and passes over the 
fi ne details, ignoring them in a defense against surfeit.  The big features, the 
massive walls and towers, the shimmering vistas, the enveloping light, are 
all hypnotizing, shutting out awareness of the particular (ibid. 1963).
The superlatives in his text are easily matched by the photographs, printed in 
stunning clarity and color.  Porter’s images linger on the general features for only 
the fi rst moments and are soon caught up in the fi ner details that were originally 
overlooked.  The photographer turns from the wide-angle to the macro close-up and 
an intimacy of the canyon becomes apparent.
 Porter continually moves between the macro and the micro in his text and his 
photographs.  He records what this “place that no one knew” was like before it was 
inundated.  The larger picture that emerges from the collection of images and text is 
that of a tremendous aesthetic asset that has been lost.  The work argued forcefully, 
if indirectly, against the discursive construction of the river as a menace, a tyrant, or 
an agent of chaos.
 Another author who experienced the river before the dam was put into place 
was  Edward Abbey.  The book that brought fame to Abbey was  Desert Solitaire,
which contains a chapter called “Down the River.”  This piece describes Abbey’s raft 
trip through Glen Canyon all the way to the site of the dam, just as the foundation 
was being poured.  It opens with Abbey’s characteristic acerbity:
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The beavers had to go and build another goddamned dam on the Colorado.
Not satisfi ed with the enormous silt trap and evaporation tank called Lake 
Mead (back of Boulder Dam) they have created another even bigger, even 
more destructive, in Glen Canyon (ibid. 1968: 173).
Abbey’s chapter continues on, using corrosive sarcasm, to belittle the Bureau of 
Reclamation and the federal government in general.  In the midst of this rant, Abbey 
fi nds time to describe the scenery in the canyon, which will be submerged under 
400 feet of water in a matter of months: “white sands,” “green willows,” “a 
sculptured landscape.”
 The  Navajo Indians also bore witness to the damming of Glen Canyon.  The 
Navajos were not politically well organized in the mid-1950s.  They had recently 
suffered a great deal of hardship due to Bureau of Indian Affairs herd reduction 
programs in the late 1930s (White 1983: 313).  This social disarray led to an offi cial, 
but essentially meaningless, approval of Glen Canyon Dam by the Navajo Tribal 
Council.  The Council, a group that was formed at the behest of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs to handle the sale and leasing of rich oil lands on the reservation in 1927, 
had very little legitimate governing power over the diverse and widespread peoples 
of the reservation.  They did, however, pass motions approving proposals from the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (such as herd reductions) and the Bureau of Reclamation 
(Glen Canyon Dam).  Raymond Nakai, the Chairman of the Tribal Council at the 
time that the dam was built, said “A conservationist is one who is content to stand 
still forever.  Major Powell would have approved of this lake.  May it ever be 
brimmin’ full” (McPhee 1971: 196).
 Nakai’s comments notwithstanding, many Navajos did not approve of the 
dam, though little of this contestation made it into the historical record.  There was 
signifi cant disagreement about the benefi ts that would fl ow to the Navajo.  There 
were many who, gesturing to history, asked what the Navajo had ever seen of other 
promises made by the government.  Others believed the Bureau of Reclamation 
promises of hydropower and irrigation water (John 2000).  In the end, the dam was 
built, based in part on the approval of the Tribal Council.  The Navajo have, forty 
years later, not received any benefi ts from the dam aside from increased tourism in 
the area.
 Though Abbey and the Navajos did not directly attack the Bureau’s 
discourse, Brower, in the Foreword to The Place No One Knew, did argue against 
the discursive construction of the Colorado as an economic resource:
Good men, who have plans for the Colorado River whereby “a natural 
menace becomes a natural resource,” would argue tirelessly that the 
Colorado must be controlled, that its energy should be tapped and sold 
to fi nance agricultural development in the arid West.  But our point here 
is that for all their good intentions these men had too insular a notion of 
what man’s relation to his environment should be, and it is tragic that 
their insularity was heeded.  The natural Colorado—what is left of it—is a 
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miracle, not a menace.  The menace is more likely the notion that growth 
and progress are the same, and that the gross national product is the 
measure of the good life (ibid. 1963: 7-8).
Brower met the Bureau’s arguments head-on.  The river was not, Brower contended, 
a menace.  The menace instead was that constellation of forces that push for what 
Brower called “blind progress”—those that rate value only by economic measures.
Brower clearly showed his bitterness in this work: his comments regarding “what 
is left of” the river, the selling of energy to fi nance agriculture, the argument for 
storage that Brower asserts is “absolutely not needed in this century, almost certainly 
not needed in the next” (ibid. 1963: 7).
 In the years to come, Brower and the  Sierra Club would indeed have 
occasion to wage battle against the Bureau’s developmentalist mindset.  They fought 
hard to lower the storage level of Glen Canyon so as to avoid the inundation of 
 Rainbow Bridge National Monument.  The original height of Glen Canyon Dam 
was to be 580 feet, but with the compromise it was raised to 730 feet.  When it was 
found that this would bring the water level to the base of Rainbow Bridge, one of 
the natural wonders of the world, the Sierra Club lobbied for protection.  Many 
schemes were put forward, including a check dam below Rainbow Bridge to keep 
the reservoir water out.  Eventually the Bureau accepted a proposal to keep the water 
level of the reservoir at 3700 feet above sea level, and to build the dam to just 710 
feet high.
 The Sierra Club’s loss at Glen Canyon may have been a high price to pay, 
but the failure in many ways galvanized the new environmentalist discourse in the 
United States.  Since the building of Glen Canyon Dam no more high dams have 
been built in the U.S.  The Sierra Club was successful in stopping several more 
dams on the Colorado, including two in Grand Canyon.  The Club has continued to 
grow in strength and purpose over the nearly four decades since the “death of Glen 
Canyon.”  In 1993 the Club attempted to avenge its loss of Glen Canyon by helping 
to write legislation to breach the dam and restore Glen Canyon.  The legislation 
remains stalled, but the discourse continues to be a powerful force in America.
Conclusion: Challenging Imperialism and Avoiding the Challenge of 
Environmentalism
 Through the struggle to save Dinosaur National Monument, and in the 
mourning of Glen Canyon, a new  oppositional discourse became established.  This 
oppositional discourse, which I have labeled environmentalist, constructed nature as 
a priceless treasure that needed to be protected from blind progress.  Drawing on the 
lessons learned from Muir’s failed Hetch Hetchy battle, activists successfully fought 
against the intrusion into the National Park System by the Bureau of Reclamation.
They were able to discursively reconstruct a river—as an entity that had value in and 
of itself, not simply something that could be economically benefi cial to society.
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 In a dramatic shift from the lack of oppositional discourses regarding the 
proposal of Boulder and Grand Coulee, a powerful new discourse was born in the 
struggle over the proposal of Echo Park and the building of Glen Canyon Dam.  This 
discourse highlighted an inherent value that existed in nature and wilderness, a value 
that was worthy of preservation over exploitation.
 This shift in the valuation of nature points to a larger transformation of the 
relationship between nature and society.  This transformation is certainly something 
that is in process, unevenly completed, and perhaps will never be as hegemonic as 
imperial modernism was.  This new view of the nature-society relationship, a view 
based on preservation and inherent natural value, has destabilized the hegemonic 
imperial modernist ideology.  In offering an effectual foundation for oppositional 
discourse, the environmentalist ideology has stopped the damming of the rivers 
of the West, and forced society to re-examine its relationship to growth, natural 
resources, and state building.
 Some commentators have identifi ed the Echo Park-Glen Canyon episode as 
a signifi cant moment of the development of environmentalism in the late twentieth 
century.  Though the discourses used were not new, they were mobilized on a 
massive level and in an effective way for the fi rst time.  Gottlieb (1993: 41) notes the 
historic signifi cance of this battle over wilderness in his book on the origins of the 
modern environmental movement, and Mark Harvey (1994) picks out Echo Park as 
a “symbol of wilderness” that was “a great test to the sanctity of the park system.”
(Harvey 1994: xiv)  Though the use of the singular “movement” by Gottlieb 
should be questioned, the importance of Echo Park and Glen Canyon for the set of 
environmental movements that have blossomed in the last 40 years is clear.
 The imperialistic modernist discourse about the domination of nature and 
the building of a state infrastructure in the West was transcendent from at least the 
early 1920s through the middle 1950s.  This hegemonic discourse brought together 
aspects of state building and the domination of nature (control of nature, control 
of the population, and the boosting of economic development) into a monolithic 
discourse that defi ned the relationship between nature and society.  With the rise of 
an oppositional discourse at Echo Park and Glen Canyon, this hegemony was fi rst 
successfully contested.
 The emergence of an oppositional discourse can be seen as both a challenge 
to the Bureau of Reclamation (surely this is how David Brower and Floyd Dominy 
saw it), but it can also be viewed as an opportunity.  The Bureau of Reclamation 
could have picked up on this new and powerful social movement and taken its 
concerns to heart.  Indeed, there has been some change within the Bureau, but the 
Bureau has hardly “gone green,” and could embrace environmental ideas to a much 
larger extent than it has.
 Instead, the Bureau still uses the old rhetoric of imperialism and triumph 
rather than absorbing the environmentalist concerns.  At the Centennial celebration 
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in June 2002, the several offi cial speakers continued the tone of imperialistic 
discourse that was used through the middle of the twentieth century.  The 
Commissioner of Reclamation declared that “stability, progress and development” 
are the cornerstones for the Bureau’s next 100 years.  John Keys continued, relying 
on notions of nationalism, declaring that “the sounds coming from the generators are 
the sound of freedom.”
 The Secretary of the Interior kept up the beating of the drum, declaring that 
“we can do it before and can do it again.”  Just what it is that the Bureau will do 
remains to be seen.  But it seems clear that what it has not done is take to heart the 
challenges of the environmental movements of the last forty years.  The Bureau 
remains stuck in a discourse of imperialism, and it risks losing legitimacy in the eyes 
of those who need it most: the people of the West.
Kevin Wehr is on the faculty of the Department of Sociology at California State 
University–Sacramento.  At the time this paper was written, he was a graduate 
student in sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.  Routledge 
published his book on this topic, America’s Fight Over Water, in 2004.
Endnotes
1. Throughout this work I will use the term natural to indicate non-human processes, entities, 
or characteristics.  I counterpoise this to the term social, which exclusively involves human endeavor.  
As I will discuss, however, these two realms are thoroughly imbricated in one another through history 
and historical recollection and reconstruction.  Thus, natural formations such as climate, geography, or 
soil composition, should be differentiated from social barriers such as the ways that humans respond to 
nature in the built environment.  For example what is normally construed as a “natural disaster” such 
as a fl ood destroying a town is more appropriately termed a “social disaster,” for it was social decision 
to place a community in a fl ood plain.
2. Black Canyon is the name of the site where Boulder Dam was built.  The name of the dam 
is after the original site, Boulder Canyon, slightly upstream from Black Canyon.  In his 1922 report 
to Congress, Arthur Powell Davis, Commissioner of Reclamation, suggested a dam “at or near 
the vicinity of Boulder Canyon.”  (Bureau of Reclamation, Albert B. Fall 1922: 21)  Thus in 1928 
Congress passed the Boulder Canyon Act, and the project was offi cially named after Boulder Canyon 
even though Black Canyon was ultimately chosen as a more appropriate site for the high dam.  The 
name was eventually changed to Hoover Dam by an act of Congress in 1947.
3. The boosters of Grand Coulee Dam published many pamphlets and bulletins, gave speeches, 
and wrote letters to offi cials.  The many documents drawn on for this work are contained in the 
National Archives and Records Administration, Denver, RG115, Central Classifi ed Files, Entry 3, 
boxes 228-325, and in the archives at the University of Washington.  For more detail, see Wehr, 2004.  
All quotations in the following section are drawn from these sources.
4. This is offi cially known as the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP).
5. Letters and pamphlets held in the Sierra Club Collection, Bancroft Library, University of 
California, Berkeley (Sierra Club 1911-1970).
6. The idea of the river as an “economic resource” as opposed to a “natural” and “aesthetic” 
resource is a false dichotomy.  Activists constructed this binary so as to fi ght the economic logic of 
using the river for society’s ends.  But what they did not recognize (or chose not to make explicit) was 
that the aesthetic use of the river is just as anthropocentric as an economic use, though it may be more 
sustainable.  Activists did use some rhetoric about the qualities of the river in and of itself, this was 
largely understood to be a benefi t for humanity in terms of recreation, spiritual regeneration, or simply 
aesthetic pleasure.  As Cronon (1996) has shown, wilderness is a human creation, a mirror that refl ects 
“our own unexamined longings and desires.”
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7. All letters quoted in this section are held by the National Archives and Record 
Administration, College Park, Maryland, Record Group 48, Central Classifi ed Files, entry number 4-4; 
boxes 360-64.
8. This memorandum is held by the National Archives and Record Administration, College 
Park, Maryland, Record Group 48, Central Classifi ed Files, entry number 4-4; box 363.
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Writing Water in the West:  Reclaiming the Language 
of Reclamation
By:
Nancy Cook
 My essay examines the  language used to write about water in the West.  
In this piece, I begin an analysis of discourses about water: offi cial language vs. 
literary language, bureaucratic narrative vs. personal narrative, scientifi c language 
vs. quotidian language, wet vs. dry texts.  Through the use of an extended 
“glossary,” I work to include western American writers as integral to the conver-
sation about the role of water issues in the West.  The Bureau of Reclamation 
(USBR) has materially changed the face of the West; yet it has just as certainly 
changed the language of water in the West.  Within the context of the USBR’s 
history, I argue that the languages we use to talk about, write about, and analyze 
water in the West are critical components of the water actions taken.  How we 
say what we say about water is integral to how we think about water and what we 
do about it.  I claim that creative writers engage water in a way that is crucial to 
public policy decisions, and that richer, more dynamic, and more deeply critical 
conversations must take place as we face yet another period of hydraulic crisis in 
the western United States.
 The glossary works to bring various discourses into play with one another, 
demonstrating that fi rst we need an adequate hydraulic language before any 
substantive analysis and change can take place.  Throughout my essay, I employ 
offi cial discourse from sources such as Bureau of Reclamation and the United 
States Geological Survey; the discourse of personal narrative and poetry from 
such writers as Wallace Stegner, William Kittredge, Richard Hugo, and Ripley 
Schemm; as well as  my own observations.  Bureaucratic discourse often operates 
like an aircraft carrier turning at sea: it takes a long time to alter its course.
Creative discourses, however, respond quickly and sometimes subtly to changes 
in an author’s experience, as Ivan Doig, Stegner, and others have so elegantly 
shown us.  These more intimate voices can articulate the local, the personal, and 
the private, offering readers deeply-placed stories that render the complexity and 
dynamism of water-use issues in the West.  Rather than the exclusively urban, 
polemicist, or public policy voices so often heard in discussions of Western water 
issues, these are the voices from the West’s outback: experienced on the land, 
observant of change, and cognizant of the myriad effects one simple alteration of 
water policy can create.
 Each of the writers I engage here resists simple binaries, infl ated rhetoric, 
and the pyrotechnics associated with other western writers such as Edward Abbey. 
While Abbey’s work remains popular and important, I think we can learn more 
about the history of federal land and water-use policy, about water in the West, 
and about creative solutions from the more measured voices among western 
writers.
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 Issues of public vs. private have vexed both policy makers and western 
writers for decades, and the friction between them is nowhere more apparent than 
in the discourse of water rights.  The arid West has more public land than any 
other part of the United States, while at the same time, private property rights 
have been defended most vigorously in the West.  And more than any offi cial 
cost-benefi t analysis, creative juxtaposition of the language of water reveals other 
parameters of any cost-benefi t analysis.  My essay asks that we try putting varied 
discourses into conversation, creating new ways of thinking about aridity, about 
public and private, about rights and responsibilities as we manage a dynamic and 
complicated set of hydraulic systems.
 Plenty of people have claimed that aridity is the great fact of the American 
West—John Wesley Powell, Walter Prescott Webb, and Wallace Stegner, 
immediately come to mind.  What happens if we look at the West, and western 
writing using discourses of water as our lens?  Instead of close readings of literary 
texts, here I offer a glossary, maybe even a primer, of water and words in the 
West.  Stegner, among many others, suggests that humans, like other species, are 
conditioned by climate and geography.  What’s western about westerners?  For the 
moment, let’s imagine it’s our relationship to water and its words.
Ablation:
1. “The process by which ice and snow waste away owing to melting and 
evaporation” (USGS website).1  2. Look up in June from any of a thousand 
parched valleys, and imagine the gift of iciness.  Look up again in July 
from the same task and the same valley, and your dreams have evaporated. 
It’s easier to imagine evaporation than melting, for your sweat has dried, 
leaving a salt line that marks your labor as clearly as the snowline retreats, 
recoiling from your parched and thirsty glare.2
Acre-foot.
1. “A unit for measuring the volume of water, is equal to the quantity of 
water required to cover 1 acre to a depth of 1 foot and is equal to 43,560 
cubic feet or 325,851 gallons.  The term is commonly used in measuring 
volumes of water used or stored” (USGS website).  2. How many acre-feet 
for Las Vegas golf courses, fountains, the lushness of even the median 
strips in San Diego, alfalfa crops, water slides, swimming pools, restaurant 
water glasses, full fl ushes, long showers, head lettuce, clean towels, car 
washes?  Who uses more water, one of William Kittredge’s eastern 
Oregon buckaroos, or the actor who plays the cowboy on screen?
3. After the movie people leave our ranch in New Mexico, the wind takes 
the porta potties and knocks them down, spilling life-giving moisture and 
death-dealing disinfectant onto the parched earth.  Math teaser: How many 
twelve-ounce plastic bottles, half full of water from France, rolling with 
the winds, taunting jackrabbit and coyote alike, does it take to cover one 
acre in one foot of water?
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Arid.
1. “A term describing a climate or region in which precipitation is so 
defi cient in quantity or occurs so infrequently that intensive agricultural 
production is not possible without irrigation” (USBR website).3  2. The 
defi ning fact of the inter-mountain West.  Perpetually in the rain shadow.  
When I hang clothes on the line, they snap in the wind and are nearly dry 
before I fi nish hanging them.  The downpour of yesterday is invisible 
today.  3. “Aridity, and aridity alone, makes the various West one.  The 
distinctive western plants and animals, the hard clarity (before power 
plants and metropolitan traffi c altered it) of the western air, the look 
and location of western towns, the empty spaces that separate them, the 
way farms and ranches are either densely concentrated where water is 
plentiful or widely scattered where it is scarce, the pervasive presence of 
the federal government as landowner and land manager, the even more 
noticeable federal presence as dam builder and water broker, the snarling 
states’-rights and antifederal feelings whose burden Bernard DeVoto once 
characterized in a sentence–‘Get out and give us more money’–those are 
all consequences, and by no means all the consequences, of aridity.”4
Backwater.
1. “Water backed up or retarded in its course as compared with its natural 
condition of fl ow” (USGS website).  2. “A small, generally shallow body 
of water with little or no current of its own.  Stagnant water in a small 
stream or inlet” (USBR website).  3. Any of the places off a state or county 
road, with no stoplight to impede the fl ow of children and dogs, sheep and 
cattle, pick-ups and tractors.  The places of the heart for Wallace Stegner, 
Ivan Doig, William Kittredge, and Deirdre McNamer.
Claim.
1. “Asserts one’s right to.”5  2. Water claims, mining claims, proving up 
a homestead claim.  3. The West does create a type, different from your 
garden-variety easterner.  4.  See “reclamation.”
Condensation.
1. “The process by which water changes from the vapor state into the 
liquid or solid state.  It is the reverse of evaporation” (USGS website).
2. A matter of faith when digging in a desert wash, visqueen sheeting in 
hand, praying water will collect, that evaporation can be reversed.  It takes 
a long time to get a drink.  3. The process by which the fl ood of memories 
becomes words–nouns, verbs, landforms.  See also Ivan Doig, Mary 
Austin, and John Muir.
Consumptive waste.
1.  “The water that returns to the atmosphere without benefi tting man.” 
(Thomas, 1951, p. 217, in USGS website).  2.  Virga.  You watch it rain 
a mile away on the valley’s western slope, and here, where cacti, not 
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timothy reign, you see the atmosphere take back the rain, even as it tries 
to fall your way.  3. Where snowpack goes when the river remains low, 
where your alfalfa crop goes when you can’t pump from the river.  
4. When your canoe runs aground every two minutes, scraping away your 
confi dence.  At least you don’t hear the irrigation pumps when the river is 
low.
Control.
1. “A natural constriction of the channel, a long reach of the channel, 
a stretch of rapids, or an artifi cial structure downstream from a gaging 
station, that determines the stage-discharge relation at the gage” (USGS 
website).  2. John Wesley Powell’s struggle on the Colorado, to keep the 
men on the river, to reach long into the future with a watershed-based law 
of ownership.  3. Glen Canyon Dam, and the lake that bears his name.
4. Edward Abbey’s Hayduke and a jeep full of dynamite.  5. The great sin 
that William Kittredge writes penance for in Hole in the Sky, Taking Care, 
Who Owns the West?, and here, in Owning It All:
I saw the beginnings of my real life as an agricultural manager.  
The fl ow of watercourses in the valley was spread before me 
like a map, and I saw it as a surgeon might see the fl ow of blood 
across a chart of anatomy, and saw myself helping to turn the 
fertile homeplace of my childhood into a machine for agriculture 
whose features could be delineated with the same surgeon’s 
precision in my mind.6
 6. The central debate in John McPhee’s Encounters with the Archdruid.
Dam.
1. “A barrier built across a watercourse to impound or divert water.  A 
barrier that obstructs, directs, retards, or stores the fl ow of water.  Usually 
built across a stream.  A structure built to hold back a fl ow of water” 
(USBR website).  Example: As children we made toy dams in the eroded 
fi ssures after a big rain.  We imagined we had equipment like our father 
had.  We chanted “keyway, spillway, cat, riprap, carryall, scraper,” hoping 
to conjure the kind of power the Connecticut Yankee had in that book 
by Mark Twain.  2. The epithet used to conjure Floyd Dominy into his 
appointed circle of hell.
Dominy.  
The damned great Floyd, Satan in Mark Reisner’s Cadillac Desert,
dominated and controlled river fl ows throughout the West, married recla-
mation to recreation, and gave us houseboats in place of “the place no one 
knew,” Glen Canyon.  For Dominy, Glen Canyon Dam:
Is food for growing America, drinking water for dwellers in an 
arid country, electric energy to provide the comforts of life and 
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to turn the wheels of industry.  It is jobs and paychecks—in the 
West and across the nation—and it is also taxes for the United 
States Treasury.
Most signifi cant of all, however, it is health and fun and the 
contentment of contemplating Nature’s beauty for thousands who 
might never experience these thrills of the outdoors if engineers 
had not inserted between the steep walls of Glen Canyon a 
mammoth concrete slab to control and clear the erratic river that 
used to be known as the “Big Red.”7
 This April Fool’s Day speech of 1965 promises that control is an absolute 
good, that nature’s messy and erratic processes should follow government 
interests, that the dirty “Big Red” will be cleansed, made “fun” for those seeking 
the “thrills of the outdoors.”  Examples: As a teenager, I jumped boat wakes on 
Lake Powell, happy for the warm water and the miles of uninterrupted water 
skiing.  The roar of the outboard motor covered the sound of wakes slapping 
the “steep walls” of sandstone, and almost covered the great echoing crashes 
as the water-weakened sandstone broke off in slabs and sank into the placid 
waters of Lake Powell.  Glen Canyon Dam has begun to silt in, as many said it 
would, water allocations exceeded “streamfl ow” and sometimes leave the Central 
Arizona Project—hundreds of miles of open concrete canal—dry as bones in 
the desert.  Abbey’s characters seek to void the Dominys, blast the “mammoth 
concrete slabs” to smithereens, and stop the Catherine “wheels of industry.”  John 
Pfahl’s photographic series of submerged petroglyphs inscribes the erasure of 
those remnants of a culture (see “traditional cultural property” [USBR website]) 
that dwelled in arid country without benefi t of houseboats, air conditioning, or 
paychecks.  Dominy has survived his foes–Brower, Reisner and Abbey all dead, 
while Floyd sips bourbon in a Vegas hotel, feted by an acre-foot of Water Board 
offi cers.
“There was this nice old man,” my mother drawls in her Tennessee
  accent, “His late wife was Southern, you know.  I think he was a 
 big deal…He got an award.  He used to work for the government.”   
  “Floyd Dominy?” I asked, incredulous.  
  “How did you know his name?  There was some book,” she 
 continues, “that made him angry.  He said he would have sued for libel 
 if his wife had been alive to read those lies.  People told him the 
 author was dead, and he just laughed.  
  ‘Survived ‘em all,’ he said.”
Would Dominy have sued in Federal Court, in Water Court? Will 
Floyd survive Glen Canyon Dam?
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Domination.
 See Dominy.
Drainage.
1. “Process of removing surface or 
subsurface water from a soil or area.  A 
technique to improve the productivity of 
some agricultural land by removing excess 
water from the soil; surface drainage 
is accomplished with open ditches; 
subsurface drainage uses porous conduits 
(drain tile) buried beneath the soil surface” 
(USBR website).  2. What westerners call 
canyons, arroyos, deep indentations in 
mountains or hills, because sometimes they
contain water.  Is there water in the La Jara 
drainage?  Will it water the cattle in the 
section 7 pasture?  Do we have to improve
the water? Can we divert it without a 
permit?  3. What William Kittredge’s family did to reclaim swamp land for 
agriculture:
The most intricate part of my job was called ‘balancing water,’ a 
night and day process of opening and closing pipes and redwood 
headgates and running the 18-inch drainage pumps.  That system 
was the fi nest plaything I ever had (60).
Drawdown.
“Lowering of a reservoir’s water level; process of depleting a reservoir 
or ground water storage. …The amount of water used from a reservoir” 
(USBR website).  Example:  The drawdown of the Snake River, as 
discussed by Mary Clearman Blew and Ripley Schemm in Schemm’s 
poem, “For Mary, On the Snake”:
“But the most amazing thing of all,”
You continue, “was the reappearance
of the river itself.”  I write it back 
To you so you hear the poem your words
sing: “Underneath has been a tough
western river all along with sandbars
and a real current.  Day by day
it emerged, and it was like gradually
recognizing a lost part of myself.” 
But then you tell how they closed
the gates, how you saw the river widen,
hardly stirring again.  “Apparently,” 
You end, “it’s not possible to have both
Placid surface and mean current.”
37.1.  Floyd E. Dominy while 
Commissioner of Reclamation.
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I have to write you back, Mary.  Think how
the mean current works, always there,
deceptive, below the surface.8
Feds.
Western term for any employee of the government or collective noun for 
any policy makers back east who make stupid decisions, as in “The feds 
say I can’t kill coyotes with 1080 anymore.  I’d like to show the feds 
my dead sheep.”  One’s antagonism toward the feds is a key element in 
western identity.  Bernard DeVoto once characterized westerners’ attitude 
toward the feds in one sentence—“Get out and give us more money” (in 
Stegner, 9).  Urban westerners resent the idea of the West as a dumping 
ground for national wastes, while lamenting the lack of federal regulation 
of utilities.  Rural westerners resent almost all federal policy, but depend 
on federal subsidies for roads, telephone service, postal delivery, and 
agricultural entitlements.  Stegner reminds us that another distinguishing 
feature of the West is the high percentage of federally owned land.  The 
feds are our landlords and our neighbors.  Feds are us.
Firn.
“Old snow on the top of glaciers, granular and compact but not yet 
converted into ice.  It is a transitional stage between snow and ice” (USGS 
website).  Example: Firn is what John Muir could see and name, but his 
fellow travelers could not.  Here is Muir from his trip with the Harriman 
expedition:
The earnest, childish wonderment with which this glorious 
page of Nature’s Bible was contemplated was delightful to 
see.  All evinced eager desire to learn.
 “Is that a glacier,” they asked, “down in the canyon?  
And is that all solid ice?”
 “Yes.”
 “How deep is it?”
 “Perhaps fi ve hundred or a thousand feet.”
 “You say it fl ows.  How can hard ice fl ow?”
 “It fl ows like water, though invisibly slow.”
 “And where does it come from?”
 “From snow that is heaped up every winter on the 
mountains.”
 “And how, then, is the snow changed into ice?”
 “It is welded by the pressure of its own weight.”
 “. . . Are those bluish draggled masses hanging down 
from beneath the snow-fi elds what you call the snouts of 
glaciers?”
 “Yes.”
 “What made the hollows they are in?”
 “The glaciers themselves, just as traveling animals 
make their own tracks.”
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 “How long have they been there?”
 “Numberless centuries,” etc.  I answered as best I 
could,…while busily engaged in sketching and noting my 
own observations, preaching glacier gospel in a rambling 
way, while the Cassiar, slowly wheezing and creeping along 
the shore, shifted our position so that the icy canyons were 
opened to view and closed again in regular succession, like 
the leaves of a book.9 (122-123)
Firn, a monosyllable, like Muir’s short affi rmatives.  “Welded by the 
pressure of its own weight,” as desertifi cation is welded to the West by 
the weight of urbanization, irrigation, and recreation.  Muir’s snouts of 
glaciers nose smaller and higher reaches of the mountain West, receding 
like the animals—bears, wolves—whose habitat shrinks as we reject 
the doctrine of “consumptive waste,” responding to the call of Muir’s 
“glacial gospel” with mining and petroleum effl uvium.  “How long have 
they been there?” ask Muir’s companions.  “Numberless centuries,” etc.  
Western writers attend to the “etc.,” asking us to consider “numberless 
centuries” against a diminished present and an evaporating future.  The 
glaciers of Glacier National Park suffer ablation, taking “fi rn” out of the 
glossary and into the antiquarian’s dictionary, signifying the ablative 
case.  [Grammatical case indicating separation, direction away from, and 
sometimes manner or agency.]
Hydrology. 
1. “Scientifi c study of water in nature: its properties, distribution, and 
behavior.  The science that treats the occurrence, circulation properties, 
and distribution of the waters of the earth and their reaction to the 
environment.  Science dealing with the properties, distribution and fl ow of 
water on or in the earth” (USBR website).  2. Modifi ed to hydro-philology. 
The attentive and loving study of the language of water.  3. The mysteries 
of virga, hail, hot springs, capillary forces, alluvium, fetch, riffl es.  The 
wonderful suggestiveness of mud cake, littoral, ephemeral creek, jeopardy 
opinion, eddy, morning glory spillway, muck, fl occulation, gravel blanket, 
paradox gate, sheepsfoot roller, or sticky limit.  4. The multiculturalism 
of arroyo, playa, reservoir, revetment.  5. The great disappointment of the 
scientifi c and bureaucratic hijacking of Eolian, fatal fl aw, future without, 
grapple, grizzly, groin, horsehead, reach, resilience, rill, sinuosity, and 
weep hole.
Infi ltration.
1. “The fl ow of fl uid into a substance through pores or small openings” 
(USGS website).  2.  Infi ltration within federal, state and local government 
to change the language of laws away from ownership of acre-feet, miner’s 
inches, prior appropriation, to a Powellian language of the communal—
use, rather than ownership, biotic and human use, as opposed to self-
interested use.  As Kittredge claims:
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In the American West we are struggling to revise our dominant 
mythology, and to fi nd a new story to inhabit.  Laws control our 
lives, and they are designed to preserve a model of society based 
on values learned from mythology.  Only after re-imagining our 
myths can we coherently remodel our laws, and hope to keep our 
society in a realistic relationship to what is actual. (64)
In situ.
“In place, the original location, in the natural environment” (USBR 
website).  Example/question: Is Rainbow Bridge really “in situ”? 
2. Where the language of water needs to be resettled.
Irretrievable.
“Commitments that are lost for a period of time” (USBR website).  Only 
in bureaucratic language could this mean “lost for a period of time.”  Fear 
not, futurists: Hetch Hetchy is “irretrievable,” but in the government sense.
Precipitation.
1. “As used in hydrology, precipitation is the discharge of water, in 
liquid or solid state, out of the atmosphere, generally upon a land or 
water surface.  It is the common process by which atmospheric water 
becomes surface or subsurface water …[.]  The term ‘precipitation’ is also 
uncommonly used to designate the quantity of water that is precipitated.” 
(Meinzer, 1923, p. 15 in USGS website).  2. The abundant precipitation 
in the winter of 1955 left Northern California fl ooded to heights still not 
duplicated.  Although we were not in the fl ood plain, our December lambs 
turned green from mold (only last year did I learn that this was fatal), 
and I have suffered from lifelong allergies to molds.  3. In Northern New 
Mexico when it rains two inches in an hour, dirt roads turn to gumbo.  You 
stop where you are, and if you want to get home from town, you walk, 
even in your town clothes, watching as the earth clings to you, wanting to 
keep you in place.  That sucking sound is the lip-smacking earth feeding 
on your best shoes.
Reclamation.
Not listed in USGS glossary.  Not listed in USBR glossary.  1. Code 
word for dam building in the fi rst two thirds of the twentieth century.  
The Bureau of Reclamation, a federal agency that spent tax dollars to 
subsidize agriculture, but more often agribusiness, utility companies, 
and urban development.  See Floyd Dominy.  2. Act of re-appropriation, 
reclaiming the West as an “emotional homeland.”  3. Coincident with the 
new language of USBR, reclaiming federal power for conservation and 
preservation.  4. Reclamation of language and representation in the service 
of biotic communities and even backwaters.
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Relict.
1. “A species, population, etc., which is a survivor of a nearly extinct 
group.  Any species surviving in a small local area and widely separated 
from closely related species” (USBR website).  2. Floyd Dominy, the 
farmer with a D8 and a dream of a little dam.  3. Relicts now gone: 
Edward Abbey; Everett Reuss, who walked away in Canyonland; Maynard 
Dixon, who dared to paint aridity; Arth Chaffi n, almost alone at Hite 
Ferry; Mary Austin’s pocket miners.
Scour.
1. “Erosion in a stream bed, particularly if caused or increased by channel 
changes” (USBR website).  2.  The ailment in cattle that makes day-use 
recreationists write letters to their Congressmen.  Get those cattle with 
diarrhea off our range.  My new hiking boots are ruined!
Things we can actually do with these words:
1.  Play: the language of water is becoming indigenous to the West, and 
it’s a language rich with possibility:  Acequia, braided channels, crick, 
ditch rider, diversion, drought, sometimes drouth, ephemeral, fl oodgate, 
headgate, irrigation, subirrigation, meander, submeander, meromictic, 
miner’s inches, mirage, parched, rain shadow, riffl e, riparian, riprap, 
runoff, spring box, tanks, troughs, throughfall, virga, water crop, water 
court, water gap, water law, waterpocket fold, water master, water witch.
2.  Twist them, divert them: here’s a post-timber sale tongue twister: How 
much water will a watershed shed if a watershed gets waterlogged from 
logging?
3.  Read them: A short of list of western books both wet and dry: wet 
books:  MacLean’s A River Runs Through It, Roosevelt’s Ranch Life and 
the Hunting Trail, The Journals of Lewis and Clark, Doig’s Bucking the 
Sun, Stegner’s Angle of Repose, McNickle’s Wind from an Enemy Sky,
and Nichols’s The Milagro Beanfi eld War, Anaya’s Bless Me, Ultima; dry 
books: Austin’s The Land of Little Rain, Abbey’s Desert Solitaire, Cather’s 
My Ántonia, Silko’s Ceremony, McCarthy’s Blood Meridian.
4.  Reclaim them: Why can’t ownership become owning up?  
Stewardship?  Why can’t the land own us?
One fi nal term from the USBR Glossary:
Author’s signature.  “This is the signature of the person or persons 
with primary responsibility for writing the document.  Signature of the 
document by the author(s) signifi es that a draft document was provided to 
team members and that they had an opportunity to comment on the draft.
The author’s signature also implies that comments were considered and 
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that any critical issues or infl uencing factors were incorporated into the 
document” (USBR website).  I await the chance to place my “author’s” 
signature on this document.
Nancy Cook, Ph.D., is an associate professor and teaches nineteenth, twentieth, 
and twenty-fi rst century American literature and culture in the English 
Department at the University of Montana, Missoula.  She has published several 
articles and is working on a book on class issues in the twentieth century rural 
West.
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